

Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, Volume 8

Gandhāran Buddhist Texts

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The present volume is the 8th in the Gandhāran Buddhist Texts series. This series presents text editions and studies of early Buddhist birch-bark scrolls in the Gāndhārī language, dating from about the first century BCE to the third century CE. These manuscripts, discovered in the ancient region of Gandhāra (modern Pakistan and Afghanistan), provide unprecedented insight into the early history of Buddhism as it was transmitted from India to Central Asia and China on its way to becoming a world religion. At the same time, as the earliest preserved manuscripts from South Asia, they are invaluable primary sources for the linguistic and literary history of the region.

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Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 5B*, by Richard Salomon, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, vol. 1 (2000)

*Three Gāndhārī Ekottarikāgama-Type Sūtras: British Library
Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 12 and 14*, by Mark Allon, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, vol. 2 (2001)

*A New Version of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada and a Collection of Previous-Birth Stories: British
Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 16 + 25*, by Timothy Lenz, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, vol. 3 (2003)

Four Gāndhārī Saṃyuktāgama Sūtras: Senior Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 5, by Andrew Glass,
Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, vol. 4 (2007)

*Two Gāndhārī Manuscripts of the Songs of Lake Anavatapta (Anavatapta-gāthā): British
Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 1 and Senior Scroll 14*, by Richard Salomon, Gandhāran
Buddhist Texts, vol. 5 (2008)

*Gandhāran Avadānas: British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 1–3 and 21 and Supplementary
Fragments A–C*, by Timothy Lenz, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, vol. 6 (2010)

Three Early Mahāyāna Treatises from Gandhāra: Bajaur Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 4, 6, and 11,
by Andrea Schlosser, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, vol. 7 (2022)

A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text

British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 28

Collett Cox

with contributions by Andrew Glass

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS

Seattle

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Printed in the United States of America

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University of Washington Press
uwapress.uw.edu

Cataloging information is available from the Library of Congress
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024945445
Cataloging information available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2024945445>
ISBN: 9780295753843 (hardcover)

∞ This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

for
Billy

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Preface

My work on the Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts began with an email from Richard Salomon (3/23/95), who at the time was just beginning the process of examining the Gāndhārī manuscripts in the British Library collection. His email alerted me to the presence of one particular manuscript, in fact BL28 presented in this volume, piquing my interest with the enticing subject line, “Why do you think they call them Sarvāstivādins?” From that moment on, I have worked with Rich on manuscripts of various types and genres in the Early Buddhist Manuscripts Project (EBMP) at the University of Washington. Although initially focused on the British Library collection, the EBMP has expanded its purview to include Gāndhārī manuscripts in several collections. Over the last twenty-five years, studies of texts preserved in these manuscripts have been published in different venues; the present volume is the 8th of the Gandhāran Buddhist Texts (GBT) series. It contains a transcription, edition, translation, analysis, and explication of the text preserved in Fragment 28 of the British Library (BL) collection of Gāndhārī manuscripts, hence, BL 28.

And what did I discover in BL 28? In short, I found a fascinating early Buddhist exegetical text without a known parallel that has far-reaching implications for our understanding not only of key early Buddhist doctrines such as “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*), but also of the development of methods of exegesis and the emergence of abhidharma. We should remember that the exegetical genre is a diverse one, ranging from straightforward commentaries to independent scholastic treatises. Examples of these different types of texts can be found within the various collections of Gāndhārī manuscripts.¹ Straightforward commentaries are represented by a commentary on the Saṅgītisūtra (BL 15) and three commentaries on previously unknown verse collections (I: BL 4; II: BL 13; III: BL 7, 9, 13, 18). An interesting case is presented by a manuscript known as the University of Washington-Islamabad Museum 1 Scroll (UW-IM 1 Scroll); it might be considered a commentary since it clearly comments on a sūtra passage, and yet it might instead preserve a section of a scholastic treatise containing an exposition of a sūtra. Independent scholastic treatises are represented by several different types of texts. Expository texts (BL 10, BL 17) are not structured as commentaries but instead focus on specific doctrinal issues. Catechetical treatises (BL 20+23) employ the interpretive techniques typical of commentaries but explicate doctrinal issues through a stricter question-and-answer style. Finally, the present text, BL 28, is a polemical, expository treatise that engages in the active criticism of alternative interpretations of related doctrinal issues through explicit argumentation between distinct parties.

These early Gāndhārī textual witnesses of the exegetical genre are significant since they expand our awareness of the variety of early Buddhist compositions that existed in Gandhāra in the early centuries CE. Perhaps even more important, given the fact that textual parallels have not yet been identified for any of these Gāndhārī exegetical texts, we can conclude that such texts were more

¹ For descriptions of these exegetical texts, see Cox 2014.

numerous and more diverse in their composition and transmission than extant Buddhist collections would suggest. In addition, the Gāndhārī texts display greater looseness and variability than known abhidharma texts. They thus provide evidence of an early stage in the development of the exegetical genre, a stage when texts had not yet undergone the revision and redaction that resulted in the more standardized texts found in later Buddhist collections. And since the Gāndhārī manuscripts in the British Library collection were interred before undergoing such textual revision, it is also likely that they preserve evidence of the various historical and social contexts of their composition and early transmission. These were contexts characterized by oral teaching into which, over time, new methods of pedagogy and elaborative interpretation were incorporated, eventually leading to forms of debate. Indeed, among the extant Gāndhārī exegetical texts, it is only in BL 28 that we find the kind of interpretive methods and arguments that might be viewed as reflecting a context of school disagreements and scholastic debate. While it is often assumed that abhidharma texts in general were composed in such a context, the presentation of various doctrinal positions as well as the cryptic school labels found in Gāndhārī texts such as BL 28 suggest that early doctrinal discussions were more fluid and dynamic in nature. This challenges the assumption that the relatively fixed doctrinal positions and school labels recorded in later scholastic treatises and doxographies were current from an early period. Finally, these Gāndhārī texts suggest an alternative perspective on the early Buddhist exegetical genre as a whole. Rather than supporting a model of clearly demarcated text types, such as commentaries and independent scholastic treatises, or even sūtra and abhidharma, text types that were to become the norm in both Buddhist textual collections and later scholarship, Gāndhārī texts lend support to a more fluid course of unbroken textual elucidation, a course in which earlier interpretations and interpretive methods were preserved and continued to be used alongside newer ones, all transforming gradually over time.

Turning to BL 28 presented in this volume, the text is an independent, polemical, scholastic treatise that recounts arguments on several related doctrinal issues, arguments involving presumably one text proponent and at least two opponents. The manuscript was written by a single scribe, and the text contains at least one possible, yet unattested school label (*Mahāsarvāstivāda*), which is used in reference to an opponent. However, the identity of the text proponent as well as the specific contexts of the text's composition, use, and transmission all remain uncertain. The text of BL 28 is at many points fragmentary and illegible, making the arguments in such sections only partially comprehensible. In the absence of a parallel text, I reconstruct these fragmentary and illegible passages on the basis of similar syntactic patterns and analogous discussions and arguments in other abhidharma texts. I also offer alternative interpretations and attempt to explain the reasons supporting my reconstructions and interpretations. These alternatives and explanations are found primarily in the "Text Notes" sections throughout the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6) chapter in Part II. To say that I (re)wrote the text of BL 28 is an exaggeration, but I would caution readers to be attentive to my role in reconstructing and hence interpreting certain portions of the text, and to remember that my own interpretations, whether correct or incorrect, have played a significant role in shaping the edition of BL 28's text. It is a role that was more active than readers might ordinarily expect in a textual edition.

Over the years that I have worked on BL 28, I have received the support and assistance of people and institutions without whom this volume would not have been possible. First and foremost, I extend my deep gratitude to my friend and colleague, Richard Salomon. I received

help and support from Rich at every stage, from my initial exposure to Gāndhārī and the Kharoṣṭhī script, to the final editing of this volume. His suggestions and corrections were always invaluable, but just as important was his inexhaustible patience as I found my way to a successful conclusion.

The work of the EBMP has relied upon the input of scholars from many universities and, of course, the contributions of the researchers and graduate students in the Department of Asian Languages and Literature at the University of Washington who worked on the Gāndhārī manuscripts. The EBMP held weekly “Kharoṣṭhī Klub” meetings in which we attempted to read and transcribe Gāndhārī manuscripts. We often managed only a few lines at a single meeting, since we also discussed questions raised by the particular manuscript at hand, as well as much broader issues ranging from its relationship with other Buddhist texts to its larger historical context. These Klub meetings proved to me the value of group scholarship. I can remember many occasions of true revelation while reading BL 28 in Klub, “aha moments” when a participant (often a student with a fresh perspective) would ask innocently, “But what about X?” or “Doesn’t this suggest Y?” when X or Y had never entered my mind. And so, I extend my sincere thanks to all Klub participants over the years for their many suggestions as well as those often obvious but insightful questions that I had somehow missed.

Many EBMP members deserve special thanks, in particular, Timothy Lenz for his acute eye in reconstructing manuscript images, Mark Allon for his many suggestions about readings and textual connections, and Andrew Glass for his help with various paleographic issues as well as virtually all technological problems. Further, I would like to thank Andrew for his analysis of the Kharoṣṭhī script of BL scribe 21, who wrote BL 28, and for his contributions to the Paleography and Orthography (§ II.2) chapter of this volume. Also, Jason Neelis and Stefan Baums were the source of many questions that revealed alternative interpretations, and Tien-chang Shih and Lin Qian provided valuable insights, especially concerning relationships with Buddhist texts in Chinese.

The work of the EBMP and the completion of this volume depend upon the support of many individuals and institutions. We all owe a debt of gratitude to the generous anonymous donor whose early financial and personal support of the EBMP placed the project on firm footing, as well as to the current donors, Cris Cyders and Melissa Upton Cyders, whose interest and support are ensuring that the project continues. Institutions that have generously supported the EBMP include the Henry Luce Foundation, the National Endowment for Humanities (Program for Collaborative Research), and the Dhammachai International Research Institute. The EBMP also received the support of the British Library and its staff; I was thankful for the assistance of Graham Shaw, formerly Head of the Pacific & Africa Collections, and Michael O’Keefe, formerly Head of the South Asian Collection. During my research visits to the British Library, I benefited from working closely with Mark Barnard, John Burton, and Robert Davies, formerly in the Conservation Studios. From its inception, the EBMP has received support from the University of Washington at all levels, including deans in the College of Arts and Sciences, Divisional Deans of Arts and Humanities in the College of Arts and Sciences, and chairs in the Department of Asian Languages and Literature. Other units at the UW such as the University of Washington Libraries and the South Asian Center have been equally supportive. In particular, I would like to mention within the Department of Asian Languages and Literature the former chairs, Professors David Knechtges, William Boltz, Michael Shapiro, and Paul Atkins, the former Administrator, Youngie Yoon, and the many Asian Languages and Literature staff members who supported all aspects of the project.

I also truly appreciate the efforts of several people who helped to bring this volume to its final stage. The editors of the Gandhāran Buddhist Text series, Richard Salomon, Stefan Baums, and Ingo Strauch, not only offered editing suggestions in all parts of the volume but also recommended helpful revisions to its structure. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek edited and formatted the volume for publication, and I am enormously grateful to her for the superb job she has done in making this volume presentable.

Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to the person who made this and all of my research possible, my late husband, Billy Arraj, who unfortunately did not live to see the publication of this volume. Not only did he read every word of the Gāndhārī text, he also critically examined, pondered over, and revised my translation, notes, text analysis, and introductory chapters, all from the perspectives of both specialized and more general readers. I know that he would be thrilled that our work is now finally completed, and it is to him that I dedicate this volume.

Reader's Guide

It is perhaps obvious that, like all texts, Buddhist texts also were the product of specific conditions and were intended to be understood and used within particular contexts. And yet, we must keep in mind that texts usually do little to clarify explicitly their conditions and contexts. While these conditions and contexts were implicitly understood in the period of these texts' composition and early transmission, over time they became increasingly obscure. Even within the Buddhist traditions of textual transmission, subsequent interpretations of particular texts often followed paths that diverged from those of earlier textual versions or interpreters, whether by misunderstanding or by intention. And for us in the modern period, the problem is still greater, since we often lack even a vague awareness of the original context or the stages in the history of a particular text's transmission, although both are essential for interpreting the text.

This problem of interpretation is particularly acute in the case of exegetical texts, which often demand an awareness of their contexts and stages of transmission if one is to come away with any understanding of the contents. Such texts emerge from a complex system of doctrinal positions and contending interpretations, and because they assume a knowledgeable audience, they are often terse to the point of incomprehensibility. In order to assist readers in making sense of BL 28, I have included certain sections in this volume that I hope will provide at least some of this necessary context for the positions and arguments found throughout the text.

Thus, the volume is divided into two parts. Part I, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text, includes chapters that present more general discussions of BL 28 and its background:

- I.1. Introduction
- I.2. Topic Outline of Text Contents
- I.3. Text and Commentary: Reconstructed Text, Sanskrit Rendering, Translation, and Commentary

Part II, Text Analysis, includes chapters that contain philological analyses of the text, an unannotated transcription, reconstruction, and translation, as well as an annotated text edition, or transcription and reconstruction, also with a translation and detailed notes:

- II.1. Description of the Manuscript
- II.2. Paleography and Orthography (with contributions by Andrew Glass)
- II.3. Phonology
- II.4. Morphology and Syntax
- II.5. Transcribed Text, Reconstruction, and Translation
- II.6. Annotated Text Edition and Notes

Part I serves as a good starting point for all readers, but it will be particularly useful for those who would like to focus on the content of the text without the details of philological or textual analysis presented in Part II. It can stand alone for those interested primarily in early Indian Buddhism, Buddhist exegesis, or Buddhist texts and teachings in a more general sense. The following chapters in Part I provide a general description of the text, its historical background and context, a summary of its contents, as well as the complete Gāndhārī reconstruction, Sanskrit rendering, English translation, and a commentary on the text's contents:

I.1 Introduction: After a brief description of the manuscript and text presented in BL 28, the introduction offers a description of Buddhist exegetical texts and specifically scholastic treatises, including their style, interpretive methods, and arguments. It then returns to the text in BL 28, with a discussion of its relationship to other abhidharma texts and a consideration of the possible school affiliations of the text proponent and opponents. The introduction concludes with an overview of the structure of the entire text and a summary of the contents of each section.

I.2 Topic Outline of Text Contents: The topic outline summarizes the contents of the text, with a brief account of the arguments between the text proponent and various opponents. Since its structure accords with the section titles that appear in the Text and Commentary (§ I.3), the Transcribed Text, Reconstruction, and Translation (§ II.5), and the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6), readers can consult this topic outline in order to clarify the flow of arguments throughout the text, even those that are dispersed over multiple sections, and to locate particular discussions in other parts of the volume.

I.3 Text and Commentary: Reconstructed Text, Sanskrit Rendering, Translation, and Commentary: This chapter contains the Gāndhārī reconstruction, Sanskrit rendering, and English translation for each section of the text, followed by a "Commentary" that presents a point-by-point explication of the contents of each section. This commentary does not mention physical characteristics of the manuscript or philological details unless they are important for interpreting the text. (Such issues are examined in the appropriate chapters in Part II, Text Analysis.) Instead, the commentary focuses on a detailed explication of the arguments presented in each section and their relationship to other parts of the text. It also includes comments on important terms or references to analogous discussions in other texts as aids for understanding the contents of each section. For a more thorough examination of alternative interpretations and the various reasons that support the interpretation adopted, readers can consult the discussion in the "Manuscript Notes" and "Text Notes" for each section as found in the chapter Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6), in Part II.

Conventions

All bibliographic citations in the text or in footnotes are by author's surname and date; full bibliographic details are given in the list of references at the end of the book. However, editions of Pali texts are not included in the reference list and are simply cited by standard title or abbreviation (as given in the list of abbreviations in the following section). Pages from Pali texts are quoted from their Pali Text Society editions by volume (where appropriate) and page: for example, SN I 75 refers to *Samyuttanikāya*, volume I, page 75.

Locations in smaller fragments or chips are cited with both fragment or chip labels and line numbers (e.g., 51D(r) ll. 1–4 indicates lines 1–4 in fragment 51D(r)). In the case of the larger contiguous manuscript fragments 51G–H and 52A–H, only the line numbers 1–141 are given (e.g., ll. 51–57 indicates lines 51–57 in manuscript fragments 51G–H). In the footnotes, line numbers for separate occurrences within the same fragment are separated by a comma, and those in separate fragments or chips, by a semicolon.

References to sections in this volume are usually cited by chapter followed by section number and section heading (e.g., Introduction § I.1.5.1 Religious Practice: Present Factors). However, abbreviations are used to cite sections in certain chapters, specifically chapters I.3 Text and Commentary and II.6. Annotated Text Edition and Notes. The word “Commentary,” followed by section headings and fragment labels and/or line numbers, refers to the Commentary for those specific sections in chapter I.3 Text and Commentary (e.g., Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A]). The phrases “Manuscript Notes” and “Text Notes,” followed by fragment labels and/or line numbers, refer to the Manuscript Notes and Text Notes for those specific sections in chapter II.6. Annotated Text Edition and Notes (e.g., Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A and Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A).

The transcriptional conventions, citation system, and abbreviations are modeled on those used in the previous volumes of the *Gandhāran Buddhist Text* series, with minor modifications. Abbreviations are used for the citation of words from Pali (P) and Sanskrit (Skt). In certain cases, words in *Gāndhārī* are identified with an abbreviation (G) but are usually cited with no identifying abbreviation. The following symbols are used in the transcriptions of the texts edited in this volume:

- [] An unclear or partially preserved akṣara (graphic syllable) whose reading is less than certain. Also used for references to line numbers within the reconstructed text and translation, as well as for identifications of the speaker as the proponent [P] or opponent [O], or as [P/O?] where the speaker cannot be identified.
- (*) A lost or illegible akṣara that has been conjecturally restored on the basis of context, parallel texts, or other evidence.
- < * > An akṣara or a component thereof that was omitted or miswritten by the scribe and has been conjecturally restored or corrected by the editor.

- « » An akṣara or a component thereof that was omitted by the scribe and then added by him or by a subsequent hand as an interlinear or marginal insertion.
- { } A superfluous akṣara that was written in error and should be ignored.
- .
- The missing portion (consonantal element or diacritic vowel sign) of a partially legible akṣara. For example, *.e* represents an akṣara in which the vowel diacritic *e* is visible, but the consonant to which it was attached is lost or illegible, while *g.* signifies that the consonant *g* is legible but incomplete so that it cannot be determined which, if any, vowel diacritic was attached to it. The notation *r.* marks an akṣara in which the preconsonantal *r* sign is visible at the bottom, but both the consonant that followed it and the vowel of the syllable missing or illegible. Similarly, the notation *.r* marks an akṣara in which the postconsonantal *r* sign is visible, but both the consonant that preceded it and the vowel of the syllable are missing or illegible. The notation *a.* indicates an independent vowel sign, or “vowel carrier” that is damaged or incomplete so that it cannot be determined whether a diacritic sign indicating one of the independent vowels *i*, *u*, *e*, or *o* was attached to it.
- ?
- A visible or partially visible but illegible akṣara.
- +
- A missing akṣara that would have appeared on a lost or obscured portion of the scroll. A series of these symbols indicates the number of lost syllables as estimated according to surrounding lines of text.
- /
- In the diplomatic transcription, separates alternative readings for an incompletely preserved or partially illegible akṣara. For example, [*s./t.*] indicates that the consonantal portion of the incomplete akṣara could be either *s* or *t*. For clarity, the alternatives are always given as full akṣaras and separated from neighboring akṣaras by spaces.
- ///
- In the diplomatic transcription, marks the beginning or end of an incomplete line.
- ...
- In the reconstruction or translation, indicates an unknown number of missing akṣaras.
-
- A small dot marking the end of a minor syntactic unit.
- ⊗
- A design consisting of a cluster of dots used in the original text presumably to indicate the conclusion of a section.
- =
- In the transcription, a word division within an akṣara, used in phrases such as *sarvam=asti* in which the final consonant of the preceding word and the initial vowel of the following word are written together as a single syllable.

Abbreviations

AARŚ	Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra, T 1553
AASKŚ	*Abhidharmāṣṭaskandhaśāstra (or *Abhidharmāṣṭagranthaśāstra), T 1543
abl.	ablative
abs.	absolute, absolute
acc.	accusative
adj.	adjective
adv.	adverb
ADV	Abhidharmadīpa, Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti (ed. Jaini 1977)
AG-G ^L	Gāndhārī Anavatapta-gāthā (BL Fragment 1, ed. Salomon 2008)
AG-G ^S	Gāndhārī Anavataptagāthā (RS Fragment 14, ed. Salomon 2008)
AHŚ (Dh)	*Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra, T 1550
AHŚ (U)	*Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra, T 1551
AKBh	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (ed. Pradhan 1975)
AKBh (tr. P)	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, T 1559
AKBh (tr. Xz)	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, T 1558
AMVŚ	*Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra (*Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra), T 1545
AKVy	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (ed. Wogihara 1932–1936)
anon.	anonymous
AN	Aṅguttaranikāya
As	Atthasālinī, Dhammasaṅganī-aṭṭhakathā
ASPrŚ	*Abhidharmasamayapradīpikāśāstra, T 1563
attrib.	attributed
ĀVBSS	*Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra, T 1549
Avś	Avadānaśataka (ed. Speijer 1906–1909)
AVŚ	*Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra, T 1546
BC	Bajaur Collection (cf. Strauch 2008)
BHS	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
BHSD	Franklin Edgerton, <i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary</i> (New Haven, 1953)
BHSG	Franklin Edgerton, <i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar</i> (New Haven, 1953)
BL	British Library
bv.	bahuvrīhi compound
caus.	causative
CDIAL	R. L. Turner, <i>A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages</i> (London, 1966)
cf.	<i>confer</i>
Chin	Chinese
cm	centimeter(s)

comm(s).	commentary, commentaries
con.	<i>contra</i>
cpd.	compound
CPD	V. Trenckner et al., <i>A Critical Pāli Dictionary</i> (Copenhagen, 1924–)
DĀ	Dirghāgama, T 1
dat.	dative
dem. pron.	demonstrative pronoun
denom.	denominative
DhK	Dhātukāya, T 1540
Dhka	Dhātukathā
Dhp-G ^K	Gāndhārī Khotan Dharmapada (“Gāndhārī Dharmapada,” ed. Brough 1962)
Dhp-G ^L	Gāndhārī London Dharmapada (BL Fragments 16 + 25, ed. Lenz 2003: part I)
Dhs	Dhammasaṅgaṇī
DhSk	Dharmaskandha, T 1537
DN	Dīghanikāya
DP	Margaret Cone, <i>A Dictionary of Pāli</i> , 2 pts. to date (Oxford, 2001–)
DPPN	G. P. Malalasekera, <i>Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names</i> , 2 vols. (London, 1937–1938)
dv.	dvandva compound
EĀ	Ekottarikāgama, T 125
ed(s).	editor(s)
esp.	especially
f.	feminine
fasc.	fascicle
fig(s).	figure(s)
frag(s).	fragment(s)
ft. nt(s).	footnote(s)
fut.	future
G	Gāndhārī
GD	Stefan Baums and Andrew Glass 2002–. <i>A Dictionary of Gāndhārī</i> , https://gandhari.org/dictionary .
gdv.	gerundive
gen.	genitive
IA	Indo-Aryan
ind.	indeclinable
indef. pron.	indefinite pronoun
inf.	infinitive
instr.	instrumental
interr.	interrogative
It-a	Itivuttaka-aṭṭhakathā, Paramatthadīpanī II
Jā	Jātaka, together with Jātakatthavaṇṇanā
JñPr	Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544
kdh.	karmadhāraya compound
Khvs-G	Gāndhārī *Khargaviṣaṇa-sutra (ed. Salomon 2000)

Kv	Kathāvatthu
Kv-a	Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā, Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā
[KvP]	Kathāvatthu proponent
l(l).	line(s)
loc.	locative
m.	masculine
MĀ	Madhyamāgama, T 26
MAHŚ	*Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayasāstra, T 1552
MIA	Middle Indo-Aryan
Mil	Milindapañha
MN	Majjhimanikāya
Mp	Manorathapūraṇī, Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Mp-ṭ	Manorathapūraṇīṭikā, Sāratthamañjūsā, Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭikā (VRI-CST4)
MPrPŚ	*Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra, T 1509
MW	Monier Monier-Williams, <i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> (Oxford, 1899)
n.	neuter
n(n).	note(s)
neg.	negative
Nett	Nettipakaraṇa
Nett-a	Nettipakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā (VRI-CST4)
Nidd I	Mahāniddeśa
Nird-G ^{L1}	Gāndhārī Verse Nirdeśa 1 (BL Fragment 4, ed. Baums in progress)
Nird-G ^{L2}	Gāndhārī Verse Nirdeśa 2 (BL Fragments 7, 9, 18 and 13 up to l. 90, ed. Baums in progress)
no(s).	number(s)
nom.	nominative
NyAŚ	*Nyāyānusārasāstra, T 1562
[o]	opponent
OIA	Old Indo-Aryan
opt.	optative
[P]	proponent
P	Pali
pass.	passive
Paṭis	Paṭisambhidāmagga
Paṭis-a	Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā, Saddhammapakāsinī
pers.	person
Peṭ	Peṭakopadesa
Pj II	Paramatthajotikā, Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā
pl.	plural
plt(s).	plate(s)
P.N.	proper noun
p(p).	page(s)
pp.	past participle
Pp	Puggalapaññatti

PrP (tr. GBh)	Prakaraṇapāda, T 1541
PrP (tr. Xz)	Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542
pres.	present
pres. part.	present participle
pret.	preterite
pron.	pronoun
Ps	Papañcasūdanī, Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Ps-pt	Papañcasūdanī-purāṇaṭīkā, Līnatthapakāsīnī II, Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā
pt(s).	part(s)
PTSD	T. W. Rhys Davids, Stede, eds., <i>The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary</i> (London, 1921–1925)
PVVŚ	*Pañcavastukavibhāṣāśāstra, T 1555
(r)	recto
rel. pron.	relative pronoun
RS	Robert Senior Collection
s.v.	<i>sub voce</i>
SĀ (tr. G)	Samyuktāgama, T 99
SĀ-G ⁵⁵	Gāndhārī Samyuktāgama sūtras, Senior Scroll 5 (ed. Glass 2007)
SaṅgCm-G	Gāndhārī Saṅgītisūtra commentary (BL Fragment 15)
SaṅgP	Saṅgītiparyāya, T 1536
ŚAS	*Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, T 1548
sg.	singular
Skt	Sanskrit
Sn	Suttanipāta
SN	Samyuttanikāya
Sp	Samantapāsādikā, Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā
Spk	Sāratthapakāsīnī, Samyuttanikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsīnī, Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Sv-pt	Sumaṅgalavilāsīnī-purāṇaṭīkā, Līnatthapakāsīnī I, Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā
T	<i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i> (eds. Takakusu, Watanabe 1924–1934)
Th	Theragāthā
tp.	tatpuruṣa compound
tr(s).	translator(s)
TSP	Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha; Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (ed. Shastri 1982)
TSS	*Tattvasiddhiśāstra, T 1636
(v)	verso
v(v).	verse(s)
Vibh	Vibhaṅga
Vibh-a	Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā, Sammohavinodanī
Vibh-mṭ	Vibhaṅga-mūlaṭīkā (VRI-CST4)
Vin	Theravādin Vinayapiṭaka
VK	Vijñānakāya, T 1539
VRI-CST4	<i>Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka, Version 4.0 (CST4)</i> Burmese

	Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition of Pali texts (http://www.tipitaka.org/) (Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute)
VŚ	*Vibhāṣāśāstra, T 1547
YBh	Yogācārabhūmi (ed. Bhattacharya 1957)
YBh (tr. Xz)	Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, T 1579

A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text

British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 28

CHAPTER I.1

Introduction

I.1.1. General Character of the Manuscript and Text

In the earliest period, Buddhist teachings were not committed to writing but were instead formulated and transmitted orally. It was through successive and varied reformulations, redactions, and expansions that they eventually reached the large scale as the canonical textual collections familiar to us now. A significant part of this textual growth occurred through the practice of interpreting, elaborating, and systematizing the teachings, which began in the sūtras themselves, gradually came to be localized in separate exegetical texts as commentary, and finally involved the formulation of independent scholastic treatises. This exegetical activity, which was carried out by Buddhist teachers and monastics from different regions and at a later point from different school groups, gave rise to new exegetical methods and interpretive positions, which themselves demanded further systematic analysis and negotiation. Thus, over time, the extensive corpus of abhidharma literature emerged.

Until recently, we lacked any documentary witnesses to the formative stages of this tradition of exegetical activity. Apart from a few independent texts preserved in early Chinese translations, all that survived were the commentaries and canonical abhidharma texts of later schools, which had been redacted, refined, and polished, both linguistically and doctrinally, by centuries of tradition. The problem might be compared to attempting to reconstruct the context and meaning of a piece of music that is only accessible as a series of echoes. Scholars interested in the formative period of both texts and doctrinal interpretations have been compelled to scour these later textual creations for any scrap of potential evidentiary value; but more often than not, within this historical vacuum, they turn to internal textual reconstructions based on hypotheses and extrapolations about form and content created on the basis of critical readings of the established texts, a decomposition or stratigraphy, as it were, of the later transmitted teaching corpus. However, this process of reasoning backwards or retrojecting interpretive positions as derived from later textual reconstructions or creations is an activity beset with obstacles and missteps. Indeed, much of the results may not be successful in revealing earlier stages.

All of this changed in recent decades with the fortuitous recovery of a number of early Indian Buddhist Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts containing several early exegetical texts. These now give us a precious window into the heretofore inaccessible formative period of early Buddhist written literature, including abhidharma. The manuscript studied here, Fragment 28 in the British Library (BL) collection, is an almost miraculous survival that takes us back to the actual period when the scholastic enterprise was in its early efflorescence. The text preserved in this

manuscript has become a key piece in a dialectical, hermeneutic circle, with known abhidharma texts enabling its interpretation, and it, in turn, shedding light on extant texts in later transmitted form and different languages that have long been the object of intense scholarly scrutiny. Indeed, this text is a piece of an original composition that enables us to check the accuracy of our reconstitution of the musical notes of Buddhist abhidharma from the remaining echoes.

The manuscript preserves only a portion of a longer text, and in style and contents, the preserved portion is typical of an exegetical, scholastic treatise. Since it consists primarily of arguments between the proponent and various opponents, it provides material for considering the differences among their various interpretations as well as for the complex character of the groups they might represent. Thus, it is a witness not only of one particular early Indian Buddhist exegetical text but also of an early stage in the development of Buddhist exegetical methods, in the emergence of the exegetical genre, and in the formation of key Buddhist doctrinal interpretations and later school groups.

Our manuscript comprises two large parts with approximately 190 mostly continuous lines written on both the recto and verso of the birch bark manuscript by the same scribe (BL scribe 21 according to the classification of Glass 2000). However, since no colophon is preserved and no textual parallel has as yet been identified, whether among extant Buddhist textual collections or independent texts, the physical relationship between the text portion preserved in this manuscript and the complete text of which it is a fragment remains uncertain.¹ As a first possibility, the original text might have been complete on a single scroll constructed from several bark parts glued together. According to this possibility, since the two surviving manuscript parts are contiguous, this text would represent either the major portion of the original text with damaged initial and final portions, or a mere portion of the original text from which one or more additional manuscript parts are missing. In either of these cases, given the size limits of a single composite scroll, it is likely that the original text treated a single topic or a set of closely related topics. As a second possibility, the surviving fragments might have been part of a multi-scroll text. In this case, it would not be possible to estimate the length of the original text, but it could very well have contained treatments of a variety of topics. However, since only one text, a Gāndhārī Verse Nirdeśa (Nird-G^{L2}), among the many texts preserved in the 29 fragments within the British Library collection has been confirmed to consist of multiple, originally discrete scrolls, the first option of a single-scroll text may be more likely.²

Even though the relationship between the text portion preserved in this manuscript and its original text remains uncertain, clues in our manuscript suggest that it was copied from a written archetype and therefore records a text that had been composed at some point prior to the probable date for the BL collection of manuscripts, which are dated to between the early first and second century CE.³ These clues consist of physical characteristics: for example, in certain cases unexpected letters in familiar words are best explained as resulting from the scribe's misreading of similar

¹ Introduction § I.1.5 Overall Structure and Contents.

² For a description of the BL manuscripts, see Salomon 1999: 87–100 [§§ 5.1–2]; Salomon 2014: 4–6 [§ 2].

³ Paleography and Orthography § II.2.6 Errors and Corrections. For the dating of the BL manuscripts, see Salomon 1999: 154–155 [§ 7.3].

longest portion of our text, is explicitly identified as a *mahasarvastivāda* (Skt **mahāsarvāstivāda*) and argues in support of the proposition “everything exists.” The position of this *mahasarvastivāda* opponent is familiar from other abhidharma texts, but the proponent’s arguments in our text, though familiar at certain points, also provide an important early context for the development of this controversy. The surrounding initial and concluding portions of our text appear to treat a different topic but one that is presumably related in some way to the intervening text. These surrounding portions of the text are fragmentary, but they contain various terms that occur in discussions of religious praxis. This would suggest that the text preserved in our manuscript may have been embedded within a larger discussion of religious practice, perhaps concerning whether past and future objects can serve as conditions for the arising of contaminants or defilements that are to be abandoned through such practice. This issue would then set the stage for the extended discussion of past and future factors preserved in our text.

I.1.2. Exegetical Texts and Scholastic Treatises

I.1.2.1. Exegesis and Context

The numerous fragments of exegetical texts that are preserved among the recently discovered Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts provide invaluable evidence for our understanding of the development of Buddhist exegetical practice and the exegetical genre.⁶ Dating from the first to second centuries CE, these fragments constitute important witnesses for exegetical practice at a crucial stage in its development from relatively straightforward commentary to the more complex methods that came to define later scholastic treatises. Their historical value is all the more important since unlike other extant exegetical texts preserved within canonical collections or independently, these Gāndhārī texts did not undergo a process of redaction and revision that would obscure clues regarding their context and history.

The exegetical texts preserved in Gāndhārī, all presumably circulating or possibly in use at around the same time, exhibit different formats and stylistic features and yet employ similar and progressively complex interpretive techniques. Thus, they would not support a model of historical progression for the exegetical genre as a whole marked by strict divisions as, for example, between commentaries and scholastic treatises. Instead, they suggest a continuously developing lineage of exegesis from its earliest form in the sūtras, through straightforward commentaries, and finally to independent scholastic treatises, with each type of text successively incorporating and yet transforming exegetical practices found in earlier texts, which the tradition would at some point classify as representing other genres. Further, since parallels for the Gāndhārī exegetical texts have not yet been identified among extant texts in other languages, they also testify to a thriving regional exegetical tradition in Gandhāra. Nevertheless, similarities with other early Indian Buddhist commentaries and scholastic treatises argue for concrete historical links among the various regionally diverse traditions.

Exegesis can be understood to refer to the practice of elaborative explication, or commentary in the broadest sense, that performs specific functions and adopts stylistic features and interpretive

⁶ For a review of the Gāndhārī exegetical texts and a discussion of their possible context, see Cox 2014. For a discussion of abhidharma as scholastic exegesis and of possible methods of textual interpretation, see Cox 2020.

techniques. These change over time and in different contexts and yet are guided by the same general purpose of preserving and adapting an authoritative textual tradition. In this general sense as explicatory practice, exegesis could be expressed in various formats, whether as straightforward commentary, catechesis, or polemics, which then occur in texts across a range of textual genres. For example, as straightforward commentary, exegesis is structured according to passages in a root text as found in certain early abhidharma texts such as the Saṅgītiparyāya, which follows its root text passage by passage, or the Dharmaskandha, which selects passages for comment and arranges them according to an external topical list, or matrix (*P mātikā*, Skt *mātrkā*). Such straightforward commentary performs the functions of clarifying and elaborating words and passages, discriminating among and evaluating variant interpretations in accordance with specific interpretive techniques, and establishing new priorities and doctrinal principles and systems through the selective emphasis upon certain issues. As to format, commentary can intersperse its comments within the root text, or it can deviate from the structure of a root text either through rhetorical patterns such as simple catechesis and classification structured as lists, or through methods of textual organization that reflect text-external doctrinal or contextual priorities. Simple interpretive techniques include glossing and definition, etymological and grammatical explanation, syntactic restatement, and summary paraphrase, but even such straightforward commentaries can employ more sophisticated techniques, such as, for example, in the case of the association or “mapping” of different sets of doctrinal categories through identification and reorganization, which clarifies their significance and reduces the total number of categories.⁷ Exegetical practices that are not linked directly to a root text follow the formats of thorough-going catechesis and alternative interpretations, which are organized according to text-external principles as found in many middle- and later-period abhidharma texts such as the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, Vijñānakāya, Dhātukāya, Prakaraṇapāda, and Jñānaprasthāna, and in the later scholastic treatises such as the Vibhāṣā compendia.⁸ Although such scholastic treatises preserve virtually all of the functions, stylistic features, and interpretive techniques of straightforward commentaries, they are intended as autonomous treatments of doctrinal topics and evince an awareness of their status as independent texts through text-internal cross-referencing. Their treatments of various topics are expanded with more extensive discursive expositions that feature newly arisen or more sophisticated doctrinal issues and technical terms. The most developed exegetical texts utilize more complex methods of catechesis and, perhaps most importantly, the active criticism of alternative interpretations and polemical argumentation.

Such functions, stylistic features, and interpretive techniques might be correlated with certain specific conditions for exegetical practice, which can in turn provide clues for a tentative reconstruction of the context in which they functioned. For example, even in its simplest form, commentary functions to clarify the content of the teaching and ensure its preservation through lists and catechesis, both of which reflect oral methods of instruction. Given this oral method of composing and transmitting early Buddhist teachings, such social and pedagogical functions of commentary are not surprising, and commentary would be expected from the beginning to co-exist together with the teachings that it elaborates. The emergence of more complex forms of catechesis

⁷ Cox 2014: 38.

⁸ For the periodization of abhidharma texts, see Cox 1992: 155–157.

and discursive exposition, which incorporate new doctrinal problems and technical terms, still suggests a pedagogical context but one influenced by an awareness of divergences among texts and the possibility of alternative interpretations. With increased interaction among geographically separated Buddhist and non-Buddhist groups, interpretation becomes overtly polemical and is eventually framed in terms of factional alignments. At this point, exegetical practice takes the form of complex scholastic treatises, which attempt to create coherent doctrinal systems that appeal to new doctrinal principles organized according to new interpretive procedures. Such treatises, with their sophisticated methods of polemical argumentation and increased self-awareness as products of an exegetical lineage, also suggest a context of inter-group rivalry and competition and possibly even intra- and inter-group scholastic debate.⁹ Thus, rather than viewing exegetical practice simply as the scholastic product of a sectarian or an elite institutionalized culture, it is perhaps better viewed as the natural result of oral transmission and instruction, which functioned as the indispensable context for mediating continued access to the teaching.

I.1.2.2. Polemical Scholastic Style

Given its stylistic features and interpretive techniques, this Gāndhārī text can be definitively classified as an exegetical text. Its explicit polemical format and in-depth examination of doctrinal issues suggest that it is an early example of an independent scholastic treatise, a characterization that is further supported by its style, language, and syntactic patterns. Among the varieties of literary Gāndhārī attested in texts of the British Library and other collections, this text represents the style of “scholastic Gāndhārī” found in exegetical and commentarial texts.¹⁰ In contrast to the other varieties of literary Gāndhārī, even those such as the “colloquial avadāna style” in which there does appear to be at least a loose correlation between style and genre,¹¹ here the style is determined by scholastic practice and its context and purposes. In general terms, the style of our text is formalized through a restricted and largely technical vocabulary as well as a limited range of syntactic patterns, with the exception of cited scriptural passages that preserve a more varied style. This abhidharma text gives the impression of following established conventions in both vocabulary and syntactic patterns, such as, for example, in its decided preference for simple copula patterns and rare use of other verbal constructions. Despite its relatively limited vocabulary and syntactic simplicity, our text is a rich source for the nominal compounds encountered in other scholastic treatises and that become an important marker of the later scholastic style.

In its phonetic features, this text is also quite regular and consistent, not displaying the variability in phonetic changes and spelling that characterize many BL manuscripts.¹² Words common in

⁹ Caution must be exercised in assuming a direct correlation between the exegetical practices and presumed context of a given text, as, for example, between polemical argumentation and scholastic debate, since particular stylistic features and interpretive techniques are generally preserved and may then indicate inherited textual conventions even though the original context no longer applies. For a discussion of the context of the Kathāvattu and Vijñānakāya, see Bronkhorst 1993.

¹⁰ Salomon 2002: 125–127.

¹¹ Salomon 1999: 114 [§ 6.1], 133 [§ 6.5]; Lenz, 2003: 107 [§ 7.8].

¹² Exceptions include the alternation of *-v-* and *-p-* in *ruva* and *rupa* (P/Skt *rūpa*), *vi* and *pi* (P/Skt *api*), and in *vuna* and *puna* (P *puna*, Skt *punar*).

Buddhist usage that reflect MIA forms not expected in Gāndhārī also regularly appear in our text: for example, *arahada* (P *arahant*, Skt *arhant*); *kama* (P *kamma*, Skt *karman*); *cakhu* (P *cakkhu*, Skt *caṅṣus*); *dhama* (P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*); and *maga* (P *magga*, Skt *mārga*). However, rather than reflecting variation resulting from the process of textual translation or transposition from another MIA dialect, the consistent use of these words may indicate that such forms had become standard in Buddhist usage at that time. Thus, this text contains little evidence suggesting that it was originally composed in another MIA dialect, and especially given the absence up to now of extant textual parallels for Gāndhārī commentarial or exegetical texts such as our text, it is possible and indeed probable that these texts were originally composed in Gāndhārī.¹³

The syntactic patterns employed in this text are dictated by its polemical style and are strikingly similar to those of certain other comparatively early Indian Buddhist exegetical or abhidharma texts such as the Kathāvatthu (among canonical Pali canonical abhidhamma texts), the Vijñānakāya (among the Sarvāstivāda canonical abhidharma texts), and the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra (an independent Sarvāstivāda-related abhidharma text extant only in Chinese translation). Even certain sections of the Vibhāṣā compendia resemble the simple polemical style of our text. These texts might be described as following a dialogical or polemical expository style that employs similar recurring rhetorical patterns and terminology and adopts a basic catechetical format in recording the opinions of the various proponents and their opponents. However, they differ from one another in their degree of structural regularity, a difference that may be an important clue for reconstructing their history.

The most tightly structured and rigidly formulaic of these four texts is the Kathāvatthu.¹⁴ In each independent section, the Kathāvatthu proponent introduces a contested point and then engages in a polemical exchange with an opponent in which each party attempts to force the other into a contradiction with his own stated position. The structure of these exchanges is also largely consistent. One party seeks the other party's endorsement of a particular position, which is then countered with a series of formulaic questions intended to force a retraction by provoking responses that in some way contradict the initial endorsement. Although these formulaic questions all function similarly in their attempt to elicit an internal contradiction, they follow a number of different patterns.

In a particularly frequent pattern, the Kathāvatthu proponent raises a question with which the respondent agrees, and then offers another question, sometimes in the form of a rhetorical question introduced by the indeclinable P *nanu*, “surely” or “isn't it the case that,” that points to a contradiction in the opponent's position. The proponent then concludes with an explicit statement of the contradiction to which these two responses lead, which usually contains the markers “if” (P *hañci*) and “it is wrong” (P *micchā*). As an example, the following exchange occurs in the first argument following the initial consideration of the declaration, “everything exists”: “[KvP] Does a past [thing] exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Is it not the case that (P *nanu*) a past [thing] is ceased, gone away, altered, vanished, and completely vanished? [O] Yes. [KvP] If (P *hañci*) a past [thing] is ceased, gone away, altered, vanished, and completely vanished, surely it cannot be said that

¹³ Salomon 2002: 126–127. BL manuscript 20+23 also lacks a parallel, but in contrast to BL 28, it displays signs of more Sanskrit phonology.

¹⁴ For arguments in the Kathāvatthu and their structure, see Ganeri 2001.

‘a past [thing] exists.’”¹⁵ Similar but more simple patterns also occur. For example, to begin the chapter “Everything Exists,”¹⁶ the proponent alternates the original contested point, which the opponent accepts, with additional but related questions, with which he disagrees: “[KvP] Does everything exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Does everything exist everywhere? [O] That should not be said. [KvP] Does everything exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Does everything always exist? [O] That should not be said. ...,” and so forth.¹⁷ Or else, the proponent raises a single question with which the opponent first agrees and then disagrees, indicating that the different circumstances that lead the opponent to offer different responses result in an internal contradiction: “[KvP] Does that which was once future become present? [O] Yes. [KvP] Is that very thing that is future [also] present? [O] That should not be said. [KvP] Is that very thing that is future [also] present? [O] Yes.”¹⁸

In the course of a polemical exchange, the opponent can also take the lead and employ the same patterns to undermine the proponent’s position, usually without a clear indication of the speaker. However, different formulaic patterns are used by each party to state the contradiction implied by their respective arguments; the Kathāvatthu proponent uses the phrase “recognize the refutation” (P *ājānāhi niggahaṃ*), while the opponent uses the phrase “recognize the rejoinder” (P *ājānāhi paṭikammaṃ*). And at the conclusion of the treatment of a given point, both parties often adduce scriptural citations either to support their own position or to counter that of their opponent. In all such arguments, the objective is not to explicate and defend one’s own view, but to undermine the other party’s fundamental position by forcing him into internal contradictions that result from his responses to criticism.

Like the Kathāvatthu, the first two sections of the Vijñānakāya are highly formulaic and employ consistent patterns. The first section criticizes the position of Maudgalyāyana, who rejects the existence of the past and future, and the second, the position of a Pudgalavādin, who maintains the existence of the person (P *puggala*, Skt *pudgala*).¹⁹ Each exchange begins with a statement of the opponent’s position followed by criticism, which opens with a scriptural citation whose authority the opponent is asked to accept or reject. Once the opponent accepts the authority of the passage, additional questions are raised, which either offer mutually exclusive alternatives or take the form of a polar “yes/no” question. In both cases, the criticism examines each alternative and then specifies the untoward consequence that forces the opponent into a contradiction with his original position.²⁰

¹⁵ P *aṭītaṃ atthīti. āmantā. nanu aṭītaṃ niruddhaṃ vigataṃ vipariṇataṃ atthaṅgataṃ abbatthaṅgatan ti. āmantā. hañci aṭītaṃ niruddhaṃ vigataṃ vipariṇataṃ atthaṅgataṃ abbatthaṅgataṃ no ca vata re vattabbe aṭītaṃ atthīti* (Kv 116).

¹⁶ Kathāvatthu, section 6, *Sabbamatthītikathā*.

¹⁷ P *sabbam atthīti. āmantā. sabbattha sabbam atthīti. na h’ evaṃ vattabbe. sabbam atthīti. āmantā. sabbadā sabbamatthīti. na h’ evaṃ vattabbe* (Kv 115–116).

¹⁸ P *anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hotīti. āmantā. tañ ñeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannan ti na h’ evaṃ vattabbe ... pe ... tañ ñeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti. āmantā ...* (Kv 125).

¹⁹ The final portion (VK 3 p. 545b24ff.) of the second section criticizing the person is in large part catechetical but deviates from the strict patterns followed in both the first section and the rest of the second.

²⁰ The criticism of polar questions begins with the statement 汝聽墮負, which would appear to be a translation of “recognize the refutation” (P *ājānāhi niggahaṃ*) found in the Kathāvatthu.

Although the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra employs a basic catechetical format and generally conforms to certain polemical and rhetorical patterns, it is much less tightly structured and formulaic than either the Kathāvatthu or the Vijñānakāya. The questions with which a particular topic begins take several different forms: for example, “What is X?,” “What is the difference between X and Y?,” or “What is X, and what is non-X?” In most cases, a number of alternative responses are given for each question, very occasionally only four in the form of a tetralemma (Skt *catuṣkoṭi*), and these alternative responses are then summarized through a concluding “topical” or “content list” (Skt *uddāna*). For certain questions, one response is attributed to someone referred to as an “Ārya,” whose identity is not otherwise specified, and in these cases a “content list” is not given. Any particular response can lead to a further question that introduces a hypothetical situation, “Suppose such and such were the case ...,” which in turn elicits the consideration of mutually exclusive or in some cases logically complementary alternatives and the consequences to which they lead. And in its examination of any given topic, the text often proceeds from one point to the next through questions that are linked in content to the preceding response. Thus, even though the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra shares both general interpretive techniques and specific rhetorical patterns with the Kathāvatthu and the Vijñānakāya, it displays much greater variety in syntax and is also characterized by at least an occasional continuity in topic that the other two texts lack.

Like these three texts, our Gāndhārī abhidharma text is polemical throughout and employs similar methods and arguments, but it is far more open in structure and shows greater flexibility in syntax. Although the character of the complete original text is uncertain since it may in fact have contained numerous and distinct topical sections, the portion preserved in this manuscript is limited in content and treats several closely related issues, all of which concern the topic of existence, in particular the existence of past and future factors. Within this broad topic, separate arguments can be identified, but they do not adopt a consistent format and do not seem to be part of a coherent overall organization. Instead, they appear to constitute a more free-flowing record of relatively isolated arguments, which in several cases spiral back to previous issues and even to specific criticisms within those issues. As a result of this greater looseness in both internal organization and argument pattern, this Gāndhārī text, in contrast to the Kathāvatthu, the Vijñānakāya, and the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra, does not exhibit the same degree of redaction and reformulation resulting from textual revision but instead gives the impression of being closer to its probable roots in pedagogy or actual debate. Nonetheless, the similarity in specific arguments, in particular to those of the Kathāvatthu, suggests that even in this early period separate lineages of exegesis in different regions shared and preserved both methods of argument and doctrinal interpretations.²¹

Polemical exchanges in this Gāndhārī abhidharma text do employ certain regular rhetorical patterns and exegetical operators even though they are not as rigidly formulaic as those in the other three texts. In addition, the exegetical operators can also be used as markers to distinguish the opponent’s and proponent’s statements. Arguments typically begin with a simple statement

²¹ For a consideration of various possibilities concerning the relationship between the Kathāvatthu and the Vijñānakāya, see Bronkhorst 1993.

of the opponent's contested position using one of two patterns. In the first pattern, the proponent raises a question introduced by the gerundive, "it is to be asked" (*prochidava*, P *pucchitabba*, Skt *praṣṭavya*), which addresses some aspect or implication of the opponent's position. This is perhaps the most frequent pattern found in the treatment of the first major topic in our text, namely, the examination of past and future factors (ll. 1–66). In the second pattern, the proponent offers a direct quotation of the opponent's position almost invariably concluding with the quotative particle *di* (P *iti/ti*, Skt *iti*). This direct quotation can be placed within a conditional clause beginning with "if" (*yadi/yidi*, P/Skt *yadi*), marked by the verb "one states" (*aha/ahadi/ahasu*, P *āha/āhaṃsu*, Skt *āha/āhuḥ*), or in two instances by "you say" (*broṣi*, P *brūsi*, Skt *bravīṣi*). While this pattern does appear in the treatment of the first topic, it is the sole method used throughout the treatment of the second major topic, "everything exists" (l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7). This second topic begins with a lengthy presentation of the opponent's position attributed directly to him through the phrase "you might wish to say" (*icheaṣi vatu*, P *iccheyyāsi vattum*, Skt *iccher vaktum*).

Following the initial citation of the opponent's position, the proponent offers a point-by-point criticism. Most often, the criticism is structured by a continued conditional-clause-response pattern, but occasionally, the proponent specifies possible alternatives within the opponent's position, which are marked by the operator "or else" (*aṣa va*, P/Skt *athavā*), and he then criticizes each in turn. In addition, the text twice employs the asseverative particle "yes" (*amaṃ*, P *āma*, Skt *ām*), which is used often in the Kathāvatthu to mark the opponent's assent in the course of an argument. In the case of both patterns, the conditional clauses or contrasting alternatives are followed by a clear statement of the untoward consequence to which each leads, often introduced by the phrase "with regard to that it should be said" (*tatra vatava*, P *tatra vattabbaṃ*, Skt *tatra vaktavyam*), or by the simple adverb "then," or "therefore" (G/P/Skt *tena*). Frequently also, arguments conclude not with a simple declarative statement but with a rhetorical question that points to the contradiction or untoward consequence following from the opponent's position. And finally, five times in this text arguments end with the operator "and so on" (*peyala*, P *peyyāla*, Skt *peyāla/piyāla/paryāya*), which signals the inclusion of the unstated final portion of an argument or of additional but unspecified supporting material.

I.1.2.3. Methods of Exegesis

As an exegetical text focused solely on polemics, this Gāndhārī abhidharma text uses only those interpretive techniques that contribute to the efficacy of its arguments. These methods include occasional appeals to authoritative scripture (P/Skt *āgama*), but they concentrate on reasoned investigation (P *yutti*, Skt *yukti*). Only rarely does our text employ other interpretive techniques such as similes and text-internal cross-referencing. The commentarial techniques of glossing and definition, the etymological or grammatical explanation of individual words and compounds, syntactic restatement, summary paraphrase, and even the application of extraneous doctrinal categories, all of which are common in other non-polemical abhidharma texts, are not found in our text.

I.1.2.3.1. Scriptural Citation

Although references to authoritative scripture do appear in this Gāndhārī text, the far greater role played by reasoned investigation reflects the shift in emphasis away from scriptural citation that can be observed in polemical expository texts of the middle and later periods, in particular from the period of the Vibhāṣā compendia onward. Our text contains fewer references to authoritative scripture than appear in the other abhidharma texts it most closely resembles. For example, the Vijñānakāya, although also not a commentary on sūtra passages per se, cites a scriptural passage to initiate virtually every argument. These passages then serve as the basis for subsequent questions that raise alternatives, each of which inevitably forces the opponent into an untoward consequence. The *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra relies less upon authoritative scripture as a primary structural element but does cite statements of the Buddha in the course of many arguments. The Kathāvatthu does not intersperse scriptural citations within its arguments but collects them at the conclusion of only certain sections. Cited passages do not serve as the basis for further questions or arguments but function simply to support the position of the party offering the citation. Rather than signaling a shift in emphasis away from scriptural citation, the fact that comparatively few references to authoritative scripture are preserved in this Gāndhārī text might simply be a chance occurrence due to the portion of the original text that has been preserved. In other words, any scriptural citations that appeared in the original text might have been reserved for the end of each section, such as in the case of the Kathāvatthu, or collected in an entirely separate section devoted to sūtra passages as is found in several polemical expository abhidharma texts such as the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra or the *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra.²²

This abhidharma text contains only eight acknowledged citations of scripture, all of which are specifically related to the progression of an argument. In addition, there is one probable citation that is partially obscured by manuscript damage and two references to events that are recounted in the sūtras.²³ The eight acknowledged scriptural citations perform several different functions.

(1–4) Serving as proof of the existence of a contested factor through a mere reference to the factor in authoritative scripture. This would appear to be the function of the only series of scriptural citations in our text (ll. 25–28). Although it is not clear whether the proponent or the opponent is speaking in this passage, the passage begins with a general question concerning whether or not there is some action whose matured effect exists.²⁴ The response, namely, that there is such action, is then supported by four scriptural citations. Although they are not clearly marked as citations through explicit attribution to the Bhagavat, three of the four can be identified with sūtra parallels, and several other indicators suggest that all four are scriptural citations. Perhaps most noticeable is their style, which differs from the remainder of the text. Specifically, several terms do not occur elsewhere and have little connection with the topics discussed in the

²² ĀVBSŚ 5 p. 759a22ff.; AHŚ (Dh) 4 p. 826b10ff.; AHŚ (U) 5 p. 859c27ff. See also MAHŚ 8 p. 931b21ff.

²³ For the probable citation with a possible sūtra parallel, see Text Notes: [81] *[sarva] ta ca asti me aḥatva cha[d]*. [82] + ///; Commentary: Opponent's Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]. For the reference to the story of Aṅgulimāla, see Text Notes: [41] *aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki n[u] khu*; Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent's Second Category [ll. 36–45]. For the reference to the Buddha as one for whom the matured effect of unvirtuous action is his own, see Commentary: (3) Criticism Opponent's Third Category [ll. 17–20].

²⁴ Commentary: (4–5) Criticism Opponent's Third Category [ll. 21–28].

text: for example, “loving kindness” (*metra*, P *mettā*, Skt *maitrā*), “small thing” (*apaṃ*, P *appam*, Skt *alpam*), “tranquility” (G/Skt *śama*, P *sama*), “dispute” (*vivata*, P/Skt *vivāda*), “conception” (*sañña*, P *saññā*, Skt *saṃjñā*), and “conventional speech” (*voḥaro*, P *voḥāra*, Skt *vyavahāra*). In addition, certain distinctive morphological forms are used that might suggest a scriptural citation: for example, the nominative plural neuter ending *-ani* in *palani* (P/Skt *phalāni*) is unique in our text and not common in other Gāndhārī texts; the first-person singular present verb form “I say” (*bromi*, P *brūmi*, Skt *bravīmi*), which does not occur elsewhere in this text, indicates a mode of direct speech typical of sūtras; and finally, the passive verb form *provucadi*, “it is proclaimed,” resembles the pattern marked by the past participle form Skt *prokta* of *pra* + \sqrt{vac} used in scholastic treatises to mark a scriptural citation.²⁵

(5) Supporting a statement by offering a similar declaration from authoritative scripture (l. 121). Here, the proponent appeals to a scriptural citation to support his statement that such nonexistent entities as a fifth noble truth, a nineteenth element, a soul, and a person should be included within the factor (*dhama*, P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*) “sense sphere” and are thus perceived by mental perceptual consciousness. Although this declaration is not attributed to the Bhagavat, it is followed by the past participle form *vuta* (P *vutta*, Skt *ukta*), which is frequently used to mark sūtra passages.²⁶

(6–7) Rejecting an unacceptable alternative by claiming that it would contradict authoritative scripture. Our text contains two examples of scriptural citations with this function. The first (ll. 34–36) occurs in an argument concerning whether or not there is some action whose matured effect will not occur at all. The proponent argues against both possible responses and rejects the second possibility, namely, that there is no such action without a matured effect, because this would render the life of religious practice useless. This possibility is rejected in the cited sūtra passage as well for the same reason.²⁷ The second example (l. 56) is found in an argument concerning whether the matured effect occurs from past or present action. Once again, the proponent argues against both possibilities, and claims that the alternative, namely, that the matured effect arises from present action, contradicts scripture (*sutraviroṣa*, P *suttavirodha*, Skt *sūtravirodha*).²⁸

(8) Providing the starting point or basis for an argument. Our text begins an argument with a scriptural citation in only one case (ll. 47–48), which occurs in the proponent’s criticism of future factors. The proponent first offers a scriptural passage that refers to cultivating religious practice for the purpose of the non-arising of future evil unvirtuous factors, and he then inquires whether these future factors should be considered “subject to arising” or not “subject to arising.” As the proponent then demonstrates, each response results in an undesirable conclusion.²⁹

²⁵ Text Notes: [26] *prov.cadi* • [p]ro[27]^[51kkk(r)+51H(r)][v].^[51H(r)][c].di [he]du[n]. [hi].

²⁶ Text Notes: [121] ^[51mmm(v)]*jiva ca pugala ca dha*^[51H(v)]*ma va[tav]. di • eva hi v[u]ta [manoviñana] ? ? [m]. [di];* Manuscript Notes: ll. 115–123.

²⁷ Text Notes: [34] *na hode br[o]mici[a]vaṣa*. Commentary: (6–7) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

²⁸ Text Notes: [56] *pa[cam]. jana samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di* •. Commentary: (8) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 51–61].

²⁹ Text Notes: [47] *bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuṣa[lana dha]mana unupaḍa* [48] + /// [s].- [mepr].[s].[na bhavedi] •. Commentary: (4–5) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51].

I.1.2.3.2. Argument

The arguments in this Gāndhārī abhidharma text depend entirely upon the method of Skt *prasaṅga*, “implication of an untoward consequence,” whereby the proponent does not argue for his own position but only attempts to refute the positions of his opponents.³⁰ Most arguments proceed by presumptive reasoning, and the objective is then not to prove or disprove a particular position but to force the opponent to withdraw his position in the face of an undesirable conclusion.³¹ An effective refutation does not demand a particular structure or type of proof but includes only those statements necessary to indicate the contradiction of commonly accepted doctrinal positions, or, very occasionally, of scriptural passages to which the opponent’s position leads. Despite the different syntactic patterns that the arguments exhibit, the internal format is that of a dialogue or polemical exchange, including questions and responses or simple statements and conclusions, through which the proponent attempts to pin down and then undermine the opponent’s position.

In the case of arguments structured by polemical exchange, or questions and responses, the questions usually take one of three forms. First, polar questions demand that the opponent accept or reject a particular position, and they elicit an affirmative or negative response. For example, in the examination of the opponent’s third category of existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, the proponent inquires whether or not this matured effect belongs to the one performing the action (ll. 17–20). If the opponent responds in the affirmative that the matured effect does indeed belong to the one performing the action, a contradiction of scripture results since the Buddha cannot be said to be one who possesses the consequences of any past unvirtuous actions. However, if the opponent responds in the negative that the matured effect does not belong to the one performing the action, then, as the proponent inquires rhetorically, how is it possible for one to experience the matured effects of one’s own actions? Thus, with both the affirmative and negative alternatives rejected, the opponent’s model of existent past actions and their matured effects is undermined and hence must be withdrawn.³²

According to a second form, questions can raise mutually exclusive alternatives, each of which is to be rejected. For example, in the examination of the second category of future matured effects, the proponent criticizes the opponent’s attempt to divide future factors into the two categories of “subject to arising” and “not subject to arising” (ll. 47–51). The proponent begins his argument with a scriptural citation: “One cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen.” He then inquires how it is possible for these future evil factors to be either subject to or not subject to arising. If the opponent responds that they are not subject to arising, the cultivation of right exertion in the path of practice has no purpose since these evil factors, as not subject to arising, will not arise in any case. However, if the opponent responds that they are subject

³⁰ If the speaker in lines 24–28 is determined to be the proponent, this would constitute the only section in which he offers and supports his own position. See Commentary: (4–5) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 21–28].

³¹ Ganeri 2001: 487.

³² In contrast to this example that examines opposing options, in two cases the text considers two affirmative or two negative possibilities. Although it is possible that these cases are a result of textual corruption, an attempt has been made to make sense of the text as written. See ll. 36–38, 43–45. Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

to arising and then as a result of practice change their status to factors not subject to arising, this contradicts the opponent's own earlier proposition that factors subject to arising inevitably arise. Thus, with the mutually exclusive categories of "subject to arising" and "not subject to arising" undermined, future matured effects stand rejected.

As a third form, questions can occur with the interrogative marker "for what reason" (*kena karanena*, P/Skt *kena kāraṇena*) or as rhetorical questions often initiated by the phrase "now how possibly" (*ki nu khu*, P *kiṃ nu kho*, Skt *kiṃ nu khalu*). For example, to initiate a more in-depth criticism of the opponent's third category of existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, the proponent asks, "Then for what reason [does one state], [O] 'Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?'" (*t(*a) kena karanena adīḍa avivakavivaga asti di*, ll. 3–4). This elicits clarification from the opponent, which then sets the stage for extended criticism and multiple arguments that continue for the next thirty-three lines.

Polemical exchanges structured by simple statements and conclusions usually begin with a direct quotation of the opponent's position, either as a simple declarative statement, or in a conditional clause followed by the untoward consequence in most cases introduced by "then" or "therefore" (G/P/Skt *tena*). At this point, the exchange may continue with the opponent offering a qualification, and the proponent, yet another untoward consequence. For example, in his elaboration of his fundamental proposition "everything exists," the opponent offers the declaration, "everything exists everywhere" (l. 67; cf. ll. 98–102). In his criticism, the proponent first cites this declaration once again and concludes that the material-form sense sphere, which is the visual object of the eye, must then exist within the visual sense sphere, or within the eye itself. Accordingly, the natures of all sentient beings would exist in a hell-being, and in fact the natures of all things would exist in all other things, a conclusion that is obviously undesirable since it would then become impossible to distinguish one thing from another. If the opponent responds that one should then not say that "everything exists everywhere," the proponent observes that this is tantamount to claiming that "everything does not exist everywhere." And this in turn results in the undesirable conclusion that "something exists and something does not exist," which of course contradicts the opponent's own fundamental proposition that "everything exists."

In only one case does the proponent present a relatively complex argument that takes on a more formal structure (ll. 95–98). The proponent begins by citing the opponent's first qualification of his fundamental proposition: "That which exists is everything" (*asti sarva*). Through a formally valid argument, he then attempts to demonstrate that this qualification results in the untoward consequence, "the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere." In other words, the qualification results in the fact that all sense organs would be identified with the eye; instead, of course, "all sense organs" as the larger category should include the eye. The formal argument proceeds as follows. The initial statement, "that which exists is everything," claims that "that which exists" (A) is to be equated with "everything" (B), or $A = B$. In the next statement, "the visual sense sphere exists," the visual sense sphere (C) is said to exist (A), or $C = A$. One can then conclude through transitive predication that the visual sense sphere (C) can be equated with everything (B), or $C = B$. Now, the opponent also offers the specification "those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist" (l. 69), through which the twelve sense spheres

(D) can then be equated with everything (B), or $D = B$. Given that the visual sense sphere is also equated with everything, or $C = B$, the untoward consequence results that the twelve sense spheres (D) can be equated with the visual sense sphere (C), or $D = C$.³³ Thus, in schematic form:

If A (that which exists) = B (everything)
 And C (visual sense sphere) = A (that which exists)
 [Then C (visual sense sphere) = B (everything)]
 [And since by definition D (twelve sense spheres) = B (everything)]
 Then D (twelve sense spheres) = C (visual sense sphere)

I.1.2.4. Principles Applied in Arguments

Throughout his arguments, the proponent in this Gāndhārī abhidharma text employs similar techniques such as insisting upon strict definitions and clear distinctions, and appealing to various types of metonymy, such as observed, for example, in the previously cited argument concerning the sense spheres. However, there are also certain specific principles that the proponent applies in a variety of arguments.

Perhaps the most pervasive of these principles are category uniformity and set equivalence, principles also encountered frequently in other abhidharma texts such as the Kathāvatthu. In many arguments in our text, the opponent's position is said to result in a category contradiction since the proponent contends that distinct parts of a single category must be qualified similarly, especially as concerns the existence of each part. For the proponent, factors of a given category must be uniform in their defining characteristics; all members must exemplify these characteristics, and parts of a whole should be marked by set equivalence. These principles are applied specifically to the opponent's attempts to divide categories into separate groups of juxtaposed opposites, specifically the categories of past and future factors that are then divided into two categories, one of which is claimed to exist, and the other, not to exist. In one case (ll. 29–31), the opponent distinguishes past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, which are claimed to exist, from those that have already given rise to their matured effects and do not exist. This distinction hinges upon the opponent's earlier statement that past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured exist because they are "possessed of a fruit" (ll. 3–7). Since past actions that have already given rise to their matured effects are no longer "possessed of a fruit," they cannot as a result be said to exist. As a rejoinder to the opponent's attempted distinction, the proponent contends that if one part of the past is claimed to exist as possessed of a fruit, the same qualification must apply to both parts; in other words, whether both parts are said to exist or not to exist, the past as a whole must display the same characteristics. In the case of future factors also (ll. 36–51), the opponent attempts to distinguish existent factors "subject to arising" from nonexistent factors "not subject to arising." Here again, the proponent contends that the category of future factors as a whole must be admitted either to exist as subject to arising, or not to exist as not subject to arising.³⁴

³³ Commentaries: Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; (3) Criticism Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 95–98].

³⁴ For other examples, see 51D(r) ll. 1–3; ll. 3–7, 7–10, 98–102.

In addition to category uniformity and set equivalence, several arguments in this text proceed from the converse and inverse of prior statements. The principle of converse and inverse is used in several abhidharma texts to clarify relationships among concepts or categories by delimiting their boundaries.³⁵ Perhaps the most notable example in our text occurs in the opponent's own qualification of his fundamental proposition "everything exists" through the converse affirmative and negative statements, "that which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything." These statements make it clear that the proposition "everything exists" does not mean that everything exists under all possible circumstances but rather only if both "everything" is properly delimited and "exists" is clarified. And this is precisely what the opponent proceeds to do through his three specifications of "everything" and two explications of "existence" that follow these two converse statements.

The final principle underlying arguments in our text is that of inclusion. Since inclusion is fundamental to the abhidharma classification of factors (P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*), it is implicit in virtually all arguments, but it appears twice explicitly. Its first occurrence is in the opponent's first specification of "everything" (l. 69): "Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist." This statement, which becomes the standard one in Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika discussions of existence, clearly specifies the extent of "everything" and thereby defines the content of what exists by limiting possible existents to the twelve sense spheres. In one subsequent argument (ll. 95–98), the proponent argues through transitive predication that this specification results in the untoward consequence that any existent factor by itself can be equated with the twelve sense spheres, which in turn violates the principle of inclusion upon which the specification itself is based. The principle of inclusion occurs explicitly a second time in the proponent's criticism of the opponent's declaration, "everything exists everywhere" (ll. 98–102). In this case, the proponent contends that the opponent's declaration results in a confusion of categories such that "other-nature exists in intrinsic nature" and "intrinsic nature exists in other-nature." This in turn violates the fundamental principle through which categories are distinguished, namely, that factors are to be included within a single category because they share the same intrinsic or "self-nature" (*svabhava*, P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*) and are concurrently excluded from other categories of factors characterized by a different or "other nature" (*parabhava*, P/Skt *parabhāva*).³⁶ Through the declaration that "everything exists everywhere," the opponent undermines the distinction between "self" nature and "other" nature, thereby violating this basic principle of inclusion upon which distinctions among factors and indeed the entire abhidharma taxonomy are based.

I.1.3. Comparison with Other Abhidharma Texts

Even though a parallel for this text has not yet been identified, its distinctive style and contents allow it to be situated relative to other texts in the development of early Indian Buddhist abhidharma. As noted above, the texts most similar to our text are the Kathāvatthu, the Vijñānakāya, and the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra, texts that represent different exegetical lineages and geographical regions. Even though the Kathāvatthu and Vijñānakāya came to be established as

³⁵ Commentary: Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

³⁶ Commentary: Criticism Opponent's First Declaration [ll. 98–102]. See also Cox 2004.

discrete texts that were accorded importance in their respective traditions, their early history is obscure.³⁷ The *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra is preserved in a single Chinese translation, and little is known about either its origins and early history or any further changes it underwent after this Chinese translation in the late fourth century CE.³⁸ At the very least, we must assume a long period of compilation, redaction, and revision during which all of these texts as we currently have them took shape. Nonetheless, their close connections in both overall structure and contents point to a common body of interpretive techniques, of controversial doctrinal issues, and even of specific arguments, which would suggest an early period of exegetical inquiry not yet defined by strict geographical or sectarian identities.³⁹ Indeed, despite the seemingly clear later school affiliation of the Kathāvatthu and the Vijñānakāya, their character as sectarian texts must be qualified. The views presented in the earliest sections of the Kathāvatthu should be accepted as predating both its commentary and certainly the Pali-centered school identity of the later tradition.⁴⁰ Further, even though the Vijñānakāya is classified as a Sarvāstivāda canonical text by the later tradition, different Chinese translations of certain canonical Sarvāstivāda texts suggest that separate branches of Sarvāstivādins throughout the northwest region transmitted different texts. In fact, it is likely that in the earliest period even these later Sarvāstivāda canonical texts had no sectarian identity but represented generalized or regionally localized exegetical materials.⁴¹ And finally, although the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra presents Sarvāstivāda positions, several perhaps for the first time,⁴² these differ in many points from those sanctioned by the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and may then represent another, possibly a non-Kāśmīra, Sarvāstivāda lineage. Thus, since these texts cannot be assumed to reflect simple school or geographical identities, caution must be exercised in attempting to draw specific historical conclusions from the apparent connections among them. Our Gāndhārī text represents yet another example of early exegesis that employs the same techniques and examines similar topics. However, rather than attempting to

³⁷ For the dating and composition of the Kathāvatthu, see Cousins 1991: 34–35; Norman 1983: 103–105. For the Vijñānakāya, see Cox 1998, in particular 197–205.

³⁸ For the complex history of the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra and its relationship to other abhidharma texts and groups, see Watanabe 1954: 186–252. For problems surrounding the identity of Vasumitra, see Yamada 1959: 403–408, who suggests (403) that certain of these problems can be resolved if Vasumitra is seen as an early figure who predates the emergence of different school groups, which then claimed him as their own. See also Akanuma 1934: 64. For structural similarities between the Kathāvatthu and the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra, see Akanuma 1934: 62; Watanabe 1954: 180–185. The *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra also shares organizational similarities with the Jñānaprasthāna, both of which begin with a “miscellany” section (Skt **saṃyukta*) and end with a section containing verse citations (Skt **gāthā*).

³⁹ For connections among certain northern abhidharma texts and Pali abhidhamma texts, notably the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, the Dharmaskandha, and the Vibhaṅga, see Kimura 1937: 67–88; Frauwallner 1995: 97–100; Yamada 1959: 70–72; Cox 1998: 162–166.

⁴⁰ For the dating of the Kathāvatthu in relation to the emergence of schools, see the summary discussion by Schmithausen 1992: 144. For the observation that the controversies recorded in the Kathāvatthu need not be taken to imply the existence of schools, see Norman 1983: 104.

⁴¹ Cox 1998: 143–160; Introduction § I.1.4 School Affiliation.

⁴² Watanabe 1954: 188–191, 200–202, 249–251.

associate this text with any particular lineage, it is better taken as evidence of the variety of early exegetical activity that was only at a later point and under certain specific circumstances codified as sectarian abhidharma.

In addition to the syntactic similarities discussed above, the Kathāvattu, Vijñānakāya, and *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra also exhibit close connections in content, specifically in their treatment of the topics of the existence of past and future factors and the proposition “everything exists,” which serve as the focus for the major part of our text. Now, both of these controversies have a complex history that can only be uncovered through an in-depth review not only of the few middle-period abhidharma texts that first record them but also of their elaboration in later texts. Nonetheless, a brief comparison of the context for and treatment of these topics in each of these three texts will place the discussion preserved in our text into a broader context and may shed light on the original text of which it was a part.

At first glance, the Kathāvattu and the Vijñānakāya appear to be similar since the sections on the topics of the person (P *puggala*, Skt *pudgala*) and existence in the three time periods are found near the beginning of both texts. However, an examination of the arguments themselves reveals that the treatments are quite different. The Kathāvattu resembles our text closely in basic structure and topics, as well as in the details of the arguments. The sixth chapter “Everything Exists” (P *Sabbamatthīkathā*) includes separate sections investigating problems concerning the past, present, and future, as well as arguments with regard to their “nature” or “mode,” the relationships among them, and their role in the dynamics of karma.⁴³ By contrast, the Vijñānakāya, which is alone among the canonical Sarvāstivāda texts in presenting a sustained treatment of existence in the three time periods, focuses its discussion on past and future factors as objects of perceptual consciousness and on the possession of past, present, and future factors. In later Sarvāstivāda discussions of the existence of the past, present, and future, the issue of past and future objects figures prominently, as, for example, in the comments of the Vibhāṣā compendia on the terms, past, present, and future as they appear in various sections of the Jñānaprasthāna, and most importantly on the past, present, and future as the first of the three-member categories within the forty, forty-one, or forty-two categories of factors under the ten divisions.⁴⁴

In the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra, discussions of existence in the three time periods appear in two separate sections. Although there is some overlap between these two sections in the specific topics treated, the examination of past and future factors is found in the first chapter containing “miscellaneous” (Skt **saṃyukta*) topics,⁴⁵ while the proposition “everything exists” is treated in a separate chapter devoted to this topic alone. The first chapter

⁴³ The examination of past and future factors also continues into chapter 7, “Past Aggregates, and so on” (P *Atītakhandhādīkathā*) and chapter 8, “Certain [Past and Future Factors] Exist” (P *Ekaccaṃ atthīkathā*).

⁴⁴ Yamada 1959: 82, 104, 108–109; Fukuhara 1965: 174–180; Kawamura 1974: 118–120, 356–366; see also Yamada 1957; AASkŚ 4 p. 802b7ff.; JñPr 5 p. 943b5ff. For the discussions of the three-member category of past, present, and future, see VŚ 7 p. 464b22ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 293c18ff.; AMVŚ 76 p. 393a9ff.

⁴⁵ This first chapter entitled 聚撻, perhaps Skt **saṃyukta-skandha/grantha*, probably here has the sense of “miscellany” as in the first chapter of the Jñānaprasthāna and *Aṣṭaskandha (or *Aṣṭagrantha), but it could have the sense of “associations” or “connections” among factors as in the *Saṃyuktasaṃgraha section

begins with an examination of the characteristic of material form and the characteristic of what is other than material form. This practice of clarification by distinguishing between or among specific characteristics of factors is then applied to ignorance (Skt *avidyā*), internal and external characteristics, the three characteristics of conditioned factors (Skt *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*), speech (Skt *vāc*) and verbal action, various types of mental events such as conception (Skt *saṃjñā*), feelings (Skt *vedanā*), mind (Skt *manas*), and perceptual consciousness (Skt *viññāna*), and finally to the characteristics of conditioned factors in the three time periods.⁴⁶ The section on the three time periods is introduced by a statement asserting that the Buddha expounds such distinctions among factors for the sake of sentient beings, in this case so that one might understand both the intrinsic characteristics of conditioned factors in the three time periods and the characteristics of the “others” from which they are differentiated. The entire section is then devoted to the presentation of six different theories dealing with distinguishing among factors in the three time periods, and no single theory is declared to be correct.⁴⁷ The examination of the proposition “everything exists” and its implications later in the text begins by citing the proposition itself and continues by exploring the extent of the term “everything” (Skt *sarva*).⁴⁸ It first offers two specifications of “everything”: the first, namely, that “everything” is the twelve sense spheres, is also found in our text and comes to be the standard Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika interpretation; the second is that “everything” is the twelve members of dependent origination. After considering the controversial issue of whether “everything” includes nonexistent entities, a problem also found in our text, it considers the extent of “everything” in relation to various other categories such as the conditioned and unconditioned, modes of arising, impermanence, and accompaniment (Skt *samanvāgama*), and finally considers the referent of “everything” in the context of the adjective “knowing everything” (Skt *sarvajñā*). The examination of the proposition “everything exists” then turns its attention to “exists” and its characteristics, exploring the distinction between “existence” and “nonexistence” in the context of various categories such as fluxes (Skt *sāsrava/anāsrava*), conditioned (Skt *saṃskṛta/asamskṛta*), and the three time periods of the past, present, and future. In this context, it presents two views, namely, that past, present, and future refer either to the three time periods themselves, or to past, present, and future factors such as the five aggregates, twelve sense spheres, and eighteen elements.⁴⁹ The remainder of the discussion explores specific issues concerning the three time periods in relation to various categories of factors and their characteristics, including their relationship to the process of perception.

In summary, despite their shared style and topics, this Gāndhārī abhidharma text cannot be neatly correlated with any of the other three texts. At many points, specific views cited in the

on “inclusion and association” within the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra. Bareau 1950: 191; Lamotte 1988 [1958]: 189–190.

⁴⁶ ĀVBSS 1 p. 724b4–724c10. This section is followed by a discussion of the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned factors (ĀVBSS 1 p. 724c13ff.), which precedes the treatment of the three time periods in the Vibhāṣā compendia (VŚ 7 p. 464a25–464b20; AVŚ 40 p. 293b8–293c17; AMVŚ 76 pp. 392c7–393a8).

⁴⁷ Commentary: Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]. See Watanabe 1954: 186–188.

⁴⁸ ĀVBSS 9 pp. 795b12–797a19.

⁴⁹ ĀVBSS 9 p. 796b7–13.

*Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra resemble those of the opponent in our text, and this particular similarity is important in suggesting the relatively open sectarian environment from which both texts emerged. Nonetheless, our text is perhaps closest in its various arguments to the Kathāvatthu.

I.1.4 School Affiliation⁵⁰

Certainly, in middle- and later-period Indian Buddhist sources, school or sect labels acquired significance as indicators of ordination lineages and monastic traditions, and perhaps especially as markers of doctrinal positions and identifiers for the exegetical literature espousing them. Various traditions proposed lists of such schools and their characteristic positions, and attempted to trace their histories, all the while assuming their existence even in the earliest period, whether as nascent or as already distinct historical groups.⁵¹ It might then seem reasonable to follow the practice of the later traditions and adopt this model of distinct schools as the salient interpretive key for understanding the otherwise obscure history and textual compositions of early Indian Buddhist groups. However, such a “school-centered” approach is called into question by various obstacles, of which the first and most significant concerns our sources. Most importantly, of the vast and varied literature of the early Indian Buddhist communities that once existed, very little remains. Further, extra-textual sources are limited to inscriptions, and of the relatively few early texts that have survived, or such texts that were preserved in later collections, most or all have undergone processes of selection and revision that obscure their origins, their interrelationships, and the complexities of their transmission. In addition, even though names of later school groups do appear in early inscriptions and as identifiers for emergent vinaya collections, it is not clear what significance these names had for the sources that used them, what types of groups they denoted, and whether they had the same sense when used to demarcate doctrinal positions in exegetical texts. And finally, even if such labels were indeed used in the early period to denote distinct groups of some kind, the groups to which they referred cannot be assumed to have remained unchanged over time or to have had the same character in different regions. Thus, such a “school-centered” approach that retrojects later interpretive categories upon earlier sources can only obscure the testimony of these early sources and any historical clues they might contain.

The question of school affiliation might be considered paramount in the case of a polemical, exegetical text such as this Gāndhārī abhidharma text, which seems to point to an environment of debate among distinct and mutually acknowledged groups. Further, a “school-centered” approach might seem justified especially since the later tradition used such early exegetical texts to fabricate their “doctrinal profiles” of school groups. However, the application of these later profiles, especially in the interpretation of early texts, results in a misleading circularity, obscuring evidence that might contradict the profile or provide clues for alternative versions of textual history or group identities. In addition, the various exegetical texts associated with any particular school label do not support the model of a unitary profile for the entire school. Instead, texts preserved within the Pālī or Sarvāstivāda canonical collections often contain conflicting positions, and evidence

⁵⁰ For a thorough discussion of the issue of school affiliation, see Cox 2009.

⁵¹ Bureau 1955: 16–30.

exists for multiple and quite different recensions of individual texts.⁵² Thus, caution concerning the school affiliation of early texts is even more important in cases of the exegetical genre.

Rather than beginning from this question of school affiliation, it is perhaps better to take an “issue-centered” approach that focuses on doctrinal issues, their interconnections and transformations, and their presentation across texts. With this perspective as a starting point, we become better able to uncover the context and potential significance of texts and to create a doctrinal history not revolving around school affiliation but revealing instead complex interconnections and divisions that do not necessarily correspond to accepted school divisions. In such an approach, school labels themselves are viewed as historical products reflecting lineages of various types, whether of textual transmission, pedagogy, ordination, or geography, and potentially providing evidence of the self-understanding of the various groups involved at a particular time. Thus, while it is still important to observe the use of school labels in a text and to explore problems of school affiliation, one should nonetheless remain cautious about any historical generalities that might be inferred from them.

