SEVEN Corrupt Scholars
Guo Xiu’s third impeachment was directed at three officials: Gao Shiqi, Chen Yuanlong, and Wang Hongxu, who served in the emperor’s Southern Study. This was a space in the palace set off for the emperor to practice the arts of Chinese civilization, calligraphy, reading and writing poetry, and reading classical texts, under the guidance of accomplished scholars. Historians of the Qing have long admired the Southern Study as an embodiment of the Kangxi emperor’s commitment to honor the intellectual traditions of the Chinese elite, and the vision of the most powerful man in China receiving tutelage from Chinese men of learning has been an attractive one.1 But the reality of the study was more complicated. The line between cultural achievement and political power was fuzzy in seventeenth-century Chinese society. Chinese intellectuals were not scholars alone, and they could readily move from their cultural remit into policy-making. The Kangxi emperor seemed distantly aware of this danger, but his efforts to contain it were ineffectual, and he himself turned to the study scholars for political advice and information. Guo Xiu objected not to Southern Study personnel being involved in politics per se, but to the fact that they profited from doing so. Guo accused Gao, Wang, and Chen of selling their influence on the emperor to outsiders—that is, collecting fees for recommending people and policies to the emperor as they guided him in his cultural activities. This chapter first addresses the limits of cultural capital on call, then turns to the men who took advantage of these limits, and finally, considers Guo’s accusations. In context, the actions of Gao, Wang, and Chen in interfering in political matters were understandable, but the fact that they profited was unforgivable.
The Limitations of Cultural Capital on Call
The Southern Study must have been a place of mystery to those in the capital who were aware of it. It was a space in the Forbidden City where the emperor spent time—likely afternoons, as mornings were spent in audience with political advisers and administrators. A creation of the 1670s, it had little institutional precedent. Though imperial Chinese history made provision for tutors for heirs apparent, there was no model for a specialized apparatus to teach adult emperors. Like many of the most interesting institutional innovations of the Qing, it was a pragmatic response to circumstances.
The first reference to what would become the Southern Study occurred in the autumn of 1677. Shortly after returning from his summer trip to Mongolia, the emperor addresses courtiers:
I occasionally want to practice calligraphy, but among those who surround me there are none who are learned and skilled calligraphers. When I discuss texts there are none who can answer my questions. Let us select two members of the Hanlin Academy who are learned and skilled in calligraphy and who can regularly be at my side and explain the meaning of texts. However, as they are likely to have other duties and to live outside of the Forbidden City, when I summon them, it will be difficult for them to respond. Let us provide them with a house inside the Forbidden City. After a few years, we can evaluate and see whether this arrangement is a good one. Now let us select one or two men who are good calligraphers, like Gao Shiqi, and invite them to the inner city. Let the Manchu and Chinese counselors collectively deliberate and memorialize on this matter.2
It would appear that the emperor had in mind a rather small, informal arrangement, explicitly temporary, that would provide him with the talent he needed when he was called upon to refer to texts or pick up the calligrapher’s brush. Gao Shiqi was meant from the beginning to be one of the emperor’s literary advisers. In view of Gao’s poverty, what the emperor proposed may have been meant to create a rationale for providing him a house near the emperor. But assisting Gao cannot have been the only aim. The need to have literary assistance readily available was a product of new demands on the emperor’s time. As a young man, much of the emperor’s time had been spent in education and ritual activities. With the Rebellion of Three Feudatories, an increasing part of the imperial day had to be devoted to military dispatches, and he had less time to ponder educational matters. When he needed help, he needed it quickly, hence the need for cultural capital on call.
Following the emperor’s direction, Grand Secretary Mingju ordered officials in the Hanlin Academy to select several scholars in good health to assist the emperor, and five names were put forward.3 A month later, Mingju recommended Zhang Ying (1638–1708) an expositor in the Hanlin Academy, to serve the emperor, holding the fourth rank, upper grade.4 Mingju continued, “For calligraphy, one person should be enough. Let Gao Shiqi serve and be given the sixth-rank, upper-grade post of an academician in the Grand Secretariat. Let the Imperial Household Department arrange houses for them to live in.”5 The ranks assigned here suggested some of the anomalous nature of the institution. Rank inhered in the office in imperial China rather than in the person: all who performed the same function held the same rank, and an individual who did not hold office did not have a rank. However, Zhang Ying and Gao Shiqi performed the same task but held different ranks. Also anomalous was the place of the Southern Study in the Qing state. As institutional history was a specialty of Chinese scholars, most organs of government were surrounded with regulations. But there were few such rules for the Southern Study. Confirming the recommendations made to him, the emperor urged Gao and Zhang Ying to be careful in their efforts and to “refrain from interfering in any outside activity.” Since both were “educated men,” the emperor continued, these instructions should be clear, but they should be observed strictly.6
It was a short step, at least in the Chinese imagination, from assisting the emperor in literary studies to producing standard texts of the classics to guide study throughout the empire. As more activity took place in the Southern Study, it became necessary to add new scholars to the institution, and the office formally acquired an archive, the Southern Study Record (Nanshufang jizhu). Like the Diaries of Action and Repose, the Record was a dated account of activities in the Southern Study that recorded dialogues of the emperor and scholars. Zhu Jinfu (n.d.), an archivist with the National Palace Museum (Beijing), has provided a useful account of the institution and its activities based on this source.7 He finds that at least thirty-six scholars were assigned to the study during the Kangxi reign, and they produced twenty-three sponsored publications. Many of the thirty-six individuals were assigned to serve only part-time or for a single project; unlike Gao and Zhang, they were not provided housing.
