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The Challenges of Cooperative Defense in NATO: Sarah Mena Nato Paper

The Challenges of Cooperative Defense in NATO
Sarah Mena Nato Paper
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“Sarah Mena Nato Paper” in “The Challenges of Cooperative Defense in NATO”

Simon Fraser University

The Challenges of Cooperative Defence in NATO:

North American and European Responses to the Russo-Ukraine War

Jordan Drayer - 301634071

Abigail Georgison - 301634048

Claudia Mateos - 301634043

Sarah Mena - 301634013

POL 880

Dr. Alexander Moens and Dr. Ryan Dean

07/17/2024

Word Count: 3996

Introduction

The 2022 Russo-Ukraine War has plunged the world into geopolitical uncertainty that challenges the core beliefs and foundational principles of North American and European security strategies. As Russian tanks advanced into Ukraine, the ripple of aggression was felt far beyond the borders of Eastern Europe, shaking the very bedrock of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). The war has reignited fears reminiscent of the Cold War and exposed the soft underbelly of NATO’s strategic vulnerabilities and conflicting priorities among allies.

The initial responses of member nations were swift and decisive, including deploying the enhanced forward presence in Eastern Europe, ramping up defensive spending, and imposing sanctions on Russia. These measures were aimed at deterring further aggression and providing immediate support to Ukraine. However, beneath this united front, the diverging strategic response of North America and Europe continues to highlight the complexities of collective response and the potential fissures this war will create within the Alliance.

This paper examines how the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War has influenced the security strategies of North America and Europe, emphasising the different priorities in political, domestic, and economic factors. By comparatively analysing both North America and European members, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of the strategic differences and similarities in how NATO reacted to Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. This analysis proposes that the varying responses within NATO reflect a deeper strategic rift that could inevitably weaken the alliance’s cohesion if not addressed. Specifically, we argue that proximity to Russia plays a crucial role in determining a nation’s ability to quickly respond to adversarial threats and the level of support for increasing defence spending among NATO members, with countries closer to Russia demonstrating more substantial commitments. By exploring these angles, we seek to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of NATO and its role in global security post-Russo-Ukraine War.

Political Priorities

The 2022 Russo-Ukraine War highlighted the contrasting political priorities between Europe and North America. This has illuminated the European reliance on NATO, the collective defence the United States (US) provides for European territory, and North America’s pragmatic balance of ideological and security priorities compared to European counterparts. While all Allies share a commitment to security and democratic values, the European Union (EU) emphasises humanitarian and democratic principles while the US focuses on pragmatic security concerns through NATO.[1] This variance has tested NATO’s unified response to the crisis, revealing the underlying differences in strategic approaches and value systems and inducing a shift between initial ideological stances and the practical application of values. The Russo-Ukraine War has further motivated a prioritisation of pragmatic collective defence concerns.

Initially, European nations severely condemned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. At the onset of the conflict in 2022, the EU introduced a series of sanctions spanning various sectors including energy, technology, and other areas of trade that have affected both the import and export of goods. As the conflict progressed, the EU tightened sanctions through successive packages on exports and export restrictions, broadcasting suspensions and prohibition of transactions with certain Russian state-owned enterprises. The increased pressure to uphold the principles of international law and sovereignty has led to a growing defence spending among EU member states and a stronger reliance on NATO for security policies. The latest “Standard Eurobarometer Survey” conducted in June 2023 showed that EU citizens continue to widely approve of the measures taken to support Ukraine, with 88% of EU citizens in favour of providing humanitarian support to people affected by the war and 75% approving of financial support to Ukraine.[2] Nevertheless, Hungary, a member of both the EU and NATO, has posed a significant challenge as its Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has shown support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.[3] The meeting of Hungarian and Russian heads of state in July of 2024 has underscored Orbán’s self-proclaimed role as a mediator pursuing a “pro-peace” agenda in the Russo-Ukraine conflict, compounded by his support for Russian perspectives.[4] Hungary's support for Russia, while framed as a productive role within NATO, risks weakening the unity of NATO in their collective response to the Russian invasion.