This abhidharma text was possibly composed and likely transmitted in the Gandhāra region no later than the first century CE, the proposed date for the British Library Collection as a whole.⁵³ Epigraphical evidence in the area includes references to the Sarvāstivāda, Mahīśāsaka, Kāśyapīya, Dharmaguptaka, and Mahāsāṅghika schools,⁵⁴ but it does not indicate the periods or regions in which certain schools were prominent, nor does it specify whether only certain groups or all groups used Gāndhārī. However, two points connect the British Library collection with the Dharmaguptakas. First, the collection as a whole was found in a clay pot inscribed with the name Dharmaguptaka, presumably indicating that the clay pot and perhaps also the manuscripts it contained were connected in some way with this group.⁵⁵ And second, a structural connection can be demonstrated between another exegetical text in the British Library collection, a commentary on the Saṅgītisūtra, and the version of the Saṅgītisūtra preserved in the Chinese translation of the Dīrghāgama (T 1 [no. 9]), which has been associated with the region of Gandhāra and with a Dharmaguptaka group on the basis of linguistic, contextual, and text-internal evidence.⁵⁶

Now, in view of its polemical style, our text might be assumed to be the product of inter-school debate, and these connections between the Dharmaguptakas and the British Library collection might also suggest that it is associated in some way with a Dharmaguptaka group. But what evidence of school affiliation does the text itself present? It is clear that the proponent in our text argues with at least two different opponents, but the text itself contains only one probable school label, which is

⁵² For example, the Sarvāstivāda canonical abhidharma texts preserved in Chinese translation include two recensions of both the Prakaraṇapāda (T 1541, 1542) and the Jñānaprasthāna (T 1544, 1543 *Aṣṭaskandha or *Aṣṭagrantha). For a study of differences among various canonical abhidharma texts in relation to geographical affiliation, see Nishimura 1985.

⁵³ Salomon 1999: 141–151 [§ 7.1].

⁵⁴ Lamotte 1988 [1958]: 523–526; Shizutani 1978: 31–47.

⁵⁵ “[Given] to the universal community, in the possession of the Dharmaguptakas” (*saghami caūdiśami dhamauṭteaṇa [p]arig[r]ahami*), Salomon 1999: 214. References to the Dharmaguptakas also appear on several potsherds within the British Library Collection: Salomon 1999: no. 8 p. 229, no. 11 p. 231, no. 17 p. 234.

⁵⁶ Salomon 1999: 173–174 [§ 8.2.2.2].

used to identify one of the opponents. In a second case, the proponent applies to his opponent a label that could be used either in its literal sense as a general characterization or as a specific reference to a school group. Further, the syntax of the statement suggests that the proponent might be applying a label to the opponent that the proponent would otherwise use to describe himself.

The probable school label appears in the criticism of the proposition “everything exists,” which is universally associated with the Sarvāstivādins. The proponent refers to his opponent as a *mahasarvastivāda* (Skt **mahāsarvāstivāda*). The purpose of the adjective *maha-* in the compound *maha-sarvastivāda* is not explained, and since this is not attested in any abhidharma source, its sense here is unclear. Further, the proponent’s intentions in using this particular label are also not specified.⁵⁷ However, it is noteworthy that the positions attributed to this *mahasarvastivāda* opponent are not consistent with those typical of the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. The clearest example in our text occurs in two of the opponent’s three specifications of everything, specifically the second specification proposing the existence of past, present, and future factors, and the third proposing the existence of past, present, and future time periods themselves.⁵⁸ The *mahasarvastivāda* opponent presents these second and third specifications as possible alternatives. Certain other middle- to later-period abhidharma texts such as the **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra* and the **Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* also appear to include these as alternative Sarvāstivāda positions.⁵⁹ However, the Vibhāṣā compendia clearly sanction only the second specification, whereby “everything” in the proposition “everything exists” is limited to conditioning forces, and the time periods are simply another name for the conditioning forces themselves. Further, the third specification that the past, present, and future time periods themselves exist can be associated with a view attributed to a Dārṣṭāntika or Vibhajyavādin opponent, namely, that the time periods (Skt **adhvaṇ*) are permanent and hence exist apart from the impermanent conditioning forces (Skt **saṃskāra*) that they contain.⁶⁰ Even though it is possible that the proponent in our text either misunderstood or intentionally misrepresented the position of his *mahasarvastivāda* opponent, his attribution of three alternative specifications to this single opponent more likely indicates variety in

⁵⁷ For possible interpretations, see Commentary: (1) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87].

⁵⁸ Commentary: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

⁵⁹ ĀVBSS 1 p. 724b19–21; MAHŚ 11 p. 963a20ff.

⁶⁰ AMVŚ 76 p. 393a10ff., 135 p. 700a26ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 293c18ff., where the term Vibhajyavāda is not mentioned. See also JñPr 13 p. 987b5–6.; SaṅgP 3 p. 378c12–22; PrP (tr. Xz) 6 p. 717b20ff., esp. 6 p. 717c2–4. Cf. AKBh 5.27c p. 301.7–9; AKVy 476.32ff. The Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti on the Abhidharmadīpa (ADV 299 p. 257.4–5) also uses the term Vibhajyavādin in reference to the Dārṣṭāntikas, who are said to maintain the existence only of a “certain portion” (Skt *pradeśa*), namely, the present time period (Skt *varṭamānādḥva*), in contrast to the Sarvāstivādins, who claim that three time periods (Skt *adhvatraya*) exist (Skt *tatra sarvāstivādasyādhvatrayam asti sa dhruvatrayam iti. vibhajyavādinā tu dārṣṭāntikasya ca pradeśo varṭamānādḥvasaṃjñakāḥ*). This passage presents the views of four groups who hold different views concerning what exists as a real entity (Skt *dravyatas*): (1) Sarvāstivāda; (2) Vibhajyavādin Dārṣṭāntika; (3) Vaitulika Ayogaśūnyatāvādin; and (4) Paudgalika Avyākṛtavastuvādin. Although the terms Vibhajyavādin and Dārṣṭāntika are followed in this passage by the particle *ca*, which might be taken to suggest separate groups, in a summary reference to three of these four views later in the text (ADV 300 p. 258.7), the following terms are used: Dārṣṭāntika, Vaitulika, and Paudgalika. Hence, it is likely that the Abhidharmadīpa proponent does not use the term Vibhajyavādin in the initial passage to refer to a group distinct from the Dārṣṭāntikas.

the positions of Sarvāstivāda groups at the time. Evidence of such variety is preserved even in later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika texts in the theories of the four Sarvāstivāda masters, and our text presents further evidence that in this early pre-Vibhāṣā period, the group subsumed under the Sarvāstivāda label was still quite diverse. Thus, even in the case of this well-attested school label, the simple characterization of particular views and certainly of entire texts with this single term Sarvāstivāda can be misleading since it does not refer to positions that are consistent over time and geography.

The second label that might be used as a school identification also appears in the criticism of the proposition “everything exists.” Since the opponent is said to reject the existence of nonexistent entities, the proponent suggests that he should not be called a *mahasarvastivāda*, “one who maintains that everything exists,” but should instead be referred to as a *vivarjavadā* (P *vibhajjavāda*, Skt *vibhajjavāda*), that is, “one who maintains distinctions.” The proponent here does not clarify what he intends by the term *vivarjavadā*, and its literal sense as “one who makes distinctions” would fit perfectly in this argument that concerns a distinction between existence and nonexistence. And since the proponent uses the exhortative emphatic particle *hata* (P *handa*, Skt *hanta*), “Well then, it is **you** who maintain distinctions!” he is perhaps implying that the label *vivarjavadā* in another context might be applied to himself.⁶¹

The term *vibhajjavāda* has a complicated history and both its usage and sense changed over time. The earliest uses occur in sūtra passages that refer to the Buddha’s practice of responding critically or “distinguishing” in particular circumstances. Although it is also used as a group label of some kind, it appears to have different senses in different contexts. Studies of occurrences of the term in Pali as well as in northern Indian abhidharma and later doxographical texts suggest that it is used as a loose designation or collective label rather than as a name for a specific school.⁶² It is associated with such non-Sarvāstivāda and non-Pudgalavāda groups as the Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas, and Dharmaguptakas, among others, and may have arisen from an old division among early Buddhist practitioners between the Mahāsāṅghikas on the one hand and the *Sthaviras on the other hand, the latter comprising the Sarvāstivādins, various groups who accepted the view of the “person” (Skt *pudgala*), and others, namely, the Vibhajjavādins. This function of Vibhajjavāda as a collective label also helps to clarify conflicting school attributions of doctrinal positions found in later scholastic sources, especially among the Vibhajjavādins, Kāśyapīyas, and Dharmaguptakas. Even greater looseness in the usage of the term is found in certain passages in the Vibhāṣā compendia. For example, in some passages, the term Vibhajjavāda appears together with references to the Vātsīputrīyas and even the Mahāsāṅghikas, who would represent the other major early division of Buddhist practitioners, that is, other than the *Sthaviras who in some sources are connected with the Vibhajjavādins. In other passages, the term Vibhajjavāda is connected with the Dārṣṭāntikas, in particular with regard to the view that the time periods exist apart from conditioning forces.⁶³ As a final example of this broader usage in the Vibhāṣā compendia, the term Vibhajjavāda is

⁶¹ *hata vivarjavadā bhoṣa*, l. 90. Commentary: (2) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 88–95].

⁶² Cox 2009: 59–60; Cousins 2001: 132–133; Bareau 1955: 167–180.

⁶³ Dharmaguptaka: AMVŚ 38 p. 198c20. Dārṣṭāntika: AMVŚ 76 p. 393a11, 151 p. 772c21–22, 152 p. 774a14–15 (see 135 p. 700a15–16, where Vibhajjavāda and Dārṣṭāntika views are distinguished). Vātsīputrīya: AMVŚ 118 p. 612c10, 118 p. 612c21. Mahāsāṅghika: AMVŚ 173 p. 871c2.

found in stylized discussions contrasting “those who maintain distinctions” (Skt **vibhajyavāda*), whose views are to be rejected, with “those who maintain a reasoned position” (Skt **yuktavāda*), whose views are deemed correct.⁶⁴ In this case, the term *Vibhajyavāda* functions not simply as a collective label but rather as a general and pejorative designation for anyone not accepting the sanctioned position of the *Vibhāṣā* itself. These various uses of the term *vibhajyavāda* suggest several possibilities for its sense as used in our text. It could function in its literal sense as a mere rhetorical characterization describing the opponent’s attempt to “distinguish” between existent and nonexistent entities, or, as in the case of its broader use in the *Vibhāṣā* compendia, it might simply mark the opponent’s position as unacceptable. However, since some of the proponent’s positions are consistent with those associated with groups that fall under its use as a collective label, it is also possible that the proponent understands himself to represent a *Vibhajyavāda* school group.

Even though these are the only references in our text that might be construed as school labels, in several cases the views of either the proponent or the opponent can be correlated with positions associated in other texts with particular school groups. The first case concerns the controversy concerning whether the “clear comprehension” gained through religious practice is gradual or instantaneous. Since the passage occurs in the heavily damaged initial portion of the manuscript, the argument cannot be reconstructed with any certainty. However, the passage contains several praxis-related terms perhaps used in the context of the general issue of whether the knowledge of suffering (*dukkhaṇa*, P *dukkhaṇāṇa*, Skt *duḥkhañāna*) can apprehend past or future object-supports (*arabana*, P *ārammaṇa*, Skt *ālambana*). The passage also contains the term “gradual clear comprehension” (*anupurva(*bhi)samaya*), which may allude to the controversy concerning whether the apprehension, or “clear comprehension,” of the four noble truths occurs gradually in discrete instances over a series of moments (P *anupubbābhisamaya*, Skt *anupūrvābhisamaya*) or instantaneously at one moment (P/Skt *ekābhisamaya*). The view of gradual clear comprehension is consistently supported in Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts. It is also cited as the view of an unnamed opponent in the *Kathāvattu*,⁶⁵ which is then attributed to the Sabbatthivādins, Andhakas, Saṃmitiyas, and Bhadrāyānikas in the commentary. In the **Mīśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, this view is attributed to the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas.⁶⁶ The opposing position of instantaneous clear comprehension is supported by the proponent in the *Kathāvattu*, and it is affiliated with the *Vibhajyavādins* in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*,⁶⁷ and with the Dharmaguptakas in both the **Mīśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*⁶⁸ and Yaśomitra’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.⁶⁹ In this passage of our text, the unnamed opponent claims that knowledge apprehends “various

⁶⁴ See in particular AMVŚ 110 p. 571c21–26, 118 p. 612c21ff.; AVŚ 59 p. 407a24ff., 195 p. 977c4ff. Cf. AMVŚ 9 p. 43a5ff., 27 p. 138c17ff., 33 p. 160a20ff., 43 p. 222a3ff., 60 p. 312c21ff., 69 p. 356c15ff., 83 p. 431b6ff.; AVŚ 1 p. 5c21ff., 5 p. 31c27ff., 15 p. 108c17ff., 17 p. 127a6ff., 32 p. 235c26ff., 36 p. 264b14ff., 43 p. 324c27ff.; VŚ 12 p. 500c14ff., 14 p. 516b16ff. See also MAHŚ 4 p. 907b21ff. Kimura 1937: 383; Watanabe 1954: 366; Bareau 1955: 167–168; personal communication, Lin Qian, November 29, 2012.

⁶⁵ Kv-a 59.

⁶⁶ MAHŚ 11 p. 962a18–19.

⁶⁷ AMVŚ 103 p. 533a20ff.

⁶⁸ MAHŚ 11 p. 962a19–20. Cf. AKBh 6.27bc p. 352.1ff.; NyAŚ 63 p. 687b10ff.

⁶⁹ AKVy 542.

distinguishing characteristics” (*nanāvilakṣana*, P *nānāvilakkhaṇa*, Skt *nānāvilakṣaṇa*), and thus he would likely support the view of gradual clear comprehension. By contrast, the proponent responds with critical rhetorical questions, which suggest that he accepts only one instance of the “knowledge of suffering” and as a result would support the alternative of instantaneous clear comprehension. Thus, in this text, neither view is explicitly affiliated with a particular school, but the opponent’s position would be consistent with the view of the Sarvāstivādins among others, and the proponent’s view, with that of the Vibhajyavādins or, possibly, the Dharmaguptakas.

The second case in which a view presented in our abhidharma text can be correlated with school positions cited in other texts occurs in the treatment of the major topic treated in the text, namely, the existence of past and future factors, specifically in relation to the operation of action. Early in this discussion, a single unnamed opponent maintains three karma-related categories of existent past and future factors: the first and third categories concern existent past factors, specifically those past factors not possessed of a matured effect or those whose matured effects have not yet matured, and the third, existent future factors that constitute the matured effect of action.⁷⁰ The Kathāvatthu also cites two of these three categories in its reference to the positions that certain future factors exist, namely, “future factors subject to arising” (P *anāgatā uppādino dhammā*), as well as past action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*, P *avipakkavipāka*, Skt *avipakvavipāka*).⁷¹ The Kathāvatthu commentary attributes the position concerning past action to the Kāśyapīyas, and even though no school attribution is given for the position concerning future factors, it too was likely understood to represent a view of the same Kāśyapīya opponent.⁷² Various other abhidharma texts also cite the position concerning past action “whose matured effect has not yet matured,” but the attributions differ. While the Vibhāṣā compendia and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra agree with the attribution to the Kāśyapīyas,⁷³ the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the *Nyāyānusāra attribute the same view to the Vibhajyavādins.⁷⁴ All of these texts reject this position but for different reasons. Whereas the Kathāvatthu and *Tattvasiddhiśāstra contend that no past factors of any type exist, the Sarvāstivāda texts claim that all past actions exist, even those that have already exerted their effects. In the arguments presented in our text, the proponent clearly rejects the existence of past and future factors in any sense whatsoever and therefore agrees with the criticism of the Kathāvatthu and *Tattvasiddhiśāstra. And as would be expected given his criticism of the *mahasarvastivāda* view that everything exists, the proponent would not accept the Sarvāstivāda criticism that all past actions must exist. Since the proponent in this text criticizes in this discussion a view associated with the Kāśyapīyas, and elsewhere criticizes views associated with the Sarvāstivādins, it would be reasonable to assume that he does not represent the perspective of either of these two groups. However, it is also of interest that the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the *Nyāyānusāra attribute the view concerning the existence of past action “whose matured effect

⁷⁰ Commentary: Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4].

⁷¹ Kv 151–155.

⁷² Kv-a 51.

⁷³ AMVŚ 144 p. 741b13–16; AVŚ 28 p. 204c15–18; TSS 3 p. 258c10ff. Cf. AMVŚ 19 p. 96b6–9, 51 p. 263c25–29.

⁷⁴ AKBh 5.25cd p. 296.4–6; NyAS 51 p. 630c10–11.

has not yet matured” to the Vibhajyavādins, although these texts do not clarify what they intend by this term. Thus, on this point at least, the proponent in our text would not be consistent with a Vibhajyavāda position, or at least with the associations that this term has in these particular Sarvāstivāda sources.

The final point that provides evidence for the proponent’s possible school leanings is his unwavering view that only present factors exist, which is consistent with the positions of certain groups associated with the term Vibhajyavāda: for example, the Mahīśāsakas, as described in later doxographies,⁷⁵ and possibly also the Dharmaguptakas, if a Dharmaguptaka affiliation is accepted for the *Śāriputrābhīdharmaśāstra.⁷⁶ Although this does not constitute definitive proof, it would support the possibility that the proponent in our text considers himself a Vibhajyavādin, and perhaps even in some sense represents a Dharmaguptaka perspective.

I.1.5. Overall Structure and Contents

The surviving manuscript is divided into four sections by the three major punctuation marks. However, since these punctuation marks do not correspond to sections distinguished by theme or any other principle based on content or function, their exact purpose is unclear.⁷⁷ The text lacks any other organizational indicators, whether in the form of explicit content lists (P/Skt *uddāna*) or an implicit topical list or matrix (P *mātikā*, Skt *māṭṛkā*). From the standpoint of its contents alone, the preserved text can be divided into four sections as indicated in the topic outline.⁷⁸

Section 1—Religious Practice: Present Factors [51A–B(v)+53A]

Section 2—Existence of Past and Future Factors [51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

Section 3—Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

Section 4—Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

The second and third sections constitute the major portion of the preserved text and examine issues connected with the topic of existence in the three time periods, namely, the existence of past and future factors, and the fundamental proposition “everything exists,” respectively. Despite their now fragmentary state, both the first and last sections bear some connection to the topic of religious practice, and they can be linked to the intervening discussion of existence through their references to the three time periods: in the first section, to the “present” (*pracupana*); and in the last section, to both the “present” and “future” (*anagaḍa*). Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the manuscript itself provides no clues as to the structure of the original text or the placement of the preserved portion within that original text, but the damaged outer strips of manuscript part 51 and the content of the first and last sections suggest an original text that was definitely longer and possibly much longer than the preserved portion.

⁷⁵ Bareau 1955: 183.

⁷⁶ Bareau 1955: 194. The *Śāriputrābhīdharmaśāstra, for which Bareau suggests a Dharmaguptaka affiliation, presents the position that the knowledge (智, Skt **jñāna*) of or concentration (定, Skt **samādhi*) upon past and future factors arises without an object, which would imply that past and future factors do not exist. See Bareau 1950: 69–95; ŚAŚ 9 p. 593c16–18, 30 p. 717b1–2.

⁷⁷ Paleography and Orthography § II.2.5 Punctuation and Marginal Marks.

⁷⁸ Topic Outline of Text Contents § I.2.

This connection between these first and last sections and the intervening portions of the preserved text suggests three possibilities for the original text from which they came. As a first possibility, the original text may have been concerned exclusively with the topic of existence in the three time periods. In this case, our text would resemble the first section of the *Vijñānakāya*, which itself likely existed at some point as a separate text presenting arguments exclusively on the topic of the existence of past and future factors.⁷⁹ However, this possibility is called into question by the predominance of terminology related to religious practice in both the first and last sections of our text, which might point to an original text that examined multiple topics. This suggests a second possibility, namely, that the original text may have contained a number of discrete sections devoted to separate topics much like the *Kathāvatthu* or the **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra*. In this case, the second and third sections, that is, the major portion of the preserved text, would constitute either a single section examining the general topic of existence in the three time periods or two related but discrete sections that would have been preceded and followed by sections on different topics. The initial and final fragmentary sections our preserved text would then represent two separate sections among the possibly many such discrete sections that the text originally contained. As a third possibility, the original text containing our preserved text, at least in this section, may have resembled the structure of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which situates the topic of existence in the three time periods within a discussion of contaminants (Skt *anuśaya*), specifically in relation to the past, present, and future objects that serve as conditions for their arising.⁸⁰ In other words, religious practice discussed in both the first and last sections would present the overarching topic that framed and in fact precipitated the intervening examination of both the existence of past and future factors and the proposition “everything exists.” Indeed, in the first section of our text, terms related to religious praxis as well as the specific term “object-support” (*arabana*, P *ārammaṇa*, Skt *ālambana*), presumably as the objects of religious practice, find parallels in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*’s discussion of the objects of contaminants, which provides the catalyst for its subsequent discussion of past, present, and future factors.⁸¹

Unfortunately, no piece of physical textual evidence precludes any one of these three possibilities, but the presence of praxis-related terms in the initial and final fragmentary sections argues for the likelihood of an original text with multiple topics or at least the topic of the existence of past and future factors and “everything exists” framed within discussions of religious practice. Hence, it appears unlikely that the original text for our text was strictly limited to the single topic of the existence of factors. However, it is not possible to estimate either the length of the original text or the range of topics it treated. It is important to remember that these three possibilities do not represent mutually exclusive concurrent options but rather potential and probable stages in the historical development of texts within the polemical expository genre. In other words, the *Vijñānakāya* comprises sections that at one time probably existed as independent texts, and the *Kathāvatthu* and **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra* certainly were added to over time and

⁷⁹ VK 1 p. 531a23–2 p. 537a26. Cf. Cox 1998: 197–205.

⁸⁰ AKBh 5.25–5.28 pp. 295.2–301.18.

⁸¹ For the broader context of the examination of existence in the three time periods and the specific proposition that everything exists, see Introduction § I.1.5.3 Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists.”

undoubtedly consisted of many fewer sections in their earliest versions. Thus, in this Gāndhārī abhidharma text we have an example of a polemical expository text preserved at an early stage of its development. Although it is possible that it included a wide range of different topics in separate sections, it is more likely, given its early date, that it treated the topic of existence either in only a slightly broader context, or together with a rather limited and related range of issues.

I.1.5.1. Religious Practice: Present Factors [Section 1: 51A–B(v)+53A]

The outermost strip of manuscript part 51 has suffered considerable damage. Certain fragments were turned over recto to verso in the conservation process, and a few chips became stuck to another scroll during their long period of storage in the clay pot. These chips have been conserved in frame 53. As a result, this first section of our text can be reconstructed only partially, and its relationship to the preceding and now missing portion of the original text and even to the following preserved text is uncertain.

This first section is clearly written in the same polemical style as the remainder of the text and records an argument between the proponent and an unknown opponent. Too little remains to allow reconstruction, but it clearly contains terminology related to religious practice. For example, references to the “knowledge of suffering” (*dukhañāna*, P *dukkhañāṇa*, Skt *duḥkhaññāna*), “noble truths” (*aryasaca*, P *ariyasacca*, Skt *āryasatya*), “observing the body” (*kayanupaśa*, P *kāyānupassin*, Skt *kāyānupaśyin*), “mindfulness of the body” (*kayasadi*, P *kāyasati*, Skt *kāyasmṛti*), and “gradual clear comprehension” (*anupurva*⟨*bhi⟩*samaya*, P *anupubbābhisamaya*, Skt *anupūrvābhisamaya*) all point to a context of the path of practice. The first statement, of which only the last portion is preserved, suggests that the issue is one of objects of knowledge, that is, whether “the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering” (51A–B(v)+53A l. 1). The following discussion involves the relationship between objects and knowledge in the case of various aspects of the path, specifically the noble truths, the object-support of the practice of mindfulness of the body, and the nature of suffering in clear comprehension. Unfortunately, the exact argument and its focus are much less clear. These praxis-related terms might indicate a concern with the various objects that are known at different stages of cultivation in the path, or the reference to “gradual clear comprehension” might suggest the controversy, well attested in abhidharma sources, between the different approaches of gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension. This latter possibility finds support in the opponent’s appeal to “various distinguishing characteristics” (*nanāvilakṣana*, P *nānāvilakkhaṇa*, Skt *nānāvilakṣaṇa*), which might reflect a view of different instances or stages of knowledge consistent with the position of “gradual clear comprehension.” And the proponent’s rhetorical question criticizing multiple instances of the “knowledge of suffering” might then suggest that he supports the alternative position of “instantaneous clear comprehension.” However, it is equally possible that these specific issues of objects known in the path and of gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension are related in some way to a more general issue raised in the preceding and now missing lines.

Now, the appearance of these terms in our text suggests an awareness of certain practices and issues that became important in the developed abhidharma paths of practice: for example, particular cultivations such as the four applications of mindfulness and the four noble truths; the importance of object-supports for the arising and abandonment of contaminants; and the

controversy concerning gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension. However, given the absence of any surrounding context for our text, it is impossible to determine the scope of the proponent's or opponent's familiarity with and involvement in these controversies. Nonetheless, at the very least this Gāndhārī text stands as an early witness that provides invaluable material presaging later mature abhidharma doctrinal developments and discussions.

I.1.5.2. Existence of Past and Future Factors [Section 2: 51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

The second section of our text extends from 51D(r) line 1 through 52(r) line 66, including fragments 51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51G–H(r), and 52(r), and strips 52A+52C–F(r), and 52B(v). As in the case of the first section discussed above, since the initial portion of fragment 51D(r) is damaged and the immediately preceding lines of text are missing, it is impossible to determine the context. Nonetheless, this second section presents a continuous polemical exchange between the proponent and a single opponent on a related set of arguments, all of which in some way concern the existence of past and future factors in the context of the dynamics of action. The arguments revolve around general issues that inform other abhidharma controversies as well: for example, the operation of action; successive or simultaneous causal functioning; the relationship between existence and present causal functioning or occurrence in the present; and the determination of existence by causal efficacy. Specifically here, the opponent will claim that certain past factors and future factors exist due to their causal efficacy as capable of producing an effect or as capable of arising. Although the proponent does not state his position explicitly, it becomes clear through his criticism that he rejects the existence of all past and future factors.

I.1.5.2.1. The Three Categories of Existent Factors

The initial portion of 51D(r) is fragmentary and preserves only the latter section of an argument presumably offered by the proponent. It mentions first the occurrence of the matured effects of past actions and then shifts abruptly to the status of future factors as “subject to” or “not subject to arising,” a juxtaposition of topics indicating that the argument concerns both past and future factors. In response, the opponent offers a general declaration setting out three categories of existent factors distinguished in terms of causal efficacy and specifically the dynamics of action: (1) the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (*avivagatva*, P *avipākatta*, Skt *avipākatva*); (2) the “state of being a matured effect” (*vivagatva*, P *vipākatta*, Skt *vipākatva*); and (3) action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*, P *avipakvavipāka*, Skt *avipakvavipāka*). This three-fold declaration serves as the basis for a lengthy polemical exchange, which extends from fragment 51D(r) through 52(r) line 66 and includes both an initial cursory rejoinder and then a series of detailed criticisms, both offered by the proponent.

I.1.5.2.2. The First Category: Past Actions whose Matured Effects Never Arise

Among these three karma-related categories of existent factors, the second refers to the future matured effects of action, and the third, to past actions that are causally efficacious in producing matured effects. Both of these categories are examined extensively in the proponent's subsequent, detailed criticisms. The first category is more problematic and unfortunately receives only two

brief lines in the proponent’s initial cursory treatment in fragment 51D(r).⁸² However, even this brief treatment indicates that the first category also concerns action, specifically past actions whose matured effects will never arise. As the proponent’s treatment makes clear, this category includes past actions whose matured effects have been obstructed, such as, for example, in the case of an arhat’s defiled past actions. In contrast to other existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet arisen but may be produced under the proper conditions, prior religious practice forever prevents the defiled past actions of an arhat from producing their effects. The opponent would respond that such past actions, even though obstructed, can still be considered potentially efficacious and hence as “possessed of a fruit”; as a result, they would meet his definition for existence that is correlated with causal efficacy, or at least with its potential. However, the proponent rejects any distinctions between potential efficacy and actual occurrence, or between possession of a matured effect and possession of a fruit.

Following this brief treatment of the first karma-related category, the proponent presumably offers an initial, cursory treatment of the opponent’s next two categories of existent factors. Unfortunately, this portion of the text is only partially preserved and concludes with the rather paradoxical statement that past and future factors do not act as causes and yet the cause of maturation cannot be something other than action. As is typical of the argument pattern throughout our text, the proponent does not explain his position further here, but fortunately these two categories constitute the focus of the following portion of this second section.

I.1.5.2.3. The Third Category: Past Actions whose Matured Effects Have Not Yet Arisen

In his subsequent, detailed criticism of the opponent’s final two karma-related categories, the proponent intersperses his treatment of the opponent’s third category of past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured (ll. 3–36, 51–61) with his treatment of the second category of existent future factors, namely, the matured effects themselves (ll. 36–51, 62–66). He begins with the third category of existent past factors and offers four specific and then three more general criticisms, each phrased as a question.

In his first criticism, the proponent inquires why past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured are claimed to exist. The opponent responds by stating the general conditions for existence, that is, existence is correlated with the potential for causal efficacy. In this case, the existence of past actions is determined by their causal efficacy; in other words, certain past actions can be said to exist precisely because they are “possessed of a fruit,” that is, because they still have the potential of causal efficacy, or of producing an effect. By contrast, past actions do not exist if they have already given rise to their matured effects and no longer possess causal efficacy. This connection between existence and causal efficacy is common in abhidharma texts and is shared by virtually all parties, certainly by both the proponent and the opponent in the case of our text. In fact, at the conclusion of this first critical question the proponent himself defines existence as the “acquisition of fruits from causes” (*hedupalapatti*, P *hetuphalapatti*, Skt *hetuphalaprāpti*). However, as will quickly become clear, the opponent and proponent do not agree on what such

⁸² This first category of past actions whose matured effects will never arise will also be instrumental in an argument criticizing the existence of action whose “matured effects will not occur at all” (ll. 31–36). Cf. Commentary: (6–7) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

“possession” or “acquisition” entails. Following the typical argument pattern in this text, which employs the method of “implication of an untoward consequence” (Skt *prasaṅga*), the proponent next criticizes the opponent’s definition of existence in terms of “possession of a fruit” by offering two mutually exclusive or logically complementary alternatives, both of which constitute untoward consequences that result from the opponent’s position. According to the first alternative, this “possession of a fruit” contradicts the opponent’s own first category of existent past factors that are “not possessed of a matured effect.” If the existence of a factor is contingent upon its possession of a fruit, factors not possessed of a fruit should then not exist. Since the opponent’s first category of past factors will never give rise to matured effects, they should then not be said to exist. If this argument is to be effective, the proponent must assume that “not being possessed of a matured effect” is tantamount to “not being possessed of a fruit”; if a factor is “not possessed of a matured effect,” it must also be “not possessed of a fruit.” By contrast, the opponent would presumably distinguish the two and contend that past factors within his first category are indeed “not possessed of a matured effect” but can still be said to exist as “possessed of a fruit” because they can act as a cause in some other way. Next, the proponent offers a second criticism that reveals his assumptions concerning what such “possession of a fruit” entails. In other words, to say that a fruit is “possessed” implies that that fruit has been acquired, which, according to the proponent, in turn requires that it be active in the present. For the proponent, it is then impossible to claim that a factor “possesses a fruit” in the sense that it has the potential of producing an effect in the future. If a factor is said to exist because it “possesses a fruit,” then that fruit must exist as well, and such existence, for the proponent, necessarily entails actual functioning or occurrence in the present.

The proponent’s assumptions about existence become clearer in his second critical question concerning whether present actions can be said to exist for the same reason as past actions whose matured effects have not occurred, namely, because they are “possessed of a fruit.” When the opponent responds that present and past factors do indeed exist for the same reason, the proponent observes that the matured effects of present actions, like those of past actions, must then occur in the present. For the proponent and his understanding of existence, to “possess a fruit” entails that the fruit already be acquired and occur in the present. And if the opponent agrees that the matured effects of present actions also occur in the present, then present actions, which act as the cause, must be simultaneous with their matured effects. This argument raises the final general issue that figures prominently throughout this second section, namely, the nature of karmic causal functioning as successive or simultaneous. Although simultaneous causal functioning is accepted by certain texts or teachers under certain very specific circumstances,⁸³ all would concur that karmic causal functioning must be successive. Thus, if the opponent agrees to this first alternative that the matured

⁸³ The Sarvāstivādins accept the possibility of simultaneous causal functioning. For example, the Vijñānakāya (VK 3 p. 547a3ff.) proposes a simultaneous model of conditioning in which the dependent origination formula describes the arising of a single factor. They also propose certain varieties of simultaneous conditioning among their six causes (Skt *hetu*) and four conditions (Skt *pratyaya*). For example, the associated cause (Skt *saṃprayuktahetu*), the simultaneous cause (Skt *sahabhūhetu*), and the object-support condition (Skt *ālambanapratyaya*) in particular are simultaneous with their effects and exert their causal efficacy while they and their effects are on the point of arising. AMVŚ 16 p. 79a16–21 p. 109c25, 76 p. 394a15–17; NyAS 15 p. 418c18ff. See Tanaka 1985; Cox 1988.

effects of present actions occur in the present, it is tantamount to admitting that actions and their matured effects are simultaneous. If the opponent disagrees and claims that the matured effects do not occur in the present, then he must accept one of two untoward consequences: either present actions do not exist since their fruit does not occur in the present and they cannot therefore be said to be “possessed of a fruit”; or present actions exist but their matured effects do not occur. And these untoward consequences would then contradict the opponent’s initial response that present and past actions exist for the same reason, namely, that they are “possessed of a fruit.”

In the third critical question, the proponent turns to the matured effect of past action and inquires whether it belongs to others or to oneself, that is, to the one who performs the action that is its cause. Here also, the proponent raises two untoward consequences that would result regardless of the opponent’s response. To say that the matured effects of past actions belong to the one who performed them contradicts scriptural authority, since the Buddha will not experience undesirable matured effects arising from any of his past evil actions. And yet, if the matured effects of past actions do not belong to the one who performed them, then one is incapable of experiencing the effects of one’s actions. Here again, it is clear that the proponent understands “belonging to,” or “possessing,” as equivalent to “experiencing,” or “occurring.”

Next, the proponent raises a fourth critical question that he will examine in more detail in a later passage (ll. 51–61): that is, whether matured effects occur from past actions or from present actions. This brief initial treatment considers only the first alternative, namely, that matured effects occur from past actions, and concludes that this response results in self-contradiction. That is to say, the opponent claims that existent past actions that serve as causes are those whose matured effects have “not yet matured.” However, since these matured effects are described as “not yet matured,” it is not possible to say that they “occur.” Further, given that the proponent equates “occurrence” with existence, since these matured effects do not occur, they cannot be said to exist. And in this case, it would then be nonsensical for the opponent to claim that past actions can give rise to such nonexistent matured effects. Once again, the proponent in his argument implicitly rejects two assumptions that are essential to the opponent’s model of efficacious past actions. First, as noted in this criticism of existent past action, the proponent rejects the possibility of the potential causal efficacy of past actions. For the proponent, causal efficacy demands actual functioning, which entails the present occurrence of the effect. Second, as will become clear in his subsequent criticism of the opponent’s second category of future matured effects, the proponent refuses to accept a model whereby existent future factors will at some point “occur” in the present. For the proponent, it is impossible to uphold a distinction between existent future factors “subject to arising” and nonexistent factors “not subject to arising.” As a result, no model of efficacious action can make use of existent future matured effects.

In the remaining three critical questions within this first section criticizing existent past factors, the proponent appears to step back from specific disputes to more general points. The next, fifth question, which inquires simply whether or not there is some action whose matured effect exists, could in fact be being raised either by the proponent or by the opponent.⁸⁴ The response could also represent the position of either party since it merely supports the existence of efficacious actions

⁸⁴ Commentary: (4–5) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 21–28].

by offering four scriptural passages referring to actions and the matured effects that they produce. The proponent's sixth critical question is even more general and inquires whether or not action exists. Although the implications of this question are unclear, the opponent responds simply by appealing to his third karma-related category of existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, which he claims constitutes only one part among past factors. In his criticism, the proponent appeals to a principle of category uniformity and insists that such a division within the single category of past factors is impossible; either all past factors must exist as possessed of a fruit, or no past factors can exist. This principle of category uniformity is employed repeatedly by the proponent throughout this second section of our text.⁸⁵

As his seventh critical question, the proponent inquires whether there are existent past actions whose matured effects will not occur at all. The alternative that there are such past actions results in the untoward consequence of self-contradiction; since the matured effects will not occur, one cannot refer to such past actions as "not yet matured." And in the case of the alternative that there are no such existent past actions whose matured effects will not occur, religious practice would be ineffective since one would never be able to become free of the effects of past actions. Despite the proponent's argument here, it is important to note that the opponent's first karma-related category of existent factors provides for precisely this type of existent past actions whose matured effects will not occur, namely, past actions that are not, or are no longer, possessed of a matured effect.

Following a partial examination of the opponent's second category of existent future factors, the proponent returns once again to past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured with an eighth and final question, namely, whether the matured effect occurs from present action or past action. The proponent had in fact raised this question previously in the fourth question criticizing existent past actions (ll. 21–22), but here the question is attributed to the opponent, and the proponent himself criticizes the two possible alternatives. In criticizing the first alternative that matured effects occur from present action, the proponent raises two related questions, the first concerning whether actions performed by the body cease with death. If such corporeal actions do cease with death, the matured effects that they cause would have to arise from corporeal actions that are past; this would in turn contradict this first alternative that matured effects arise from present actions. However, if corporeal actions do not cease with death, there must be some "agent" that continues after death and is then able to give rise to matured effects. The second question concerns whether present actions cease for one who has attained the first trance state. Here, the proponent responds only to the first alternative that such present actions do not cease, in which case scripture is contradicted. In other words, since a scriptural passage states that speech ceases for one in the first trance state, this would prove that present actions do indeed cease, and the production of matured effects from such ceased actions is impossible.

For the second alternative that matured effects occur from past actions, the proponent inquires only whether such past action can be understood as "possessed of a fruit," in accordance with the opponent's definition of existence as determined by possession of a fruit. As would be expected from both his three karma-related categories of existent factors and his determination of existence through causal efficacy, the opponent responds that past actions should indeed be seen as possessed

⁸⁵ Cf. 51D(r) ll. 1–3; ll. 7–17, 29–45.

of a fruit. In his subsequent criticism, the proponent makes explicit certain principles that underlie several of his earlier arguments. First, he appeals to his assumption that “possession” entails both “existence” and, in his view, “occurrence.” He contends that past action that acts as a cause can only be said to be possessed of a fruit if the fruit already exists and hence occurs, or is active. However, this would contradict our everyday experience of causation in such cases as a father and his son; given the proponent’s argument here, the father can only be accepted as the cause of the son if his son already exists. In his next criticism, the proponent appeals to the principle of category uniformity to underscore his assumption that the “fruit” cannot be distinguished from the “matured effect.” As noted above, in the case of his first category of existent past factors “not possessed of a matured effect,” the opponent implies that since such factors exist, they must be “possessed of a fruit,” and yet he also describes them as “not possessed of a matured effect.” However, for the proponent, such a distinction between the “fruit” and the “matured effect” is impossible. Here, the proponent makes his view explicit through the example of gold in a crucible; if gold is consumed by fire, it ceases together with any “matured effects” or “fruits” that it might be considered to have.

I.1.5.2.4. The Second Category: Future Matured Effects

As in the case of his treatment of the opponent’s third category of existent past actions just discussed, the proponent also divides his arguments against the second category of existent future factors, or matured effects, into two separate sections. The first contains four points, the second, two.

All four points in the first section in some way concern the opponent’s attempt to distinguish between two categories of future factors, namely, those “subject to arising” and those “not subject to arising.” As in the case of past factors, here also the proponent applies the principle of category uniformity and refuses to accept such a distinction within the single category of future factors. He first raises a general question, that is, whether it is possible for a future factor subject to arising to become not subject to arising. Here, the proponent offers two untoward consequences, both following from the negative alternative that such a transformation is not possible.⁸⁶ According to the first untoward consequence, if one claims that a future factor cannot change its status from “subject to arising” to “not subject to arising,” this then negates the factor’s ability to act, which it should possess given its nature as an existent factor “subject to arising.” And further, as a second untoward consequence, if such a change in status is not possible, religious practice is without purpose since it would never be possible to make future matured effects of evil past actions “not subject to arising.”

As the second point, the proponent offers a distinction, presumably intended to represent the position of the opponent, namely, that future factors subject to arising exist and those not subject to arising do not exist. The proponent responds with the counterexample, that is, the case of the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice.⁸⁷ In other words, given

⁸⁶ It is possible that the manuscript contains an error here and that the first of these two alternatives represents the affirmative option, that is, that such a transformation is possible. Even though this pattern of affirmative and negative alternatives better fits the common polemical pattern, the text has been accepted as written. Cf. Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

⁸⁷ The significance of the reference to the “life contrary to religious practice” in this counterexample is not explained, but it may anticipate the case of Aṅgulimāla cited in the next argument: see Commentary:

a distinction among future factors between those subject to arising, which exist, and those not subject to arising, which do not exist, the “cessation of suffering” as a factor not subject to arising cannot be said to exist.

As the third point, the proponent offers a separate but similar proposition, again presumably representing the position of the opponent: future factors subject to arising will inevitably arise, and those not subject to arising will not arise. He cites the case of Aṅgulimāla who, as a result of the Buddha’s intervention, gives up his former life as a robber, which should result in rebirth in hell, and engages in religious practice. The proponent then inquires whether Aṅgulimāla’s future nature as a hell-being should be considered a factor subject to or not subject to arising. As in his treatment of the first point, here also the proponent offers two untoward consequences that follow from a single alternative, in this case the affirmative alternative, namely, that Aṅgulimāla’s nature as a hell-being is subject to arising.⁸⁸ First, classifying Aṅgulimāla’s nature as a hell-being as a factor subject to arising that will inevitably arise results in self-contradiction, since he will never in fact be reborn in hell. And second, if Aṅgulimāla’s nature as a hell-being is a factor subject to arising that will inevitably arise, he should not engage in a life of religious practice, which contradicts his life-story, since he does pursue the religious life under the Buddha’s influence.

In response, the opponent offers a further qualification of his proposition that future factors subject to arising will inevitably arise and those not subject to arising will not arise. He states that a future factor’s status as “subject to arising” depends upon two further criteria: first, it must obtain a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions (*samagri*, P *sāmaggī*, Skt *sāmagrī*); and second, it must reach the point of its arising. These two criteria dictate that future factors will not arise of their own accord at some indeterminate point in the future, nor will they arise due to a single cause. Instead, they can only be considered “subject to arising” and will then inevitably arise when combined with the requisite conditions and at the right moment, that is, when they are on the point of arising. Since Aṅgulimāla never obtains the requisite conditions for the arising of his matured effects, and his nature as a hell-being cannot be considered subject to arising, he will never be reborn in hell. To the opponent’s qualification, the proponent replies that a future factor should then be considered subject to arising simply on the basis of whether it obtains a complete collocation of requisite conditions; in other words, the criterion of reaching the point of arising is irrelevant. And since according to the opponent’s own position the various individual conditions within this complete collocation would themselves exist as future factors, any future factor would exist together with its requisite conditions at any point in the future, and thus all future factors should in fact be considered “subject to arising.”

As the fourth point criticizing the opponent’s second category of existent future factors, the proponent cites a scriptural passage that will be contradicted regardless of the classification of future factors as subject to or not subject to arising. This passage refers to unarisen, unvirtuous factors that will not arise because one has cultivated right exertion. In this case, if these unvirtuous factors

(1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

⁸⁸ Again, it is possible that the manuscript contains an error in the first of these alternatives, which may have originally represented the negative option, that is, that it is not subject to arising. However, once again, the text has been accepted as written. Cf. Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

do not arise because they are by nature not subject to arising, the efficacy of religious practice is undermined since there would be no reason to undertake practice to prevent their arising. And yet, if they are “subject to arising” and then become “not subject to arising” through the efficacy of the path, the opponent’s prior proposition that factors subject to arising inevitably arise is contradicted.

After concluding his treatment of the opponent’s third category of existent past factors, the proponent returns to add two final points to his examination of the second category of future matured effects. Once again, these points hinge upon the opponent’s distinction between the two categories of future factors as “subject to arising” or “not subject to arising.” As his fifth point, the proponent contends that the categorization of future factors as subject to arising results in confusion between future and present factors such that a future factor subject to arising must in fact be present. This contention is based in part upon the proponent’s own assumption that existence is tantamount to occurrence in the present; that is to say, if the opponent claims that a future factor exists as subject to arising, the proponent concludes that it must be present since he maintains that to exist is to be present. The proponent’s contention here also depends upon the opponent’s qualification that future factors are subject to arising if they obtain a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions and reach the point of their arising. As an example, the proponent offers the future noble path that is subject to arising, which, in the stage immediately prior to its arising, is referred to as “not yet having reached” (*anagama*, Skt *anāgamyā*). Even in this still future, preparatory stage of “not yet having reached,” the noble path must in fact already be considered present and hence “not subject to arising,” either because it will inevitably arise in the next moment or because the noble path itself also includes this preparatory stage. And as present, it must then be a factor not subject to arising. Thus, a double contradiction results: the future noble path that is “not yet having reached” must in fact be considered to be present and hence “having reached,” and even though it is a future factor “subject to arising,” it must instead be considered “not subject to arising” since it is present and “reached.”

As his sixth and final point, the proponent returns to the opponent’s proposition that factors “subject to arising” will inevitably arise, and those “not subject to arising” will not arise. He notes that this proposition results in one of two untoward consequences. In the first case, the two categories of “subject to” and “not subject to arising” will remain static and cannot be changed. Then, the life of religious practice would be without purpose since the status of any future defilements subject to arising could not be altered and would inevitably arise. In the second case, if future factors “subject to arising” could indeed become “not subject to arising,” they would never arise and in this respect should be equated with unconditioned factors. This constitutes an untoward consequence because unconditioned factors are, by definition, neither subject to arising nor can they be qualified with respect to the time periods. By contrast, since future factors are qualified by the time periods, they cannot be considered to be unconditioned.

I.1.5.3. Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [Section 3: l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

The third section of the text is by far the longest, extending from 52F(r) line 66 at least to the end of the layer 51ssss, which covers the final ten lines of fragment 51G(v). Despite the questions that remain concerning the structure of the original text and the placement of our text within it, the second and third sections are closely linked by their treatment of controversies concerning

the existence of past and future factors. These two sections are separated by a major punctuation mark, which in this case corresponds to a thematic change from the existence of past and future factors considered from the perspective of action in section two, to existence in the abstract in section three, which is considered through the opponent's fundamental proposition "everything exists." These two topics are also closely linked in other abhidharma texts, as, for example, in the Kathāvatthu, where their order is reversed with a brief discussion of the proposition "everything exists," which introduces the examination of past and future factors. Even though this third section of our text continues the same stylistic pattern of polemical exchange, the unknown opponent in section two is replaced in section three by an opponent explicitly identified as a *mahasarvastivāda* (Skt **mahāsarvāstivāda*). Certainly, as a supporter of the proposition "everything exists" this Mahāsarvāstivādin opponent espouses a well-known Sarvāstivāda position, but on certain specific points he deviates in interesting and important ways from mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika views as recorded in later sources such as the Vibhāṣā compendia.

Section three is tightly structured and begins with the opponent's fundamental proposition "everything exists," which he then expands through a series of declarations and further elaboration. The section then presents the proponent's point-by-point criticism of the opponent's position. Whereas the arguments in section two are informed by general issues concerning existence and its connection to either occurrence or causal efficacy, section three raises specific controversies concerning the relationship between factors and the time periods, distinctions among factors of the three time periods, and the definition of existence in terms of either "mode" (P/Skt *bhāva*) or "intrinsic nature" (P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*). Many of the arguments in section three are familiar from other abhidharma texts of all periods, but since the closest parallels, namely, the Pali Kathāvatthu and the **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra*, are comparatively early texts, this Gāndhārī abhidharma text also likely represents an early source for these important issues. The relatively simple arguments in all three of these texts set the stage for more complex controversies and the development of intricate models of existence and of the precise activity of existent factors. Just as importantly, treatments in early texts such as this one provide a context for these later controversies and suggest that they arose from specific problems involving practical issues primarily of causation and religious practice.

I.1.5.3.1. Elaboration of the Opponent's Fundamental Proposition: "Everything Exists"

Section three begins with the fundamental proposition "everything exists" (*sarvam asti*), which is expanded through a series of seven formulaic declarations (ll. 67–68): "Everything exists at all times. Everything exists everywhere. Everything exists with every aspect. (*Everything exists) through every reason. Everything exists through all modes. Everything exists through all causes. Everything exists though all conditions." Both the fundamental proposition and the formulaic declarations are explicitly marked as the view of an opponent who is identified only later in the text as a Mahāsarvāstivādin. This passage in our text is extremely close in both content and structure to the chapter "Everything Exists" in the Kathāvatthu, which the commentary claims represents the views of the Sabbatthivādins. In our text, this initial statement of the fundamental proposition and its attendant declarations serves initially as the basis for further elaboration by the opponent, and then for a point-by-point criticism by the proponent.

In his elaboration, the opponent offers a series of qualifications, specifications, and explications in an attempt to clarify his fundamental proposition. He first qualifies his proposition through two logically complementary general statements: “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything” (l. 69). Both of these statements represent the converse of the proposition “everything exists,” and in their logically complementary affirmative and negative forms, they serve to elucidate the concepts “everything” and “exists” by qualifying their relationship to one another. The scope of “everything” as the content of “existence” is first delimited through three specifications to which a fourth will be added at the conclusion of the opponent’s elaboration. The first specification states that “everything” refers to those factors that are included within the “twelve sense spheres” (P *dvādasāyatana*, Skt *dvādasāyatana*), that is, the entire range of possible sense organs and objects that function in all experience, which is at root perceptual. This first specification is based on a scriptural passage frequently cited in abhidharma texts, one that is selected by the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas as the most succinct and therefore the correct one defining “everything.” The second and third specifications both mention the time periods (P *addhan*, Skt *adhvan*). The second specification delimiting “everything” as the content of “existence” states that existence refers to the factors of the three time periods, which are not confused with one another. This specification stems from a problem implicit in the fundamental proposition “everything exists”: namely, that since this proposition entails that past, present, and future factors all exist, some method of distinguishing clearly among factors of the different time periods must be established. This issue becomes significant in virtually all discussions of existence in abhidharma texts of the middle and later periods and also underlies the theories of the four masters, which come to be used as part of the standard presentation of the Sarvāstivāda position that “everything exists.” It also precipitated later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika ontological investigations that attempt to determine criteria for existence and thereby clarify the relationship between existence and either present occurrence or causal efficacy.⁸⁹ The third specification delimiting “everything” appears to present the contrasting view that existence is not to be identified with past, present, and future factors but rather with the time periods themselves.

These second and third specifications correspond to two views concerning the relationship between factors and the time periods that are recorded in other abhidharma texts. The second specification, which is supported by the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, suggests that existence can only be applied to conditioned factors; the time periods are to be understood as nothing more than provisional designations that ultimately refer to the factors of which they consist. By contrast, the third specification suggests that the time periods themselves exist apart from conditioned factors, which move through them. In the Vibhāṣā compendia, this view is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas or Vibhajyavādins, but in our Gāndhārī abhidharma text and certain other early texts, it is alluded to without school attribution. In fact, since our text presents this third specification as an alternative position of the same opponent, it is likely that it is intended to represent not some separate group but rather an alternative Sarvāstivāda interpretation that predates the standardized view as found in the Vibhāṣā compendia. In other words, in this controversy concerning the relationship between

⁸⁹ Commentaries: (8) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 51–61]; Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]. For the extended discussion in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, see Takeda and Cox 2010.

factors and the time periods, our text preserves an early stage in which the later sectarian positions have not yet been clearly delineated and ascribed.⁹⁰

After presenting these first three specifications that delimit “everything,” the opponent further elaborates his first qualification through two explications of the concept of “existence” (*astiḍa*). Both utilize derivational explanations that relate the term *astiḍa* (P *atthitā*, Skt *astitā*) to the verb *as*, “to be” or “to exist”: “That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; (*that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence. The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence.”⁹¹ He then returns to the second and third specifications of everything and elaborates the relationship between existence and the past, present, and future. Manuscript damage prevents a secure reconstruction of the beginning of this passage, but the following text asserts that past and future years exist and that “modes” of various stages in both ordinary and religious life, for example, the mode of a householder, monastery worker, merchant, or arhat, exist as past and future. Here, the opponent uses the term *bhava*, as in the phrases “mode of the householder” or “mode of the arhat.” This term *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) has a complex history with different senses that become prominent in different periods, contexts, or for different groups. Indeed, throughout its history, the term is multivalent, and this ambiguity becomes particularly important in the arguments between the proponent and his Mahāsarvāstivādin opponent in this Gāndhārī abhidharma text. In general, P/Skt *bhāva* refers to a “state of being” or “nature” that identifies things and serves as the basis of recognition and naming, but the understanding of this “nature” and hence the referent of P/Skt *bhāva* developed and changed over time. In the earlier period, P/Skt *bhāva* appears to carry a more general ontic sense of “nature” as “modes” referring to particular states or ways of being. However, it also comes to be used in a more limited typological sense referring to a strictly defining and abstract “nature,” that is, with the sense of the term “intrinsic nature” (P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*) as used in later abhidharma discussions. In fact, the argument in this and other passages of our text suggests that these two senses of *bhava* as more generally ontic or more abstractly typological both come into play, with the opponent preferring the first ontic sense as multiple “modes” in which a factor exists, while the proponent prefers the second typological sense as a factor’s singular “nature.” In fact, such passages provide important examples of the multivalence of the term P/Skt *bhāva* and constitute early evidence for the development of the term and the emergence of the notion of “intrinsic nature” (Skt *svabhāva*) so important in later Sarvāstivāda ontology. Thus, in this passage, the opponent appears to suggest that factors can be said to exist in different “modes” in the past and future as in the case of the second specification, and possibly that the past and future time periods themselves can be said to exist as “modes,” as in the case of the third specification.

Continuing his elaboration of the fundamental proposition “everything exists” the opponent next offers a second qualification intended to elucidate both “everything” and “exists” once again through two complementary, but in this case negative statements: “It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist” (l. 75). The first statement, “it is not the case

⁹⁰ Commentary: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

⁹¹ *ya asti ta ha astiḍa vatava • (*ya nast) i t (*a) nastiḍa ha vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •* (ll. 70–71).

that everything exists,” indicates that the proposition “everything exists” does not entail the existence of everything under all possible circumstances; instead, it is only valid if the scope of “everything” is properly delimited and “existence” is determined. The opponent offers two examples that clarify this proper delimitation and determination. The first example is that of an arhat’s past defilements. Since an arhat has reached the final goal of religious practice, any past defilements will be obstructed by his prior practice and can no longer cause the arising of future defilements. However, since such past defilements may still be said to exist as potential causes, one can say that “it is not the case that everything does not exist,” and yet since their causal efficacy is obstructed and effects will not arise from them, one can also say that “it is not the case that everything exists.” The second example appeals directly to the past, present, and future, stating simply, “the past should be said to be the past alone; the future should be said to be the future alone; the present should be said to be the present alone.” By referring to the past, present, and future, this statement can be understood to assert their existence, and thus it supports the fact that “it is not the case that everything does not exist.” However, by using the restrictive particle “alone” (G/P/Skt *eva*), it indicates that for example the past exists as past **alone** but does not exist as present or future. As a result, it also demonstrates that “it is not the case that everything exists.” This second example is then expanded through a formulaic pattern that describes the process of determination by clearly discriminating “intrinsic nature” (*svabhava*, P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*): specifically the determination (*parinipanañhada*, P *parinipphannañhatā*, Skt **pariniṣpannasthatā*) of the past is achieved through the establishment (*astivabhinipana*, P **atthittābhiniṣpanna*, Skt **astivābhiniṣpanna*) of the intrinsic nature not only of the past but also of the present and future. In this way, past, present, and future factors, and by extension all factors, are determined through a process of proper discrimination on the basis of intrinsic nature.

Following this second qualification concerning determination through proper discrimination, the opponent concludes the elaboration of his fundamental proposition with a fourth and final specification of “everything” in terms of the distinctly Sarvāstivāda notion of the three characteristics of a conditioned factor (*sakhaḍḍa lakṣaṇa*, Skt *saṃskṛtasya lakṣaṇa*), namely, birth, senescence, and desinence, which serve to distinguish existence as past, present, and future.

1.1.5.3.2. Criticism of the Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition: “Everything Exists”

After presenting the opponent’s elaboration of his fundamental proposition, the proponent offers a point-by-point criticism, which extends from line 82 almost to the end of the surviving manuscript. Each point in this criticism is linked to specific statements by the opponent, beginning with a general criticism of the opponent’s first qualification of the fundamental proposition, and then proceeding to the formulaic declarations that expand upon this proposition, through each of his specifications of the scope of “everything” (*sarva*), and then to his explications of the concept of “existence” (*astiḍa*).

To introduce his criticism, the proponent states that he will examine the proposition “everything exists” and explicitly identifies his opponent as a Mahāsarvāstivādin (*mahasarvastivāḍa*). He then offers yet another assertion by this opponent presumably intended to clarify his fundamental proposition: “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist. Past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors] exist” (l. 83). This statement might also be taken as yet another

specification of the scope of “everything” as the content of “existence,” here in terms of a standard Sarvāstivāda set of four categories of existent factors, namely, past, future, and present conditioned factors, as well as unconditioned factors.

In his criticism, the proponent begins with the opponent’s first qualification of his fundamental proposition in the form of two converse and complementary statements: “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything” (l. 69). The proponent addresses only the first of these statements, “that which exists is everything,” and offers two arguments, both of which result in untoward consequences. In his first argument, the proponent applies the opponent’s qualification, “that which exists is everything,” to his immediately preceding assertion, “certainly there is nothing that does not exist,” and draws the undesirable conclusion that “even that which does not exist also exists.” Such nonexistent entities would include things such as a soul (*jīva*, P/Skt *jīva*) or a person (*pugala*, P *puggala*, Skt *puḍgala*), which are rejected on the basis of the Buddhist denial of the self, as well as things such as a fifth noble truth, which are rejected because they fall outside accepted Buddhist doctrinal category sets. Further, the proponent observes that the inevitable conclusion following from the opponent’s assertion here, namely, that even nonexistent entities exist, is undesirable since it is not upheld in authoritative scripture. Instead, scripture upholds the position that “the existent should be said to be existence,” and “the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence” (ll. 86–87). Here, the proponent also points to an internal contradiction within the opponent’s own position: specifically, the statement, “even that which does not exist also exists,” stands in direct contradiction to the opponent’s earlier explication of the concept of “existence,” namely, “that which exists should indeed be said to be existence” (ll. 70–71). And further, the opposite statement, which is supported by scripture, “the existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence” corresponds exactly to the opponent’s own previously given second explication of “existence” (l. 71). Thus, through his first qualification, “that which exists is everything,” and through his assertion here in this passage, “certainly there is nothing that does not exist,” the opponent falls prey not only to the undesirable conclusion that the nonexistent exists but also to both a contradiction of scripture and self-contradiction.

If in response to this criticism the opponent admits that such nonexistent entities do not in fact exist, then two problems result. First, since the opponent here allows that there is in fact something that does not exist, he cannot be referred to as a *mahasarvastivāda*, “one who claims that everything exists.” Instead, he should be labeled a *vivarjavāda* (P *vibhajjavāda*, Skt *vibhajjavāda*), “one who maintains distinctions,” specifically in this case the distinction between “that which exists” and “that which does not exist.” The syntactic structure of the proponent’s retort here is also significant: “Well then, it is **you** who maintain distinctions!” (l. 90). This emphatic construction suggests that the proponent may be attempting to draw a contrast, specifically between the opponent and himself whereby “it is **you** [the opponent], and not **I** [the proponent], who maintains distinctions!” This in turn might be taken as indicating that the proponent here rhetorically applies to his opponent the label *vivarjavāda* that would normally be applied to himself, and depending upon the sense of the label *vivarjavāda*, this might be taken as an allusion by the proponent to his own school affiliation.⁹² The proponent then notes a second problem that results from the opponent’s admission that nonexistent entities do not exist, namely, that the cognition of such nonexistent entities would

⁹² Introduction § I.1.4 School Affiliation.

have no object. This in turn would contradict the Buddhist model of perception that demands four existent conditions for the arising of cognition, one of which is the perceived object.

Next, the proponent offers a second argument against the opponent's first qualification of his fundamental proposition, and once again he addresses only the first of the two converse and complementary statements originally given in line 69, namely, "that which exists is everything." The proponent uses a simple formal argument to demonstrate that this converse statement by itself results in an undesirable conclusion. He appeals to the example of the twelve sense spheres that form the basis of the opponent's first specification of everything: "And [one states,] [o] 'That which exists is everything.' [p] And the visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere" (ll. 95–96). In other words, given the opponent's statement, "that which exists (A) is everything (B; or $A = B$)," and the fact that any existent entity such as the visual sense organ (C) can be said to exist ($C = A$), then the visual sense organ (C) should be equated with everything (B; or $C = B$). And since the opponent would specify the scope of "everything" (B) as the twelve sense spheres (D; or $B = D$), then the visual sense organ (C) itself should be equated with the twelve sense spheres (D; or $C = D$). This conclusion results in a blatant contradiction since the visual sense organ cannot be equated with the twelve sense spheres but is in fact included among them. The opponent might respond that the visual sense sphere obviously is not the only thing that exists since its object, material form, also exists. However, this would contradict his previous statement, "that which exists is everything," since he would be forced to admit that the visual sense organ, which he has stated exists, is not in fact everything. As a final response, the opponent might modify his previous statement. Rather than claiming "that which exists is everything," he might state, "that which exists is in some cases everything ($A = B$) and in some cases not everything ($A \neq B$)." However, as the proponent is quick to note, this results in a contradiction of the opponent's fundamental proposition. In other words, the opponent's response here leads to two formally complementary statements: "Everything in some cases should be said to exist ($B = A$) and in some cases should be said not to exist ($B \neq A$)." And these statements in turn contradict the opponent's fundamental proposition "everything exists." Thus, the proponent concludes that both the opponent's fundamental proposition "everything exists" and his converse qualification, "that which exists is everything," are untenable.

I.1.5.3.3. Criticism of the Declarations Expanding upon "Everything Exists"

After criticizing the opponent's fundamental proposition itself as well as its elaboration through the qualifications offered by the opponent, the proponent next turns to the formulaic declarations that immediately follow the fundamental proposition. He offers separate criticisms of a total of six declarations, including four of the seven declarations given in lines 67–68 and two declarations not listed in this root passage. For the remaining three declarations that appear in the root passage, the proponent merely offers an abbreviation formula presumably suggesting that they should be criticized according to the method used throughout the prior arguments, namely, by offering counterexamples that point to the untoward consequences to which each declaration leads.

The proponent begins with the second declaration cited in the root passage, "Everything exists everywhere (*sarvatra*)" (G2: ll. 98–99), and offers three counterexamples that illustrate the confusion of factors to which this declaration leads. First, if "everything exists everywhere," one is

forced to admit that the objects of sense exist within the very sense organs that perceive them, thus in effect precluding any possibility of perception. Second, if “everything exists everywhere,” the natures of various sentient beings exist in the nature of a single sentient being such as a hell-being, thus negating the causal efficacy of actions and the operation of karma that govern the process of rebirth. The final counterexample points to the general conclusion that all factors become confused: specifically if “everything exists everywhere,” “intrinsic nature” and “other-nature” would exist in one another, thus making distinctions of any type among entities impossible. To avoid these untoward consequences, the opponent might respond that one should not say that “everything exists everywhere.” However, as the proponent observes, this is tantamount to claiming that “everything does not exist everywhere,” which in turn contradicts the opponent’s own declaration being criticized here. Thus, the proponent concludes that the opponent would be left with the claim that “something exists [and] something does not exist,” which would contradict his fundamental proposition “everything exists.”

Turning to two declarations not included in the root passage, the proponent first examines the statement, “Everything exists in all [factors] (*sarveṣu*)” (G9: l. 102). Here also, the proponent offers counterexamples. The first concerns “controlling faculties” (*idriya*, P/Skt *indriya*), which could be understood either in a broader sense to refer to the mental and physical “faculties” that control various aspects of sentient life, or in a narrower sense to refer only to the faculties, or organs, of the senses. In either case, the point is the same; under ordinary circumstances, an impaired controlling faculty, such as a sense organ, would no longer be able to serve as the condition for the arising of future, unimpaired controlling faculties within its own stream. Specifically, if “everything exists in all factors,” there is nothing to prevent, for example, an eye that is blind from conditioning the arising of a functioning eye within its own stream at some point in the future. The second counterexample returns to the hell-beings, who, if “everything exists in all factors,” must possess the nature of other sentient beings as well as their own. As in the case of the previous declaration, the opponent responds here also that one should not say “everything exists in all factors,” which is once again the very declaration being criticized. As a result, the proponent concludes that the opponent should maintain instead that “something exists [and] something does not exist.” In contrast to his criticism of the previous declaration, the proponent here adds to his argument a rhetorical question that explicitly states the opponent’s self-contradiction: “Now how possibly could it be said by you that ‘everything exists?’” For the next declaration, also not included in the root passage, “Everything exists as belonging to everything (*sarvaśa*)” (G10: l. 105), the proponent offers a simple rebuttal. He raises the untoward consequence that if “everything exists as belonging to everything,” one sentient being possesses the characteristics of another, or, using Buddhist terminology, one sentient being is connected to the aggregates, sense spheres, and elements of another. As a result, distinguishing among sentient beings becomes impossible.

The next three declarations criticized by the proponent do appear in the root passage. For the declaration, “Everything exists at all times (*sarvakala*)” (G1: l. 107), the proponent notes that the result is temporal confusion: for example, the time in the morning before the meal would exist in the afternoon after the meal; the future and past would exist in the present; and many other such examples could be given. In the case of “Everything exists with every aspect (*sarvagarena*)” (G3: l. 109), the proponent gives numerous counterexamples, all of which illustrate the confusion of

aspects that result: a future aspect exists with a past aspect; tranquility with the aspect of voidness; untruth with the aspect of truth; happiness with the aspect of suffering; self with the aspect of non-self; and “not everything” with the aspect of “everything.” For the declaration, “Everything exists by every reason (*sarvakaranena*)” (G4: ll. 67–68), the proponent offers only one counterexample: virtuous and unvirtuous factors exist due to past, present, and future factors. The proponent gives no further explanation of this counterexample, but since he rejects the existence of past and future factors, presumably he simply does not accept that they can serve as “reasons” (P/Skt *kāraṇa*) or “causes” for the existence of other factors. However, since the Mahāsarvāstivādin opponent contends that various types of past and future factors do indeed exist, he would readily admit that they can serve as causes of various types. Hence, the proponent’s argument, as succinctly preserved here, would not constitute an effective criticism of his Mahāsarvāstivādin opponent’s position.

The opponent offers three additional declarations in the root passage: “Everything exists through all modes (*sarvabhavaḥ*). Everything exists through all causes (*sarvahuḍa*). Everything exists through all conditions (*sarvaprakageḥ*)” (G5–7: ll. 68–69). However, the proponent in his criticism includes only a brief reference to the first declaration concerning “modes” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*), followed by the abbreviation adverb “and so on” (P *peyyāla*, Skt *peyāla*). This presumably indicates that these three declarations should be criticized by means of similar reasoning, namely, through the application of counterexamples demonstrating that the modes, causes, and conditions of factors would be confused. Thus, in the view of the proponent, rather than expanding upon the fundamental proposition, all of these formulaic declarations result in the untoward consequence of confusion among factors and thereby undermine the fundamental proposition that they are intended to elaborate.

I.1.5.3.4. Criticism of the Specifications of “Everything” and the Explications of “Existence”

Continuing his criticism, the proponent next takes up the opponent’s specifications of “everything” (*sarva*) as the content of “existence” (*astiḍa*). The first specification becomes the standard, mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the scope of “everything”: “Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist” (l. 69). Even though the proponent alluded to this specification in his earlier argument criticizing the opponent’s qualification of his fundamental proposition (ll. 95–98), here he criticizes it explicitly. Following a restatement of this first specification is a description of how it should be applied. For example, since the visual sense sphere exists, it is included within the twelve sense spheres; in the same way, each of the sense spheres contributes to the determination of the scope of “everything.” Although this statement is not explicitly attributed to the opponent, it constitutes a reasonable application of his first specification. Next, the proponent raises the example of nonexistent entities by citing the opponent’s earlier statement that nonexistent entities do not exist (ll. 88–90). The proponent begins his criticism proper with a question concerning the cognition of nonexistent entities. In his previous argument, the proponent emphasized that nonexistent entities are incapable of serving as conditions for the arising of perceptual consciousness. Here, he shifts his focus to perceptual consciousness itself and inquires which perceptual consciousness cognizes nonexistent entities. The opponent responds simply that nonexistent entities are cognized by the mental sense sphere and by mental perceptual consciousness. In that case, the proponent concludes, nonexistent entities should be subsumed

within the “factor sense sphere,” which is the proper object of mental perceptual consciousness. As a result, the “factor sense sphere” would include both factors that exist and factors that do not exist. Thus, given the opponent’s specification of “everything” as the twelve sense spheres, since the twelve sense spheres include the factor sense sphere, “everything” would then also include nonexistent entities, and the fundamental proposition “everything exists” would be contradicted.

Next, the proponent turns to the opponent’s second specification: “Or, [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence” (l. 123). It should be noted that the proponent’s citation here omits from the original specification the phrase “which are not confused” (*aśabhina*): “[Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence” (l. 70). It is precisely this issue of confusion among factors of the three time periods that the proponent will address in his criticism. In other words, if factors exist as past, present, and future, they cannot be distinguished from one another, and as the proponent will observe, a future factor is present, and a present factor is past. This problem of potential confusion among factors plays a prominent role in the criticism of the proposition “everything exists” in abhidharma texts of all periods.⁹³ A frequent response to this criticism, as in the case of the opponent’s response here in our text, is the simple statement that a factor having been future becomes present, and similarly, being present becomes past. However, in this case the proponent claims that any given factor should possess three separate “natures” (*bhava*) as past, present, and future. The opponent attempts to clarify his position by noting that a particular factor, for example, a single instance of material form, does in fact exist through various “modes” (*bhava*), from future to present and then to past, but that does not result in the untoward consequence that there are three discrete factors of material form. This response makes it clear that the proponent and the opponent understand the term *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) differently. For the proponent, *bhava* carries only an abstract typological sense referring to the distinctive “nature” that uniquely characterizes any given particular factor, which in turn allows all factors to be clearly discriminated and classified. However, it appears that the opponent understands *bhava* also in a general ontic sense referring to “modes” of existence, and therefore, while a factor still retains its distinctive and defining “nature,” it is possible to describe that factor as existing in multiple “modes.” Hence, from the proponent’s perspective, if the opponent claims that a single factor exists as past, present, and future, it must possess three distinct “natures,” and this necessarily entails the existence of three separate factors. By contrast, given the opponent’s understanding of *bhava* also as “mode,” he encounters no difficulty in maintaining that a single factor characterized by a single identifying “nature” nonetheless exists in different “modes.”

In the context of this response by the opponent, the proponent returns to the issue of the mechanism by which future factors become present and present factors become past. In the proponent’s words, “How is there the acquisition of a present ‘nature’ in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?” (ll. 128–129). As in the case of the unnamed opponent in the second section of our text (ll. 45–47), here also the Mahāsarvāstivādin opponent appeals to the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions (*samagri*, P *sāmaggī*, Skt *sāmagrī*), which functions to bring future factors to the point of arising:

⁹³ Commentaries: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

“Material form possessed of a future ‘mode’ [comes to] be possessed of a present ‘mode’ due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions]” (l. 129). However, for the proponent, this notion of the “complete collocation” simply defers the problem by adding yet another factor to the already complicated array of factors whose arising must be explained. To stop what he sees as equivocation through regress, the proponent inquires, “Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?” (l. 130). In what would appear to be a definitive response, the opponent states simply that the “complete collocation” exists, but as the following discussion makes clear, the real issue for both parties is the manner of its existence in relation to the *bhava* of the factor whose arising it conditions. As the proponent responds, “If one states, [O] ‘[The complete collocation] exists,’ [P] then the ‘nature’ of material form in the present is not material form, [but should instead be that of the separately existing complete collocation]” (ll. 130–131). In this exchange also, it is apparent that the proponent and the opponent apply different notions of the term *bhava*. For the proponent, if the complete collocation is said to exist, it has its own distinctive “nature” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*), and the factor that becomes part of this collocation should be characterized by the “nature” of the collocation. By contrast, the opponent would understand *bhava* in this argument not as defining “nature” but as indicating “mode,” which can and does change. Thus, throughout his subsequent criticism, the proponent raises the contradiction that results from a single factor possessing different “natures,” and the opponent responds by distinguishing among a factor’s different temporal “modes.” And given his model of a single factor that exists through multiple “modes,” the opponent has no problem speaking of a future factor acquiring a present mode, or arising, through the “force of the complete collocation” (*samagrivaśena*, P *sāmaggīvasena*, Skt *sāmagrīvaśena*). This exchange ends with the opponent’s second response, unfortunately only partially preserved, to the proponent’s question concerning the “complete collocation”: “One states, [O] ‘Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all...’” (l. 134). Obviously, the opponent here still maintains that the “complete collocation” exists, but he offers some further qualification as to the manner of its existence. Although this further qualification is lost, given the opponent’s other responses, it seems reasonable to assume that it would specify that the collocation does not exist in such a way that the “nature” of the collocation could become confused with that of the factor.

Unfortunately, damage to the final portion of the manuscript prevents the reconstruction of the next passage. However, two legible references to the “complete collocation” (ll. 139, 140) suggest that the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s second, and possibly also third and fourth specifications of the scope of “everything” continues. A layer of bark covers approximately the next fourteen lines of the manuscript, but certain terms on this overlying layer (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5) are legible: specifically, “future,” *bhava*, “twelve sense spheres,” as well as “visual” and “mental perceptual consciousness,” and most importantly *mahasarvastivada*. These terms indicate a concern with the same set of issues found in the earlier criticism of the opponent’s specifications of “everything.” Since the initial portion of the argument in this passage is not preserved, clues for its general topic must be inferred from the following polemical exchange. Nonetheless, since it presents once again a major point of contention and further clarifies the positions of the proponent

and the opponent, it is worth describing in some detail.⁹⁴ Just as in the argument in lines 115–121, here also the proponent appears to raise the problem of the cognition of objects, although in this context he is concerned about the cognition not of nonexistent entities but rather of future and possibly of past objects. The term *bhava* in this argument evokes the immediately preceding argument (ll. 123–134) concerning the *bhava* of factors in the past, present, and future. As in that preceding argument, here also the differing senses of *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) assumed by the proponent and the opponent become significant; for the proponent, *bhava* carries only the sense of a factor’s defining “nature,” while for the opponent, it refers in this argument to a factor’s varying “modes.” The proponent inquires simply, “By means of which perceptual consciousness will one perceive the *bhava* of material form?”—a question that is ambiguous given their differing conceptions of *bhava*. If the proponent has in mind his own understanding of *bhava* as “nature,” the opponent’s answer would make perfect sense: “It is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness.” However, the proponent responds with an untoward consequence, which suggests that he intends through his question to challenge the opponent’s understanding of *bhava* as referring, in this context, to a factor’s past, present, or future mode: “With regard to that it should then be said that that ‘nature’ consists of material form, [since] visual perceptual consciousness should perceive material form.” In other words, visual perceptual consciousness perceives only a factor’s nature as material form and only in the present moment; for the proponent to consider the opponent’s response unacceptable, he must be inquiring about an object that visual perceptual consciousness cannot perceive, namely, a factor’s past or future “modes.” The opponent’s second response “It is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness” addresses this first untoward consequence, since a past or future “mode” would be perceived by mental perceptual consciousness. However, in response to this, the proponent raises a second untoward consequence: “Then [its] ‘nature’ should be said to be [constituted by] the factor [sense sphere].” Here, the proponent points to a category contradiction such that material form, which by “nature” properly belongs to the material-form sense sphere, is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness, and must then belong to the factor sense sphere. And for this to constitute an untoward consequence, the proponent must intend the term *bhava* here as the “nature,” in the sense of the defining nature, of a factor of material form. However, as in the previous argument (ll. 123–134), the opponent would contend that no contradiction results since the term *bhava* can refer to a factor’s temporally varying “modes.”

With this, the proponent turns from his criticism of the opponent’s specifications of the scope of “everything” to his explications of “existence” and presents virtually the same argument as offered previously at the beginning of his initial criticism of the elaboration of the opponent’s fundamental proposition (ll. 82–87). However, here the argument is constructed in reverse order. First, the proponent alludes to the opponent’s second explication of “existence,” with which he presumably agrees: “It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist” (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5). Next, the proponent cites once again the assertion of his Mahāsarvāstivādin opponent with which his previous criticism began (ll. 82–83): “[o] Certainly there is nothing that does not exist”

⁹⁴ Commentary: Criticism Opponent’s Second, Third (?), and Fourth (?) Specifications [l. 135–51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 5].

(51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6). Despite the difference in order, the conclusion in both arguments is the same, namely, that even nonexistent entities must be admitted to exist. The passage continues with a reference to “four,” which may refer to the four categories of existent factors cited by the opponent in the previous argument, namely, past, future, and present conditioned factors, as well as unconditioned factors (l. 83). This is followed by the partial sentence “in the case of the existent ..., a ‘nature’ exists; a ‘nature,’ in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist.”⁹⁵ If this represents the position of the proponent, it could reflect his view that *bhava*, understood as defining “nature,” only applies to existent entities. Unfortunately, damage to the manuscript at this point obscures both the proponent’s argument and the opponent’s response, as well as any further criticism of the opponent’s explications of “existence.”

I.1.5.4. Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [Section 4: 51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

The fourth and last section of our text is not indicated by a punctuation mark or any other textual separator and can in fact be closely connected to the preceding third section through both shared terminology and one textual citation. Nonetheless, the three outer strips of the manuscript have been tentatively designated as a separate section on the basis of the frequent occurrence of praxis-related terms that do not appear in the previous third section.⁹⁶ Given the apparent concern with religious practice, this fourth section might also serve as a gradual transition back to the topic examined in the fragmentary section with which the text as preserved began. Further, since the final and only partially preserved line of the manuscript contains a statement indicating that the proponent’s criticism continues, it is clear that our text once formed part of a larger original text.

Among these three outer strips, only fragment 51D(v), which is relatively well preserved, provides a comprehensible argument and explicit evidence of changes in speaker. The preceding passage, which is found on the lower portion of layer 51ssss together with various chips that cover fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v), contains only isolated legible terms, some that figure in the proponent’s earlier arguments and others that suggest new issues related to religious practice. For example, the phrase *sarvam asti* (P *sabbaṃ atthi*, Skt *sarvam asti*) referring to the opponent’s fundamental proposition “everything exists” and *adida* (P/Skt, *atīta*), “past,” establish connections with the primary topic of the third section. In addition, *ruva* (P/Skt, *rūpa*), “material form,” and *bhava* (P/Skt, *bhāva*), “nature” or “mode,” recall the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s specifications of “everything” in the immediately preceding passage (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5). Fragment 51D(v) also refers to the “past” and “future” and contains a verbatim citation of a statement by the opponent concerning the relationship between the time periods and existence that appeared in his elaboration of his proposition “everything exists” (ll. 71–72). Since this statement immediately follows the opponent’s explication of “existence,” which was examined in the preceding passage (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7), it is possible that the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s elaboration of his fundamental proposition continues throughout layer 51ssss, that is,

⁹⁵ *s(*a)d(*a) bh(*a)va asti • bh(*a)v(*a) ? ? asaḍa nasti* (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7).

⁹⁶ Certain praxis-related terms also occur in section 51jjjj, which precedes layer 51ssss, and covers the last portion of fragment 51G(v) constituting the final portion of the previous section. However, section 51jjjj may have been displaced upward from a point after this portion of 51ssss(v), that is, from some place within these final three strips of the manuscript.

including the portion of layer 51ssss that forms fragment 51D and 51A–B. However, praxis-related terms, which suggest a change in topic to religious practice, also occur throughout the fragments and pieces of bark that constitute the latter portion of layer 51ssss. Most pervasive are references to the “attainment of religious practice” (*upaśapaḍa*, P/Skt *upasampadā*), “one who has attained religious practice” (*upaśapana*, P/Skt *upasampanna*), and “one who has not attained religious practice” (*anupaśapana*, P/Skt *anupasampanna*). Fragment 51D(v) also contains the term “observing moral conduct” (*śilavata*, P *aśilavanta*, Skt *aśilavanti*), and the final strip of the manuscript, 51A–B(r), mentions “contaminants” (*anuśaya*, P *anusaya*, Skt *anuśaya*), the state of being “freed from lust” (*viḍaraga*, P/Skt *vītarāga*), and the adjective “future” (*anagaḍae*, P *anāgatāya*, Skt *anāgatāyai*), which is declined in a feminine oblique case probably referring to the feminine noun “attainment of religious practice” (*upaśapaḍa*, P/Skt *upasampadā*).

Unfortunately, the damaged condition of this final portion of the manuscript prevents a full reconstruction of the presented arguments, but the best preserved of the fragments, 51D(v), clearly presents an argument against the existence of future factors. It uses the now familiar pattern of applying the principle of category uniformity in the context of juxtaposed opposites in order to contend that a transition from one state to its opposite within a single category, specifically within the single category of future factors, is impossible. Earlier arguments focused on the general opposition between past action whose effects have “occurred” (*nivurta*, Skt *nirvṛtta*, P *anibbatta*) or “not occurred” (*anivurta*, Skt *anirvṛtta*, P *anibbatta*) (51D(r) l. 1), or future “factors subject to” (*upaḍadhama*, P **uppādidhamma*, Skt **utpādidharma*) and “not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*, P **anuppādidhamma*, Skt **anutpādidharma*) (ll. 36–51, 62–66).⁹⁷ The argument in fragment 51D(v) still concerns future factors but focuses on praxis-related contrasts, specifically between the status of “one who has not attained” and “one who has attained religious practice,” and between “not observing moral conduct” and “observing moral conduct.” The same argument pattern will continue in the final strip of the manuscript (51A–B(r) l. 5) with a contrast between states of being “not yet freed from lust” and being “freed from lust.” Through this argument, the proponent presumably argues against the opponent’s claim that future factors exist by undermining a change in their status that would be required to explain the efficacy of religious practice. Thus, even though the specific arguments in this fourth section cannot be reconstructed, the terminology and the occasional complete phrase are sufficient to indicate that the proponent returns to the concern with religious practice with which the text began, which precipitated his criticism of the existence of past and future factors.