Zhu Jinfu takes some pains to establish that those in the Southern Study did not draft political documents in the study, although they may have had responsibility for drafting them in concurrent appointments they held elsewhere in the government. Politics, however, could not be completely banned from the study, nor could the emperor’s moments of scholarly leisure be completely walled off from his political preoccupations. On March 3, 1681, the Record notes that the emperor summoned Zhang Ying and recited from memory the explanation of the Great Strength (Da Zhuang) hexagram, #34 from the Book of Changes (Yijing). This text was read as a meditation on power and how it should be used. Great strength was interpreted as the strength of the great, and the dominant message was that the great needed to use their power with constancy and rectitude. But there were also dangers associated with great strength; the text speaks of a ram who “butts his head against the hedge and finds that it can neither retreat or advance.”8
At the moment when he recited the Book of Changes text, the emperor was confronted with a choice involving the application of strength. In late February, shortly after the New Year, the general in charge of Kangxi’s armies in the far south had reported that he was ready to begin marching into Yunnan in pursuit of the last remnant of Wu Sangui’s forces. There were reasons to be cautious, however. The campaign had been a long one, and the court received a report in early March that troops in Sichuan needed rest before they could be redeployed. At about the same time, the court received an urgent message that the troops in the south needed provisions, and the emperor ordered the governor-general of Huguang to dispatch grain to the south.9 Orders were given to advance into Yunnan, but the emperor was worried. He questioned Zhang Ying in the Southern Study: Would the Qing army get stuck in Yunnan, with rebel forces to its rear and front, like a ram that had butted its horns into a hedge and could neither advance nor retreat?
Zhang Ying responded, “The force of the bandit armies is spent; the lands they held are lost. It is difficult for them to maneuver. Relying on the authority of Heaven, victory will be as easy as “crushing weeds and smashing rotten wood. The news that [the enemies] have been cleared away will come on the appointed day.” Zhang assured the emperor that as long as he relied on the right heavenly principles in applying strength, and applied it with constancy and rectitude, he need not worry about the outcome. In fact, Qing armies did succeed in Yunnan, though the march to the capital city of Yunnanfu took almost a year of cautious advance. Interpreting this passage, Zhu Jinfu claims that Zhang Ying was doing nothing more than providing an exegesis to the monarch, but it is hard to imagine that Kangxi was not, at some level, asking whether the advance into Yunnan was wise, and Zhang was answering that it was.10
If the emperor was asking for advice, might he also have been testing the waters, trying to assess literati opinion to make sure the leaders of Chinese society were still with him as he prosecuted a long and costly war in the southwest? Remarkably, in view of his care to assert that those in the Southern Study did not carry out political tasks, Zhu Jinfu entertains the possibility that the emperor used them as spies. He offers as an example the well-known case of Wang Hongxu being asked to report by secret memorial on conditions in the south.11 Zhu also cites the instance, mentioned above, in which the emperor asked Gao Shiqi if Yu Chenglong’s description of Mingju’s corruption was accurate. The emperor almost certainly sought political intelligence.
Begun as a temporary expedient to provide the emperor with the expertise he needed to deal with matters of Chinese culture, the Southern Study evolved as it became a permanent institution.12 Although it never had formal political functions, scholars served as informal advisers to the monarch on issues that concerned the monarch and had cultural implications. Service in the study must have seemed like a high-wire act; scholars were in the most extraordinary position, but a slight misjudgment brought disaster. Some were able to keep their balance better than others.
Advisers of the Southern Study
Although the Southern Study was a place of some mystery where the dangerous boundary between advising and influencing the emperor was easily crossed, Guo Xiu did not impeach all who worked there; he only impeached three. Of these, Gao Shiqi was the most egregiously guilty, the instigator of corrupt activities and the principal beneficiary. Wang Hongxu played an organizational role, collecting money, overseeing real property, and interacting with civil officials. Chen Yuanlong had a sort of guilt by association. Particularly rich biographical accounts are extant for all three figures.