Europe’s strategic alliances have traditionally been anchored in NATO and transatlantic ties with the US and Canada. This Atlantic dependence on security has had repercussions on defence concerns within the EU. In response to the Russo-Ukraine War, military reinforcement was directed through NATO and extended to potential partners in Eastern Europe. This acknowledges Europe's dependence on North America while emphasising the need to build a more autonomous European defence framework. Although there are some initiatives, like the Permanent Structured Cooperation, that are accelerating independence, autonomous defence has been a long-time challenge due to the diverse defence capabilities and priorities within EU states. French President Macron recognises "Our sovereignty depends on our ability to defend ourselves. Europe must build its strategic autonomy to ensure its security and defend its values and interests.”[5] This acknowledgment of the necessity of regional defence sovereignty underscores the perspective that the two pillars of NATO have some areas of divergence, and therefore Europe requires its own defence capabilities to ensure its priorities are maintained.

Another factor that has influenced the rise of European security strategy priorities is the geographical proximity of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. It cannot yet be determined whether the Russo-Ukrainian War has made European Allies stronger because of the coordination and cooperation in mobilising resources, or weaker because of possible responses to this increased NATO presence in Eastern Europe. Europe has had to strengthen border security measures due to the conflict, and currently the three Baltic countries invest more than 3% of their GDP in defence in response to the war.[6] However, countries such as Spain and Portugal are not following suit, with defence spending remaining below the 2% target set by NATO in 2014.[7] Although they are members of both the EU and NATO, Spain and Portugal are also geographically further away from the conflict and are some of the NATO Allies that invest the least in defence. This further supports the notion that proximity to the conflict dictates how much a nation prioritises defence.

America has been characterised by the promotion and protection of liberal values while always balancing them with pragmatic security interests.[8] Understanding the duality of this nation is key to understanding its foreign policy actions.[9] The US perspective often diverges from the views of other NATO members on issues of homeland protection, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation.[10] Though the war in Ukraine has ensured the US maintains strong support for NATO, America is also balancing its strategic interests in the Pacific. North America has a wide variety of commercial and strategic partners and competing priorities, with a current special interest in the Asia-Pacific region. This growing importance can be seen in the relationships with countries such as Australia, India, and Japan, exemplified in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, to join forces in the face of rising Chinese economic and military power.[11]

Canada shares America's distractions from the Russo-Ukraine conflict, prioritising China as a strategic challenge across the Pacific.[12] Canada’s vast Arctic territory bordering Russia presents a unique security concern. The recent war in Ukraine has heightened anxieties about potential Russian aggression in this region, inspiring an increase of Canadian investment in Arctic defence capabilities and cooperation with NATO Allies. This focus on the Arctic makes Canada a strong advocate for a stable and rules-based international order, aligning closely with US foreign policy goals.[13]

Additionally, North America is geographically distant from the conflict zone, reducing the immediate threat perception from Europe as it focuses on the Indo-Pacific. America has supported its European Allies through NATO, provided military aid to Ukraine, and positioned itself strategically. However, we see a priority shift influenced by the war between Israel and Hamas and the election race of Donald Trump and Joe Biden in the United States.[14] As recently as April of 2024, the US House of Representatives did not approve a $60.8 billion USD military aid package for Ukraine, which had been stalled for more than four months due to the refusal of Republican lawmakers.[15] The geographic distance from the conflict, aggravated by United States’ competing priorities, has allowed for the prioritisation of other issues than the war in Ukraine and a more measured European defence response from America. North American Allies have been managing competing priorities due to their more global strategic reach, which emphasises the differing considerations between the North American and European pillars of NATO.

Domestic Opinions

NATO’s greatest strengths are the democratic ideals and shared values its member states uphold. However, these ideals can be the barriers that NATO members must overcome to act.[16] Aid to NATO partners, like Ukraine, requires domestic political approval, and nations can face critical, unsupportive, and disinterested domestic stakeholders who hold the power to prevent members’ actions in the Alliance. The United States and Canada, the Alliance’s North American members, have both faced these apathetic stakeholders. While some states face domestic resistance when it comes to approval of defence policy, other members, especially those close to Russia, find eager and highly receptive audiences in their domestic populations. These constituencies drive disparities in defence commitments to NATO, an influence that the Russo-Ukraine War, like many other international issues, has highlighted for the international community once again.