⁹⁷ Text Notes: [37] *y[i]di na śaka*. Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

CHAPTER I.2

Topic Outline of Text Contents

The major part of our Gāndhārī abhidharma text consists of a continuous argument on related issues, but the text lacks internal markers indicating topical sections or an explicit organizational structure. As a result, the following detailed outline is offered as an aid to the reader to clarify both the underlying structure of the text and the arguments that it presents. (For a brief outline, readers can consult the Contents of this volume, specifically the section Text and Commentary § I.3.) Equivalents in Gāndhārī, Pali, or Sanskrit are provided only in the case of terms whose meanings become significant in the arguments. Transitions from one topic to the next within this outline generally correspond to separate sections in the reconstructed text and translation (Text and Commentary § I.3, Transcribed Text, Reconstruction, and Translation § II.5). However, in certain cases, due to the length of the treatment of a given topic, a single topic in the outline subsumes sections that have been separated in the extended discussion of the text in the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6).

Within this detailed topic outline, the section and subsection headings correspond to those used in the discussion of the text content within the Text and Commentary (§ I.3). References to fragments and line numbers will allow the reader to locate more detailed discussions of textual issues in the text analysis. Simple parentheses contain individual words and phrases or descriptive summaries of portions of the text that are damaged and cannot be reconstructed with confidence. Parentheses containing numbers enumerate points of criticism or responses that occur within a particular argument. Square brackets are used for references to fragment and line numbers and for identifications of the speaker as the proponent [P] or opponent [O], or, where the speaker cannot be identified, as [P/O?].

I.2.1. Section 1–Religious Practice: Present Factors [51A–B(v)+53A]

I.2.1.1. Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A]

[P/O?] The present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering

[P] Criticism: which noble truth is observed by mindfulness of the body?

[O] Response: the noble truth of suffering

[P] (... present ... one abides observing the body)

[P] Criticism: does mindfulness of the body observe feelings?

[O] Response: no, mindfulness of the body does not observe feelings

[P] Criticism: the nature of suffering becomes an object in gradual clear comprehension

[o] Response: ... one sees various distinguishing characteristics

[p] Criticism: what knowledge clearly comprehends suffering?

[p] Criticism: how many instances of the knowledge of suffering are there?

[o] (??)

I.2.2. Section 2—Existence of Past and Future Factors [51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

I.2.2.1. The Opponent’s Three Categories of Existent Factors [51D(r) ll. 1–4]

[p] Criticism of the existence of past and future factors

[p] Criticism: matured effects have occurred for one division of past action but not for the other division

[p] Criticism: or else, an arhat must possess past defiled actions whose matured effects have not matured

[p] Criticism: can future factors “subject to arising” act as factors “not subject to arising”?

[o] Three categories of past and future factors exist

(1) [o] “The state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (i.e., past actions whose matured effects will never be produced)

(2) [o] “The state of being a matured effect” (i.e., future matured effects)

(3) [o] “Actions whose matured effects have not yet matured” (i.e., ordinary past actions that can produce matured effects)

I.2.2.2. General Criticism of the Opponent’s Three Categories of Existent Factors [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3]

[p] Criticism: (1) “The state of not being possessed of a matured effect”: if past actions exist, their matured effects must exist and hence must occur (i.e., existence entails occurrence in the present)

[p] Criticism: (2) “The state of being a matured effect”: since matured effects themselves lack further matured effects, they should belong to the first category of factors “not possessed of matured effects”

[p] Criticism: (3) (“Actions whose matured effects have not yet matured”: ??)

[p] Conclusion: according to your position, unborn past and future factors cannot act as causes, and yet the cause of maturation cannot be something other than action

I.2.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 1–7) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 3–36]

(1) [p] Why do past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured exist?

[o] Response: because they are “possessed of a fruit” (i.e., are causally efficacious)

[p] Criticism: if the “fruit” is the reason for existence, then actions possessed of a fruit should exist, and actions not possessed of a fruit should not exist (i.e., this contradicts the opponent’s first category)

of existent factors: since past factors of this first category are no longer able to produce matured effects, they should not be said to be “possessed of a fruit” and hence should not exist)

[P] Criticism: if actions exist as “possessed of a fruit,” then the fruit should occur at all times, and existent past actions should constantly function as causes, since existence is defined as the acquisition of fruits from causes

(2) [P] Do present actions exist for the same reason as past actions whose matured effects have not occurred, that is, because they are “possessed of a fruit”?

[O] Response: yes, present actions exist for the same reason as past actions

[P] Criticism: then the matured effects of present actions should also occur in the present

[O] Response: the matured effects of present actions do occur in the present

[P] Criticism: then there is concurrence of actions and their matured effects (i.e., this violates the sequential efficacy of actions)

[P] Response: or else, the matured effects of present actions do not occur in the present

[P] Criticism: then present actions whose matured effects have not yet matured should not exist, since these present actions cannot be said to be “possessed of a fruit” (i.e., possession of a fruit demands occurrence in the present)

[P] Criticism: or else, present actions exist as “possessed of a fruit,” but their matured effects do not occur

[P] Conclusion: in that case, your proposition “present actions exist for the same reason as past actions” does not hold, since present actions cannot be said to be “possessed of a fruit,” since their matured effects do not occur

(3) [P] Do the matured effects of actions belong to others and are not one’s own?

[O] Response: the matured effects of actions are brought about as one’s own

[P] Criticism: then the Buddha cannot be said to be one for whom the matured effects of actions are his own, since scripture states that he is not possessed of unvirtuous actions

[P] Response: or else, matured effects are not one’s own

[P] Criticism: how then can it be said that one experiences the matured effects of one’s own actions?

(4) [P] From what actions do matured effects occur: from present actions, or from past actions?

[O] Response: matured effects occur from past actions

- [P] Criticism: then how can the matured effects of past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured be said to have occurred? (i.e., this is a self-contradiction)
- (5) [O] Are there some actions whose matured effects exist, or not?
 [P] Response: there are actions whose matured effects exist, as demonstrated by four corroborating scriptural passages
- (6) [P] Are there some actions that exist, or not?
 [O] Response: there are actions that exist, and they constitute one part of the past, namely, past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured
 [P] Criticism: then the fruit should be presented by both parts of the past (i.e., past actions whose matured effects have matured and those whose matured effects have not yet matured), since the past must be uniform
- (7) [P] Are there some actions whose matured effects will never occur?
 [O] Response: there are actions whose matured effects will never occur
 [P] Criticism: then such actions are not “actions whose matured effects have not yet matured,” since their matured effects will never occur (i.e., this is a self-contradiction)
 [P] Response: or else, there are no actions whose matured effects will never occur
 [P] Criticism: then a life of religious practice is useless, since all actions will produce matured effects (i.e., this is a contradiction of scripture)
- I.2.2.4. Detailed Criticism (7: 1–5) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 36–51]
- (1) [P] Is it possible for future factors “subject to arising” to act as factors “not subject to arising”?
 [P] Response: if it is not possible, they should not be said to be “subject to arising,” since factors subject to arising would then have to be able to act (i.e., this is a self-contradiction)
 [P] Response: or else, if it is not possible, the religious life has no purpose, since all future matured effects that are “subject to arising” would in fact occur
- (2) [P] If future factors “subject to arising” exist, and future factors “not subject to arising” do not exist,
 [P] Criticism: then how would one classify the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice? (i.e., cessation as “not subject to arising” would then not exist)
- (3) [P] You contend that factors “subject to arising” will inevitably arise and factors “not subject to arising” will inevitably not arise
 [P] Criticism: in the case of Aṅgulimāla, is his “nature” as a hell-being a factor “subject to” or “not subject to arising?”
 [P] Response: if it is “subject to arising,” it will not in fact arise, since Aṅgulimāla will not be reborn in hell (i.e., this is a self-contradiction)
 [P] Response: or else, if it is “subject to arising,” Aṅgulimāla should not pursue a life of religious practice, since he will, in any case, be reborn in hell

(4) [O] Future factors are “subject to arising” because they first obtain a complete collocation of causes and conditions and then reach the point of arising

[P] Criticism: future factors should be “subject to arising” simply as a result of obtaining this collocation, that is, even without actually reaching the point of arising

(5) [P] A scriptural passage states, “one cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not yet arisen”

[P] Criticism: how can these evil factors be either “subject to” or “not subject to arising”?

[P] Response: if they are “not subject to arising,” the cultivation of right exertion has no purpose, since they would not arise in any case

[P] Response: or else, if they are “subject to arising” and then act as factors “not subject to arising,” the opponent’s proposition is worsted, namely, “factors subject to arising” inevitably arise

I.2.2.5. Detailed Criticism (8: 8) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 51–61]

(8) [O] From what actions do matured effects occur, from present actions, or from past actions?

[P] Criticism: if matured effects occur from present actions,

[P] Does corporeal moral conduct cease after death, or not?

[P] Response: if it ceases, matured effects occur from past, not present actions (i.e., this is a self-contradiction)

[P] Response: or else, if it does not cease, there must be an agent of action that preserves this causal efficacy over time (i.e., such an agent is rejected)

[P] Do present actions cease for one who gains the first trance state, or not?

[P] Response: if they do not cease, scripture is contradicted

[P] Criticism: or else, if matured effects occur from past actions,

[P] Are past actions possessed of a fruit, or not?

[O] Response: past actions are possessed of a fruit

[P] Criticism: actions cannot exist as possessed of a fruit without the existence of the fruit itself

[P] Causes would then only exist through the existence of their effects: counterexample, father and son

[P] Criticism: past actions said to be possessed of a fruit must then also be possessed of matured effects

[P] Thus, past actions possessed of a fruit would cease together with their matured effects: example, gold burned in a crucible

I.2.2.6. Detailed Criticism (7: 6–7) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 62–66]

(6) [P] Criticism: if future factors are “subject to arising,” future factors must be present

[P] Example: in the immediately preceding stage of “not yet having reached,” the future noble path that is “subject to arising” must be considered “not subject to arising,” since it is “not reached,” and yet, as still future, it should be “subject to arising” (i.e., this is a self-contradiction)

(7) [P] Criticism: if future factors are both “subject to” and “not subject to arising,” and factors “subject to arising” will inevitably arise, and factors “not subject to arising” will not arise,

[P] Response: the two categories of “subject to arising” and “not subject to arising” can never change, and the life of religious practice is without purpose

[P] Response: or else, future factors “subject to arising” can act as factors “not subject to arising,” and, being “not subject to arising,” future factors would be unconditioned (i.e., this is a category contradiction)

I.2.3. Section 3–Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

I.2.3.1. The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]

[o] Formulaic declarations expanding upon “everything exists”

(G1) “Everything exists at all times”

(G2) “Everything exists everywhere”

(G3) “Everything exists with every aspect”

(G4) “Everything exists through every reason”

(G5) “Everything exists through all modes”

(G6) “Everything exists through all causes”

(G7) “Everything exists through all conditions”

I.2.3.2. The Opponent’s Elaboration of “Everything Exists”: Two Qualifications of the Fundamental Proposition; Four Specifications of “Everything”; Two Explications of “Existence” [ll. 69–82]

(1) [o] First qualification of the fundamental proposition: “that which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything”

[o] Three specifications of “everything” in “everything exists”

(1) “Factors included within the twelve sense spheres exist”

(2) “Existence is the factors that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused”

(3) “Or else, existence is the three time periods”

[o] Two explications of “existence” in “everything exists”

(1) “Existence is that which exists; nonexistence is that which does not exist”

(2) “Existence is the existent; nonexistence is the non-existent”

[o] Further elaboration of the relationship between the time periods and existence, that is, the second and third specifications

[o] Existence is the past, present, and future

[o] Past and future years exist

- [o] “Modes” of ordinary and religious life exist as past and future
(e.g., householder, monastery worker, merchant, arhat)
- (2) [o] Second qualification of the fundamental proposition: “it is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist”
- [o] Past factors without efficacy exist: for example, the past defilements of an arhat
- [o] The past, present, and future must be clearly discriminated
- [o] The past is past alone; the present is present alone; the future is future alone
- [o] The past is determined through the establishment of the intrinsic nature (*svabhava*, P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*) of pastness, futureness, and presentness
- [o] Thus, all factors are determined through this process of mutual discrimination on the basis of intrinsic nature
- [o] Fourth specification of “everything” in “everything exists”
- (4) Existence is the three conditioned characteristics of conditioned factors
- I.2.3.3. Criticism (3: 1–3) of the Opponent’s First Qualification of the Fundamental Proposition: “That Which Exists Is Everything” [ll. 82–98]
- [p] The “distinguisher” (**vivajaga*, P/Skt **vibhājaka*) and the [o] “Mahāsarvāstivādins”
- [o] (Mahāsarvāstivādins) “There is nothing that does not exist; past, future, and present conditioned factors and unconditioned factors exist”
- (1) [p] Criticism: nonexistent entities such as the soul, creaturehood, and the person, as well as the sixth aggregate, the thirteenth sense sphere, the nineteenth element, and the fifth noble truth should all exist
- [p] Criticism: the claim that “even that which does not exist also exists” is not upheld in the sūtras
- [p] Criticism: the sūtras uphold that “existence is the existent, and nonexistence is the nonexistent”
- (2) [o] Response: such nonexistent entities as the soul, and so forth, do not exist
- [p] Criticism: then you, Mahāsarvāstivādins, are the ones who “maintain distinctions” (*vivarjavadā*, P *vibhajjavāda*, Skt *vibhajjavāda*), since you do not claim that “everything exists” but claim instead that “something is existence, and something is nonexistence”
- [p] Criticism: if nonexistent entities do not exist, what is the object and what is the sovereign condition of the perceptual consciousness of nonexistent entities, since a moment of thought can only arise on the basis of four conditions?
- (3) [p] Criticism: since that which exists is “everything,” the visual sense sphere exists, and since “everything” is defined as the twelve sense spheres, the twelve sense spheres should be equated with the visual sense sphere
- [o] Response: since both the material-form and visual sense spheres exist, the visual sense sphere is not everything
- [p] Criticism: then your qualification “that which exists is everything” is contradicted
- [o] Response: that which exists is in some cases everything and in some cases not everything

[P] Conclusion: then you should not say that “everything exists” but rather that “everything in some cases exists and in some cases does not exist”

I.2.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent’s Seven Declarations Expanding upon “Everything Exists” [ll. 98–115]

(1) [o] Declaration (G2): “Everything exists everywhere”

[P] Criticism: then factors exist in one another (e.g., the material-form sense sphere exists in the visual sense sphere; the “natures” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*) of various sentient beings exist in the “nature” of a hell-being; other nature exists in intrinsic nature)

[o] Response: it should not be said that everything exists everywhere

[P] Criticism: then everything does not exist everywhere

[P] Conclusion: and you should not say that “everything exists” but rather that “something exists, and something does not exist”

(2) [o] Declaration (G9): “Everything exists in all factors”

[P] Criticism: then all factors possess all other factors (e.g., impaired faculties possess unimpaired faculties; hell-beings possess the “nature” of other beings) and the faculties are everywhere

[o] Response: it should not be said that everything exists in all factors

[P] Criticism: then “in all factors, something exists, and something does not exist”

[P] Conclusion: and you cannot claim that “everything exists”

(3) [o] Declaration (G10): “Everything exists as belonging to everything”

[P] Criticism: then one sentient being possesses a connection to the aggregates, and so on, of another sentient being

(4) [o] Declaration (G1): “Everything exists at all times”

[P] Criticism: then the various times are confused (e.g., the times before and after the meal; the past, present, and future)

(5) [o] Declaration (G3): “Everything exists with every aspect”

[P] Criticism: then one factor exists with the aspects of another (e.g., future and past; tranquility and voidness; untruth and truth, and so on)

(6) [o] Declaration (G4): “Everything exists through every reason”

[P] Criticism: then all factors are causes for all other factors (e.g., even future factors become causes for present virtuous and unvirtuous factors)

(7) [o] Declarations (G5–7): “Everything exists through all modes, all causes, all conditions”

[P] Criticism: the criticism of the three remaining declarations follows the previous pattern

I.2.3.5. Criticism of the Opponent’s Four Specifications of “Everything” [ll. 115–51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 5]

[o] First specification: “Those factors that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist”

[o] Application: since the visual sense sphere exists, it is included within the twelve sense spheres, and so on; each of the sense spheres should be considered in this way

- [O] Counterexample: nonexistent entities such as the thirteenth sense sphere, and so forth, do not exist
 - [P] Criticism: what type of perceptual consciousness cognizes that nonexistent entities do not exist?
 - [O] Response: they are apprehended by the mental sense sphere and cognized by mental perceptual consciousness
 - [P] Criticism: then these nonexistent entities should be included within the factor sense sphere, which is the proper object of mental perceptual consciousness
 - [P] Conclusion: if nonexistent entities are considered to be “factors,” then one must admit that certain factors within the factor sense sphere exist, and certain factors within the factor sense sphere do not exist
- [O] Second specification: “Existence is the factors that belong to the three time periods”
 - [P] Criticism: if factors of all three time periods exist, future factors are present, and present factors are past
 - [O] Response: factors having been future become present, and factors having been present become past
 - [P] Criticism: then one factor possesses three “natures” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*), namely, past, present, and future
 - [O] Response: a factor exists through various “modes” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*), but that factor is not, as a result, three different factors with distinct natures
 - [P] Criticism: how do future factors acquire a present “nature” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*)?
 - [O] Response: factors possessed of a future “mode” acquire a present “mode” through the force of the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions
 - [P] Criticism: does the complete collocation exist, or not?
 - [O] Response: the complete collocation exists
 - [P] Criticism: then the “nature” of present material form is not material form but is instead the “nature” of the collocation
 - [P] Criticism: if past factors have three “natures,” then, in the case of future factors, how many “natures” are future?
 - [O] Response: future factors have both a future “mode” and a present “mode”
 - [P] Criticism: why is that present “nature,” if still future, referred to as present?
 - [O] Response: it is referred to as present because the present “mode” is acquired in the present

- [O] Response: or else, a future factor possesses the present “mode” due to the force of the complete collocation
- [O] Response: (the complete collocation exists, but it does not exist at all ...)
- [O] Second (continued), third, and fourth specifications (??): “Existence is the factors that belong to the three time periods. Existence is the three time periods. Existence is the three conditioned characteristics of conditioned factors”
- [P/O?] (The past and future; the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions; the attainment of religious practice)
- [P] Criticism: which perceptual consciousness perceives the “nature” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*) of (past or future??) material form?
- [O] Response: it is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness
- [P] Criticism: then the “nature” (of past and future) material form consists of material form, which is the proper object of visual perceptual consciousness
- [O] Response: it is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness
- [P] Criticism: then the “nature” (of past and future) material form belongs to the factor sense sphere, which is the proper object of mental perceptual consciousness
- I.2.3.6. Criticism of the Opponent’s Two Explications of “Existence” [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7]
- [P] Criticism: in the case of an existent entity, it should be said that the existent exists, and the nonexistent does not exist
- [O] (Mahāsarvāstivādins) “Certainly, there is nothing that does not exist”
- [P] Criticism: then there is nothing that does not exist even in the case of the nonexistent
- [P] Criticism: (the four ..., ... in the case of the existent ..., a “nature” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*) exists; a “nature,” in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist)
- [O] (Response: ??)
- I.2.4. Section 4—Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]
- I.2.4.1. Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]
- [P/O?] (Material form; attainment of religious practice; suffering; “nature”/“mode” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*))
- [P] Criticism: (one who has not attained religious practice ... does not exist)
- [P] Criticism: the accompaniment of future factors also does not exist
- [O] Response: the attainment of religious practice exists
- [P] Criticism: how does one who has not attained religious practice become one who has attained religious practice?
- [P] Conclusion: thus, future factors do not exist
- [O] Response: a past year exists

- [P] Criticism: another future year is not possessed of past years
 - [O] Response: a future year exists as possessed of future years
- [P] Conclusion: if one is accompanied by future years, an elder should possess future years, but he does not
- [P/O?] (Moral conduct ...)
 - [O] Response: moral conduct is future
 - [P] Conclusion: (then all who do not observe moral conduct ... moral conduct in entirety ...)
- [P] (Future and present contaminants; attainment of religious practice that is freed from lust and/or not yet freed from lust)

Text and Commentary

This chapter presents a discussion of the contents of the abhidharma text preserved in the Gāndhārī manuscript BL 28. It includes the reconstructed text, a Sanskrit rendering, and an English translation, these followed by commentary offering both an overview of the individual arguments and a more in-depth treatment of issues and problems that these raise, where possible in relation to other exegetical texts and scholastic treatises. The text has been divided into topical sections as can be found in the contents of this volume. The headings of each topical section include references to fragment and line numbers in brackets. Both fragment or chip labels and line numbers are provided in the case of smaller fragments or chips, but for the larger manuscript pieces 51G–H and 52A–H, only the continuous text line numbers (from 1 to 141) are given. In the footnotes, references to separate occurrences within the same fragment are separated by commas, and those in separate fragments or chips, by semicolons. Using these topical section headings, the reader can locate related discussions in both this Text and Commentary (§ I.3) and the Topic Outline of Text Contents (§ I.2). The latter provides an extended outline of the arguments and issues. In addition, the references to fragment and line numbers in brackets allow the reader to consult relevant sections in both the Transcribed Text, Reconstruction, and Translation (§ II.5) and the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6).

This chapter provides an overview of the basic argument that structures the text as a whole. For a brief summary of the entire text and a more general discussion of exegetical methods and Buddhist abhidharma scholastic treatises, readers should consult the Introduction (§ I.1). For specific textual and linguistic issues, readers are directed to the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6). Further details on the paleography, orthography, phonology, and morphology of the text can be found in the relevant chapters and in the Word Index.

For formatting conventions used in the transcription, including the symbols indicating incomplete or uncertain akṣaras and the like, as well as for the labeling and numbering of fragments and the abbreviations used in footnote references to certain sections of this volume, see Conventions (p. xix). In addition to these conventions, square brackets are also used for references to fragments and line numbers within the transcription, reconstruction, and translation, as well as for identifications of the speaker as the proponent [P] or opponent [O], or, where the speaker cannot be identified, as [P/O?].

I.3.1. Section 1—Religious Practice: Present Factors [51A–B(v)+53A]

I.3.1.1. Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A]

51A–B(v)+53A

Reconstruction

[1] + + + + *pr(*a)cupana dukhañ(*a)n(*a)pr(*a)c(*u)p(*a)n(*a) dukha a(*bhisa)m(*e)di*
 • *yena kalena k(*a)y(*a)* + [2] + + + ? *(*a)ry(*a)s(*a)c(*a) yidi dukha di • ? + +*
*pr(*acupana)* + + + + + [3] *(*ka)yanupaśa viharadi prochiḍav(*a) k(*a)y(*a)s(*ad)i*
*ved(*a)n(*a) arabane karodi • [4] (*yi)di na arabane karodi • n(*an)u (*d)ukh(*a)ta*
*anupurva(*bhi)s(*a)m(*a)ye bhodi • yidi aha [5] + + di nanavilakṣana paśadi • dukha*
*abhisamedī kena jñānena • kici sva [6] + + + + + + + + ? ? ? p(*ro)chiḍavo • kadi*
dukhañana di • yidi aha [7] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ? ? ? + + .e/.i .e/.i
 + + + +

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... *pratyutpannaṃ duḥkhajñānaṃ pratyutpannaṃ duḥkham abhisamayati. yena kālena*
kāya- ... [2] ... *ārysatya-* . *yadi duḥkham iti, ... pratyutpanna-* ... [3] *kāyānupaśyī viharati.*
praṣṭavyaṃ kāyasmṛtir vedanām ālambanaṃ karoti. [4] yadi nālambanaṃ karoti, nanu
duḥkhatānupūrvābhisamayā bhavati. yady āha [5] ... nānāvilakṣaṇāni paśyati, duḥkham
abhisamayati kena jñānena. kimcit sva- [6] ... *praṣṭavyaṃ kati duḥkhajñānānīti. yady āha*
 [7] ...

Translation

[1] [P/O?] ... the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering.
 [P] At the time when the body ... [2] noble truth. If [one states], [O] “It is suffering,” [P]
 ... present ... [3] one abides observing the body. It should be asked, “Does mindfulness of
 the body take feelings as its object-support?” [4] [Even] if [you respond that mindfulness
 of the body] does not take [feelings] as its object-support, surely [you would admit that]
 the nature of suffering becomes [an object-support] in gradual clear comprehension. If one
 states, [5] [O] “... one sees various distinguishing characteristics,” [P] by means of which
 knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering? Some self- ... [6] It should be asked,
 “How many [instances of] the knowledge of suffering [are there]?” If one states, [O] ...

Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A]

The damaged condition of the fragments and chips (51A–B(v)+53A) that form the outermost recto strip of the manuscript and their uncertain physical relationship to the remainder of the manuscript render the reconstruction, translation, and interpretation of this first section of our abhidharma text problematic.¹ Nonetheless, terms such as “present” (*pacupana*) and “object-support” (*arabana*) in this first section suggest continuity with the subsequent examination of existence in the three time periods and of the proposition “everything exists.” However, this first section also contains terms referring to categories of religious practice not mentioned elsewhere in the text: for example, “knowledge of suffering” (*dukhañana*); “clearly comprehend” (*abhisamedī*); “gradual clear

¹ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A. Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Second, Third (?), and Fourth (?) Specifications [l. 135–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5].

comprehension” (*anupurvabhisamaye*); and “mindfulness of the body” (*kayasadi*). Although the relationship between this discussion of religious practice and the topic of existence in the three time periods remains unclear, it is noteworthy that the last section of the preserved text (51A–B(r)) also contains praxis-related terminology, specifically in the continued examination of future factors in relation to “contaminants” (*anusāya*) and the “attainment of religious practice” (*upaśapada*).²

The deteriorated condition of the initial portion of the manuscript also hinders any attempt to determine the structure of the original text to which our preserved text belonged. The topic of religious practice apparently examined in this initial portion could be part of a preceding section of the original text not directly related to the topic of existence in the three time periods treated in the remainder of our text. In this case, the original Gāndhārī text may have consisted of a series of discrete topics, much like the Kathāvattu or the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra. However, it is also possible that the issue of religious practice provides the context for the examination of existence in the three time periods, as in the case of the discussion of existence in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, which appears in the midst of a discussion of contaminants (P *anusaya*, Skt *anusāya*) and the arising of contaminants on the basis of past and future objects.³ This option is also suggested for our Gāndhārī abhidharma text by the references to “object-support” (*arabana*, P *ārammaṇa*, Skt *ālambana*) that appear in this first section, presumably referring to the objects of religious practice.

The first such praxis-related term to occur is the “present knowledge of suffering” (*pracupana dukhañāna*, cf. *dukhañāna*), which is said to “clearly comprehend present suffering” (*pacupana dukha abhisamedī*). The references to “clearly comprehend” (*abhisamedī*), “gradual clear comprehension” (*anupurva(*bhi)samaya*), and the “noble truths” (*aryasaca*) suggest that the term “knowledge of suffering” (*dukhañāna*, P *dukkhañāṇa*, Skt *duḥkhajñāna*) denotes knowledge of the noble truth of suffering, which appears in abhidharma texts in both “gradual clear comprehension” and the “noble truths.”⁴ In this context, the knowledge of suffering is said to discern the four aspects (Skt *ākāra*) of impermanence (Skt *anitya*), suffering (Skt *duḥkha*), voidness (Skt *śūnya*), and non-self (Skt *anātman*) while taking the five grasping aggregates (Skt *upādānaskandha*) or conditioning forces (Skt *saṃskāra*) as its object.⁵ In another context, the “knowledge of suffering” is linked with the verb “clearly comprehend” (P *abhisameti*, Skt *abhisamayati*) directed toward the

² Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A].

³ AKBh 5.25–5.28 pp. 295.2–301.18. Introduction § I.1.5.1 Religious Practice: Present Factors, § I.1.5.4 Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors.

⁴ For the role of the knowledge of suffering and of the other three noble truths in removing defilements, see VK 4 p. 551a21–23, 9 p. 573a13ff., passim; JñPr 1 p. 921a17ff.; AMVŚ 56 p. 289b29ff. For a summary of the various lists of types of knowledge, see AMVŚ 105 p. 546c1ff. For the four types of knowledge, namely, of the four noble truths, see SaṅgP 7 p. 393c27ff.; PrP (tr. GBh) 4 p. 645b5; PrP (tr. Xz) 5 p. 712b10–11; JñPr 12 p. 981a3; AMVŚ 148 p. 756c26. For the eight types of knowledge, see JñPr 8 p. 957b17ff., esp. p. 957b26ff.; AMVŚ 105 p. 546b9ff. For the ten types of knowledge, see PrP (tr. GBh) 1 p. 628b7ff.; PrP (tr. Xz) 1 p. 693c22ff.

⁵ 苦智云何。謂於五取蘊。思惟非常苦空非我 (PrP (tr. Xz) 1 p. 694a3–4; PrP (tr. GBh) 1 p. 628b21–22). 云何苦智。答於諸行。作苦非常空非我行相轉智 (JñPr 8 p. 957b26–27). 或苦智者。謂知欲界諸行非常相苦相空相非我相 (AMVŚ 148 p. 757a17–18). Cf. AKBh 7.13a p. 400.2–3.

four noble truths, which then becomes the central activity in the cultivation of religious practice. “Clear comprehension” is equated with “seeing” (Skt *paśyati*): in other words, “seeing is correctly cultivating the [truths of] suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path as taught by the Bhagavat. Because one attains clear comprehension of [the truths of] suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path with regard to present factors, it is referred to as ‘seeing.’”⁶ And it is through this practice of “seeing,” or the “clear comprehension” of the four noble truths, that the contaminants associated with various objects are to be abandoned.⁷

A second praxis-related term that aids in the interpretation of this passage is “gradual clear comprehension,” or *anupurva*⟨*bhi⟩*samaye* (P *anupubbābhisamaya*, Skt *anupūrvābhisamaya*), which acquires significance in long-standing doctrinal controversies concerning whether the clear comprehension of the four noble truths is gradual (P *anupubbābhisamaya*, Skt *anupūrvābhisamaya*) or instantaneous (P/Skt *ekābhisamaya*).⁸ The position of gradual clear comprehension is consistently upheld in Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts. It is also cited as the view of an unnamed opponent in the Kathāvatthu⁹ and is attributed to the Sabbatthivādins, Andhakas, Saṃmitiyas, and Bhadrāyānikas in the commentary on the Kathāvatthu,¹⁰ and to the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra.¹¹ The opposing position of instantaneous clear comprehension is supported by the proponent of the Kathāvatthu and is associated with the Vibhajyavādins in the *Mahāvībhāṣā,¹² and with the Dharmaguptakas in both Yaśomitra’s commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya¹³ and the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra.¹⁴

This controversy concerning whether clear comprehension is gradual or instantaneous arises in relation to two sets of issues. The first concerns whether the four noble truths themselves are comprehended gradually or instantaneously. The second set of issues arises in the context of differential analyses of the four noble truths within the path, specifically as they are applied to different realms or stages or as they function differently in the path of practice. Certain themes raised in the more general and presumably earlier discussions of the gradual or instantaneous comprehension of the four noble truths themselves were undoubtedly recombined and restructured in the later more complex systems of differential analysis with respect to their application. Thus, in the case of this early Gāndhārī abhidharma text, it is perhaps best to view the term “gradual clear comprehension” as referring to the more general sense of the gradual comprehension of the four noble truths themselves.

⁶ 言現見者。謂正脩習世尊所說苦集滅道。現觀道時。於現法中。即入苦集滅道。現觀故名現見 (DhSk 2 p. 462a23–25). Cf. AHŚ (Dh) pp. 818c29–819a1; AHŚ (U) p. 849c20–21; MAHŚ 5 p. 910b29.

⁷ DhSk 2 p. 462a27ff.

⁸ Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A [4] [n]..[u] .[ukh].ta *anupurva*^[53A+51B(v)][s].^[51B(v)][m].[ye] *bhodi* • *yidi* [aha].

⁹ Kv-a 59.

¹⁰ Kv-a 59.

¹¹ MAHŚ 11 p. 962a18–19.

¹² AMVŚ 103 p. 533a20ff.

¹³ AKVy 542.

¹⁴ MAHŚ 11 p. 962a19–20. Cf. AKBh 6.27bc p. 352.1ff.; NyAŚ 63 p. 687b10ff.

The first set of issues concerning whether the clear comprehension of the four noble truths is gradual or instantaneous is raised in the *Mahāvibhāṣā with regard to the sequential order of the four noble truths themselves, that is, from the first truth of suffering to the last truth of the path.¹⁵ The *Mahāvibhāṣā attributes their sequential order to the fact that clear comprehension occurs gradually and supports this assertion with several reasons: for example, the truths range from gross to subtle; delusion concerning one noble truth leads to delusion concerning the next; the clear comprehension of each noble truth is able to draw out the clear comprehension of the next; or each of the four truths is the cause or preparation for the next. The *Mahāvibhāṣā next considers the relative order of smaller groupings within the four noble truths and finally turns to the controversy concerning gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension itself, specifically in relation to whether clear comprehension of the four noble truths sees a factor's particular inherent characteristic (自相, Skt **svalakṣaṇa*) or its generic characteristic (共相, Skt **sāmanyalakṣaṇa*). The *Mahāvibhāṣā observes that both alternatives result in untoward consequences. If clear comprehension were directed toward particular inherent characteristics, it could never be accomplished since the virtually endless number of factors would yield a similarly endless number of particular inherent characteristics. And if clear comprehension were directed toward generic characteristics, then clear comprehension of all four noble truths would be instantaneous. The *Mahāvibhāṣā opts for clear comprehension of the generic characteristic but insists that the clear comprehension of the four noble truths is not, as a result, instantaneous.

All of the various reasons offered in the *Mahāvibhāṣā to justify its position hinge upon a few basic arguments. The first argument contends that clear comprehension is not directed toward a single generic characteristic shared by all factors, but it rather apprehends more limited generic characteristics that can be viewed from different perspectives either as particular inherent or as generic characteristics. For example, the four aspects of suffering, impermanence, voidness, and non-self can be viewed as either particular inherent characteristics apprehended by the clear comprehension of the noble truth of suffering, or as generic characteristics apprehended through the clear comprehension of all grasping aggregates. The second argument offered in the *Mahāvibhāṣā contends simply that even though one comprehends the generic characteristics that pertain to all four noble truths, these four noble truths cannot be identified with one another. Instead, like all factors, the four noble truths are each defined by different particular inherent characteristics and also differ from one another on the basis of, for example, their moral quality, their nature as conditioned and unconditioned, or their status as cause and result.¹⁶ As a result, comprehension of their generic characteristics cannot be instantaneous. The Kathāvatthu records a similar position attributed to an opponent who advocates the position that clear comprehension is gradual: “[O] When [the truth of] suffering is seen, are [all] four truths seen? [KvP] Yes. [O] Is the truth of suffering [to be identified with] the four truths? [KvP] That is not to be said.”¹⁷ The commentary (Kv-a 60) explains that in assenting to the opponent's first question, the proponent presumes that clear comprehension is

¹⁵ AMVŚ 78 pp. 404b11–406a28.

¹⁶ MAHŚ 11 p. 962a22ff.

¹⁷ P *dukkhe diṭṭhe cattāri saccāni diṭṭhāni hontī ti. āmantā. dukkhasaccaṃ cattāri saccāni ti. na h' evaṃ vattabbe* (Kv 218).

instantaneous (P *ekābhisamayavasena*), but by dissenting to the second question, the proponent stresses that the four truths have different intrinsic natures (P *catunnam pi nānāsabhāvattā*).

The second set of issues within which the controversy concerning gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension is examined involves differential analyses of each of the four noble truths in terms of their application to realms or stages in the path and their function in the path of practice. As noted above, clear comprehension of the four noble truths is applied to specific objects for the purpose of abandoning defilements connected with those objects. These objects, their attendant defilements, and hence the noble truths that counteract them, can then be differentiated in various ways: for example, in accordance with the three cosmic realms, in which case they are divided either into two groups—one group connected with the realm of desire, and a second, with the realm of form and the formless realm taken together¹⁸—or in accordance with the various stages in the acquisition of the goals of religious practice.¹⁹ The treatment in the Kathāvatthu of gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension focuses on precisely this application of the four noble truths to different stages of religious acquisition.²⁰ Here, the proponent of the Kathāvatthu adopts the position of “instantaneous clear comprehension,” and the opponents, identified in the commentary as the Sabbatthivādins among others, advocate “gradual clear comprehension.” The Kathāvatthu commentary explains the position of the Sabbatthivādin opponents as follows: “One practicing the path through the realization of the fruit of stream-entering abandons certain defilements through the vision of [the noble truth of] suffering, certain [defilements] through the vision of [the noble truth of] arising, and in that way, the remaining [paths] also. Thus, one acquires arhatship after abandoning defilements gradually in sixteen parts, [specifically four parts corresponding to each of the four noble truths in conjunction with the four fruits].”²¹ Here, the proponent of the Kathāvatthu objects that if clear comprehension were gradual (P *anupubbābhisamaya*), then one would practice and attain the goals of each of the four stages in religious acquisition only gradually (P *anupubbena*). Accordingly, the fruit of each stage would be acquired not at one time but rather part by part, and as a result one should be labeled a “partial” stream-enterer, (P *sotāpatti*), once-returner (P *sakadāgāmin*), non-returner (P *anāgāmin*), and arhat (P *arahant*).

The controversy concerning gradual or instantaneous clear comprehension also figures prominently in northern Indian abhidharma analyses of the path of practice. Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts propose several complex systems of praxis that combine much of the terminology present in the earlier and more simple applications of the four noble truths to the cosmic realms, and so on, as described thus far. One such system of praxis applies the four noble truths to a sequence of five defilements (Skt *kleśa*) and five antidotes (Skt *pratipakṣa*).²² Here, defilements are divided into five groups: four that are to be abandoned through the vision (Skt *darśana*) of the four noble truths,

¹⁸ JñPr 1 p. 918a28–918b1; AMVŚ 4 p. 15c7ff., 78 p. 405c1ff.

¹⁹ DhSk 3 p. 463c10ff.; AMVŚ 77 p. 396c14ff.

²⁰ Kv 213ff.

²¹ P *sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyāya paṭipanno ekacce kilese dukkhadassanena pajahati, ekacce samudayan-irodhamaggadassanena, tathā sesā pi ti. evaṃ soḷasahi koṭṭhāsehi anupubbena kilesappahānaṃ katvā arahattapaṭilābho hotī ti* (Kv-a 59).

²² AMVŚ 52 p. 268a9ff., 145 p. 742c29ff.

and a fifth, to be abandoned through cultivation (Skt *bhāvanā*).²³ Accordingly, these five groups of defilements are countered by five corresponding antidotes. The first four groups of defilements include those to be abandoned through the vision of the truth of suffering, which are countered by the antidotes of conviction with regard to suffering (Skt **duḥkhakṣānti*) and knowledge of suffering (Skt **duḥkhajñāna*), on up through those defilements abandoned through the vision of the truth of the path, which are countered by the antidotes of conviction with regard to the path (Skt **mārgakṣānti*) and knowledge of the path (Skt **mārgajñāna*). The fifth and final category of defilements to be abandoned by cultivation is countered by the antidotes of the knowledge of each of the four noble truths as well as conventional knowledge (Skt *saṃvṛtijñāna*).²⁴ Since the various defilements classified into these five groups are to be abandoned differentially, first through distinct acts of vision of each of the four noble truths, and finally by cultivation, it is concluded that clear comprehension must be gradual and not instantaneous.

A second system outlined in Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts is that of the knowledge of the four noble truths in sixteen aspects (Skt *ākāra*). As noted above, the knowledge of suffering discerns the four aspects of impermanence, suffering, voidness, and non-self in relation to the five grasping aggregates (Skt *upādānaskandha*) or with conditioning forces (Skt *saṃskāra*) as its object. Accordingly, each of the other three noble truths is also associated with a different set of four aspects, yielding sixteen in total. Taken together, knowledge of the four noble truths in sixteen aspects constitutes the clear comprehension (Skt *abhisamaya*) of the four noble truths.²⁵ According to this system of praxis, since the knowledge of each of the four truths is associated with a different set of four aspects, a single moment of instantaneous clear comprehension of all four noble truths as a whole is impossible. By contrast, an opponent who advocates instantaneous clear comprehension would object that since one sees all four truths in terms of the single aspect of non-self, clear comprehension can indeed be instantaneous. However, Sarvāstivādins reject this position because, if clear comprehension were instantaneous, there would be no vision of each of the four truths in terms of its own individual set of four aspects, and the scriptural passage that mentions these various aspects would be contradicted.²⁶

An analogous and presumably related system of praxis correlates the four noble truths with sixteen moments of thought (十六心, Skt **ṣoḍaśacitta*). This system of praxis first appears in the *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra and allied texts and comes to characterize the later Sarvāstivāda path structure.²⁷ It is structured by four moments, each associated with the clear comprehension of

²³ 五部煩惱者。謂見苦所斷乃至修所斷 (AMVŚ 52 p. 268a14–15, 145 p. 743a3–4, 64 p. 332c20–21; JñPr 5 p. 940c2–3).

²⁴ 五部對治者。謂苦忍苦智是見苦所斷對治。乃至道忍道智是見道所斷對治。苦集滅道及世俗智是修所斷對治 (AMVŚ 52 p. 268a15–18). For this fivefold classification expanded to fifteen groups, when extended over the three realms of desire, form, and the formless realm, see JñPr 5 p. 940c14016; AMVŚ 55 p. 287c23–24, 64 p. 332c20–21. For an analogous classification of fifteen moments of thought, see VK 10 p. 578b8–12; AMVŚ 22 p. 110b11–12.

²⁵ AMVŚ 79 p. 408c9–13, 106 p. 547b3–4, 148 p. 757a17–22; AHŚ (Dh) 2 p. 818b4ff.; AHŚ (U) 3 p. 849a16ff.; MAHŚ 5 p. 909b17ff.; AKBh 7.13a p. 400.1ff.

²⁶ AKBh 6.27b p. 351.16–18; AKVy 543. Cf. MAHŚ 5 p. 916b3–10, 11 p. 962b2ff.

²⁷ AHŚ (Dh) 2 p. 818c11ff.; AHŚ (U) 3 p. 849c4ff.; MAHŚ 5 p. 910a27ff.; AMVŚ 40 p. 209c7–8, 54 p. 280c4; AKBh 6.25cd–6.27ab p. 349.20ff.; NyAŚ 62 p. 683c20ff.

one of the four noble truths: defilements in the realm of desire are counteracted by (1) conviction with regard to the knowledge of factors in relation to the particular noble truth (e.g., Skt *duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*) and (2) the knowledge of factors in relation to the particular noble truth (e.g., Skt *duḥkhe dharmajñāna*); and defilements in the realm of form and formless realms taken together are counteracted by (3) conviction with regard to the subsequent knowledge in relation to the particular noble truth (e.g., Skt *duḥkhe anvayajñānakṣānti*) and (4) the subsequent knowledge in relation to the particular noble truth (e.g., Skt *duḥkhe anvayajñāna*). The first fifteen of these sixteen moments constitute the path of vision (Skt *darśanamārga*), and the sixteenth and final moment constitutes the path of cultivation (Skt *bhāvanāmārga*).²⁸ Here, the clear comprehension of the four noble truths differs in accordance with both the depth of the knowledge and the aspects of the object comprehended, specifically the realm in which its associated defilements occur. Given this variety both in the manner of apprehension and in the object, the Sarvāstivādins assert that clear comprehension must be gradual, not instantaneous.

These various contexts for the terms *dukhañāna*, *abhisamedi*, and *anupurvabhisamaye* point to the complex history of the early Buddhist systems of praxis that culminated in the intricate path structures of the later abhidharma period. The final three systems of the five defilements and antidotes, sixteen aspects, and sixteen moments analyze the path of practice from different perspectives; whereas the system of sixteen aspects highlights the content of the knowledge associated with each noble truth, the systems of the five defilements and antidotes, as well as the sixteen moments reflect the gradual process through which this knowledge is attained and applied to different objects. Despite their differing emphases, it is not surprising that they share terminology both among themselves and with the presumably earlier and less complex systems from which they emerged. References to several of these key terms in this first section of our Gāndhārī abhidharma text suggest a connection to this complex course of development, but it is impossible to determine which, if any, of the particular controversies or path structures might have been familiar either to the proponent of our text or to his opponent. Given the early date of this manuscript and hence text, it is doubtful that either party was operating inside the complex system of a path structure in sixteen moments typical of the later abhidharma period. However, terms appearing in our text do at least suggest awareness of the role of the four applications of mindfulness and the four noble truths within the path of practice, the function of objects in both the activity of defilements and their abandonment, and some form of the controversy concerning gradual and instantaneous clear comprehension. Unfortunately, too little remains of the manuscript in this initial portion to do more than point out these probable connections.

Clearly, the terms *dukhañāna*, *abhisamedi*, *kayasadi*, and *anupurvabhisamaye* establish the praxis-related context for this first section of the text. However, the relationship of this section to the following major portion of the text is unclear. It is possible that this first section concludes a preceding and unrelated treatment of religious practice per se, which is then followed by a separate treatment of topics related to existence in the three time periods. However, it is also possible that

²⁸ AHŚ (U) 23 p. 849c20–23; AHŚ (Dh) 2 pp. 818c29–819a1; MAHŚ 5 p. 910b28–910c1. The *Mahāvibhāṣā cites the view of “outsiders” who claim that all sixteen moments constitute the path of vision, but the *Mahāvibhāṣā concludes that the path of vision consists of only fifteen moments: 答外國師說十六心刹那皆是見道。問今不問彼。但問十五心刹那爲見道者 (AMVŚ 143 p. 735a13–15).

the praxis-related issue examined in this first section serves as the introductory context for the more general treatment of existence in the three time periods that follows. In other words, this first section might be concerned not with the topic of religious practice per se, but rather with the apprehension of objects in the course of practice, specifically here, objects as past, present, and future. And this praxis-related issue might then precipitate a thorough-going criticism of the existence of past and future factors as presented in the remaining portion of our text.

Regardless of the relationship between this first section and the following text, the arguments that it presents can be clarified through further examination of these key praxis-related terms. As noted above, the term “knowledge of suffering” (*duḥkhañāna*) likely refers to the knowledge of the noble truth of suffering. However, two senses are possible for the term “suffering” (*duḥkha*) in the clause “the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering” (*pr(*a)cupana dukhañ(*a)n(*a) pr(*a)c(*u)p(*a)n(*a) dukha a(*bhisa)m(*e)di •*, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 1). Indeed, the argument offered by the proponent appears to hinge upon his intentional conflation of these two senses. Specifically, “suffering” appears in two distinct sets of four characteristics. One such set, as noted above, comprises the four generic characteristics or aspects that define the first noble truth of suffering: suffering (Skt *duḥkha*); impermanence (Skt *anitya*); voidness (Skt *sūnya*); and non-self (Skt *anātman*). These four characteristics also figure in the practice of the four applications of mindfulness (Skt *smṛtyupasthāna*), one of which, the observation of the body (*kayasadi*, P *kāyasati*, Skt *kāyasmṛti*), is mentioned in this section.²⁹ Through the practice of the four applications of mindfulness, one observes the particular inherent characteristic of the individual object of each application, namely, the body, feelings, thought, and factors. However, one also observes the four generic characteristics of all objects or factors: impermanence (Skt *anityatā*) that characterizes all conditioning forces; suffering (Skt *duḥkhatā*) that characterizes all factors with the fluxes; and both voidness (Skt *sūnyatā*) and non-self (Skt *anātmatā*) that characterize all factors.³⁰ Within the later Sarvāstivāda path structure, the four applications of mindfulness are cultivated in preparation for the vision of the noble truths within the noble path, and by means of the final application of mindfulness with regard to factors, one sees all factors, including the objects of the first three applications, in terms of these four generic characteristics.

It is also possible that “suffering” (*duḥkha*) in this first section does not allude to the set of four generic characteristics of all factors but rather to “suffering” in a narrower sense that functions within a second set of four characteristics associated specifically with the application of mindfulness directed toward feelings. That is to say, each of the applications of mindfulness functions as an antidote (Skt *pratipakṣa*) to a particular mistaken view (Skt *viparyāsa*): mindfulness of the body counteracts the mistaken view that the body is pure when it is actually impure (Skt *asūci*); mindfulness of feelings, the mistaken view that feelings are pleasurable when they are actually suffering (Skt *duḥkha*); mindfulness of thought, the mistaken view that thought is permanent when it is actually impermanent (Skt *anitya*); and mindfulness of factors, the mistaken view that factors

²⁹ Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A [3] + /// ^[53A][yanu]paśa viha^[53b]radi ^[51(v)][pro]chiḍav. k.y.s.^[51B(v)][i ved].[n]. arabane karodi •.

³⁰ AMVŚ 42 p. 217a17–19. For the role of the four generic characteristics in the applications of mindfulness, see AHŚ (Dh) 2 p. 818a29ff.; AHŚ (U) 3 p. 848c17; MAHŚ 5 p. 909b7ff.; AKBh 6.14 p. 341.8ff.

are possessed of a self when they are actually not possessed of a self (Skt *anātman*).³¹ Thus, in this narrower sense, “suffering” serves as the object apprehended only through the second application of mindfulness directed toward feelings.

This first section begins with a straightforward statement concerning the “knowledge of suffering”: “[P/O?] ... the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering” (*pr(*a)cupana dukhañ(*a)n(*a) p(*a)c(*u)p(*a)n(*a) dukha a(*bhisa)m(*e)di* •, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 1). Although the speaker is not specified, if this statement is understood as having a general sense, that is, as referring to a present instance of the knowledge of suffering that clearly comprehends present suffering, it could represent the perspective of either the proponent or the opponent. However, if the statement is understood in a restrictive sense, it might imply that the present knowledge of present suffering comprehends **only** present suffering and **not** past or future suffering. In that case, it would most likely represent the position of the proponent for whom past and future factors do not exist and hence cannot be apprehended as objects of knowledge.

The next statement, or possibly question, is unfortunately only partially preserved: “[P] At the time when the body ... noble truth” (*yena kalena k(*a)y(*a) + + + + ? (*a)ry(*a)s(*a)c(*a)*, 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 1–2). Once again, the speaker is not specified, but the following response, most likely offered by the opponent, suggests that this statement is posed by the proponent and in some way concerns a connection between the “body” and the “noble truths.” If the syllables *kaya*, “body,” are taken to form the first member of the compound *kayasadi*, “mindfulness of the body,” as cited later in this section, the proponent here challenges the opponent to specify which noble truth is observed when one engages in the practice of mindfulness of the body. To this statement or question the opponent offers a simple response: “If [one states], [O] ‘It is suffering,’ ...” (*yidi dukha di* •, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 2). The referent of the term “suffering” here is not indicated, but it could refer to the “noble truth of suffering” or perhaps more generally to the generic characteristics of all factors as observed by all four applications of mindfulness. The proponent’s criticism of this response is again only partially preserved, but it clearly includes the term “mindfulness of the body”: [P] ... present ... one abides observing the body” (*pr(*acupana) + + + + + (*ka)yanupaśa viharadi*, 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 2–3). Although the manuscript is too fragmentary here to permit a secure reconstruction of this sentence, since it refers specifically to mindfulness of the body, it is likely that the proponent’s criticism points to the internal contradiction in the opponent’s response that mindfulness of the body observes “present suffering” rather than simply the body itself.

In the next statement, the proponent continues his criticism of the opponent’s response and draws him into an internal contradiction. The proponent begins with a question that entails both senses of “suffering” outlined above and implies the contradiction that results from their conflation: “It should be asked, ‘does mindfulness of the body take feelings as its object-support?’” (*prochidav(*a) k(*a)y(*a)s(*ad)i ved(*a)n(*a) arabane karodi* •, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 3) Despite uncertain readings at key points, this question clearly raises the possibility that mindfulness of the body takes “feelings” (P/Skt *vedanā*), and not the body (P/Skt *kāya*), as its object. Such a confusion of objects is only possible if one conflates both referents of “suffering” through a process of serial

³¹ AMVŚ 104 p. 537a7ff., 187 p. 939a26ff.; AHŚ (Dh) 2 p. 818a19ff.; MAHŚ 5 p. 908c9ff.; AKBh 6.15cd p. 342.24ff.; AKVy 531.

identification: mindfulness of the body, like all four applications, observes “suffering” as a generic characteristic of all factors; mindfulness of feelings observes feelings in the form of “suffering” as one of its objects; therefore, through the shared characteristic of “suffering,” mindfulness of the body could be said to observe feelings. Hence, the proponent implies that the opponent’s appeal to the knowledge of “suffering” is undermined by an internal contradiction whereby a particular application of mindfulness takes the object of a separate application of mindfulness as its own.

To summarize the interpretation of the argument presented thus far, the first statement could represent the perspective of either the proponent or opponent and refers to the “knowledge of suffering,” or the knowledge of the noble truth of suffering, which entails the clear comprehension of “present suffering.” To the proponent’s inquiry about the noble truths in relation to the body, or possibly mindfulness of the body, the opponent responds simply, “suffering,” which the proponent then links explicitly with “mindfulness of the body.” The proponent then suggests that the opponent’s response results in a contradiction, since this mindfulness of the body would then take “suffering” as its object rather than the body. Now, the term “suffering” in the opponent’s response may indeed carry the more general sense as one of the generic characteristics of all factors that are apprehended by the four applications of mindfulness as a whole in the stage preceding the clear comprehension of each of the four noble truths. This interpretation would be supported by the reference to “noble truths” and, more importantly, by the proponent’s own reference to “mindfulness of the body.” Unfortunately, the fragmentary state of this first section makes it difficult to locate changes in speaker, but the phrase “it should be asked” (*prochidav(*a)*) clearly signals an objection raised by the proponent. With this question, the proponent attempts to force the opponent into a contradiction by introducing the narrower sense of “suffering,” specifically as associated with mindfulness of feelings. That is to say, the opponent’s response appears to presume that “suffering” be understood as a generic characteristic apprehended through all four applications of mindfulness, including mindfulness of the body. However, this position that mindfulness of the body apprehends “suffering” would contradict the narrower sense of “suffering” that functions as the object of feelings alone. Hence, by intentionally conflating these two senses of the term “suffering” in his question, the proponent forces the opponent into the internal contradiction that mindfulness of the body takes feelings as its object.

Continuing with his argument, the proponent offers a statement that presents the opponent’s response to his previous question and then alludes to the statement given in the first line of this section, namely, that present suffering is the object of clear comprehension: “[Even] if [you respond that mindfulness of the body] does not take [feelings] as its object-support, surely [you would admit that] the nature of suffering becomes [an object-support] in gradual clear comprehension” (*(*yi)di na arabane karodi • n(*an)u (*d)ukh(*a)ta anupurva(*bhi)s(*a)m(*a)ye bhodi •*, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 4). In other words, even if the opponent attempts to evade an internal contradiction by refusing to concede that mindfulness of the body apprehends feelings, he would nonetheless have to accept that “suffering” becomes the object of clear comprehension, or in his view “gradual clear comprehension.” Here, the proponent implies that such “gradual clear comprehension,” as presumably accepted by the opponent, would have to occur in the form of discrete events over a period of several moments; as a result, it would entail not simply one instance of “knowledge

of suffering” but multiple instances that occur in each successive moment. In response the opponent might agree, claiming that one sees, presumably through the vision of the path, “various distinguishing characteristics” (*nanavilakṣana*), this implying that “suffering” can be seen with different characteristics in different contexts. For example, as suggested by the proponent’s own prior objection, suffering could be seen simply as the noble truth of suffering, or as a generic characteristic of all factors that is comprehended by all applications of mindfulness, or as the object of the mindfulness of feelings. Given this response of the opponent, the proponent then presses his point with a further question: “By means of which knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering?” (*dukha abhisamedī kena ñānena* •, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 5). Here, the proponent again alludes to the statement in the first line of this section concerning present knowledge and present suffering, and implies that these different types of “suffering” must be apprehended by different instances or types of knowledge. As a result, the single term “knowledge of suffering” (*dukhañāna*) is at best ambiguous and at worst internally contradictory.

The question with which this first section concludes—“How many [instances of] the knowledge of suffering [are there]?” (*p(*ro)chiḍavo • kadi dukhañāna di* •, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 6)—yields two possible interpretations. First, in accordance with the preceding argument, the proponent might be attempting to force the opponent to acknowledge the contradiction entailed by his own initial reference simply to “suffering” in the singular and his consequent appeal to the fact that suffering has differing characteristics. As a second interpretation, with this final question the proponent might be alluding to the controversy concerning the nature of clear comprehension as gradual or instantaneous. In other words, the question, “how many [instances of] the knowledge of suffering [are there],” might function as a rhetorical question, implying that there is in fact only one such instance of knowledge of suffering. This might be understood to reflect the proponent’s own position that clear comprehension is instantaneous and not gradual. The opponent’s view that suffering functions in various contexts, such as during the application of mindfulness and on the path of clear comprehension, necessarily implies that suffering can be known in various ways, or through various instances of knowledge. This would be consistent with the position of an advocate of gradual clear comprehension, as is suggested by the proponent’s use of the term “gradual clear comprehension” (*anupurva(*bhi)samaye*, P *anupubbābhisamaya*, Skt *anupūrvābhisamaya*) in his previous statement characterizing the opponent’s position (51A–B(v)+53A l. 4). The final question might then serve as an indicator that the proponent himself supports the contrasting position of instantaneous clear comprehension. If so, this would be consistent with other evidence suggesting a similarity between the proponent’s views and those associated with the Vibhajyavādins or Dharmaguptakas, with whom the position of instantaneous clear comprehension has been linked in other abhidharma texts.³² This first section ends with the phrase “if one states,” indicating that the opponent will offer another response to the proponent’s question. Unfortunately, this response, which might have clarified the proponent’s intention further, is not preserved.

³² AMVŚ 103 p. 533a22ff.; AKVy 542.

I.3.2. Section 2—Existence of Past and Future Factors [51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

I.3.2.1 The Opponent’s Three Categories of Existent Factors [51D(r) ll. 1–4]

51D(r)

Reconstruction

[1] + + + + + + + + + + + *ekadeśa vivaga nivurta • ekadeśa vivaga (*aniv)u(*rta)*

[2] + + + + + + *aśa arahatvapraṭaṣa asti so pranadivada avivakavivaga* [3] *ś(*a)k(*a)*
ca upaḍadhama anupaḍadhama kato • ahasu avivagatva vivagatva aviva[4]*kavivaga asti •*

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... *ekadeśe vipāko nirvṛtta, ekadeśe vipāko 'nirvṛttaḥ* [2] ... *athārhattvapraṭasyāsti sa*
prāṇātīpāto 'vipakvavipākaḥ. [3] *śakyam cotpādidharmo 'nutpādidharmaṃ kartum. āhur*
avipākatvaṃ vipākatvaṃ avipa[4]*kvavipākaṃ santi.*

Translation

[1] ... [P] in the case of one division [of past action], the matured effect has occurred, [and] in the case of another division [of past action], the matured effect has not occurred. [2] Or else, one who has acquired arhatship possesses [prior action, specifically that of] taking life, whose matured effect has not yet matured. [3] And is it possible for a [future] factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising? They state, [o] “The state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, [and action] whose matured effect has not yet matured [4] [all] exist.”

Commentary: The Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4]

Section 2 begins with a partial line of text along the upper edge of fragment 51D(r), which constitutes the second strip of the manuscript. Fragment 51D(r) has no physical or obvious content connections with the various fragments and chips that have been assembled to form the outermost strip of the manuscript.³³ Indeed, it is possible that the order of these two outer strips has been reversed in the process of conserving them, and that fragment 51D actually preceded fragments 51A–B(v), and so forth, in the original scroll. Regardless of the original location of fragment 51D, it is clear that at least one and very possibly several lines are missing prior to the first line on fragment 51D(r).

It is impossible to reconstruct with confidence the initial portion of the statement with which fragment 51D(r) begins. However, clues for its probable context can be found in the general topic of the subsequent discussion, and specifically in the argument pattern presented in the first few lines of the fragment. In this second major section of the text, that is, from this fragment through line 66 of fragment 52(r), the proponent argues against an opponent who claims that certain past and future factors exist. In the third major section from 52(r) line 66 to 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 7, the proponent turns to a more general topic also connected with the issue of existence in the three time periods, namely, the proposition “everything exists.” Thus, rather than beginning with the topic of existence in the abstract and proceeding to an examination of differing positions on related issues, the proponent begins with the more specific topic of the existence of past and future factors, which then precipitates the more general topic of existence in the abstract. This more specific topic of the existence of past and future factors appears to be linked to the topic of religious practice discussed

³³ Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A].

in the previous first section. Throughout this second section, from 51D(r) to 52(r) line 66, the existence of past and future factors is examined in relation to karmic efficacy.

The second clue for the context of the missing first portion of fragment 51D lies in the argument pattern signaled by the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa* (P/Skt *atha*), “or else,” which is regularly used to signal an alternative interpretation whose syntax often parallels that of the preceding statement.³⁴ Throughout this abhidharma text, the proponent utilizes the method of “implication of an untoward consequence” (Skt *prasaṅga*), whereby a particular position is criticized by drawing out the untoward consequences resulting from two or occasionally more alternative interpretations. In conjunction with this method, *aśa* is typically used in one of two patterns. According to the first, *aśa* distinguishes two mutually exclusive or logically complementary alternatives, often expressed through affirmative and negative constructions. For example, “They state, [O] ‘From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from **past** action) or else from **present** [action]?’ [P] (*If) the matured effect occurs from **present** [action], as a result of that, **Or else**, [if] the matured effect of **past** [action] occurs, ...” ((**a*)*h*(**a*)*su kaḍamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) adidaḍo a)ś(*a) pr(*ac)-upan(*a)do (*nivartadi di • yidi) pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi tena de ... aśa adidaś(*a) kamaśa) vivaga nivartadi di ...*, ll. 51–57). In this first example, the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa* distinguishes the two mutually exclusive alternatives of **past** and **present** action. In a second example, the alternatives are logical complements: “[P] ... if that [present action] exists, as a result of that, [its] matured effect occurs in the present. If one states, [O] ‘It **does** occur [in the present],’ ... **Or else**, [if one states], [O] ‘The matured effect of present action] does **not** occur [in the present],’ ...” (*yadi ta asti tena de pracupana vivaga nivartadi yidi aha nivartadi • ... aśa n(*a) nivartadi ...*, ll. 12–13). Here, the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa* distinguishes the two logically complementary alternatives “it **does** occur” and “it does **not** occur.” In both examples, each of the mutually exclusive or logically complementary alternatives is then rejected as resulting in an untoward consequence.

In a second but related pattern, the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa* distinguishes two contrasting but not mutually exclusive or logically complementary alternatives. Often, these alternatives represent untoward consequences resulting from different doctrinal interpretations: for example, “[P] It should be said, ‘For what reason is that [present “nature,” if still future, said to be] present?’ One states, [O] ‘[Because the present “mode”] is **acquired**. **Or else**, it possesses the present “mode” **due to the force of its complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions]**’” (*vatava ki karano ta pacupana bhodi ah(*a) prata di aśa taśa samagravaśena pacupanabhava (*a)sti*, ll. 132–134. Cf. l. 70). In this example, the text offers two alternative explanations based on different doctrinal interpretations. Presumably, both of these were demonstrated to be unacceptable in the subsequent, heavily damaged portion of the manuscript (ll. 135ff.).

Thus, even though damage to the manuscript in this portion of fragment 51D(r) clouds the overall context, since the statement following *aśa* clearly presents the second alternative and appears to consist simply of an untoward consequence, not a mutually exclusive or logically complementary alternative, it is likely that the argument follows the second pattern; that is to say, *aśa* simply distinguishes two contrasting positions or doctrinally determined untoward consequences. However, the extent and content of the first missing alternative, as well as of any

³⁴ DP s.v. *atha*, #5.

response to it, are much more difficult to determine. Some help can be found in a related set of untoward consequences that appears later in the text (ll. 29–36) in a similar argument elaborating upon the opponent’s position that only certain types of past actions exist. This later argument begins with the opponent’s assertion that past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured exist and “constitute one part” (*ekaṅgha*) of the past. This assertion implies that there is yet another part of the past, that is, past actions whose matured effects have already matured, whose existence the opponent would presumably reject. In his criticism of this assertion, the proponent first utilizes the principles of category uniformity and set equivalence, which are employed frequently in this abhidharma text; that is to say, a category is determined by certain distinguishing characteristics that must be shared uniformly by all members of that category, and the categories thus defined by these characteristics are related through set equivalence.³⁵ Accordingly, the proponent insists that the past must be taken as a single category and is hence uniform; if the opponent asserts the existence of one part of the past because it is “possessed of fruit” (*sopala*) and its matured effects have not yet occurred, then the entirety of the past must be admitted to exist for the same reason and in the same way. By contrast, if the opponent rejects the existence of those past factors that are “not possessed of a fruit” because their matured effects have already occurred, then he must reject the existence of the past in its entirety. Thus, it would not be possible for the opponent to suggest a division of the past into two distinct parts with different characteristics.

Within this argument later in the text (ll. 29–36), the proponent next turns to the opponent’s subcategory of existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, inquiring whether this subcategory also includes past actions whose matured effects will never occur. Even if the opponent maintains that such past actions whose matured effects will never occur do indeed exist, he cannot consistently include them within the subcategory of past “actions whose matured effect have not yet matured” since they cannot in fact be said to be possessed of matured effects. And if the opponent claims that such past actions whose matured effects will never occur do not exist, the life of religious practice becomes useless, since one could never succeed in preventing the arising of the matured effects of defiled past actions.³⁶ This later argument concerning past actions and their matured effects is followed by an analogous argument concerning future factors subject to and not subject to arising, which also utilizes the principles of category uniformity and set equivalence (l. 36–51).

The similarity between this brief discussion on fragment 51D(r) and the more detailed treatment found later in the text provides an important clue for the original structure of our abhidharma text as a whole; namely, the opponent’s position and the proponent’s initial response are outlined first in cursory form and then elaborated and criticized in detail later in the text. Specifically, fragment 51D(r) contains the cursory statement of the opponent’s views, which then form the basis of the extended treatment presented through line 66 of the text. The framing issue for both the cursory and extended treatments would appear to be the opponent’s assertion about the dynamics of karma, namely, that certain past actions as well as their future matured effects exist. Fragment 51D(r) begins with an only partially preserved statement: “... in the case of one division [of past action], the matured effect has occurred, [and] in the case of another division [of past action], the matured effect has not occurred”

³⁵ Introduction § I.1.2.4 Principles Applied in Arguments.

³⁶ Commentary: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

(... *ekadeśa vivaga nivurta • ekadeśa vivaga (*aniv)u(*rta)*, 51D(r) l. 1). Since the preceding discussion is not preserved, the speaker and exact function of this initial statement remain unclear, but it represents a portion either of the first alternative, or more likely of its untoward consequence, which is offered by the proponent as a rejoinder to a previous assertion by the opponent. Even though the latter portion of this first untoward consequence is missing at the beginning of the next line, the proponent's argument here, as later in the text (ll. 29–36), assumes that the single category of the past must be uniform. Accordingly, he argues against any attempt by the opponent to draw a distinction within the general category of past actions between those existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured or occurred (*anivurta*), and nonexistent past actions whose matured effects have already occurred (*nivurta*). Thus, the proponent suggests that the opponent must accept that past actions as a whole either exist or do not exist. And given the proponent's insistence upon category uniformity, the opponent will either be forced into self-contradiction by denying that past actions exist or be forced to admit that all past actions exist as efficacious. Both are addressed by the proponent in the following discussion in the text.

The brief seven-syllable hiatus at the beginning of the next line (51D(r) l. 2) is too short to have held a response from the opponent and is likely to have contained only the proponent's conclusion to the first untoward consequence. The proponent's second untoward consequence begins with the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa*: “Or else, one who has acquired arhatship possesses [prior action, specifically that of] taking life, whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*aśa arahatvapraṭaśa asti so pranadivada avivakavivaga*, 51D(r) l. 2). Here, the proponent alludes to the case of an arhat whose defilements have been abandoned through practice and for whom the ill effects of defiled past actions, such as taking life (*pranadivada*, P *pāṇātipāta*, Skt *prāṇātipāta*), will not arise.³⁷ If in response to the proponent's first untoward consequence the opponent refuses to concede that no past actions can be said to exist since the matured effects of all past actions must have already occurred, he then has no choice but to admit the alternative, namely, that all efficacious past actions must be capable of giving rise to matured effects, even those defiled actions performed previously by one who is now an arhat. Despite the questions that remain about the immediate context for these first two lines of fragment 51D(r), their similarity to the argument later in the text (ll. 29–36) is striking. This is reinforced by the fact that the next line raises the issue of future factors subject to and not subject to arising, which parallels a still later argument in the text (ll. 36–52). Thus, it seems likely that the context here is the opponent's assertion that only those past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured can be said to exist.

Following this second untoward consequence, the proponent next offers what can be interpreted as a rhetorical question challenging the opponent's implied response to the second untoward consequence: “And is it possible for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising?” (*ś(*a)k(*a) ca upaḍadhama anupaḍadhama kato •*, 51D(r) l. 3). In other words, the proponent implies that one might attempt to avoid the second untoward consequence concerning the past actions of an arhat by claiming that indeed, under special circumstances, certain future “factors subject to arising” (*upaḍadhama*) can become “factors not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*). In this case, an arhat's defiled past actions that have not yet given rise to their matured effects can

³⁷ For a similar argument utilizing the counterexample of an arhat's past defilements, see Commentary: The Opponent's Second Qualification [ll. 75–82].

still be considered to exist, and yet, their matured effects, which would themselves be considered future factors, are obstructed from arising through the arhat's practice. As a result, the proponent implies that such matured effects, although once "factors subject to arising," would become future "factors not subject to arising" that will never in fact occur. Both the opponent's actual position on the issue of which future factors can be said to exist and the proponent's full argument against it will become clear later in the text.³⁸

The argument at the beginning of fragment 51D(r) might then be reconstructed as follows. In response to the opponent's general position that only certain past and future factors exist, the proponent first objects that the opponent must then accept that the matured effects of certain past actions have occurred, while those of others have not. From the proponent's perspective, such a distinction among past actions is impossible since the single category of the past must be uniform; characteristics of one part of the past must apply to the whole. If the opponent responds that only certain past actions are indeed efficacious and hence can be said to exist, the proponent, once again maintaining the principle of category uniformity and set equivalence, insists that all past efficacious actions must then give rise to their matured effects. He thereby forces the opponent into the second untoward consequence, specifically that an arhat's defiled past action of taking life must at some point yield its matured effects. Finally, the proponent rejects what he assumes would be the opponent's response to this second untoward consequence; namely, an arhat's defiled past actions will never give rise to their matured effects since their status has changed from being "subject to arising" to being "not subject to arising" as a result of the arhat's practice. In a later passage (ll. 36–38), the proponent will return to this argument concerning the efficacy of future factors, and the opponent will offer a response (ll. 45–46) that attempts to account for the arising of future factors without appealing to a change in a factor's status.

The opponent responds to the proponent's previous criticism by specifying precisely those past and future factors that can be said to exist: "They state, [o] 'The state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, [and action] whose matured effect has not yet matured [all] exist'" (*ahasu avivagatva vivagatva avivakavivaga asti* •, 51D(r) ll. 3–4). Here, the opponent lists three categories of existent factors distinguished in accordance with the dynamics of karma: (1) the "state of not being possessed of a matured effect" (*avivagatva*); (2) the "state of being a matured effect" (*vivagatva*); and (3) [action] "whose matured effect has not yet matured" (*avivakavivaga*). Whereas the last two of these three terms are comparatively straightforward, the first term *avivagatva* would support two possible explanations, depending upon the interpretation of the negated compound element *avivaga* to which the neuter abstract suffix *-tva* has been added: (1) "the state of not being a matured effect," in which *a-vivaga* is understood as a simple karmadhāraya; or (2) "the state of not being possessed of a matured effect," in which *a-vivaga* is understood as a bahuvrīhi. Both senses are attested in abhidharma taxonomic matrices (P *mātikā*, Skt *māṭṛkā*) used to classify factors in relation to the dynamics of karma. For example, Skt *avipāka* is understood as a karmadhāraya meaning simply "not a matured effect" in the context of a twofold matrix (Skt *māṭṛkā*) distinguishing factors that are "matured effects" (異熟, Skt **vipāka*) from those that are "not matured effects" (非異熟, Skt **avipāka*). By contrast, Skt *avipāka* functions as a bahuvrīhi

³⁸ Commentaries: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent's Second Category [ll. 36–45]; (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent's Second Category [ll. 45–51]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent's Second Category [ll. 62–66].

meaning “not possessed of a matured effect” in a second and often consecutively listed twofold matrix distinguishing factors that are “possessed of matured effects” (有異熟, Skt **savipāka*) from those that are “not possessed of matured effects” (無異熟, Skt **avipāka*).³⁹ A threefold matrix given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi subsumes both of these senses within a third and final category that negates the prior two: (1) “factors that are matured effects; (2) factors that possess factors that are matured effects; (3) factors that are neither matured effects nor possess factors that are matured effects.”⁴⁰ The Kathāvatthu also uses P *avipāka* as a bahuvrīhi in a passage that is particularly relevant to the three categories of existent factors offered here by the opponent in our Gāndhārī text.⁴¹ In criticizing the opponent’s position that different parts of the past either exist or do not exist (*ekaccaṃ atthi ekaccaṃ n’ atthīti*, Kv 151), the Kathāvatthu proponent cites a set of three distinct groups of past factors: (1) those “whose matured effects have not yet matured” (P *avipakkavipāka*); (2) those “whose matured effects have already matured” (P *vipakkavipāka*); and (3) those “not possessed of matured effects” (P *avipāka*). In responding to repeated questions by the Kathāvatthu proponent, the opponent consistently asserts the existence of the first category of past factors “whose matured effects have not yet matured” (P *avipakkavipāka*) and denies the existence of the second, those “whose matured effects have already matured” (P *vipakkavipāka*). However, the opponent refuses to admit that the third category of past factors “not possessed of matured effects” (P *avipāka*) either exists or does not exist.⁴² The Kathāvatthu commentary (Kv-a 52) explains the term P *avipāka* as referring to “indeterminate” factors (P *avyākata*), presumably here to factors whose matured effects are not determined as arising. Both the Kathāvatthu’s category of factors “not possessed of matured effects” (P *avipāka*) and the commentary’s explanation of P *avipāka* as “indeterminate” would appear to be closely connected to the Gāndhārī opponent’s understanding of this first category of the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (*avivagatva*). As a final note, the term P/Skt *avipāka*, especially in the abstract form Skt *avipākatva* (P *avipākatta*) frequently occurs

³⁹ In the Prakaraṇapāda, these four categories are presented within a long matrix (PrP (tr. Xz) 5 p. 711b7ff., esp. 5 p. 711c23), which is then applied to various numerically listed sets of factors (PrP (tr. Xz) 6 p. 716b12ff., 12 p. 740c19ff.). This set of four categories is listed in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 157 pp. 800c29–801a2) and is also applied to various sets of factors (e.g., AMVŚ 21 p. 108b11ff., 24 p. 122c3ff., 144 p. 741b10–741c18).

⁴⁰ P *vipākā dhammā vipākadhammadhammā n’ evavipākanavipākadhammadhammā* (Dhs 180). Cf. Dhka 17; Vibh 62, passim; Peṭ 23. Later in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (Dhs 180–181), these three categories are explained as follows: (1) “factors that are matured effects” are the matured effects of virtuous and unvirtuous factors and belong to the three realms or do not belong to any realm, including the four aggregates (P *kusalākusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ vipākā kāmāvacarā, rūpāvacarā, arūpāvacarā, apariyāpannā; vedanākkhandho ... pe ... viññāṇakkhandho*); (2) “factors that possess factors that are matured effects” are the virtuous and unvirtuous factors that belong to the three realms or do not belong to any realm, including the four aggregates (P *kusalākusalā dhammā kāmāvacarā, rūpāvacarā, arūpāvacarā, apariyāpannā; vedanākkhandho ... pe ... viññāṇakkhandho*); and (3) “factors that are neither matured effects nor possess factors that are matured effects” are those factors that are ineffective action, which is neither virtuous, nor unvirtuous, nor the matured effects of action, all material form, and the unconditioned element (P *ye ca dhammā kiriyā neva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā, sabbañ ca rūpaṃ, asaṃkhatā ca dhātu*).

⁴¹ Kv 151ff.; Kv-a 51–52. Commentary: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

⁴² P *atītā avipākā dhammā te atthīti. na h’ evaṃ vattabbe atītā avipādā dhammā te n’ atthīti. na h’ evaṃ vattabbe* (Kv 152).

independently in abhidharma and commentarial literature as a bahuvrīhi referring to action that is “not possessed of a matured effect.”⁴³ Hence, within the Gāndhārī opponent’s list of three categories of existent factors, the first category of *avivagatva* is most likely based on this sense of *avivaga* as a bahuvrīhi and hence refers to “the state of not being possessed of a matured effect.”

Thus, the opponent here on 51D(r) asserts that there are three distinct karma-related categories of existent factors: (1) the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect”; (2) the “state of being a matured effect”; and (3) action “whose matured effect has not yet matured.” The opponent is not identified in our text, but his third category of action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*, P *avipakkavipāka*, Skt *avipakvavipāka*) is cited and examined at length in the Kathāvatthu: “Past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured exist, and past factors whose matured effects have already matured do not exist.”⁴⁴ Although not affiliated with any school group in the Kathāvatthu itself, this position is attributed to the Kāśyapīyas in the Kathāvatthu commentary, the Vibhāṣā compendia, and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra.⁴⁵ However, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra attribute it to the Vibhajjavādins.⁴⁶ Next, the Kathāvatthu cites the corresponding position that a portion of the future exists, namely, “future factors subject to arising” (P *anāgatā uppādino dhammā*, Kv 153–55). Since the Kathāvatthu commentary does not separately identify the source of this view concerning the future, it too was likely understood to represent the same Kāśyapīya opponent. Even though later sources attribute these positions to particular school groups, it is important to note that texts of the early period, such as the Kathāvatthu itself and our Gāndhārī abhidharma text, offer no such attribution. Nonetheless, the positions that these early texts present on this point do resemble those later ones associated with a Kāśyapīya-Vibhajjavāda lineage.⁴⁷

Even though the opponent does not specify the particular past and future factors that are to be included within each of the three karma-related categories of existent factors, the context suggests that he intends his categorization as a response to the proponent’s immediately preceding criticism (51D(r) ll. 1–3). Specifically, the opponent’s first category of existent factors, the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (*avivagatva*), includes factors that fall under the second untoward consequence, namely, past factors whose matured effects will never arise, as in the case of an arhat’s defiled past actions. The state of “arhatship” (*arahatva*) represents the culmination of the path of religious practice in which the ill effects of all unmatured defiled past actions will no longer arise. However, even in the case of an arhat, any such defiled past actions that have not yet given rise to their matured effect might be considered simply actions “whose matured effects have not

⁴³ The Saṅgītiparyāya (SaṅgP 8 p. 398b29–398c1) contains a definition of 無異熟, presumably Skt **avipāka*, clearly understood as a bahuvrīhi: “*Avipāka* means that this action is not like the prior three varieties of action that are able to yield a matured effect; therefore, it is named *avipāka* action” (無異熟者。謂此業非如前三業能感異熟). Cf. AKVy 196, 240, 421, 422.

⁴⁴ P *atītā avipakkavipākā dhammā te atthi, atītā vipakkavipākā dhammā te n’ atthīti* (Kv 151–153).

⁴⁵ Kv-a 51; 飲光部說。諸異熟因。異熟未生彼因有體。異熟生已彼因便失。如芽未生種猶有體。芽既生已種體便無 (AMVŚ 144 p. 741b13–16, 19 p. 96b6–9, 51 p. 263c25–29; AVŚ 28 p. 204c15–18); TSS 3 p. 258c10ff.

⁴⁶ AKBh 5.25cd p. 296.4–6; NyAŚ 51 p. 630c10–11.

⁴⁷ Commentary: (2) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 88–95].

matured” and subsumed within the opponent’s third category of existent factors: actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*, P *avipakkavipāka*, Skt *avipakvavipāka*).⁴⁸ In this case, one might also assume, as does the proponent, that an arhat’s defiled past actions, like all other actions within this third category, are capable of giving rise to effects, thus undermining the status of arhatship. For the opponent, an arhat’s defiled past actions can exist since their matured effects have not yet arisen and they can therefore be said to be “possessed of a fruit” (*sopala*), meeting his own criterion for existence presented later in the text (l. 4). And yet, these defiled past actions are rendered forever incapable of giving rise to their matured effects due to the obstructing antidotes produced in religious practice. As a result, even though such defiled past actions share characteristics with and might be assumed to belong to the third category of actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured,” the opponent places them within a separate category of existent factors, namely, existent past actions “not possessed of matured effects” in the sense that their matured effects are no longer capable of arising. In contrast to the opponent, the proponent considers the position that actions can be “possessed of a fruit” and yet “not possessed of a matured effect” to be self-contradictory; he regards this distinction between a “fruit” and a “matured effect” as merely semantic. If one claims that an arhat’s defiled past actions exist as “possessed of a fruit,” one must also admit that they are “possessed of a matured effect.” Thus, they must be classified within the third category of existent past actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured,” and as such their fruit or matured effects should be expected to occur. Hence, for the proponent, this state of being “possessed of a fruit” necessarily entails the arising of that fruit or, in the case of actions, being “possessed of a matured effect,” thus potentially contradicting the arhat’s acknowledged status as free of the matured effects of his own defiled past actions.⁴⁹

This argument in our Gāndhārī abhidharma text concerning this first category of existent factors “not possessed of matured effects” also sheds light on the third set of factors “not possessed of matured effects” (P *avipāka*) in the previously cited passage from the Kathāvatthu.⁵⁰ When questioned about this set of factors, the Kathāvatthu opponent refuses to admit that factors “not possessed of matured effects” exist because their effects will not arise, but he also refuses to admit that they do not exist because, as factors that have not yet given rise to their matured effects, they are still efficacious. In other words, as the Kathāvatthu commentary explains, such factors “not possessed of matured effects” are “indeterminate” with regard to the arising of their matured effects.

Thus, through this set of three categories of existent factors and in particular the first category of actions “not possessed of matured effects” (*avivagatva*), the opponent attempts to avoid the untoward consequence concerning an arhat’s past defilements while still preserving his own distinctive criterion for existence, namely, that past actions exist because they are “possessed of a fruit.” By contrast, the proponent insists on the principle of category uniformity and argues against the opponent’s attempt to draw distinctions among past factors: first, between existent past factors

⁴⁸ Commentaries: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7]; (2) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 7–17]; (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 21–28]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36]; (8) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 51–61].

⁴⁹ Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7].

⁵⁰ Kv 151ff.; Kv-a 52.

that are “possessed of a fruit” and nonexistent past factors that are “not possessed of a fruit”; and second, within the former group of existent past factors “possessed of a fruit,” between the two categories of factors “whose matured effects have not yet matured” and those “not possessed of matured effects.”