GAO SHIQI
Gao Shiqi was a remarkably colorful figure at the seventeenth-century Kangxi court. He was rare among the emperor’s courtiers in having made his way into the imperial inner circle without either examination credentials or hereditary entitlement. A rags-to-riches figure, he had remarkable calligraphy skills, and a quick-witted facility with Chinese culture endeared him to the monarch. Gossip about his rise and accomplishments abounded, and there were many questions about his ascent and service.13
A first question about Gao was how he came to the attention of the emperor. Two stories survive. Zhaolian (1780–1833), a Manchu historian writing in the early nineteenth century, claims that Gao Shiqi was introduced to the emperor by Mingju.14 This is a plausible hypothesis, as Mingju had wide connections among Chinese literati, but the Veritable Records describe the emperor identifying Gao to Mingju as a man he sought in the Southern Study. A different story is found in Jottings from a Western Journey by Wang Jingqi.15 Wang argues that it was Songgotu, Mingju’s predecessor as the Kangxi emperor’s Manchu favorite, who recommended Gao to the emperor.
Wang Jingqi, who grew up in Beijing at the time Gao Shiqi served in the Southern Study, has much more to say about Gao. Wang’s father was a contemporary of Gao’s, and he had a special awareness of Gao since both were natives of Zhejiang.16 In 1724, Wang Jingqi made a journey to Shaanxi. His Notes purported to recount the journey, but the text was actually a satirical discussion of late-Kangxi political life. One chapter of Wang’s book concerned Gao Shiqi, whom Wang found to be a corrupt and immoral opportunist.
According to Wang Jingqi, Gao Shiqi was discovered by a Chinese martial bannerman named Zu Zeshen (n.d.), who met him when Gao was trying to earn a living by producing pieces of calligraphy on demand in the courtyard of a temple in Beijing. Observing the quality of Gao’s calligraphy, Zu remarked that Gao was destined for great things, but Gao asked how he could achieve great things when he was poor, cold, and hungry. Skill at calligraphy is always mentioned in descriptions of Gao’s ascent. Early poverty is another central element of nearly all accounts of Gao, but in this case, poverty may have been relative: Gao was no farmer. Nothing is known of his family or early circumstances, but he had the leisure to develop his talents and accumulate a large fund of knowledge of Chinese culture. Early deprivation was, however, part of his self-image, made poignant by the fact that he interacted with wealthy individuals with earned degrees. Sometime after meeting Gao, Zu heard that one of Songgotu’s bondservants was looking for an assistant who could do sums and write documents. Zu recommended Gao, and Gao thus became part of Songgotu’s household. Once installed, Gao cleverly maneuvered to bring himself to the attention of the master of the house, who admired his calligraphy and recommended him to the emperor.17 Wang’s account thus far is plausible but not provable. The Kangxi emperor knew of Gao when the Southern Study was founded in 1677, two years before Songgotu fell from power, so that his recommendation to the emperor could easily have come from Songgotu.
This is not all there is to Wang’s tale. When Gao came to the imperial court, he pledged undying gratitude to Zu Zeshen. Some years later, Zu was appointed to serve as a military supervisor in Jingnan District of northwest Hubei. At this point, Wang Jingqi’s tale of Gao Shiqi’s rise can be checked against historical data. Zu Zeshen was in fact a circuit intendant in northwest Hubei when Zhang Qian was appointed governor of the province in January 1686. The two men met and disagreed, and the new governor impeached the circuit intendant for extortion. According to both Wang’s account and Veritable Records, Saileng’e (n.d.), a member of the Ministry of Punishments, was dispatched from Beijing to investigate the charge against Zu Zeshen. Zu Zeshen impeached Zhang for corruption and asked for help from Gao Shiqi in the capital.18
Faced with this challenge to his protector, Gao allied with Xu Qianxue, a colleague in the Southern Study who held a concurrent appointment as head of the Censorate. Together they offered a bribe to Saileng’e to exonerate Zu Zeshen and recommend Zhang Qian’s dismissal. Zhang Qian, however, offered a bigger bribe, and Saileng’e was prepared on his return to Beijing to recommend that Zu Zeshen be found guilty. At this point, Gao told the emperor that Zhang had bribed Saileng’e, without of course mentioning that he and Xu Qianxue had also tried to bribe the Manchu. Acting on their information, the emperor rejected Saileng’e’s report and abruptly ordered him exiled.19