Since the renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022, domestic opinion has challenged Allied priorities. This experience has shown that differences in how populations experience war can lead to consequential divergences in domestic support for initiatives to assist NATO partners. NATO’s two North American members, Canada and the United States, have struggled to convince domestic audiences to prioritise aiding Ukraine. The lack of domestic prioritisation is clear given the difficulty America faced in approving aid to Ukraine and the recent Canadian defence budget cut of $1 billion CAD.[17] The challenge faced by North American Allies is stark when compared to European countries closer to the conflict whose populations see the invasion of Ukraine as an imminent threat and an indication of growing danger for themselves. The Alliance’s vast geographic span has begun to pull members apart, showing that location may challenge ‘shared values’ when citizens consider supporting aid to Ukraine.

Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine War, the number of American citizens who believe the US is sending too much aid to Ukraine has more than quadrupled, growing from 7% in 2022 to 31% in 2024.[18] Citizens report more concern over climate change and inflation than the war in Ukraine, and 41% of Americans claim that the war is ‘none of our business’.[19] Americans have shown to prioritise a slew of interests over supporting Ukraine, which came 19th out of 22 foreign policy concerns, falling behind priorities like reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the US and protecting against terrorism. Furthermore, a Gallup 2024 survey showed that 41% of Americans named China as the United States’ greatest enemy today, trumping Russia in terms of large-scale threat perception.[20] This makes China the top perceived US adversary for the fourth straight year, with only a quarter of the participants ranking Russia the secondary threat.[21] Beyond this dismal level of interest in Ukraine and Russia, US citizens maintain more interest in internal affairs, with 83% claiming that President Biden should prioritise domestic over foreign policy 2024.[22]

Comparatively, in Canada, domestic interest in the war has dropped off in the face of similar domestic priorities. 54% of Canadians stated that, given Canada’s economic crisis, the country cannot afford to support Ukraine. This represents a 9% increase over 2023 numbers. The length and relative impasse of the conflict has caused 39% of the population to believe that the war will not grow beyond Russia and Ukraine, lessening the population’s sense of urgency. Interest in the conflict is also on the decline, with only 58% of Canadians following the war as closely as they did in 2022.[23] These trends indicate a less sympathetic audience in Canada which has led to rollbacks in defence spending and an increase in the belief that Canada is providing too much aid to Ukraine.[24]

However, the negative opinion trends displayed by the North American members are not representative across the NATO Alliance. NATO Allies have unprecedentedly increased defence spending by 18% since the onset of the Russo-Ukraine War, a result of many members budgeting their national defence spending over the recommended 2% GDP threshold. Several notable increases from 2021 include Poland’s increase of 1.9%, Estonia’s of 1.4%, Latvia’s of 1.06%, Finland’s of 1.01%, and Lithuania’s of 0.89%.[25] These members occupy key strategic positions due to their location near Russia, where the domestic population is familiar with the realities of the Russian threat. This indicates a correlation between distance, threat perception, and domestic interest in meeting NATO spending and commitment goals.[26]

While Americans and Canadians remain largely disengaged and unconvinced of the threatening nature of the Russo-Ukraine War, Eastern European citizens have shown that their geographic differences can and will separate their response from their far-flung NATO counterparts across the Atlantic. The proactive reactions of Eastern European citizens to increased government demands for both money and military enlistment have highlighted striking differences in the way geography influences a population's response to the threat of Russian aggression. Recent changes in civilian posture include conscription in certain Allied nations such as Latvia, and extensions of previously existing service requirements in countries like Estonia.[27]

Eastern European domestic populations generally support increasing defence capabilities, with only 27.1% of residents in Latvia expressing disapproval of measures like conscription, while the number of Estonians in service enrolling voluntarily increased to 46%.[28] In both Latvia and Estonia, the invasion of Ukraine boosted support for conscription with both countries, especially among the 18-29 year old age group affected by the draft which had initially been hesitant to commit to service requirements in polls.[29] This trend indicates that proximity to the Russian border might not be the only influence separating Latvian and Baltic civilians’ responses from those of North Americans. Previous lived experience under Russian oppression is pivotal in determining concern over the Russo-Ukraine War, a state too familiar to the citizens of Eastern Europe, and too remote for the residents of North America.