The opponent’s first category of existent factors, that is, actions “not possessed of matured effects,” also clarifies the opponent’s response to certain objections raised by the proponent later in the text in a passage criticizing the existence of action whose “matured effects will not occur at all” (*y(*a)sa vivaga na kica nivartiśadi (*•)*, ll. 31–36).⁵¹ In this later passage, the proponent first argues (ll. 32–33) that if the opponent asserts that “there is action whose matured effects will not occur,” since such action cannot, strictly speaking, be classified as action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*), then the opponent falls into a contradiction with his prior assertion that only past actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured” exist. And if on the other hand the opponent responds that “there is no action whose matured effect will not occur” (ll. 33–34), then the life of religious practice would become useless since the abandonment of the effects of defiled past actions would become impossible. However, this first category of existent actions “not possessed of matured effects” as proposed by the opponent here (51D(r) ll. 3–4) provides a solution to both of the proponent’s later arguments. In response to the proponent’s first argument, the opponent can now claim that past actions “whose matured effects will not occur” should not in fact be included within the category of action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*). Instead, they should be classified within this separate first category of actions “not possessed of matured effects” (*avivagatva*). Thus, any contradiction with the definition of the third category of actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured” would be evaded. In response to the proponent’s second argument, the opponent can claim that as in the case of the arhat’s defiled past actions cited in this passage, any past defilements whose effects have been obstructed by antidotes produced through the practice of the path can be included within the same first category of actions “not possessed of matured effects,” and as a result the efficacy of the life of religious practice can be maintained.

Thus, the opponent clearly distinguishes this first category of existent past factors “not possessed of matured effects” from the third category of existent past factors “whose matured effects have not yet matured.” However, since past factors “not possessed of matured effects” within the first category will never give rise to their matured effects, confusion is also possible with nonexistent past factors whose matured effects have already matured. Although our abhidharma text does not explicitly address this issue, two possible explanations can be offered on the basis of the criterion for existence offered by the opponent later in the text (l. 4). Existence, the opponent maintains, is established on the basis of causal efficacy, that is, a factor’s status as “possessed of a fruit” (*sopala*):

⁵¹ Commentary: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36]. The possibility of actions whose “matured effects will not occur at all” is suggested in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 162 p. 820c22ff.), which explains that all unvirtuous and virtuous factors with contaminants are possessed of matured effects and hence can be said to have “determination with regard to matured effect” (異熟定). Some of these factors can also be said to have “determination with regard to arising” (生定) because their matured effects will arise, while others have no such “determination with regard to arising” because their matured effects will not arise; this latter group is also said to be “without location” (無處所).

factors that are possessed of a fruit exist, and those not so possessed do not exist. Even though defiled past actions that are counteracted by the path of practice will never give rise to their matured effects and hence are no longer “possessed of a matured effect,” since the opponent asserts that they exist, they must still in some way be considered to be “possessed of a fruit.” In responding to this problem, the opponent might first claim that even though such existent past actions will never give rise to their own matured effects, they are still capable of acting as the condition for the arising of other factors and hence can be said to be “possessed of a fruit.” This is the position adopted by the Sarvāstivādins, who maintain that factors of all time periods are capable of acting as conditions in multiple ways and hence can all be said to exist. However, this explanation would also entail that even past actions whose matured effects have already matured should be acknowledged to exist due to their potential efficacy in other conditioning processes, a conclusion that the opponent in our text would presumably reject, especially if he is considered to be aligned with the Kāśyapīya-Vibhajyavāda lineage on this issue.⁵² As a second and more probable explanation, the opponent might claim that even though an arhat’s defiled past actions will never give rise to their matured effects, these defiled past actions can still be considered to exist as “possessed of a fruit” simply because their matured effects have not already matured. In the context of the three categories of existent factors, such defiled past actions, prior to their obstruction through the practice of the path, would be classified within the third category of actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*) since their matured effects are still subject to arising (*upaḍadhama*). Once their arising is obstructed by antidotes produced through religious practice, they would be more properly classified within the first category of actions “not possessed of matured effects” (*avivagatva*). However, since their matured effects have not yet matured, they would still exist as “possessed of a fruit,” and their status would now more accurately be that of actions “not possessed of matured effects.” Thus, such existent past actions not possessed of matured effects can be clearly distinguished from nonexistent past factors whose matured effects have already matured.

The opponent’s second category of existent factors, namely, the “state of being a matured effect,” does not refer to past actions but to their future matured effects. This is also treated later in our text (ll. 36–51, 62–66) in the examination of future factors subject to arising (*upaḍadhama*).⁵³ This second category of existent future factors also fulfills an important function in explaining the dynamics of karma: past action acting as the cause of karma and karma’s future matured effect represent the two ends in a causal dynamic. Both, the opponent maintains, must be said to exist to ensure a karmic causal connection. Past actions within the third category, “whose matured effects have not yet matured,” can be said to exist precisely because they are efficacious in the production of their effects. The future matured effects of such past actions that are on the point of arising since they have encountered the requisite conditions for their arising (ll. 36–38) are considered “subject to arising” and can be said to exist due to the potential force of these efficacious past actions. Such future matured effects then constitute the opponent’s second category of existent factors in the “state of being a matured effect.” By contrast, since past actions within the opponent’s first

⁵² Commentary: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36]. Cf. AMVŚ 144 p. 741b13–16.

⁵³ Commentaries: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 62–66].

their causes. As the proponent next proposes, “[if] that action, [even though] not possessed of a matured effect, is existent, the matured effect is not nonexistent” (*ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asaḍa na bhodi* •, 51D(r) l. 5). That is to say, the opponent might claim that in the case of this first category of existent past factors, as, for example, in the case of an arhat’s defiled past actions, the matured effects cannot arise and hence cannot be said to exist. However, since the opponent also admits that these past actions that act as causes exist as “possessed of a fruit,” the proponent maintains that their matured effects must be said to exist as well. And as the proponent will insist in a later argument (ll. 10–12), the existence of a matured effect is tantamount to its occurrence; hence, all such existent matured effects must also be admitted to occur. The proponent concludes his criticism of the first category with the statement, “[However,] if [one states], [O] ‘This [action] is past,’ [P] the matured effect does not exist” (*yadi (*e)ḍa aḍi(*a d)i (*viva)g(*a) nasti* •, 51D(r) ll. 5–6). Even though the implied argument is not specified here, in this statement the proponent points to an internal contradiction within the opponent’s position. The opponent might suggest that even though the matured effects of past actions can be said to **exist** together with those existent past actions, they never **occur** simultaneously with the actions themselves. For the proponent, however, such a distinction between “existence” and “occurrence” is impossible; if the opponent refuses to admit that the matured effect occurs, then this is tantamount to an admission that the “matured effect does not exist.”

Through his criticism thus far, the proponent attempts to demonstrate that past actions that are not possessed of matured effects cannot be said to exist and hence the first of the opponent’s karma-related categories is contradicted. According to the opponent’s position, since the matured effects of such past actions are not nonexistent, the proponent will respond that these matured effects must be admitted to occur (51D(r) l. 5). Even by creating a new category of existent past actions “not possessed of matured effects” and distinguishing existent future factors subject to arising from nonexistent future factors not subject to arising, the opponent cannot evade the contradiction posed by his own definition of existence as determined by “possession of a fruit” since it inevitably entails the existence and occurrence of both action and its matured effect.⁵⁴ Thus, the proponent concludes that even in the case of past actions “not possessed of matured effects,” their matured effects must be said to exist, and if they are said to exist, they must occur. As a result, this first category of existent factors cannot evade the contradiction posed by an arhat’s past defilements.

The proponent then turns to a criticism of the opponent’s second category, the “state of being a matured effect” (*vivagatva*), but only the introduction to his argument is preserved. Sporadic terms and phrases such as *(*a/ni)vurta* and *vivaga* suggest that the criticism of the opponent’s categories of existent factors may have continued through the now damaged intervening portion of the manuscript. However, these terms are not sufficient either to determine the particular category that is being criticized or to permit a reconstruction of the proponent’s argument. To begin his criticism of this second category, the proponent observes: “[As for] the ‘state of being a matured effect,’ since [one states] [O] ‘It is not possessed of a matured effect,’ [P] the past ...” (*vivag(*atva) yena tas(*a avi)va(*ga) di (*a)di(*ḍa)*, 51D(r) l. 6). Since the readings of several key syllables in

⁵⁴ Commentaries: (2) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 7–17]; (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51].

this statement are uncertain, the suggested reconstruction is tentative. However, even this tentative reconstruction points to a possible argument, especially given the probable connection between this second category and future factors. The key term for this argument is *(*avi)va(*ga)*, “not possessed of a matured effect.” This term suggests that the second category of factors, which are themselves in the “state of being matured effects” (*vivagatva*), lack further matured effects of their own. Given their nature as “not possessed of matured effects” (*avivaga*), one might expect them to be placed within the first category of factors in the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (*avivagatva*). However, according to the opponent’s model, the first category refers to past actions and would be incompatible with the members of the second category, which corresponds to future matured effects themselves. Thus, the proponent once again accuses the opponent of a category contradiction; namely, since it is possible to describe the future matured effects that belong to the second category as “not possessed of matured effects,” they should in fact be placed within the first category of factors, which are past. As a result, even though this second category of matured effects are future, they would then, as proper members of the first category, be considered past.

Following fragment 51D(r) in the reconstructed manuscript are fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r), which, on the basis of physical characteristics such as bark consistency and line spacing, are likely contiguous with the subsequent fragments 51G(r) and following. However, the reconstruction of this outer part of the manuscript is made more difficult by the presence on the fragments of an extra layer (51ssss) and pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo), also parts of the same original manuscript. According to the most likely scenario, the extra layer 51ssss constitutes both the recto and verso surfaces of fragments 51A–B and 51D, but only the verso surfaces of fragment 51G, from line 135 to the end, and of fragments 51C and 51F. As a result, fourteen lines of text from the original verso surfaces of these fragments are now hidden by the bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss. Here on the recto, layer 51ssss represents fragments 51A–B and 51D, but 51C and 51F and lines 1–8 on fragment 51G cover approximately fourteen lines of text on layer 51ssss. As a result, fragments 51C and 51F were likely preceded by fourteen lines of text from the now-hidden recto surfaces of bark sections 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss.⁵⁵ Thus, we cannot expect the text on 51C(r) and 51F(r) to be continuous with that on fragment 51D(r). It is possible that the proponent’s general criticism of the opponent’s three categories of existent factors begun on fragment 51D(r) concluded within these fourteen now-hidden lines. Moreover, they also may then contain criticism of the opponent’s second category of the “state of being a matured effect” (*vivagatva*) as well as, possibly, his third category of action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*). However, it is also possible that some of these criticism passages continued onto fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r).

Unfortunately, extensive damage to the recto surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F precludes even a tentative determination of their contents. Various terms preserved on the fragments appear in both the preceding and following text, but these terms alone do little more than allude to general topics discussed throughout the text and are not sufficient to determine the specific arguments being presented. The term *niviśeṣa* (51C(r)+51F(r) ll. 2–3) suggests a discussion concerning “distinctions” (*P viśeṣa*, Skt *viśeṣa*), possibly, for example, whether distinctions can be drawn among

⁵⁵ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A; 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r); 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5; Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v); ll. 1–3.

or within a given category of factors, or whether certain individual factors possess characteristics that distinguish them from other factors. In the context of all three of the opponent's categories of existent factors, "distinction" (*viśeṣa*) here might refer to the opponent's proposed distinction within the larger group of past factors between the first category of the "state of not being possessed of a matured effect" (*avivagatva*) and the third category of action "whose matured effect has not yet matured" (*avivakavivaga*). As a second possibility, "distinction" might also refer only to the second category of future existent factors, namely, "the state of being a matured effect" (*vivagatva*). Here, the opponent would be distinguishing between future factors "subject to arising" (*upaḍadhama*), which exist, and future factors "not subject to arising" (*anupaḍadhama*), which do not exist. Or finally, "distinction" might refer to a general distinction among past, future, and possibly even present factors. Unfortunately, the text preserved on fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) does little to clarify which particular "distinction" was intended. The terms "past" (*adiḍa*) and "unvirtuous" or "virtuous" (*[a]kūśalasa*) suggest a discussion of action, which might point to past factors of the first or third categories, but the following question (51C+51F(r) l. 4) clearly concerns matured effects and hence possibly future factors of the second category. A final term on fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) is "sense sphere," or *(*a)īḍana*, which represents the compound-final form of *ayaḍana*. The term "sense sphere" does occur elsewhere in the text, but in these other passages, the context is the scope of "everything" in the proposition "everything exists" (ll. 53, 95, 96–97, 99, 106, 116, 119). Its connection to the discussion of past or future factors as presented here is uncertain.

The next fragment 51G(r) is likely contiguous with fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r), but given the damaged condition of fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) and the probability that at least some intervening text has been lost, the context for the first three lines of fragment 51G(r) is also uncertain. The terms *hedu*, *anagaḍa*, *adiḍa*, *kamaheduo*, and *vivaga* suggest that the issue treated in the preceding fragments continues here, namely, that of the causal efficacy of past factors, specifically in the context of actions (P *kamma*, Skt *karman*) and their production of future matured effects (P/Skt *vipāka*). However, it is less clear whether the beginning of fragment 51G(r) concludes a general criticism of the opponent's third karma-related category of existent factors or perhaps concludes a summary criticism of all three categories. The next section of the text through line 66 contains more detailed critical examinations of karma and its matured effects, focusing specifically on the dynamics of causal efficacy and the existence of past actions and future matured effects.

Fragment 51G(r) begins with only a partial line of text: "[P] ... in some way acts as the cause of the sprout" (... *akuraṣa hedu kica karodi* •, l. 1). The reference to a sprout (*akura*, P/Skt *aṅkura*) suggests a discussion of causation, specifically the seed (P/Skt *bīja*) as a past cause that gives rise to a future sprout. The causal relationship between a seed and a sprout is frequently used as an everyday example of successive causation, in which the cause, or the seed, gives rise immediately to its effect, or the sprout.⁵⁶ Since karmic efficacy likewise occurs only successively, the sprout example may be used here to illustrate the causal dynamics of karma in which the seed corresponds to the past cause, or action, and the sprout, to the future matured effect. And if these first three lines do indeed conclude the proponent's summary criticism of the opponent's three categories

⁵⁶ P ... *bījaṅkuro viya samanantarahetutāya* (Nett 79). Cf. AMVŚ 11 p. 51b1ff.; AKBh 2.62a p. 99.15–16; NyAŚ 16 p. 425a27ff., 51 p. 629c1ff.

of existent factors, the sprout example may be adduced by the proponent to challenge a model of successive causal efficacy between past and future factors, which is assumed in all three of the opponent's categories. As the proponent observes in the next statement, "and therefore, it is certainly not the case that precisely these past [factors] and future [factors], in this way so long as they are unborn, would act as in some way the cause of that" (*ta ca na adida va ya anagaḍa eva yava ajaḍa nama te tasa hedu kica kareasu* •, ll. 1–2). In other words, the proponent rejects the existence of past factors included within the first category, the "state of not being possessed of a matured effect" (*avivagatva*), and the third category, action "whose matured effect has not yet matured" (*avivakavivaga*), as well as the existence of future factors included within the second category, the "state of being a matured effect" (*vivagatva*). By rejecting the possibility that past and future factors serve respectively as karmic causes and matured effects, the proponent precludes the possibility of their causal relationship and thus undermines his opponent's proposed model of karmic functioning. Nonetheless, as the proponent concludes, "the matured effect certainly has action as its cause, for it is not [claimed] that the cause of maturation is [something] other than action" (*kamaheduo ca nama vivago nahi vivagahedu akamaṃ di* ☸, ll. 2–3). Clearly, the proponent upholds karmic functioning, and yet, as his later arguments will suggest, he presumably relegates karmic efficacy to the only factors whose existence he acknowledges, namely, present factors. However, as is typical of the argument pattern employed throughout this polemical text, the proponent is content to undermine his opponent's position and does not offer an alternative model by which karmic functioning can be explained without appealing to existent past or future factors.

I.3.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 1) of the Opponent's Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 3–7]

Reconstruction

(1) [3] *t(*a) kena karanena* [4] *adida avivakavivaga asti di ahadi taṣa de sopalo di ta*[5] *(*travatava) yadi palakarana astikarana tena yo sopala so asti yo ni*[6] *(*pala so na) sti • yadi ca asti s(*a)p(*a)lade di tena sarvakala pa*[7] *la daḍavo astitva h(*e)d(*u)p(*a)l(*a)-p(*ra)ti di •*

Sanskrit rendering

(1) [3] *tat kena kāraṇenā*[4] *tītam avipakvavipākam astīti. āha tathā saphalam iti. ta*[5] *travakavyaṃ yadi phalakāraṇam astikāraṇam, tena yat saphalaṃ tad asti, yan niṣ*[6] *phalaṃ tan nāsti. yadi cāsti saphalād iti, tena sarvakāle pha*[7] *laṃ dātavyam astitvaṃ hetuphalaprāptir iti.*

Translation

(1) [3] [P] Then for what reason [does one state], [4] [O] "Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?" [P] One states, [O] "[It is] in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit." [5] [P] (*With regard to that it should be said that) if the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, then that [action], which is possessed of a fruit, exists, [and inversely] that [action], which is not [6] (*possessed of a fruit, does not) exist. And if [one states], [O] "[Action] exists due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit," [P] then the fruit [7] should be presented at all times since existence is [understood] as the acquisition of fruits from causes.

Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent's Third Category [ll. 3–7]

The issue of karmic efficacy continues with a detailed criticism of the opponent's third karma-related category of existent factors, namely, past action "whose matured effect has not yet matured" (*avivakavivaga*, P *avipakkavipāka*, Skt *avipakvavipāka*) (51D(r) ll. 3–4). The proponent begins his criticism with a question restating the opponent's previous assertion, "Then for what reason [does one state], [o] 'Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?'" (*t(*a) kena karanena adida avivakavivaga asti di*, ll. 3–4). The response offered by the opponent specifies the general condition for existence by correlating the existence of such past factors with their causal efficacy: "One states, [o] '[It is] in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit'" (*ahadi [ta]ṣa [de so]palo di*, l. 4). In other words, if past action is demonstrated to have causal efficacy, that is, to be "possessed of a fruit," this fact alone constitutes the reason for its existence. The position that existence must be admitted for any factor functioning as a cause is fundamental to virtually all abhidharma ontological models and becomes the focal point of numerous doctrinal controversies, including the arguments in this second section of our text.

The proponent offers a twofold argument against the opponent's assertion that past factors exist because they are "possessed of a fruit." The first argument (ll. 4–6) is obscured by both ambiguous syntax and the uncertain equivalent for and interpretation of the Gāndhārī term *karana*. The argument begins with a conditional clause summarizing the opponent's previous assertion concerning the third category of existent factors: "(*With regard to that it should be said that) if the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, ..." (*ta(*tra vatava) yadi palakarana astikarana tena ...*, ll. 4–5). The extent of the conditional clause is clearly indicated by the indeclinably used pronoun *tena*, which in this text regularly marks the apodosis in conditional constructions whose protasis begins with *yadi*. However, the repeated term *karana* in the conditional clause is problematic. The Gāndhārī term *karana* has two possible equivalents: P/Skt *karāṇa* as a verbal noun with the sense of "functioning" or "effecting," or as a simple noun meaning "instrument" or possibly "performance" perhaps referring to the instrumental cause; or P/Skt *kāraṇa* as the "reason" or "grounds" for a statement offered in the course of an argument, or possibly as a synonym for the "cause" (P/Skt *hetu*) or "condition" (P *paccaya*, Skt *pratyaya*) of a factor's arising. Elsewhere in this text, *karana* is used frequently in the second sense as P/Skt *kāraṇa*, or the "reason," "grounds," or "cause," and indeed that sense appears to fit the present context.

However, the connotation of the term *karana* as P/Skt *kāraṇa* in this clause depends upon its function within the two separate compounds, both of which are, unfortunately, far from clear. It is possible that the repetition of the term is the result of anticipatory dittography, whereby the first occurrence in *pala-karana* was written in error and merely anticipates the second and intended *karana* in *asti-karana*. According to this interpretation, the second compound, *asti-karana*, would be understood as a *tatpuruṣa*, "reason for existence," which is then used in apposition to the preceding single term *pala*, yielding the following translation: "If the fruit is the reason for existence, ..." (*yadi pala{karana} astikarana*, l. 5). If however the text is accepted as written, the connotation of *karana* must be considered in the context of both compounds: *palakarana* and *astikarana*. The opponent's previous assertion (l. 4) that past factors exist because they are "possessed of a fruit" suggests two possible interpretations of the first compound *palakarana*. First, it might be understood as a *karmadhāraya*: the "reason [constituted by] the fruit" or the "grounds, namely, the

fruit.” Second, it might be understood as a samāhāra dvandva, “fruit and cause,” which would refer to the determining relationship between cause and effect. This sense is conveyed by the compound Skt *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, common in Buddhist and non-Buddhist discussions of causation, where “effect” is expressed by Skt *kārya* rather than Skt *phala*. Regardless of the interpretation adopted for *palakarana*, the second compound *astikarana* would be best interpreted simply as a tatpuruṣa referring simply to the “reason for existence” or “grounds for existence.” Thus, depending upon the interpretation adopted for the first compound *palakarana*, two readings result. In asserting that past action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” exists because it is “possessed of a fruit,” the opponent claims that the “reason for existence” (*asti-karana*) is established either by the “reason constituted by the fruit” (*pala-karana*) or by the relationship between “the fruit and the cause” (*pala-karana*). Either interpretation of the second compound *palakarana* would support the opponent’s view that existence is determined by causal efficacy. However, since in the case of the first interpretation of the compound as a karmadhāraya, the “reason constituted by the fruit,” the final member of the compound, *karana* (P/Skt *kāraṇa*), would function with the same sense as in the second compound “reason for existence” (*astikarana*), this first interpretation has been tentatively adopted yielding the following translation: “If the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, ...” (*yadi palakarana astikarana*, l. 5).

Following this conditional clause summarizing the opponent’s assertion, the proponent draws a conclusion that he assumes will contradict the opponent’s attempt to correlate the existence of factors with their causal efficacy as “possessed of a fruit.” If a factor’s existence is determined by its efficacy as “possessed of a fruit,” then the opponent should also accept that a factor which is “not possessed of a fruit” does not exist. As the proponent concludes, “then that [action], which is possessed of a fruit, exists, [and inversely] that [action], which is not (*possessed of a fruit, does not) exist” (*tena yo sopala so asti yo ni(*pala so na)sti •*, ll. 5–6). According to the opponent’s first category of existent factors, namely, the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (*avivagatva*), certain past actions that are “not possessed of matured effects” do indeed exist, for example, an arhat’s defiled past actions whose matured effects are obstructed through the antidote of religious practice. Hence, the proponent contends that the opponent’s assertion here leads to a self-contradiction; that is to say, the assertion here that past factors exist because they are “possessed of a fruit” contradicts his previously offered category of past factors that exist but are “not possessed of a matured effect.” To avoid this contradiction, the opponent must draw some kind of distinction between the “fruit” and the “matured effect,” but clearly, for the proponent, no such distinction is possible. And even though no clear distinction between “fruit” and the “matured effect” is ever explicitly attributed to the opponent in our text, this may be precisely what the opponent intends through his first category of existent factors.⁵⁷ Thus, the opponent would concur with the proponent’s statement, “[action], which is not (*possessed of a fruit, does not) exist,” but only if such factors “not possessed of a fruit” are limited to past factors that have already given rise to their matured effects. The opponent would assert that his first category of existent factors “not possessed of matured effects” can still be said to be “possessed of a fruit,” and hence they can be said to exist. Since they have not given rise to their matured effect, they can still be said to be

⁵⁷ Commentaries: The Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36]. Cf. AMVŚ 144 p. 741b13–16.

“possessed of a fruit,” and yet, they can also be said to be “not possessed of matured effects,” since their matured effects will never arise. As a result, the proponent’s first argument here would not, in the end, constitute a valid criticism of the opponent’s assertion.

In his second argument, the proponent turns to the implications of the qualifier “possessed of a fruit” (*sopala*) for the ontic status of the effect. Specifically, he claims that a factor’s status as possessed of a fruit entails that its effect be “presented” (*daḍavo*), which, as the proponent understands it, means that it will arise, or occur, at all times. Therefore, an action’s status as possessed of a fruit implies not only the existence of the potentially efficacious action itself but also of the effect that it possesses. The term *daḍavo* (P *dātabba*, Skt *dātavya*) in this passage might simply be used, as in the Pali commentarial literature, to refer generally to the production, or occurrence, of the effects of action.⁵⁸ However, it might also indicate familiarity with a causal model similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins, whereby all causes exert their efficacy in two stages: an initial stage of “projecting” ($\bar{a} + \sqrt{kṣip}$), or “seizing” (*prati + \sqrt{grah}*), the effect; and a second stage of “presenting” ($\sqrt{dā}$), or “delivering” (*pra + \sqrt{yam}*), the effect. In the case of successive causes such as karmic action, the first stage of “projecting” occurs when the cause itself is present and the effect is still future; the second stage of “presenting” occurs only when the cause, now past, brings its future effect into the present. Hence, this second stage of “presenting” the effect does not occur at all times but rather only subsequent to the first stage of “seizing,” that is, when the cause itself has become past. Further, even though for Sarvāstivādins all past factors exist as causally efficacious and can be described as possessed of a fruit in the sense that they are potentially capable of giving rise to effects, existent past factors, like all causes, must await a “complete collocation” (P *sāmaggī*, Skt *sāmagrī*) of requisite causes and conditions in order to exert their second stage of presenting their effects.⁵⁹ Hence, in contrast to the proponent’s view in our text, a factor’s status as possessed of a fruit would not imply that the effect exists in the sense that it occurs. For Sarvāstivādins, the effect, even when linked to or possessed by a particular cause, simply exists as future; it occurs, or exerts its function, only when it becomes present. Thus, for Sarvāstivādins, possession of a fruit entails the existence of both the cause and the effect, but it does not require that causally efficacious past factors present their effects at all times.

Even though the opponent here in the second section of our text does not accept the Sarvāstivāda position that all past factors are efficacious, he does admit the efficacy of certain past factors and views this efficacy as a reason for their existence. Thus, for the opponent, as for the Sarvāstivādins, the compound “possessed of a fruit” indicates a state of potential causal efficacy, whether present or past, in which the effect has not yet arisen. This state of potential causal efficacy, or “possession of a fruit,” demands the existence of both causally efficacious past factors and their future matured effects. It must also be distinguished from the state of “acquisition of fruits from a cause,” which would refer to the present moment in which the effect arises, that is, occurs. By contrast, the proponent does not accept any type of existence for past or future factors. Accordingly, he rejects this distinction between existence and occurrence, that is to say, between a stage of “possession of the fruit,” in which causally efficacious past factors as well as their future potential effects can be said to exist, and a stage of “acquisition of fruits from causes,” marked by the present arising, or

⁵⁸ Text Notes: [7] ^[51kk(r)+51ll(r)+51E(r)]*[la]* *daḍavo astitva* ^{[h].}*[d].*^{[p].}^[51E(r)+51G(r)]*[l]*^[51G(r)]*[p]*..ti di •.

⁵⁹ Commentary: (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51].

occurrence, of the effect. Like certain opponents of the Sarvāstivādins such as the Dārṣṭāntikas and Vasubandhu, the proponent of our Gāndhārī abhidharma text equates existence with occurrence, or arising in the present; thus “existence is [understood] as the acquisition of fruits from causes” (*astitva h(*e)d(*u)p(*a)l(*a)p(*ra)ti*, l. 7). According to the proponent’s position, the qualifier “possession of a fruit” used by the opponent does not entail the existence either of a past yet still efficacious cause or of its future effect. Instead, it indicates simply that an effect occurs in the present. Hence, for the proponent, existence is not indicated by causal efficacy or potential arising but rather is limited to functioning in the present moment, that is, the present occurrence of the effect, described by the compound “acquisition of fruits from causes” (*astitva h(*e)d(*u)p(*a)l(*a)-p(*ra)ti*, l. 7).

1.3.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 2) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 7–17]

Reconstruction

(2) [7] *prochidava yeneva* [8] *(*ka)r(*a)nen(*a adiḍa aviva)kavivaga asti • t(*e)neva karanena pac(*u)pana a*[9]*(*vivakavivaga asti • tena de) adi(*ḍa avivakavivaga asti • p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a)* [10] *(*avivakavivaga asti) • yidi aha amaṃ di • tatra vatav(*a) paḍiṇade* [11] *adiḍavivaga asti di •* [12] *tena yadi ta asti tena de pracupana vivaga nivartadi yidi aha* [13] *nivartadi • tena kamaṣa ca vivagaṣa ca samuṣana • aṣa n(*a) nivartadi* [14] *tena pracupana avivakavivaga nasti • aṣa asti c(*a p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a) a)viv(*a)k(*a)*[15]*vivaga • na ca tas(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) nivartadi ya pradiṇa yeneva karanena* [16] *ad(*i)ḍa avivakavivaga asti (*•) t(*e)neva k(*a)ranena pracupana avivakaviva*[17]-*ga asti di n(*a) bho(*di •)*

Sanskrit rendering

(2) [7] *praṣṭavyaṃ yenaiva* [8] *kāraṇenātītam avipakvavipākam asti, tenaiva kāraṇena pratyutpannam a*[9]*vipakvavipākam asti, tenātītam avipakvavipākam asti, pratyutpannam* [10] *avipakvavipākam asti. yady āhām iti, tatra vaktavyaṃ pratijñāyā* [11] *atītavipāko ’stīti,* [12] *tena yadi tad asti, tena pratyutpanne vipāko nirvartate. yady āha* [13] *nirvartate, tena karmaṇas ca vipākasya ca samavadhānam. atha na nirvartate.* [14] *tena pratyutpannam avipakvavipākam nāsti. athāsti ca pratyutpannam avipakva*[15]*vipākam, na ca tasya vipāko nirvartate. yā pratijñā yenaiva kāraṇenā*[16]*tītam avipakvavipākam asti, tenaiva kāraṇena pratyutpannam avipakvavipā*[17]*kam astīti na bhavati.*

Translation

(2) [7] [P] It should be asked, [8] “[Is it the case that] present [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) for the same reason that (*past) [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists, [namely, due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,] [9] (*and as a result of that,) past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) [and] present [action] [10] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)?” If one states, [O] “Yes,” [P] with regard to that it should be said in accordance with this proposition, [11] since the matured effect of past [action] exists, [12] then [similarly], if that [present action] exists, as a result of that, [its] matured effect occurs in the present. If one states, [13] [O] “It does occur [in the present],” [P] then there is a concurrence of both action and [its] matured effect [in the present, which is precluded by the successive nature

of karmic causal functioning]. Or else, [the matured effect of present action] does not occur [in the present]. [14] Then present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured does not exist [since it cannot be said to be possessed of a fruit.] Or else, present [action] whose matured effect (*has not yet matured) exists [as possessed of a fruit], [15] and yet its matured effect does not occur. [Then, your prior] proposition, [16] “present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists for the same reason that past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists),” [17] does not hold.

Commentary: (2) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 7–17]

With the gerundive *prochidava*, “it should be asked” (l. 7), the proponent introduces a second argument against the opponent’s third karma-related category of existent factors: past action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (51D(r) l. 3). The proponent begins his argument with a question concerning the parallelism between present and past action: “It should be asked, ‘[Is it the case that] present [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) for the same reason that (*past) [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists, [namely, due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,] (*and as a result of that,) past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) [and] present [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)?’” (*prochidava yeneva (*ka)r(*a)nen(*a adida aviva)kavivaga asti • t(*e)neva karanena pac(*u)pana a(*vivakavivaga asti • tena de) adi(*da avivakavivaga asti • p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a avivakavivaga asti)*, ll. 7–10). Here, once again, the proponent applies the principles of category uniformity and set equivalence used frequently in arguments in this abhidharma text and familiar also from the Kathāvatthu.⁶⁰ According to these principles, all members of a given category uniformly share the same distinguishing characteristics, and categories thus defined by such characteristics are related by set equivalence.⁶¹ Thus, efficacious actions, whether present or past, must share the same fundamental characteristics, and as members of a single category, both present and past action must be said to exist for the same reason. Through a multi-stage argument, the proponent attempts to demonstrate that this parallelism of present and past efficacious actions is impossible and results in a series of contradictions that ultimately undermine the opponent’s prior assertion that certain past factors exist.

The opponent responds (l. 10) affirmatively to the proponent’s proposed parallelism between present actions and past actions “whose matured effects have not yet matured”: present actions can be said to exist for the same reason as such past actions, specifically because both are “possessed of a fruit.” In this case, the proponent argues (ll. 10–12), the opponent is forced to admit that the existence of present action together with its matured effect also entails the occurrence of that matured effect precisely in the present. In order to make sense of this untoward consequence, one must remember both the opponent’s criterion for existence and the proponent’s equation of existence and occurrence as outlined in the previous passage.⁶² There, the opponent asserts that past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured exist due to their “possession of a fruit” (*sapala*).

⁶⁰ Kv 119ff., 151ff.

⁶¹ Commentary: The Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4].

⁶² Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7].

For the opponent, the characterization “possession of a fruit” also entails the future existence of that fruit, since the fruit is possessed by and therefore must exist together with the existent action that possesses it. By contrast, the proponent admits only the causal efficacy and hence existence of present action and understands the qualifier “possession of a fruit,” as well as the existence of the fruit that it implies, as tantamount to the “acquisition of effects from causes” (*h(*e)d(*u)p(*a)-l(*a)p(*r)ati*). This can occur only when the fruit is present (ll. 6–7). Hence, for the proponent, the assertion that an existent action is attended by an existent matured effect entails the simultaneous occurrence, or functioning in the present, of both that action and its matured effect.

To summarize the proponent’s first argument (ll. 10–12), if the opponent accedes to the parallelism of present actions and past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, then he must also admit that the matured effect of present action, just like that of past action, exists (*asti*) and also, according to the position of the proponent, occurs (*nivartadi*) together with that action precisely when it is present. Next (ll. 12–14), in accordance with the typical argument pattern employed throughout our text, the proponent examines the two possible and in this case logically complementary responses to this statement joined by the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa* (P/Skt *atha*): either one assents that the matured effect of present action occurs when that causal action is present, or one dissents, claiming that it does not occur. If in accordance with the first alternative one admits that the matured effect of present action exists and also occurs (ll. 12–13), this existent matured effect would occur in the present simultaneously with the present action that causes it. Such a conclusion is unacceptable since the simultaneity of karmic cause and effect is precluded under the successive model of karmic efficacy accepted by all early Indian Buddhist school groups.⁶³ If the opponent opts for the second alternative that the matured effect of present action does not occur in the present (ll. 13–14), he avoids the untoward consequence of the simultaneity of the karmic cause and its matured effect. However, in that case the proponent contends that the opponent cannot claim that present action whose matured effect has not matured exists. For the proponent, since to exist is to occur, if the matured effect exists, it must occur, and if it does not occur, it cannot exist. As a result, if the opponent opts for this second response, he cannot maintain that a present action is possessed of a fruit since that fruit would not exist.

Still maintaining this second alternative that the matured effect of present action does not occur in the present, the opponent might then attempt to sever existence from occurrence by claiming that both present action and its matured effect exist, and yet the matured effect has not yet occurred (ll. 14–15). However, as the proponent points out (ll. 15–17), in that case the previous proposition asserting the parallelism between present action and past action whose matured effects have not

⁶³ “If it is said that [the effect obtained by that present cause of maturation] is found in the present, one should claim that the cause of maturation (異熟因, Skt **vipākahetu*) and [its] matured effect (異熟果, Skt **vipākaphala*) are simultaneous (同時, Skt **yugapad*). Such [a claim] then contradicts what is stated in the [following] verse: ‘One does not receive [the effect] of evil just at that point when one performs it, in contrast to the case of milk, which [immediately] changes to become sour. It can be compared to a foolish person treading on top of burning embers covered by ashes, who is burned only after a while’” (若言在過去應說有過去。若言在未來應說有未來。若言在現在應說異熟因果同時。如是便違伽他所說。作惡不即受。非如乳成酪。猶灰覆火上。愚蹈久方燒, AMVŚ 76 p. 393a27–393b3). Cf. MAHŚ 11 p. 963b9–12.

yet matured would be undermined; that is to say, the opponent asserts that past action exists and is possessed of a fruit that occurs when that causal action is past; by contrast, he would claim that present action exists and yet cannot be described as “possessed of a fruit” in the same sense that its fruit occurs when that causal action is present. In other words, the simultaneous possession, existence, and occurrence of matured effects that characterize past action whose matured effects have not matured could not be applied to present action. And given the principles of category uniformity and set equivalence, such a fundamental distinction between the past and present within the single category of action is unacceptable. Thus, the proponent argues that the opponent cannot assert that past factors “whose matured effects have not yet matured” exist.

I.3.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 3) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 17–20]

Reconstruction

(3) [17] *prochidava vatava puna so tena hi kamena* [18] *añeṣu ca as(*vago) yidi (*a)h(*a)di (*svago) katavo ten(*a) na vat(*a)v(*a) tena budhas(*a) c(*a)* [19] *k(*a)masvag(*o) • maḍa na akuśalakamasvago • aṣa na vatava svago* [20] *kuḍarahi ya so vivaga nivartadi • paḍiṣavededi • {proch.}*

Sanskrit rendering

(3) [17] *praṣṭavyaṃ vaktavyaṃ punaḥ sa tena hi karmaṇā* [18] *nyeṣu cāsvakaḥ. yady āha svakaḥ kartavyas, tena na vaktavyaṃ tena buddhasya ca* [19] *karmasvakaḥ. mataṃ na akuśalakarmasvakaḥ. atha na vaktavyaṃ svakaḥ.* [20] *katarair yaḥ sa vipāko nirvartate, pratisaṃvedayati.*

Translation

(3) [17] [P] It should be asked, “Should it further be said that the [matured effect, which occurs] through that action, [18] belongs to others and is not (*one’s own)?” If one states, [O] “[The matured effect] should be brought about (*as one’s own),” [P] then it should not be said in the case of the Buddha that [19] he is one for whom the [matured effect of] action, [which occurs] through that [action], is his own. [This is because] it is held [in the scriptures] that he is not one for whom the [matured effect of] unvirtuous action is his own. Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect of action] is one’s own. [20] [In that case,] by means of which [actions is it said that] one experiences that matured effect which occurs?

Commentary: (3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 17–20]

Reconstruction of the text in this heavily damaged portion of the manuscript is aided by parallel syntactic structures and typical argument patterns, but the substance of the argument must be inferred from partially legible and often incomplete statements. Here, the proponent offers a third argument criticizing the existence of past factors, which focuses once again on the issue of karmic causal functioning but raises specifically the connection between an action and the recipient of the resultant matured effect of that action. The initial question introduces the argument with the terms *añeṣu* and presumably *as(*vago)*: [P] “It should be asked, ‘Should it be said further that the [matured effect, which occurs] through that action, belongs to others and is not (*one’s own)?’”

(*prochidava vatava puna so tena hi kamena añeṣu ca as(*vago •)*, ll. 17–18; cf. l. 19). This suggests that the problem concerns whether the matured effect of a given action is one’s own or accrues to others, that is to say, whether the matured effect of an action occurs in the life-stream within which the action was performed or in that of another. This initial question is followed by an examination of these two mutually exclusive alternatives, each being demonstrated as leading to an untoward consequence (ll. 18–20). Thus, in using the categories of “one’s own” and “not one’s own,” or “others,” the proponent challenges the opponent to account for the connection among action, its resultant matured effect, and the person who performs the action and experiences its matured effect.

Even though no canonical passage has yet been located that mirrors the syntax of this discussion, a context for the interpretation of the key terms used in this argument—*kamasvaga*, *svaga*, and *asvaga*—can be found in discussions of action in both sūtra and abhidharma texts. For example, in Pali sources, the term *kamassaka*, interpreted as a bahuvrīhi, occurs most frequently in the following formula: “[I am one] whose action is one’s own, whose inheritance is action, for whom action is the source, for whom action is the relative, for whom action is the refuge; that action which I perform, whether good or bad, I will be the heir of that”⁶⁴ The Pali commentary explains *kamassaka* in terms of a distinction between one’s own action and that of others: “For beings whose action is their own go to a future existence in accordance with their own action; the father does not go to [a future existence] by the action of the son, nor the son, by the action of the father”⁶⁵ The term P *kamassaka* also occurs in the compound P *kamassakatāñāna*, “the knowledge of the state of having action as one’s own,” where P *kamassaka* is glossed in commentaries as a bahuvrīhi in which the adjective P *saka* is equated with P *kamma*.⁶⁶ For example, the Atthasālinī explains P *kamassakatāñāna* as the “insight that knows ‘this action is one’s own; this is not one’s own.’”⁶⁷ The Vibhaṅga further explains the compound P *kamassakatañāna* in terms of knowledge of the matured effect (P *vipāka*) of action: “... There is the matured effect, [that is,] the fruit of good and bad actions”⁶⁸

Thus, in the context of this passage also, the term P *kamassaka* would likely be used as a bahuvrīhi to refer to one “whose action is one’s own,” but it further implies that the fruit or the matured effect of action performed by one person accrues to that very person and to no one else. Hence, the term P *kamma*, in the compound P *kamassaka*, is used in an extended sense to refer not simply to causal action as distinct from its fruit but rather to action that incorporates both causal efficacy and its eventual fruition as a matured effect. The qualification of action as one’s own (P *saka*, Skt *svaka*) not only indicates that one performs a given action, but it also implies that

⁶⁴ P *kamassako kammadāyādo kammayoni kammabandhu kammappaṭisaraṇo, yaṃ kammaṃ karissāmi kalyāṇaṃ vā pāpakaṃ vā tassa dāyādo bhavissāmi ...* (AN III 74, V 88). Cf. MN III 202ff.

⁶⁵ P *kamassakā hi sattā attano kammānurūpaṃ eva gatiṃ gacchanti. neva pitā puttasa kammaṃ gacchati, na putto pitu kammaṃ ...* (Sv I 37). Similarly, Saṅghabhadra states in the *Nyāyānusāra: “All sentient beings depend upon their own karma. Who has the power to be able to influence another?” (一切有情皆依自業。說誰有力能損於誰, NyĀŚ 37 p. 555c5–6).

⁶⁶ P *kammameva sakaṃ etesaṃ ti, kamassakā, sattā, tabbhāvo kamassakatām,* (Sv-pt II 400). Cf. Ps V 10.

⁶⁷ P *idaṃ kammaṃ sakaṃ, idaṃ no sakaṃ ti jānanapaññā* (As 406). Cf. Vibh-a 411; Sv-pt III 236.

⁶⁸ P ... *atthi sukataḍḍakkaṭṭanaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko ...* (Vibh 328).

the matured effect of that action is one's own in the sense that it will arise within one's own life-stream. This extended sense including both action and the occurrence of its matured effect within one's own life-stream is made explicit in northern abhidharma discussions of Skt *karmasvaka* and Skt *karmasvakajñāna*. For example, the Jñānaprasthāna explains "action that is one's own" (自業, Skt *karmasvaka*, **svakarman*) as indicating not simply that actions are performed by one sentient being but also that the matured effects of those actions arise within the life-stream of the one by whom the actions were performed.⁶⁹ As the Jñānaprasthāna states, "What is the meaning of 'action as one's own?' [It means] to obtain one's own fruit, one's own fruit of uniform outflow (Skt *niṣyandaphala*), one's own matured effect (Skt *vipākaphala*)."⁷⁰ Like the Pali commentaries, the Jñānaprasthāna states that Skt **karmasvaka* also indicates "the matured effect that occurs from an action, which matures within one's own stream, and not within that of another."⁷¹ Thus, Skt **karmasvaka* not only refers to both the cause and its effect, but it also specifies where that effect will occur. The *Mahāvibhāṣā contains only one reference to the power of the knowledge of action as one's own (自業智力, Skt **karmasvakajñānabala*),⁷² but a lengthy treatment in Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyanusāra states explicitly that Skt **karma-svaka-jñānabala* (自業智力) is an alternative term for Skt **karma-vipāka-jñānabala* (業異熟智力), referring to the discernment that a matured effect of a certain type occurs through the power of action that one has performed oneself.⁷³ Thus, as Saṅghabhadra also makes clear, Skt **karmasvaka* not only refers to mere action, but it also connotes the extended efficacy of action encompassing also its own resultant matured effect.

This sense of Skt *karmasvaka* as contrasting one's own actions with those of others and its extended usage to include both action and its resultant matured effect suggest a probable interpretation of the proponent's initial question in this third criticism: "It should be asked, 'Should it be said further that the (*so*) [matured effect, which occurs] through that action (*tena kamena*), belongs to others (*añeṣu*) and is not (*one's own) (*as(*vago)*)?'" (*prochiḍava vatava puna so tena hi kamena añeṣu ca as(*vago •)*, ll. 17–18). Although in our text both the pronominal form *so* and the ending *-o* can appear for the nominative singular of a neuter referent, they appear twice as often with a masculine referent. Thus, the clear adjective *svago* in the proponent's subsequent statement (l. 19) and hence the partially legible adjective *as(*vago)* in this question most likely function as masculine forms referring to the matured effect (*vivaga*) of action, which is masculine, rather than to action itself, which is neuter. This interpretation is supported by the appearance in this question of the separate term action (*kamena*) in the instrumental case.

With the indeclinable conditional particle *yidi* that begins the next sentence (l. 18), the proponent presumably begins his examination of the first alternative, namely, that action and its resultant matured effect are one's own (*svaga*). Even though two syllables within the conditional clause [*yi*]*di* [*a*].[*h*].[*di*] ? + [*ka*]*tavo* are illegible, the next sentence (l. 19) is parallel and mentions

⁶⁹ JñPr 12 p. 980b10ff.; AMVŚ 124 p. 649a15ff., 127 p. 650c8ff.

⁷⁰ 自業是何義。答是得自果自等流自異熟義 (JñPr 12 p. 980b9–10; AMVŚ 124 p. 649b19).

⁷¹ 復次此業所招異熟。於自相續。現熟非餘 ... 故名自業 (JñPr 12 p. 980b10–12; AMVŚ 124 p. 649b24–26).

⁷² AMVŚ 41 p. 212c27ff.

⁷³ 或說名爲自業智力。謂善分別如是類果。是自所造業力所招 (NyAŚ 75 p. 746c18–19). Cf. AKBh 7.28d p. 411.16 (Skt *karmavipākajñānabala*), 7.32bc p. 414.5 (Skt *karmasvakajñānabala*).

the second alternative of *na svago*, or “not one’s own.” This suggests that this sentence takes up the first alternative of the matured effect of action as *svago*, or “one’s own.” Unfortunately, the immediately following untoward consequence (ll. 18–19) to which this first alternative leads is also obscure. Here, the proponent appears to offer the counterexample of the Buddha as one for whom past action and its resultant matured effects are not his own, presumably since the matured effects of any past unvirtuous actions performed by the Buddha will no longer occur within his life-stream. This counterexample should be understood in relation to the “power of the knowledge of action as one’s own” (P *kamassakataññābala*, Skt *karmasvakajñābala*, 自業智力), which is one of the ten powers perfected by the Buddha.⁷⁴ As the previously cited passage from the Atthasālinī explains, this “knowledge of action as one’s own” knows that “this action is one’s own; this is not one’s own,” and as a result “in that case, whether [action] is done by oneself or by another, all unvirtuous action is not one’s own.”⁷⁵ The Buddha, having perfected this “power of the knowledge of action as one’s own,” no longer possesses unvirtuous action as his own. As a result, the Buddha would constitute an exception to or the untoward consequence resulting from this first alternative that action and its resultant matured effects are one’s own. Even though this interpretation of the proponent’s implicit criticism of the first alternative is plausible, it remains unconfirmed in the absence of a scriptural parallel or an analogous argument in another text.

The second alternative and its untoward consequence are less obscure, but even here there are difficulties in interpretation. The statement of the second alternative is clear: “Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect is] one’s own” (*aṣa na vatava svago*, ll. 19). Unfortunately, the damaged manuscript renders the untoward consequence less certain. A clue is found in the term *paḍisaṃvededi* (P *paṭisaṃvedeti/paṭisaṃvedayati*, Skt *pratisaṃvedayate*), which occurs frequently in discussions of action, specifically in two related contexts: first, in discussions of the relationship between the agent of action and the recipient of the matured effect; and second, in discussions of the causal connection between efficacious action and its resultant matured effect. In the first context, the relationship between the agent and the recipient of the matured effects of action is said to be one of neither identity nor complete difference. For example, in the Acelaḥassapaṣutta, the ascetic Kassapa asks the Buddha whether suffering is wrought by oneself (P *sayamkata*), by another (P *paramkata*), by both, or by neither.⁷⁶ The Buddha responds that the first alternative asserting the identity of agent and recipient, whereby “one acts and that same one experiences [the matured effect]” (P *so karoti so paṭisaṃvedayati*), results in the untoward consequence of eternalism (P *sassata*) since the agent of both the action and the subsequent experience of the effects would be constant. The second alternative of a distinction between agent and recipient, whereby “one acts and another one experiences [the matured effect]” (P *añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedayati*), results in

⁷⁴ AARŚ p. 974c18–19; AMVŚ 41 p. 212c27ff.; MAHŚ 6 p. 921c4ff.; AKBh 7.28c p. 411.16; NyAS 75 p. 746a22ff.; ASPrŚ 36 p. 955b10ff.

⁷⁵ P *tattha attanā vā kataṃ hotu parena vā sabbampi akusalakammaṃ no sakaṃ* (As 406).

⁷⁶ SN II 19. Cf. SĀ (tr. G) 13 nos. 302–303 p. 86a4ff. and Mil 413. The Kathāvatthu (Kv 52–53) raises the same issue of the identity or difference of the person who acts (P *karoti*) and the one who experiences (P *paṭisaṃvedeti/paṭisaṃvedayati*) the matured effects, and it offers the same four alternatives of identity, difference, both, and neither. To each alternative, the opponent first offers a negative response, which the commentary (Kv-a 31) explains as resulting from a desire not to contradict the sūtra.

the untoward consequence of annihilationism (*P uccheda*) since the efficacy of action is terminated vis-à-vis the one who performs it. These two alternatives are rejected, in contrast to the Buddha's favored position of the middle path of dependent origination, whereby matured effects occur as the result of a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions, including, of course, the efficacy of the prior action.

The second and related context in which the term Skt *pratisamvedayate* (P *paṭisaṃvedeti/ paṭisaṃvedayati*) occurs concerns the connection or conditioning relation between the causal efficacy of action and the arising of its resultant matured effect. This connection is specified in terms of the locus of action and of its effect, which are determined by the particular type of causal dependence connecting them. For example, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya distinguishes the fruit of maturation (Skt *vipākaphala*) from the other five varieties of fruits (Skt *phala*) as follows: “But the matured effect [of action] is not shared. For it is not the case that one person experiences the matured effect of an action performed by another.”⁷⁷ Hence, the causal efficacy of action is specified by the delimited locus in which its effect arises; that is to say, the matured effect of any given action is experienced only within the life-stream that is connected through a conditioning process with the prior moment of that causal action. As in the case of the first context examined above, this connection is not one of identity but rather of causal connection. The Nidānasutta in the Aṅguttaranikāya provides an example that appears analogous to our Gāndhārī text. In discussing the three causes of action—lust, hatred, and delusion—the Nidānasutta delimits the locus of one's experience of matured effects as follows: “Wherever that action comes to fruition, there one experiences the matured effect of that action, whether in the present lifetime or in some other way.”⁷⁸ In contrast to the Pali clause “that action comes to fruition” (P *taṃ kammaṃ vipaccati*), our Gāndhārī text uses the clause “that matured effect occurs” (*so vivaga nivartadi*), but both clauses clearly refer to the maturation of the effect of action and attempt to delimit the locus of the arising of this matured effect to the life-stream that is causally connected with the previous action.

Presumably alluding to these issues either of agency and retribution or of the connection between the causal efficacy of action and the arising of its matured effects, the proponent finally offers a rhetorical question to counter the second alternative that the matured effects of action are not one's own: “[In that case,] by means of which [actions is it said that] one experiences that matured effect which occurs?” (*kuḍarahi ya so vivaga nivartadi • paḍiṣavededi •*, l. 20). In other words, if in accordance with the second alternative one responds that the matured effects of action are not one's own, how would it be possible to link actions with any particular matured effects? Thus, in the absence of a causal connection between the agent and retribution, the efficacy of action central to both the dynamics of rebirth and religious practice would be undermined. In accordance with the argument method of “implication of an untoward consequence” (Skt *prasaṅga*) employed throughout our text, the proponent is content simply to allude to the untoward consequences of his opponents' position without offering an interpretation of his own.

⁷⁷ Skt *aśādhāraṇas tu vipākaḥ. naḥy anyakṛtasya karmaṇo 'nyo vipākam pratisamvedayate* (AKBh 2.57b p. 95.18–19).

⁷⁸ P *yattha taṃ kammaṃ vipaccati tattha tassa kammaṃ vipākam paṭisaṃvedeti, diṭṭhe vā dhamme upa-pajja vā apare vā pariyāye* (AN I 134ff.). Cf. AN I 249ff.

I.3.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 4–5) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 21–28]

Reconstruction

(4) [21] *prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi • yadi aha adidado* [22] *vivaga d(*i) • tat(*r)a vat(*a)va kaḍ(*a)ma aviv(*a)k(*a)vivaga ca viv(*a)g(*a) yaṣa nivartadi •*
 (5) [23] *pr(*o)chadi asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma yasa kamaṣa vivago asti • aṣa nasti kica kama*
 [24] *yaṣa vivaga asti di • vatav(*a) asti kici kama yaṣa kamaṣa vivaga asti • [25] metrae ca*
*ek(*a)-m-aṣa p(*a)la sa ca met(*r)a asti sa ca pala asti di • apam* [26] *hi eḍa (*a)nala*
*ś(*a)m(*ae) du(*ve) vivatas(*a) p(*a)lan(*i) bromi (*d)i prov(*u)cadi • pro*[27]-
*v(*u)c(*a)di hedun(*a) hi ca ṣa palani paḍikakṣidava • saṅa voharovivaga yaṣa yaṣa* [28]
sarjanadi taṣa taṣa voharadi eva asti taṣa ca pala asti di bromi ❀

Sanskrit rendering

(4) [21] *praṣṭavyam katamasmāt karmaṇo vipāko nirvartate. yady āhā ’tītād* [22] *vipāka iti, tatra vaktavyam katamad avipakvavipākaṃ ca vipāko yasya nirvartate.*
 (5) [23] *prechaty asti kiṃcit karma yasya karmaṇo vipāko ’sty, atha nāsti kiṃcit karma*
 [24] *yasya vipāko ’stīti. vaktavyam asti kiṃcit karma yasya karmaṇo vipāko ’sti. [25] maitrāyās caikāṃśaḥ phalam, sā ca maitrāsti, tac ca phalam astīti. alpam* [26] *hy etad analam śamāya. dve vivādasya phale bravīmīti procyate. pro*[27]*cyate hetūnām hi ca tāni phalāni pratikāṅkṣitavyāni. saṃjñā vyavahāravipākā. yathā yathā* [28] *saṃjñāti, tathā tathā vyavaharaty evam asti. tasya ca phalam astīti bravīmi.*

Translation

(4) [21] [P] It should be asked, “From which action does the matured effect occur?” If one states, [O] “The matured effect [occurs] from past [action],” [22] [P] with regard to that it should be said, “And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?”

(5) [23] One asks, [O] “Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action [24] whose matured effect exists?” [P] It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists, [as indicated by the following scriptural passages]. [For example,] [25] “A little bit of loving kindness [results in] a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists.” [26] [Or] it is proclaimed, “For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute.” [27] [Or] it is proclaimed, “For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes.” [Or] “I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way [28] one conceives, in that way one declares, ‘It exists in this way.’ And the fruit of that [conception] exists.”

Commentary: (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 21–28]

Continuing his criticism of the opponent’s third category of existent past factors, the proponent remains within the larger issue of karmic causal functioning but shifts his focus from the matured effect to the action itself. He demands that the opponent specify those actions that give rise to matured effects: “[P] It should be asked, ‘From which action does the matured effect occur?’” (*prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi* •, l. 21). The first option that the matured effect occurs from past action would conform to the opponent’s previously stated position: “If one states, [O] ‘The matured

effect [occurs] from past [action],’ ...” (*yadi aha adidādo vivaga d(*i)* •, ll. 21–22). In criticizing this position, the proponent points to an internal contradiction within efficacious past action since its matured effect would be both “not yet matured” and yet also “occur”: “[P] With regard to that it should be said, ‘And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?’” (*tat(*r)a vat(*a)va kad(*a)ma aviv(*a)k(*a)vivaga ca viv(*a)g(*a) yaṣa nivartadi* •, l. 22). Through this rhetorical question, the proponent also implicitly rejects two points he understands to be essential to the opponent’s position that matured effects arise from past actions. The first underlies his criticism of the opponent’s third category of existent past factors, namely, that existent past factors are characterized by potential, karmic causal efficacy. The second point will become the cornerstone of the proponent’s subsequent criticism of the opponent’s second category of existent future factors, namely, that a matured effect can change its status from a future state as “not yet matured” to a present state as “occurred.”

The regular pattern of discourse in this text, whereby criticisms by the proponent are initiated by questions, would suggest that the next question is also raised by the proponent: “One asks, ‘Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action whose matured effect exists?’” (*pr(*o)chadi asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma yasa kamaṣa vivago asti • aṣa nasti kica kama yaṣa vivaga asti di* •, ll. 23–24). However, this question is introduced by the finite verb form *pr(*o)chadi*, “one asks,” in contrast to the gerundive form *prochidava*, “it is to be asked,” which is consistently used throughout the text to introduce the proponent’s criticisms. The implications of this syntactic difference are not apparent but could be significant for the determination of the speaker. If the difference in verbal forms is significant, the finite verb form *pr(*o)chadi* may signal an objection raised by the opponent who interrupts the proponent’s prior criticism with a question challenging him to take a position on the very possibility of karmic causal functioning. In other words, throughout his criticism, the proponent rejects the causal efficacy and hence the existence of past actions, and in his first two criticisms (ll. 7–17), he appears to admit that present actions cannot exert causal efficacy to produce matured effects that arise simultaneously in the present. As a result, seeing no other possible explanation, the opponent demands to know whether the proponent would reject karmic functioning altogether. According to this first interpretation of this passage, the proponent’s rejoinder follows immediately, introduced by the gerundive *vatava*: “It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists” (*vatav(*a) asti kici kama yaṣa kamaṣa vivaga asti* •, l. 24). To justify his rejoinder, the proponent then offers four statements, presumably all scriptural citations, which mention an action and either its fruit (*pala*) or its matured effect (*vivaga*). According to the typical argument pattern that appeals to both authoritative scripture (Skt *āgama*) and reasoned investigation (Skt *yukti*), these authoritative scriptural citations, by their mere mention of the contested terms, constitute proof of the existence of the referents of these terms as well as of the cause and effect relation suggested between them. If the attribution of this rejoinder and the supporting scriptural citations to the proponent is accepted, this passage acquires particular importance as the only passage in our text in which the proponent presents and supports a position of his own. This break with his habitual pattern, which is maintained throughout the remainder of the text, could be justified by his desire to make clear that he is merely rejecting the specifics of the opponent’s understanding of the mechanism of karma, not karma itself. Thus, with this rejoinder, the proponent deviates from his normal pattern in order to preclude any confusion

concerning this issue and to reaffirm that karma is absolutely foundational. However, it is important to note that even in this case the proponent offers no further reasoned arguments in defense of his position and leaves unstated any extended explanation of his own model of karmic functioning.

This first interpretation is supported by several stylistic factors. First, as noted above, the initial question signaled by the finite verb *pr(*o)chadi* may well indicate a question raised by another party, in this case the opponent, since it does not follow the pattern typical of the proponent's objections elsewhere in this text. Normally, the proponent introduces his objections with the gerundive *prochidava*, then offers a conditional clause introduced by the phrase *yadi aha*, "if one states," which signals two mutually exclusive, logically complementary, or simple contrasting alternatives that might be offered by the opponent, and usually concludes with the untoward consequence of each alternative introduced by the conjunctive adverb *tena*.⁷⁹ In another passage (l. 82), the preterite finite verb form *prochi* (P *pucchi/apucchi*, Skt *aprākṣīt*) is used to introduce a statement attributed to a third party, which in that case nonetheless presumably also represents the position of the proponent.⁸⁰ As a second factor supporting this first interpretation, the general content of this question appears out of place within the proponent's detailed criticism of the opponent's assertion concerning the existence of past actions. Specifically, it interrupts the flow of the proponent's critical examination of the particular type of action, past or present, from which matured effects arise. Instead, this question returns to a fundamental issue concerning the very possibility of karmic functioning, which seems unwarranted here as part of the proponent's continuing argument. As a third factor, with comparatively few exceptions,⁸¹ the gerundive *vatava*, which is used here to introduce scriptural citations, is typically found in clause-initial position marking a statement or criticism offered by the proponent. Hence, one might then expect the scriptural citations to represent the proponent's own contribution as a rejoinder to the opponent's question. As a fourth and final factor, the scriptural citations do not precipitate any rejoinder or critical examination by the proponent himself, as might be expected if they had been offered by the opponent.

If however the difference between the gerundive form *prochidava* and the present finite form *pr(*o)chadi* is not deemed significant, the finite form *pr(*o)chadi*, like *prochidava*, might be interpreted as introducing yet another objection raised by the proponent himself. According to this second interpretation, the proponent interrupts his examination of the opponent's assertion concerning the existence of past actions with a general question that returns to a fundamental controversy raised by the issue of karmic functioning, namely, whether action possesses or does not possess a matured effect. The opponent then responds by offering scriptural citations that clearly link actions with matured effects and thereby prove both their existence and the relationship between them. In his next two criticisms (6, 7), the proponent then raises two additional questions that concern fundamental issues of karmic functioning.

This second interpretation finds support in certain less concrete but nonetheless notable stylistic features. First, as noted above, if these scriptural citations are attributed to the proponent, they constitute the only explicit statement of his position in the entire text. As a result, there is some justification for attributing them to the opponent, even though they do not provoke additional

⁷⁹ Commentary: The Opponent's Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4].

⁸⁰ Text Notes: [82] + ^{52F(v)?} *jaga eṣa prochi* •.

⁸¹ Cf. ll. 70–71 [5x], 76–77 [3x], 86–87 [2x]; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5 [3x].

criticism by the proponent. Second, the initial question in this passage (ll. 23–24) is parallel in both syntax and level of generality with the questions that introduce the next two criticisms, both of which are more clearly offered by the proponent: “Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action whose matured effect exists?” (ll. 23–24); “Is there some action that exists, or is there no action that exists?” (l. 29); “Is there some action whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect will not occur at all?” (ll. 31–32). Syntactically, all three questions include the indefinite pronoun *kica* (P *kiñci*, Skt *kiñcit*) and employ the same pattern of an initial *asti/nasti* marking a proposition or assertion, namely, “it is/is not the case that ...” or “there is/is not ...” In terms of level of generality, all three questions address the most fundamental issues concerning karmic functioning: the first question inquires about the basic relationship between action and its effect; the second question, about whether actions exist; and the third question, about actions whose effects will not occur. If taken as a group, these three questions might then also function as a conclusion for the proponent’s treatment thus far of the opponent’s first and third categories of existent past factors: (1) the “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” (*avivagatva*); and (3) [action] “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*). And indeed, following the treatment of these three questions, the text (l. 36) shifts to an examination of the opponent’s second category of existent future factors: (2) the “state of being a matured effect” (*vivagatva*).

Despite the syntactic parallelism and the similar level of generality that appear to connect the initial question (ll. 23–24) with the two questions treated in the subsequent discussion (ll. 29, 31–32), the first interpretation, which attributes this question to the opponent, has been tentatively adopted here. Syntactic parallelism is a common rhetorical pattern in polemical prose and does not necessarily reflect the identity of or a change in speaker.⁸² Adopting a similar level of generality in the following questions can also be viewed merely as a rhetorical technique employed by the proponent in his rejoinder to the opponent’s initial question. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a large punctuation mark occurs after the scriptural citations, and although its exact function is unclear, it would appear to signal a transition of some sort and would thus argue against taking the three questions raised in this and the next passage as a unified summary offered by the proponent. Thus, it has been assumed that the question that introduces this passage is raised by the opponent and answered by the proponent through the citation of four scriptural passages. The proponent then responds with syntactically parallel and similarly general questions in the next passage.

Unfortunately, given the deteriorated state of the manuscript, clear parallels have been identified for only two of the probable four scriptural citations in this passage. The first statement is marked with the quotative particle *di*, suggesting that it is a scriptural citation, but no parallel has yet been located. Hence, both the reading and syntactic structure of the passage are uncertain: “A little bit of loving kindness [results in] a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists” (*metrae ca ek(*a)-m-amśa p(*a)la sa ca met(*r)a asti sa ca pala asti di •*, l. 25). As provisionally reconstructed, the passage refers to the causal efficacy through which the action of loving kindness (P *mettā*, Skt *maitrā*) produces a fruit (P/Skt *phala*). A scriptural parallel has been identified for the second statement that refers to the fruits of dispute: “[Or] it is proclaimed, ‘For this [praise] is

⁸² See, for example, the syntactic parallelism between the comments of proponents and opponents throughout the Kathāvatthu.

a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are the two fruits of dispute” (*apaṃ hi eḍa (*a)nala ś(*a)m(*ae) du(*ve) vivatas(*a) p(*a)lan(*i) bromi(*d)i*, ll. 25–26). The parallel is a frequently cited half-verse from the Suttanipāta: “For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute.”⁸³

No exact scriptural parallel has yet been identified for the third statement: “[Or] it is proclaimed. ‘For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes’” (*prov(*u)c(*a)di hedun(*a) hi ca śa palani paḍikakṣidava*, ll. 26–27). Nonetheless, it is introduced by the verb *provucadi*, “it is proclaimed,” which would resemble the pattern of the passive participle form Skt *prokta* of *pra* + \sqrt{vac} used in scholastic treatises to mark a scriptural citation.⁸⁴ In Pali texts, the terms *phala* or *vipāka* occur frequently with *pāṭikāṅkha* in the pattern “X (*phala* or *vipāka*, nominative) is to be anticipated (*pāṭikāṅkha*) by Y (agent, genitive),” for example, “... by him one of two fruits is to be anticipated.”⁸⁵ Hence, rather than citing one particular scriptural passage presenting a specific instance of causal efficacy, this statement may simply allude to a formulaic pattern that indicates a connection between action and its fruit or matured effect. However, it is also possible that since the statement itself does not refer to a particular type of action, it might not be intended as a scriptural citation but instead simply functions as an introduction to the scriptural passage cited next.

The fourth and final statement cites a scriptural passage specifying the causal connection between the action of conception and its effect in conventional speech: “I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way one conceives, in that way one proclaims, ‘It exists in this way.’ And the fruit of that [conception] exists” (*saṅṅa voharovivaga yaśa yaśa sarjanadi taśa taśa voharadi eva asti taśa ca pala asti di bromi* ❁, ll. 27–28). A close scriptural parallel is found in the Anguttaranikāya: “I declare, O monks, conception to have conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way one conceives, in that way one says: ‘I have had a conception in this way.’ This is said, O monks, to be the matured effect of conceptions.”⁸⁶

I.3.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 6–7) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 29–36]

Reconstruction

(6) [29] *prochiḍava asti kica kama asti nasti kica kama asti di • asti kica kama avi*[30]-*vakavivaga adiḍa adiḍaḥhanena ekaḥha • yidi ekaḥha tena ubha(*e)h(*i) pal(*a)* [31] *d(*a)-d(*a)vo ubhaye va asti ubhaye va nasti di •*

(7) [31] *asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma avivakavivag(*a)* [32] *y(*a)sa vivaga na kica nivartiśadi (*•) yidi aha asti kama (*yasa) vivaga na ni*[33]*var(*i)śadi tena ta kama avivakavivaga nasti • aśa nasti kica kama ya*[34]*s(*a) vivaga <*na> nivartiśadi • na hode bromiciavaśa*

⁸³ Sn 896 p. 175; Pj II 2.557. Text Notes: [25] *apaṃ* [26] *hi [e]ḍa [a].nala [ś].[m].[a]. [dudo] vi[vatas]. p.la[n]. [bromi] .[i]*.

⁸⁴ Text Notes: [26] *prov.cadi • [p]ro*[27]^[51kk(r)+51H(r)]*[v].*^[51H(r)]*[c].di [he]du[n]. [hi]*.

⁸⁵ P ... *tassa dvinnam phalānam aññataram phalaṃ pāṭikāṅkham* (DN II 314). Cf. MN I 62; AN III 82, V 108; AKBh 4.117ab p. 270.6–8.

⁸⁶ Text Notes: [27] *saṅṅa voharovi*[va]*ga yaśa ya*⟨sa⟩ [28] *sa*[rja]*nadi taśa taśa voharadi*.

*eva hi vuta bhagavaḍa yaṣa [35] y(*a)ṣa aya kama avis(*a)kh(*a)rodi taṣa taṣa vivaga paḍiṣavededi • na bhodi bro[36](*)mi)c(*)i)avaṣo •*

Sanskrit rendering

(6) [29] *praṣṭavyam asti kiṃcit karmāsti, nāsti kiṃcit karmāstīti. asti kiṃcit karmāvi[30]-pakvavipākam atītam atītasthānenaikastham. yady ekastham, tenobhayaiḥ phalaṃ [31] dātavyam. ubhayāni vā santi, ubhayāni vā na santīti.*

(7) [31] *asti kiṃcit karmāvipakvavipākam [32] yasya vipāko na kiṃcin nirvartīṣyati. yady āhāsti karma yasya vipāko na nir[33]vartīṣyati, tena tat karmāvipakvavipākam nāsti. atha nāsti kiṃcit karma ya[34]sya vipāko na nirvartīṣyati, na bhaved brahmacaryavāsaḥ. evaṃ hy uktam bhagavatā yathā [35] yathedaṃ karmābhisaṃskaroti tathā tathā vipākam pratisaṃvedayati, na bhavati bra[36]hmacyavāsaḥ.*

Translation

(6) [29] [P] It should be asked, “Is there some action that exists, or is there no action that exists?” [O] “There is some action [that exists, namely,] [30] past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, which constitutes one part within the region of the past.” [P] If [action whose matured effect has not yet matured exists as possessed of a fruit and] constitutes one part [of the past], then the fruit should be presented by both [31] [parts, that is, by past action whose matured effect has not yet matured and by past action whose matured effect has already matured]. [It should be said that] either both [parts of the past] exist [as possessed of a fruit] or both do not exist [as not possessed of a fruit].

(7) [31] [P] Is there some action whose matured effect has not yet matured, [32] of which the matured effect will not occur at all? If one states, [O] “There is action (*whose) matured effect [33] will not occur,” [P] then that action is not [to be referred to as action] “whose matured effect has not yet matured.” Or else, [if] there were no action whose [34] matured effect will not occur, there would be no life of religious practice. For it has been spoken thus by the Bhagavat, [35] “[If it is said that] in whatever way this one instigates an action, in that way one experiences the matured effect, then there is no life of [36] religious practice.”

Commentary: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36]

In concluding the previous passage, the opponent challenged the proponent to comment in general terms on the possibility of karmic causal functioning and the existence of the matured effect: “Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action whose matured effect exists?” (*pr(*o)chadi asti kic(*a)k(*a)ma yasa kama vivago asti • aṣa nasti kica kama yaṣa vivaga asti di •*, ll. 23–24). Echoing the opponent’s challenge, the proponent begins this criticism with a question that focuses on the action rather than the matured effect: “It should be asked, ‘Is there some action that exists, or is there no action that exists?’” (*prochiḍava asti kica kama asti nasti kica kama asti di •*, l. 29). The opponent’s response repeats his initial assertion that past action whose matured effect has not yet matured (*avivakavivaga*) exists (51D(r) ll. 3–4): “There is some action [that exists, namely,] past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, which constitutes one part within the region of the past” (*asti kica kama avivakavivaga adiḍa adiḍaḥhanena ekaḥha •*, ll. 29–30). In

this response, the opponent makes it explicit that existent past action whose matured effect has not yet matured constitutes only one part of the past. In other words, the opponent divides the general category of past action into two subcategories: past action whose matured effect has not yet matured (*avivakavivaga*), and past action whose matured effect has already matured (*vivakavivaga*). Further, the opponent contends that the first subcategory of past action whose matured effect has not yet matured exists precisely because it is causally efficacious. By contrast, the second subcategory of past action that has already exerted its matured effect has no such causal efficacy and hence does not exist. The proponent, however, rejects any such attempt to draw an ontic distinction within the single category of “past actions,” instead maintaining that no past factors of any kind exist.

In his rejection of the opponent’s attempt to distinguish among varieties of past action, the proponent again applies the principle of category uniformity utilized in his previous arguments (51D(r), ll. 3–17). The Kathāvatthu employs a similar argument against an opponent who, like the opponent in our Gāndhārī text, attempts to divide the category of past factors into those that exist and those that do not exist.⁸⁷ First, the Kathāvatthu proponent observes that nonexistent past factors, as nonexistent, should be characterized as ceased (P *niruddha*), gone away (P *vigata*), vanished (P *atthaṅgata*), and completely vanished (P *abbhatthaṅgata*). By contrast, existent past factors should be characterized as not ceased (P *na niruddha*), not gone away (P *na vigata*), and so forth. By equating “nonexistence” with the characterization “ceased,” and “existence” with the characterization “not ceased,” the Kathāvatthu proponent points to an internal contradiction within the opponent’s position, that is to say, the assertion that certain past factors exist also entails their characterization as “not ceased,” and so forth, which in turn contradicts their nature as past. In the opinion of the Kathāvatthu proponent, any factors that exist as “not ceased” must, as “not ceased,” be present. However, the opponent refuses to agree to such an equation of “existent” with either “not ceased” or “present.” Next, the Kathāvatthu proponent applies the same criticism to three subgroups of past factors, presumably subgroups accepted by the opponent himself: (1) past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured (P *avipakkavipāka*); (2) past factors whose matured effects have already matured (P *vipakkavipāka*); and (3) past factors not possessed of matured effects (P *avipāka*). For the Kathāvatthu proponent, these three subgroups of past factors, like the category of past factors as a whole, should be subject to the same internal distinction between “existent” and “nonexistent.” The opponent, however, distinguishes among “existent” and “nonexistent” factors only in the case of the category of past factors taken as a whole and refuses to admit such a distinction within each of the three subgroups. He specifies that the first subgroup of past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured (P *avipakkavipāka*) exists and the second subgroup of past factors whose matured effects have already matured (P *vipakkavipāka*) does not exist. As for the third subgroup of past factors not possessed of matured effects (P *avipāka*), the opponent refuses to acknowledge that they either exist or do not exist. The Kathāvatthu commentary identifies this third subgroup of past factors not possessed of matured effects (P *avipāka*) as indeterminate (P *avyākata*), which in this context would suggest that the arising of the matured effects is not determined.⁸⁸ Hence, such indeterminate past factors might be said to exist like the first subgroup of past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured (P *avipakkavipāka*),

⁸⁷ Kv 151ff. Cf. Kv 115.

⁸⁸ Kv-a 52.

but since their matured effects will never in fact arise, they could also be said not to exist, like the second subgroup of past factors whose matured effects have already matured (P *vipakkavipāka*).

The force of the Kathāvatthu proponent's criticism lies in his assumption that past factors, as members of a single category, must share the same characteristics; that is to say, past factors, as past, must uniformly manifest the characteristics that are indicative of the past, namely, as "ceased," and so forth. Thus, if past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured are indeed past, they too must have ceased, and as ceased, they cannot be said to exist.⁸⁹ In other words, in the opinion of the Kathāvatthu proponent, a factor's status as "past" is tantamount to its status as "ceased," and this status as "ceased" precludes its existence. If however a factor is claimed to exist, it must be characterized as "not ceased," and as a result must be present. Thus, the argument of the proponent of the Kathāvatthu proceeds through three main points: (1) a given category must be uniform, and consequently its members must share the same distinguishing characteristics; (2) existence is equated with functioning, or occurrence; and (3) such occurrence, or functioning, and hence existence, only take place in the present moment.

Using the same principles that inform this argument in the Kathāvatthu, the proponent of our Gāndhārī text argues that it is not possible to draw distinctions within the single category of past action. Accordingly, the proponent criticizes the opponent for asserting that one portion of past action exists, specifically those past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured. As the proponent argues here (ll. 30–31), if one part of the past, that is, past factors whose matured effects have already matured, is claimed not to exist because its members are not possessed of a fruit, then this characterization must apply to both parts of the past. In other words, either past action as a whole must be possessed of a fruit and exist, or it must be without fruit and not exist.

In his next criticism (l. 31), the proponent returns to the opponent's proposed category of existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured and inquires whether this category includes past actions whose matured effects will not occur at all. Following the typical argument pattern, the proponent examines the two logically complementary responses to this question and attempts to demonstrate that both responses result in an untoward consequence. First, the opponent might assent to the fact that the category of existent past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured also includes past actions whose matured effects will not occur at all. In that case, this category of existent past actions "whose matured effects have not yet matured" (*avivakavivaga*) becomes internally contradictory; the qualification "not yet matured" implies that a matured effect may still occur, and yet, for this subset of past actions, the matured effects will never occur. Once again here, the proponent insists that the single category of existent past actions must be homogeneous and characterized uniformly as action "whose matured effect has not yet matured." However, it is important to remember that the opponent does not in fact limit possible existent past actions to the single category of those "whose matured effects have not yet matured." In his previously proposed three karma-related categories of existent factors (51D(r) ll. 3–4), the opponent includes the separate first category of the state of "not being possessed of a matured effect" (*avivatva*), which refers precisely to such past actions whose matured effects will never occur. As a result, this first untoward consequence raised by the proponent here loses its force

⁸⁹ Kv 152.

precisely because the opponent acknowledges two subcategories of existent past actions: (1) those whose matured effects have not yet matured; and (2) those whose matured effects will not occur.

As for the second logically complementary response to the proponent's initial question, if the opponent dissents, claiming that no such past action exists whose matured effect will not occur, then the religious life of practice becomes useless. To support his criticism, the proponent next cites a scriptural passage, for which a parallel is found in the *Loṇakapallasutta* of the *Āṅguttaranikāya*: "If one should say, O monks, 'In whatever way a person performs an **action**, in that way one experiences **that**,' in this case O monks, there is no life of religious practice"⁹⁰ In this statement, the scriptural passage refers to a strictly deterministic model of karmic efficacy whereby a given action under all circumstances replicates itself in its effect. Under such a deterministic model, defiled past actions would inevitably give rise to untoward effects, making it useless to initiate a life of religious practice. The next statement in this passage from the *Loṇakapallasutta* modifies this model of strict, karmic determinism: "And if one should speak in this way, O monks, 'In whatever way a person performs an action that is **to be experienced**, in that way one experiences its **matured effect**,' in this case, O monks, there is the life of religious practice"⁹¹ In this statement, both the initial action and its effects are qualified; that is to say, action must first be of the type that is **to be experienced** (*P vedanīyaṃ*), and secondly, one experiences not the replicated action itself but its **matured effect** conditioned by a multiplicity of causes including, but not limited to, that prior action.

The proponent cites this scriptural passage to counter the second negative alternative that "there is no action whose matured effect will not occur." For the successful practice of the Buddhist path, it is essential that the matured effects of certain past actions not arise; otherwise, the course of karmic retribution could never be interrupted, and the life of religious practice would be useless. However, as in the case of the first alternative, here also the proponent's criticism is ultimately ineffective since in the case of this second alternative also the opponent's first category of existent past actions undermines the proponent's untoward consequence; that is to say, this first category of existent past factors "not possessed of a matured effect" (*avivagatva*) refers specifically to defiled past actions whose effects will no longer arise, and presumably was proposed precisely to allow for the usefulness of religious practice. Thus, the proponent's criticism only appears reasonable if the proponent does not acknowledge or refuses to accept the opponent's threefold categorization of existent factors.

⁹⁰ *P yo bhikkhave evaṃ vadeyya yathā yathāyaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā taṃ paṭisaṃvedetī ti evaṃ santaṃ bhikkhave brahmacariyavāso na hoti ...* (AN I 249).

⁹¹ *P yo ca kho bhikkhave evaṃ vadeyya yathā yathā vedanīyaṃ ayaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā tassa vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedetī ti evaṃ santaṃ bhikkhave brahmacariyavāso hoti ...* (AN I 249). Cf. 世尊告諸比丘。隨人所作業則受其報。如是。不行梵行不得盡苦。若作是說。隨人所作業則受其報。如是。修行梵行便得盡苦 (MĀ 3 no. 11 p. 433a14–17); AMVŚ 20 p. 99c24ff.

I.3.2.4. Detailed Criticism (7: 1–3) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 36–45]

Reconstruction

(1) [36] *prochidava śaka upaḍadhamo anagado thamena va viryena va anu*[37]*paḍadhama kato di • yidi na śaka na so upaḍadhamo ya karana śaka upaḍadhamo* [38] *kato • aṣa na śaka nirarthyā bramiciavaṣa bhodi •*

(2) [38] *yadi upaḍadhama anagaḍa asti* [39] *anupaḍadhama anagaḍa nasti • kaḍamaṣa dukhaniroṣa abromiciavaṣa •*

(3) [39] *upaḍadhamo* [40] *hi avaṣa upajisādi • anupaḍadham(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajisādi •* [41] *yasmi samahe aguḍimala manuṣa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki nu khu* [42] *tasmi samahe neraīyabhava* [43] *(*upaḍadha)ma aṣa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka tatra jadi u*[44]*(*padido •) ? ? ? (*a)vaṣa nahi tena gatava neraa di • aṣa upaḍadh(*a)-mo •* [45] *t(*e)n(*a) n(*a) bramiciavaṣa •*

Sanskrit rendering

(1) [36] *praṣṭavyaṃ śakyam utpādidharmo 'nāgataḥ sthāmnā vā vīryeṇa vānut*[37]-*pādidharmaṃ kartum iti. yadi na śakyam, na sa utpādidharmo yat kāraṇaṃ śakyam utpādidharmaḥ* [38] *kartum. atha na śakyam, nirarthiko brahmacaryavāso bhavati.*

(2) [38] *yady utpādidharmā anāgatāḥ santy, [39] anutpādidharmā anāgatā na santi, katamasya duḥkhanirodho 'brahmacaryavāse.*

(3) [39] *utpādidharmo* [40] *hy avaśyam utpatsyate, 'nutpādidharmo 'vaśyam notpatsyate. [41] yasmin samaye Aṅgulimālo manuṣyān hatvā aṅgulīnāṃ mālāṃ dhārayati, kiṃ nu khalu* [42] *tasmin samaye nairayikabhāva* [43] *utpādidharmo, 'tha notpādidharmaḥ. yady utpādidharmo, na tena śakyam tatra jātir ut*[44]*pattum ... avaśyam nahi tena gantavyaṃ nirayam iti. athotpādidharmas, [45] tena na brahmacaryavāsaḥ.*

Translation

(1) [36] [P] It should be asked, “Is it possible for a future factor subject to arising, by virtue of [its] strength or energy, [37] to act as a factor not subject to arising?” If it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], it is not a factor subject to arising since it is possible for a factor subject to arising [38] to act. Or else, [if] it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], the life of religious practice is without purpose.