Wang Jingqi’s was quite a story, of a poor but clever man’s ascent and his desperate attempt to protect his benefactor. Many details, of the nature and amount of the bribes (or, for that matter, how a man who had earlier protested that he lacked money to feed his family had gotten the money to offer a bribe) cannot be confirmed. Gao Shiqi was certainly involved in the Zhang Qian case, however, and he was impeached in 1687 and found guilty of bribery. In a memorial responding to the impeachment, Gao drew the mantle of imperial scholarship over himself. He made the remarkable argument that since the emperor had placed him in a position where others became resentful, the monarch had an obligation to rescue him when he was accused. Acknowledging that it was Zhang Qian who had accused him, Gao claimed that Zhang had acted through jealousy of Gao’s position, accusing him without reason. Judged guilty, Gao asked for and was granted the favor of retirement rather than punishment.20
Wang Jingqi had one further tale to tell of his Zhejiang compatriot: how Gao survived the fall of his patron Songgotu. According to Wang, Gao changed his allegiance when he was invited on a trip with the emperor. Traveling with Mingju, he recognized the power of the new counselor and pledged his allegiance. Songgotu was furious, but there was little he could do. When Gao came to visit Songgotu on his return, Songgotu required him to kneel during the entire visit, never permitting the calligrapher to assume a posture of friendship or equality. The case seemed to Wang Jingqi nothing more than proof of the corruption of the court, in which friends and allies could turn on each other at the slightest provocation, and no one could be trusted as a model. Seeing Gao “ally with Ming[ju] to overthrow Song[gotu], then ally with Xu [Qianxue] to overthrow Ming[ju], then ally with Wang [Hongxu] and Ming[ju] to overthrow Xu [Qianxue],” Wang Jingqi asked, “where could the ordinary man observing the court learn of righteousness, honesty, and shame?”21
However Gao rose, he became a favored companion of the emperor. Gao made this clear in his published diaries of journeys he made with the monarch. The first was a trip of a little over a month that the imperial family made in 1681 to a hot spring northeast of Beijing.22 In 1682, Gao accompanied the imperial party on a three-month journey to Manchuria, where the emperor officially informed his ancestors of his victory in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories.23 Gao participated in a third imperial trip, a monthlong excursion to see the sights in Shanxi in the spring of 1683.24 Gao also left an account of a fourth trip to Mongolia, but his participation was very brief; after about two weeks, he fell ill and was sent home to the imperial physician for treatment.25 In 1684, Gao accompanied the emperor on the trip to Jiangnan where the emperor met Jin Fu for the first time, though Gao left no diary for this trip. On these trips, Gao appeared to be part tour guide, part poetry tutor, and part secretary. He dined in the emperor’s tent, joined in discussions after dinner, composed poems, and provided literary and historical information about sites passed.
In addition to his travel accounts, many collections of his own poetry were among the over fifty titles he produced during his lifetime. Gao was particularly fond of making lists, perhaps a reflection of his interest, as a calligrapher, in the forms of characters. He produced lists of personal and place names in the Spring and Autumn Annals. He left no autobiography, however, and the mysteries of Gao Shiqi’s life—how he became so skilled at calligraphy and so knowledgeable about Chinese culture during an early life of poverty, and what particular qualities the emperor found attractive in this clever man from Zhejiang—may never be resolved. But he found himself in a secure spot inside the emperor’s inner circle in the late 1680s, and he seemed willing for all to know about it. There were probably as many who resented as admired him, but he was a force to be reckoned with in the Manchu court.
CHEN YUANLONG
Few officials could have been more different from each other than Gao Shiqi and Chen Yuanlong. Sources are silent on Gao Shiqi’s family, except to imply that there was not enough money for him to prepare for the examinations. By contrast, Chen Yuanlong came from one of the most famous families of eighteenth-century China, a remarkable clan that produced seven generations of jinshi degree holders. They were known as the Haining Chens, after their native county near Ningbo in Zhejiang. According to family tradition, the first Chen to receive an official degree did so in 1443, drawing on wealth that had been acquired in the salt monopoly.26 From the “sixteenth to the nineteenth century, inclusive, the family produced thirty-one jinshi, one hundred and three juren, seventy-four senior licentiates, and about one thousand xiucai and students of the Imperial Academy. Three became grand secretaries, thirteen were officials above the third rank.”27 The Chens’ examination success crossed the dynastic boundary. Already distinguished in the late Ming, the Chens rose even higher in the Qing, when they served as ministers and grand secretaries. This was not an easy feat. In fact, the first of the Haining Chens who served the Qing, Chen Zhilin (1605–1666), was exiled to the northeast for factionalism.28 This exile was no doubt a blow, but the Chens were in it for the long haul, and within twenty years another Chen had risen to the rank of minister.