The vast distance between NATO’s member nations has been a strength of the Alliance for many decades, enabling the organisation to claim its status as a ‘Euro-Atlantic power’ and to strategically defend and deter entire regions. Despite this, the Atlantic rift is growing greater each day as new challenges to a joint defence strategy show just how ambitiously NATO has cast its nets. However, differences in opinion in domestic populations are not the only challenge issued by NATO’s cross-continental nature.

Economic Repercussions

Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine forced NATO to respond with economic consequences for the illegal Russian military action. Allies responded with unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia and an ambitious decoupling initiative to isolate the Russian economy and improve autonomous western resilience. These initiatives to impose economic consequences on Russia and revamp the material ability to ensure collective defence have been difficult to enact and revealed a remarkable difference between the North American and European pillars of NATO. Allied economies have been unevenly affected by the sanctions, with some, like Germany and Latvia, facing greater GDP losses than states like Canada and the US due to their proximal and historical dependence on Russian commodities.[30]

The extent and success of sanctions and decoupling initiatives against the Russian economy have shown to be correlated with the proximity of sanctioning states to Russia. North American economies have historically lacked a significant economic relationship with Russia, amounting to less than 0.5% of Canadian trade and less than 3% of annual US exports and imports since the Second World War.[31] Contrastingly, European Allies have cultivated a significant trade relationship with Russia. The EU has consistently been the largest investor in the Russian economy, and in 2020, the European Union was Russia’s primary trade partner, accounting for 36.5% of Russian imports and 37.9% of exports.[32] This proximal correlation of economic integration and interdependence has affected the viability of decoupling efforts and western sanctions on Russia between NATO’s North American and European pillars.

The expansion of western sanctions on Russia after their 2022 invasion of Ukraine has targeted the Russian financial system, the acquisition of goods, and investment into its defence industry. The most significant change was the introduction of a ban on petroleum product imports from Russia.[33] Trade restrictions on energy greatly affected the cost of living in some Allied countries, which is especially notable as the sanctions began while the global economy was still recovering from supply chain disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.[34] An analysis of how NATO members recovered from energy supply interruptions and sustainably shifted oil and gas procurement will be used as a barometer to understand the proximal reasoning for why North American sanctions were implemented faster and with less costs than European sanctions.

American sanctions and decoupling initiatives against Russia were swiftly implemented and maintained. The United States imported over $4.7 million USD worth of oil and gas from Russia in 2021, accounting for 7.9% of America’s petroleum imports.[35] This makes Russia a considerable trading partner for America, but not necessarily a significant one. Therefore, the ban on Russian oil and gas imports was enacted shortly after the February 24th, 2022 invasion, coming into effect on March 8th.[36] This quick implementation was made possible by turning to close trading partners like Canada and Mexico.[37] However, consumers were still affected by rising petroleum prices following the sanctions. Americans saw a sharp increase in gas prices during the transitional period following the shift in supply chains and uncertainty in the global petroleum market. Despite these impacts, the American transition was more continuous and better supported than the European transition due to the varied options for petroleum found in North America. This highlights the importance of regional resilience and autonomy.[38]

Canadian sanctions against Russia have been consistent and seamlessly implemented since the 2022 invasion. Canada’s imported oil is primarily sourced from the United States, and it benefits from a considerable domestic production that makes Canada the fourth largest oil-producing country in the world.[39] Canada has not imported crude oil from Russia since 2020 and historic import levels have been relatively low.[40] This has made Canada’s petroleum sanctions against Russia immediate, without risking significant additional costs for the domestic population outside of the rising costs on the global market. Canadian decoupling initiatives have also been efficiently implemented, largely due to the lack of historic integration between the Canadian and Russian economies. Due to the considerable overlap of Canadian and Russian resources both nations have favoured domestic procurement of critical resources over imports, resulting in a lack of reliance on bilateral trade.[41] This resource overlap and the proximity to other significant trading partners, like the US, has made the decoupling strategy relatively costless for Canadians.[42]