(2) [38] [P] If future factors subject to arising exist, [39] [and] future factors not subject to arising do not exist, to which of these [two categories] does the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice [belong]?

(3) [39] Indeed, [you contend that] “a factor subject to arising [40] will inevitably arise, [and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise.” [41] When Aṅgulimāla, having killed human beings, wears a garland of finger bones, now how possibly [42] at that time is [his future] nature as a hell-being [43] either (*a factor subject to arising), or else not a factor subject to arising? If it is a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action] [44] ... for hell inevitably should not be reached by him. Or else, [if] it is a factor subject to arising, [45] then [there is] no life of religious practice [for him].

Commentary: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]

In this passage, the text turns from the issues of the efficacy of past action and the existence of past factors to an examination of future factors. The proponent’s criticism of the existence of future factors mirrors his prior treatment of the existence of past factors (ll. 29–36), and both passages together parallel the discussion of past and future factors presented in the Kathāvatthu.⁹² As noted above, the Kathāvatthu commentary does not identify the source of the view concerning the existence of future factors, but since it appears immediately after the analogous view concerning the existence of past factors, it likely represents the view of the same opponent.⁹³ Furthermore, the close parallelism of our Gāndhārī text with the Kathāvatthu suggests that both texts record an integrated argument against an opponent who maintains the existence of certain past and future factors.

As in the case of past factors treated in the previous passage, here also the proponent alludes to the assertion of an opponent who divides future factors into two categories: (1) “factors subject to arising” (*upadadhama*); and (2) “factors not subject to arising” (*anupadadhama*). And just as for past factors, the proponent criticizes the opponent’s bifurcation of future factors into these two groups by maintaining that distinctions cannot be drawn among factors of the single category of future factors.⁹⁴ The Kathāvatthu, too, in its criticism of the existence of future factors, uses an argument based on the principle of category uniformity analogous to the one it had used concerning past factors.⁹⁵ In response to the question of whether the future exists (P *anāgataṃ atthīti*), the opponent proposes that one portion of the future exists and another portion does not exist (P *ekaccaṃ atthi ekaccaṃ n’ atthīti*); specifically, future factors subject to arising (P *uppādino dhammā*) are said to exist, while those not subject to arising (P *anuppādino dhammā*) are said not to exist. The Kathāvatthu proponent then demands whether the opponent would characterize existent future factors as born (P *jāta*), originated (P *sañjāta*), occurred (P *nibbatta*), and appeared (P *pātubhūta*), and nonexistent future factors as not born (P *ajāta*), not originated (P *asañjāta*), and so forth. If existent future factors were said to be born, and so forth, they should in fact be admitted to be present; and yet, if future factors were said to be unborn, they should be said not to exist. As the Kathāvatthu proponent concludes, “If future factors subject to arising are unborn, surely it cannot be said that ‘future factors subject to arising exist.’”⁹⁶ In an attempt to defend the existence of future factors subject to arising (P *uppādino dhammā*), the opponent suggests that such future factors can be said to exist because they “will arise” (P *uppajjissanti*), presumably referring to those future factors that are on the point of arising. However, to this the Kathāvatthu proponent responds that

⁹² Kv 151–155. Commentaries: General Criticism of the Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3]; (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

⁹³ Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7].

⁹⁴ The reasoning applied here, that is, of a necessary uniformity within the single temporal category of the future, is also utilized in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 76 p. 394c16–24) in an examination of the relationship between the nature (體, Skt **bhāva*) of future factors and the nature of the future time period. There it is objected that if the nature of the future time period is produced when future factors are produced, all future factors should arise at one time.

⁹⁵ Kv 153ff.

⁹⁶ P *hañci anāgatā uppādino dhammā ajātā, no vata re vattabbe anāgatā uppādino dhammā te atthīti* (Kv 154).

the claim that such factors exist because they are on the point of arising is tantamount to claiming that they are present. Thus, as in the case of the argument against the existence of past factors, here also for future factors the Kathāvatthu proponent's argument is only effective if existence is equated with functioning and if such functioning occurs only in the present moment.⁹⁷ However, the opponent in the Kathāvatthu does not equate existence with present functioning alone. As a result, he refuses to accept either the characterization of existent future factors as born (P *jāta*), and so forth, and nonexistent future factors as not born (P *ajāta*), and so forth, or the equation of being “on the point of arising” with being “present.” Instead, the opponent persists in distinguishing between two categories of future factors, namely, those subject to arising, which exist, and those not subject to arising, which do not exist.⁹⁸

Even though the precise Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of the Gāndhārī terms *upaḍadhama* and *anupaḍadhama* are uncertain, this parallel passage in the Kathāvatthu suggests that they have the sense of factors “subject to arising” (P *uppādinō*) or “not subject to arising” (P *anuppādinō*).⁹⁹ Further clues for the probable equivalents of P *upaḍadhama* and P *anupaḍadhama* can be found in sets of related terms used in abhidharma taxonomic matrices (P *mātikā*, Skt *māṭṭikā*). For example, the Pali terms *uppanna*, *anuppanna*, and *uppādin* appear frequently in Pali abhidhamma texts in a threefold matrix used to classify factors as “arisen” (P *uppana*), “not arisen” (P *anuppana*), and “subject to arising” (P *uppādin*).¹⁰⁰ The Dhammasaṅgaṇī explains that factors are arisen (P *uppana*) if they “have been born, have become, have originated, have occurred, have happened, have appeared”¹⁰¹ As a result, the term P *uppana* can be applied to both past and present factors.¹⁰² The definition of not arisen (P *anuppana*) is the opposite and is applied only to future factors: “those which have not been born, have not become, have not originated, have not occurred, have not happened, have not appeared”¹⁰³ As this passage from the Dhammasaṅgaṇī makes clear, the past participle form “arisen” (P *uppana*) cannot be applied to future factors, which must all be said to be as yet “unarisen” (P *anuppana*). Hence, P *uppana* is not a possible equivalent for the Gāndhārī term *upaḍa*, which in our text is clearly used in reference to future factors. By contrast, the definition of “subject to arising” (P *uppādin*) given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī refers specifically to future factors: “Which factors are subject to arising? The matured effects of virtuous and unvirtuous [action] whose matured effects have not yet matured, whether of the realm of desire, of form, of the formless realm, or not included [within the three realms, namely,] the four aggregates, from feelings through perceptual consciousness, and that material form that will arise

⁹⁷ Commentaries: The Opponent's Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4]; General Criticism of the Opponent's Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent's Third Category [ll. 29–36].

⁹⁸ P *anāgatā uppādinō dhammā te atthi, anāgatā anuppādinō dhammā te n' atthīti* (Kv 154).

⁹⁹ Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] + ///^[51D(r)][ś].[k]. ca u[pa]ḍadhama anu[pa]ḍadhama kato •.

¹⁰⁰ Dhs 186–187, 240; As 20; Vibh 50, 63, 74, 92, passim.

¹⁰¹ P *ye dhammā jātā bhūtā sañjātā nibbattā abhinibbattā pātubhūtā ...* (Dhs 186–187).

¹⁰² Accordingly, past factors are defined as “those factors that are past, have ceased, have gone away, have changed, have disappeared, have vanished, have gone away after having arisen ...” (*ye dhammā atītā niruddhā vigatā vipariṇatā atthaṅgatā abbatthaṅgatā uppajjitvā vigatā ...*, Dhs 187).

¹⁰³ P *ye dhammā ajātā abhūtā asañjātā anibbattā anabhinibbattā apātubhūtā ...* (Dhs 187).

due to the performance of action, these factors are subject to arising.”¹⁰⁴ Such passages then support the Pali terms *uppādi-* and *anuppādi-*, also indicated by the parallel passage in the Kathāvattu, as the most likely equivalents of the Gāndhārī *upaḍa* and *anupaḍa*.

Significantly, this passage from the Dhammasaṅgaṇī also suggests that the category “subject to arising” (P *uppādin*) is not applied to future factors of all types, but specifically to the future matured effects of action. Accordingly, another passage from the Dhammasaṅgaṇī offers the following explanation: “A matured effect in the four realms¹⁰⁵ and that material form [that will arise] due to the performance of action, these factors may be either arisen (P *uppanna*) or subject to arising (P *uppādin*) but should not be said to be not arisen (P *anuppanna*). That which is virtuous or unvirtuous in the four realms or indeterminate in the three realms, that material form that is not due to the performance of action, these factors may be either arisen (P *uppanna*) or not arisen (P *anuppanna*) but should not be said to be subject to arising (P *uppādin*). Nibbāna should not be said to be arisen, not arisen, or subject to arising.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, this passage from the Dhammasaṅgaṇī suggests that the term “subject to arising” (P *uppādin*) is not applied indiscriminately to all future factors, but is reserved exclusively for the future indeterminate, matured effects of action. Similarly, the Gāndhārī text also limits its discussion of future factors subject to arising (P *upaḍadhama*) to the matured effects of action.

Abhidharma materials extant in Chinese translation also provide clues for the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of the Gāndhārī terms *upaḍadhama* and *anupaḍadhama*. In a frequently repeated formula, the *Mahāvibhāṣā contrasts the categories of “factors subject to arising” (生法, Skt **utpattidharma*) and “factors not subject to arising” (不生法, Skt **anutpattidharma*) in relation to the three time periods: “In the case of [the category of] factors subject to arising, it is used in relation to future [factors]; in the case of [the category of] factors that are not subject to arising, it is used in relation to [factors of] the three time periods.”¹⁰⁷ In another passage that discusses various twofold matrices applied to the sets of eighteen elements, twelve sense spheres, and five aggregates, the *Mahāvibhāṣā employs the two categories of “factors that are arisen” (已生法, Skt **utpannadharma*) and “factors not subject to arising” (定不生法, Skt **anutpattidharma*).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ P *katame dhammā uppādino. kusalākusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ avipakkavipākānaṃ vipākā kāmāvacarā rūpāvacarā arūpāvacarā aparīyāpannā vedanākkhandho ... pe ... viññāṇakkhandho yañca rūpaṃ kammasa katattā uppajjissati ime dhammā uppādino* (Dhs 187).

¹⁰⁵ For the “four realms” identified as the three realms of desire, form, and the formless realm, as well as that which is not included within these three, see P *tattha catūsūti kāmāvacararūpāvacarārūpāvacarāparīyāpannāsu* (As 410).

¹⁰⁶ P *catūsu bhūmīsu vipāko, yañca rūpaṃ kammasa katattā ime dhammā siyā uppannā, siyā uppādino na vattabbā anuppannāti. catūsu bhūmīsu kusalaṃ, akusalaṃ, tīsu bhūmīsu kiriyābyākataṃ, yañca rūpaṃ na kammasa katattā ime dhammā siyā uppannā, siyā anuppannā, na vattabbā uppādino ti. nibbānaṃ na vattabbāṃ uppannaṃ ti pi, anuppannanti pi, uppādino ti pi* (Dhs 240).

¹⁰⁷ 若生法緣未來。若不生法緣三世 (AMVŚ 26 p. 134c18–19). Cf. AMVŚ 30 p. 157b15, 40 p. 207b14–15, 106 p. 549a25–26, 156 p. 796a5–6.

¹⁰⁸ AMVŚ 197 p. 986b26ff. For a frequently occurring twofold matrix used in the *Mahāvibhāṣā to characterize various factors in terms of the three time periods, see AMVŚ 12 p. 57a6, 26 p. 134c18–19, 30 p. 157b15, 197 p. 983b13ff., 39 p. 202c24ff., 56 p. 288c4, 84 p. 435b14–15, 85 p. 439b26–27, 85 p. 440c17–18, 99 p. 513b17, 106 p. 549a25, 157 p. 796a5–6. Here, future factors are distinguished as 生法, presumably Skt **utpatti* since future factors cannot be described as “already arisen” (已生, Skt **utpan-*

As in the case of the explanation in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, in the *Mahāvibhāṣā also the category of “arisen factors” includes factors of both the past and present. However, the category of “factors not subject to arising” is said to include three groups: (1) factors of the past and present that have already arisen and hence will not arise again; (2) future factors that inevitably will not arise because their conditions have been obstructed; and (3) unconditioned factors (Skt *asaṃskṛtadharmā*), which are, by their very nature, completely without arising. Next, the *Mahāvibhāṣā contrasts the two categories of “factors not arisen” (非已生法, Skt **anutpannadharma*) and “factors not subject to arising” (定不生法, Skt **anutpattidharma*). The first category of “factors that are not arisen” includes future and unconditioned factors, while that of “factors that are not subject to arising” refers to those that will not arise, as described previously.

It is noteworthy that the *Mahāvibhāṣā applies each of the categories of “factors that are arisen” and “factors not subject to arising” to both past and present factors. Since neither past nor present factors could possibly be described as “not arisen” (Skt *anutpanna*), the term 定不生法 must be equivalent to Skt *anutpattidharma*, “factors not subject to arising.” Accordingly, past and present factors can reasonably be described as “not subject to arising” (Skt *anutpattidharma*) in the sense that they have already arisen (Skt *utpanna*).¹⁰⁹ The opposite term Skt *utpattin* would then have the sense of being “liable to” or “subject to arising” and would be applied to future factors. It is also noteworthy that the *Mahāvibhāṣā also uses the category of “factors not subject to arising” (定不生法, Skt **anutpattidharma*) for certain types of future factors, implying that these particular future factors inevitably will not arise. This accords well with the category of future factors referred to in our Gāndhārī text by the term *anupaḍadhama* and supports both the meaning “factors not subject to arising” for that term and Skt *anutpattidharma* as its probable Sanskrit equivalent. As a final point, the *Mahāvibhāṣā applies the term “factors not subject to arising” (定不生法, Skt **anutpattidharma*) also to unconditioned factors, which would include the truth of cessation of suffering, or *nirvāṇa*, a point that will become significant for a later argument in our text. Such unconditioned factors can be said to be both “not subject to arising” (定不生法, Skt **anutpattidharma*) and “not arisen” (非已生法, Skt **anutpannadharma*) since they are exempt from arising in any sense and hence from any form of categorization that is based on the three time periods (離世法, Skt **adhvavinirmukta*).

In addition to suggesting equivalents for the terms *upaḍa* and *anupaḍa*, these references in other abhidharma texts also provide a general context for interpreting this passage in our text. As in the case of his prior treatment of the existence of past factors, here also the proponent criticizes the existence of future factors by rejecting the opponent’s attempt to divide future factors into the

na), and 不生法, presumably, by contrast, Skt **anutpatti*. In another passage, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 197 p. 986b26ff.) attempts to specify the sets of eighteen elements, twelve sense spheres, and five aggregates through the application of various twofold *māṭṛkā*. Two of these are significant here. One *māṭṛkā* contrasts 已生法 (Skt **utpanna*) with 定不生法 (Skt **anutpatti*-), and the second, 非已生 (Skt **anutpanna*) again with 定不生法 (Skt **anutpatti*-). The difficulty of accurately predicting Sanskrit or MIA equivalents as encountered by different translators is indicated by a passage from the Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra (ŚAŚ 21 p. 663a17–18) in which the terms 生法 and 不生法 are used in a twofold *māṭṛkā*, presumably for Skt *utpanna* and Skt *anutpanna*, respectively.

¹⁰⁹ For the use of the terms Skt *anutpattidharma* and Skt *utpattidharma* in the sense of “factors not subject to” and “subject to arising,” see AKBh 1.6 p. 4.18ff.

two categories of “factors subject to arising” (*upaḍadhama*) and “factors not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*). The proponent begins his first criticism with a question: “It should be asked, ‘Is it possible for a future factor subject to arising, by virtue of [its] strength or energy, to act as a factor not subject to arising?’” (*prochiḍava śaka upaḍadhamo anagado thamena va viryena va anupaḍadhama kato di* •, ll. 36–37).¹¹⁰ According to the typical argument pattern of two logically complementary alternatives separated by the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa*, this initial question should be followed by two complementary alternatives, affirmative and negative, each then demonstrated as resulting in an untoward consequence: “If it **is** possible, ...; If it is **not** possible, ...” However, the two alternatives here, as presented in lines 37–38, both employ a privative construction and hence appear to represent only the negative alternative: “If it is **not** possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising, ...].” Each of these two negative alternatives is then followed by an untoward consequence. If the typical argument pattern is assumed here, it becomes necessary to emend one of these two statements to represent the affirmative alternative. In all but one or possibly two clear examples of this pattern in our text (ll. 43–44, 48–50), the affirmative alternative appears first. Further, the second negative alternative entails a familiar argument encountered previously (l. 34): “Or else, [if] it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], the life of religious practice is without purpose” (*aśa na śaka nirarthyā bramiciavaśa bhodi* •, l. 38).¹¹¹ Thus, the first alternative (ll. 37–38) might be expected to present the logically complementary, affirmative alternative, and if so, it must be emended through the deletion of the negative particle *na*: “If it is **not** possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], it is not a factor subject to arising since it is possible for a factor subject to arising to act” (*yidi na śaka na so upaḍadhamo ya karana śaka upaḍadhamo kato* •, ll. 37–38). Phrased affirmatively, this first alternative would then point to an internal contradiction that results if a future factor is said to change its status from that of being “subject to arising” to being “not subject to arising.” In other words, if it were possible for a factor subject to arising to become a factor not subject to arising, that factor’s very nature as potentially efficacious would be contradicted since a factor that becomes not subject to arising would no longer be able to act. This very point was raised by the proponent in a previous argument,¹¹² and thus it might be reasonable that he cites and attempts to refute it again here.

However, if the text is accepted as written, with two negative alternatives resulting in two different untoward consequences, the first negative alternative and its untoward consequence would read as follows: “If it is **not** possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], it is not a factor subject to arising since it is possible for a factor subject to arising to act” (*yidi na śaka na so upaḍadhamo ya karana śaka upaḍadhamo kato* •, ll. 37–38). In this case, the proponent’s argument would hinge upon the infinitive *kato*, “to act,” and its function both in the initial question and in the untoward consequence of this first alternative. In other words, the claim that it is not possible (*na śaka*) for a factor subject to arising (*upaḍadhama*) to act (*kato*) in changing its status from that of being “subject to arising” to “not subject to arising” results in

¹¹⁰ The proponent raises the same question immediately before the opponent offers his three karma-related categories of existent factors; see 51D(r) l. 3.

¹¹¹ Commentary: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

¹¹² Cf. 51D(r) l. 3.

an internal contradiction, since a factor subject to arising by its very nature should indeed be able to “act” (*kato*), even if simply to become a factor not subject to arising. Thus, this second option of accepting the text as written does not conform to the recurrent argument pattern employed in our text, and it yields a contorted, albeit possible interpretation. However, since it does not require textual emendation, it has been tentatively adopted.

If the text is accepted without emendation, the proponent next offers a second untoward consequence that results from the same negative alternative: “Or else, [if] it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], the life of religious practice is without purpose” (*aṣa na śaka nirarthyā bramiciavaṣa bhodī* •, l. 38). In other words, if future factors subject to arising cannot in some way change their status to become factors not subject to arising, the life of religious practice is undermined since its purpose is to counteract defilements, rendering them forever incapable of arising. According to this second untoward consequence, future defilements, whose subsequent arising is to be obstructed through the practice of the path, should in fact still arise since their status as future “factors subject to arising” could not be altered. As will become clear in the next discussion (ll. 45–46), the opponent will offer a response to this criticism by claiming that a future factor’s status as “subject to arising” is in fact dependent upon two criteria: a future factor must obtain a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions; and it must be on the point of arising (*samagri latsadi upa<*>iṣadi*, l. 45). This would suggest that we cannot assume that the opponent accepts a model whereby future factors do not arise simply because of a change in status from being subject to arising to that of not being subject to arising. Instead, it would appear that he limits the use of the descriptor “subject to arising” (*upaḍadhama*) to those future factors that are on the point of arising due to the collocation of their requisite conditions. Given the obstruction of certain conditions, a collocation of requisite conditions would not be achieved and the point of arising would not be reached; as a result, such future factors would be considered “not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*).

The proponent’s second criticism (ll. 38–39) is problematic both because of syntactic difficulties and because the intention underlying the proponent’s characterization of the opponent’s position, as well as the accuracy of this characterization, are uncertain. The proponent begins with a proposition, presumably intended to represent the view of the opponent, that correlates the two categories of future factors “subject to arising” and “not subject to arising” with existence and nonexistence, respectively: “If future factors subject to arising exist, [and] future factors not subject to arising do not exist, ...” (*yadi upaḍadhama anaḡaḡa asti anupaḍadhama anaḡaḡa nasti*, ll. 38–39). Indeed, this echoes a position attributed to an opponent in the Kathāvatthu: “Future factors subject to arising exist, and future factors not subject to arising do not exist.”¹¹³ Next, the Gāndhārī proponent, perhaps anticipating the case of Aṅgulimāla that he will offer in his third criticism (ll. 41–42), raises a counterexample that is intended to undermine this ontic distinction: “To which of these [two categories, factors subject to or not subject to arising,] does the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice [belong]?” (*kaḡamaṣa dukhaniroṣa abromiciavaṣa* •, l. 39). Unfortunately, the proponent does not clarify how the “cessation of suffering” and the “life contrary to religious practice” relate to one another syntactically, nor precisely how the “cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice” constitutes a counterexample here, that is to

¹¹³ P *anāgatā uppāḡino dhammā atthi, anāgatā anuppāḡino dhammā te n’ atthīti* (Kv 154).

say, for the distinction between existent future factors “subject to arising” and nonexistent future factors “not subject to arising.” Clearly, the context of the argument is the two categories of future factors that are “subject to” and “not subject to arising.” And since the “cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice” is intended as a counterexample, the proponent must assume that the opponent would place it within one of these two categories. Indeed, as the previously cited passages from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and the **Mahāvibhāṣā* make clear, the “cessation of suffering” can be considered a factor “not subject to arising,” but only in the sense that cessation is in no way connected with arising.¹¹⁴ However, for that reason too, that is, since it is in no way connected with arising, it cannot be classified in relation to the three time periods and hence cannot be considered a “future factor” that is not subject to arising. Thus, by referring to the “cessation of suffering” here, the proponent might be attempting to imply that the opponent’s position falls prey to a contradiction whereby the cessation of suffering must be considered a “future factor” not subject to arising. And according to the ontic distinction between the future factors “subject to” and “not subject to arising” cited here, the cessation of suffering as not subject to arising would not exist. However, as the above other texts make clear, the category of “factors not subject to arising” overlaps with but is not subsumed within factors of the time periods; that is to say, it also includes unconditioned factors such as cessation that have no relation to arising or the time periods. Since it is certainly possible, and indeed likely, that the opponent also holds this view, the proponent’s criticism here would appear to hold little force.

The use of the compound *abromiciavaṣa* and its role in this counterexample also present a problem. Certainly, the proponent may simply be anticipating the case of *Āṅgulimāla* and pointing to a contradiction between his prior life as a robber, which is contrary to religious practice, and his later attainment of cessation; in other words, the cessation of suffering, or *nirvāṇa*, is to be expected only in conjunction with a life of religious practice. However, this interpretation of the proponent’s implied criticism suggests that he understands “cessation” as a simple matured effect of religious practice. The status of unconditioned factors such as cessation in relation to causal efficacy and models of cause and effect become controversial issues in *abhidharma* texts from the middle period onward, but in general, cessation is considered exempt from classification as a cause or an effect.¹¹⁵ As a result, the “cessation of suffering” referred to here would not have a cause in the strict sense of the term and should not be considered as a matured effect produced by some prior action, whether it be a life of religious practice or contrary to religious practice. Thus, the relationship between the “cessation of suffering” and the “life contrary to religious practice” in the proponent’s criticism here is unclear.

Immediately following this counterexample of the “cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice” comes a second proposition, which presumably begins a separate but possibly related third criticism: “Indeed, [you contend that] ‘a factor subject to arising will inevitably arise,

¹¹⁴ Dhs 240; AMVŚ 197 p. 986b26ff.

¹¹⁵ Mil 268. In the rather convoluted solution proposed by the *Sarvāstivādin*s, cessation is itself a cause and an effect (*Skt visamyogaphala*), both in very specific and limited senses, but it has no cause and produces no effect: AMVŚ 21 p. 105c13–19, 21 pp. 105c20–106a14; AKBh 2.55cd p. 90.30ff. For periods in *abhidharma* exegesis, see Introduction § I.1.2.1 Exegesis and Context, § I.1.2.2 Polemical Scholastic Style, § I.1.2.3.1 Scriptural Citation, § I.1.3 Comparison with Other *Abhidharma* Texts, and § I.1.4 School Affiliation.

[and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise” (*upaḍadhamo hi avaśa upajīśadi • anupaḍadham(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajīśadi •*, ll. 39–40). The proponent intends this proposition to reflect the position of the opponent and argues against it both here and in following discussions (ll. 45–51, 62–66). In fact, in concluding his fifth criticism, the proponent states that “the [previous] proposition is worsted” (*hina pradiña*, l. 50), which clearly indicates that he views this as the view of the opponent. Even though the first statement in this third criticism contains the particle *hi*, which usually functions to mark a reason for a prior statement, it is more closely related to the following counterexample of Aṅgulimāla, a robber who kills freely and takes finger bones from his victims, which he then wears as a garland.¹¹⁶ Aṅgulimāla is converted by the Buddha through a display of magical power, and when Aṅgulimāla is abused by those whom he had previously victimized, the Buddha notes that he is experiencing the matured effects in this lifetime of his previous evil action that would otherwise have resulted in rebirth in hell (P *niraya*). In commentarial and abhidharma texts, this episode is cited in discussions of precisely the issue treated here, namely, the possibility that a particular action will not inevitably give rise to a given matured effect.¹¹⁷ Hence, the proponent uses the counterexample of Aṅgulimāla to challenge his characterization of the opponent’s position here that a factor subject to arising, in this case a matured effect from prior action, inevitably arises, and that a factor not subject to arising inevitably does not arise. In the example of Aṅgulimāla, if it were the case that a factor subject to arising inevitably arises, his past evil actions would be expected to result in rebirth in hell. However, through the intervention of the Buddha, Aṅgulimāla’s own conversion, and his subsequent religious practice, this matured effect of rebirth in hell does not in fact occur.

Continuing with the counterexample of Aṅgulimāla, the proponent (ll. 41–43) raises a question concerning whether the *bhava* of a hell-being (*nerāyīya-bhava*), which would otherwise have been produced as the matured effect of Aṅgulimāla’s past actions, should itself be considered a factor subject to or not subject to arising. Since Kharoṣṭhī script does not distinguish vowel length, two Sanskrit or MIA equivalents are possible for the Gāndhārī term *bhava*: (1) “stage of existence/life” (P/Skt *bhava*) as included among the various formulaic sets of “stages,” including rebirth states¹¹⁸; or (2) “state of being,” “nature,” or “mode” (P/Skt *bhāva*) in a more abstract sense that defines a factor in accordance with its distinguishing characteristics, here referring to the nature of a hell-being.¹¹⁹ In the context of the following argument, either equivalent is possible, namely, Aṅgulimāla’s future “rebirth state” as a hell-being or his future “nature” as a hell-being. However, a commentarial explication of the secondary derivative P *nerayika*, “hell-being,” suggests that this term already encompasses the sense of “rebirth state”: “hell-beings are rebirth states in hell” (P *niraye bhavā*

¹¹⁶ MN II 97ff.; SĀ (tr. G) 38 no. 1077 p. 280c18ff.; EĀ 31 no. 6 p. 719b20ff.; Th 80–82.

¹¹⁷ Nett 99; TSŚ 8 p. 301b2–3; T 1641 1 p. 159a8ff.; AVŚ T1546 p. 39b9–11; AMVŚ 11 p. 52a6–7.

¹¹⁸ Commentaries: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

¹¹⁹ For similar references to *nerāyīyabhava*, see Commentaries: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105]. For a discussion of the term P/Skt *bhāva*, see Commentaries: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134]. The ambiguity inherent within the term *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) between its sense as defining “nature” and variable “mode,” which becomes an issue in other occurrences of the term in this text, would not appear to be significant in the context of this passage.

nerayikā).¹²⁰ As a result, the separate noun *bhava* with which *nerāiya* occurs here in compound might reasonably be expected to correspond to P/Skt *bhāva*, indicating the “nature” of the “hell-being” rebirth state. Further, references in Pali commentaries to the compound P *nerayikabhāva* (Skt *nairayikabhāva*) support P/Skt *-bhāva* “nature” rather than P/Skt *-bhava* “rebirth state” as the more likely equivalent for the second member in the compound *nerāiyabhava*.¹²¹

In responding to his question whether Aṅgulimāla’s nature as a hell-being should itself be considered a factor subject to or not subject to arising, the proponent, in accordance with the typical argument pattern, would once again be expected to offer two logically complementary alternatives, one affirmative and the other negative. However, as in the previous first criticism (ll. 37–38), here also the text presents two syntactically similar, but in this case affirmative alternatives: “If it **is** a factor subject to arising, ...” (*yidi upaḍadhamo ...*, l. 43); and “Or else, [if] it **is** a factor subject to arising, ...” (*aṣa upaḍadh(*a)mo ...*, l. 44). If the typical argument pattern is assumed here, one of the two statements must be emended through the addition of a negative particle to represent the complementary negative alternative: “If it is <not> a factor subject to arising” The second affirmative alternative is straightforward and returns once again to the familiar issue of the life of religious practice: “Or else, [if] it is a factor subject to arising, then [there is] no life of religious practice [for him]” (*aṣa upaḍadh(*a)mo • t(*e)n(*a)n(*a) bramiciavaṣa •*, ll. 44–45). In other words, the proponent suggests that if the matured effect of Aṅgulimāla’s past evil actions, specifically his nature as a hell-being, were indeed a factor subject to arising, then the life of religious practice would be useless for him, for, according to the proposition attributed to the opponent, the matured effect of rebirth in hell will inevitably arise. This would then contradict the life story of Aṅgulimāla, who does indeed successfully pursue the religious life.

The first affirmative alternative is less straightforward and is further complicated by damage to the manuscript. Clearly, the argument must involve a contradiction with some aspect of Aṅgulimāla’s life story. If the text is accepted as written, the proponent offers another affirmative alternative, and the argument entails a contradiction of the power of the Buddha’s intervention in altering Aṅgulimāla’s rebirth as a hell-being: “If it **is** a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action], ? ? ? for hell inevitably should not be reached by him” (*yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka tatra jadi u(*padido •) ? ? ? (*a)vaṣa nahi tena gatava neraa di •*, ll. 43–44). In other words, if it were the case that factors subject to arising inevitably arise, Aṅgulimāla should be expected to be reborn in hell and acquire the nature of a hell-being as a result of his past evil actions regardless of any other circumstances. Indeed, according to the Buddha’s own statement, Aṅgulimāla’s prior evil actions were such that he would have undergone their maturing in hell for many hundreds and thousands of years.¹²² And yet, as the narrative makes clear, Aṅgulimāla’s past actions will not reach fruition, and he will never be reborn in hell, all as a result of the Buddha’s intervention. Thus, if factors subject to arising inevitably arise, Aṅgulimāla should be reborn in hell, and the Buddha’s power would be contradicted.

¹²⁰ Abhidhammāvatāra purāṇaṭīkā (VRI-CST4) 2.38.

¹²¹ Ps-pt (VRI-CST4) 2.144; Mp-ṭ (VRI-CST4) 2.104; Pañcapakaraṇa-anuṭīkā (VRI-CST4) 155.

¹²² MN II 104.

If the typical argument pattern were followed here, the first alternative should be emended through the addition of the negative particle *na*: “If it is ⟨*not⟩ a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action], ? ? ? for hell inevitably should not be reached by him” (*yidi* ⟨**na*⟩ *upaḍadhama na tena śaka tatra jadi u(*padido •) ? ? ? (*a)vaśa nahi tena gatava neraa di •*, ll. 43–44). In this case, the argument would be similar; it would hinge upon the generally acknowledged fate resulting from past evil actions and entail a contradiction of the power of the Buddha. That is to say, if the matured effect of Aṅgulimāla’s past evil actions, specifically his nature as a hell-being, were “not subject to arising,” it should inevitably not arise in any case, and the Buddha’s intervention would have been unnecessary. Since the force of the argument would be virtually the same whether the text is accepted as written or emended, the option of accepting the text as written has been tentatively adopted despite its inconsistency with the typical argument pattern. Thus, the proponent uses the case of Aṅgulimāla as an authoritative scriptural counterexample to undermine various aspects of the opponent’s position concerning future factors, including their bifurcation into two categories, their existence or nonexistence, and as the proponent would characterize them, the inevitability of their arising or non-arising.

I.3.2.4. Detailed Criticism (7: 4–5) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 45–51]

Reconstruction

(4) [45] *ahadi yidi samagri latsadi upa⟨*j⟩iṣadi di tena k(*a)r(*a)[46]n(*e)na upaḍadhama di • vatava tena de yadi samagri latsadi tena kar(*a)⟨*ne⟩n(*a) upaḍadhama di [47] vatava •*

(5) [47] *vatava ca bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśalana dhamana ⟨*a⟩-nupaḍa[48](*e) s(*a)mepr(*a)ṣ(*a)na bhavedi • ki nu khu te pave akuśaladhama upaḍadhama aṣa na upaḍadhama • [49] yidi anupaḍadhama nirartha same[50](*pra)-ṣ(*a)na bhavedi • aṣa upaḍadhama ta ca anupaḍadhama karodi hina pradiña [51] (*upa)-ḍadhama avaśa upajadi di •*

Sanskrit rendering

(4) [45] *āha yadi sāmagrīm lapsyate utpatsyata iti, tena kāra[46]ṇenotpādidharma iti. vaktavyam tena yadi sāmagrīm lapsyate, tena kāraṇenotpādidharma iti [47] vaktavyam.*

(5) [47] *vaktavyam ca bhagavān āhānutpannānām pāpakānām akuśalānām dharmānām anutpādā[48]ya samyakpradhānaṃ bhāvayati. kiṃ nu khalu te pāpā akuśaladharmā utpādidharmā, atha notpādidharmāḥ. [49] yady anutpādidharmā, nirarthaṃ samyak[50]-pradhānaṃ bhāvayati. athopādidharmās tac ca anutpādidharmān kurvanti, hīnā pratijño[51]tpādidharmo ’vaśyam utpadyata iti.*

Translation

(4) [45] One states, [o] “If [a factor] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] and reaches the point of arising, for that reason [46] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.” [P] It should be said that, as a result of that, if [a factor merely] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions], for that reason [alone] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.

(5) [47] And it should be said that the Bhagavat states, “One cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen.” [48] Now how possibly are those evil unvirtuous factors either factors subject to arising, or else factors not subject to arising? [49] If they are factors not subject to arising, one cultivates right exertion without purpose. [50] Or else, [if] they are factors subject to arising and thereafter act as factors not subject to arising, the [previous] proposition is worsted: [51] [namely, that] “A factor subject to arising inevitably arises.”

Commentary: (4, 5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51]

Continuing the examination of future factors subject to and not subject to arising, the proponent offers a fourth criticism that introduces the notion of the “complete collocation” of requisite causes and conditions (*samagri*, P *sāmaggī*, Skt *sāmagrī*). In its most general sense, Skt *sāmagrī* refers to a “collocation” or “assemblage” and is used in two particular contexts in abhidharma materials: (1) the basis of concord within the monastic community¹²³; and (2) the collocation of conditions required for the production of any factor.¹²⁴ In this passage, *samagri* is used in the second sense in relation to the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions; in other words, a factor does not arise on the basis of a single cause, but only when it obtains (*latsadi*) the entire group of causes and conditions necessary for its production.¹²⁵

The opponent appeals to the “complete collocation” in an attempt to refine further the proponent’s previous characterization of his own position and thereby evade his criticism: “A factor subject to arising will inevitably arise, [and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise” (*upaḍadhamo hi avaśa upajīśadi • anupaḍadham(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajīśadi •*, ll. 39–40). In criticizing this proposition, the proponent offered the counterexample of Aṅgulimāla, for whom the matured effects of past evil actions, which would be considered “factors subject to arising,” will not in fact arise. In response, the opponent here offers the qualification that a factor can be considered subject to arising (*upaḍadhama*) only if it both (1) obtains a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions (*samagri*) and thereby (2) becomes about to, or reaches the point of, arising (*upajīśadi*). The opponent’s argument demands that the inverse also be accepted: if this complete

¹²³ The *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 60 p. 313b1ff., 116 p. 602b6ff.), the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh 4.98 p. 260.17ff.; AKVy 142.29), *Nyāyānusāra (NyAŚ 12 p. 396c9, 43 587b8ff.), and the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra (MAHŚ 3 p. 898c19ff.) all define discord within the monastic community (僧破, Skt **saṅgh-abheda*) as the “in-complete assemblage” (不和合, Skt **asāmagrī*), which is declared to be a factor dissociated from thought (心不相應行, Skt **cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*). The Yogacārabhūmiśāstra (YBh (tr. Xz) 3 p. 293c7ff.) also includes both Skt **sāmagrī* and Skt **asāmagrī* within its list of twenty-four dissociated factors, but they are apparently understood in the sense of the complete collocation or absence of the complete collocation of causes and conditions. Cf. YBh (tr. Xz) 52 p. 587b29ff., 56 p. 608a3ff.

¹²⁴ As the collocation of conditions, see AMVŚ 21 p. 105a6ff., 108 p. 561b25; as the requisite collocation for the arising of cognition, see AMVŚ 21 p. 109b25ff., 121 p. 630b15ff., 197 p. 984a1ff.

¹²⁵ For Skt *sāmagrī* used with the root *labh*: “Only when they obtain the collocation [of requisite causes and conditions], do they fall and are born” (Skt *yadi tāvatā sāmagrīm na labhate tatraiva punaś cyutvā jāyante*, AKBh 3.14d p. 126.9–10). Concerning Skt *sāmagrī*, the *Mahāvibhāṣā comments: “Vasumitra states, ‘If the mind obtains [its] collocation of conditions, it is not referred to as “broken.” If it does not obtain [its] collocation of conditions, it is referred to as “broken.”’” (尊者世友說曰。意若遇和合緣不名為壞。若不遇和合緣則名為壞, AMVŚ 12 p. 59a11–13).

collocation of causes and conditions is not obtained and the point of arising is not reached, a future factor cannot be considered subject to arising.¹²⁶ Thus, even though still future, once a future factor satisfies these two criteria of “obtaining” the necessary causes for arising and thereby “reaching” the point of arising, it can be considered “subject to arising.” As a result, the opponent contends that the qualification “subject to arising” does not entail that a future factor will inevitably arise of its own accord or due to a single cause. Instead, it indicates that it will arise only in dependence upon two conditions, namely, it obtaining the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions and hence it reaching the point of arising. Thus, since in the case of Aṅgulimāla the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions for the arising of the matured effects is not obtained, rebirth in hell will not occur.

To counter the opponent’s contention, the proponent responds that a future factor’s status as “subject to arising” should then be determined solely on the basis of whether or not it obtains a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions without the further qualification of reaching the point of arising. This is suggested by the proponent’s restatement of the opponent’s prior qualification, with one major difference (ll. 46–47). Whereas the opponent asserts that a future factor should be considered subject to arising as a result of the occurrence of two conditions—obtaining a complete collocation of causes and conditions, and reaching the point of arising—the proponent omits the reference to “reaching the point of arising” (*upa(*j)iṣadi*): “It should be said that, as a result of that, if [a factor merely] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions], for that reason [alone] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising” (*yadi samagri latsadi tena kar(*a)(*ne)n(*a) upaḍadhama di vatava •*, ll. 46–47). The proponent’s rejoinder constitutes an untoward consequence because any future factor, even when it is not actually about to, or is not on the point of arising, could be considered a factor “subject to arising” as long as the factors that constitute its complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions exist in the future. In fact, this very argument is used against the Sarvāstivāda assertion that future factors exist. For example, in its criticism of the proposition “everything exists,” the Kathāvatthu appeals to the case of the possible arising of perceptual consciousness (P *viññāṇa*) in the past and future.¹²⁷ If “everything exists,” the sense organ and the object-field conditions that are necessary for the arising of perceptual consciousness exist as both past and future; as a result, these past or future visual organs should also then be able to grasp past or future material form and act as the conditions that give rise to visual perceptual consciousness also in the past or future.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ For the use of the English present tense to translate the future verb forms *latsadi* and *upaḍiṣadi*, see Text Notes: [45] *yidi samagri latsadi upaḍiṣadi di*.

¹²⁷ Kv 126–127.

¹²⁸ In its discussion of the “non-obstructing cause” (能作因, Skt **kāraṇahetu*), the *Mahāvibhāṣā considers a similar objection concerning the connection between the arising and passing away of factors and the “collocation of causes and conditions” (因緣和合, Skt **hetupratyayasāmagrī*): “[If] factors arise due to a collocation of causes and conditions and pass away due to a collocation of causes and conditions, [since] there is no time when the causes and conditions are not collocated, why do factors not arise and pass away at all times?” (問因緣和合故諸法生。因緣和合故諸法滅。因緣無有不和合時。諸法云何不恒生滅, AMVŚ 21 p. 105a6–8. Cf. AMVŚ 197 p. 983b25ff.). Elsewhere, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 17 p. 87b19–25) makes clear that a factor’s causal efficacy cannot be equated with its intrinsic nature, but rather reflects the state of its activity (作用, Skt **kāritra*). In other words, one must distinguish a factor’s

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya raises a similar objection to the Sarvāstivāda attempt to distinguish between a factor's existence as past or future and its arising in the present by claiming that present arising is marked uniquely by the exertion of a factor's activity: "What is the obstruction to the constant exertion of activity of a factor that exists on its own accord, such that it sometimes exerts activity and sometimes does not? If [one claims] that it is due to the absence of the complete collocation [of requisite conditions, that is] not [the case], because of the assumption of the constant existence [of those conditions]."¹²⁹ Despite the apparent similarity in their arguments, the position of the opponent in this discussion in our Gāndhārī text appears to differ from that of the Sarvāstivādins in that he does not maintain that all future factors exist. In fact, as the opponent attempts to make clear in this very passage, future matured effects can only be considered to be "subject to arising" when they are on the point of arising. Thus, it would appear that the possibility that future matured effects can change their status from "subject to arising" to "not subject to arising" at any point does not represent the opponent's view, and the proponent's repeated appeal to this criticism in the broadest sense would not be effective in undermining his position.

Nonetheless, this change in status from "subject to arising" to "not subject to arising" is precisely the point that the proponent raises next in his fifth criticism, which cites a scriptural passage concerning the cultivation of the four right exertions (*P padhāna*, *Skt pradhāna*): "One cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen" (*ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśalana dhamana* < *a)nupaḍa(*e) s(*a)mepr(*a)s(*a)na bhavedi •, ll. 47–48).¹³⁰ Using the typical argument pattern, the proponent attempts to demonstrate that this scriptural authority would be contradicted whether these evil unvirtuous factors are claimed to be future factors subject to or not subject to arising. If future unvirtuous factors are considered "not subject to arising," then their non-arising brought about through the cultivation of the four right exertions becomes useless since they would never arise in any case (ll. 49–50). If however they are

intrinsic nature, which exists unchanged at all times, from its activity, which only arises in dependence upon a requisite collocation of causes and conditions. Hence, even though a factor may exist at all times, it only exerts causal efficacy, is active, or arises, when the requisite causes and conditions are present. As the *Mahāvibhāṣā explains: "Since there is [a collocation of] causes and conditions, [future factors are referred to as] 'produced, having already been produced.' That is to say, all factors already have intrinsic nature, because from the beginning each [factor] is established in [its] own particular inherent characteristic. They are referred to as 'having already been produced' because they already have intrinsic nature. [However,] it is not the case that [their] intrinsic nature has 'already been produced' through [a collocation of] causes and conditions; [rather] since the collocation of causes and conditions arises, they are referred to as 'produced' [in the present]. [Similarly,] since there is [a collocation of] causes and conditions, [future factors are referred to as] 'produced, not yet having already been produced.' That is to say, future factors are referred to as 'not yet having already been produced' because they are just at the point of obtaining production through [a collocation of] causes and conditions" (有因緣故已生而生。謂一切法已有自性本來各住自體相故。已有體故說名已生。非從因緣已生自體。因緣和合起故名生。有因緣故未已生而生。謂未來法名未已生。有從因緣正得生故, AMVŚ 76 p. 394b23–27). Cf. NyAŚ 52 p. 636b7–10.

¹²⁹ *Skt tenaivātmanā sato dharmasya nityam kāritrakaraṇe kiṃ viḥnaṃ yena kadācit kāritram karoti kadācin neti. pratyayānām aśāmagryam iti cet. na. nityam astitvābhyupagamāt* (AKBh 5.27a p. 297.18ff.; AKVy 471.28–472.1). Cf. AMVŚ 21 p. 105a6ff.

¹³⁰ Text Notes: [47] *bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśa[lana dha]mana unupaḍa* [48] + /// [s].[mepr].[s].[na bhavedi] •.

considered to be factors “subject to arising” that become “not subject to arising” through cultivation, then the opponent’s previous proposition that future factors “subject to arising will inevitably arise” is contradicted (ll. 50–51. Cf. ll. 39–40).

I.3.2.5. Detailed Criticism (8: 8) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 51–61]

Reconstruction

(8) [51] (*a)h(*a)su kaḍamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) adidado [52] (*a)s(*a) pr(*ac)-upan(*a)do (*nivartadi di • yidi pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi tena de kaḅgam eva śi[53]la śaḥhai(*ḍa)naḥiḍa • ta puna kama maranaśa niruḅjadi aśa na niruḅjadi di yidi niruḅja[54](**di a*)diḍado nivartadi di • aśa na niruḅjadi sa kata bh(*o)di tasa kamasa • yadi pun(*a) t(*a)s(*a) [55] vivaga nivartadi • yena sa kamado p(*a)d(*a)⟨**ma*⟩ jāna samavarjadi • ki so tasa nirudha ani[56](**rudha*) di anirudha sutravirośa pa⟨**ḍ*⟩am(*a) jāna samavanaśa vaca nirudha di • aśa adidās(*a) [57] (*kamaśa) vivaga nivartadi di ki so kama sapala • aśa apalo di • yidi (*a)h(*a)di sapalo • [58] (*tatra) vatava kadha nasti na palena sapal(*a) yidi ca nasti na palena sapalo tena nasti na putrena [59] (*ja)n(*a)-go • yidi ca so kama śapala śavivaga nanu de so kama sapala savivaga niru[60](**ja*)d(*i) vatava yaśa hema ta sapala hemukhḅśa dajadi na ca ta sadha palena dajadi • eva s(*a)-p(*a)[61](**la*) so kama nirudha • nanu ⟨**d*⟩e sadha vivagena (*nirudha) ...

Sanskrit rendering

(8) [51] āhuḥ katamasmāt karmano vipāko ’tītato, [52] ’tha pratyutpannato nirvartata iti. yadi pratyutpannād vipāko nirvartate, tena kāyikam eva śī[53]laṃ śaṣṭhāyatanasthitam, tat punaḥ karma maraṅsasya nirudhyate, ’tha na nirudhyata iti. yadi nirudhya[54]te, ’tītato nirvartata iti. atha na nirudhyate, sa kartā bhavati tasya karmaṅaḥ. yadi punas tasya [55] vipāko nirvartate, yena sa karmaṅaḥ prathamam dhyānam samāpadyate, kiṃ svit tasya niruddham ani[56]ruddham iti. aniruddham, sūtravirodhaḥ prathamam dhyānam samāpannasya vāg niruddheti. athātītasya [57] karmaṅo vipāko nirvartata iti, kiṃ svit karma saphalam, athāphalam iti. yady āha saphalaṃ, [58] tatra vaktavyam katham nāsti na phalena saphalam. yadi ca nāsti na phalena saphalaṃ, tena nāsti na putreṅa [59] janakaḥ. yadi ca tat karma saphalaṃ savipākam, nanu tat karma saphalaṃ savipākam niru[60]dhyate. vaktavyam yathā hema tat saphalaṃ hemokhāyāṃ dahyate, na ca tat sārḍham phalena dahyate. evaṃ sapha[61]laṃ tat karma niruddham, nanu sārḍham vipākena niruddham. ...

Translation

(8) [51] They state, [O] “From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from past action), [52] or else from present [action]?” [P] (*If) the matured effect occurs from present [action], as a result of that, [with regard to] that very corporeal moral conduct [53] that is stationed in the sixth sense sphere, now does that action cease after death, or else does it not cease? If it ceases, [54] [then the matured effect] occurs from past [action]. Or else, [if that present corporeal moral conduct] does not cease, there is an agent of that action. Further, if the matured effect of that [present action] [55] occurs, when one gains the first trance state after [that] action, has then [the present action] of that one ceased, [56] [or] not ceased? [If that present action] has not ceased, there is a contradiction of scripture, [which

states,] “Speech has ceased for one who has gained the first trance state.” Or else, [if] [57] the matured effect of past (*action) occurs, is then [that past] action possessed of a fruit, or else not possessed of a fruit? If one states, [o] “It is possessed of a fruit,” [58] [p] (*with regard to that) it should be said, “How is it that there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit?” And if there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit, then there exists no father other than through [the existence of] the son. [59] And if that action, which is possessed of a fruit, is [also] possessed of a matured effect, then surely that action, which is possessed of a fruit, ceases together with its matured effect. [60] It should be said that just as that gold [as the cause], being possessed of a fruit, is consumed by fire in a crucible, isn’t it the case that that [cause] is consumed together with [its] fruit? In this way, [when] that action possessed of a fruit [61] has ceased, then surely it (*has ceased) together with its matured effect. ...

Commentary: (8) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 51–61]

In this passage, the text returns to the relationship between action and its matured effect discussed previously (ll. 3–36), focusing in particular on the controversy as to whether the matured effect occurs from past or present action. The initial question, signaled by *ahasu* and therefore presumably offered by the opponent, echoes a similar question first raised by the proponent in the previous discussion: “[p] It should be asked, ‘From which action does the matured effect occur?’” (*prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamada vivaga nivartadi* •, l. 21). In this previous passage, the proponent uses three points to criticize the possibility that the matured effect arises from past action: (1) the inherent contradiction in claiming that the matured effect occurs from past action whose matured effect has not yet matured (l. 22); (2) the impossibility of a distinction within the single category of past factors between efficacious existent past action and non-efficacious nonexistent past action (ll. 29–31); and (3) the inherent contradiction in claiming that past action is efficacious and yet does not give rise to a matured effect (ll. 31–36). This prior discussion of past factors is followed by a parallel discussion of future factors, examining an analogous distinction between future factors subject to and not subject to arising as well as the controversy as to whether or not future factors subject to arising inevitably arise (ll. 36–51).

In this examination of action and its matured effects, the proponent first takes up the second and contrasting alternative not examined in the previous passage (ll. 21–36), namely, that the matured effect arises from present action. Here, the opponents initially raise the general question of whether matured effects occur from past or present action: “They state, [o] ‘From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from past action) or else from present [action]?’” (*(*a)h(*a)su kaḍamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) adidado a)ḡ(*a) pr(*ac)upan(*a)do (*nivartadi di* •, ll. 51–52). Since when matured effects arise from present action, they must occur while that present action is being performed, the proponent proposes two counterexamples in which the efficacy of such present action would be obstructed. The first counterexample concerns the maturation of the effects of corporeal moral conduct that is interrupted by death: “[p] (*If) the matured effect occurs from present [action], as a result of that, [with regard to] that very corporeal moral conduct [53] that is stationed in the sixth sense sphere, now does that action cease after death, or else does it not cease?” (*(*yidi) pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi tena de kaigam eva śila ṣaṭhaiḥ(*ḍa)naḥiḍa • ta puna kama maranaṣa nirujadi aṣa na nirujadi di*, ll. 52–53). In the event of death and the cessation of the

body, since the matured effects of present corporeal moral conduct can no longer arise immediately, two options are presented and rejected in turn.¹³¹ If the present corporeal moral conduct ceases at death without giving rise to its matured effect, then this matured effect must arise from conduct that has become past. As a result, the position that the matured effect arises from present action is contradicted. And if the present corporeal moral conduct does not cease at death, then its efficacy must persist in some way, for example, through a perduring agent (Skt *karṭṛ*), a possibility that the majority of Buddhists would reject.

This first counterexample is clarified as “corporeal moral conduct that is stationed in the sixth sense sphere” (*kaṅgam eva śīla ṣaṭṭhāi[*da]naḥhiḍa*, ll. 52–53). In scriptural sources, the term “corporeal” (P/Skt *kāyika*) appears frequently together with “mental” (P *cetasika*/*mānasika*, Skt *caitasika*/*mānasa*) in the classification of varieties of feelings (P/Skt *vedanā*).¹³² It also appears together with “verbal” (P *vācasika*, Skt *vācika*) as well as “mental” in discussions of the three types of action (P *kamma*, Skt *karman*) as “corporeal,” “verbal,” and “mental,”¹³³ specifically in relation to virtuous and unvirtuous courses of action (P *kamma**patha*, Skt *karma**patha*).¹³⁴ In this Gāndhārī passage, *kaṅgam* modifies *śīla* and refers to “moral conduct” performed by means of the body.¹³⁵ Such “corporeal moral conduct” is then modified by the compound *ṣaṭṭhāiḍana-ḥhiḍa*, “stationed in the sixth sense sphere.” Here, the compound *ṣaṭṭhāiḍana* (P *chaṭṭhāyatana*, Skt *ṣaṣṭhāyatana*), “sixth sense sphere,” presumably refers to the mind (P/Skt *manas*), that is, the sixth sense organ in the set of six, which, together with their six corresponding objects, constitute the standard set of twelve sense spheres (P/Skt *āyatana*).¹³⁶ However, in the compound *ṣaṭṭhāiḍana-ḥhiḍa*, “stationed in the sixth sense sphere,” the implication of the final past participle member *ḥhiḍa* and its relationship both to the prior member of the compound, *ṣaṭṭhāiḍana*, and to the modified *kaṅgamśīla* are less certain.

No arguments have been located that refer specifically to the “stationing” of corporeal moral conduct in the sixth sense organ, but the proponent’s argument here is reminiscent of the controversy concerning the arising of thought after the equipoise of cessation (Skt *nirodhasamāpatti*). Upon

¹³¹ For the interruption of the *prātimokṣasaṃvara* at death, see AKBh 4.38 p. 222.19ff.

¹³² MN I 302; SN IV 209; Mil 44.

¹³³ AN III 314. Cf. 業法云何。謂身語業及思 (PrP (tr. Xz) 6 p. 714c3; PrP (tr. Xz) 2 p. 697a16–17). Elsewhere (PrP (tr. Xz) 7 p. 717c27) 思 (Skt *cetanā*) is defined as 善業 (Skt *manaskarma*). Cf. JñPr 11 p. 972b9–10; AMVŚ 114 p. 589c19, 114 p. 592a17, 115 p. 596a20, 115 p. 597b11, 115 p. 597b20; AMVŚ 177 p. 887b23ff. For an extended discussion of causal interaction among the three types of action, see AMVŚ 118 p. 614c2ff.

¹³⁴ Peṭ 164; As 89; AMVŚ 113 p. 583b9ff. Cf. AKVy 356.

¹³⁵ Text Notes: [52] *kaṅgam*=*eva śī*[53][*la*] *ṣaṭṭhāinaḥhiḍa* •.

¹³⁶ In at least one case, the compound P *chaṭṭhāyatana*, with the ordinal P *chaṭṭa*- as the first member, is used in place of the more frequently encountered compound P *saḷāyatana* with the cardinal *saḷ*-. This is found in the Vibhaṅga (Vibh 136, 138ff.) in a discussion of the twelve members of dependent origination (P *paṭṭi-**casamuppāda*, Skt *pratītyasamutpāda*): in contrast to the “Exposition According to the Sutta” (P *suttant-**abhājanīya*), which uses the term P *saḷāyatana*, or the “six sense spheres,” the “Exposition According to the Abhidhamma” (P *abhidhammabhājanīya*) uses P *chaṭṭhāyatana*. For commentarial explanations of this difference, see Vibh-a 173; Vibh-mṭ (VRI-CST4) 115. However, in this passage of our Gāndhārī text, the subsequent reference to death and the possibility of the continuation of “corporeal moral conduct” would preclude interpreting the ordinal *ṣaṭṭha*, “sixth,” with the sense of the cardinal number “six.”

entering this equipoise, the ordinary series of mutually dependent thought moments is interrupted, and in contrast to ordinary states that are possessed of thought, the first moment of thought after emerging from the equipoise cannot be considered to be conditioned by the immediately prior moment of thought, that is, the moment of thought immediately preceding the equipoise of cessation. Several theories are proposed to account for the preceding conditions that give rise to this first moment of thought after equipoise, one of which appeals to the theory of the “mutual seeding” (Skt *anyonyabījaka*) of thought and the “body possessed of sense organs” (Skt *sendriyaḥ kāyaḥ*).¹³⁷ According to this theory, the seeds of past corporeal action are deposited in the mind, and those of past mental action, in the body. Perhaps then, the proponent is here alluding to a model whereby corporeal moral conduct is “stationed,” or “seeded,” in the sixth sense organ, which might then be claimed to be the source of karmic efficacy not only during life but also after the termination of the body at death. Even though this interpretation cannot be corroborated through parallel arguments in other texts, it is clear that the proponent uses this counterexample to suggest the impossibility of present action as the cause of matured effects. In other words, whether corporeal moral conduct ceases at death or not, its matured effects cannot be said to arise from present action in the form of present corporeal moral conduct. If the action of corporeal moral conduct ceases at death, then that particular action becomes past, and its matured effects must be said to arise from past action. This would then contradict the option being considered here, namely, that the matured effect occurs from present action. If however that present corporeal moral conduct does not cease at death, it must continue in some form as present, thus constituting some kind of perduring “agent” as the source of its matured effects.

In the second counterexample (ll. 54–56), the arising of matured effects immediately from present action is interrupted by entering a state of trance: “Further, if the matured effect of that [present action] occurs, when one gains the first trance state after [that] action, has then [the present action] of that one ceased, [or] not ceased?” (*yadi pun(*a) t(*a)s(*a) vivaga nivartadi • yena sa kamado p(*a)d(*a)⟨*ma⟩ jāna samavarjadi • ki so tasa nirudha ani(*rudha) di*, ll. 54–56). The proponent does not address the first alternative, namely, that the present action has ceased, but his criticism would presumably be identical to that given in the case of the first counterexample; that is to say, if the present action has ceased, the resultant matured effect would then arise from action that has become past, and the position that the matured effect arises from present action would be contradicted. As for the second alternative, the proponent notes that if efficacious present action does not cease upon entering the first trance state, authoritative scripture is contradicted: “Speech has ceased for one who has gained the first trance state” (*anirudha sutraviroṣa pa⟨*d⟩am(*a) jāna samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di*, l. 56).¹³⁸

The proponent’s two counterexamples concerning corporeal moral conduct and speech are further clarified by a similar controversy recorded in the Kathāvatthu on the issue of whether one who enters a trance state is possessed of verbal expression.¹³⁹ The Kathāvatthu confirms a close connection between verbal and corporeal manifestations (P *vacīviññatti, kāyaviññatti*) since both

¹³⁷ AKBh 2.44d p. 72.21ff.; AKVy 167.14ff. Cf. NyAŚ 13 p. 404a1ff.; Cox 1995: 273, 287.

¹³⁸ P *paṭhamam jhānam samāpannessa vācā niruddhā hoti* (SN IV 217, 220). Cf. SĀ (tr. G) 17 no. 474 p. 121b2–3.

¹³⁹ P *samāpannessa atthi vacībhedo ti* (Kv 195; Kv-a 57).

arise from the same thoughts. These verbal and corporeal manifestations correspond to the two external and therefore manifest varieties of action, specifically those of the body and of speech. Accordingly, it is possible that the Gāndhārī proponent's choice of these two counterexamples, focusing on corporeal moral conduct and speech, respectively, is informed by such classifications of the two varieties of corporeal and verbal external action.

Next, the proponent raises the alternative that the matured effect occurs from past action: “Or else, [if] the matured effect of past (*action) occurs, ...” (*aṣa adidaṣ(*a kamaṣa) vivaga nivartadi di ...*, ll. 56–57). Here, the proponent focuses on the second major mutually exclusive alternative in the initial question with which this passage begins: “They state, [O] ‘From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from past action), or else from present [action]?’ [P] (*If) the matured effect occurs from present [action], ...” (*(*a)h(*a)su kaḍamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) adidaḍo (*a)ṣ(*a) pr(*ac)upan(*a)do (*nivartadi di •)*, ll. 51–52). This alternative that the matured effect occurs from past action was raised previously (ll. 21–22), but instead of a detailed argument, the proponent merely offered what would appear to be an implicitly critical rhetorical question: “With regard to that it should be said, ‘And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?’” (*tat(*r)a vat(*a)va kaḍ(*a)ma aviv(*a)k(*a)-vivaga ca viv(*a)g(*a) yaṣa nivartadi •*, l. 22). Here in this discussion, the proponent offers explicit criticism beginning with a question that presents the contrasting alternatives: “Is then [that past] action possessed of a fruit, or else not possessed of a fruit?” (*ki so kama sapala • aṣa apalo di •*, l. 57). The second option that past action is not possessed of a fruit (*apala*) is not examined, perhaps because it would be impossible *prima facie* for action that is not possessed of a fruit to give rise to an effect. Taking up the first alternative that past action is possessed of a fruit (*sapala*), the proponent asks, “How is it that there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit?” (*kadha nasti na palena sapal(*a)*, l. 58). The import of this question and of the following everyday counterexample concerning a father and son is complicated by two factors: first, by the possibility that the verb *asti* could be used in either a strong or weak sense; and second, by the double-negative construction. If the verb *asti* were interpreted with a weak sense as indicating mere presence, this question and the following example might be concerned merely with a descriptive designation; that is to say, one cannot describe action as possessed of a fruit apart from the presence of the designation “fruit”; similarly, one cannot describe a man as a “father” apart from the presence of the designation “son.” Both of these statements are reasonable insofar as they convey the interdependent descriptive power of designations.¹⁴⁰ However, the argument pattern typical of this text and the syntax of the question (l. 58) both suggest that the case of the father and son is offered as a counterexample specifically to undermine the thesis that past action is possessed of a fruit. As a result, it functions as an untoward consequence and hence must be deemed unreasonable.

How then can this everyday counterexample of father and son be interpreted such that it is unreasonable and undermines the characterization of past action as “possessed of a fruit”? A

¹⁴⁰ For the example of father and son used to illustrate relative determination, see AKBh 1.17ab p. 11.2–23; ADV 304 p. 263.5–6. For the fact that characteristics (Skt *lakṣaṇa*) are determined and not confused, despite relative determination, see MAHŚ 1 p. 870c15–26; AKBh 3.28ab p. 136.10–13; AKBh (tr. Xz) 9 pp. 49c27–50a3; NyAŚ 28 p. 498c12–18.

possible interpretation emerges when the verb *asti* is interpreted not in the weak sense as referring simply to presence or to a descriptive designation but rather in the strong sense as referring to existence. That is to say, rather than indicating the reasonable and interdependent applicability of the provisional designations “father” and “son,” this counterexample might involve the existence and in the proponent’s view, the occurrence or present functioning of the referent of these designations. The terms *janago* and *putra* would then function here not in the weak sense as mere designations for “father” or “son,” but rather in the strong sense implying the existence and occurrence of the father and the son as such. In other words, if the statement, “there exists no father other than through the son,” is to be patently false, it must suggest that the father exists and functions as a cause only through the present existence and functioning of his effect, that is, his son. In fact, the opposite is true: the father must exist and function as a cause prior to the occurrence of his son as the effect. As in the case of his previous arguments, once again here the proponent’s objection is reasonable only in the context of his equation of existence with occurrence, or functioning, and his insistence that such occurrence, or functioning, takes place only in the present moment. If the opponent asserts that past action exists as possessed of a fruit with the implication that the fruit or matured effect exists as well, for the proponent, such existence entails its simultaneous functioning, or occurrence, and such “functioning,” or “occurrence,” takes place only in the present moment.¹⁴¹

In the context of this counterexample of father and son, the initial question, with which the proponent’s criticism begins, acquires a new meaning: “If one states, [O] ‘It is possessed of a fruit,’ [P] (*with regard to that) it should be said, ‘How is it that there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit (*na palena*)?’” (*yidi (*a)h(*a)di sapalo • (*atara) vatava kadha nasti na palena sapal(*a)*, ll. 57–58). For the proponent, the terms *sapala* and *palena* would function not in a weak sense to indicate simply the designations “possessed of a fruit” referring to the causal action and “fruit” referring to the effect; instead, they would have a strong sense implying that the very existence and occurrence, or functioning, of the fruit is encompassed in the existence of its cause. And so, the statement, “there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit,” suggests that the causal action possessed of a fruit exists, or functions, as the cause only through the simultaneous existence and functioning of the fruit. Understood in this way, both the initial statement concerning action and its fruit and the counterexample of the father and his son become patently false because they contradict the standard successive causal model for karma, which assumes that action precedes its effect. In fact, this counterexample of father and son is used in precisely this way in the *Mahāvibhāṣā to refute the position that subsequent factors can serve as the cause of prior factors: “If one claims that subsequent factors serve as the cause for prior factors, ... causal efficacy resides in the son, and under those circumstances there exist a father and mother.”¹⁴²

The proponent continues his argument concerning the simultaneous existence and occurrence of both the cause and the effect by examining further the notion of being “possessed of a fruit.” In a previous discussion (l. 4), the opponent asserted that the existence of past action is proven by its causal efficacy as indicated by the fact that it is “possessed of a fruit” (*sapala*). Assuming that

¹⁴¹ Commentaries: General Criticism of the Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3]; (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7]; (3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 17–20].

¹⁴² 若說後法爲前因者 ... 因於子息而有父母 (AMVŚ 118 p. 613c4–6).

“fruit” (*pala*) and “matured effect” (*vivaga*) are synonymous, the proponent suggests here that this causally efficacious past action, which the opponent has already described as “possessed of a fruit” (*sapala*), should also be described as “possessed of a matured effect” (*savivaga*): “And if that action, which is possessed of a fruit, is [also] possessed of a matured effect ...” (*yidi ca so kama sapala savivaga*, l. 59). With this statement, the proponent attempts to make the import of his previous argument concerning the father and son even clearer. The opponent would assert that past action exists as “possessed of a fruit” (l. 4), which indicates merely its potential causal efficacy. However, the proponent, by equating “possessed of a fruit” with “possessed of a matured effect,” suggests that both compounds must be understood in the strong sense to refer to the existence and the occurrence, or present functioning, of the matured effect. In other words, even if the opponent persists in claiming that “possession of a fruit” indicates nothing other than the potential causal efficacy of action, the proponent, by using the new compound “possessed of a matured effect,” attempts to force the opponent into the position of accepting the simultaneous existence and occurrence of the matured effect with its cause. And if the opponent accepts the use of both “possessed of a fruit” and “possessed of a matured effect” as equivalent descriptors for the causal action, then, when the causal action, which is possessed of a fruit (*sapala*), ceases and becomes past, it must cease together with its matured effect (*savivaga*); in other words, its existent and, in the proponent’s view, presently occurring matured effect must also cease.

This untoward consequence is illustrated through the simile of gold: “Just as gold [as the cause], being possessed of a fruit, is consumed by fire in a crucible, isn’t it the case that that [cause] is burned together with [its] fruit?” (*yaṣa hema ta sapala hemukhkṣa dajadi na ca ta sadha palena dajadi •*, l. 60). This everyday simile is used to counter the position that the matured effect arises from past action and more specifically that the potential causal efficacy and hence existence of past action is determined by its status as “possessed of a fruit.” This simile uses the term “possessed of a fruit” (*sapala*, P/Skt *saphala*) rather than “possessed of a matured effect” (*savivaga*, P/Skt *savipāka*), since “matured effects” are limited to the “fruits” or effects of action. However, in accordance with his previous statement (l. 59), the proponent equates “possessed of a fruit” with “possessed of a matured effect,” and hence he can use the example of gold and its fruit to illustrate action and its effects. Even though the reading and interpretation of the word *hemukhkṣa* are problematic,¹⁴³ the example clearly refers to something that “is consumed by fire together with [its] fruit” (*ta sadha palena dajadi •*, l. 60), and it is intended to illustrate that “[when] that action possessed of a fruit has ceased, then surely it (*has ceased) together with its matured effect” (*eva s(*a)p(*ala) so kama nirudha • nanu <*d>e sadha vivagena (*nirudha)*, ll. 60–61). Thus, in this context, the refining of gold in a crucible (*hemukhkṣa*) offers a reasonable interpretation.

Similes involving gold or a crucible are usually applied to the process of practice through which defilements are burned away and one’s inner nature is purified.¹⁴⁴ In scholastic literature, gold that undergoes a process of refining can also be used to illustrate an unvarying underlying nature. For example, among the theories of the so-called “four Sarvāstivāda masters” that explain the differences among factors of the three time periods, Dharmatrāta maintains that factors can be

¹⁴³ Text Notes: [60] [*he*]*m*[*u*]*khkṣa*.

¹⁴⁴ MN I 38, III 243; AN I 257; Pj II 1.193; Peṭ 8, 12. For various applications of the gold simile, see Ps I 175; ĀVBSŚ 10 p. 804b13–14; AMVŚ 175 p. 880a1ff.; YBh (tr. Xz) 47 p. 556a11ff., 47 p. 556c27ff.

distinguished on the basis of their difference in “mode” (Skt *bhāva*), for which he uses the example of a gold vase (Skt *suvarṇabhājana*) that maintains its color or substance as gold, even though it is broken or changes in shape. Accordingly, a factor can change its “mode” as past, present, or future, but not its “mode” as a real entity (Skt *dravya*), which is determined by intrinsic nature (Skt *vabhāva*).¹⁴⁵ In other contexts, the example of gold is also cited by certain opponents in support of their view that the mind, whether defiled or purified, does not change in its underlying nature or essence.¹⁴⁶ Unfortunately, no passage has been identified that uses the simile of gold with the sense proposed for this example in our text. Nevertheless, the proponent here would appear to equate gold “possessed of a fruit” that is consumed by fire with action “possessed of a matured effect” that becomes past: just as the gold ceases together with its fruit, so also action ceases together with its matured effect. In this way, the proponent attempts to demonstrate that the opponent cannot maintain that the matured effect occurs from past action.

I.3.2.6. Detailed Criticism (7: 6–7) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 62–66]

Reconstruction

(6) [62] (*yadi ana)gaḍa upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa pracupanadhamo yaśa anagaḍa upaḍadhama aryamago [63] (*anagamo a)nupaḍadhama kariśadi • nanu aryamago anagamo anagaḍa kariśadi

(7) [63] yadi [64] (*ca ana)g(*a)ḍ(*a u)p(*a)ḍ(*a)dh(*a)m(*a) pi anupaḍadhama pi • ya ca upaḍadhama ta ava(*śa) up(*a)j(*i)ś(*adi) • [65] (*ya ca a)n(*u)paḍadhama ta na upajiśadi tena nirarthyā bromiciavaśa bhodi aśa śaka upa[66](*ḍadhama a)nagaḍa anupaḍadhama kato tena anagaḍa aśakhaḍa bhodi ☸

Sanskrit rendering

(6) [62] yady anāgata utpādidharmo, nanv anāgataḥ pratyutpannadharmaḥ. yathānāgata utpādidharma āryamārgo [63] ’nāgamyam anutpādidharmaṃ kariṣyati. nanv āryamārgo ’nāgamyo ’nāgataṃ kariṣyati.

(7) [63] yadi [64] cānāgatā utpādidharmā apy anutpādidharmā api, yaś cotpādidharmaḥ, so ’vaśyam utpatsyate, [65] yaś cānutpādidharmaḥ, sa notpatsyate, tena nirarthiko brahmacaryavāso bhavati. atha śakyam utpā[66]didharmo ’nāgato ’nutpādidharmaṃ kartuṃ, tenānāgato ’saṃskṛto bhavati.

Translation

(6) [62] [P] (*If) a future [factor] is a factor subject to arising, surely a future [factor] is a present factor. [It is] just like the case of the future noble path that is a factor subject to arising, [63] which, (*as the stage of “not yet having reached,”) will act as a factor not subject to arising. Surely the noble path [of] the stage of “not yet having reached” will [still] act as future [and therefore must still be a factor subject to arising].

¹⁴⁵ Skt *evaṃ dharmo ’py anāgatād adhvaṇaḥ pratyutpannam adhvānam āgacchann anāgatabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvam. evaṃ pratyutpannād atītam adhvānaṃ gacchan pratyutpannabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvam iti* (AKBh 5.26 p. 296.13–15). Cf. AMVŚ 132 p. 683c8ff., 176 p. 885c18ff.

¹⁴⁶ AMVŚ 22 p. 110a8–20. Cf. AMVŚ 188 p. 943a5ff.; YBh (tr. Xz) 13 p. 343c17ff.

(7) [63] (*And) if [64] future [factors] are both factors subject to arising and factors not subject to arising, and a factor that is subject to arising will inevitably arise, [65] and a factor that is not subject to arising will not arise, then the life of religious practice is without purpose. Or else, it is possible [66] for a future factor (*subject to arising) to act as a factor not subject to arising; therefore, a future [factor, as not subject to arising,] is unconditioned.

Commentary: (6, 7) Criticism of the Opponent's Second Category [ll. 62–66]

In this passage, the proponent continues his examination of the relationship between action and its matured effect, but his attention returns to the issue of the status of the fruit or matured effect, which the opponent claims exists as a future factor. Given the damage to the manuscript in this section,¹⁴⁷ the following discussion of future factors may have been linked more closely to the preceding discussion of past action and its matured effect by a transitional statement that is now lost. Nonetheless, it is clear that the proponent offers two additional criticisms of the opponent's category of existent future factors. As in the case of his previous criticisms (ll. 36–51), here too the proponent focuses on opponent's characterization of future factors as subject to or not subject to arising. These sixth and seventh criticisms appear to be separate but related, each marked by parallel conditional constructions: “(*If) a future [factor] is a factor subject to arising ...” (*(*yadi ana)gaḍa upaḍadhama ...*, l. 62); “(*And) if future [factors] are both factors subject to arising and factors not subject to arising ...” (*yadi (*ca ana)g(*a)d(*a u)p(*a)d(*a)dh(*a)m(*a) pi anupaḍadhama pi ...*, ll. 63–64). While these similar constructions do not conform to the pattern of mutually exclusive, logically complementary, or simple contrasting alternatives characteristic of the proponent's typical arguments, it is possible that they represent alternative responses to a preceding but still missing statement with which this passage began.¹⁴⁸

In his sixth criticism of an existent future fruit or matured effect, the proponent objects that the characterization “subject to arising” results in confusion between factors of the future and present time periods: “(*If) a future [factor] is a factor subject to arising, surely a future [factor] is a present factor” (*(*yadi ana)gaḍa upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa pracupanadhamo*, l. 62). The rationale underlying this objection becomes clear in light of a similar argument in the Kathāvatthu.¹⁴⁹ The Kathāvatthu proponent objects to the opponent's assertion that certain future factors exist as subject to arising in contrast to other nonexistent future factors that are not subject to arising. The opponent responds that if one admits that future factors subject to arising “will arise” (*P uppajjissanti*), or are on the point of arising, one should also accept that they exist (*P atthi*). To this, the Kathāvatthu proponent retorts that if future factors subject to arising are claimed to exist precisely because they will arise (*P uppajjissanti*), these future factors must already be present. The Kathāvatthu proponent next applies the same logic to present factors that will cease (*P nirujjhissanti*); that is to say, since present factors “will cease” in the sense that they are on the point of ceasing, they should already be

¹⁴⁷ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61. Text Notes: [61] *nanu [e] sadha* ^{|52C(r)+52z(v)+52B(v)}*vivagena ? + ? (///)*.

¹⁴⁸ Commentaries: The Opponent's Three Categories [51D(r) ll. 1–4]; General Criticism of the Opponent's Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3].

¹⁴⁹ Kv 154–155.

said not to exist, and hence must be considered past. In other words, for the Kathāvatthu proponent, future factors that “will arise” and hence are claimed to exist should in fact already be present, and present factors that “will cease” should in fact be claimed not to exist and should already be past. This argument in the Kathāvatthu clarifies the Gāndhārī proponent’s objection that “a future [factor] is a present factor” (*anagaḍa pracupanadhmo*, l. 62); that is to say, the opponent’s claim that future factors subject to arising exist is tantamount to the claim that future factors are present and inevitably leads to the confusion of factors of the future and present time periods.

This objection that future factors subject to arising must in fact be present presumably provides the context for our proponent’s following counterexample (ll. 62–63). Unfortunately, this counterexample and its rhetorical conclusion are obscured by manuscript damage and resulting lacunae, as well as by the ambiguity, perhaps intentional on the part of the proponent, in the use of the term *anagamo*. The Sanskrit equivalent of the Gāndhārī term *anagamo* is most likely *anāgamyā*, which appears in discussions of the path of religious practice. Even though we cannot presume that the complex Sarvāstivāda model of the noble path (Skt *āryamārga*) presented in later texts existed at the time of our Gāndhārī abhidharma text, in this model Skt *anāgamyā* is used to refer generally to various stages of practice, as well as in a narrow and more technical sense to a specific stage.¹⁵⁰ All eight fundamental meditative states in the form and formless realms are preceded by thresholds (Skt *sāmantaka*) that can be characterized as “not yet having reached” (Skt *anāgamyā*), because practitioners in these thresholds have not yet reached the immediately following fundamental trance state (Skt *dhyāna*).¹⁵¹ That is to say, these thresholds constitute a preliminary stage in which practitioners cultivate antidotes to certain defilements whose complete abandonment then defines the subsequent fundamental trance state.¹⁵² Despite this general usage of Skt *anāgamyā* to refer to all such thresholds, the term is most often reserved for the threshold of the first of the four trance states in the realm of form.¹⁵³ It is in this particular stage of “not yet having

¹⁵⁰ The earliest references to the state of Skt *anāgamyā* (未至, 未至定) within Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts are found in the Dharmaskandha (DhSk 10 p. 499b22–25, 10 p. 501a25–27, 11 p. 504b19–21). Even though the history of the development of this path structure is complex and any connections to school distinctions are not altogether clear, the overall structure and the distinctive terms it employs are not found within extant Pali abhidhamma materials. Cf. Frauwallner 1995: 162–165.

¹⁵¹ The *Mahāvibhāṣā explains that the thresholds are referred to as Skt *anāgamyā* because one has not yet reached their respective fundamental trance states, 如餘處說。依未至言通靜慮中間。及上地近分。皆未至彼根本定故立未至名 (AMVŚ 96 p. 495a1–3). Similarly, Yaśomitra (AKVy 569.31–32) states, “It is produced not having reached, not having entered the fundamental trance state, thus *anāgamyā*” (Skt *maulaṃ dhyānam anāgamyāpraviśyotpadyata ity anāgamyam*).

¹⁵² 靜慮中間皆名未至。並未能入勝本地地。而能現前斷煩惱故 (AMVŚ 129 p. 671b24–26). For an extended discussion of the role of *anāgamyā* in the abandonment of defilements, see AMVŚ 72 p. 373a29ff., 60 p. 311a15–311c8ff., 129 pp. 671a26–673a12ff., 161 p. 818a29ff.; AKBh 6.47cd p. 367.12ff.

¹⁵³ AKBh 8.22c p. 418.4. In the *Nyāyānusara, Saṅghabhadra explains that the designation *anāgamyā* is reserved for the threshold of the first trance state in order to distinguish it from the other thresholds. It is called “not having reached” (*anāgamyā*) because this first threshold does not arise supported by previous trance states and one in this state has not yet given rise to the feeling of enjoyment typical of the trance states; 唯初近分名未至者。爲欲簡別餘近分故。非此近分乘先定起。又非住此已起愛味。依如是義立未至名。非上定邊亦名未至。皆乘先定勢力引生。及住彼時已起味故。毘婆沙者作如是說。未至本地立未至名。是本地德未現前義 (NyAŚ 78 p. 765c17–22).

reached” that one first abandons a defilement, which brings about the arising of the first moment of virtuous thought in the subsequent first trance state. This stage of “not yet having reached” leads immediately and inevitably to the stage in which the “eventual realization of enlightenment is assured” (Skt *samyaktvaniyāmāvakraṅti*) in the first trance state, which then constitutes the first moment of the path of vision (Skt *darśanamārga*) within the noble path. As a result, this preliminary stage of “not yet having reached” can by extension also be considered part of the noble path (Skt *āryamārga*).¹⁵⁴

This counterexample concerning the stage of “not yet having reached” is intended to elaborate the proponent’s sixth criticism (l. 62), namely, that a future factor as subject to arising must in fact be present. The proponent appeals to an example presumably accepted by the opponent, namely, that of the future noble path (*anagaḍa aryamago*) in relation to the threshold stage of “not yet having reached” (*anagama*). Since the noble path per se begins with the first trance state in the realm of form, in the threshold stage of “not yet having reached,” the noble path would presumably still be referred to as a future factor subject to arising. However, the proponent objects that while still in this stage of “not yet having reached,” the noble path should in fact be considered a “factor not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*). Although the proponent offers no further rationale for this objection, two related explanations appear possible. First, since even in this stage of “not yet having reached,” the arising of the noble path is imminent and assured, the noble path should be deemed “not subject to arising” because it can be considered, in effect, already arisen. Second, the noble path in an extended sense can be understood to subsume this threshold stage of “not yet having reached.” Therefore, even though the noble path as narrowly defined is still, strictly speaking, “subject to arising,” it might be considered “not subject to arising” since the threshold stage is already in effect. As a result, the noble path in this stage would be admitted to be “not subject to arising” and therefore present.