The Haining Chens were “aristogenic,” in Timothy Brook’s term—that is, although they earned their social status in each generation, they behaved as if their status, like their wealth, were inherited. They became masters of the social and cultural forms that defined the elite in the late imperial world. These included, according to Brook, “a confident competence in the arts of reading and writing, an ability to manipulate the symbols of the Confucian order, an appreciation of complex artistic media through which elite values found expression, an understanding of courtesy and deference and their effective use in social encounters, and a knowledge of acceptable models and precedents in decision making.”29 What more could an emperor possibly ask of an imperial tutor?
Chen Yuanlong’s own achievements were significant: he passed second on his jinshi examinations in 1685 and was appointed compiler in the Hanlin Academy. In the same year he was assigned to serve in the Southern Study. The emperor noted his skill in writing the formal, regular style of Chinese characters (kaishu) and asked him to demonstrate his ability with large characters. Pleased with what he saw, the emperor rewarded Chen with a piece of his own calligraphy.30 In the Southern Study, Chen formed a particularly close relationship with Gao Shiqi. They were both from Zhejiang, and they seem to have shared an in-joke. There was a legend in the Chen family that their ancestors were originally surnamed Gao. In theory, therefore, the Chens could have been distantly related to any Gao family in Zhejiang, Gao Shiqi’s included. Because of this possibility, Chen referred to Gao Shiqi as his cousin, probably in jest, when they served together in the Southern Study.
Friendly colleagues they may have been, but Chen and Gao were drawn to very different kinds of intellectual work. Gao was a poet, diarist, and calligrapher, but Chen was an encyclopedist and polymath, a slow and steady accumulator of fact and text. Chen’s work was titled The Mirror of Extending Learning (Gezhi jingyuan). It was a hundred-juan work divided into thirty categories—the body, clothing, types of cloth, foods, beverages, writing implements, grasses, grains, flowers, and so on. Each category contained relevant texts establishing the origin of names, common understandings, and the like. Related to what Benjamin Elman has termed “natural studies,” a movement toward practical studies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the work was a compilation of the textual sources of empirical knowledge.31 Chen also compiled, at the emperor’s order, an anthology of fu poems, long narrative poems from China’s early imperial period.
The Chen family was certainly one that the Kangxi emperor would have wanted to cultivate, a widely known clan whose wealth and cultural capital could be of immense value to the throne. It was not surprising, therefore, that Yuanlong was invited into the Southern Study early in his career. The emperor knew who Chen was, as subsequent developments indicated, but he never warmed to Chen in the way he did to Gao Shiqi.
WANG HONGXU
Like Chen Yuanlong, Wang came from a distinguished family in the southeast; like Gao Shiqi, he was a prolific poet, whose collected poetic works fill thirty-two juan in a modern edition. But unlike either Gao or Chen, Wang was also a politician drawn to the cut and thrust of the governmental arena. In Wang’s life, the Kangxi emperor’s charge that scholarly advisers should not be involved in current affairs found its sharpest challenge, but the emperor also found one of his most useful servants.32
Although the Wangs of the early Qing did not have as many generations of degree holders in their past as the Chens, they were a well-established scholarly and political family in the early Kangxi years. Wang Hongxu’s great-grandfather held high office at the Ming court, and his father, Wang Guangxin (1610–1691), earned his jinshi degree in 1648 and embarked on a career of service to the Qing. Hongxu was one of three sons, all of whom received the jinshi degree. The family counted Huating Xian, near Shanghai in southeastern Jiangsu, as its native place. Wang Hongxu may have been raised there, at least for part of his boyhood. Early in his life, his father’s elderly uncle, who had no sons, adopted Hongxu. When his granduncle died in 1654, Wang joined his natal family in Beijing, where his father was serving, and passed his first examination in the capital in 1672. He received his jinshi the following year, ranking fourth in the examination. The emperor raised him from fourth to second place after the palace examination.33
One of three jinshi-holding sons of a serving censor who had been recognized by the emperor in the palace examination, Wang attracted attention at court. In fact, he petitioned to change his name from Wang Duxin, which so closely resembled his father’s name that it created confusion, to Wang Hongxu.34 Wang moved steadily upward through literary and ceremonial positions in the 1670s. As he advanced through the courtly ranks, Kangxi began to rely on him for editorial tasks. In 1682, he was appointed to be editor of the Ming History, and in the same year, he was chosen as editor for the campaign history of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories and the Collected Statutes of the Qing. In 1683 he was appointed to a junior post in the Grand Secretariat and likely became Mingju’s protégé. In 1685 he became minister of finance on Mingju’s recommendation.35
In the first lunar month of 1685, Wang was appointed to serve in the Southern Study. Unlike Gao and Chen, Wang held outer court appointments concurrently with his appointment in the Southern Study. He continued to hold his position as minister of finance during his first months in the Southern Study. Two years after his appointment to the study, he was appointed senior censor, on Mingju’s recommendation. He took an active role in that institution, producing, among other writings, a long memorial urging that the Manchu garrison forces be prevented from interfering in the lives and livelihoods of Chinese who lived nearby.36 This was quite a remarkable document, which came close to attacking the Manchu occupation of China or at the very least suggesting that it needed to be modified in peacetime.