This consistency and ease of sanctioning and decoupling efforts by North American NATO members has not been seen with the European allies. Europe is more reliant on Russian petroleum supplies, making sanctions and decoupling efforts much more difficult. Germany is a significant example, as it is heavily reliant on energy imports. In 2021, Germany imported 19.4 billion euros of crude oil and natural gas from Russia.[43] In 2022, around 95% of its gas consumption was met by imports, 50% of which was supplied by Russia.[44] Therefore, the international demand to sanction Russian oil and gas has put Germany under pressure to liberate itself from this import dependence. This has proven to be a difficult task that is very expensive for residents.[45] Imported energy costs rose sharply in February 2022 after the invasion, with Germany experiencing a 129.5% energy price increase between February 2021 to 2022, with most of that increased expense being passed on to consumers.[46]

Furthermore, Germany faced complications implementing sanctions quickly due to this over-reliance on Russian energy imports. This culminated in a graduated sanctioning of Russian petroleum that resulted in Russia’s share of Germany’s total crude oil imports being reduced to 0.1% by January 2023, eventually reaching zero in August of 2023.[47] This complicated transition was supported by increasing oil imports from Norway, the United Kingdom, and Kazakhstan, signalling the proximal limitations of changing supply chains for certain economic sectors.

Another example can be seen in Latvia, which has historically been dependent on Russian gas due to Soviet-era integration. Latvian imports of Russian gas made up over 90% of total petroleum imports in 2021, but gradual supply chain changes have reduced this number to only 10.1% in 2023.[48] This transition is supported by increasing connections with other EU members and has also been subject to volatile price increases.[49] This demonstrates the regional nature of oil supply chains as well as the increased difficulty European nations face when drastically altering economic sectors to account for the costs of Russian sanctions. Therefore, regional answers to regional problems should be a priority for the Alliance, and strengthening European capabilities and autonomy should be an area of NATO investment.

Conclusion

Our analysis reveals the importance of grasping the significant differences in how NATO member nations reacted to the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War. These differences, influenced by distinct political priorities, varying domestic opinions, and the economic circumstances unique to each state, are important for future policy making within NATO. Notably, our findings highlight that the proximity to Russia significantly affects the level of defence support, with countries closer to Russia showing a greater commitment to increased defence spending.

While NATO’s strength lies in its unity, the differing reactions to the Russo-Ukraine War have exposed division that could weaken the alliance's future. These divisions suggest shifts in geopolitics and conflicting national interests that, if left unattended, might undermine NATO’s effectiveness. Recognizing and addressing these differences is essential for NATO to develop policies that bridge these gaps and strengthen the alliance against established and emerging threats. Unless member nations wish to see NATO slowly dissolve into a non-functional alliance, there is a need for a more adaptable, resilient, and capable leadership within the alliance that can navigate internal divisions and restructuring while projecting a united front.

Understanding these starkly different responses is not just a matter of academic interest but crucial for policymaking within NATO. To address these challenges, NATO should consider the following recommendations:

Enhancing the Transatlantic dialogue would strengthen communication between North American and European members and ensure alignment on strategic goals. Ensuring transparent civilian strategic communication is essential to maintaining a cohesive alliance and ensuring priorities are consistent across nations. NATO must focus on open, engaging, and educational platforms for public interaction that allow people to connect and learn about the alliance. Educating people about NATO’s goals and values is vital to ensure its future success. Collaborating with schools to create programs informing citizens about NATO’s mission, along with using social media to interact with the public, will help garner support for the alliance and foster a shared sense of purpose. NATO could also implement integrating defence strategies, developing joint defence initiatives that can reinforce regional capabilities and the strengths of both North American and European military capabilities. Through initiatives aimed at improving the European defence market, NATO could encourage North America to invest in interoperability technologies and intelligence sharing platforms, creating economic incentives and opportunities for maintaining the alliance. NATO should also develop an equitable plan of NATO investment to support regional resiliency in other areas, like the energy sector.

Without cooperation, cohesion, and adaptability, NATO has no chance of tackling today’s global landscape. To manage the evolving regional and global challenges that the Russo-Ukraine War highlighted, NATO must adapt to these changes if it wishes to maintain a transatlantic alliance. By embracing a more nuanced and flexible approach with better regional preparation to address future challenges while also ensuring that countries' citizens understand the policies and actions needed for NATO to maintain alliance priorities, NATO can continue to be a solid force to counterbalance the instability we see today.

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