Regardless of which rationale is accepted for this first statement, it is clear that this example is intended to point to the confusion with regard to a factor’s status as future or present. The proponent emphasizes this in his rhetorical conclusion: “Surely the noble path [of] the stage of ‘not yet having reached’ will [still] act as future [and therefore must still be a factor subject to arising]” (*nanu aryamago anagamo anagaḍa kariṣadi*, l. 63). In other words, even though, as the proponent has just argued, the opponent’s position demands that while still in the stage of “not yet having reached,” the noble path must, strictly speaking, be considered a present factor that is “not subject to arising,” it is in fact still future and hence “subject to arising.” The rationale underlying this conclusion is again somewhat obscure. The proponent might simply be returning to

¹⁵⁴ For the close connection between Skt *anāgamya* and the subsequent first trance state, as well as its status as a part of the path of vision (Skt *darśanamārga*), see AMVŚ 60 p. 311b8–9; AKBh 4.17b p. 208.3–6. For passages that attest to the noble character of the Skt *anāgamya* state, see AHŚ (Dh) 3 p. 824a18ff.; MAHŚ 7 p. 925b2, 7 p. 925b10ff.; AMVŚ 175 p. 878c7ff., 89 p. 459a21–459b1, 94 p. 485b1–2, 105 p. 543c9–12; AKBh 4.26bc p. 211.26–30, 8.22c p. 448.3ff.; NyAŚ 56 p. 656c1–2. For the practitioner’s status as “noble” and its connection to the “stage in which the eventual realization of enlightenment is assured,” the stage of the acquisition of the “highest mundane dharmas” (Skt **laukikāgradharma*), and the Skt *anāgamya* state, see JñPr 14 p. 989c24–25; AMVŚ 2 p. 6b9–15, 2 p. 7a2ff., 2 p. 8c26ff., 2 p. 9c23–3 p. 11b3, 3 p. 13a2ff.; AKBh 6.26a p. 350.5ff.; AKVy 541.18ff. Cf. Buswell 1997.

a strict distinction between the stage of “not yet having reached” and the subsequent first moment of the noble path. As a result, in this threshold stage of “not yet having reached,” the noble path per se must still be acknowledged to be future and hence “subject to arising.” However, it is also possible that the proponent assumes a wordplay with the various senses of the term *anagama* (Skt *anāgamyā*). In other words, the proponent in this statement uses *anagama* not primarily as a technical term to refer to the threshold of the first trance state in the noble path, but rather with the more literal meaning of “not yet having reached” derived from the same prefix and root $\bar{a} + \sqrt{gam}$ as the word meaning “future,” Skt *anāgata*. Thus, in this stage of “not yet having reached,” the noble path would literally “not yet have been reached,” and hence must still be considered to be future, not present. Unfortunately, given the terse phrasing of this rhetorical statement and the absence of a parallel for this argument, this interpretation remains unconfirmed.

The proponent next turns to his seventh criticism concerning the status of the future matured effect: “(*And) if future [factors] are both factors subject to arising and factors not subject to arising, and a factor that is subject to arising will inevitably arise, and a factor that is not subject to arising will not arise, ...” (*yadi (*ca ana)g(*a)d(*a u)p(*a)d(*a)dh(*a)m(*a) pi anupaḍadhama pi • ya ca upaḍadhama ta ava(*śa) up(*a)j(*i)ś(*adi) • ya ca a)n(*u)paḍadhama ta na upajiśadi*, ll. 63–65). In this criticism, the proponent alludes to a previously cited and criticized proposition, which he assumes represents the opponent’s position: “Indeed, [you contend that] ‘a factor subject to arising will inevitably arise, [and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise’” (*upaḍadhama hi avaśa upajiśadi • anupaḍadhama(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajiśadi •*, ll. 39–40). In this proposition, the opponent divides future factors into two subcategories of existent “factors subject to arising” (*upaḍadhama*) and nonexistent “factors not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*), each of which respectively will inevitably arise or not arise. In his previous argument (ll. 38–45), the proponent notes that this distinction within future factors either results in an internal contradiction in the definition of each subcategory or demands that factors change their status from “subject to arising” to “not subject to arising.” Also here in the current argument, the proponent appeals to the same two untoward consequences: either these two subcategories of future factors are static and must remain distinct (l. 65), or factors subject to arising will act as or change their status to become factors not subject to arising (ll. 65–66). According to the first untoward consequence, every future factor must be placed in only one of the two distinct subcategories: that is, factors “subject to arising” that will inevitably arise, or those “not subject to arising” that will not arise. In this case, the proponent will suggest that the path of religious practice becomes useless since defilements, if considered future factors “subject to arising,” can never be prevented from arising; in other words, they can never change their status to factors not subject to arising.¹⁵⁵ According to the second untoward consequence, if it were possible for future factors subject to arising to change their status to factors not subject to arising, then any such future factor, given its new status as “not subject to arising,” should be considered unconditioned. Here, the proponent’s argument assumes the threefold categorization of “factors not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*) found in middle-period abhidharma texts: (1) factors of the past and present that have already arisen;

¹⁵⁵ For the opponent’s probable position concerning a change in status from “subject to arising” to “not subject to arising,” see Commentary: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

(2) future factors that inevitably will not arise; and (3) unconditioned factors.¹⁵⁶ In the current argument, if future factors can become “not subject to arising,” they will never arise and can be in effect equated with “unconditioned factors,” which also never arise. However, since unconditioned factors, by definition, are not subject to qualification by the time periods and hence could never be described as future, such labeling of future factors, which are classified within the time periods, as unconditioned is patently impossible.

I.3.3. Section 3—Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

I.3.3.1. The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]

Reconstruction

[66] *icheaṣi vatu sar(*va)[67](*m a)st(*i) • sarvakāla sarvam asti • sarvatra sarvam asti • sarvagareṇa sarvam asti • sarvakāraṇa(*a) [68] (*sarvam a)sti • sarvabhāvaiḥ sarvam asti • sarvāhetubhiḥ sarvam asti • sarvapratyayaiḥ sarvam asti • [69] (*sar)v(*a)m asti •*

Sanskrit rendering

[66] *iccher vaktuṃ sarva[67]m asti. sarvakāle sarvam asti. sarvatra sarvam asti. sarvākāreṇa sarvam asti. sarvakāraṇena [68] sarvam asti. sarvabhāvaiḥ sarvam asti. sarvāhetubhiḥ sarvam asti. sarvapratyayaiḥ sarvam asti. [69] sarvam asti.*

Translation

[66] [P] You might wish to say, [67] [O] “Everything exists. Everything exists at all times. Everything exists everywhere. Everything exists with every aspect. (*Everything exists) through every reason. [68] Everything exists through all modes. Everything exists through all causes. Everything exists through all conditions. [69] (*Everything) exists.”

Commentary: The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]

Section 3 of our text takes up a separate topic, that is, the fundamental proposition “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*), which is nonetheless integrally connected to the prior topic of the existence of factors in the past and future. The connection between these two topics is apparent in abhidharma texts of all periods, even though later discussions focus on existence in the abstract, offer detailed analyses of the functioning of existent factors, and develop more complex methods of argumentation. These two topics are also connected in the Kathāvatthu (Kv 115ff.), where they are treated in reverse order, beginning with an examination of the proposition “everything exists” and then continuing with a detailed examination of existence in the past and the future. Several later abhidharma treatments imply that the proposition “everything exists” and the later controversies concerning existence in the abstract find their origin in specific doctrinal issues of religious practice and causation that for the Sarvāstivādins entailed the existence of factors in the past and future. Indeed, both topics become the hallmark of Sarvāstivāda groups. Nonetheless, although the Kathāvatthu commentary identifies the opponent as a Sabbatthivādin, and our Gāndhārī text addresses the opponent by

¹⁵⁶ Commentaries: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51].

the appellation *mahasarvastivaḍa* (Skt **mahāsarvāstivāḍa*) (l. 82; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6),¹⁵⁷ when interpreting early materials such as our text, it is important to guard against anachronistic interpretations and to exercise care not to retroject contexts or positions sanctioned in later texts.

This section begins with the position of an opponent, the fundamental proposition “everything exists,” which he first expands through a series of formulaic declarations and in the next passage elaborates with qualifications, specifications, and explications (ll. 66–85). Through most of the remaining text (ll. 82–147), these declarations are then addressed individually in extended examination and criticism offered by the proponent. Both the opponent’s position as well as the major points in the proponent’s criticism are clarified in analogous discussions in other abhidharma texts, in particular the Kathāvatthu, the **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra*, the **Mīśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.¹⁵⁸

As in several other passages of our Gāndhārī text, this discussion in the Kathāvatthu is markedly similar in both content and structure. The Kathāvatthu begins its treatment with a series of formulaic questions that resemble the fundamental proposition and subsequent declarations found in the present Gāndhārī passage: “[KvP] Does everything exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Does everything exist everywhere? [O] That should not be said. [KvP] Does everything exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Does everything always exist? [O] That should not be said. ... [KvP] Does everything exist with all [aspects]? ... [KvP] Does everything exist in all [factors]? ... [KvP] Does everything exist without connection? ... [KvP] Does that which does not exist also exist? ... [KvP] Does the correct view that [considers] the view that all exists to be a false view exist?”¹⁵⁹

As indicated in the following chart, all but one or possibly two of the formulaic questions included in the Kathāvatthu (Kv7, Kv5?) find a parallel in our Gāndhārī text, either in this brief introductory discussion or in the course of the proponent’s subsequent extended criticism. For example, question six in the Kathāvatthu (Kv6) does not appear in the Gāndhārī text, but the explanation offered in the Kathāvatthu commentary of “connection among various intrinsic natures” (*P nānāsabhāvānañ hi yogo*) resembles the criticism of the declaration, “everything exists as belonging to everything,” found later in the Gāndhārī text.¹⁶⁰ Four of the declarations in the Gāndhārī text are absent from the Kathāvatthu: (G4) “everything exists through every reason” (*sarvakaranena sarvam asti*); (G5) “everything exists through all modes” (*sarvabhavaḥ sarvam asti*); (G6) “everything exists through all causes” (*sarvaheduḥ sarvam asti*); and (G7) “everything exists through all conditions” (*sarvaprakāṣaḥ sarvam asti*). Notable also is the fact that two of the declarations in the Gāndhārī text resemble glosses in the Kathāvatthu commentary more closely than the formulaic questions presented in the Kathāvatthu itself: (G1) “everything exists at all

¹⁵⁷ Commentaries: The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]; (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87].

¹⁵⁸ Kv 115ff.; ĀVBSŚ 9 p. 795b11ff.; MAHŚ 11 p. 961c27ff., 11 p. 963a20ff.; AKBh 5.27c p. 301.7–9.

¹⁵⁹ *P sabbam atthīti. āmantā. sabbattha sabbam atthīti. na h’ evaṃ vattabe. sabbam atthīti. āmantā. sabbadā sabbam atthīti. na h’ evaṃ vattabe. ... sabbena sabbam atthīti. ... sabbesu sabbam atthīti. ... ayogan ti katvā sabbam atthīti. ... yaṃ pi n’ atthi taṃ p’ atthīti. ... sabbam atthīti yā diṭṭhi sā diṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhi ti yā diṭṭhi sā diṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhi ti* (Kv 115ff.; Kv-a 44).

¹⁶⁰ Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105].

times” (*sarvakala sarvam asti*, P *sabbasmim kāle sabbam atthīti*) and (G3) “everything exists with every aspect” (*sarvagarena sarvam asti*, P *sabbenākārena sabbam atthīti*).¹⁶¹

Table 1. Sarvāstivāda positions and criticism: BL 28 and Kathāvatthu

BL 28: Opponent	BL 28: Proponent	Kathāvatthu
Proposition:	(Criticism)	Proposition:
<i>sarvam asti</i> (ll. 66–67)	(l. 82)	P <i>sabbam atthi</i> (Kv 115)
Declarations:		Questions:
G1. <i>sarvakala sarvam asti</i> (l. 67)	(ll. 107–109)	Kv2. P <i>sabbadā sabbam atthi</i> (Kv 115)
G2. <i>sarvatra sarvam asti</i> (l. 67)	(ll. 98–102)	Kv1. P <i>sabbattha sabbam atthi</i> (Kv 115)
G3. <i>sarvagarena sarvam asti</i> (l. 67)	(ll. 109–113)	Kv3. P <i>sabbena sabbam atthi</i> (Kv 116)
G4. <i>sarvakaranena sarvam asti</i> (l. 67)	(ll. 113–114)	
G5. <i>sarvabhveha sarvam asti</i> (l. 68)	(ll. 114–115)	
G6. <i>sarvaheduha sarvam asti</i> (l. 68) ¹⁶²	(ll. 114–115)	
G7. <i>sarvapraccageha sarvam asti</i> (l. 68)	(ll. 114–115)	
G8. <i>ya pi nasti ta pi asti</i>	(l. 86)	Kv6. P <i>yaṃ pi n’ atthi taṃ p’ atthi</i> (Kv 116)
G9. <i>sarveṣu sarvam asti</i>	(ll. 102–105)	Kv4. P <i>sabbesu sabbam atthi</i> (Kv 116)
G10. <i>sarvasa sarvam asti</i>	(ll. 105–106)	Kv5. P <i>ayogan ti katvā sabbam atthi</i> (Kv 116) ¹⁶³
		Kv7. P <i>sabbam atthīti yā diṭṭhi sā diṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhī ti yā diṭṭhi sā diṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhī</i> (Kv 116)

The Kathāvatthu begins its treatment of the proposition “everything exists” with the simple question, “Does everything exist?” (P *sabbam atthīti*), to which the opponent responds in the affirmative, “Yes” (P *āmantā*). The commentary observes that the proposition “everything exists” is claimed by the opponent to be grounded in an authoritative scriptural passage cited later within the Kathāvatthu’s discussion: “Material form that is past, future, or present, internal or external

¹⁶¹ Kv-a 44.

¹⁶² The criticism of the two final formulaic declarations—(G6) “everything exists through all causes” (*sarvaheduha sarvam asti*) and (G7) “everything exists through all conditions” (*sarvapraccageha sarvam asti*)—is subsumed under the summary rejection of the prior declaration (G5) “everything exists through all modes” (*sarvabhveha sarvam asti*, ll. 114–115). This omission is indicated through the adverb *peyāla* (P *peyyāla*, Skt *peyāla/piyāla/paryāya*), which signals a textual abbreviation or ellipsis. Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Declarations [ll. 109–115].

¹⁶³ Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Third and Fourth Declarations [ll. 105–109].

... this is said to be the material form aggregate.”¹⁶⁴ This authoritative scriptural passage proves that “everything exists” through its mere reference to material form of the past, present, or future, and it also suggests an integral connection between the topics of existence in the abstract and the existence of factors in the past and future. The Kathāvatthu commentary also offers explanations of the questions presented in the text, explanations that help clarify both the general content for and the specific terminology encountered in the proponent’s criticism in our Gāndhārī text. For example, the Kathāvatthu commentary explains the first question, “Does everything exist everywhere?” (P *sabbattha sabbam atthi*), as referring to the existence of everything in “every body” (P *sabbasmim sarīre*). The second question, “Does everything always exist?” (P *sabbadā sabbam atthi*), refers to the existence of everything “at all times” (P *sabbasmim kāle*). The third question, “Does everything exist with all?” (P *sabbena sabbam atthi*), refers to the existence of everything “with every aspect” (P *sabbenākārena*). The fourth question, “Does everything exist in all?” (P *sabbesu sabbam atthi*), refers to the existence of everything “in all factors” (P *sabbesu dhammesu*). For the fifth question, “Does everything exist without connection?” (P *ayogan ti katvā sabbam atthi*), the explanation of the Kathāvatthu commentary suggests that the term “without connection” indicates an absence of connection that is implied by the identity of the entities considered.¹⁶⁵ The sixth question, “Does that which does not exist also exist?” is explained as alluding to such entities as the “sixth aggregate or a hare’s horn, and so forth.”¹⁶⁶

Throughout this section, the Kathāvatthu proponent follows a stylized rhetorical pattern common in the text whereby the opponent is forced into an internal contradiction by accepting one position and yet rejecting logical extensions of that position. Specifically in this case, the Kathāvatthu opponent accepts the proposition “everything exists” and yet rejects the application of that proposition to time, space, and so forth: “[KvP] Does everything exist? [o] Yes. [KvP] Does everything exist everywhere? [o] That should not be said. [KvP] Does everything exist? [o] Yes. [KvP] Does everything always exist? [o] That should not be said. ...,” and so forth. The pattern of affirmative and negative responses by the opponent suggests that he is forced into adopting internally contradictory positions, but in this particular case the commentary does not offer an explanation of the opponent’s specific reasons for each response. Thus, the opponent’s negative responses must be interpreted with caution. Specifically, one cannot assume that the negative responses indicate in a simple, straightforward way the opponent’s own opinion that one should not say, for example,

¹⁶⁴ P *yaṃ kiñci, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhataṃ vā bahiddhā ... ayaṃ vuccati rūpa-kkhandho* (Kv-a 44). Cf. Kv 140, 150–151; Kv-a 50; Vibh 1; MN I 138, III 16ff.; SN II 125, III 47, IV 382; SĀ (tr. G) 1 no. 22 p. 4c27ff., 2 no. 33 p. 7c4ff., 2 no. 58 p. 14c4ff., passim; SaṅgP 11 p. 412a2ff.; ŚAŚ 3 p. 543a13ff.; AMVŚ 74 p. 383a24ff.; AVŚ 39 p. 287b28ff.; VŚ 6 p. 457b29ff.; AKBh 1.20ab p. 13.5ff.; NyAŚ 3 p. 343b28ff.; SĀ (tr. G) 3 no. 79 p. 20a10ff.; ĀVBSS 2 p. 730b11ff., 1 p. 727a26ff.; TSŚ 2 p. 255b13–14. For another scriptural passage cited frequently in arguments concerning the existence of the past and future, see: “Form, monks, is impermanent, as past and future. What is to be said about the present?” (P *rūpaṃ bhikkhave aniccaṃ atītānāgataṃ. ko pana vādo paccuppannassa*, SN III 19). Cf. SĀ (tr. G) 1 no. 8 p. 1c23–24, 3 no. 79 p. 20a11–12; AKBh 5.25a p. 295.10ff.; AKVy 468.32ff.

¹⁶⁵ P *ayogan ti ayuttaṃ. nānāsabhāvānañ hi yogo hoti, na ekasabhāvassa* (Kv-a 44). Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Third and Fourth Declarations [ll. 105–109].

¹⁶⁶ P *chaṭṭhakkhandhādikaṃ sasavisāṇādikaṃ* (Kv-a 44). Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87].

that “everything exists everywhere.” As in the case of other arguments in the Kathāvatthu, the opponent’s negative responses here might result from particular circumstances or conditions that the opponent would reject but are left unexplained in both the text and commentary. Also, given the Kathāvatthu proponent’s control of the polemical exchange and his use of a presumptive method of argument, it is also possible that the opponent’s negative responses reflect the proponent’s opinion that the questions themselves must be rejected in order to avoid the undesirable conclusion that he believes would result from them.

This exchange in the Kathāvatthu is helpful in clarifying the polemical exchange in our Gāndhārī text. The fundamental proposition “everything exists” is clearly attributed to the opponent, as indicated by the introductory clause “you might wish to say” (*icheaṣi vatu*, l. 66). However, the identity of the speaker in the rest of the passage (ll. 67–69) is less certain. It is possible that the scope of this introductory clause continues and that the subsequent series of declarations also represents the self-acknowledged position of the opponent. However, in accordance with the pattern of the Kathāvatthu, these subsequent declarations could also represent the Gāndhārī proponent’s attempt to expand upon the opponent’s fundamental proposition by offering logical extensions of it. Whether the formulaic declarations listed in this passage represent assertions offered by the opponent himself or critical implications of the opponent’s position raised by the proponent, they do become the object of the proponent’s extended criticism in the remainder of this third section of the text. However, several stylistic factors in our text suggest that the declarations following the fundamental proposition are intended to represent the position of the opponent. First, following the initial phrase “you might wish to say” (*icheaṣi vatu*, l. 66), none of the typical markers used to indicate a change in speaker appear prior to the final restatement of the proposition (l. 69). These markers include, for example, the gerundives “it is to be asked” (*prochidava*, P *pucchitabbaṃ*, Skt *praṣṭavyam*), or “it is to be said” (*vatava*, P *vattabba*, Skt *vaktavyam*), or the indeclinable “with regard to that” (*tatra*, P *tatra/tattha*, Skt *tatra*), or the adverb “then” or “therefore” (G/P/Skt *tena*) (Introduction § I.1.2.2 Polemical Scholastic Style). Thus, it might be assumed that these next declarations also represent the position of the opponent. Further, given the syntactic pattern of the proponent’s later criticism (l. 98), which cites these declarations using the quotative particle *di* (P *iti/ti*, Skt *iti*), it is likely that they are intended to represent assertions by the opponent. Thus, it would appear that at least in our text, both the fundamental proposition and the following declarations in this root passage are intended in a straightforward sense to represent the position of the opponent.

I.3.3.2. The Opponent’s Elaboration of “Everything Exists”: Two Qualifications (1) of the Fundamental Proposition; Four Specifications of “Everything”; Two Explications of “Existence” [ll. 69–75]

Reconstruction

[69] *asti sarva • asti no ca sarva • ye duḍaṣa ayadaneha {a}ṣagrahida se asti • [70] (*tra)-y(*a)adhva astida aṣabhina vatava • aṣa adh(*v)a astita di • ya asti ta ha astida vatava • [71] (*ya nast)i t(*a) nastida ha vatava • sata astida vatava • asata nastida vatava • adida anagaḍa pra[72](**cupana va astida di a)d(*i)d(*a) v(*a)ṣ(*ag)e asti • anagaḍa vaṣage asti • adida anagaḍa a[73](**didana)g(*a)d(*a)bh(*a)v(*a) asti • adida anagaḍa***

*grihibhava asti • adiḍa anagaḍa aramiya[74]bhava asti • adiḍa (*a)nagaḍ(*a) veśiabhava asti • anagaḍa arahaḍabhava asti • [75] (*sar)v(*a)m asti •*

Sanskrit rendering

[69] *asti sarvam, asti no ca sarvam. ye dvādaśair āyatanaiḥ saṃgrahītās te santi.* [70] *traiyadhvikā astitāsambhinnā vaktavyāḥ. athādhvāno 'stīti. yad asti tad dhy astitā vaktavyam.* [71] *yan nāsti tan nāstitā hi vaktavyam. sad astitā vaktavyam, asan nāstitā vaktavyam. atītam anāgatam pra[72]tyutpannam vāstiteti. atīto varṣako 'sti. anāgato varṣako 'sti. atītā anāgatā [73] atītānāgatabhāvāḥ santi. atīto 'nāgato gṛhibhāvo 'sti. atīto 'nāgata ārāmika[74]bhāvo 'sti. atīto 'nāgato vaiśyabhāvo 'sti. anāgato 'rhadbhāvo 'sti. [75] *sarvam asti.**

Translation

(1) [69] [o] “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything. Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist. [70] [Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence. Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence. That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; [71] (*that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence. The existent should be said to be existence; the non-existent should be said to be nonexistence. [Or] the past, future, [72] and present (*should be said to be existence). A past year exists; a future year exists. [73] The modes of the past and future exist as past and future. The mode of the householder exists as past and future. The mode of the monastery worker exists as past and future. [74] The mode of the merchant exists as past and future. The mode of the arhat exists as future. [75] Everything exists.”

Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]

The current passage clarifies the fundamental proposition “everything exists” (ll. 66–67), first through a qualification of the proposition, then through specifications of the scope of “everything” (*sarva*), and finally through explications of “existence” (*astiḍa*). As in the case of the formulaic declarations in the preceding root passage, it is likely that this passage also represents the opponent’s views. However, it may also contain critical implications raised by the proponent as a rejoinder to the opponent’s fundamental proposition. Even though both options present difficulties in interpretation, it is nonetheless clear that the statements in this passage, like those in the root passage (ll. 66–69), become the object of the proponent’s criticism later in the text.¹⁶⁷ Thus, they have been interpreted as expansions of the fundamental proposition offered by the opponent.

This passage begins with a statement that represents the converse of the opponent’s fundamental proposition “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*): “That which exists is everything” (*asti sarva*, l. 69). The conversion of statements of equivalence from $A = B \Rightarrow B = A$ becomes an important exegetical tool in the explication of doctrinal concepts, and is frequently employed in abhidharma texts, notably in the Pali Yamaka and the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra preserved in Chinese translation.¹⁶⁸ Such conversion of statements permits the determination of the two concepts involved by delimiting

¹⁶⁷ Cf. chart of declarations and criticisms in Commentary: The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69].

¹⁶⁸ ŚĀŚ 21–22 pp. 661a15–671b23.

their categorial boundaries and thereby clarifying their exact relationship to one another.¹⁶⁹ The significance of the converse here and its implications for the sense of the terms “everything” and “exists” are not made explicit in our text, but a clue can be found in a similar pattern in the Kathāvatthu that also appears in its criticism of the proposition “everything exists”: “[KvP] Does the past exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Is that which exists the past? [O] That which exists may be the past or may be not the past.”¹⁷⁰ The opponent’s response “that which exists may be the past or may be not the past” employs the finite verb *atthi* not with primary verbal force or even as a clause-initial verbal to mark a proposition or assertion, but rather as a pseudo-substantive referring to the general category of “existents,” which are then considered as either “past” or “other than past,” namely, present or future.¹⁷¹ In other words, the Kathāvatthu opponent would appear to understand the categories of “that which exists” (B) and the “past” (A) as not coextensive or equivalent ($B \neq A$). Instead, the “past” is a subset of the category of “that which exists” ($A \subset B$). Hence, for the Kathāvatthu opponent, existents include the present and future in addition to the past. Continuing his criticism of the opponent’s response, the Kathāvatthu proponent insists that the opponent’s two statements, the “past exists” and “that which exists may be the past or may be not the past,” result in a contradiction: “If the past exists ($A = B$), and that which exists may be past ($B = A$) or may be not the past ($B = \sim A$), then the past is not the past ($A = \sim A$) and that which is not the past is the past ($\sim A = A$).”¹⁷²

In this argument, our Gāndhārī text pairs the affirmative, converted statement *asti sarva* with a parallel and logically complementary negation: “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything” (*asti sarva • asti no ca sarva •*, l. 69). This pattern of juxtaposing two logically complementary statements is also found in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra at the beginning of a lengthy discussion of the proposition “everything exists”:

As has been stated, there are four types of Sarvāstivāda. Does this mean that everything exists or does not exist?

[VERSE] One should know that everything exists, but [everything] does not exist with the characteristics of everything. Everything is without [the characteristics of] everything [because] no factor exists that has the characteristics of another.

This is [the sense of] “exists” established by the Sarvāstivādins. [That is to say, the term] “everything” refers to the twelve sense spheres (入, Skt **āyatana*). [Each of] these sense spheres exists with its own characteristic and not [with the characteristics of] others because the activities performed by all characteristics differ. The difference in activity (作業, Skt **kāritra*) has been explained previously. [The phrase,] “everything is without [the characteristics of] everything,” refers to the fact that among factors belonging to one in training (學法, Skt **śaikṣadharmā*), there are factors belonging to one in training but not factors belonging to one beyond training (無學法, Skt **aśaikṣadharmā*). Among factors belonging to one beyond training, there

¹⁶⁹ Cox 2004: 558ff.

¹⁷⁰ P *aṭītaṃ atthūti. āmantā. atthi atītan ti. atthi siyā aṭītaṃ siyā nvātītan ti* (Kv 138ff.) Cf. Kv 119ff.; Kv-a 50.

¹⁷¹ CPD s.v. *atthi*² f. “existence.”

¹⁷² P *hañci aṭītaṃ atthi, atthi siyā aṭītaṃ siyā nvātītaṃ, tenātītaṃ nvātītaṃ nvātītaṃ atītan ti* (Kv 139).

are factors belonging to one beyond training but not factors belonging to one in training. It should be compared to the fact that there are no footprints in the sky. This is the explanation of “exists.”

What is [the sense of] “does not exist?” [The phrase,] “no factor exists that has the characteristics of another,” [refers to the fact that] the characteristic of the visual organ (眼, Skt **cakṣus*) is [that of] the visual sense sphere (眼入, Skt **cakṣurāyatana*) and it is without the characteristics of other sense spheres because those characteristics are different. Therefore, it is explained that all factors are not confused.

[VERSE] Everything, [that is to say,] the time periods exist; this does not contradict what is reasonable [and] has been taught by the Silent One. ...

“Sarvāstivāda” [has the sense that] the three time periods exist; this is established by the Sarvāstivāda. Why is this? The present time period is designated taking into consideration the past and future [time periods]. If there were no past or future [time periods], then there would be no present time period. [And if] there were no present time period, there would be no conditioned factors. Therefore, the three time periods exist.¹⁷³

As this discussion from the **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* suggests, the proposition “everything exists” does not mean that everything exists under all circumstances or from every possible perspective; instead, it can be upheld only if the scope of “everything” is properly delimited.

The discussion in the **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* begins by inquiring whether the appellation “Sarvāstivāda” means that “everything exists or does not exist.” The initial response offers a qualification in the form of logically complementary alternatives: “One should know that everything exists, but [everything] does not exist with the characteristics of everything.” This qualification is followed by a series of specifications presumably intended to delimit the scope of “everything” and thereby to determine the exact content of “existence.” First, the proposition “everything exists” is clarified by equating “everything” with the twelve sense spheres, each of which can be said to exist by virtue of its own defining or its particular inherent characteristic. Abhidharma materials offer several specifications of “everything,” which are intended to delimit existents and thereby exclude nonexistent entities. For example, at its most extensive, “everything” is specified as including the twelve sense spheres (P/Skt *āyatana*), the five aggregates (P *khandha*, Skt *skandha*), and the eighteen elements (P/Skt *dhātu*).¹⁷⁴ To these three sets of sense spheres, aggregates, and elements, the Paṭisambhidāmagga adds also virtuous, unvirtuous, and indeterminate factors, as well as factors that belong to the three realms or do not belong to any

¹⁷³ 如所說四種薩婆多。問爲有一切有爲無。答。當知一切有。非有一切相。一切無一切。無有他相法。此有是薩婆多所立。一切者。謂十二入。彼諸入有自相非餘。一切相所作別故。作業別前已說。一切無一切者。謂學法中有學法無學法。無學法中有無學法亦無學法。如空中亦無有跡。如是比。問此說有云何無有。答無有他相法。如眼相是眼入。無餘入相。相別故。以是故說一切法不雜。一切世悉有。不違其所應。... 有三世薩婆多。此薩婆多所立。問何故。答現在世者觀過去未來故施設。若無過去未來者則無現在世。現在世無者亦無有爲法。是故有三世 (MAHŚ 11 p. 963a20–963b7). Cf. AKBh (tr. Xz) 20 p. 104b3; AKBh 5.25a p. 295.7.

¹⁷⁴ Sv I 116; Ps II 298; Mp IV 43; TSŚ 2 p. 255a1ff.; TSP p. 507.

realm.¹⁷⁵ The *Mahāvibhāṣā also offers several alternative specifications of “everything”: for example, the eighteen elements; the five aggregates together with unconditioned factors (無爲法, Skt **asaṃskṛtadharmā*); the four noble truths, space, and cessation not resulting from consideration (非擇滅, Skt **apratisaṃkhyānirodha*); and name and form (名與色, Skt **nāmarūpa*).¹⁷⁶ These alternatives, it states, are to be contrasted with the specification given in the sūtras, which is neither too extensive nor too narrow and is favored by the Sarvāstivādins, namely, “everything” refers to “those factors that are included within the twelve sense spheres.”¹⁷⁷ As the sūtra states, “What, O monks, is everything? The eye and material form, the ear and sounds, the nose and odors, the tongue and flavors, the body and tangibles, the mind and factors; this, O monks, is said to be everything.”¹⁷⁸ This specification of “everything” in terms of the twelve sense spheres comes to be accepted as the standard in mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika discussions of existence.

As in the case of the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, our Gāndhārī text (l. 69) begins this discussion by qualifying the fundamental proposition “everything exists” through two logically complementary alternatives, both of which stress that the scope of “everything” must be delimited. Through the first converted statement, “that which exists is everything,” the text reasserts the proposition that “everything exists” using *asti* as a pseudo-substantive referring to the general category of “existents.” And yet, “everything,” if not properly delimited, might be understood to include nonexistent entities, imaginary perceptions and concepts, and conventional objects, whose existence is refuted by correct perception, reasoned investigation, or Buddhistically informed analysis.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, through the second and complementary alternative, which also uses *asti* as a pseudo-substantive, “that which exists is not everything,” the text suggests that the scope of “everything” must be delimited, thereby excluding entities whose existence is rejected. Next, again as in the pattern of the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, our Gāndhārī text offers a specification that delimits the scope of “everything” to the twelve sense spheres: (1) “Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist” (*ye duaḍaśa ayadaṇeha saḡrahiḍa se asti* •, l. 69). This is followed by two further specifications of “everything” separated by the conjunctive indeclinable *aśa* (P/Skt *atha*), which indicates a contrast: (2) “[Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence”; (3) “Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence” ((**tra*)y(**a*)*adhva astiḍa aśabhina vatava* • *aśa adh(*v)a astita di* •, l. 70). Both the second and third specifications include the term *adhva* (P *addhan*, Skt *adhvan*), literally “path” or “passage,” referring in this context to the three time periods of past,

¹⁷⁵ Paṭis I 101, II 230.

¹⁷⁶ AMVŚ 73 p. 378c8ff.

¹⁷⁷ 一切法性皆攝入此十二處中 (AMVŚ 73 p. 378c13–14). Cf. AMVŚ 51 p. 263c10–11, 74 p. 382c11ff.

¹⁷⁸ P *kiṃ ca bhikkhave sabbaṃ. cakkhuṃ c’ eva rūpā ca sotam ca saddā ca ghānaṃ ca gandhā ca jivhā ca rasā ca kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca mano ca dhammā ca idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave sabbaṃ* (SN IV 15). Cf. SĀ (tr. G) 13 no. 319 p. 91a27ff.; Nidd I 1.133, 2.430, 2.441; ĀVBSS 9 p. 795b12–13; DhSk 10 p. 500a2ff.; TSS 2 p. 256a21; MAHŚ 11 p. 963a24; AKBh 5.27c p. 301.7–9, 9 p. 465.19–20; NyAS 51 p. 630c16ff.; YBh (tr. Xz) 6 p. 304c1–2; YBh 124.

¹⁷⁹ For the proponent’s use of the argument concerning nonexistent entities, see ll. 84–85, 88–90, 91–92, 117–118, 120–121.

present, and future.¹⁸⁰ Despite certain syntactic difficulties,¹⁸¹ the second specification asserting that factors of the time periods are not confused can be clarified once again through comparison with the previously cited discussion from the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra. As that discussion suggests, the second of the two complementary statements in the Gāndhārī text, “[everything] does not exist,” should be understood as meaning “[everything] does not exist with the characteristics of everything” since “no factor exists that has the characteristics of another.” Each category of existent factors is thus determined by its own distinguishing characteristic, and as a result, “all factors are not confused.” A fourth specification will be offered by the opponent in a subsequent passage of the Gāndhārī text: 4). “Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence” (*va(*ta)v(*a) c(*a) tr(*a)ya sakhaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa* •, ll. 80–81).¹⁸²

In view of the structural similarity between this passage in our Gāndhārī text and the discussion in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, it is possible that the first and second specifications of “everything” presented prior to the *aṣa* (l. 70) are to be taken together as a unit, each clarifying one of the two complementary alternatives with which the passage begins: “[o] That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything” (*asti sarva • asti no ca sarva* •, l. 69). In other words, the first alternative “that which exists is everything” is clarified through the first specification “those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist,” and the second alternative “that which exists is not everything,” through the second specification “[those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence.” The conjunctive indeclinable *aṣa* would then contrast these two initial specifications taken together with a third: “Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence” (*aṣa adh(*v)a astita di* •, l. 70). This interpretation would be supported by the structure of the discussion in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, which first explains the two complementary alternatives “exists” and “does not exist,” specifically in relation to conditioned factors, and next offers a statement that shifts the focus to the three time periods: “‘Sarvāstivāda’ [has the sense that] the three time periods exist.” Accordingly, in our Gāndhārī text, the first two specifications of “everything” could be interpreted as applying existence to conditioned factors, whereby “everything” is either the (1) twelve sense spheres or (2) those factors of the three time periods, which are not confused. The third specification, which is separated from the first two by the conjunctive indeclinable *aṣa*, would then represent a separate alternative that applies existence to the time periods themselves, which are then considered to exist apart from conditioned factors: “Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence” (*aṣa adh(*v)a astita di* •, l. 70).

The two contrasting views represented by the second and third specifications in our Gāndhārī text, namely, that existence is to be applied to conditioned factors alone or to the time periods themselves, are recorded in the Vibhāṣā compendia at the beginning of the discussion of the existence of past, present, and future factors.¹⁸³ The first view presents an interpretation

¹⁸⁰ AMVŚ 76 p. 393c7–8.

¹⁸¹ Text Notes: [70] + /// |^{52kk(r)}[y].|^{52E(r)}*adhva astiḍa*.

¹⁸² Commentary: The Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82].

¹⁸³ AMVŚ 76 p. 393a9ff., 135 p. 700a26ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 293c18ff. This topic of the existence of past, present, and future factors constitutes one category within the distinctive Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika matrix of forty

of the relation between factors and the time periods that is supported by the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, that is, “everything” in the proposition “everything exists” is limited to conditioned factors (Skt *saṃskṛtadharmā*) or conditioning forces (Skt *saṃskāra*), and the time periods should be understood simply as another name for the conditioning forces themselves. The Vibhāṣā compendia take the position that individual factors exist at all times by virtue of their own defining and unvarying intrinsic nature (Skt *svabhāva*), but the time periods do not exist as independent factors determined by intrinsic nature apart from the individual factors of which they consist.¹⁸⁴ However, it would appear that the Sarvāstivāda proposition “everything exists” quickly provoked the criticism that this leads to the confusion of factors of the past, present and future. In short, if each factor is determined by a single distinguishing characteristic or intrinsic nature, and the proposition “everything exists” entails the existence of factors in the three time periods, how then can any given factor existing as present be discriminated from that factor as past or future? Early attempts to address this problem are found in the theories of the four Sarvāstivāda masters, among others, each of which offers a different criterion by which factors of the three periods can be differentiated.¹⁸⁵ The mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika response to this criticism, developed over centuries of debate, proposes a distinction between a factor’s intrinsic nature (Skt *svabhāva*), which does not vary, and its “modes” (Skt *bhāva*), which can be discriminated in different time periods in dependence upon the occurrence of that conditioned factor’s activity (Skt *kāritra*) or capability (Skt *sāmarthya*).¹⁸⁶ A factor’s activity or capability arises and passes away and thereby not only determines each factor’s nature as conditioned but also distinguishes factors of differing time periods. Thus, every factor can be said to exist in different “modes” (Skt *bhāva*) as past, present, and future, which are discriminated by the presence or absence of that factor’s activity or capability. The use of the term “not confused” (*aśabhina*, Skt *asambhinna*) here in the Gāndhārī text, as in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, presumably alludes to this controversy and might be taken to imply the Sarvāstivāda interpretation of the time periods as constituted by the factors themselves. However, it should not be assumed that the distinction between intrinsic nature and “modes” determined by activity as characteristic of the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model, which was developed over time as a response to this controversy, was already in place.

or forty-two categories of factors, which is one of the ten topics that serve as an outline for scholastic exegesis in certain sections of the Vibhāṣā compendia. For an overview of the ten sections and forty-two factors, see Yamada 1959: 82–84; Yamada 1957. For a detailed comparison of the *Mahāvibhāṣā and the *Vibhāṣāśāstra, see Kawamura 1974: 80–120. Cf. Cox 1998: 155–160, 229–239.

¹⁸⁴ AMVŚ 76 p. 393a15–17, 76 p. 393c4–6, 135 p. 700a25; AVŚ 40 p. 293c24–26; JñPr 13 p. 987b5–6. Cf. SaṅgP 3 p. 378c12–22; PrP (tr. Xz) 6 p. 717b20ff., esp. 6 p. 717c2–4.

¹⁸⁵ For an early discussion, see ĀVBSS 1 p. 724a21ff. Indeed, the possibility of confusing factors of the three time periods precipitated the theories of the so-called “four Sarvāstivāda masters.” For various theories, including those of these four masters and others, see ĀVBSS 1 p. 724b5ff.; VŚ 7 p. 466b7ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 295c6ff.; AMVŚ 77 p. 396a10ff.; MAHŚ 11 p. 961c27ff.; AKBh 5.26ab p. 296.10ff.; NyAŚ 52 p. 631a11ff.; ADV 302 p. 259.7ff. Cf. Kawamura 1974: 42ff.; Dessein 2007.

¹⁸⁶ This “mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model” is suggested in the Vibhāṣā compendia (AMVŚ 76 p. 393c26ff., 77 p. 396b5ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 294b18ff., 40 p. 295c20ff.; VŚ 7 p. 466b21ff.) and culminates in the complex ontological model proposed by Saṅghabhadra in the *Nyāyānusāra. For discussions of Saṅghabhadra’s later model, see the references in Text and Commentary § I.3, n. 205.

In contrast to this sanctioned, mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika interpretation, the opponent in the Vibhāṣā compendia, who is identified as a Dārṣṭāntika or Vibhajyavādin, takes the position that the time periods (Skt *adhvan*) are permanent and hence exist apart from conditioning forces (Skt *samskāra*), which are impermanent.¹⁸⁷ According to this Dārṣṭāntika or Vibhajyavāda position, conditioning forces travel through the time periods like fruit through a series of containers or a person through a series of houses. This position appears similar to the third specification offered in both the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra and our Gāndhārī text, although neither text attributes it to a separate specific group such as the Dārṣṭāntikas or Vibhajyavādins. Instead, it appears that the proponent of our Gāndhārī text and even the Sarvāstivādin opponent himself considers this position to represent an alternative Sarvāstivāda viewpoint. Thus, this example stands as a reminder of two important caveats that must be kept in mind when thinking about the school identification of doctrinal positions, especially during the early period. First, the characterization of the views of a particular school or group, in this case those of the Dārṣṭāntikas, might not accurately reflect the views of that group; instead, they might represent the views of another group entirely or, in certain cases, even possibly an abstract position not held by any group at all. And second, the tendency to assume that a single school or group maintained only one interpretive position on a particular issue, as often suggested by later scholastic texts, cannot be assumed to be the case, especially in the early period. In fact, early- and even middle-period texts such as the Vibhāṣā compendia display a tolerance of a multiplicity of views on doctrinal issues, all of which are attributed to a single group.

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya also offers two alternative explanations of the proposition that “everything exists,” which appear to correspond to the first and third among the three specifications of “everything” in this passage of the Gāndhārī text: “But [the teaching ‘everything exists’] is well [understood] in this way: [namely,] it is to be stated in accordance with what has been said in the sūtra. And how has it been said in the sūtra that ‘everything exists’? It is said, ‘Everything exists, O Brahmans, up to the twelve sense spheres.’ Or [the referent of ‘everything exists’ is] the three time periods.”¹⁸⁸ Here, the first explanation of “everything” in terms of the twelve sense spheres agrees with the first specification in our Gāndhārī text. The second explanation in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in terms of the three time periods might be aligned with either the second or the third specification in the Gāndhārī text. However, Vasubandhu’s interpretation of the relationship between existence and the three time periods differs from that of either the Sarvāstivādins or the Dārṣṭāntikas given above. As the subsequent discussion in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya makes clear, Vasubandhu rejects both the Sarvāstivāda position that factors exist as real entities (Skt *dravyataḥ*) and the Dārṣṭāntika position that the time periods as such exist as real entities. To clarify his

¹⁸⁷ AMVŚ 76 p. 393a10ff., 135 p. 700a26ff. Cf. AVŚ 40 p. 293c21ff., where the term Vibhajyavāda is not mentioned.

¹⁸⁸ Skt *evaṃ tu sādhur bhavati. yathā sūtre sarvamastīty uktam tathā vadati. katham ca sūtre sarvam astīty uktam. sarvamastīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānīti. adhvatrāyaṃ vā* (AKBh 5.27c p. 301.7–9; AKVy 476.32ff.). Yaśomitra explains the manner in which the time periods can be said to exist as “everything” as follows: “The past is that which existed previously; the future is that which will exist when there is a cause; the present is that which having existed has not perished” (Skt *yad bhūtapūrvam tad atītam. yat sati hetau bhaviṣyati tad anāgatam. yad bhūtvāvinaṣṭam tat pratyutpannam*, AKVy 477.2–4). Cf. ADV 301ab p. 259.5.

own view of the relationship between existence and the time periods, Vasubandhu refers to an earlier statement in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, which he claims allows the application of the verb Skt *asti*, or “exists,” to the past and future and yet avoids contradicting scripture: “We too say that the past and future exist, but the past is that which existed previously, and the future is that which will exist when there is a cause. In this way, it is said that [they] ‘exist’ but not as real entities.”¹⁸⁹ Hence, in Vasubandhu’s view, Skt *asti* functions in the weak sense as an indeclinable or referential particle (Skt *nipāta*) indicating a relationship, here between either “past” or “future” factors and “present” factors, rather than as a verb indicating existence per se as a real entity (Skt *dravyataḥ*).¹⁹⁰ For Vasubandhu, the past and future can be said to “exist” only in the sense that each is linked syntactically with some form of the ontic verb “to exist” (\sqrt{as} or $\sqrt{bhū}$); the past is linked with the past participle “existed” (Skt *bhūta*), and the future, with the future finite form “will exist” (Skt *bhaviṣyati*). However, such “existence” understood as “existed” or “will exist” does not entail either existence in the same manner as the present or existence as a real entity.

Thus, Vasubandhu’s second explanation, “or [everything] is the three time periods,” could be correlated with either the second or third specification in our Gāndhārī text. Since Vasubandhu applies existence to the time periods only in the weak sense through their mere syntactic linkage with ontic verbs, he would avoid the problem of “confusion” raised by the second specification. And yet, the wording of this second explanation most closely resembles the third specification that identifies the three time periods as the content of existence: “Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence” (*aśa adh(*v)a astita di •*, l. 70). Hence, if the third specification in the Gāndhārī text were interpreted in terms of Vasubandhu’s second explanation, it would simply apply existence in the weak sense to the time periods and would not entail the Dārṣṭāntika position that the time periods as such exist.

This review of discussions in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, the Vibhāṣā compendia, and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya on the relationship between existence and either conditioned factors or the time periods suggests different possibilities for the attribution of the third specification in our Gāndhārī text. However, it is likely that the third specification in the our text does not allude to the views of a specific group or person such as the Dārṣṭāntikas, Vibhājyavādas, mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, or Vasubandhu. In fact, it may reflect an early and as yet undeveloped view of the relationship between existence and the time periods, a view that was to be further investigated and clarified through these later theories. Thus, our Gāndhārī text is perhaps best interpreted as presenting an alternative Sarvāstivāda interpretation that predates the standardized views found in the Vibhāṣā

¹⁸⁹ Skt *vayam api brūmosty atītānāgatam iti. atītaṃ tu yad bhūtapūrvam. anāgatam yat sati hetau bhaviṣyati. evaṃ ca kṛtvāstīty ucyate na tu punar dravyataḥ* (AKBh 5.27c p. 299.1–3; AKVy 472.33ff.).

¹⁹⁰ “... it was said by the Bhagavat, ‘There is past [form]; there is future [form],’ [simply] due to the fact that the word ‘*asti*’ is a particle, just as there are those who say, ‘There is the prior nonexistence of the lamp; there is the following nonexistence of the lamp,’ and just as it is said, ‘There is a lamp that is extinguished, but that lamp has not been extinguished by me,’ in this way it is said, ‘There is the past and present.’ Otherwise, the past and present nature would not be established” (Skt ... *bhagavatāsty atītam asty anāgatam iti. astiśabdasya nipātatvāt. yathāsti dīpasya prāgabhāvo ’sti paścādabhāva iti vaktāro bhavanti. yathā cāsti niruddhaḥ sa dīpo na tu mayā nirodhita iti. evam atītānāgatam apy astīty uktam. anyathā hy atītānāgatabhāva eva na sidhyet*, AKBh 5.27c p. 299.6–10; AKVy 473.5ff.). Cf. NyAS 51 p. 626b29ff.

compendia. Remnants of this early and as yet inchoate interpretation found in our Gāndhārī text can be found in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.¹⁹¹

Next (ll. 70–71), our text turns from the specifications of “everything” (*sarva*) in the proposition “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*) and focuses instead on the term “existence” (*astiḍa*). Two explications of “existence” are offered, both entailing etymological or derivational explanations. The first explication explains the abstract form *astiḍa* (Skt *astitā*) in terms of the finite verb *asti* (Skt *asti*): “That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; (*that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence” (*ya asti ta ha astiḍa vatava • (*ya nasti) i t(*a) nastiḍa ha vatava •*, ll. 70–71). The second glosses the abstract form *astiḍa* (Skt *astitā*) with the present participle form *sat* of the same root *as*: “The existent (or existing) should be said to be existence; the non-existent (or not existing) should be said to be nonexistence” (*sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*, l. 71).¹⁹²

The passage then appears to continue with the specification of “everything” by elaborating upon its relationship to the three time periods (ll. 71–75). The discussion clearly focuses on existence as past and future, but questions still remain with regard to certain points: the referents of the terms “past” and “future,” the speaker, the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of certain terms (e.g., *vaṣage*, *veśia*), the sense of terms whose equivalents are clear (e.g., *bhava*), and the principle of coherence underlying the formulaic list cited.

Even though the initial adjectives *adiḍa anagaḍa pra(*cupana)* (ll. 71–72) suggest that the general topic of this passage is existence in relation to the three time periods, manuscript damage renders the first sentence uncertain. Even a tentative reconstruction requires close attention to the syntactic structures employed in the surrounding passages and at least a provisional identification of the doctrinal position that this passage represents, if not of the actual speaker. The previous elaboration of the fundamental proposition “everything exists” (ll. 69–71) qualifies the fundamental proposition through two converse and complementary statements, specifies three possible referents of “everything” (*sarva*), and offers two abstract explications of “existence” (*astiḍa*). The following passage (ll. 75–82) qualifies the fundamental proposition yet again and adds a fourth and final specification of “everything” in terms of the three characteristics of conditioned factors (l. 81). Presumably then, this intervening passage (ll. 71–75) also examines the issue of the content of “existence” (*astiḍa*), specifically in relation either to the factors belonging to the three time periods or to the three time periods as such, as mentioned in the second and third specifications of “everything” given previously. Hence, the obscured first sentence has been tentatively reconstructed to include the term “existence” (*astiḍa*), following the pattern of the previous specifications: “[Or,] the past, future, and present (*should be said to be existence)” (*adiḍa anagaḍa pra(*cupana va astiḍa di*), ll. 71–72).

Interpreting this first sentence, however, requires consideration of the possible referents of the terms “past” and “future” and a provisional identification of the speaker or at least of the

¹⁹¹ Commentaries: The Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

¹⁹² Text Notes: [71] + + /// ^{52gg}[i] ^{52gg+52G(r)}[t]. ^{52G(r)}*nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*; [86] *sata asti* [87] + + /// [t].*va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śad[e]hi*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7 [5] ^{51G(v)}[51ssss(v)]^{1.5}*saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*.

viewpoint represented. As in the previous and following passages, the speaker in this passage is tentatively assumed to be the opponent referred to later in the text by the term *mahasarvastivāda*.¹⁹³ Clearly, as their name suggests, the Sarvāstivādins assert that “everything exists,” which entails the existence of factors of all three time periods, past, present, and future. However, even for the Sarvāstivādins, the exact relationship between existent factors and the time periods as such is a complex one. As noted above, the later Vibhāṣā compendia maintain that the Sarvāstivādins reject the existence of the three time periods per se as discrete real entities defined by intrinsic natures distinct from conditioning forces. Instead, the time periods are nothing other than general terms referring to the conditioning forces that constitute them. In accordance with this position, the terms *adida anagaḍa pra(*cupana)* (ll. 71–72) would be interpreted as plural adjectives in the masculine referring to the various conditioning forces or factors, which themselves may be past, present, and future: “[Or,] past, future, and present [**factors**] (*should be said to be existence)” (*adida anagaḍa pra(*cupana va astida di*), ll. 71–72).¹⁹⁴ Such an interpretation of the referent of these terms would be consistent with the second specification given previously: “[Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence” (*(*tra)y(*a)adhva astida aṣabhina vatava •*, l. 70).

A second interpretation is suggested by the third specification of “everything” given previously: “Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence” (*aṣa adh(*v)a astita di •*, l. 70). This third specification appears to acknowledge an interpretation of the time periods that was not accepted by the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, namely, that the time periods can be said to exist as distinct entities. In accordance with this position, this first sentence (ll. 71–72) would refer to the “time periods” themselves as the content of “existence” (*astida*): “[Or,] the past, future, and present [**time periods**] (*should be said to be existence)” (*adida anagaḍa pra(*cupana va astida di*), ll. 71–72). In this case, *adida*, *anagaḍa*, and *pra(*cupana)* would be interpreted either as neuter singular adjectives referring to the past, present and future in the abstract, or possibly as masculine singular adjectives modifying the understood masculine noun “time period” (*adhva*). As noted above, even though this position comes to be associated specifically with the Dārṣṭāntikas or Vibhajyavādins in later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika sources, in this context it would perhaps best be viewed as an early and alternative Sarvāstivāda position that predates the explicit controversy concerning whether existence should be applied to conditioning forces or to the time periods themselves. Even though either of these two interpretations is possible, since the text does not specify the referent of *adida*, *anagaḍa*, and *pracupana* and the gender is not apparent from the Gāndhārī, a translation that reflects this possible ambiguity has been adopted, specifically such that “past,” “present,” and “future” could refer either to conditioned factors or to the time periods themselves: “[Or,] the past, future, and present (*should be said to be existence).”

The next statement presents difficulties with respect to both its overall function and the specific sense of the term *vaṣage*: “A past year exists; a future year exists” (*(*a)d(*i)d(*a)v(*a)ṣ(*ag)e asti • anagaḍa vaṣage asti •*, l. 72). This statement does not contain the term *bhava* and therefore deviates

¹⁹³ Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87].

¹⁹⁴ Commentaries: The Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

from the syntactic pattern of the formulaic list in the next several lines. As a result, it would appear to function either as an example linked to the preceding statement concerning the past, present, and future, or possibly as a general statement intended to introduce the following formulaic list. Determining the function of this statement is further complicated by the uncertain meaning and equivalent of the term *vaṣage*. Since this passage concerns existence in the three time periods, the most likely Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of *vaṣage* are perhaps *varṣaka* or *vassika*, respectively, for which the sense of “rainy season retreat,” “rainy season,” or “year” and by extension year in the general sense of a “period of time” or “stage” might be appropriate. This interpretation would be supported by the fact that *vaṣaga* is used in this sense later in the text (51D(v) ll. 3–5) in a discussion of past, present, and future factors. Even though this more general sense of *vaṣage* does little to clarify the function of the statement in line 72, it would suggest that it be interpreted as an example clarifying the preceding statement; that is to say, the past, present, and future can be said to be existence in the same way that one states that a past year exists or a future year exists. Further, this more general sense of the term *vaṣage* as “period of time” or “year” may also help to clarify the syntactic function of the words *anagaḍa* and *adiḍa* in both this statement and the following formulaic list. For example, they could be interpreted either as substantively used adjectives in the locative singular neuter referring to the past and future time periods as such, namely, “a year in the past [time period]” and “a year in the future [time period].” Or they could function as simple adjectives modifying *vaṣage*, “a past year” and “a future year.” This second interpretation as simple adjectives has been tentatively adopted: “A past year exists; a future year exists.” It seems more reasonable when combined with the word “year” and preserves the ambiguity of “past” and “future” as referring to either conditioned factors or as the time periods per se.

In the next several lines (ll. 72–75), the text presents a formulaic list of examples presumably intended to illustrate the second or possibly the third specifications of “everything” offered previously. Despite the regular syntactic pattern of each example in the list, problems remain concerning the interpretation of certain key terms, most importantly *bhava* but also *adiḍa*, *anagaḍa*, and *veśīa*, as well as the principle of coherence that unites these various examples. Given the general topic of existence in the three time periods, the term *bhava* presumably corresponds to P/Skt *bhāva* in the abstract sense of “state of being,” “nature,” or, in certain contexts, “mode,” rather than to P/Skt *bhava* in the sense of “stage of existence/life” or “rebirth state.”¹⁹⁵ However, P/Skt *bhāva* is a multivalent term with a complex history, and the intended sense here is uncertain. In Pali abhidhamma texts, P *bhāva* is used almost exclusively in compound-final position, with several examples in the chapter “Everything Exists” in the Kathāvatthu, for example, P *rūpabhāva*, or the “state of being material form,” and P *aṭṭabhāva*, or the “state of being past.”¹⁹⁶ And yet, in these compounds, the sense of P *bhāva*, even when understood in its most general meaning as a “state of being,” remains ambiguous. The term P *bhāva* can refer to the abstract defining character of the prior member of the compound, for example, a factor’s defining “nature” as material form (P *rūpabhāva*). This more abstract sense of P *bhāva* as “nature” is supported by other passages

¹⁹⁵ Commentaries: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; Criticism of the Opponent’s First Declaration [ll. 98–102]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134]. For other occurrences of *bhava*, see ll. 42, 94, 99–100, 115, 126–134.

¹⁹⁶ P *rūpaṃ rūpabhāvaṃ na jahaṭi ti* (Kv 120). Cf. P *aṭṭaṃ atthi aṭṭaṃ aṭṭabhāvaṃ na jahaṭi ti* (Kv 121).

in Pali abhidhamma texts in which compounds with P *bhāva* as a final member appear in lists of synonyms together with other terms ending in the abstract suffixes *-tta* (Skt *-tva*) or *-tā* (Skt *-tā*), for example, “femaleness” (P *itthattaṃ*) and the “nature as female” (P *itthibhāva*).¹⁹⁷ However, the term P *bhāva* is also frequently used in compound-final position to refer to a more generalized state of the prior member of the compound or a less abstract manner, or “mode,” of its existence as, for example, a factor’s “mode” of existence as past (P *atītabhāva*).

In fact, the argument in the Kathāvatthu in which the two compounds P *rūpabhāva* and P *atītabhāva* appear demands that the single term P *bhāva* be multivalent, with its different senses demarcating the interpretations of the proponent and his opponent. The argument begins with a question raised by the Kathāvatthu proponent, who asks whether, in the case of the compound “present material form” (P *paccuppannarūpa*), the P *bhāva* indicated by the prior qualifier “present” (P *paccuppanna*) should be equated with the P *bhāva* indicated by the compound-final member “material form” (P *rūpa*): “[KvP] Does present material form that is ceasing abandon its state of being present (P *paccuppannabhāva*)? [O] Yes. [KvP] Does it abandon its state of being material form (P *rūpabhāva*)? [O] That is not to be said.”¹⁹⁸ Here, the Kathāvatthu proponent apparently understands P *bhāva* as denoting something akin to “nature,” or even possibly “intrinsic nature,” and implies that P *bhāva* in this sense of “nature” should not be abandoned, whether used in reference to “material form” or its temporal status as “present.” However, for the opponent, the term P *bhāva* appears to be multivalent; when used in conjunction with “material form” to signify defining character, P *bhāva* conveys a more abstract typological sense of “nature” that does not vary, but when used in conjunction with the time periods, P *bhāva* has a simple or more generalized ontic sense signifying a “mode” of existence that can vary as past, present, or future. To clarify his seemingly contradictory responses, the opponent compares “present material form” to a white cloth, which when dyed abandons its “state of being white” (P *odātabhāva*) but not its “state of being a cloth” (P *vatthabhāva*). This example illustrates the distinction that the opponent assumes must be drawn between an entity and its characteristics: a white cloth can be dyed and will abandon its “whiteness” (P *odātabhāva*), and yet it will not abandon its “clothness” (P *vatthabhāva*). Thus, the opponent appears to use the term P *bhāva* in two senses, as “state of being” and as “nature,” by suggesting that it is possible for a “present” instance of material form to abandon its ontic “state of being” (P *bhāva*) (i.e., mode of existence) as present without abandoning its typological “nature” (P *bhāva*) (i.e., self-nature) as material form. And as a result, in contrast to the Kathāvatthu proponent who would appear to understand the term P *bhāva* in both compounds as referring to a more abstract defining “nature,” the opponent would appear to understand them differently, in one case using the term as a more generalized “state of being,” or “mode,” of existence that changes depending upon its context.

This multivalence of the term P/Skt *bhāva* is evident in abhidharma texts of all periods, that is, as referring to (1) a more abstract typological sense as “nature” referring to a factor’s determined and distinguishing characteristic, and to (2) a more generalized ontic sense as “mode” of existence

¹⁹⁷ Dhs 143; Vibh 122.

¹⁹⁸ P *paccuppannaṃ rūpaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ paccuppannabhāvaṃ jahatī ti. āmantā. rūpabhāvaṃ jahatī ti. na h’ evaṃ vattabbe* (Kv 120).

referring to its changing states such as past, present, and future.¹⁹⁹ This complex semantic history of P/Skt *bhāva* becomes clearer in relation to the term Skt *svabhāva* (P *sabhāva*) to which it is etymologically and functionally connected. The specialized meaning of Skt *svabhāva* is best understood as developing in the context of categorization, through which all aspects of experience are identified, classified, and thereby clearly discriminated. These functionally determined categories result in an elaborate taxonomy of factors (Skt *dharma*) structured in accordance with each factor's distinguishing characteristic, or "intrinsic nature" (P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*). Just as categories in a taxonomic schema are distinct, invariably constituted by their demarcating characteristics and hence not subject to fluctuation, so also each factor thus determined by its "intrinsic nature" is unalterably discriminated and not subject to confusion with other factors. Intrinsic nature undergoes no variation or modification, and therefore factors, which as categories are nothing other than their defining intrinsic natures, are established as stable and immutable. This initial context of typological discrimination of factors through categorization provides the basis in later Sarvāstivāda texts for a shift of focus in the use of the term Skt *svabhāva* to refer to the ontic status of the individual factors thus categorized; that is to say, Skt *svabhāva* no longer simply discriminates the categories to which factors belong but also marks the manner of existence of these factors as real entities. This new concern with ontology led to a reappraisal according to ontic criteria of the traditional categories of factors defined by intrinsic nature; hence Skt *svabhāva* acquired an explicit and specialized ontic sense, which came to be expressed through the term "real entity" (Skt *dravya*).

Whereas the term Skt *bhāva* appears in Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts of all periods, the specialized sense of Skt *svabhāva* referring to a factor's ontologically real status as marked by a defining and unvarying intrinsic nature is encountered only from the middle period of the Vibhāṣā compendia onward.²⁰⁰ In texts of the early period, Skt *bhāva* is used in contexts in which the later texts employ Skt *svabhāva*, and even after Skt *svabhāva* acquires a specialized ontic sense, ambiguity in the use of Skt *bhāva* is still commonplace; in any given occurrence, it might be expected to convey either one or possibly both meanings.²⁰¹ In certain early passages, Skt *bhāva* appears to be used with an abstract typological sense as "nature," that is, referring to a factor's distinguishing characteristic, quality, or nature, but still lacking the fully developed and specialized ontic sense that Skt *svabhāva* was to acquire. And in other early passages, Skt *bhāva* is used, in accordance with its etymological meaning, with a more generalized ontic sense indicating the manner of existence, conveying the sense of "state of being" or "mode" of existence, but again without any necessary implication of "real existence" associated with the term Skt *svabhāva*. As the more specialized sense of Skt *svabhāva* developed, Skt *bhāva* continued to be used, often

¹⁹⁹ For a discussion of Skt *bhāva* in early Sarvāstivāda texts, see Katō 1985: 501–504; Cox 2004. Cf. SaṅgP 3 p. 387c12ff., 11 p. 412a2–4, 11 p. 412c5ff.; PrP (tr. Xz) 2 p. 699c8ff., 3 p. 700a16–17, 3 p. 702a5ff. The Kathāvatthu commentary (Kv-a 44) employs P *sabhāva* where the Kathāvatthu itself has P *bhāva*: P *sabbe pi aṭṭādibhedā dhammā khandasabhāvaṃ na vijahanti* (Kv-a 44). For a discussion of *sabhāva* in Pali sources, see Ronkin 2005: 86–131.

²⁰⁰ Cox 2004, esp. n. 109.

²⁰¹ AMVŚ 76 394c16ff., 76 p. 395a2ff., 77 p. 396a13ff. Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent's Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

resulting in ambiguity concerning both its intended sense as typological or ontic and its relation to the emerging sense of “intrinsic nature.”

Since this distinction between Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva* evolved through analytical refinement and debate over a considerable period, the term Skt *bhāva* remains ambiguous even in texts of the middle period. For example, the early Sarvāstivāda master Dharmatrāta, in explaining the distinction among factors of the three time periods, uses Skt *bhāva* with the sense of a potentially varying “mode” of existence, and discriminates factors of the three time periods on the basis of a “‘difference in ‘mode’ (Skt *bhāvānyathātva*) and not on the basis of a ‘difference as real entities’ (Skt *dravyānyathātva*). In this way, when factors come to the present time period from the future time period, even though they abandon [their] ‘mode’ as future, they do not abandon [their] ‘mode’ as real entities (Skt *dravyabhāva*). Similarly, when factors go to the past time period from the present time period, even though they abandon [their] ‘mode’ as present, they do not abandon [their] ‘mode’ as real entities.”²⁰² In its criticism of this theory, the *Mahāvibhāṣā notes that Dharmatrāta must explain “what this Skt *bhāva* (類) is apart from a factor’s Skt *svabhāva*, ‘intrinsic nature’ (自性).”²⁰³ This criticism implies that for the arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣā, Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva* are so close in meaning as to render untenable any change in one and not in the other.²⁰⁴ However, Dharmatrāta’s theory itself implies some clear distinction between Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva*, even though the stereotyped presentations of his theory do not clarify this distinction. Hence, in Dharmatrāta’s usage, Skt *bhāva* would be better translated by “mode,” or “mode of existence,” than “nature.” The later Sarvāstivāda scholastic Saṅghabhadra attempts to resolve this ambiguity in the meaning of the term Skt *bhāva* by clearly demarcating it from Skt *svabhāva* on the basis of Dharmatrāta’s theory.²⁰⁵ For Saṅghabhadra, a factor’s unvarying “intrinsic nature” (Skt *svabhāva*) is distinguished from its “modes” (Skt *bhāva*), which differ in each of the three time periods

²⁰² Skt ... *bhāvānyathātvaṃ bhavati na dravyānyathātvaṃ ... evaṃ dharmo ’py anāgatād adhvaṇaḥ pratyutpannam adhvānam āgacchann anāgatabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvaṃ. evaṃ pratyutpannād atītam adhvānam gacchan pratyutpannabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvaṃ iti* (AKBh 5.26ab p. 296.11–15).

²⁰³ 說類異者。離法自性說何爲類故亦非理 (AMVŚ 77 p. 396b18–19).

²⁰⁴ The identity of Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva* is also clearly assumed in a verse expressing Vasubandhu’s criticism of the position that “everything exists”: “Intrinsic nature always exists, and yet the mode of existence is not admitted to be permanent. Further, it is not to be said that mode of existence is something other than intrinsic nature. [This is an] act of the lord” (Skt *svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti, bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate. na ca svabhāvād bhāvo ’nyo vyaktam. īśvaraceṣṭitam*, AKBh 5.27c p. 298.21–22; AKVy 472.25ff.). Cf. NyAŚ 52 p. 633c14ff.

²⁰⁵ According to Saṅghabhadra, the master Dharmatrāta claims merely that factors of the three time periods differ in mode of existence (性類, Skt **bhāva*) and yet remain the same in intrinsic form (體相, Skt **svarūpa*). Saṅghabhadra concludes that Dharmatrāta’s position is in essence identical to that of the master Vasumitra, whose theory is sanctioned by the tradition (最初執法轉變故應置在數論朋中。今謂不然。非彼尊者說有爲法其體是常。歷三世時法隱法顯。但說諸法行於世時。體相雖同而性類異。此與尊者世友分同。何容判同數論外道, NyAŚ 52 p. 631b6–10). For the model proposed by Saṅghabhadra, see Cox 1995: 133ff., 305ff.; La Valleé Poussin 1936–1937; Frauwallner 1995: 193–208; Williams 1981; Aohara 1986a; Aohara 1986b; Fukuda 1988. This model is also suggested but not fully developed in the Vibhāṣā compendia: AMVŚ 76 p. 393c26ff., 77 p. 396b5ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 294b18ff., 40 p. 295c20ff.; VŚ 7 p. 466b21ff.

depending upon the occurrence of that factor's activity (作用, Skt *kāritra*) or its capability (功能, Skt *sāmarthya*).

Such passages suggest a complex history in the development of the terms Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva* that precludes any simplistic chronological or sectarian characterization. They also mirror an irresolvable ambiguity between the terms, especially in sources of the early period such as our Gāndhārī text, which provides two examples of the term *svabhava*.²⁰⁶ In one passage (l. 100), *svabhava* (Skt *svabhāva*) is used in contrast to *parabhava* (Skt *parabhāva*), “other-nature,” a contrast that reflects the process by which Skt *svabhāva* came to be discriminated from Skt *bhāva* and used in isolation to refer to a factor's unvarying “intrinsic nature.” Here, the final member of the compound *-bhāva* carries the same sense as in compounds such as the “nature of material form” (P/Skt *rūpabhāva*) found in the Kathāvattu and the Vibhāṣā compendia: that is, as referring to a “nature” belonging to “oneself” (*sva-bhāva*) as opposed to “another” (*para-bhāva*). In such compounds, the final member *-bhāva* clearly conveys the sense of an abstract existent “nature,” rather than that of a varying “mode” of existence. In a second passage (ll. 77–80), our text uses *svabhava* in compound-final position with the abstract forms *adi(*datva)*, *anagaḍatva*, and *pacupanatva*, where it would also appear to have the sense of an abstract existent “nature” similar to the sense of “intrinsic nature” common in later Sarvāstivāda sources.

Since no discussion in our text specifies the sense of *bhava* nor explicitly distinguishes its possible sense as “nature” from that as “mode,” the correct interpretation of the term *bhava* in all passages is problematic. However, the different senses assumed by the proponent and by his Sarvāstivādin opponent are evident in at least two passages. Among the formulaic declarations expanding upon the proposition “everything exists,” the opponent refers to *bhavas* in the instrumental plural: “Everything exists by all [Skt] *bhāvas*” (*sarvabhavaheha sarvam asti* •, l. 68). This would suggest that the opponent does not understand the term *bhava* here as “nature” referring to the single defining characteristic of a particular factor. In the second passage, the proponent criticizes the opponent's view that factors exist as past, present, and future: “With regard to that it should be said that (*one factor) possesses three ‘natures’: a past ‘nature,’ a future ‘nature,’ and a present ‘nature’” (*tatra vatava (*ekasa dhama)ḥ(*a) t(*ra)ya bhava asti • adidabhava ca • anagaḍabhavo*

²⁰⁶ Unfortunately, tracing this history through the Chinese translations of northern Indian abhidharma texts is complicated by the fact that secure MIA or Sanskrit equivalents have often been obscured due to the process of translation. For example, the Vijnānakāya (VK 3 p. 543c9) uses the compound “nature of factors” 法性 in contrast to “sentient beings” 有情, which is merely a provisional designation resulting from concepts. Xuanzang often uses the translation 性 alone for Skt *bhāva*, but here the meaning would appear to be factors in their defining, or intrinsic nature (Skt **svabhāva*). The term 性 is also used in the **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra* (ĀVBSŚ 8 p. 785b219ff.), though the equivalent as Skt *bhāva* is less certain. Also of interest is the **Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra*, which uses both 性 (e.g., MAHŚ 1 p. 870a3–4, 7) and 自性 (e.g., MAHŚ 1 870a20–21), apparently recognizing a distinction between Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva*. However, determining the equivalent in any given passage is extremely difficult. One section of the **Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra*, with a close analogue in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, clearly demonstrates the uncertainty introduced by the Chinese translation; here the **Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* has 法性, suggesting Skt **dharmabhāva* (MAHŚ 1 p. 873b4), where the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh 1.24 p. 16.15) clearly has Skt *dharmasvabhāva*. Cf. AKBh (tr. Xz) 1 p. 6a9, where the term 體 is used in this passage, and AKBh (tr. P) 1 p. 166b11, which uses 自性.

*ca pacup(*a)nabhavo ca* •, ll. 125–127). For this to constitute a criticism, the proponent must reject the possibility that a single factor possesses more than one “nature” (*bhava*, Skt *bhāva*). As a rejoinder, the Sarvāstivādin opponent asserts that one factor exists in or through various *bhavas*, again in the instrumental plural: “Material form exists through *bhāvas*, but there are not three separate [discrete factors of] material form” (*bhavehi* < *ru > *poṃ asti nasti trae* < *ru > *po di* •, l. 127). Since the Sarvāstivādin would define a single factor by only one intrinsic nature (Skt *svabhāva*), this admission of multiple *bhavas* and the contrast between material form on the one hand and the various *bhavas* through which it exists on the other would suggest that the opponent draws at least some kind of distinction between Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva*.

Thus, our text retains traces of the complex process through which the two terms Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva* originally used virtually synonymously, were gradually distinguished from one another. The apparently original sense of Skt *bhāva*, which encompassed both an abstract typological sense as “nature” and a more generalized ontic sense as “mode” of existence, was bifurcated: its abstract sense as “intrinsic nature” became centered on Skt *svabhāva*, while Skt *bhāva* acquired a new, technical denotation referring primarily to a factor’s varying “mode” of existence. As important, in this comparatively early Gāndhārī text, it is likely that the term *bhava* preserves a multivalence characteristic of other abhidharma texts of the early period, a multivalence that will play a crucial role in the arguments between the proponent and his opponents. Indeed, arguments of the type encountered in this text presumably provide examples of the context in which progressively complex doctrinal elaboration eventually led to the emergence of explicitly distinguished interpretations of the term. It reminds us that in scholastic treatises of all periods, a term can be used in an argument with one meaning by one party without regard for the alternative meanings understood or employed by the other party, often with the express intention of forcing the other party into a self-contradiction.

In view of this inherent ambiguity in the use of the Gāndhārī term *bhava* throughout this text and of its different senses as understood by the proponent and his opponent, different translations have been adopted for the term that reflect these different senses. Specifically, *bhava* as used by the proponent is translated as “nature,” which reflects both its earlier sense as a factor’s character as well as its later connection with Skt *svabhāva*, “intrinsic nature.” The Sarvāstivādin opponent in this early Gāndhārī text may not yet explicitly distinguish Skt *bhāva* in the sense of “nature” from the sense of “mode,” but it is nonetheless clear that his multivalent use of the term becomes the focus of criticism by the proponent. Even though the Sarvāstivādin opponent may also understand “nature” as the primary sense of *bhava* in certain contexts, the translation “mode” has been adopted to reflect his distinctive interpretation of *bhava* as a varying “mode” of existence, an interpretation that appears to be assumed in this particular passage and in several of the opponent’s other arguments.²⁰⁷ This use of two different translations should not, however, be understood to suggest that the Sarvāstivādin opponent in this early Gāndhārī text had already self-consciously developed and consistently used the term *bhava* only in the more limited sense of a varying “mode” of existence, as is observed in the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika texts of a later period.

²⁰⁷ Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

Even if the sense of the term *bhava* in this passage is understood as “mode,” reflecting the probable interpretation of the Sarvāstivādin opponent, the character of the formulaic list (ll. 72–75) still remains obscure. Each statement in the list follows a regular syntactic structure whereby the “mode” (*bhava*) of various stages in life or in religious practice are said to exist in some relation to past and future: “the mode of *X* exists *adiḍa anagaḍa*” (*adiḍa anagaḍa X-bhava asti*). Unfortunately, the referents of certain terms, the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of others, and the relationships among or the principle of coherence that unites the individual members of the list are all uncertain. First, as in the case of the previous statements in this passage, the terms *adiḍa anagaḍa* could be understood either as substantively used adjectives in the locative singular neuter referring to the past and future time periods as such, or as simple adjectives in the masculine modifying *bhava*, or “mode.”²⁰⁸ Thus, this formulaic list could entail “mode(s) that exist in the past and future [time periods]” or “mode(s) that exist as past and future.” And as in the case of the previous statements, the second interpretation, that is, “mode(s) that exist as past and future,” has been tentatively adopted in order to preserve the ambiguity of the terms “past” and “future” in this early text.

The first statement with which the formulaic list of examples begins (ll. 72–73) is obscured by both overlying pieces of bark and the deteriorated right margin of the manuscript. The remaining lower portions of the initial syllables support the reading *[g].[ḍ].[bh].[v].*, but the reconstruction of the prior syllables and hence of the statement as a whole is largely speculative: “The modes of the past and future exist as past and future” (*adiḍa anagaḍa a(*diḍana)g(*a)ḍ(*a)bh(*a)v(*a) asti* •, ll. 72–73). This reconstruction conforms to the syntactic pattern of the subsequent examples (ll. 73–75) in which *bhava*, as the final member of the compound, indicates the “mode” of the prior member, which is then said to exist as both past and future, as for example in “the mode of the householder exists as past and future” (*adiḍa anagaḍa grihibhava asti* •, l. 73), and so forth. This first statement concerning modes of the past and future might then be interpreted as offering the most general case for which the following stages of life or religious practice would serve as specific examples. As in the case of *adiḍa* and *anagaḍa* as used throughout this formulaic list, the terms in the compound “modes of the past and future” (*a(*diḍana)g(*a)ḍ(*a)bh(*a)v(*a)*) could refer either to past and future conditioning forces or to the past and future time periods themselves. If they refer to conditioning forces, this could be understood as a general statement that introduces the specific examples that follow: “The modes of [various conditioning forces that are] past and future exist as past and future.” However, if they were interpreted as referring to the time periods themselves, this statement could entail the view that the time periods as such exist as individual factors, a view that is explicitly rejected by the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas but may be accepted by the Sarvāstivādin opponent in our Gāndhārī text: “The modes of the [time periods of] past and future exist as past and future.” As in the previous passages, since such an interpretation is nonetheless possible as an alternative Sarvāstivāda view that predates the standardized position typical of the later period, a translation has been adopted that allows for this ambiguity: “The modes of the past and future exist as past and future.”

²⁰⁸ For the ambiguity in case and gender in the declension of Gāndhārī nouns and adjectives, especially for stems ending in *-a*, see Morphology and Syntax § II.4.1.1 Stems in *a*, Masculine, Neuter, and Feminine.

The following four statements conform to a regular pattern, each containing individual terms whose “mode” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*) is said to exist as past and future, or as future alone in the case of the final example of the arhat (*arahaḍa*). All four terms refer to stages in life and religious practice: (1) the mode of the householder (*grihibhava*, P *gihibhāva*, Skt *gṛhibhāva*); (2) the mode of a monastery attendant or worker serving the monastery (*aramiyabhava*, P/Skt *ārāmikabhāva*); (3) the mode of the merchant (*veśiabhava*, P *vessabhāvo*, Skt *vaiśyabhāva*); and (4) the mode of an arhat (*arahaḍabhava*, P *arahabhāvo*, Skt *arhadbhāva*). The principle of coherence underlying this particular list of four is unclear. The first two terms, the mode of the householder and the mode of a monastery worker, appear in certain lists of life stages discriminated on the basis of their relation to religious communities, but neither the mode of the merchant nor that of an arhat is included in such lists.²⁰⁹ Phonological reconstruction supports the equivalent “merchant” (Skt *vaiśya*) as the equivalent for *veśia*, but it seems reasonable that the opponent would have adopted a regularly occurring sequence of Buddhist life stages, for which a term referring to the monastic life might be expected. The reading *veśia* presents certain difficulties and might be read as *G kaśia* derived from Skt. *kaśāya* (P *kasāya*), referring to the brown-red or yellowish color of the mendicant’s garments.²¹⁰ Fortunately, the designatory referents of the terms in this list are not germane to the ontological discussion of our text. We might then speculate that the archaic or stereotyped nature of the list and the loss of referential significance in this context led to its being misread or misremembered. However, until such time as a corroborative parallel list is found, the tentative reading as “merchant” has been adopted.

The final example, the mode of the arhat (*arahaḍabhava*), presents two additional problems. The first problem concerns whether *arahaḍa* should be understood as a stem form in compound, or as an independent, declined noun in the genitive singular.²¹¹ However, given the syntactic pattern of the prior members of the series, *arahaḍa* has been understood as the stem form in the compound *arahaḍabhava*. Second, unlike the other modes or stages that are said to exist as past and future, the mode of the arhat is said to exist only as future. The reference to the future alone may reflect the perspective of a practitioner for whom such a stage is still future because arhatship has not yet been attained. However, it is also possible that this example originally paralleled the previous examples and that the adjective “past” (*adiḍa*) was simply omitted by the scribe through haplography, or more correctly, by homoeoarchon.

I.3.3.2. The Opponent’s Elaboration of “Everything Exists”: Two Qualifications (2) of the Fundamental Proposition; Four Specifications of “Everything”; Two Explications of “Existence” [ll. 75–82]

²⁰⁹ CPD s.v. *ārāmika*. For a list including the Pali terms *bhikkhubhāva*, *gihibhāva*, *upāsakabhāva*, *ārāmikabhāva*, *sāmaṇerabhāvaṃ* *tiṭṭhiyabhāva*, *tiṭṭhiyasāvabhāva*, *assamaṇabhāva*, and *asakyaputtīyabhāva*, see Vin III 24–25. Cf. Vin IV 40, 42, 307, which contrasts P *ārāmika* with P *bhikkhu* and P *sāmaṇera*; MN II 6, which contrasts P *ārāmikabhūta* and P *upāsakabhūta*; and Ps II 152, which gives a fourfold list of the Pali terms *bhikkhu*, *sāmaṇera*, *āramika*, and *upāsaka*. For a discussion of the duties and status of the *ārāmika*, see Schopen 1994; Yamagiwa 2002; Silk 2008: 42ff.

²¹⁰ Text Notes: [74] *adiḍa naga[d]*. [*v*]eśiabhavo asti •.

²¹¹ Text Notes: [74] *anagaḍa arahaḍabhava asti* [•] [75] + /// |^{52H(v)+52mm(v)+52ll}. [*v*]. |^{52H(v)}m=a|^{52H(v)+52ll}sti •.

Reconstruction

(2) [75] *na sarvam asti • na sarva nasti • adiḍa anathariya asti • arahaḍa adi[76]-
ḍaragadoṣamoha asti • adiḍa adiḍam eva vatava • anagaḍa ana[77](*gaḍam e)v(*a)
v(*a)tava • pracupana pracupanam eva vatava • yasa (*p)i adiḍaśa adi[78](*ḍatvasva)-
bhava astitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍaḍae • eva adiḍaśa anagaḍatvasvabhā[79](*va
a)stitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍaḍae • eva adiḍaśa pacupanatvasvabhāve astitv(*a)-
[80](*bhini)p(*a)n(*a) p(*a)rinipanaḥḍaḍaye • eva anagadena yoyiḍava eva yava
aśakhadana •*

[80] *va[81](*ta)v(*a) c(*a) tr(*a)ya sakhaḍaśa lakṣana va astiḍa • sarva ta ca asti me
aḗatva chad(*a) [82] (*di) ...*

Sanskrit rendering

(2) [75] *na sarvam asti. na sarvaṃ nāsti. atīto 'narthiko 'sti. arhato 'ti[76]tarāgadveṣamohāḥ
santi. atītam atītam eva vaktavyam. anāgatam anā[77]gatam eva vaktavyam. pratyutpannaṃ
pratyutpannam eva vaktavyam. yathāpy atītasyātī[78]tatvasvabhāvo 'stitvābhiniṣpannaḥ
pariṇiṣpannasthatāyā, evam atītasyānāgatatvasvabhā[79]vo 'stitvābhiniṣpannaḥ pariṇiṣ-
pannasthatāyā, evam atītasya pratyutpannatvasvabhāvo 'stitvā[80]bhiniṣpannaḥ pari-
niṣpannasthatāyai. evam anāgatena yoktavyam evaṃ yāvad asaṃskṛtena.*

[80] *va[81]ktavyaṃ ca trīṇi saṃskṛtasya lakṣaṇāni vāstitā. sarvaṃ tac cāsti me 'dhyātmaṃ
chanda [82] iti ...*

Translation

(2) [75] [o] “It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist. A past [factor] without efficacy exists; [for example,] an arhat possesses [76] past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion. The past should be said to be the past alone; the future [77] should be said to be the future alone; the present should be said to be the present alone. Just as, [78] for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of pastness is established as having existence, in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of futureness [79] is established as having existence, [and] in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of presentness [80] is established as having existence. In this way, it should be applied in the case of the future, continuing on in this way through the unconditioned.