In the midst of such a busy political career, it’s hard to imagine that Wang contributed much to the scholarly work of the study in the 1680s, although he was eventually credited with editing the Kangxi edition of the Classic of Poetry (Shijing). His appointment may have reflected the emperor’s growing reliance on him or been a mark of privilege acknowledging his important position at court.
Guo Xiu’s Impeachment
Each of Guo’s impeachments had a different tone. The impeachment of Jin Fu was a terse statement of a view widely held. The impeachment of Mingju took a legalistic tone, likely necessary in view of the prominence of the target. The accusation of scholars of the Southern Study was the only one that seemed to reveal affect: accusing degree holders like himself, Guo strained to contain his anger and disgust. Guo’s frustration with the scholars of the Southern Study was evident in his turns of phrase—his amazement that educated men could possibly engage in the sort of behavior he described—and his recommendation that at least one of his targets be executed.37
Guo introduced his claims with a contrast between a tireless emperor who worked only for the public good and corrupt literati that worked only for their own ends:
The emperor rises before dawn and labors until he is weary and worn, exerting his finest effort in government. He himself decides on the employment of people for his administration, never involving assistants or so-called deputies to [use his power]. When a faction has been established for private ends, using [the emperor’s] name for its own gain as the Junior Household Administrator of the Heir Apparent Gao Shiqi and Censor of the Left Wang Hongxu have done.… Their guilt deserves execution. Words can barely express all the evil that they do, but I shall try to describe it in brief compass.38
None of Guo Xiu’s other impeachments recommend execution; they rather point to the actions condemned and allow the emperor to decide on punishments. Recommending execution increased the rhetorical force of the document. Guo Xiu was likely aware that Gao Shiqi was a favorite of the emperor’s, as Gao seemed to have made no secret of his relationship to the monarch. Did Guo Xiu recommend execution to emphasize the damage Gao was doing to the reputation of the monarch? Did he actually expect that the Kangxi emperor would order his favorite executed? There can be no final answer to these questions, but the recommendation of execution provides the structure of the memorial; it is divided into four sections, each focused on a different reason why Gao Shiqi deserved execution.
The first of the four sections argues that Gao deserved execution because he accepted a prestigious appointment and rewarded the monarch with immoral behavior. Gao was vulnerable as he did not have a degree, and thus lacked the moral training that passing an examination would have demonstrated. But Guo had to be careful. Guo did say that Gao’s background was not the usual one: “Gao Shiqi was born in very humble circumstances and wandered to the capital knocking on office doors to seek a living. Because his calligraphy was very accomplished, the emperor, ignoring rules of seniority, promoted him to the Hanlin Academy.” No censure was implied in the claim that the emperor had set aside rules of seniority in appointing Gao; Guo Xiu described his own promotion to censor in these terms. But, Guo argues, Gao Shiqi was promoted for quite specific purposes: “[Gao] serves in the Southern Study, carrying out imperial orders. The role should be limited to reading texts and not involve access to political affairs.” Gao’s lack of qualifications should have limited his actions. In fact, he stood out among those in the Southern Study precisely for his flouting of the rules. “Among the officials at court and in the provinces, there are none who do not know his name. More than one person has served in the Southern Study, but the names of others who serve there are not known; why is it that Gao Shiqi’s name alone is so widely known for evil and corruption? This is the first reason why Gao’s guilt is worthy of execution.”39
If Gao was the principal culprit, he was not the only one, as Guo made clear in the second reason he offered that the guilt of Gao and Wang Hongxu merited execution: they had formed a faction. “Over time, [Gao] has acquired many henchmen; they have formed a faction. He has united with Wang Hongxu; they are sworn confederates. [Gao] and the censor He Kai act like brothers. [Gao] and the Hanlin [official] Chen Yuanlong are uncle and nephew, and [Gao’s] daughter is married to Wang Hongxu’s older brother Wang Xuling” (1642–1725).40 Guo asserts that familial or quasi-familial bonds underlay corrupt practice in the Southern Study. The charge that Gao and Chen Yuanlong were uncle and nephew likely referred to Chen’s habit of referring to Gao as his cousin, which was probably more of an in-joke than a statement of putative relationship. Guo Xiu himself had not spent time in the Southern Study and was likely making his claim based on reported practices, which he may not fully have understood. This was the only evidence presented against Chen in the memorial, and except for the concluding sentences of the document, Chen was not among those Gao described as worthy of execution.
According to Guo, the group had established a systematic practice of extortion: “For those who are not a part of the faction, there is also a standing practice [of payment], which is called peace money [ping’an qian]. For those who are willing to give him bribes, Gao provides long service, brilliantly turning circumstances in their favor, and people refer to [Gao’s services] as ‘the path’ [menlu zhen]. Gao is so intent on his greed that he has no doubt about his actions and declares that ‘mine is the true path.’”41 The expression menlu literally means a “path through the door,” but it is used to describe those who have a way, a knack for getting perhaps illicit things done. Gao, Wang, and Chen were so successful that they could brag about the success and craftiness of their efforts.
Guo writes of Gao and Wang: “All governors-general, governors, lieutenant governors, provincial judges, circuit intendants, prefects, and magistrates and senior and junior officials at court, all sit down one by one with Wang Hongxu and others, who beguile them in all ways. Those who have ambitions to high office bribe them with thousands and tens of thousands.” Careful reading of Wang Hongxu’s biography suggests that Wang and Gao may not have had time to form an association of the sort Gao described. Wang was appointed to the Southern Study during the first lunar month of 1685. In spring of that year, Wang Hongxu served as chief examiner for the jinshi examination. During the third lunar month of the following year, Wang received word that his birth mother had died, and he requested and was granted leave to return to Jiangnan for mourning.42 In the following year, Wang’s adoptive mother died, again requiring him to return home. In 1688, he signaled his readiness to return to office by greeting the emperor’s carriage as it passed through Jiangnan on the emperor’s second southern tour. Guo’s impeachment was submitted in the fall of 1688.
In view of Wang’s many commitments it was unlikely—though surely not impossible—that Guo and Wang had built the sort of systematic corrupt machine that Guo alleged. However, it seems very likely that Wang was involved in corruption. A protégé of Mingju, whose epitaph he wrote, Wang was likely involved in many of the favorite’s activities. The type of corrupt activity that Guo alleged Gao and Wang committed was quite similar to the sale of office that Mingju engaged in with his henchman Yu Guozhu. Gao’s sale of office may have been a continuation of Mingju’s enterprise after the favorite fell from power. The Qianlong emperor, for one, was convinced that Wang was corrupt and ordered that Guo’s accusation be included in Wang’s biography.43
The third reason Gao Shiqi deserved execution was his ostentatious display of recently acquired wealth. Accusations of corruption usually did not detail the uses the accused made of their ill-gotten gains. Gao Shiqi’s rise from poverty to wealth was so striking, and so widely commented on, that Guo Xiu included some detail in his impeachment: “The villain44 Yu Ziyi [n.d.] has acted without restraint in the capital for many years. Fearing only that his deeds would become known, he hid himself in Tianjin, Zhili, and Luokou, Shandong. He gave Shiqi a sixty-room house with a tiled roof near Hufang Qiao worth eight thousand in gold, requesting that [Shiqi] take care of his problems.”45 Hufang Qiao was located to the southwest of the Liulichang antique market in the Chinese part of the city.
In the eighteenth century, corrupt officials often sought to acquire art objects and jade as marks of their wealth.46 Either because it was a different time or because of his personal poverty, Gao Shiqi seems to have focused instead on acquiring income-earning property or businesses. According to Guo Xiu, in addition to the house at Hufang Qiao, Gao had acquired a string of houses on Dou Street outside of Shuncheng Gate, for which He Kai collected the rent.47 Gao and Wang Hongxu had also jointly acquired a series of businesses in southeast China worth nearly a million liang. Gao had acquired productive agricultural lands in Pinghu County in Zhejiang and an estate planted in fruit trees near Hangzhou. When a poor scholar who sold calligraphy in the streets acquires such wealth, Guo argued, one had to ask where it had come from. It was either taken from the state treasury or stolen from the people. Either way, the censor asserted, Gao must be counted a “worm in the state” and a “thief of the people.”