[80–81] Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence. And ‘everything’ [in] that [sense is suggested by the scripture passage that states], ‘I have longing internally’” [82]

Commentary: The Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]

Both the content of this passage and the absence of the formulaic markers indicating a transition between speakers suggest that the speaker continues without change, and therefore is likely the Sarvāstivādin opponent who is expressing his own views. Nonetheless, various points in the passage appear inconsistent with a typical Sarvāstivāda or later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika perspective. For example, the passage begins with two negative complementary statements: “It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist” (*na sarvam asti • na sarva nasti* •, l. 75). The first statement in particular, “It is not the case that everything exists,” would appear

to contradict the hallmark Sarvāstivāda assertion that “everything exists.” However, as in the case of the pair of complementary statements that begin the previous passage, these two statements also may represent an attempt on the part of the Sarvāstivādin opponent to qualify his fundamental proposition in such a way as to exclude phenomena whose existence must be rejected.²¹² That is to say, the fundamental proposition “everything exists” does not mean that everything exists from every possible perspective, but rather it only holds if the scope of “everything” is properly delimited. The second of the two statements, “it is not the case that everything does not exist” (*na sarva nasti*), would be accepted by the Sarvāstivādin opponent and proponent alike and hence would appear to require no explicit comment. Nonetheless, as in the case of the previous passage, here also the two complementary statements function together to delimit the scope of “everything” and thereby determine “existence.”

The passage continues with two examples that further illustrate the delimitation of existent factors suggested by these initial complementary statements. The first example, employed in a variety of contexts in abhidharma materials, concerns an arhat’s past defilements: “A past [factor] without efficacy exists; [for example,] an arhat possesses past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion” (*adiḍa anathariya asti • arahaḍa adiḍaragadoṣamoha asti •*, ll. 75–76). Here, the Sarvāstivādin opponent maintains that an arhat’s past defilements “exist” as potential causes, or by virtue of their intrinsic nature (*svabhava*, Skt *svabhāva*), but can also be said “not to exist” in the sense that having been obstructed by religious practice, they will never condition the arising of effects, that is, other defilements. Once again, the Kathāvatthu records a similar exchange on this issue with an opponent identified in the commentary as a Sabbatthivādin.²¹³ The opponent agrees that past lust exists for an arhat (*P arahato atīto rāgo atthi*), but he refuses to admit that an arhat should be considered “possessed of lust” (*P sarāgo*) due to this existent past lust. The Kathāvatthu proponent then notes a contradiction in the opponent’s position concerning the defilements of an ordinary person as opposed to those of an arhat. In the case of an ordinary person, past defilements exist as potentially efficacious and can give rise to their effects when the requisite conditions are assembled. However, for an arhat, past defilements still exist but their efficacy has been obstructed by the path of religious practice, and they will never function to produce effects. As in the case of the Kathāvatthu, the Sarvāstivādin opponent in this passage of our Gāndhārī text appeals to an arhat’s past defilements as an example of past factors that exist but lack efficacy (*anathariya*, Skt *anarthika*); that is to say, since an arhat has abandoned all defilements, existent past defilements can no longer function as causes in giving rise to additional defilements.²¹⁴ Thus, the case of the arhat’s past defilements serves as an example for both of the initial complementary statements in this passage (l. 75): the second statement, “it is not the case that everything does not exist,” is clarified by the arhat’s past defilements that do indeed exist, while the first statement, “it is not the case that everything exists,” is clarified by the efficacy or activity of the arhat’s past defilements, which will never serve as the condition for the arising of effects.

²¹² Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

²¹³ Kv 131ff.; Kv-a 50.

²¹⁴ AMVŚ 18 p. 89b10ff., 23 p. 118b16–19, 27 p. 140b19ff., 65 p. 338a1ff.; NyAS 52 p. 635b20ff. Cf. MAHŚ 8 p. 936a16–19.

For the second example illustrating the proper delimitation of existent factors, the opponent returns to the issue of the three time periods: “The past should be said to be the past alone; the future should be said to be the future alone; the present should be said to be the present alone” (*adiḍa adiḍam eva vatava • anagaḍa ana(*gaḍam e)v(*a) v(*a)tava • pracupana pracupanam eva vatava •*, ll. 76–77). Although seemingly tautological in form, this statement becomes significant in the context of the Sarvāstivāda assertion that factors exist at all times, an assertion that requires some method of discriminating among factors of the past, present, and future. In other words, confusion among past, present, and future factors can be avoided only through the demarcation of clear boundaries among the three time periods.²¹⁵ By referring to and thereby asserting the existence of the three time periods of past, present, and future, or possibly of the factors of which they consist, this statement clearly confirms the second statement introducing this passage, “it is not the case that everything does not exist.” And yet, the appearance of the restrictive particle “alone” (*eva*) implies that the past, present, and future are clearly demarcated, since the past exists as **past alone** but does not exist as present or future, and so forth. This then illustrates the first introductory statement, “it is not the case that everything exists.” Hence, this second example also illustrates the two initial statements in line 75—“It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist”—since it suggests that factors of any given time period **do** indeed exist, and yet do **not** exist as factors of a different time period.

Elaborating upon this second example, the opponent further demarcates the time periods through a series of three formulaic statements that describe the process by which each time period is determined and thereby discriminated from the other two. The passage consists of a conclusion preceded by three syntactically parallel statements, distinguished only by the terms “pastness” (*adiḍatva*), “futureness” (*anagaḍatva*), and “presentness” (*pacupanatva*), which occur in the same location and presumably with the same syntactic function in each statement (ll. 77–80):

*yasa <*p>i adiḍaṣa adi(*ḍatvasva)bhava astitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥhaḍae.*

*eva adiḍaṣa anagaḍatvasvabha(*va a)stivabhiniḍana parinipanaḥhaḍae.*

*eva adiḍaṣa pacupanatvasvabhava astitv(*abhini)p(*a)n(*a) p(*a)rinipanaḥhaḍaye.*

eva anagadena yoyiḍava eva yava aṣakhadena.

Despite the obvious structural parallelism, problems remain in the interpretation of certain syntactic relationships within each statement, as well as of the meaning of individual terms. This is largely a result of the variability of Gāndhārī case terminations, which obscures compound boundaries and renders the cases of un-compounded words uncertain.

All three statements begin with the un-compounded word *adiḍaṣa* (Skt *aṭṭasya*) declined in the genitive singular, and the concluding statement in this passage, “In this way, it should be applied in the case of the future, ...” (*eva anagadena yoyiḍava*, l. 80), suggests that the pattern is to be applied similarly to the future and present. However, the gender of *adiḍaṣa* as masculine or neuter and hence its referent are both uncertain. It could be interpreted in one of three ways: (1) in the masculine referring to a past factor (Skt *dharma*); (2) in the masculine referring to the past time

²¹⁵ Text Notes: [70] + /// |^{52kk(r)}[y].|^{52E(r)}*adhva astiḍa*. Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

period per se (Skt *adhvan*); or (3) in the neuter referring to the past state in the abstract (Skt *atīta*). The mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position that grants intrinsic nature only to individual factors and not to the time periods as such would support the first option, whereby *adiḍaṣa* is understood as masculine referring to a past factor. The second option whereby *adiḍaṣa* refers to the past time period would be consistent with the third specification of “everything” offered previously by the Sarvāstivādin opponent in our text, namely, that existence (*astida*) can be equated with the time periods (*adhva*) themselves (l. 70). However, since the immediately preceding statement (ll. 76–77) contains the apparently neuter forms *adiḍam*, *ana(*gaḍam)*, and *pracupanam*, the third option in which *adiḍaṣa* functions as a neuter abstract noun referring to the past state in the abstract appears to be the most likely interpretation.²¹⁶ Although not referring specifically to the masculine noun “time period” (Skt *adhvan*), the use of such time-related adjectives in the neuter abstract is ambiguous, and could be interpreted as implying the position that the past, present, and future exist in some sense independently, and thus in a way that is not consistent with the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position.

The uncertain relationships among the remaining elements in the statement raise three possibilities for the syntactic function of this initial genitive, *adiḍaṣa*. The genitive case could be construed with the following compound, *adi(*ḍatvasva)bhava*, yielding “the intrinsic nature of pastness belonging to the past.” However, if the same syntactic connection were adopted for the second and third parallel statements, *anagaḍatvasvabha(*va)* (ll. 78–79) and *pacupanatvasvabhava* (l. 79), the past would also be characterized by the intrinsic nature of both futureness (*anagaḍatvasvabha(*va)*) and presentness (*pacupanatvasvabhava*). This in turn would contradict the definition of a single factor by a single intrinsic nature, as well as the intention of clearly discriminating among the past, present, and future. Thus, it is more likely that this initial genitive *adiḍaṣa* serves either as a genitive of reference, “in the case of the past,” or is construed with another noun that occurs later in the statement, very likely the final compound *parinipanaḥhaḍae*, “for the sake of the determination of the past.”²¹⁷

The first member *parinipana* (P *parinipphanna*, Skt *pariniṣpanna*) of this final compound *parinipana-ḥha-ḍae* is perhaps most familiar from the Yogācāra model of the three natures (Skt *trisvabhāva*) of all phenomena, where Skt *pariniṣpanna* refers to the third and final “perfected,” or “absolutely determined,” nature (Skt *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) that characterizes phenomena as they really exist. The origins of this specialized Yogācāra sense of the term Skt *pariniṣpanna* can be found in Sarvāstivāda attempts to define and establish their taxonomy of discrete and really existing factors (Skt *dharma*), as is observed in this Gāndhārī passage.²¹⁸ Clarifying the significance of the term Skt *pariniṣpanna* in Sarvāstivāda ontology and its later development in Yogācāra texts presents

²¹⁶ For an analogous use of the Sanskrit terms *atītam*, *anāgatam*, and *pratyutpannam* in the neuter with an abstract sense, see AKBh 5.24d p. 295.2, 5.25cd p. 296.4.

²¹⁷ Text Notes: [77] • *yasa yi adiḍaṣa adi*[78] + + + ///^[52E(v)][*bha*]va *astitvabhiniṣpana parinipanaḥhaḍae* •.

²¹⁸ The need to clearly discriminate Skt *dharma*s in order to avoid confusion among them, especially in the context of inclusion, is a frequent issue also in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra: 尊作是說。當言無量相。設一相者。法則有壞。法則有亂。此無有定處。如此諸法而有自相。猶如此有爲法不可得作無爲法。無爲法亦不可得作有爲法 (ĀVBSŚ 1 p. 724a21–25). Cf. ĀVBSŚ 3 p. 737c9ff., esp. 3 p. 737c22ff., passim. Cf. 有說此論略顯諸法體類差別不相雜亂攝一切法。故唯說五 (PVVŚ *shang* p. 989b28–989c1).

complex problems. Perhaps the greatest of these problems is the fact that relevant Sarvāstivāda abhidharma and certain Yogācāra materials are available only in Chinese translations that obscure the Sanskrit equivalents for the often divergent Chinese translations of specific terms. Interestingly, in his translation of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, Xuanzang uses one Chinese equivalent to translate Skt *pariṇiṣpanna* (圓成實) in the context of the distinctively Yogācāra theory of the three natures but usually avoids that translation in other contexts. In one passage in the Yogācārabhūmi, which criticizes the view that past and future factors exist as real entities, Skt *pariṇiṣpanna* clearly carries a distinctively Sarvāstivāda sense for which Xuanzang uses the translations 成就 and 真實 or simply 成實.²¹⁹ This passage examines an opponent’s assertion that “the past and future exist as real entities” (Skt *atītānāgatadravyasadvāda*, 去來實有論者). The opponent claims that “the past and future exist [and] are determined (Skt *pariṇiṣpanna*, 成就) by their [respective] characteristics (Skt *lakṣaṇa*, 其相). Just like the present, they exist as real entities (Skt *dravyasat*, 實有), not as provisional designations (Skt *prajñaptisat*, 假).”²²⁰ Explaining the reasoning that underlies this assertion, the opponent states that “a factor is determined (Skt *pariṇiṣpanna*, 真實) by that characteristic (Skt *lakṣaṇa*, 自相) by which that factor is established (Skt *vyavasthita*, 安住).”²²¹ And he continues, “If that future [factor] did not exist, then it would not have acquired its characteristic at that time. [And] if a past [factor] did not exist, then it would have abandoned its characteristic at that time. This being the case, a factor would not have a determined characteristic. [And] it is therefore not reasonable that a factor would not have a determined characteristic.”²²² Thus, the opponent in this passage of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra links a factor’s existence to its “determination,” which refers to establishment through its characteristic, and such “determination” entails that a factor’s characteristic is “established” without alteration.

The assertion of this opponent in the Yogācārabhūmi echoes similar statements in the Vibhāṣā compendia and other Sarvāstivāda abhidharma sources.²²³ For example, factors are said to be “established” by their intrinsic nature: “All factors already have intrinsic nature, because from the beginning each [factor] is established in [its] own particular inherent characteristic.”²²⁴ Therefore, “every factor is established in its intrinsic identity, its own self, its own form, its own characteristic, its own part, and its own original nature.”²²⁵ Intrinsic nature defines the category in which factors

²¹⁹ For 成就 and 真實, see YBh (tr. Xz) 6 p. 304b24ff. For 成實, see YBh (tr. Xz) 36 p. 490c8–10, 45 p. 543a16–17, 77 p. 738a24–25.

²²⁰ 有過去有未來。其相成就猶如現在實有非假 (YBh (tr. Xz) 6 p. 304b26–27). Skt *asty atītam. asty anāgatam. lakṣaṇena pariṇiṣpannam. yathaiṣa pratyutpannam. dravyasat. na prajñaptisat* (YBh 122–123).

²²¹ 若法自相安住此法真實是有 (YBh (tr. Xz) 6 p. 304c5). Skt *yo dharmo yena lakṣaṇena vyavasthitaḥ sa tena pariṇiṣpannaḥ* (YBh 125).

²²² 此若未來無者。爾時應未受相。此若過去無者。爾時應失自相。若如是者。諸法自相應不成就。由此道理亦非真實故。不應理 (YBh (tr. Xz) 6 p. 304c5–8). Skt *sacet so ’nāgato na syāt tena tad anupāttasvalakṣaṇaḥ syāt. saced atīto na syāt tena tadā vihīnasvalakṣaṇaḥ syāt. evam sa saty apariniṣpannasvalakṣaṇaḥ syāt. tasmad apariniṣpannasvalakṣaṇaḥ syād iti na yujyate* (YBh 125).

²²³ For *P pariṇipphanna* used with a similar sense in the Kathāvatthu, see Kv 459, *passim*.

²²⁴ 謂一切法已有自性本來各住自體相故 (AMVŚ 76 p. 394b23–24). Cf. VK 12 p. 589c27–28, *passim*; AHŚ (Dh) 1 p. 810b8; AHŚ (U) 1 p. 836b13ff.; MAHŚ 1 p. 880b12ff.

²²⁵ 自體在者。謂一切法各住自體自我自物自相自本性中 (AMVŚ 52 p. 272a21–22, 39 p. 200a21–22). For other references to this or similar formulaic lists, see AMVŚ 1 p. 4a10–11, 6 p. 29c23, 23 p.

are classified, and through this “establishment” by intrinsic nature, factors are then “determined.”²²⁶ Such “determination” by intrinsic nature implies two further features of the factors so determined. First, just as categories in a well-structured taxonomic schema are distinct and not subject to fluctuation, so also factors, as “determined,” are uniquely individuated and clearly and unalterably discriminated. Thus, as in the case of categories, it is only through clear discrimination on the basis of intrinsic nature that confusion among factors can be avoided.²²⁷ Second, such “determination” by intrinsic nature undergoes no variation or modification; hence, factors, which represent types or categories of intrinsic nature, are established as stable and immutable. In this regard, Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts speak of factors as “always established as their intrinsic nature,” with the inevitable consequence that factors, being determined without confusion, always exist as intrinsic nature and “do not abandon their intrinsic nature.”²²⁸ Thus, this “determination” is also ontic since factors thus “determined” by intrinsic nature also exist as real entities (Skt *dravyasat*). And from this Sarvāstivāda interpretation of the term “determined,” which entails the real existence of each factor characterized by a stable and invariable intrinsic nature, it is then one small step to the Yogācāra concept of the “perfected,” or “absolutely determined,” nature (Skt *pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) that characterizes phenomena as they really exist.

The middle portions of each of the three parallel statements in this passage in our Gāndhārī text also present certain perplexing problems: ... *adi(*datvasva)bhava astitvabhiniṣpana* ... (ll. 77–78); ... *anagaḍatvasvabha(*va a)stitvabhiniṣpana* ... (ll. 78–79); and ... *pacupanatvasvabhava astitv(*abhini)p(*a)n(*a)* ... (ll. 79–80). The first problem lies in the abstract terms formed with the *-tva* suffix, “pastness” (*adidaṭva*), “futureness” (*anagaḍatva*), and “presentness” (*pracupanatva*),²²⁹ especially as compounded with “intrinsic nature” (Skt *svabhāva*) and in conjunction with the term “determined” (Skt *pariṇiṣpana*). The compound *adidaṭvasvabhava* (Skt *atītatvasvabhāva*), if indeed it is a compound, appears to mean the “intrinsic nature of pastness” and would appear to refer to the past as an abstract entity. This might suggest either that factors in each of the three time periods exist with an intrinsic nature (*svabhava*) of “pastness” (*adidaṭva*), and so on, or that the time periods, as such, exist. Both of these positions would be inconsistent with the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika assertion that the time periods themselves do not exist as discrete factors, but they are instead constructs that refer simply to the factors of which they consist. However, as in the case of the term Skt *bhāva*, these abstract terms should perhaps be taken as evidence of an early

117c23–24, 39 p. 200a21–22, 46 p. 237c9–10, 71 p. 367c19–20, 73 p. 379a9–10, 76 p. 393c5–6, passim; PVVŚ *shang* p. 990b13–14.

²²⁶ AMVŚ 30 p. 154b18–20, 23 p. 116c19–21. Cf. AMVŚ 74 p. 381b3–4, 113 p. 588a22–24.

²²⁷ AMVŚ 23 p. 118b20–22; MAHŚ 2 p. 882b20.

²²⁸ 諸法決定無有雜亂。恒住自性不捨自性 (AMVŚ 33 p. 171b1–2; JñPr 2 p. 923c21–23).

²²⁹ The Saṅgītiparyāya glosses (SaṅgP 11 p. 412a22–24) a sūtra reference to “material form, whether past, present, or future ...” (如是名爲諸所有色。若過去若未來若現在者, SaṅgP 11 p. 412a18–22) with a parallel series of adjectives, which include probable equivalents of these abstract terms: for example, “pastness (過去性 Skt **atītatva*), nature as past (過去類 Skt **atītabhāva*), and being included within the past time period (過去世攝 Skt **atītasamgrahīta*).” Cf. Katō 1985.

alternative Sarvāstivāda view that reflects a less precise understanding of the relationship between existence and the time periods than that developed by the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas.²³⁰

As a second problem, the sense of the term *abhinipana* (Skt *abhinīṣpanna*) in the context of these Gāndhārī statements is uncertain. Derivatives of the root *pad* with the prefixes *abhi-* and *niṣ-* occur most frequently in abhidharma texts in the context of religious practice and are used with the sense of “to appear,” “to bring about,” or “to attain.”²³¹ Additional clues for the meaning of *abhinīṣpanna* are provided by the above-cited passage from the Yogācārabhūmi, in which the term “determined” (Skt *parinīṣpanna*) is explained through Skt *vyavasthita* in the sense of “established” or “distinguished”: a factor is “established through [its] characteristic.”²³² Similarly, Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts define a factor as “established” in its intrinsic nature, or particular inherent characteristic, by which it is then said to be “determined.”²³³ Both the Yogācārabhūmi and Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts suggest that the determination of a factor is dependent upon, or is a function of, the establishment of that factor’s intrinsic nature; in other words, the state of being “determined” (Skt *parinīṣpanna*) follows from that of being “established” (Skt *vyavasthita*). Even though a Gāndhārī equivalent for the term Skt *vyavasthita* does not appear in this passage of our text, it is nonetheless possible that *abhinipana* (Skt *abhinīṣpanna*) conveys the same sense; that is to say, the “determination of the past” follows from the fact that the “intrinsic nature of pastness” (*adiḍatvasvabhava*) is “established as having existence” (*astitvabhinipana*). This tentative interpretation could be supported by comparing the distinctive senses of the prefixes *abhi-* and *pari-*, where *abhi-* would convey the sense of “toward” or “approaching” in contrast to *pari-*, which conveys the sense of “fully” or “completely.” Hence, Skt *abhi-nīṣpanna* might refer to a preliminary stage of “establishment” preceding Skt *pari-nīṣpanna*, which would then refer to the final stage of “determination.”

From these tentative interpretations of the syntax and of the terms employed in these formulaic statements emerges a provisional sense of the passage as a whole. The first statement can thus be translated as follows: “And just as, for the sake of the determination (*parinipana-īha-ḍae*) of the past (*adiḍasa*) the intrinsic nature of pastness (*adiḍatva-svabhava*) is established as having existence (*astitvabhinipana*) ...” (*yasa* < **p* > *i* *adiḍasa* *adi*(**ḍatvasva*)*bhava* *astitvabhinipana* *parinipana-īha-ḍae* •, ll. 77–78). The second and third parallel statements would follow the same pattern, with the substitution of “futureness” and “presentness” for “pastness” as it appears in the first statement: “In the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of futureness is established as having existence, and in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of presentness is established as having existence” (*eva* *adiḍasa* *anagaḍatvasvabha*(**va* *a*)*stitvabhinipana* *parinipana-īha-ḍae* • *eva* *adiḍasa* *pacupanatvasvabhava*

²³⁰ Commentaries: The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]; The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

²³¹ For Skt *abhinīṣpatti* with the sense of “arising,” see AKBh 1.43d p. 32.15, 4.4ab p. 197.18–19, 7.8ad p. 395.7, 7.13ab p. 400.4–5. For Skt *abhinīṣpādana*, see AKBh 7.13ab p. 400.4. For Skt *abhinīṣpanna* in the context of religious practice, see AKBh 7.43d p. 422.7ff.

²³² See Text and Commentary § I.3, n. 221.

²³³ See Text and Commentary § I.3, nn. 224–228.

*astiv(*abhini)p(*a)n(*a)p(*a)rinipanañhadaye*, ll. 78–80). Taken together, these three statements assert that all categories of factors are “determined” not only through establishment by their own intrinsic nature but also through a process of mutual discrimination; that is to say, a given category, such as the past, is “determined” (Skt *pariniṣpanna*) not simply through the establishment of its own intrinsic nature of “pastness,” but equally through the establishment of the intrinsic nature of “futureness” and “presentness” with which its “pastness” must be contrasted.

The importance of mutual discrimination as a method for the establishment of all categories of factors becomes clear in a passage in the *Mahāvibhāṣā that argues for the existence of past and future factors:

Further, if past and future [factors] did not exist as real entities, there would also be no [factors] of the present time period because the provisional designation (Skt **prajñapti*), “present [factors],” depends upon past and future [factors]. If there are no [factors] of the three time periods, there are no conditioned [factors] (Skt **saṃskṛta*). If there are no conditioned [factors], there are no unconditioned [factors] (Skt **asaṃskṛta*) because unconditioned [factors] are established in dependence upon conditioned [factors]. If there were no conditioned or unconditioned [factors], there would be no factors at all. If there were no factors at all, there would be no liberation (Skt **vimokṣa*), no escape (Skt **niḥsarāṇa*), and no nirvāṇa. Such [statements] then are established as incorrect views, and one must avoid these faults. Therefore, it is known that past and future [factors] exist as real entities.²³⁴

In our Gāndhārī text, the prior statements that “the past should be said to be the past alone” and so on (ll. 76–77) imply this mutually discriminating establishment of the time periods that is then made explicit in the following three formulaic statements. And as in the case of this passage from the *Mahāvibhāṣā, the final statement in our text concludes that all such categories of factors are to be thus “determined” (Skt *pariniṣpanna*) through the same process of establishing their intrinsic nature in contrast to that of other factors: “In this way, it should be applied in the case of the future on down to the unconditioned” (*eva anagadena yoyidava eva yava aṣakhadena* •, l. 80).

²³⁴ 復次若過去未來非實有者。彼現在世應亦是無。觀過去未來施設現在故。若無三世便無有爲。若無有爲亦無無爲。觀有爲法立無爲故。若無有爲無爲應無一切法。若無一切法應無解脫出離涅槃。如是便成大邪見者。勿有斯過故知實有過去未來 (AMVŚ 76 p. 393b21–26). Cf. AVŚ 40 p. 294a27ff. For the mutual determination of factors, specifically those of the three time periods, see the *Mahāvibhāṣā: “Further, conditioned factors are provisionally designated as future in dependence upon [factors of] the past and present. [But conditioned factors] are not provisionally designated as future in dependence upon [factors of yet another] future [time period] because there is no fourth time period. Further, [conditioned factors] are provisionally designated as past in dependence upon [factors of] the future and present. [But conditioned factors] are not provisionally designated as past in dependence upon [factors of yet another] past [time period] because there is no fourth time period. Further, [conditioned factors] are provisionally designated as present in dependence upon [factors of] the past and future. [But conditioned factors] are not provisionally designated as present in dependence upon [factors of yet another] present [time period] because there is no fourth time period” (復次諸有爲法。觀過去現在故施設未來。不觀未來故施設未來。無第四世故觀未來現在。故施設過去。不觀過去故施設過去。無第四世故。觀過去未來。故施設現在。不觀現在故施設現在。無第四世故。如是名爲三世差別, AMVŚ 76 p. 394b12–17). Cf. AVŚ 40 p. 294c12ff. For the treatment in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, see Takeda and Cox 2010.

Even though the general sense of the passage appears clear, several syntactic and semantic problems remain. First, the suggested compound boundaries and syntactic connections are tentative. Second, the interpretation of Skt *abhiniṣpanna* with a sense similar to that of Skt *vyavasthita* as “established” or “distinguished” as it is used in conjunction with Skt *pariṣpanna* is far from certain. Third, the interpretation of this passage becomes problematic in view of the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position concerning the ontic status of the time periods and their relationship to factors. As noted above, the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas will maintain that the time periods do not exist in and of themselves, that is, as real entities (Skt *dravya*) possessed of intrinsic nature (Skt *svabhāva*), but rather are to be equated with the conditioning forces of which they consist. Hence, if the Gāndhārī proponent were arguing with an opponent representing this mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position, he would be unlikely to attribute to him the position that the time periods possess an abstract “pastness,” “futureness,” or “presentness,” each of which is determined by an intrinsic nature. However, a partial solution to this problem is suggested by passages in the *Mahāvibhāṣā that apply intrinsic nature to both individual factors and categorial groups of factors as a whole. In these passages, the intrinsic nature of the individual or group is identified by means of a formulaic characterization that employs the frequent Chinese equivalents 自性, presumably for to the Sanskrit term *svabhāva*. For example, in the discussion of the three time periods, it states, “What do the three time periods, [understood] in this way, take as [their] intrinsic nature? They take all conditioned factors as [their] intrinsic nature. As in the case of intrinsic nature, so also the self, form, identity, characteristic, part, and original nature [of the three time periods] should be understood. The intrinsic nature [of the three time periods] has already been explained.”²³⁵ Here, 自性 (Skt *svabhāva*) is used in reference to the three time periods, even though for the Sarvāstivādins the time periods do not constitute independent factors determined by intrinsic nature. If however “intrinsic nature” (Skt *svabhāva*) is understood in its original sense as signifying the defining property of an abstract category rather than the existence as a real entity of a discrete factor, it can then be applied without contradiction either to categorial groups as a whole or to their individual constituents. The *Mahāvibhāṣā’s frequent application of this formulaic characterization in terms of intrinsic nature both to individual phenomenal events acknowledged as discrete independent factors and to entire categorial groups of factors²³⁶ points to this original function of Skt *svabhāva* in abhidharma texts: that is, to identify the specific property that enables the discrimination of categorial-types, whether on the level of individuals or groupings, and not to signify that the category as a whole exists as a single independent factor.²³⁷ Such an interpretation of Skt *svabhāva* would help to resolve the apparent contradiction in the application of “intrinsic nature” to the time periods, which may be occurring in this passage of the Gāndhārī text.

A second solution to the problem is suggested by the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra, which is generally recognized to be an early (pre-Vibhāṣā) Sarvāstivāda text. In a discussion

²³⁵ 問如三世以何爲自性。答以一切有爲法爲自性。如說自性。我物自體相分本性應知亦爾。已說自性 (AMVŚ 76 p. 393c4–6).

²³⁶ For Skt *svabhāva* as applied to the aggregates (Skt *skandha*), see AMVŚ 74 p. 383c12–15, 75 p. 386c10–12, 112 p. 579a13–14; to the elements (Skt *dhātu*), see AMVŚ 71 p. 367c13–15, 71 p. 367c19–21, 71 p. 368a16–17; to the sense spheres (Skt *āyatana*), see AMVŚ 73 p. 378c29ff., esp. 73 p. 379a9–11.

²³⁷ Cox 2004.

of possible criteria by which factors of the three time periods can be discriminated, the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra offers as many as six theories.²³⁸ Two of these theories can clearly be connected with two of the four theories of the “Sarvāstivāda masters” cited in the Vibhāṣā compendia and in later sources: specifically Dharmatrāta’s theory that discriminates factors of the three time periods on the basis of Skt *bhāva*, “nature,” here understood as “mode”; and Ghoṣaka’s theory based on Skt *lakṣaṇa*, “characteristic.” Possible connections between the remaining theories in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra and those of the other two masters are much less certain.²³⁹ In the context of this Gāndhārī passage, it is more important to note that these theories are offered in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra as alternatives, and in contrast to the Vibhāṣā compendia, no single theory is designated as correct. The fifth theory is of particular interest since it resembles the view cited in this passage of our Gāndhārī text: “[Within] the locus of the three time periods, [factors] either arise or do not arise; this is the meaning. The locus of the future is precisely the future; the past time period is precisely the past; the present time period is precisely the present.”²⁴⁰ The subsequent question suggests that this fifth theory raises the controversy concerning the problematic relationship between the time periods and past, present, and future conditioning forces: “QUESTION: Are the time periods and conditioning forces different? Suppose the time periods and conditioning forces are separate; [then] the time periods are permanently established. If the time periods are identified with conditioning forces, then those conditioning forces are either assembled [in the present] or dispersed [in the future or past].”²⁴¹ Even though this question remains unanswered in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra, it does at least clearly indicate that the existence of the time periods as such was a contentious issue among early Sarvāstivādins, with supporters on both sides.²⁴²

Now this fifth theory in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra based on a difference in locus is similar to one theory among the four “Sarvāstivāda masters,” namely, that of Vasumitra,

²³⁸ ĀVBSS 1 p. 724b4ff. Cf. MAHŚ 11 p. 963b2ff.; Watanabe 1954: 186–188.

²³⁹ The few scholars who have worked on the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra identify four of these seven theories with the theories of the four Sarvāstivāda masters: Watanabe 1954: 187ff., 235; Akanuma 1934: 87–89. However, the names of the various masters do not appear in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra, the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra, or the *Vibhāṣāśāstra. In the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra (AVŚ 40 pp. 295c29–296a2), they appear only at the conclusion of the discussion, separated from the presentation of the individual theories. Specific names are connected with the individual theories only in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and the *Nyāyānusāra. It is of course possible that the theories of the four masters cannot be neatly correlated with the individual theories listed in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra but rather represent an attempt to schematize a much more complex history of development.

²⁴⁰ 或作是說。三世處或生或不生。此之謂也。未來處是謂未來。過去世是謂過去。現在世是謂現在 (ĀVBSS 1 p. 724b17–19). Cf. ... 當言過去。當言未來。當言現在。答曰。過去世當言過去。未來世當言未來。現在世當言現在世 (ĀVBSS 1 p. 796b7–9).

²⁴¹ 問世與行有異耶。設當世別行別者世常住。若世即是行者。是故彼行或聚或移 (ĀVBSS 1 p. 724b19–21).

²⁴² Both views that the past, present, and future refer to the time periods or to factors, specifically, the five aggregates, twelve sense spheres, or eighteen elements, are presented once again later in the text: ĀVBSS 9 p. 796b7–13.

who discriminates among factors of the three time periods on the basis of a difference in “state” (Skt *avasthā*). And both this fifth theory in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra and the theory of Vasumitra resemble the position of separately existing time periods that the *Mahāvibhāṣā attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins and that is rejected by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. As presented in the Vibhāṣā compendia, Vasumitra’s theory based on a difference in “state” is elaborated through what would appear to be a separate theory that discriminates among factors of the three time periods on the basis of a difference in “activity” (Skt *kāritra*). And this single theory that combines the notions of “state” and “activity” comes to be sanctioned as correct by the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas.²⁴³ It is thus possible that Vasumitra’s theory of difference based on “state” was emended through the addition of this theory of “activity,” thereby obscuring its original similarity to a distinction based on “locus” and the position that the time periods themselves exist separately as we find in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra.

Even though the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas rejected the separate existence of the time periods and hence the interpretation of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins, the testimony of the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra indicates that at this early stage in the development of Sarvāstivāda ontology, this view of the separate existence of the time periods represented an alternative Sarvāstivāda position that was questioned but not yet rejected. Similarly, our Gāndhārī text also provides evidence of a comparably early stage in which at least one group of Sarvāstivādins could still be characterized by their critics, such as the Gāndhārī proponent, with statements that implied the existence of the time periods as such. Hence, the statements, “the past should be said to be the past alone” (*adiḍa adidam eva vatava*, l. 76) or “the intrinsic nature of pastness,” and so on (*adi(*datvasva)bhava*, ll. 77–78), even though problematic from the standpoint of the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika orthodox interpretation, can still be accepted as alternative Sarvāstivāda positions of an earlier period. This would suggest that the development of theories attempting to discriminate clearly among past, present, and future factors and to specify their relationship to the time periods was much more complex than the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theories of the “four Sarvāstivāda masters” would suggest, and this development can only be clarified through the evidence presented by such witnesses as the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra and our Gāndhārī text.

This passage concludes with a statement that in its form appears to offer a fourth and final specification of “everything,” that is, in addition to the three offered in the previous passage (ll. 69–70): “Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence” (*va(*ta)v(*a) c(*a) tr(*a)ya sakhaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa* •, ll. 80–81). This interpretation is framed in terms of an issue central to Sarvāstivāda ontology, specifically the three conditioned characteristics of conditioned factors (Skt *trīṇi saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni*) that determine the nature of all conditioned factors as conditioned, namely, birth (Skt *jāti*), senescence (Skt *jarā*), and desinence (Skt *anityatā*).²⁴⁴ Our Gāndhārī text then illustrates the function of these three

²⁴³ Frauwallner 1995: 189–193, 205–208. The theory of activity is added to Vasumitra’s theory in all three versions of the Vibhāṣā: VS 7 p. 466b22–24; AVŚ 40 p. 295c20–22; AMVŚ 77 p. 396b5–8. Cf. AKBh 5.25d–5.26b p. 296.20–24, 5.26cd p. 297.9ff.; Dessein 2007.

²⁴⁴ The majority of both early and later Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts mention four conditioned characteristics: birth (Skt *jāti*), continuance (Skt *sthiti*), senescence (Skt *jarā*), and desinence (Skt *anityatā*). Other abhidharma texts, including certain Sarvāstivāda texts, mention three, omitting the characteristic

characteristics in distinguishing the past, present, and future²⁴⁵ through an authoritative scriptural passage: “And ‘everything’ [in] that [sense is suggested by the scripture passage that states], ‘I have longing internally’ ...” (*sarva ta ca asti me aḥatva chaḍ(*a di)*, ll. 81–82). The probable scriptural parallel in Pali mentions the connection between longing and the three time periods of past, present, and future: “Here, O monks, with regard to longing for sense pleasure that exists internally, a monk understands ‘I have longing for sense pleasure internally.’ With regard to longing for sense pleasure that does not exist internally, one understands ‘I do not have longing for sense pleasure internally.’ And just as there is arising of longing for sense pleasure that has not arisen, one understands that. And just as there will be no arising in the future of longing for sense pleasure that has been abandoned, one understands that.”²⁴⁶ Through its reference to longing that exists internally, the scriptural passage can be taken to verify the existence of the present marked by the characteristic of continuance; through its reference to longing that arises, it verifies the future marked by the characteristic of birth; and through its reference to longing that is abandoned, it verifies the past marked by the characteristic of desinence.

I.3.3.3. Criticism (3: 1) of the Opponent’s First Qualification of the Fundamental Proposition: “That Which Exists Is Everything” [ll. 82–87]

Reconstruction

[82] (*viva)jaga eṣa prochi • tatanuyoga sarvam asti • mahasarvastivaḍa • tatra maha[83](*sarva)stivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama • adidanagaḍap(*r)acup(*a)-n(*a)s(*a)kh(*a)d(*a) asti di

(1) [84] (*asti sa)rva aha vatava jive asti • bhudatve asti • pugale asti • seṭha [85] (*kadha asti) • t(*r)e(*ḍ)(*a)(*ś)a ayaḍana asti • ekunaviṣadi dhadu asti • paṃcame aryasace [86]

of continuance: ĀVBSS 1 p. 723a26ff., 9 p. 796a22ff.; ŚAŚ 1 p. 526c6–7, 21 p. 663a17ff.; AASkŚ 3 p. 780b17ff.; VŚ 6 p. 458a18. The total number of conditioned characteristics as three or four and the status of the characteristic of continuance in particular continued to be a point of controversy for later abhidharma interpreters, as indicated by the lengthy discussion in the Vibhāṣā compendia: AMVŚ 39 p. 199c25ff., 39 p. 201a17ff.; AVŚ 20 p. 149c1ff., 20 p. 150b22ff. For a complete discussion of the three or four characteristics of conditioned factors, see Cox 1995: 146–158, 305–375.

²⁴⁵ For the application of the three characteristics to factors of the three time periods, see the *Mahāvibhāṣā: “Further, conditioned factors (Skt **saṃskṛta*) upon which the three characteristics of conditioned factors (Skt **saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) have not yet already exerted [their] activity are referred to as future. [Those conditioned factors upon which] one [characteristic, namely, the characteristic of birth (Skt **jāti*),] has already exerted [its] activity and two [characteristics, namely, the characteristics of senescence (Skt **jarā*) and desinence (Skt **anityatā*),] are just at the point of exerting [their] activity are referred to as present. [Those conditioned factors upon which] all three [characteristics] have already exerted [their] activity are referred to as past” (復次諸有爲法三有爲相。未已作用名未來。一已作用二正作用名現在。三已作用名過去, AMVŚ 76 p. 394a2–4).

²⁴⁶ P *idha bhikkhave bhikkhu santam vā ajjhataṃ kāmacchandaṃ atthi me ajjhataṃ kāmacchando ti pajānāti. asantaṃ vā ajjhataṃ kāmacchandaṃ natthi me ajjhataṃ kāmacchando ti pajānāti. yathā ca anuppannassa kāmacchandassa uppādo hoti taṃ ca pajānāti yathā ca uppannassa kāmacchandassa pahānaṃ hoti taṃ ca pajānāti. yathā ca pahīnassa kāmacchandassa āyatim anuppādo hoti taṃ ca pajānāti* (DN II 300ff.). Cf. MN I 60ff.; AN I 272; Vibh 199.

(*asti) • ya pi nasti ta pi asti di • nasti śadehi sutrehi anuyujidavo • sata asti[87](*da va)-
t(*a)va • asata nastida vatava • eva śadehi sutrehi anuyujidava •

Sanskrit rendering

[82] *vibhājaka etad aprākṣīt. tatrānyogaḥ sarvam asti mahāsarvāstivādāḥ. tatra mahā[83]sarvāstivādā āhur nāsti kiṃcin nāsti nāma. atītānāgatapratyutpannāsamskṛtāḥ santīti.*

(1) [84] *asti sarvam āha, vaktavyaṃ jīvo 'sti, bhūtatvam asti, pudgalo 'sti, śaṣṭhaḥ [85] skandho 'sti, trayodaśam āyatanam asty, ekonaviṃśatir dhātur asti, pañcamam āryasatyam [86] asti. yad api nāsti, tad apy astīti. nāsti śataiḥ sūtrair anuyuktavyam. sad asti[87]tā vaktavyam. asan nāstītā vaktavyam. evaṃ śataiḥ sūtrair anuyuktavyam.*

Translation

[82] [P] The distinguisher asked about this [position elaborated previously by the opponent]. With regard to that there is a point of discussion, [that is, concerning] the Mahāsarvāstivādins [and their proposition] “everything exists.” With regard to that [83] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist. Past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors] exist.”

(1) [84] [If] one states, [O] “(*That which exists) is everything,” [P] it should be said that a soul exists, creaturehood exists, a person exists, a sixth [85] (*aggregate) exists, a thirteenth sense sphere exists, a nineteenth element exists, and a fifth noble truth [86] (*exists). [The statement,] “even that which does not exist also exists,” should not be upheld by hundreds of scriptures. “The existent [87] should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence.” In this way, it should be upheld by hundreds of scriptures.

Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87]

For almost all of the remaining text, the proponent offers an extended criticism of the Sarvāstivādin opponent’s position as presented in the previous passages (ll. 66–82). This criticism is tightly structured, beginning with the opponent’s first qualification of his fundamental proposition, and then turning to the formulaic declarations that expand upon this proposition, the specifications of the scope of “everything” (*sarva*), and finally, in the heavily damaged final portion of the manuscript, to the explications of the concept of “existence” (*astiḍa*). Despite manuscript damage at the beginning of this passage, the speaker clearly shifts to the proponent. In the legible portion of the first line, the proponent explicitly identifies his opponent and cites his position: “With regard to that there is a point of discussion, [that is, concerning] the Mahāsarvāstivādins [and their proposition] ‘everything exists’” (*tatranuyoga sarvam asti • mahasarvastivaḍa •*, l. 82). The preceding portion of this line ends with the finite verb “asked,” but the agent of the verb is only partially legible. Given the clear reference to the opponent that follows, it has been assumed that the proponent refers to himself in this initial portion, and the agent has been tentatively reconstructed as (**viva*)*jaga*, the “distinguisher.”²⁴⁷ Thus, this passage has been understood to begin with appellations for both the proponent and his opponent. The appellation *mahasarvastivaḍa* (Skt **mahāsarvāstivāḍa*) is not attested in other abhidharma texts, and hence the function of the adjective *maha-* in the compound *maha-sarvastivaḍa*

²⁴⁷ Text Notes: [82] + |^{52F(v)?} *jaga eṣa prochi •*.

is uncertain. It is possible that it possesses a simple descriptive or laudatory function, that is, the “great Sarvāstivāda,” referring to a specific school group with the adjective “great” or “venerable” (*maha-*, Skt *mahā*), perhaps also having the connotation of widespread or respected. As a second possibility, since the appellation is used by the proponent to introduce an extended criticism of the opponent’s position, the adjective *maha-* might also carry a sarcastic or even a pejorative connotation. Finally, it is also remotely possible that the proponent uses this adjective in compound to highlight the polemical position that “everything exists” rather than primarily to describe the character of a specific school group. In this case, the appellation *mahasarvastivāda* might have the sense of one who maintains that “everything ‘in the broad sense’ exists” or “everything exists ‘greatly.’” This designation can then be contrasted with *vivarjavaḍa* (P *vibhajjavāda*, Skt *vibhajyavāda*), “one who maintains distinctions,” here specifically, distinctions between that which exists and that which does not exist. Indeed, in a later criticism, the proponent will apply this designation *vivarjavaḍa* to his *mahasarvastivāda* opponent to suggest a contradiction, presumably with this contrast in mind.²⁴⁸ Following his references to *vivarjavaḍa* and *mahasarvastivāda*, the proponent offers an additional assertion that was not included in the prior presentation of the opponent’s position: “With regard to that the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [o] ‘Certainly there is nothing that does not exist. Past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors] exist’” (*tatra maha(*sarva)stivāda ahasu nasti kica nasti nama • adidānagaḍap(*r)acup(*a)n(*a)s(*a)kh(*a)ḍ(*a) asti di*, ll. 82–83).²⁴⁹ This might be interpreted as a fourth specification by the opponent that delimits the scope of “everything” by appealing to a set of four categories common in Sarvāstivāda enumerations of existent factors. However, it might also be seen not as an additional fourth specification, but rather as a summary of the opponent’s position stated here in negative terms, which then sets the stage for the proponent’s following criticism.

The proponent will offer three criticisms of the opponent’s first qualification of his fundamental proposition, which was structured in the form of two converse and complementary statements: “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything” (*asti sarva • asti no ca sarva* •, l. 69). Even though the initial portion of his first criticism is lost, it is clear that it focuses only on the first of these two statements: “[If] one states, [o] ‘(*That which exists) is everything, ...’” (*(*asti sa)rva aha*, l. 84).²⁵⁰ Using the method of “implication of an untoward consequence” (Skt *prasaṅga*), the proponent will argue that the Sarvāstivādin opponent’s assertion, “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist” offered in the preceding lines together with this first statement, “that which exists is everything,” lead to the untoward consequence that even entities whose existence is commonly rejected must be acknowledged to exist.²⁵¹ The proponent next offers seven examples of such nonexistent entities, which can be divided into two distinct groups: first, entities such as a soul (*jīva*), creaturehood (*bhūdatva*), and a person (*pugala*) that are to be rejected through the Buddhist denial of the self (Skt *ātman*)²⁵²; and second, entities such as a sixth aggregate (*ṣeṭha*

²⁴⁸ Commentary: (2) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 88–95].

²⁴⁹ Text Notes: [83] *adidānagaḍa[p].[acup].[n].[s].[kh].[ḍ]. [asti di]*.

²⁵⁰ Text Notes: [84] + + + /// |^{52B(r)}*[rva] aha vatava*.

²⁵¹ Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

²⁵² 謂一切法無我。無有情無命 (AMVŚ 124 p. 649c3).

kadha), a thirteenth sense sphere (*treḍaśa ayāḍana*), a nineteenth element (*ekunaviśadi dhadu*), and a fifth noble truth (*paṃcame aryasace*) that are to be rejected because they fall outside standard Buddhist categories, in this case the six aggregates, the twelve sense spheres, the eighteen elements, and the four noble truths.²⁵³ Even though the proponent limits his criticism to the opponent's first statement, it is important to note that the opponent's first qualification as given previously contains two complementary statements, "that which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything." Indeed, one might then interpret the opponent's second statement as itself clarifying that the scope of "everything" must be delimited to exclude nonexistent entities; as a result, he would evade the proponent's criticism as offered here.²⁵⁴

Both this untoward consequence that even nonexistent entities must be admitted to exist and the specific list of nonexistent entities cited find parallels in other abhidharma texts. For example, following its consideration of the fundamental proposition that "everything exists" and of the questions that follow from it, the Kathāvatthu asks, "[KvP] Does everything exist? [O] Yes. [KvP] Does that which does not exist also exist? [O] That should not be said."²⁵⁵ The commentary identifies such entities that do not exist as a sixth aggregate or the horn on a hare, and so forth.²⁵⁶ The section devoted to the proposition "everything exists" in the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra contains a similar criticism: "If it were the case that everything exists, would that which does not exist also exist? Do nonexistent entities also exist in all cases?"²⁵⁷ Formulaic lists of nonexistent entities similar to the list offered by the proponent in our Gāndhārī text also appear in arguments supporting the existence of factors in the three time periods. Such lists include a second head, a third hand, a sixth aggregate, a thirteenth sense sphere, a nineteenth element, and so forth, which are then contrasted with past and future factors, whose existence must be accepted.²⁵⁸

Thus, the proponent concludes, the opponent's additional assertion given here (l. 83) that "there is nothing that does not exist" inevitably leads to the untoward consequence that "even that which does not exist also exists" (*ya pi nasti ta pi asti di •*, l. 86), a conclusion that is unacceptable because it is not upheld by authoritative scripture. Instead, the proponent claims, authoritative scripture maintains that "the existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence" (*sata asti(*ḍa va)t(*a)va • asata nastiḍa vatava •*, ll. 86–87). In fact,

²⁵³ For other occurrences of this list, see ll. 84–85, 88–90, 91–92, 118, 119, 120–121.

²⁵⁴ Commentary: The Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

²⁵⁵ *P sabbaṃ atthīti. āmantā. yaṃ pi n' atthi taṃ p' atthīti. na h' evaṃ vattabbe* (Kv 116).

²⁵⁶ *P chaṭṭhakkhandādikāṃ sasaviśāṅgādikāṃ vā* (Kv-a 44).

²⁵⁷ 問若一切皆有者。云何無者亦當有。無物者亦皆悉有 (ĀVBSS 9 p. 795b14–15).

²⁵⁸ 第二頭第三手第六蘊。第十三處第十九界等 (AMVŚ 15 p. 72c3–4; AVŚ 9 p. 59c7–8). For this list in arguments in support of the existence of past and future factors, specifically in relation to accompaniment (Skt *samanvāgama*) and karmic efficacy, see AMVŚ 76 p. 393a22, 76 p. 393b5–6, 76 p. 393b12; AVŚ 40 p. 293c29ff.; VŚ 7 p. 464c7ff. Cf. AMVŚ 157 p. 796b3–4; AVŚ 46 p. 352a4ff. For the dependence of perceptual consciousness upon an existent object-support (Skt *ālambana*), see VK 1 p. 535b27ff.; VŚ 7 p. 464b26ff.; AKBh 5.27 p. 300.7–8; AKVy 475.10ff.; ADV 306cd p. 271.16ff., 272.4ff. Cf. MPPrŚ 26 p. 255a14ff.; TSS 2 p. 255b17–19. For a nonexistent, seventh variety of perceptual consciousness (Skt *vijñāna*), see NyAŚ 50 p. 622b1. For a discussion of the arguments concerning such nonexistent objects, see Cox 1988.

with this conclusion the proponent forces the opponent into a contradiction with his own previous statement. The untoward consequence “even that which does not exist also exists” stands in direct contradiction to the opponent’s first explication of “existence”: “That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; (*that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence” (*ya asti ta ha astiḍa vatava • (*ya nast)i t(*a) nastiḍa ha vatava •*, ll. 70–71). And the second statement, which is upheld by authoritative scripture, corresponds verbatim to the second explication of existence offered by the opponent in that same previous passage: “The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence” (*sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*, l. 71).²⁵⁹ Thus, the proponent contends that opponent’s position leads not only to an untoward consequence and contradicts scripture, but also results in self-contradiction.

I.3.3.3. Criticism (3: 2) of the Opponent’s First Qualification of the Fundamental Proposition: “That Which Exists Is Everything” [ll. 88–95]

Reconstruction

(2) [88] (*yidi a)hadi nasti jiva • nasti bhūḍatva • nasti pugala • [89] (*na)sti ṣeṭha kadha • nasti treḍaśa ayaḍana • nasti ekunaviś(*a)d(*i) dhadu nasti paṃc(*a)m(*a a)[90](*)rya-s(*a)ca • hata vivarjavadā bhoṣa • kici astiḍa paḍiyanaṣa • kic(*i) nastiḍ(*a) • na ca na vata[91](*)va sa)rvam asti di • yadi taṣa nasti paṃcame aryasaca • nasti ṣeṭha kadha • nasti tre[92](*)ḍa)śa ayaḍana • nasti ekunaviśadi dhadu • nasti jiva • nasti bhūḍatv(*a) • nasti pugala • [93] (*i)ḍ(*a)s(*a) viṇanasa ki arambana • ya eḍa viṇana evaruva upajadi di • iḍasa cita[94](*)sa ki (*a)r(*am)b(*a)na • ki aṣip(*ad)i • yaṣa de arambanabhava nasti • upajadi cat(*u)n(*a) t(*a)[95](*)ṣa ta) cita di •

Sanskrit rendering

(2) [88] *yadyāha nāsti jīvo, nāsti bhūtatvaṃ, nāsti pudgalo, [89] nāsti ṣaṣṭhaḥ skandho, nāsti trayodaśam āyatanam, nāsti ekonaviṃśatir dhātur, nāsti pañcamam ā[90]ryasatyam, hanta vibhajyavādā bhavatha. kiṃcid astitāṃ pratijānītha, kiṃcin nāstitāṃ, na ca na vaktā[91]-vyam sarvam asīti. yadi tathā nāsti pañcamam āryasatyam, nāsti ṣaṣṭhaḥ skandho, nāsti trayo[92]daśam āyatanam, nāsti ekonaviṃśatir dhātur, nāsti jīvo, nāsti bhūtatvaṃ, nāsti pudgalo, [93] śya vijñānasya kim ālambanam, yad etad vijñānam evamrūpam utpadyata iti. asya citta[94]śya kim ālambanam, ko ’dhipatir, yathā ālambanabhāvo nāsty, utpadyate caturṇām ta[95]thā tac cittam iti.*

Translation

(2) [88] (*If) one states, [O] “There exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, [89] there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no fifth [90] noble truth,” [P] well then, it is you who maintain distinctions! [Since] you admit something to be existence and something to be nonexistence, isn’t it the case that it should not be said [91] that “everything exists?” If in that way there exists no fifth (*noble) truth, there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no [92] thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, [93] what is the object-support of this

²⁵⁹ Commentaries: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Two Explications [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7].

perceptual consciousness since this perceptual consciousness arises with the form of [these nonexistent entities]? [94] What is the object-support of this moment of thought, what is the sovereign condition, insofar as the “nature” of the object-support does not exist, [and yet] (*that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] [95] in that way?

Commentary: (2) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 88–95]

Continuing his criticism of the Sarvāstivādin opponent’s first qualification of his fundamental proposition, the proponent contends in this passage that the qualification, “that which exists is everything,” entails the existence even of nonexistent entities. If the opponent responds by agreeing that entities such as a soul, creaturehood, and so forth, do not exist, the proponent suggests that he can no longer be identified as a Sarvāstivādin, that is, “one who maintains that everything exists.” Instead, since the opponent admits “something to be existence, and something to be nonexistence,” he should be described by the term Skt *vibhajyavāda*, “one who maintains distinctions,” or the “distinguisher.” As the proponent argues, if the opponent is to be consistently labeled a Sarvāstivādin, he must admit that **all** entities exist, even those commonly acknowledged to be nonexistent.²⁶⁰

The designation *vibhajyavāda* is notoriously problematic. It was used with various senses, and the historical group(s), if any, to which it might have referred are as yet uncertain. At the very least, the term as used in this argument can function as a rhetorical designation that carries its fundamental sense of “one who maintains distinctions,” specifically between factors that exist and those that do not exist. Hence, the proponent suggests that by admitting that certain entities do not exist and therefore by distinguishing between entities that exist and those that do not exist, the Sarvāstivādin opponent contradicts his identifying proposition “everything exists” and falls into the camp of “those who maintain distinctions.” Given the polemical context within which this single secure occurrence of the designation *vivarjavadā* occurs (cf. l. 82), it is possible that it functions not simply in this rhetorical sense but also as a group label with historical significance, contrasting the proponent’s group identity with that of his Sarvāstivādin opponent. In other words, with the statement, “well then, it is **you** who distinguish!” (*hata vivarjavadā bhoṣa* •, l. 90), the proponent might imply that the opponent’s identity as a Sarvāstivādin is undermined since he maintains distinctions between “exists” and “does not exist.” As a result, the proponent might suggest that it is the opponent, and not the proponent himself, who should properly be referred to as a Vibhajyavādin. In such polemical contexts, the term Skt *vibhajyavāda* might then function as a collective label that came to be used with the emergence of a self-identified Sarvāstivāda group to refer to those groups that could not be identified as Sarvāstivāda.

The proponent next offers a second untoward consequence of the opponent’s rejection of the existence of nonexistent entities (ll. 91–94). If the Sarvāstivādins agree that there exists no fifth noble truth, no sixth aggregate, and so forth, then what serves as the object-support for the cognition of such nonexistent entities? Since cognition having the form “fifth noble truth,” and so forth, does in fact occur, the object-supports of such cognitions must be identified. Here, the proponent alludes to an argument that the Sarvāstivādins themselves employ to support the existence of past

²⁶⁰ Text Notes: [90] [*ha*]ta vivarjavadā bhoṣa •.

and future factors, namely, that since perceptual consciousness (Skt *vijñāna*) without an object-support, or with a nonexistent entity as its object-support, is inadmissible, the cognition of past and future factors must depend upon an existent entity. The Sarvāstivādins buttress their position through two arguments.²⁶¹ First, scripture clearly states that perceptual consciousness can arise only through the cooperation of two factors: the sense organ (Skt *indriya*), or basis (Skt *āśraya*), and the object-field (Skt *viśaya*), or object-support (Skt *ālambana*). If either of these is absent, perceptual consciousness will not arise.²⁶² Hence, perceptual consciousness that lacks an existent object-support is inadmissible. Secondly, the Sarvāstivādins maintain that all factors that function as causes must actually exist.²⁶³ Nonexistent entities are devoid of causal efficacy and therefore cannot act as object-support conditions that give rise to perceptual consciousness.²⁶⁴ As a result, for the Sarvāstivādins, if one acknowledges that the cognition of past and future factors is possible, as surely one must, then past and future factors must be admitted to exist.

In clarifying his criticism, the proponent asks his opponent to specify both the object-support ((**a*)*r*(**am*)*b*(**a*)*na*, Skt *ālambana*) and sovereign conditions (*a**ṣip*(**ad*)*i*, Skt *adhipati*) that support the perceptual consciousness of such nonexistent entities as the fifth noble truth, and so forth (ll. 94–95). Here, the proponent alludes to the Sarvāstivāda model of four conditions (Skt *pratyaya*), employed specifically to explain the arising of thought (Skt *citta*) and thought concomitants (Skt *caitta*): (1) the object-support condition (Skt *ālambanapratyaya*); (2) the sovereign condition (Skt *adhipatipratyaya*); (3) the immediately contiguous condition (Skt *samanantarapratyaya*); and (4) the causal condition (Skt *hetupratyaya*).²⁶⁵ Since the Sarvāstivādins maintain that perceptual consciousness arises only on the basis of the full requisite of four conditions, then in the case of the cognition of such nonexistent entities, they must either specify the object-support and sovereign conditions, or they must allow that such nonexistent entities do in fact exist as possible object-supports.

Since this argument hinges upon the status of the object-support as one of four necessary conditions for the arising of perceptual consciousness, it is not immediately apparent why the proponent mentions only the object-support and sovereign conditions, while omitting the two immediately contiguous and causal conditions. Other relevant abhidharma passages do, however, provide some clues. In its general discussion of causes and conditions, the Vijñānakāya focuses

²⁶¹ For an extended treatment of this controversy concerning the cognition of nonexistent objects, see Cox 1988.

²⁶² P *kathaṃ ca bhikkhave dvayaṃ paṭicca viññānaṃ sambhoti. cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānaṃ* (SN IV 67). Cf. SĀ (tr. G) 8 no. 214 p. 54a23ff.; MĀ 54 no. 201 p. 767a24ff.; MN I 259; MĀ 7 no. 30 p. 467a3ff. For references in abhidharma texts, see SaṅgP 15 p. 429a15–18 (where the visual sense organ is identified as the Skt *adhipatipratyaya* and form as the Skt *ālambanapratyaya*); DhSk 10 p. 502c20–21, 11 p. 507c25; VK 3 p. 545b24–25; DhK *shang* p. 615c4ff.; PrP (tr. Xz) 2 p. 699a4ff.; ĀVBSS 9 p. 797a12ff.; AMVŚ 18 p. 369b18ff.; AKBh 5.25b p. 295.16; NyAŚ 51 p. 627c17–18, 57 p. 658c8–9.

²⁶³ AMVŚ 10 p. 47a28–47b1, 16 p. 79a19–21, 107 p. 555a2–4, 131 p. 680b26ff., 136 p. 702b13–15, 137 p. 709a28–709b1, 146 p. 747a7–8, 165 p. 833a23–26, 196 p. 982b4–6; AVŚ 30 p. 218c14ff.

²⁶⁴ VK 1 p. 531a26ff.; ŚAŚ 9 p. 594c7ff.; AMVŚ 10 p. 48a1–3, 105 p. 554c15–17, 136 p. 704a7–9, 146 p. 747b15–17, 195 p. 975a3–5, 197 p. 983a23–25; AVŚ 55 p. 393b10–12.

²⁶⁵ Text Notes: [94] *upajadi ca*[t].[n]. [t]. [95] + + ///^{52A(v)}*cita di* •.

specifically on the four conditions that give rise to perceptual consciousness, or thought, and notes that the causal condition (Skt *hetupratyaya*) and the immediately contiguous condition (Skt *samanantarapratyaya*) are limited to mental factors, specifically thought concomitants and the immediately prior moment of thought, respectively.²⁶⁶ However, the object-support (Skt *ālamabanapratyaya*) and sovereign conditions (Skt *adhipatipratyaya*) encompass all factors, with the exception of the specific moment of thought that is being conditioned.²⁶⁷ Since the nonexistent entities under discussion here cannot be classified as either thought or thought concomitants, only the latter two object-support and sovereign conditions would be appropriate in an examination of their causal efficacy. Further clues are provided by the *Mahāvibhāṣā, which presents a tetralemma (Skt *catuṣkoṭi*) that functions to delimit and thereby define each of the four conditions, as for example in the phrase, “if a factor is a causal condition, is it also an immediately contiguous condition?” and so on.²⁶⁸ Only in the case of the object-support and sovereign conditions are the two categories of factors said to be identical; that is to say, an entity that serves as an object-support condition could also serve as a sovereign condition and vice versa. Hence, a challenge brought against one, in this case the object-support condition, would entail a challenge against the other, the sovereign condition. Accordingly, in this passage of our text, the proponent’s challenge to an entity’s status as an object-support condition inevitably entails a challenge to its status as a sovereign condition.

I.3.3.3. Criticism (3: 3) of the Opponent’s First Qualification of the Fundamental Proposition: “That Which Exists Is Everything” [Il. 95–98]

Reconstruction

(3) [95] *asti ca sarva di • cakḥaiḍana ca asti • ten(*a) c(*a)kh(*a)īd(*a)na* [96] *duḍaśa ayḍana bhavati • y(*a)di r(*u)v(*a)cakḥai[97]ḍana asti • na ca ta sarva di • tena de asti sarva se ca nasti • asti kica sarva ki[98]c(*a) na sarva di • vatava tena de sarva kic(*a) asti • kica na vatava asti •*

Sanskrit rendering

(3) [95] *asti ca sarvam iti. cakṣurāyatanam cāsti. tena cakṣurāyatanam* [96] *dvādaśāyatanāni bhavanti. yadi rūpacakṣurāya[97]tanāni santi, na ca tat sarvam iti, tena asti sarvaṃ sā ca nāsti. asti kiṃcit sarvaṃ, kiṃ[98]cin na sarvam iti, vaktavyaṃ tena sarvaṃ kiṃcid asti, kiṃcin na vaktavyam asti.*

Translation

(3) [95] And [one states], [o] “That which exists is everything.” [p] And the visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, [96] the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere. If [one states], [o] “[Since both] the material-form [sense sphere] and the visual sense sphere [97] exist, it is not the case that that [visual sense sphere] is everything,” [p] as a result of that, the [proposition], “that which exists is everything,” is not upheld. [If you respond,] [o] “that which exists is in some cases everything [98] [and] in some cases not

²⁶⁶ VK 3 p. 547a3ff., 11 p. 584a29ff.

²⁶⁷ VK 3 p. 547b22ff.; AMVŚ 21 p. 104c9ff.

²⁶⁸ 問若法是因緣彼亦是等無間緣耶 (AMVŚ 21 p. 109a2). Cf. AMVŚ 21 p. 108c20ff., esp. 21 p. 109a17.

everything,” [P] it should be said that, as a result of that, everything in some cases [should be said to] exist [and] in some cases should not be said to exist.

Commentary: (3) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 95–98]

Here, the proponent offers a third criticism of the Sarvāstivādin opponent’s first qualification of his fundamental proposition “everything exists.” He focuses on the opponent’s first specification of “everything” in terms of the twelve sense spheres: “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything. Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist” (*asti sarva • asti no ca sarva • ye duḍḍaśa ayadaneha sagrahida se asti* •, l. 69).²⁶⁹ Even though the uncertainty of some readings and the terse wording of the argument render the interpretation tentative, the present passage clearly presents a quick exchange of statements and responses in which the proponent once again attempts to undermine the opponent’s proposition through the method of “implication of an untoward consequence” (Skt *prasaṅga*).

The proponent begins his criticism with a formally valid but terse argument: “And [one states], [O] ‘That which exists is everything.’ [P] And the visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere” (*asti ca sarva di • cakhaīdana ca asti • ten(*a) c(*a)kh(*a)id(*a)na duḍḍaśa ayadana bhavati* •, ll. 95–96). The argument concludes with an untoward consequence, that is, the equation of the “twelve sense spheres” with the “visual sense sphere,” which the Sarvāstivādin opponent himself would not accept. In the initial statement, “that which exists is everything,” that which exists ($A = asti$) is equated with everything ($B = sarva$), or $A = B$. In the next statement, “the visual sense sphere exists,” the visual sense sphere ($C = cakhaīdana$) is declared to exist ($A = asti$), or $C = A$. As a result, the visual sense sphere ($C = cakhaīdana$) can, through transitive predication, be equated with everything ($B = sarva$), or $C = B$. Now, according to the opponent’s first specification, “those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist,” hence one can conclude that the twelve sense spheres ($D = duḍḍaśa ayadana$) determine the scope of everything ($B = sarva$), or $D = B$. And since in the previous stage of the argument the visual sense sphere ($C = cakhaīdana$) has been equated with everything, or $C = B$, then the proponent draws the untoward consequence that the twelve sense spheres ($D = duḍḍaśa ayadana$) can be equated with the visual sense sphere ($C = cakhaīdana$), or $D = C$.²⁷⁰ This argument can be represented in schematic form as follows

If A (*asti*) = B (*sarva*)
 And C (*cakhaīdana*) = A (*asti*)
 [Then C (*cakhaīdana*) = B (*sarva*)]
 [And since by definition D (*duḍḍaśa ayadana*) = B (*sarva*)]
 Then D (*duḍḍaśa ayadana*) = C (*cakhaīdana*)

This equation of the twelve sense spheres with the visual sense sphere contradicts their expected relation of inclusion, whereby the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres

²⁶⁹ Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

²⁷⁰ Commentaries: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; (3) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 95–98].

and not equated with the group as a whole. Accordingly, the function of this statement as an untoward consequence is made clear through the use of the copula “become” (*bhavati*), which can be contrasted with the past participle “included” (*sagrahīda*) that occurs in an otherwise parallel statement in lines 116–117: “Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres” (*tena cakhaīdana duaḍaśaayaḍanasag(*ra)hīda*). Thus, this untoward consequence that the visual sense sphere becomes, or is equated with, the twelve sense spheres undermines the proposition with which the argument began, namely, “that which exists is everything.”

To counter this unacceptable equation of the visual sense sphere with the twelve sense spheres, the opponent might respond that since the material-form sense sphere exists in addition to the visual sense sphere, “it is not the case that that [visual sense sphere] is everything” (*y(*a)di r(*u)-v(*a)cakhaīdana asti • na ca ta sarva di •*, ll. 96–97). Even in that case, the proponent notes (l. 97) that the opponent’s first qualification, “that which exists is everything,” would be contradicted since, as the immediately preceding argument illustrates, it would still result in the contradiction that the material-form sense sphere and visual sense sphere are then equated with “everything.”

The opponent might respond again (ll. 97–98) by revising his first qualification, “that which exists is everything.” He might suggest that “that which exists” ($A = asti$) is in some cases everything ($B = sarva$, or $A = B$), for example, in the case of the proposition, “that which exists is everything,” and in some cases not everything ($A \neq B$), as in the case of statements such as “that which exists is the visual sense sphere” or “that which exists is the material-form and visual sense spheres.” However, the proponent, by applying the principle of transitive predication to the opponent’s attempt to revise his first qualification, concludes that it would then be justified to assert the contradictory claims that “everything in some cases [should be said to] exist” ($B = A$) and “in some cases should not be said to exist” ($B \neq A$). Thus, with this conclusion, both the Sarvāstivādin opponent’s first qualification and his fundamental proposition that “everything exists” stand contradicted.

I.3.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent’s Seven Declarations (7: 1) Expanding upon “Everything Exists” [ll. 98–102]

Reconstruction

(1) [98] *sarvatra sarva[99](*m a)sti di • tena cakhaīdana ruvaiḍana neraiyabhavave sarvabhavave asti • peyala [100] svabhavave parabhavave asti • parabhava svabhavave asti • yadi ahadi na vatava sa(*r)va[101]t(*ra) s(*a)rva asti di • tatra vatave eva sate sarvat(*r)e s(*ar)ve n(*a)st(*i) [102] (*di ki)c(*a) asti k(*i)c(*a) n(*a)st(*i) •*

Sanskrit rendering

(1) [98] *sarvatra sarva[99]m astīti. tena cakṣurāyatane rūpāyatanam, nairayikabhāve sarvabhāvāḥ santi, peyālam [100] svabhāve parabhāvo ’sti, parabhāve svabhāvo ’sti. yady āha na vaktavyam sarva[101]tra sarvam astīti, tatra vaktavyam evam sati sarvatra sarvam nāstī[102]ti. kiṃcid asti, kiṃcin nāstī.*

Translation

(1) [98] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists everywhere.” [99] [p] Therefore, the material-form sense sphere [exists] in the visual sense sphere, all natures exist in the nature of a hell-being, and so on, [100] other-nature exists in intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature

exists in other-nature. If one states, [o] “It should not be said that everything [101] exists everywhere,” [p] with regard to that it should be said that it being thus, everything does not exist everywhere. [102] [Therefore, you should not maintain that everything exists but rather] something exists [and] something does not exist.

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s First Declaration [ll. 98–102]

In this passage, the proponent turns from a criticism of the Sarvāstivādin opponent’s first qualification of his fundamental proposition to the criticism of the series of formulaic declarations that the opponent offered in the root passage to elaborate his fundamental proposition (ll. 66–69). In the remaining portion of the manuscript, only four of the seven declarations are taken up for detailed criticism: *sarvakala sarvam asti* (ll. 67, 107–109); *sarvatra sarvam asti* (ll. 67, 98–102); *sarvagarena sarvam asti* (ll. 67, 109–113); and *sarvakaranena sarvam asti* (ll. 67, 113–115). The three remaining declarations, *sarvabhava sarvam asti*, *sarvaheduha sarvam asti*, and *sarvaprakageha sarvam asti* (l. 68), are treated together under the cursory reference to the declaration *sarvabhava sarvam asti*.²⁷¹ In addition, the proponent criticizes two additional declarations that do not appear in the root passage (ll. 66–69): *sarveṣu sarvam asti* (ll. 102–105), and *sarvasa sarvam asti* (ll. 105–106).

In criticizing each of these declarations, the proponent utilizes the same method of “implication of an untoward consequence” (Skt *prasaṅga*) by offering an undesirable conclusion to which each declaration leads. The first declaration, “everything exists everywhere” (*sarvatra sarva(*m a)sti di •*, ll. 98–99. Cf. l. 67), also appears in the Kathāvatthu (P *sabbattha sabbam atthi*, Kv 115), and the Kathāvatthu commentary states that it refers to the fact that “everything exists in every body” (P *sabbasmim sarīre sabbam atthi*, Kv-a 44). Using the same syntactic pattern “locative-nominative-*asti*” that characterizes this declaration, the Gāndhārī proponent extends its scope to a series of three counterexamples that clearly represent undesirable conclusions: if “everything exists everywhere,” then “the material-form sense sphere [exists] in the visual sense sphere; all natures exist in the nature of a hell-being” (*tena cakhaīdana ruvaiḍana neraīyabhava sarvabhava asti •*, l. 99); and “other-nature exists in intrinsic nature; intrinsic nature exists in other-nature” (*svabhava parabhave) asti • parabhava svabhava asti •*, l. 100).

The first counterexample, “the material-form sense sphere [exists] in the visual sense sphere” (*cakhaīdana ruvaiḍana [asti]*), conflates two distinct sense spheres characterized by separate natures and functions. Material form is the object-field that is correlated with the visual sense organ; as the object-field that is perceived, it must exist apart from the organ that perceives it. The second counterexample, “all natures exist in the nature of a hell-being” (*neraīyabhava sarvabhava asti*), suggests the possibility that beings reborn in hell can also possess the nature of other rebirth states as well. As in the case of the previous reference to *neraīyabhava* (P *nerayikabhāva*, Skt *nairayikabhāva*, l. 42), here also the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of the Gāndhārī term *bhava* are uncertain and could be understood either as “stage of existence/life,” “rebirth state” (P/Skt *bhava*) or as “nature” (P/Skt *bhāva*). Even though the equivalent P/Skt *bhava* referring specifically to a rebirth state would

²⁷¹ Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Declarations [ll. 109–115].

appear to fit the context of the present argument, the equivalent P/Skt *bhāva* is more likely here due to the probability of P/Skt *bhāva* as the equivalent in the previous case of *neraiyabhava*.²⁷²

These two initial counterexamples are followed by the adverb *peyala*, signaling a textual abbreviation or ellipsis of a repeated passage or of a portion of a previously mentioned or well-known list. Here, *peyala* undoubtedly indicates that other specific counterexamples, presumably employing the same syntactic pattern, have been omitted. The third and final counterexample, “other-nature exists in intrinsic nature; intrinsic nature exists in other-nature” (*svabhava parabhave asti • parabhava svabhava asti* •), juxtaposes “intrinsic” or “self-nature” (*svabhava*, Skt *svabhāva*), with “other-nature” (*parabhava*, Skt *parabhāva*). As this final counterexample suggests, the first two as well as other possible counterexamples are patently unacceptable because they conflate “intrinsic” or “self-nature” with “other-nature.” Thus, the final counterexample would appear to represent a more abstract summary statement of the contradiction that arises if “everything exists everywhere.”

This final counterexample, in its explicit use of the terms “intrinsic” or “self-nature” (Skt *svabhāva*) and “other-nature” (Skt *parabhāva*), alludes to a controversy that emerged among various abhidharma groups in their attempts to classify all aspects of experience by generating exhaustive and detailed taxonomies of factors (Skt *dharma*). These distinctive abhidharma taxonomies were generated through a process of inclusion (Skt *saṃgraha*) and non-inclusion (Skt *asaṃgraha*); factors sharing the same nature were included within a single category, thereby implicitly excluding those of a different nature.²⁷³ The *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra is the earliest extant abhidharma text to apply this method of inclusion and to refer to its basis in the “intrinsic” (性自, Skt **svabhāva*) or “other-nature” (他性, Skt **parabhāva*) of factors. This text first devotes a separate section to a description of the method of inclusion that clearly cites both intrinsic nature and other-nature as the criteria by which inclusion within a particular category is determined.²⁷⁴ Next, it offers a matrix of over two hundred attribute categories structured in contrasting, affirmative and negative dyads that reflect this fundamental distinction between intrinsic nature and other-nature. The next section applies this method of inclusion through a set of formulaic questions that relate each of the over two hundred dyads of the basic matrix to the three categories of the aggregates (陰, Skt **skandha*), elements (界, Skt **dhātu*), and sense spheres (入, Skt **āyatana*): for example, “The visual sense sphere (Skt *caḥsurāyatana*) is included within how many aggregates, elements, and sense spheres? About what factor is this question asked? The question is asked about the factor of the visual sense sphere, excluding other factors. What other factors are excluded? [The next category, namely, those] factors that are not the visual sense sphere, [is excluded].”²⁷⁵ Finally, this set of formulaic questions is posed once again, but now in terms of the negative alternative of “non-inclusion,” again as applied to each of the over two hundred dyads in the basic matrix.

For the Sarvāstivādins, the various categories of existent factors are discriminated from one another on the basis of each factor’s “intrinsic” or “self-nature” (Skt *svabhāva*). In fact, the term

²⁷² Commentaries: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

²⁷³ Cox 2004.

²⁷⁴ ŚAŚ 21–22 pp. 661a15–671b23.

²⁷⁵ 眼入法幾陰界入攝。問何等法。問眼入法。除餘法。除何等法。非眼入法 (ŚAŚ 21 p. 666c19–20).

Skt *svabhāva* acquires its distinctive function as the invariable determinant of existent factors precisely in this context of the proper classification of factors through this process of inclusion on the basis of the contrast between “intrinsic nature” (Skt *svabhāva*) and “other-nature” (Skt *parabhāva*).²⁷⁶ Thus, the distinctive Sarvāstivāda taxonomy of factors based on “intrinsic nature” also entails the existence of each factor so classified as a discrete real entity. In the Vibhāṣā compendia, the Sarvāstivāda method of inclusion by intrinsic nature is contrasted with the position of others, referred to as Vibhajyavādins, who assert that “factors are included on the basis of other nature (他性, Skt **parabhāva*) and not on the basis of intrinsic nature (自性, **svabhāva*).”²⁷⁷ The Vibhajyavādins appeal not only to scriptural authority, but also to common usage in maintaining that “that which includes” and “that which is included” are mutually distinct from one another as “other.” For example, the everyday example of a householder who states, “I possess land, domestic animals, and so forth,” demonstrates that inclusion is based on other-nature since “I” is determined only in contrast to that which is characterized as “other-nature,” namely, in this case “land,” “domestic animals,” and so forth.²⁷⁸ The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas respond that the scriptural citations and examples from common usage offered by the Vibhajyavādins are merely provisional; they involve a form of conventional inclusion that is based on other-nature and vary in accordance with both time and circumstances. By contrast, the Sarvāstivāda position of inclusion by intrinsic or self-nature is absolute and not dependent upon the exigencies of time or conditions precisely because a factor’s identity (自體, Skt **ātmabhāva*) is not contingent upon conditions and is invariable.²⁷⁹ As the **Mahāvibhāṣā* suggests, absolute inclusion is determined by intrinsic nature because that intrinsic nature exists, is a real entity, and can be obtained; it is not different, not other, not separated, not apart, and is never void; it is not the case that it has not existed, does not exist, or will not exist; it neither increases nor decreases. Inclusion by intrinsic nature does not involve one thing grasping another, as in the case of a hand grabbing food or fingers pinching cloth. Instead, factors (Skt *dharma*) each uphold their own identity as “intrinsic nature” and prevent it from disintegrating. The term “inclusion” is established on the basis of this sense of “upholding,” and this becomes the fundamental sense of the term Skt *dharma*.²⁸⁰

Thus, through these three counterexamples, the Gāndhārī proponent contends that if, as the Sarvāstivādins maintain, “everything exists everywhere,” the clear demarcation between intrinsic nature and other-nature breaks down; in other words, intrinsic nature would exist in other-nature, and vice versa. Accordingly, the declaration, “everything exists everywhere,” would contradict the

²⁷⁶ AHŚ (Dh) 1 p. 810b6ff.; AHŚ (U) 1 p. 836b11ff.; MAHŚ 2 p. 880b10ff.; AKBh 1.18 p. 12.6ff.; NyAŚ 3 p. 342b29ff. Cf. MAHŚ 11 p. 963a20ff. Commentary: The Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82].

²⁷⁷ 謂或有說。諸法攝他性非自性攝。如分別論者 (AMVŚ 59 p. 306b12–13)。自性自性攝。自性非他性攝 (ŚAŚ 21 p. 661a20–21)。Cf. AMVŚ 106 p. 550a7ff., 154 p. 785b1ff., 167 p. 841b23ff., 197 p. 985b5ff.; AKBh 1.18cd p. 12.10ff.

²⁷⁸ AMVŚ 59 p. 306c2–6.

²⁷⁹ AMVŚ 59 p. 307a9–13.

²⁸⁰ 問云何諸法各攝自性。答自性於自性是有是實是可得故說名為攝。自性於自性非異非外非離非別恒不空故說名為攝。自性於自性非不已有非不今有非不當有故名為攝。自性於自性非增非減故名為攝。諸法自性攝自性時。非如以手取食指捻衣等。然彼各各執持自體令不散壞故名為攝。於執持義立以攝名。故勝義攝唯攝自性 (AMVŚ 59 p. 308a20–28)。Cf. Cox 2004.

very principle of inclusion that is the cornerstone of their own taxonomy of existent factors. In an attempt to evade this contradiction, the Sarvāstivādin opponent then responds, “it should not be said that everything exists everywhere” (*yadi ahadi na vatava sa(*r)vat(*ra) s(*a)rva asti di •*, ll. 100–101). Here, it is important to note that the force of the negative particle *na* is applied to the gerundive and hence to the entire clause “everything exists everywhere.” However, the proponent in his rejoinder changes the referent of the negative particle from the clause as a whole to one term, specifically the verb: “With regard to that it should be said that it being thus, everything does **not exist** everywhere” (*tatra vatave eva sate sarvat(*r)e s(*ar)ve n(*a)st(*i) di*, ll. 101–102). In other words, through this change from exclusionary negation of the clause as a whole to predicate term negation, the opponent’s declaration is then itself contradicted; “everything exists everywhere” becomes “everything does **not exist** everywhere.” And as the proponent concludes, if “everything does not exist everywhere,” the opponent is left with the limited assertion, “something exists [and] something does not exist,” (*(*ki)c(*a) asti k(*i)c(*a) n(*a)st(*i) •*, l. 102), which clearly contradicts his fundamental proposition “everything exists.”

I.3.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent’s Seven Declarations (7: 2) Expanding upon “Everything Exists” [ll. 102–105]

Reconstruction

(2) [102] *s(*a)rveṣu s(*a)rvam asti di • tena uvahaḍāidriana* [103] *(*a)n(*a)g(*a)ḍ(*a)-īdriya asti • neraīyana catvare bhava asti • eva sarvaga* [104] *(*i)driya anuyujīdava • yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam asti di •* [105] *tena de sarveṣu kica asti kica nasti (*ki)nu khu de vatava sarve asti •*

Sanskrit rendering

(2) [102] *sarveṣu sarvam astīti. tena upahatendriyānām* [103] *anāgatendriyāṇi santi, nairayikānām catvāro bhāvāḥ santi. evaṃ sarvagāṇi*[104]*ndriyāṇy anuyoktavyam. yady āha na vaktavyaṃ sarveṣu sarvam astīti,* [105] *tena sarveṣu kiṃcid asti, kiṃcin nāsti. kiṃ nu khalu te vaktavyaṃ sarvam asti.*

Translation

(2) [102] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists in all [factors].” [p] Therefore, [even] impaired controlling faculties possess [103] future [unimpaired] controlling faculties, and hell-beings possess the four natures [of other beings]. In this way, [104] it should be upheld that the controlling faculties are everywhere.” If one states, [o] “It should not be said that everything exists in all [factors],” [105] [p] as a result of that, in all [factors], something exists, [and] something does not exist. Now how possibly could it be said by you that “everything exists?”