The fourth reason why Gao deserved execution involved his continuing pursuit of illicit ends after he had been reprimanded for corruption. At the time Guo memorialized, Gao Shiqi had in fact been retired from office as a result of his involvement in the Zhang Qian / Zu Zeshen case. Without questioning the emperor’s judgment, Guo was at some pains to point out that Gao was guilty of more than the corruption for which he had already been charged: “With his sage understanding, the emperor is aware of Gao’s guilt, but because the task of reviewing manuscripts in the Southern Study is not finished, he has ordered that [Gao] be relieved of office while he continued his tasks [in the Southern Study], an instance of great imperial grace. In the most extreme case, Gao and Wang do not think of reforming themselves but continue their evils ceaselessly.48
Not only had Gao and Wang continued to engage in corruption after Gao was impeached but, according to Guo, both were particularly active during the Kangxi emperor’s second southern tour. This took place during the spring of 1689, just before Guo submitted his impeachment. Although the emperor had given strict orders at the beginning of tours to limit expenditures and the burdens they might impose on the local population, inevitably a great deal of money changed hands. Guo Xiu argued that some of this money went to Gao and Wang. Even though Gao had been technically relieved of office, and Wang was completing his mourning obligations while on home leave, they had engaged in corruption during the tour: “When the emperor was on his southern tour, he strictly prohibited [members of his entourage from] soliciting bribes and determined to punish violators through military law. However, Wang Hongxu and Gao Shiqi, not fearing death, sought business with district and local officials in Huai’an and Yangzhou, resulting in the illicit payment of ten thousand liang to [Gao] Shiqi. If it was like this in Huai’an and Yangzhou, who knows how much money was extorted elsewhere!”49 Their brazen conduct on the second southern tour constituted the fourth reason why Gao deserved execution.
In a final peroration, Guo forcefully expressed his personal anger that men of his own class would engage in corrupt behavior:
Even more shocking, Wang Hongxu and Chen Yuanlong are products of the examination system! They are assumed to be preeminently men of virtue among the literati. But they have no respect for the criticism of the pure, and they have become infamous without any sense of shame. Moreover, as toadying officials, there is nothing they will not do: what others have not dared to do, they willingly undertake without guilt. Scheming after wealth even as they do harm to our moral tradition, do they not constitute a blemish on [the reputation of] those who serve at court? Gao Shiqi, Chen Yuanlong, and Wang Hongxu have the nature of wolves, the hearts of snakes, and the form of treacherous turtles. Those who fear the powerful do not dare speak of them; those who receive their favors are pressed and do not desire to speak of them. If I dared not speak, I would have repaid imperial grace with great guilt. So, not fearing others’ resentment, I look to the emperor to dismiss and banish them, to make clear the laws of the state; the people’s hearts will rejoice, and all under heaven will be benefited.50
It is impossible to know how the emperor felt about this passionate denunciation of three of his closest collaborators. Shortly after receiving the memorial, he duly ordered Gao, Wang, Chen, He Kai, and Wang Hongxu’s brother Wang Xuling dismissed from office, offering no further comments on the affair. There were no reforms to the Southern Study, which existed as a central government institution until the end of the dynasty.
Scholars, Grandees, and Moralists
Historians have praised the formation of the Southern Study as a particularly striking example of the Kangxi emperor’s commitment to Chinese principles in his administration of the Qing state. The praise in fact began with one of the early appointees to the study, Xu Qianxue, who wrote that the emperor “summons to the palace many eminent gentlemen from various regions, and diligently do they come, afraid to be late. Gao Shiqi was the first to be favored for his culture and learning.… Daily is he consulted in the heart of the Forbidden City.” Quoting this, Harry Miller terms the Southern Study “a masterpiece of co-optation.”51
Guo’s memorial and the new information that has become available with Zhu Jinfu’s publication quoting the Southern Study Record demonstrate that although classics were explained and allusions explicated in the Southern Study, a lot more went on as well. As the emperor interacted with representatives of the great families of the empire, strategies were evaluated and appointments considered. The study proved to be a space, and possibly the only space, where the emperor could associate easily with representatives of the Chinese elite, including the uncredentialed Gao Shiqi, whose company the monarch seemed genuinely to enjoy. It also proved to be a site where staff could pursue their own ends—personal, political, and pecuniary.
This pursuit of private ends proved especially aggravating to Guo Xiu and led him to impeach degree holders like himself. Guo’s first two impeachments were directed at officials who from the historical standpoint were irregular officials, Manchu and Chinese martial bannermen. Although Guo’s examples of corruption were likely true, they represented examples of irregular officials functioning in unusual ways. Southern Study appointees were serving in traditional roles as advisers to the monarch, albeit in a new institution. The censor’s mission compelled Guo to point out corruption wherever he saw it, including among those who possessed the same qualification he held.
Viewed in another way, Guo’s impeachment pointed out the range of commitments found among those who held the same credentials, read the same texts, and took the same exams. Gao, Wang, and Chen were a calligrapher, a poet, and an encyclopedist. Preserving text and practice under a foreign emperor was their purpose, evidently one that allowed them to feel comfortable recommending people and policies to the monarch and accepting the gifts that came as a result. For Wang and Chen, whose relatives and ancestors served throughout the Ming and early Qing, corruption may have been business as usual.52 Gao was new to the world, but poverty impelled and opportunity tempted him to make the best of his situation. Guo, on the other hand, was a moralist, firm in his convictions and confidently aware of his role. For him, the integrity of the state was the ultimate goal.