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105]

Next, the proponent turns to a declaration not included in the root passage (ll. 66–69): “Everything exists in all [factors]” (*sarveṣu sarvam asti*, l. 102). This declaration does occur in the Kathāvattu (P *sabbesu sabbam atthi*, Kv 116), and the commentary specifies “all” as referring to “all factors” (P *sabbesu dhammesu sabbam atthi*, Kv-a 44). In criticizing this declaration, the proponent offers two counterexamples, of which each results in an untoward consequence: (1) “[Even] impaired

idriyas possess future [unimpaired] *idriyas*”; and (2) “Hell-beings possess the four natures [of other beings].”

The exact sense of the term *idriya* (P/Skt *indriya*) in the first counterexample is uncertain. The compound P *upahatindriya*, “impaired *idriya*,” appears once in the Pali suttas and several times in the vinaya, where it functions in a generic sense to refer to someone who is physically impaired. For example, one who becomes P *upahatindriya* through the fever of desire (P *kāmapariḷāha*) is compared to one whose *indriyas* are impaired (P *upahata*) through disease or the arising of a fever (P *pariḷāha*).²⁸¹ The compound P *upahatindriya* can refer specifically to the impairment of the “clarity” or “sensitivity” (P *pasāda*, Skt *prasāda*) of the sense organs such that they become unable to perceive their corresponding object-fields, as for example in the case of sense organs such as the body (P *upahatakāyappasāda*)²⁸² or the eye (P *cakkhupasāda*).²⁸³ Or commentaries interpret *indriya* in terms of a broader traditional list of twenty-two “controlling faculties,” as for example in references to the controlling faculty of insight (P *paññindriya*)²⁸⁴ or the five controlling faculties including faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and insight (P *saddhādi*).²⁸⁵ This traditional list of twenty-two controlling faculties comprises the six sense organs in addition to other faculties that control or have sovereignty (Skt *ādhipatya*) over various aspects of sentient life.²⁸⁶ For example, the five externally directed sense organs have sovereignty over a pleasing appearance, protection, the arising of perceptual consciousness directed toward their corresponding external object-fields, and their own distinctive activity; the sexual organs have sovereignty over the distribution and differentiation among sentient beings; the faculty of life has sovereignty over the connection of homogeneous character (Skt *nikāyasabhāga*) at the time of rebirth as well as the maintenance of that homogeneous character during life, and so forth.²⁸⁷ Thus, the term *indriya* in this first counterexample could be seen as being used either in its narrower sense to refer specifically to the sense organs, or in its broader sense to refer to all controlling faculties. Since the context of this first counterexample does not make the referent of *indriya* clear, the translation as “controlling faculty” consistent with the broader sense has been adopted.

Regardless of the referent of the term *indriya*, the import of the counterexample remains the same. If one claims that everything exists in all factors, future controlling faculties that will be fully capable of functioning must also be said to exist within the causal stream of impaired controlling faculties. As a result, a present controlling faculty that is impaired and unable to function should be capable of conditioning the arising of an unimpaired controlling faculty within its own future stream. Thus, it should be possible for a faculty that is impaired and does not function to give

²⁸¹ MN I 507; Mp-ṭ (VRI-CST4) 1.69; Vibh 479.

²⁸² Sp I 279 on Vin III 37.

²⁸³ Ps II 351, III 220; Spk III 41, III 95.

²⁸⁴ Ps III 218 on MN I 507.

²⁸⁵ Sp VII 1362 on Vin V 161.

²⁸⁶ For the definition of Skt *indriya* as Skt *ādhipatya*: 問何故名根。根是何義。答增上義是根義 (AMVŚ 142 p. 730c6–7). Cf. Skt *ata ādhipatyārtha indriyārthaḥ* (AKBh 2.1 p. 38.4); P ... *ādhipatyaṭṭhena indriyam* ... (Paṭis-a III 619; As 119).

²⁸⁷ AMVŚ 142 p. 730c26ff.; AKBh 1.48 p. 37.5ff., 2.1 p. 38.4ff.

rise to a faculty that is fully functional. Such a possibility is, however, precluded by the present controlling faculty's very nature as impaired.

In the second counterexample (l. 103), the proponent turns once again to hell-beings and specifically to the possibility of a hell-being possessing four *bhavas*. Identifying the probable Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of *bhava* used here in conjunction with the independent genitive *nerāyana* and modified by the adjective “four” (*catvare*) is more problematic than in its other two occurrences in our Gāndhārī text. In the other occurrences, *bhava* is found in compound with *nerāya*, where the equivalent “nature” (P/Skt *bhāva*) rather than “rebirth state” (P/Skt *bhava*) appears more likely.²⁸⁸ In this passage also, the equivalent *bhāva* is supported by examples of the compound P *nerayikabhāva*, or “nature of hell-beings,” in Pali commentaries and by the commentarial definition of the term P *nerayika* as itself encompassing the sense of *bhava* as “rebirth state.” However, this counterexample clearly includes the phrase “four *bhava*,” which suggests a set list of four or, here by implication, five *bhava* including that of hell-beings (*nerāyana catvare bhava asti* •, l. 103). Even though this particular list of four or five *bhavas* is not specified in our text, likely textual sources employ the term P/Skt *bhava* rather than P/Skt *bhāva* and hence refer to “stages of existence/ life” or “rebirth states.” Several different formulaic sets of such “stages” or “states” (P/Skt *bhava*) appear in abhidharma texts of different periods. In earlier abhidharma texts, Skt *bhava* is used most often in a set of three, referring to the states of desire (Skt *kāma*), the states of form (Skt *rūpa*), and the formless states (Skt *ārūpya*).²⁸⁹ In this set, Skt *bhava* is synonymous with Skt *dhātu*, “realm,” which was to become the term of choice in texts of the later period. In later abhidharma texts, Skt *bhava* is most often used within two sets, of which each is claimed to be attested in the sūtras.²⁹⁰ The first is a set of four Skt *bhavas* that demarcate periods within the life-stream (Skt *santāna*) of sentient beings: the state of birth (Skt *upapattibhava*); the state between birth and death (Skt *pūrvakālabhava*, lit. “previous time”); the state of death (Skt *marañabhava*); and the intermediate state between one rebirth state and the next (Skt *antarābhava*).²⁹¹ The second set of seven Skt *bhavas* includes the five possible rebirth states recognized by the Sarvāstivādins, namely, hells (Skt *narakabhava*), animals (Skt *tiryagbhava*), hungry ghosts (Skt *pretabhava*), divine beings (Skt *devabhava*), and human beings (Skt *manuṣyabhava*), together with the state of action (Skt *karmabhava*), which is their cause (Skt *hetu*), and the intermediate state (Skt *antarābhava*), which is their approach (Skt *āgamana*).²⁹²

²⁸⁸ Commentary: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent's Second Category [ll. 36–45].

²⁸⁹ SaṅgP 4 p. 383b25ff. 三有者。一欲有。二色有。三無色有。 Cf. DhSk 12 p. 512b28ff.; Dietz 1984: 60; PrP (tr. GBh) 4 p. 645a7; PrP (tr. Xz) 5 p. 712a10–11.

²⁹⁰ For the second list of seven Skt *bhavas*, a parallel can only be found in An Shigao's translation of the Daśottarasūtra: T 13 *shang* p. 236b14–16.

²⁹¹ AASkŚ 29 p. 907b28ff.; JñPr 19 p. 1024a3ff.; AARŚ *shang* p. 967c6–7, *xia* p. 980b9ff.; AMVŚ 60 p. 309b4ff., 192 p. 959a13ff.; AVŚ 32 p. 233a10–11; TTVŚ 3 p. 256b12ff.; AKBh 3.10ff. p. 120.4ff., 3.37d ff. p. 151.18ff.; NyAŚ 30 p. 509b7ff.

²⁹² 如說七有。一地獄有。二傍生有。三鬼界有。四天有。五人有。六業有。七中有。彼說五趣及彼因彼方便名有。謂地獄有等即是五趣。業有是彼因。中有是彼方便 (AMVŚ 60 p. 309b15–19). Cf. AMVŚ 192 p. 960b16–18; AVŚ 32 p. 233a20–24; Skt *sapta bhavā narakabhavas tiryagbhavaḥ pre-*

Even though the second counterexample in our text contains the phrase “four *bhavas*” (*catvare bhave*) and therefore implies a set of four or five, none of these standard lists of P/Skt *bhavas* fits the context. The term *bhava* here clearly would not be referring to the set of four states demarcating periods within a given life-stream, since this would not result in a contradiction. This counterexample is offered by the proponent as an untoward consequence following from the opponent’s initial declaration, “everything exists in all [factors]”; for this reason, these “four *bhavas*” should not exist among those reborn in hell. The first set of four states demarcating periods in the life-stream applies to beings in the two realms of desire and form, including also those born as hell-beings.²⁹³ Further, since the term *neraiya* in our text itself refers to a rebirth state, it seems more reasonable here also to interpret the term *bhava* as “nature” (P/Skt *bhāva*). Thus, the term “four *bhava*” would refer to the natures of the four rebirth states of animals, hungry ghosts, gods, and humans, which, together with hell-beings, constitute the set of five rebirth states recognized by the Sarvāstivādins. In this case, the statement, “hell-beings possess the four natures [of other beings]” (*neraiyana catvare bhava asti* •, l. 103), results in the untoward consequence that beings reborn in hell and defined by their nature as “hell-beings” would also possess the natures of the other four rebirth states.

Following the proponent’s two counterexamples is a conclusion signaled by the particle *eva* (P *evam*, Skt *evam*): “In this way, it should be upheld that the (**i*)*driya* are everywhere” (*eva sarvaga (*i)driya anuyujidava* •, ll. 103–104). In order to encompass the previous two counterexamples, the term *idriya* (P/Skt *indriya*) here must be understood not in its narrower sense as “sense organ” but in its broader sense as “controlling faculty.” The twenty-two controlling faculties can be grouped according to the circumstances of the various sentient beings who possess them: for example, the stage of the path to which they belong; their moral quality; their status as “matured effect” or “not matured effect” or as “possessed or “not possessed of a matured effect”; the method by which they are to be abandoned; the location of their occurrence; and the location of their matured effect.²⁹⁴ Since not all twenty-two controlling faculties can be said to characterize all sentient beings under all circumstances, this conclusion makes explicit the untoward consequence of the opponent’s original declaration as suggested by the previous two counterexamples.

Following this criticism of the declaration, the proponent anticipates a possible response by the opponent: “If one states, [O] ‘It should not be said that everything exists in all [factors],’ ...” (*yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam asti di* •, l. 104). By admitting this, as in the criticism of the previous declaration, the opponent must accept that “in all [factors], something exists [and] something does not exist” (*sarveṣu kica asti kica nasti*, l. 105). This then contradicts his own declaration that

tabhavo devabhavo manuṣyabhavaḥ karmabhavo ’ntarābhava iti. atra hi pañca gatayaḥ sahetukāḥ sahāgamanās coktāḥ (AKBh 3.14 p. 144.19–21). Cf. AKBh 3.12 p. 121.20–21; SaṅgP 11 p. 415c17–18; PrP (tr. Xz) 5 p. 712b27; NyAŚ 21 p. 459b27–29.

²⁹³ AMVŚ 68 p. 352b18–19, 69 p. 358c17ff. Several positions are cited in this section, of which one claims that the presence of the intermediate state depends upon the strength of action. According to this position, rebirth in heavens and hells results from strong action and hence has no intermediate state. The dominant position is, however, that the intermediate state does occur in the case of hell-states. Cf. AKBh 3.38c p. 152.3ff.

²⁹⁴ AMVŚ 144 p. 738a8ff., 145 p. 745b28ff., esp. 145 p. 745c13ff.; AKBh 2.9–13 p. 42.20ff.

“everything exists in all [factors].” In contrast to his criticism of the previous declaration, here the proponent adds a rhetorical question that makes explicit the resulting contraction of the opponent’s fundamental proposition that “everything exists”: “Now how possibly could it be said by you that ‘everything exists?’” (*(*ki n)u khu de vatava sarve asti* •, l. 105).

I.3.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent’s Seven Declarations (7: 3–4) Expanding upon “Everything Exists” [ll. 105–109]

Reconstruction

(3) [105] *yidi* [106] *puna sarvaṣa sarvam asti ikaṣa parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyoathi* •

(4) [107] *sarvakala sarvam asti di* • *purebhatakale pacabhatakalo asti* • *pacabha*[108]-*takal(*e) purebhatakala asti* • *pacupanakale anagadakala ca adida*[109]*kala ca asti peyale kalena anuyujidavu* •

Sanskrit rendering

(3) [105] *yadi* [106] *punaḥ sarvasya sarvam asty, ekasya paraskandhaparāyatana-paradhātuyogo 'sti.*

(4) [107] *sarvakāle sarvam astīti. purobhaktakāle paścādbhaktakālo 'sti. paścādbha*[108]-*ktakale purobhaktakālo 'sti. pratyutpannakāle 'nāgatakālaś cātīta*[109]*kālaś ca santi. peyālaṃ kālenānyuktavyam.*

Translation

(3) [105] If [106] further [o] “Everything exists as belonging to everything,” [P] one [sentient being] possesses a connection with the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another.

(4) [107] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists at all times.” [P] [In that case,] at the time before the meal, the time after the meal exists; at the time after the meal, [108] the time before the meal exists. At the present time, both future and past times [109] exist; and so on, it should be upheld by means of [other] times.

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Third and Fourth Declarations [ll. 105–109]

In this passage, the proponent briefly criticizes two formulaic declarations offered by his Sarvāstivādin opponent to expand upon his fundamental proposition that “everything exists.” The first declaration, “everything exists as belonging to everything” (*sarvaṣa sarvam asti*, l. 106), is found neither in the initial list of declarations given in the root passage of our text (ll. 66–69) nor in the analogous discussion in the Kathāvatthu.²⁹⁵ The criticism offered here is straightforward: if everything belongs to everything, then one being would possess a connection (*yoa*, P/Skt *yoga*) with the aggregates (*kadha*), sense spheres (*ayaḍana*, cpd. form *aiḍana*), and elements (*dhadu*)

²⁹⁵ Kv 115ff. The *Mīśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra (MAHŚ 11 p. 963a20ff.) begins its discussion of the proposition “everything exists” with the clarification that everything does not possess the characteristics of everything else; see Text and Commentary § I.3, n. 173. Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

of another. Such a connection would result in the clearly untoward consequence of undermining distinctions among different sentient beings.

Even though the Kathāvatthu does not include this declaration among its introductory statements, the term *yoa* that appears in this passage of the Gāndhārī text suggests a possible link with the following question that does occur in this section of the Kathāvatthu: “Does everything exist without connection?”²⁹⁶ The Kathāvatthu commentary notes, “‘Without connection’ means ‘unconnected.’ For there is a connection among things characterized by different intrinsic natures and not in the case of that which has a single intrinsic nature. Thus, in this question it is asked, ‘Does everything exist?’ while considering material form with feelings, or feelings with material form, as not different and as having a single characteristic.”²⁹⁷ As the Kathāvatthu commentary explains, the term “without connection” (*ayoga*) refers to an absence of connection that is only possible in the case of entities that are identical. Thus, the statement, “everything exists without connection,” would imply the existence of everything as a single entity marked by a single characteristic in the absence of any other entity to which a connection could be formed. One might then understand the negated word *ayoga* in this statement in the Kathāvatthu commentary as a clue that points to the sense of the affirmative form *yoa* appearing in our text. That is to say, since the explanation of our text clearly uses the example of different beings in referring to a connection of one being (*ikaṣa*) with the “aggregates, sense spheres, and elements of another” (*parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhadyoa*), there is little doubt that the affirmative form *yoa* is intended. Despite these differences between the two texts in the presence or absence of the privative prefix *a-* and the perspectives implied, both the Kathāvatthu and the explanation in our Gāndhārī text offer the same untoward consequence of identity where no such identity should exist, that is, an implied connection among entities that should in fact be distinct.

The second declaration criticized here, namely, “everything exists at all times” (*sarvakala sarvam asti*, l. 107), is included within the initial list of formulaic declarations given in the root passage of our text (l. 67). In the criticism offered here, the proponent presents two counterexamples, both illustrating that this declaration inevitably results in temporal confusion. The proponent first chooses the everyday example of the time before the meal (*purebhatakala*) and the time after the meal (*pacabhatakala*), or the morning and the afternoon. If “everything exists at all times,” then these two different periods of time would become confused, and as a result it would become impossible to determine the appropriate time for important daily events. The second more general example concerns the time periods of the past, present, and future: if “everything exists at all times,” then the time periods of the present, future, and past would become confused.²⁹⁸ The proponent gives only one case, namely, “at the present time, both future and past times exist,” but by using the abbreviation adverb *peyale*, he suggests that the same confusion would apply to the future

²⁹⁶ P *ayogan ti katvā sabbaṃ atthīti* (Kv 116).

²⁹⁷ P *ayogan ti ayuttaṃ. nānāśabhāvānañ hi yogo hoti, na ekasabhāvassa. iti imasmiṃ pañhe rūpaṃ vedanāya, vedanaṃ vā rūpena anānaṃ ekalakkhaṇaṃ eva katvā sabbaṃ atthīti pucchati* (Kv 44).

²⁹⁸ For this frequently employed criticism, see Commentaries: (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 62–66]; The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; The Opponent’s Second Qualification [ll. 75–82]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

and past times as well: “and so on, it should be upheld by means of [other] times” (*pacupanakale anagaḍakala ca adidaḍakala ca asti peyale kalena anuyujidavu* •, ll. 108–109).

I.3.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent’s Seven Declarations (7: 5–7) Expanding upon “Everything Exists” [ll. 109–115]

Reconstruction

(5) [109] *sarvagarena sarvam asti di* [110] *adidaḍa⟨*g⟩ar⟨an⟩ena anagaḍa⟨*g⟩ara⟨na⟩ asti* • *anagaḍa⟨*g⟩arena adidaḍa⟨*g⟩are asti* • [111] *śuñāḍagarena* • *śatagare asti* • *śatagarena śuñāḍagara asti* • *sacagare*[112]*n⟨*a a⟩sacagara asti* • *dukhagarena suhagar⟨*a⟩* • *anatvagarena atvagara asti* • [113] *atvagarena anatvagarō asti* • *sarvagarena as⟨*a⟩-rvagarō asti* •

(6) [113] *adidaḍa*[114]*k⟨*a⟩r⟨*a⟩nena p⟨*i a⟩n⟨*a⟩g⟨*a⟩ḍ⟨*a⟩k⟨*a⟩r⟨*a⟩nen⟨*a⟩* • *pi pacupanakaranena kuśalakuśala*

(7) [114] *sa*[115]*rve vi bhava prañahi ukṣividavu peyala*

Sanskrit rendering

(5) [109] *sarvākāreṇa sarvam astīti*. [110] *atītākāreṇānāgatākāro ’sti. anāgatākāreṇātītākāro ’sti*. [111] *śūnyatākāreṇa śāntākāro ’sti. śāntākāreṇa śūnyatākāro ’sti. satyākāre*[112]*ṇāsatyākāro ’sti. duḥkhākāreṇa sukhākāraḥ. anātmākāreṇātmākāro ’sti*. [113] *ātmākāreṇānātmākāro ’sti. sarvākāreṇāsarvākāro ’sti*.

(6) [113] *atīta*[114]*kāraṇenāpy anāgatakāraṇenāpi pratyutpannakāraṇena kuśalākuśalāḥ*.

(7) [114] *sa*[115]*rve ’pi bhāvāḥ prajñābhir utkṣeptavyaṃ peyālam*.

Translation

(5) [109] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists with every aspect.” [110] [p] [In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect. [111] The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of tranquility. The aspect of untruth [112] exists with the aspect of truth. The aspect of happiness exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. [113] The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self. The aspect of what is not everything exists with the aspect of everything.

(6) [113–114] Virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past [factors], by reason of future [factors], and by reason of present [factors].

(7) [114–115] And [as for the declarations concerning] all “modes,” [namely, “everything exists through all modes,]” and so on, it should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight.

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Declarations [ll. 109–115]

The proponent completes his criticism of the formulaic declarations given by his Sarvāstivādin opponent in the root passage (ll. 66–69) by examining two in depth and summarily dismissing the final three. The first declaration, “everything exists with every aspect” (*sarvagarena sarvam asti*, l. 109), is also cited in the chapter “Everything Exists” (*P sabbaṃ atthi*) in the Kathāvatthu with the

somewhat ambiguous statement, “everything exists with everything.”²⁹⁹ However, the Kathāvatthu commentary identifies the referent of the instrumental P *sabbena* in this statement as “with every aspect” (P *sabbenākārena*), thus “everything exists with every aspect.”³⁰⁰ The proponent of our Gāndhārī text offers six examples to illustrate that the declaration, “everything exists with every aspect,” results in the confusion of these aspects (*agara*, P/Skt *ākāra*). This confusion in turn prevents the clear apprehension of factors by undermining the very aspects by which they are ascertained as distinct. These six examples utilize complementary or opposed aspects, including conventionally recognized contrasts such as past and future, truth and untruth, happiness and suffering, “everything” and “not everything,” as well as contrasts that are meaningful specifically in a Buddhist doctrinal context, such as voidness and tranquility, and self and non-self. Three examples, namely, past/future, tranquility/voidness, and self/non-self, employ a regular syntactic pattern consisting of two parallel and contrasting clauses: for example, “the aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self” (*anatvagarena anatvagara asti • atvagarena anatvagarō asti •*, ll. 112–113). The three remaining examples, namely, truth/untruth, happiness/suffering, and everything/not everything, employ an abbreviated pattern that presents the pairs of aspects through only a single clause: for example, “the aspect of untruth exists with the aspect of truth” (*sacagaren(*a a)sacagara asti •*, ll. 111–112).

Even though most of these examples are clear, in two cases the intended contrasts and hence the proper contexts for their interpretation are not immediately apparent. Indeed, the very first example is problematic. Here, as will be explained below, the issue is not one of interpretation but of possible scribal confusion between “aspects” (*agara*, P/Skt *ākāra*) and “reasons” (*karana*, P/Skt *kāraṇa*).³⁰¹ As explained above, this first example should be understood as contrasting past (*adiḍa*) and future (*anagaḍa*) “aspects”: “[P] [In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect” (*adiḍa<*g>ar{an}ena anagaḍa<*g>ara{na} asti • anagaḍa<*g>arena adiḍa<*g>are asti •*, l. 110). The second example is also problematic, but here the issue is one of context and interpretation rather than inconsistency or possible scribal error: “The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of tranquility” (*śuñḍagarena • śatagare asti • śatagarena śuñḍagara asti •*, l. 111). Voidness and tranquility do not constitute a commonplace contrast like happiness and suffering or truth and untruth. They presumably refer to a doctrinally based contrast, but unlike self and non-self, the precise context is uncertain. Voidness and tranquility, and the specific terms “aspect of voidness” (Skt *śūnyatākāra*) and “aspect of tranquility” (Skt *śāntākāra*), appear in the Sarvāstivāda enumeration of sixteen aspects in the path of religious practice that mark one’s progressive knowledge of the four noble truths, whereby each of the four noble truths is known in terms of four distinct aspects.³⁰² Within this total set of sixteen, the aspects of voidness and tranquility are clearly distinguished:

²⁹⁹ P *sabbena sabbam atthi* (Kv 116).

³⁰⁰ P *sabbenākārena sabbam atthīti pucchati* (Kv-a 44).

³⁰¹ Text Notes: [110] *adiḍakaranena* |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}*anaga*|^{51H(v)}*ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adiḍakare asti •*.

³⁰² For these 16 aspects as distinct real entities: 評曰應作是說。十六行相名與實體俱有十六 (AMVŚ 79 p. 408c21–22). Cf. AARŚ *shang* p. 973a1ff.; AHŚ (Dh) 3 p. 820c20ff.; AHŚ (U) 4 p. 852c7ff.; MAHŚ 6 p. 918a19ff.; AKBh 7.13a p. 400.1ff.

the aspect of voidness corresponds to the third stage in the first noble truth of suffering, and the aspect of tranquility, to the second stage in the third noble truth of nirvāṇa. This list of sixteen aspects is then utilized in several different contexts: for example, in the cultivation of the four states conducive to penetration (Skt *nirvedhabhāgīya*), or within the four stages of practice preliminary to the path of vision (Skt *darśanamārga*) in which the four noble truths in their sixteen aspects are to be comprehended in the context of the four applications of mindfulness (Skt *smṛtyupasthāna*).³⁰³ In a second context, the sixteen aspects are apportioned among a standard set of three concentrations (Skt *samādhi*). Here, the concentration of voidness (Skt *sūnyatāsamādhi*) is associated with two aspects including the aspect of voidness, the concentration of the signless (Skt *animittasamādhi*) is associated with four aspects including the aspect of tranquility, and the concentration without intention (Skt *apraṇihitasamādhi*) is associated with the remaining ten aspects.³⁰⁴ In both of these applications of the sixteen aspects, the two aspects of voidness and tranquility are clearly distinguished, but they are not contrasted specifically with one another. Hence, in the contrast here specifically between voidness and tranquility, the proponent might be appealing to a specific contrast between the aspects of voidness and tranquility for which no other textual parallel has been located, or he might simply be appealing to a commonly acknowledged need to distinguish distinct stages in the path of practice.

Next, the proponent turns to a brief criticism of the fourth declaration, but in contrast to his criticism of the other declarations, he does not restate the declaration itself given in the root passage: “(*Everything exists) through every reason” (*sarvakaranen(*a sarvam a)sti*, ll. 67–68). The omission of this restatement reinforces the impression of scribal confusion throughout this portion of the manuscript.³⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the proponent in this criticism consistently uses the term “reason” (*karana*, P/Skt *kāraṇa*) rather than “aspect” (*agara*, P/Skt *ākāra*) and abandons completely the contrasting two-clause structure employed in the examples in the preceding criticism of aspects. Thus, even though the proponent does not begin with the declaration itself, it seems likely that he does indeed shift from the criticism of the declaration concerning aspects to a criticism of the subsequent declaration concerning reasons.

The proponent’s criticism of the declaration concerning reasons reads as follows: “Virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past [factors], by reason of future [factors], and by reason of present [factors]” (*adiḍak(*a)r(*a)nena p(*i a)n(*a)g(*a)d(*a)k(*a)r(*a)nen(*a) • pi pacupanakaranena kuśalakuśala*, ll. 113–114). Unfortunately, no parallel for this declaration is found in the Kathāvatthu or its commentary, and the proponent does not explain how this brief statement constitutes a criticism of or an untoward consequence resulting from this declaration. However, a possible explanation can be found in connotations of the term Skt *kāraṇa*, as used in several different contexts in Sarvāstivāda texts. Perhaps most often, Skt *kāraṇa* is used to refer to “reasons” operative in the context of an argument, as in the case of the set phrase “what is the

³⁰³ AMVŚ 5 p. 24b4–7 p. 34c26; AARŚ *xia* p. 974a29ff.; AHŚ (Dh) 2 p. 818b3ff.; AHŚ (U) 3 p. 849a15ff.; MAHŚ 5 p. 909b16ff.; AKBh. 6.19d p. 345.11ff.

³⁰⁴ AMVŚ 104 p. 538a19ff.; AKBh 8.24 p. 449.9ff.

³⁰⁵ For a discussion of this scribal confusion, see Text Notes: [110] *adiḍakaranena* |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}*anaga-* |^{51H(v)}*ḍakaranena asti • anagaḍakarena adiḍakare asti •*

reason?" (Skt *kiṃ kāraṇam*), which signals a reason offered for a prior statement. However, the term Skt *kāraṇa* can also be used to refer to causal force or activity in the most general sense, including all varieties of causes that contribute to the arising of a given factor. From this sense as a general causal force, Skt *kāraṇa* comes to be used in Sarvāstivāda doctrinal analysis as the name for the most basic type of cause within the Sarvāstivāda set of six causes (Skt *hetu*), that is, the "comprehensive non-obstructing cause" (Skt *kāraṇahetu*). This refers to the causal force exerted by all other factors in the arising of any given factor, a causal force consisting simply of non-obstruction on the part of these other factors.³⁰⁶ In accordance with the comprehensive nature of this type of cause, the Sarvāstivādins maintain that factors of all three time periods of the past, present, and future function as comprehensive non-obstructing causes in the arising of any given factor, that is, with the exception of the factor whose arising is being explained. In view of this Sarvāstivāda model of a "comprehensive non-obstructing cause," the proponent's statement, "virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past, future, and present [factors]," would not appear to constitute an effective criticism of the Sarvāstivāda declaration concerning "reasons." However, from the perspective of the proponent, for whom past and future factors do not exist and are incapable of exerting causal efficacy, the possibility of past and future factors acting as causes for the arising of another factor would indeed function to undermine the declaration that "everything exists through every reason." A further clue to the force of the proponent's criticism is offered by the discussion of Skt *kāraṇahetu* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. This text contends that future factors cannot serve as Skt *kāraṇahetu* because they cannot possess any form of causal efficacy, in particular as would be exerted on present or past factors, since no subsequent factor can function as a cause of prior factors.³⁰⁷ Hence, it is also possible that the proponent's criticism here reflects this position; that is to say, the statement, "virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past, future, and present [factors]," constitutes an untoward consequence precisely because it suggests that prior factors (i.e., present or past) depend upon the causal efficacy of subsequent factors (i.e., future or present).

The final statement in this passage ends with the adverb *peyala*, marking a textual abbreviation or ellipsis: *śarve vi bhava prañahi ukṣivīdavu peyala* (ll. 114–115).³⁰⁸ However, the syntax of the statement, its relationship to both the preceding discussion and the root passage, and the content of the abbreviated or omitted material all are uncertain. *Peyala* can function to signal the omission of a previously mentioned or well-known list. However, the content of the omitted material in this case is obscured by the unclear syntax of the preceding clause and the uncertain function of *peyala* within it. If the clause *śarve vi bhava prañahi ukṣivīdavu* is linked to the previous criticism of the declaration concerning reasons, *peyala* most likely refers to other counterexamples concerning "reasons" in addition to the virtuous and unvirtuous factors mentioned in the text. In this case, the terms *bhava prañahi* could be interpreted either as a phrase or as a compound. In three of its five occurrences in our text (ll. 109, 115, 117), *peyala* is used with a gerundive that governs a

³⁰⁶ AMVŚ 21 p. 106a19ff.; AKBh 2.50a p. 82.25ff.

³⁰⁷ AKBh 2.50a p. 83.5–6.

³⁰⁸ For further discussion of *peyala*, see Commentary: (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent's Second Category [ll. 36–45]. Text Notes: [99] *sarvabhava asti • peyala*.

noun in the instrumental: “And so on (*peyala*), X should be ‘upheld’ (*anuyujidavu*) or ‘expanded’ (*ukṣividavu*) by means of/through Y (instrumental).” And in two of these occurrences (ll. 115, 117), the word *sarva* is also found: “All (*sarva*) [such cases] should be ‘expanded’ (*ukṣividavu*) by means of Y (instrumental).” If *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) were understood as an independent noun within the phrase modified by the adjective *sarva*, it could then refer to the other “natures” or factors that would serve as counterexamples for the previous declaration concerning reasons: “All (*sarve*) natures (*bhava*) also should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight (*prañahi*), and so on” (*śarve vi bhava prañahi ukṣividavu peyala*). Alternatively, if *bhava-prañahi* were taken as a compound, *sarve* would refer to the other counterexamples, and *bhava* would represent the “natures” of other factors similar to those mentioned in the omitted counterexamples, which are then to be correctly understood through insight: “Everything (*sarve*) should also be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight into ‘natures’ (*bhava-prañahi*), and so on” (*śarve vi bhavaprañahi ukṣividavu peyala*, ll. 114–115).

A second interpretation of this final statement is suggested by the term *bhava*, which could indicate a connection specifically to the next declaration in the root passage: “Everything exists through all modes” (*sarvabhavaḥ sarvam asti* •, l. 68). In this case, this final statement, rather than being linked to the preceding declaration concerning reasons, would constitute an abbreviated criticism referring back to the opponent’s declaration concerning natures (*bhava*) given in the root passage (l. 68). In this case, *peyala* would signal the inclusion within this abbreviated statement of the two final declarations given in the root passage: “Everything exists through all causes. Everything exists through all conditions” (*sarvaduḥ sarvam asti* • *sarvaprakāṣa sarvam asti* •, ll. 68–69). This second interpretation is supported by the fact that the text does not offer any criticism of these two final declarations, but instead it turns immediately to a criticism of the passage (ll. 69–71) that follows the formulaic declarations. Thus, according to this second interpretation, this final statement would be rendered as follows: “And [as for the declarations concerning] all ‘modes’ (*sarve vi bhava*), [namely, ‘everything exists through all modes,’] and so on, it should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight” (*śarve vi bhava prañahi ukṣividavu peyala*, ll. 114–115). In this abbreviated reference, the phrase *śarve vi bhava* would be interpreted as a simple citation of the topic in the nominative plural referring back to the original declaration in which *sarvabhavaḥ* appears in the instrumental plural. And the abbreviation adverb *peyala* would indicate that the other declarations are to be treated in the same way, that is, by means of similar applications of “insight,” or reasoning. Further, the criticism of the preceding declarations would suggest the use of counterexamples to demonstrate confusion among factors, namely, that factors would exist both with the modes of other factors and due to the causes and conditions of other factors. Given the abbreviated statement containing the term *bhava*, “modes,” the use of *peyala* to signal omitted material, and most importantly the absence of any criticism of the two final declarations and the following shift in topic to the next discussion in the root passage, the second interpretation has been tentatively adopted. Nonetheless, in view of the remaining uncertainties in syntax and context, the reconstruction and translation of this final statement in this passage remain tentative.

I.3.3.5. Criticism of the Opponent's Four Specifications (4: 1) of "Everything" [ll. 115–123]

Reconstruction

(1) [115] *ya duaḍaśa ayaḍanehi sagrahiḍa* [116] *ta asti di cakhaḍana ca asti di tena cakhaḍana duaḍaśaayaḍanasag(*ra)*[117]*hiḍa peyalo sarva ukṣiviḍavu • ayaḍanehi • nasti treḍaśa ayaḍana yava nasti* [118] *jiva • n(*a)sti (*pu)g(*a)l(*a) vedid(*ava) peyal(*a) tatra vatava kaḍamena viṇanena vīry(*e)n(*a)* [119] *(*va) n(*a)sti j(*iva) nasti* *p(*u)g(*a)l(*a) vedi(*ḍa)v(*a) di aha manaḍanena di manoviṇanena di •* [120] *tatra vatava man(*o)v(*i)ñ(*a)n(*a)ṣ(*a) ca pañcamam ca aryasaca ekunaviśaḍa ca dhadu* [121] *jiva ca pugala ca dhama vatav(*a) di • eva hi vuta manoviṇana(*ṣa) dha)m(*a) di* [122] *yidi puna dhama di paḍiyanadi tatra vatava tena de ekaca dhama athi •* [123] *ekaca nasti di •*

Sanskrit rendering

(1) [115] *ye dvādaśair āyatanaiḥ saṃgrhītās,* [116] *te santīti. cakṣurāyatanam cāstīti. tena cakṣurāyatanam dvādaśāyatanasamgr[117]hītam. peyālam sarvam utkṣeptavyam āyatanaiḥ. nāsti trayodaśam ayatanam yāvan nāsti* [118] *jīvo, nāsti pudgalo veditavyam peyalam. tatra vaktavyam katamena vijñānena vīryeṇa* [119] *vā nāsti jīvo nāsti pudgalo veditavyam iti. āha manaāyataneneti manovijñāneneti.* [120] *tatra vaktavyam manovijñānasya ca pañcamam cāryasatyam ekonaviṃśatiś ca dhātur* [121] *jīvaś ca pudgalaś ca dharmā vaktavyā ity, evam hy uktaṃ manovijñānasya dharmā iti.* [122] *yadi punar dharmā iti pratijñāti, tatra vaktavyam tena ekatye dharmāḥ santy,* [123] *ekatye na santīti.*

Translation

(1) [115] [One states,] [o] “Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres [116] exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres; [117] and so on, [the scope of] ‘everything’ should be expanded through the [other] sense spheres. It should be known that there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, continuing on through [the previously cited list], there exists no [118] soul, there exists no person, and so on.” [p] With regard to that it should be said, “By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy [119] should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?” One states, [o] “[It is] by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness.” [120] [p] With regard to that it should be said that a fifth noble truth, nineteenth element, [121] soul, and person should be said to be factors [that are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness, for in this way it has been said, “Factors [are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness.” [122] Now if one admits that [these nonexistent entities are] factors, with regard to that it should be said that, as a result of that, certain factors exist [123] [and] certain factors do not exist.

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent's First Specification [ll. 115–123]

In his continuing criticism of the opponent's fundamental proposition “everything exists,” the proponent turns from the formulaic declarations (ll. 66–69) given in the root passage and takes up the three specifications (ll. 69–71) that the opponent uses to delimit the scope of “everything” (*sarva*) as the content of “existence” (*astida*). Here, the proponent addresses the first specification, which is

also sanctioned by the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas: “Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist” (*ya duḍḍaśa ayaḍanehi sagrahiḍa ta asti di*, ll. 115–116).³⁰⁹ The proponent discussed this specification earlier in his criticism of the opponent’s first qualification of his proposition, namely, “that which exists is everything.”³¹⁰ In both the earlier and the current passage, the proponent connects this specification in terms of the twelve sense spheres to the issue of nonexistent entities. Here, the proponent first cites presumably the view of the opponent, who applies this first specification to one and then extends it to all sense spheres: “The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres; and so on, [the scope of] ‘everything’ should be expanded through the [other] sense spheres” (*cakhaḍḍana ca asti di tena cakhaḍḍana duḍḍaśaayaḍanasag(*ra)hiḍa peyalo sarva ukṣividiḍavu • ayaḍanehi •*, ll. 116–117). In other words, since “the visual sense sphere exists,” then the “visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres,” and the scope of “everything” can be specified by extending this formula through all twelve sense spheres. Next, the proponent turns to his criticism of this first specification and raises the case of nonexistent entities. These were also discussed in his criticism of the first qualification (ll. 84–98). In both passages, the issue concerns whether such nonexistent entities can serve as object-supports (P *ārammaṇa*, Skt *ālambana*) for the arising of perceptual consciousness (P *viññāna*, Skt *vijñāna*). In his previous criticism, the proponent focused on the status of such entities as nonexistent and their resulting inability to exert causal efficacy as object-supports. Here, the proponent turns his attention to perceptual consciousness itself and takes up the related problem of how one cognizes that such nonexistent entities do not in fact exist, in other words, what type of perceptual consciousness takes as its object-support the negation, “there exists no thirteenth sense sphere.” Hence, the proponent’s concern in this passage shifts from the nonexistent entity to the cognition of the assertion that such nonexistent entities do not exist.

To begin his argument, the proponent first alludes to the opponent’s own earlier list (ll. 88–90) of entities, such as the thirteenth sense sphere or the soul, that do not in fact exist. Next, his criticism begins with a question: “With regard to that it should be said, ‘By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?’” (*tatra vatava kaḍḍamena viñānena viry(*e)n(*a va) n(*a)sti j(*iva nasti) p(*u)g(*a)l(*a) vedi(*ḍa)-v(*a) di*, ll. 118–119). Here, the proponent demands that the opponent explain the exact process by which one cognizes that an entity does not exist. In other words, the opponent must specify which type of perceptual consciousness or what energy or capacity cognizes or takes such nonexistent entities as its object-support. In this question, “energy” (*viriyena*) might be used in a general sense to refer to the efficacy that underlies each of the causes of perceptual consciousness, or it could refer specifically to the activity of the organ sense sphere that functions together with the object-support as one of the two causes for the arising of perceptual consciousness.³¹¹ The response to this question, presumably offered by the Sarvāstivādin opponent, places the cognition of nonexistent entities within the “mental” arena: “[It is] by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental

³⁰⁹ Text Notes: [69] *ye duḍḍaśa ayaḍaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti •*. Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

³¹⁰ Commentary: (3) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 95–98].

³¹¹ Text Notes: [118] *vi[ry].[n]*. [119] ? *[n].[sti j]*. + + + *[p].[g].[l]*. *[vedi] ? [v]*. *[di aha]*.

perceptual consciousness” (*manāīdanena di manoviñānena di* •, l. 119). In this case, the proponent offers the rejoinder that nonexistent entities themselves must then be included within the twelfth sense sphere of factors (P *dhammāyatana*, Skt *dharmāyatana*), which constitutes the proper object-support of the mental sense organ (P *manindriya*, Skt *manāindriya*) and conditions the arising of mental perceptual consciousness (P *manoviññāna*, Skt *manovijñāna*). In order to support his rejoinder, the proponent cites a scriptural passage that attests to this particular relationship between mental perceptual consciousness and factors: “For in this way it has been said, ‘Factors [are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness’” (*eva hi vuta manoviñāna(*sa dha)m(*a) di*, l. 121).³¹² Thus, by claiming that the mental sense sphere and mental perceptual consciousness cognize that nonexistent entities do not exist, such nonexistent entities, as object-supports of mental perceptual consciousness, must be included in the factors (*dhama*) sense sphere. As a result, the opponent would be forced to admit that a certain portion of this category of factors exists and a certain portion, specifically such nonexistent entities, does not exist. In this way, the opponent’s proposition that “everything exists” is contradicted, since “everything,” defined as the twelve sense spheres, would then also contain entities that are admitted not to exist.

I.3.3.5. Criticism of the Opponent’s Four Specifications (4: 2) of “Everything” [ll. 123–134]

Reconstruction

(2) [123] *yidi aha trayaa(*dh)va va athita di tatra vatava jaḍa a* [124] *nagaḍa pracup(*a)-n(*a) bhodi • pracupana adiḍa bhodi yidi aha anaga* [125] *ḍa bhavita pa(*cupa)na bhodi • p(*r)acupana bhavita adiḍ(*a) bho(*d)i • tatra vatava* [126] *(*ekasa dhama)ḡ(*a) t(*ra)-ya bhava asti • adiḍabhava ca • anagaḍabhavo ca pacu* [127] *p(*a)nabhavo ca • yi(*di) ah(*a)di bhavehi (*ru)poṃ asti nasti trae (*ru)po di • tatra* [128] *vatava ki puna yat(*r)a anagaḍa rupoṃ yava viñāno tatra pacupanaḡa bhavaḡa* [129] *prati di ahadi s(*a)magr(*a)-vaḡen(*a a)n(*a)ḡ(*a)ḍ(*a)bh(*a)vo (*ru)p(*o p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a)bh(*ava) di • vatava* [130] *s(*a) v(*u)na samagri asti nasti di • yidi ahadi asti di tena pacupana ruv(*a)* [131] *-bh(*a)va ruva na bhodi • adiḍa traya ruva bhodi anagaḍa kaḍama bhava anaga* [132] *ḍa ahadi anagaḍa anagaḍ(*a)bhavo pacupanabhava anagaḍ(*a) di vatava ki* [133] *karano ta pacupana bhodi ah(*a) prata di aḡa taḡa samagravaḡena pacu* [134] *panabhava (*a)sti a(*ha)di s(*a) vuna samag(*r)i asti n(*a) kici (*a)sti + + ? + + + + +*

Sanskrit rendering

(2) [123] *yady āha trayadhvikā vāstīti, tatra vaktavyaṃ jātva an* [124] *āgataḥ pratyutpanno bhavati, pratyutpanno ’tīto bhavati. yady āhānāga* [125] *to bhūtvā pratyutpanno bhavati, pratyutpanno bhūtvātīto bhavati, tatra vaktavyaṃ* [126] *ekasya dharmasya trayo bhāvāḥ santy, atītabhāvaś cā, ’nāgatabhāvaś ca, pratyut* [127] *pannabhāvaś ca. yady āha bhāvai rūpaṃ asti, nāsti trīṇi rūpāṇīti, tatra* [128] *vaktavyaṃ kiṃ punar yatrānāgataṃ rūpaṃ yāvad vijñānaṃ, tatra pratyutpannasya bhāvasya* [129] *prāptir iti. āha sāmāgrīvaḡenānāgatabhāvaṃ rūpaṃ pratyutpannabhāvaṃ iti. vaktavyaṃ* [130] *sā punaḥ sāmāgry asti, nāstīti. yady āhāstīti, tena pratyutpanne rūpa* [131] *bhāvo rūpaṃ na*

³¹² P *cha kho paṇimāni, Ānanda, ajjhattikabāhirāni āyatanāni. cakkhu c’ eva rūpā ca sotam ca saddā ca ghānaṃ ca gandhā ca jivhā ca rasā ca kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca mano ca dhammā ca* (MN III 63). Cf. MĀ 47 no. 181 p. 723b17–20.

bhavati. atīte trīṇi rūpāṇi bhavanty, anāgate katame bhāvā anāga[132]tāḥ. āhānāgate 'nāgatabhāvaḥ pratyutpannabhāvo 'nāgatā iti. vaktavyaṃ kiṃ [133] kāraṇaṃ sa pratyutpanno bhavati. āha prāpta iti. atha tasya sāmāgrīvaśena pratyut[134]pannabhāvo 'sti. āha sā punaḥ sāmāgry asti, na kiṃcid asti ...

Translation

(2) [123] If one states, [o] “Or [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence,” [p] with regard to that it should be said that [124] undoubtedly a future [factor] is present, and a present [factor] is past. If one states, [o] “A [factor] having been future [125] becomes present, and having been present becomes past,” [p] with regard to that it should be said that [126] (*one factor) possesses three “natures”: a past “nature,” a future “nature,” and [127] a present “nature.” If one states, [o] “Material form exists through [various] ‘modes,’ but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form,” [p] with regard to that [128] it should be said, “Now how is there the acquisition of a present ‘nature’ in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?” [129] One states, [o] “Material form possessed of a future ‘mode’ [comes to] be possessed of a present ‘mode’ due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions].” [p] It should be said, [130] “Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?” If one states, [o] “[The complete collocation] exists,” [p] then the “nature” of material form in the present [131] is not material form, [but should instead be that of the separately existing complete collocation]. [Since you maintain that] in the past, there are three [“natures” of] material form, in the future, which “natures” [of material form] are future? [132] One states, [o] “In the future, a future ‘mode’ and a present ‘mode’ [of material form] are future.” [p] It should be said, “For what [133] reason is that [present ‘nature,’ if still future, said to be] present?” One states, [o] “[Because the present ‘mode’] is acquired. Or else, it possesses the present ‘mode’ due to the force of the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions].” [134] One states, [o] “Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all”

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134]

Continuing his criticism of the three specifications of the scope of “everything” (*sarva*) as the content of “existence” (*astiḍa*), the proponent here takes up the second specification in terms of factors belonging to the three time periods: “[Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence” (*(*tra)y(*a)adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava •, l. 70*).³¹³ The proponent’s criticism focuses on the potential problem of confusion among factors of the three time periods, which, he suggests, inevitably results from this second specification.³¹⁴ In other words, if one maintains that existence is to be equated with factors that exist as past, present, and future, why are past factors not considered to be present or future, and so on? And further, on what grounds can factors of the three time periods be clearly discriminated from one another? This constitutes the central argument against the Sarvāstivāda position raised by critics in abhidharma

³¹³ Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

³¹⁴ Text Notes: [70] + /// |^{52kk(r)}[y].|^{52E(r)}*adhva astiḍa*. Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

texts of all periods and serves as the impetus for the theories of the four Sarvāstivāda masters, which provide attempts to distinguish clearly among factors of the three time periods.³¹⁵

The proponent begins his criticism by restating the opponent's second specification and offering an untoward consequence: "If one states, [O] 'Or [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence,' [P] with regard to that it should be said that undoubtedly a future [factor] is present, and a present [factor] is past" (*yidi aha trayaa<*dh>va va astita di tatra vatava jaḍa anagaḍa pracup(*a)n(*a) bhodi • pracupana adida bhodi*, ll. 123–124). Thus, if any given factor exists as past, present, and future, then some method must be found to discriminate among its three temporal varieties to avoid confusion among its different forms. The proponent next cites a possible response by the opponent that is well attested in other abhidharma texts: "A [factor] having been future becomes present, and having been present becomes past, ..." (*yidi aha anagaḍa bhavita pa(*cupa)na bhodi • p(*r)acupana bhavita adid(*a) bho(*d)i •*, ll. 124–125). In other words, the opponent might respond that factors of the three time periods can indeed be discriminated from one another since a particular factor, having once been future, becomes present, and similarly, being present, then becomes past. However, this response is deemed unsatisfactory both by our Gāndhārī proponent and by critics of the Sarvāstivāda position in other abhidharma texts.³¹⁶ As the Gāndhārī proponent next observes (ll. 125–127), the opponent's response results in the untoward consequence that every factor must then be admitted to have three separate "natures" (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*), one corresponding to each of the three time periods; otherwise, a factor's "nature" as future, present, or past would have no basis.³¹⁷

The following argument consists of a quick and abbreviated exchange between the proponent and his Sarvāstivādin opponent. Once again it only makes sense if their differing notions of *bhava* are kept in mind.³¹⁸ In this criticism, the proponent uses the term *bhava* in the sense of "nature" (P/Skt *bhāva*), which he presumably understands as synonymous with "intrinsic nature" (*svabhava*, P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*), a term employed by the Sarvāstivādins to refer to the unvarying, particular inherent characteristic by which factors are to be defined and discriminated. According to the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model, each category of factors is characterized by a single intrinsic nature (Skt *svabhāva*) that exists without variation at all times and functions to discriminate that particular category from all others. Every conditioned individual factor is impermanent in the sense that its activity (Skt *kāritra*) arises and passes away in dependence upon a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions, but this conditioning and the factor's resulting impermanent character have no impact upon that factor's distinguishing characteristic, or intrinsic nature. If one claimed that a single factor were characterized by more than one intrinsic nature, each demarcating a distinct category, that single factor would actually exist as multiple factors. Hence, the proponent

³¹⁵ AVBSS 1 p. 724b5ff.; AMVŚ 77 p. 396a13ff.; AVŚ 40 p. 295c6ff.; VŚ 7 p. 466b7ff.; AKBh 5.25d–5.26ab p. 296.6ff. For the theories of the four Sarvāstivāda masters and attempts to discriminate among factors of the three time periods, see Text and Commentary § I.3, nn. 185, 218, 239.

³¹⁶ Kv 125–126; Kv-a 46–48; AKBh 5.27b p. 298.8ff.; AKVy 472.13ff. Commentary: The Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

³¹⁷ Kv 137–138.

³¹⁸ Commentaries: The Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism of the Opponent's Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Declarations [ll. 109–115].

here argues that if a single factor were characterized by the three distinct “natures” of future, present, and past, it would actually exist as three discrete factors rather than as one.

As the rejoinder of the Sarvāstivādin opponent makes clear, he understands the term *bhava* in a sense different from that assumed by the proponent: “If one states, [o] ‘Material form exists through [various] *bhavas*, but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form,’ ...” (*yi(*di) ah(*a)di bhavehi <*ru>poṃ asti nasti trae <*ru>po di...*, l. 127). Here, the Sarvāstivādin opponent freely admits that a single factor, in this case material form, exists through multiple “*bhavas*” (*bhavehi*), but he denies the seemingly inevitable untoward consequence of this admission, namely, that “there are three [discrete factors of] material form.” Since he refuses to admit that multiple *bhavas* determine multiple discrete factors, the Sarvāstivādin opponent must understand the term *bhava* in a sense different from a factor’s “nature,” or defining “intrinsic nature,” as assumed in the proponent’s argument. The opponent’s response suggests that he understands *bhava* to refer to a factor’s “modes” of existence, which vary in accordance with the state or the conditions in which that factor is found. This difference in interpretation of the term *bhava* as “nature” or “mode” integral to this argument is supported by the early ambiguity in the use of the term *bhava*, which is attested in the theory of the Sarvāstivāda master Dharmatrāta and in other abhidharma texts, and is resolved in the interpretation of the late Sarvāstivāda scholastic Saṅghabhadra.³¹⁹ Thus, in this passage of our Gāndhāri text (ll. 125–127), the proponent’s criticism assumes that Skt *bhāva* refers to a factor’s “nature,” or defining character, which is virtually identical to Skt *svabhāva*. As a result, a single factor cannot be described by more than one such “nature” (Skt *bhāva*), and it is impossible to conceive of a single factor as characterized by past, present, and future “natures.” By contrast, the opponent appears to adopt the position that Skt *bhāva* refers to something other than a factor’s defining “intrinsic nature” (Skt *svabhāva*), specifically its varying “modes” of existence. As a result, he can claim that “material form exists through [various] ‘modes,’ but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form” (*bhavehi <*ru>poṃ asti nasti trae <*ru>po di •*, l. 127). Even though still cryptic at points, this argument provides valuable early evidence of the complex history of the terms Skt *bhāva* and Skt *svabhāva*, evidence both of their overlapping usage and of the gradual emergence of a new interpretation of Skt *bhāva* as “mode” of existence distinct from Skt *svabhāva* as “intrinsic nature.” In order to convey the contrasting positions of the proponent and his opponent, as well as the complex history that these divergent positions indicate, two different translations have been adopted for this single term *bhava* (Skt *bhāva*) throughout this passage: that is, as “nature” when used by the proponent, and as “mode” when used by the Sarvāstivādin opponent.

The proponent continues his argument with a challenge to the opponent’s suggestion that one factor may be characterized by multiple *bhavas*: “With regard to that it should be said, now how is there the acquisition of a present ‘nature’ in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?” (*tatra vatava ki puna yat<*r>a anagaḍa rupoṃ yava viṇano tatra pacupanaṣa bhavaṣa prati di*, ll. 127–129). In other words, if one understands *bhava* (Skt *bhāva*) to refer to a factor’s defining “nature,” how can one explain the arising of a present “nature” in a factor characterized by a future “nature?” In effect, how is it possible for a future factor, defined as future on the basis of its future “nature,”

³¹⁹ Commentaries: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Declaration [ll. 102–105].

to change this “nature” and become present? The opponent responds (l. 129) by appealing to the “complete collocation” (*samagra*, P *sāmaggī*, Skt *sāmagrī*) of requisite causes and conditions. In other words, no factor arises, or changes its temporal status, of its own accord or as a result of a single cause; instead, factors arise, or become present, through the cooperation of a number of causes and conditions referred to as a “complete collocation.” Thus, a future factor can be said to arise, or acquire a present “mode,” not as a result of its own causal force, that is, by changing its intrinsic nature, but rather by meeting or obtaining a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions.

The remainder of the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s second specification (ll. 130–134) concerns this notion of the “complete collocation.”³²⁰ The proponent begins with a rejoinder questioning its status: “It should be said, now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?” (*vatava s(*a) v(*u)na samagri asti nasti di •*, ll. 129–130). According to the most common pattern, the argument would then be expected to examine both the affirmative and negative complementary responses, “it does exist” and “it does not exist.” The next statement indeed offers the affirmative response “If one states, [o] ‘[The complete collocation] exists’” (*yidi ahadi asti di*, l. 130). This is then followed by a lengthy and somewhat circuitous discussion that cycles back to the previously examined issue of *bhava*, and returns in the final and only partially preserved line of this passage to offer what might be construed as the second negative response to this initial question: “One states, [o] ‘Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all’ ...” (*a(*ha)di s(*a) vuna samag(*r)i asti n(*a) kici (*a)sti ... ///*, l. 134). Here, it is important to note that since this statement is introduced by the verb “one states” (*aha*, P/Skt *āha*), it also is intended to represent the perspective of the opponent, and yet it does not take the form of the simple negative alternative “it does not exist” that would be expected given the typical argument pattern. Instead, it would appear to present a qualification of the initial affirmative response with which the argument began. It would then function to reiterate but qualify the opponent’s initial response that the complete collocation exists. As in the case of the previous discussion concerning *bhava*, here also the proponent’s argument appears to assume that existence entails a defining “nature,” and hence the complete collocation could only be said to exist if it were understood to exist as a discrete factor. The proponent observes that if the opponent claims that the complete collocation exists, “then the ‘nature’ of material form in the present is not material form” (*tena pacupana ruv(*a)bh(*a)va ruva na bhodi •*, ll. 130–131). In other words, for the proponent’s argument to be effective, when material form arises in the present as part of a “collocation,” its “nature” (*bhava*) must have become something else, specifically that of the “complete collocation.” As in the case of the previous argument, if the opponent maintains that a factor such as material form arises, or changes its state from future to present, only by combining with requisite causes and conditions, then the “nature” of that present material form must also have changed to become the newly constituted conjunction of material form and its complete collocation. Thus, the proponent argues that such a change in state from an isolated future factor to a present factor conditioned by its complete collocation would entail a corresponding change in that factor’s defining “nature.” Of course, the opponent would reject this assumption that the term *bhava* refers only to a singular defining “nature” and as will become clear in the final line of this passage, presumably also would reject that existence necessarily entails such a defining “nature.”

³²⁰ Commentary: (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51].

Thus, for the Sarvāstivādin opponent, the proponent's argument that entails attributing intrinsic nature to the complete collocation apart from the factor is unfounded.

Although there is no indication of a change in speaker, the next statement is apparently offered by the proponent as a summary intended to set up his subsequent criticism, which hinges upon a contradiction inherent in the opponent's interpretation of factors as possessed of multiple *bhavas*. Here, the proponent refers back to the opponent's attempt to distinguish among factors of the three time periods on the basis of their different *bhavas*: "In the past there are three [*bhavas* of] material form ..." (*adiḍa traya ruva bhodi*, l. 131). Once again, this criticism depends upon the proponent's own understanding of the term *bhava* as referring to a factor's defining "nature" and would become ineffective if, as in the opponent's view, *bhava* referred to a factor's varying "modes." In this initial statement, the proponent describes the opponent as claiming that a past instance of material form can be characterized by three such "modes," which would include its current "mode" as past, as well as its prior "modes" as present and future. In other words, a past factor that existed previously as future and then arose as present would have been characterized by future and present "modes" in each of those states, respectively, and it is also characterized by a past "mode" in its current state of having passed away. However, for the proponent, who assumes that *bhava* carries only the sense of defining "nature," it would be impossible for a factor to be characterized by more than one "nature" on the basis of temporal changes. Thus, although the proponent intends this statement to reflect the view of the opponent, the subsequent criticism demands the proponent's own understanding of *bhava* as defining "nature." As a result, reflecting the proponent's understanding, the referent of the adjective "three" in this statement has been supplied as "nature": "[Since you maintain that] in the past, there are three ['natures' of] material form ..." (*adiḍa traya ruva bhodi*, l. 131).

Immediately following his summary statement of the opponent's position, the proponent begins his criticism with a question: "In the future, which 'natures' (*bhava*) [of material form] are future?" (*anagaḍa kaḍama bhava anagaḍa*, ll. 131–132). The opponent responds that a future factor of material form is characterized by both a future "mode" (*bhava*) and a present "mode." For the proponent, who understands *bhava* as a singular defining "nature," multiple *bhavas* in a single factor result in a contradiction: "It should be said, 'For what reason is that [present "nature," if still future, said to be] present?'" (*vatava ki karano ta pacupana bhodi*, ll. 132–133). Here, the proponent assumes that a future factor, as future, cannot also be characterized by a present "nature," since a factor characterized by a present "nature" must actually be present. The opponent's first response is brief: "One states, [o] '[Because the present "mode"] is acquired'" (*ah(*a) prata di*, l. 133). With the participial adjective "acquired," the opponent here refers to the point at which a future factor arises, that is, when its present "mode" can be said to have just "arrived," or be "acquired" (*prata*, Skt *prāpta*).³²¹ As a result, a future factor would be characterized by a future "mode" until it reaches the point at which it is about to arise, and at that point it can be said to be characterized by both future and present "modes." Next, the opponent offers an alternative or perhaps supplementary explanation that appeals once again to the complete collocation: "Or else, it possesses the present "mode" due to the force of the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions]" (*aṣa taṣa samagravaśena pacupanabhava (*a)sti*, ll. 133–134). That is to say, a future factor reaches this point of arising through the causal efficacy of a complete collocation of requisite causes and

³²¹ Cox 1995: 83–84.

Sanskrit rendering

(2–4?) [135] ... *yadi* ... *a*[136]*nāgata iti, tasya* ... [137] ... [138] ... *a*[139]*tītānagatā na santi. bravīṣi ca sāmāgrīvaśena* ... [140] ... *iti. yadi sāmāgry asti* ... *anut*[141]-*pādadharmam karoti. anagaḍa* ...

Translation

(2–4?) [P/O?] [135] If ... [136] ... future,” of that ... [137] ... [138] ... [P] ... [139] past and future [factors] do not exist. And you say, [O] “(*Due to the force) of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] ... [140] ...” [P] If the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists ... [141] acts as a factor (*not subject to arising). The future ...

51jjjj

Reconstruction

[1] ... (**tena*) *de sutre ? maḍa sarva aṣ(*a) na t(*a)ṣ(*a) sarva anupaṣapana di* ... [2] ... ? *sa ? asti ? ?* ... [3] ... • ? ? (**a*)*sti* ...

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... *tena sūtre* ... *matam sarve. atha na tathā sarve 'nupasampannā iti* ... [2] ... *asti* ... [3] ... *asti* ...

Translation

[1] ... [P] ... (*as a result of that,) it is held in the scripture that all [have not attained religious practice]. Or else, it is not the case in that way that all have not attained [religious practice] ... [2] ... exists ... [3] ... exists ...

51llll

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? *n(*a)h(*i) v(*atava) ?* ... [2] ... ? *v. .i • asti (*a)n(*a)g(*aḍa)* ...

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... *nahi vaktavyam* ... [2] ... *asty anāgata-* ...

Translation

[1] ... for it should not be said ... [2] ... There are future ...

51oooo

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? ? ? ? ? + ? ? ? .*o* ? ? ... [2] ... • *yidi anagad(*a) <*e>va viry(*ena)* ... [3] ... ? + ? + ? ? ? ? .*i/e .i/e* + ...

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... [2] ... *yady anāgata eva viryeṇa* ... [3] ...

Translation

[1] ... [2] ... [P] If a future [factor] alone by virtue of [its] energy ... [3] ...

existence” (*aṣa adh(*v)a astita di •*, l. 70).³²³ Given this similarity of the two specifications, it is possible that the criticism of the third specification of “everything” is subsumed within that of the second, which might then extend from the preceding passage into the current portion of the text. It is also possible that the criticism of the third and possibly fourth specifications were presented within the approximately fourteen lines of text on fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F that are now completely covered by pieces of bark and layer 51ssss. The next passage (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7) begins a discussion of the existent (*sata*) and the nonexistent (*asata*) that probably refers back to the opponent’s explications of “existence” (*astiḍa*) (ll. 70–71), immediately following his initial three specifications of “everything.” Hence, it is likely that the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s third and fourth specifications occurred within the missing lines prior to this discussion of the existent (*sata*) and the nonexistent (*asata*), that is, in the portion of the manuscript now covered by pieces of bark and layer 51ssss.

Unfortunately, given the severe damage to the manuscript, neither the criticism offered by the proponent nor the opponent’s responses in the first portion of this passage can be even tentatively reconstructed. The only legible statements present problems in both syntax and interpretation: “... [P] ... past and future [factors] do not exist. And you say, [o] ‘(*Due to the force) of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] ...’ [P] If the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists ...” (*a(*d)iḍaanagaḍa nasti broṣi ca samagriv(*aṣena) ... di • yidi samagri asti*, ll. 138–140). The syntactic problem lies in the second-person singular present verb *broṣi*, “you say,” which is presumably used by the proponent in reference to his Sarvāstivādin opponent. In the interpretation adopted here, *broṣi* is understood to begin a sentence, which is then connected to the previous sentence through the following enclitic particle *ca*. The first-person singular present verb *bromi* occurs twice in this text (ll. 26, 28), in each case concluding the statement that it governs. However, the form *broṣi*, “you say,” would make little sense as the concluding verb for the prior statement since the opponent would not support the position that the “... past and future do not exist.” Hence, it has been assumed that this prior statement represents the position of the proponent, and the next statement, which is introduced by the second-person singular verb *broṣi*, returns to the opponent’s assertion that future factors arise through a “complete collocation.”³²⁴ The proponent next raises a criticism using the frequent pattern of a conditional construction that contains a protasis representing the position of the opponent and an apodosis offering the untoward consequence: “If the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists ..., ... acts as a factor (*not subject to arising)” (*yidi samagri asti ... (*anupaḍadha)mo kar(*o)di*, ll. 140–141). Even though the major portion of the undesirable conclusion is not preserved, the proponent’s criticism in this passage likely concerns the impossibility that a future factor subject to arising would act as a factor not subject to arising, an argument that he raised in previous discussions.³²⁵

³²³ Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

³²⁴ Commentaries: (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51]; Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

³²⁵ Commentaries: General Criticism of the Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3]; (1–3) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45]; (4–5) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 45–51]; (6–7) Criticism of the Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 62–66].

These final deteriorated sections of the manuscript obscure any clues as to the structure of the text as a whole and provide no evidence indicating whether our text represents only one part of a much longer text on various doctrinal topics or the major part of a shorter text focused on a more limited number of topics, perhaps even on the topic of existence in the three time periods.³²⁶ As a result, the content of these final passages and their relationship either to the preceding text or to any following but now missing text remain obscure. Given the lacuna of fourteen or more lines within this passage,³²⁷ it is impossible to trace the arguments, but similarities in terminology do indicate thematic connections, however ill-defined, with the preceding passages. Several terms and phrases suggest that the proponent's criticism of the opponent's specifications of "everything," specifically in the context of future factors, continues onto these bark pieces and layer 51G(v)[51ssss(v)]: for example, "future"; *bhava*; "sense sphere" (*ayaḍana*); "visual" (*caḅhu-*) and "mental perceptual consciousness" (*manoviñana*); and most importantly *mahasarvastivada*. Further, the apparent reference in the next passage to the opponent's first explication of "existence," which follows his specifications of "everything" in his original elaboration (ll. 70–71), would suggest that the proponent's criticism of the opponent's specifications, specifically in the context of future factors, continues in the intervening passage preserved on these pieces of bark and layer 51ssss.

Thus, the correct placement as well as the content of the various pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo) remain unclear. Although on two pieces (51llll, 51oooo) the term "future" can be read, which might indicate connections with the previous passages, the term *anupaṣapana* (Skt *anupasampannā*) found on another bark piece (51jjjj) presents a problem. In its literal sense as an adjective meaning "not attained," it could simply describe future factors that have "not arisen." With this sense, it too would fit well into an argument against the opponent's assertion that certain future factors exist, and its current placement might then indeed correspond to its original location. However, *anupaṣapana* can also be used in an extended sense to refer specifically to religious practice that is "not attained" or to "one who has not attained religious practice."³²⁸ This might then indicate a change in topic and a return to the issue of religious practice with which the preserved portion of our text begins and ends. Hence, it is possible that these bark pieces were displaced upward from an original location at some point closer to the last section of the manuscript. Regardless of their placement, however, these heavily damaged bark pieces do little to clarify the argument presented here or the transition from the previous portion of the text.

The continuous portion of layer 51ssss is better preserved and contains at least certain terms and statements that can be correlated with the opponent's original elaboration of his fundamental proposition. However, since the first three lines are heavily damaged, the specific topic treated and the structure of the argument as a whole must be inferred from the better-preserved subsequent

³²⁶ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A. Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A].

³²⁷ Manuscript Notes: 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5.

³²⁸ For a discussion of the connotations of the terms *upaṣapana* and *anupaṣapana*, see Commentary: Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

However, this model applies only to present perceptual objects; that is to say, visual perceptual consciousness can perceive an object of its corresponding category of material form only in the present time period. Thus, the problem that results in an untoward consequence must lie in the different views of the proponent and opponent concerning the term *bhava* and the existence of past and future factors. Whereas the proponent understands the term *bhava* to refer only to an object's distinguishing "nature," in the sense of "intrinsic nature" (P *sabhāva*, Skt *svabhāva*), the opponent accepts an additional sense of *bhava* referring to varying "modes," which could then include temporal modes as past, present, and future. Thus, in his question the proponent asks the opponent to identify which perceptual consciousness perceives the *bhava* of material form. If one assumes the proponent's notion of *bhava* as "intrinsic nature" and the question concerns material form in the present, the proponent and opponent would agree: the "nature" of material form is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness. However, the proponent could view this response as an untoward consequence if in his initial question he intended to raise, implicitly or explicitly, the issue of past or future material form: in other words, if his question were "Which perceptual consciousness perceives the temporal 'mode' (*bhava*) of material form as past, present, or future?" In this case, the opponent's response would become unacceptable, since visual perceptual consciousness can only perceive a present instance of material form.

Next, the proponent cites a second possible response by the opponent to his initial question: "If one states, [O] '[It is perceived] by means of mental perceptual consciousness, ...' (*yidi aha manoviñanena*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4). Here, the opponent's second response adopts the perspective of *bhava* as changing temporal "modes," which can only be perceived by mental perceptual consciousness. Thus, the opponent would contend that material form can become an object-support perceived by two different types of perceptual consciousness: as present, its "nature" as material form is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness, while as past or future, its temporal "mode" is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness. To this second response, the proponent then offers another untoward consequence: "[P] Then [its] 'nature' should be said to be [constituted by] the factor [sense sphere]" (*tena bhava dhama*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6). In other words, if the *bhava* characterizing past or future material form is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness, material form must belong to the factor (P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*) sense sphere, since factors are the object-support correlated with mental perceptual consciousness. Here, the proponent clearly takes *bhava* as referring to "nature," in the sense of "intrinsic nature." And since he does not distinguish between the senses of "nature" and "mode," the opponent's claim that such temporal "modes" (*bhava*) of material form are perceived by mental perceptual consciousness results in category contradiction, whereby material form, whose "nature" (*bhava*) is by definition material form, would have the "nature" of factors.

I.3.3.6. Criticism of the Opponent's Two Explications of "Existence" [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7]

Reconstruction

[5] *saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava mahasa*[6]*rvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo • cadu ? ?* [7] (**pa*)*ḍig. + + a. ? s(*a)ḍ(*a) bh(*a)va asti • bh(*a)v(*a) + + asaḍa nasti atra mahasa(*r)v(*a)sti*[8](**vaḍa*) ...

Sanskrit rendering

[5] *sataḥ sad astīti vaktavyam. sato 'san nāstīti vaktavyam. mahāsa[6]rvāstivādā āhur nāsti kiṃcin nāsti nāma. nāsti kiṃcid asan nāsti nāma. catu- ... [7] pratig- ... sato bhāvo 'sti. bhāvaḥ ... asato nāsti. atra mahāsarvāsti[8]vādāḥ ...*

Translation

[5] [P] It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist. [6] [And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist.” [P] [In that case,] there is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist. The four [7–8] ... in the case of the existent ..., a “nature” exists; a “nature,” in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist. With regard to this, the Mahāsarvāstivādins ...

Commentary: Criticism of the Opponent’s Two Explications [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7]

In this passage, the proponent continues the criticism of the opponent’s original elaboration of the proposition “everything exists,” but he turns from the opponent’s specifications of the scope of “everything” to a criticism of his two explications of the term “existence” (*astiḍa*): “[O] (1) That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; (*that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence. (2) The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence” (*ya asti ta ha astiḍa vatava • (*ya nast) i t(*a) nastiḍa ha vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*, ll. 70–71).³³³ In an earlier reference to this passage, the proponent concludes his argument with a verbatim quotation of the opponent’s second explication and declares it to be supported by authoritative scripture: “The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence. In this way, it should be upheld by hundreds of sūtras” (*sata asti(*ḍa va)t(*a)va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śadehi sutrehi anuyujidava •*, ll. 86–87).³³⁴ Here in the current passage, the proponent’s initial statement is not syntactically identical to either of the opponent’s two explications of existence given in the initial passage (ll. 70–71), but may be intended as a restatement of this second explication: “[P] It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist” (*saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5). Given the proponent’s previous endorsement of this second explication, the proponent’s statement here likely represents a viewpoint that both he and the opponent share, which will then serve as the starting point for his subsequent criticism of the opponent’s position.

Next, the proponent offers an assertion attributed to the *mahasarvastivaḍa*, which he clearly rejects: “[And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] ‘There is certainly nothing that does not exist’” (*mahasarvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] lines 5–6). This assertion is cited verbatim from the very beginning of the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s position (ll. 82–83) and in both cases can be viewed as a restatement in negative terms of the opponent’s fundamental proposition “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*). As the proponent argues in his previous criticism, the opponent’s claim that “there is certainly nothing that does not exist”

³³³ Commentary: The Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

³³⁴ Commentary: (1) Criticism of the Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87].

results in the undesirable conclusion that even nonexistent entities such as a soul (*jīva*) or a sixth aggregate (*ṣeṭha kadha*) must be said to exist. And as his earlier argument concludes, the statement, “there is certainly nothing that does not exist,” contradicts the opponent’s own second explication of existence: “The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence” (*sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*, l. 71).

In the current passage, the proponent appears to offer a similar argument but in reverse order. After presenting the opponent’s second explication of existence, with which he apparently agrees, and then a restatement in negative terms of the opponent’s fundamental proposition “everything exists,” he offers the untoward consequence to which these two statements lead: “There is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist” (*nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6).³³⁵ This rather convoluted negative construction can be paraphrased in more colloquial terms, that is, “no nonexistent thing can be found.” In other words, as in the case of his previous argument (ll. 84–87), here also the proponent contends that the Sarvāstivāda assertion, “there is certainly nothing that does not exist,” results in the untoward consequence that even nonexistent entities must be admitted to exist. Thus, this passage would appear to consist of a compressed argument that parallels, in reverse order, the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s proposition as presented previously.

This close parallelism between the current passage and the proponent’s previous criticism (ll. 82–87) also suggests a possible referent for the word “four” (*cadu*) that appears in the next, only partially preserved statement: “The four ... in the case of the existent ..., a ‘nature’ exists; a ‘nature,’ in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist” (*cadu ? ? (*pa)ḍig. + + a. ? s(*a)ḍ(*a) bh(*a)va asti • bh(*a)v(*a) + + asaḍa nasti*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 6–7). Specifically, the word “four” here might correspond to the set of four categories cited by the opponent in that earlier passage to delimit factors that do indeed exist: factors that are (1) past (*adiḍa*); (2) future (*anagaḍa*); (3) present (*pacupana*); and (4) unconditioned (*asakhaḍa*).³³⁶ Despite this possible correspondence of “four” to the opponent’s set of four categories of existent factors, a likely equivalent for the word *(*pa)ḍig.* is still not apparent.

Regardless of whether or not this interpretation of the word “four” is accepted, in the next line (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6), the proponent clearly argues that the opponent must admit the existence of nonexistent entities, which he then suggests leads to an internal contradiction concerning some set of “four.” The next statement offers a general characterization of existence that combines the terms *bhava* with *saḍa/asaḍa*: “... in the case of the existent ..., a ‘nature’ exists; a ‘nature,’ in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist” *a. ? s(*a)ḍ(*a) bh(*a)va asti • bh(*a)v(*a) + + asaḍa nasti*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7.³³⁷ However, given the uncertain readings prior to and even within this statement itself, it is difficult to determine whether it represents the view of the proponent or the opponent, or a view they would both accept. As in the case of prior polemical exchanges between

³³⁵ Text Notes: [71] + + /// |^{52gg}. [i] |^{52gg+52G(r)} [t]. |^{52G(r)} *nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7 [5] |^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.5} *saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*. Cf. 51D(r) l. 5.

³³⁶ Text Notes: [83] *adiḍanagaḍa[p]. [acup]. [n]. [s]. [kh]. [ḍ]. [asti di]*.

³³⁷ Text Notes: 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7 [6] *cadu ? ? [7] |^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.7?} ḍig. + + [a]. ? [s]. [ḍ]. [bh].va asti • [bh]. [v]. + + asaḍa nasti*.

the proponent and opponent, their differing notions of the term *bhava* might provide a clue: once again, for the proponent, *bhava* refers to a factor’s defining “nature,” while, for the opponent, it refers to the varying “modes,” or “states of being,” that a factor undergoes. Therefore, if taken as representing the position of the proponent, this statement would assert that “... in the case of the existent ..., a ‘nature’ exists; a [‘nature’], in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist.” That is to say, “nature” as a factor’s distinguishing characteristic would apply to an existent factor but not to a nonexistent entity. However, if this statement were taken as representing the position of the opponent, it would be asserting that “... in the case of the existent ..., the ‘mode’ exists; the [‘mode’], in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist.” Similarly then also for the opponent, “modes” would apply to existent factors but not to nonexistent entities. Thus, this statement could represent the position of either the proponent or the opponent. Nonetheless, it has been tentatively assumed that the proponent’s critical rejoinder beginning in the middle of the previous line continues through this partial phrase: in other words, in this statement that combines *bhava* and *sada/asada*, the proponent is expressing his own position, whereby *bhava*, understood as defining “nature,” only applies to existent entities. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the final statement on layer 51ssss marks a shift of speaker back to the opponent: “With regard to this, the Mahāsarvāstivādins ...” (*atra mahasa(*r)v(*a)sti(*vada)*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7). Unfortunately, the opponent’s response and the remainder of the argument are not preserved.

I.3.4 Section 4—Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

I.3.4.1. Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

[51C(v)[51ssss(v)]]

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? *na neva* ? ? *aṣa ta va* ... [2] ... ? *gehi anuyujidavo • ruvaṣa* ... [3] ... *upaṣapad(*a)*
*ye sarvasatva upaṣap(*ana/da)* ... [4] ... *a da/na* ? ? ? ...

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... *na naiva ... atha tad/sa* ... [2] ... *-gair anuyoktavyam. rūpasya* ... [3] ... *upasampadā.*
ye sarvasattvā upasampannāḥ ... / upasampadā ... [4] ...

Translation

[P/O?] [1] ... not at all Or else that ... [2] ... it should be upheld in the case of Of material form ... [3] ... the attainment [of religious practice]. All sentient beings who ... having attained/the attainment [of religious practice] ... [4] ...

51C(v)[51l(v)+51m(v)+51n(v)+51o(v)]

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? ? + ? *pr(*ac)u(*pana)* ... [2] ... *s./r. e/ve vi di* ? ...

Sanskrit rendering

[1] /// ? ? + ? *pratyutpanna-* ... [2] ... ? ? ? ? ? ...

Translation

[1] ... present ... [2] ...

51C(v)

Reconstruction

[4] ... *tatra va(*tava)* ...

Sanskrit rendering

[4] ... *tatra vaktavyam* ...

Translation

[4] ... With regard to that it should be said ...

51F(v)[51ssss(v)]

Reconstruction

[1] ... *(*sar)v(*a)m asti ?* ... [2] ... ? *adiḍa (*a)diḍ(*a) ?* ... [3] ... *n(*a) v(*a)tav(*a •) yidi ahadi nasti ? upasapada • na dukh(*a)* [4] ... ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *bhava anuyujidava ? ? ?* ...

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... *sarvam asti* ... [2] ... *atīta- atīta-* ... [3] ... *na vaktavyam. yady āha nāsti* ... *upasampadā, na duḥkham* [4] ... *bhāvo 'nuyoktavyam* ...

Translation

[1] ... everything exists ... [2] ... past ... past ... [3] ... [P] ... should not be said. If one states, [O] “There is no attainment [of religious practice],” [P] it is not the case that suffering ... [4] ... should be upheld that “nature” ...

51gg

Reconstruction

... ? *up(*a)/(•an)up(*a)ḡ(*a)p(*a)n(*a)* ...

Sanskrit rendering

... *upa/anupasampanna-* ...

Translation

... one having attained (*or*, not having attained) [religious practice] ...

51aaaa

Reconstruction

... ? *ubh(*a)y.* ...

Sanskrit rendering

... ? *ubhay-* ...

Translation

... both ...

51D(v)

Reconstruction

[1] + + + + ? ? + (*anu)p(*a)sapan(*a) + + ? ? + + + + + + + + + + + + [2] +
+ nasti • yo vi anagad(*a)samunagamo so vi nasti • asti upasapada asti k(*a)d(*a)m(*e)-
na u[3](*pa)s(*a)pano anuvaṣapano • eva anagaḍa <*na>sti •

[3] adiḍa vaṣ(*a)ga asti di tena avaro ma[4]na vaṣo avaṣiyo • anagadehi vaṣagehi anagado
vaṣaga asti di • yidi (*a)[5](*nagaḍavaṣaga)s(*a)munagado di therāṣa vi vaṣaga asti so
hi tena na samunagado di

[5] śi(*la) [6] + + + + + + + + + + + + (*śi)l(*a) <*a>n(*a)g(*a)do di tena sarva
aśilavata sarvevadu śila [7] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ? + + + + + + ? + + +
+ + + + +

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... anupasampanna- ... [2] ... nāsti. yo 'py anāgatasamanvāgamaḥ so 'pi nāsti. asty
upasampadāsti, katameno[3]pasampanno 'nupasampannaḥ. evam anāgatā na santi.

[3] atīto varṣako 'stīti, tenāparaḥ pu[4]nar varṣo 'varṣikaḥ. anāgatair varṣakair anāgato
varṣako 'stīti. yady a[5]nāgatavarṣakasamanvāgata iti, sthavirasyāpi varṣako 'sti, sa hi
tena na samanvāgata iti.

[5] śīla- [6] ... śīlam anāgatam iti, tena sarva aśilavantaḥ sarvāvat śīla- [7] ...

Translation

[1] ... [P] ... one who has not attained [religious practice] ... [2] ... does not exist. That
accompaniment of future [factors] also does not exist. [If one states,] [O] “It is the case that
the attainment [of religious practice] exists,” [P] [then] by what means [3] does one who
has not attained [religious practice become] one who has attained [religious practice]? In
this way, future [factors] do not exist.

[3] [One states,] [O] “A past year exists,” [P] [but] then [4] yet another [future] year is not
possessed of [past] years. [One states,] [O] “A future year exists with future years.” If [5]
[one states,] [O] “One is accompanied by (*future years),” [P] [then] an elder [should] also
possess a [future] year, [but] indeed he is not accompanied by that [future year].

[P/O?] [5] Moral conduct [6] ... [O] [one states], “... moral conduct is future,” [P] then all
who are not observing moral conduct ... moral conduct in entirety [7] ...

51A–B(r)

Reconstruction

[1] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + n. hi ? + + ? .u h. + + ni/no + .o [2] + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + di ca anagadehi pacupana [3] + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + anuśayo • vidaraga u[4](*paṣapada) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ tena so anagaḍae [5] (*upaṣapadae) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + anagaḍae vid(*a)r(*a)g(*ae
a)vid(*a)r(*a)g(*a) [6] + + + + ? n. anuśayo bhodi • n(*a)hi ahadi + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + [7] + + + (*a)n(*a)g(*a)d(*a) + ? ? + ? ? ? ? + + + + + + .i/.o ṣ./p. p./?
? ? ? + + +

Sanskrit rendering

[1] ... [2] ... *cānāgataiḥ pratyutpanna-* [3] ... *anuśaya-*. *vītarāgo*[4]*pasampadā* ... *tena sa anāgatāyā* [5] *upasampadāyai* ... *anāgatāyai vītarāgāyā avītarāga-* [6] ... *anuśayo bhavati. nahy āha* [7] ... *anāgata-* ...

Translation

[1] ... [2] ... [p] ... and together with future ... present [3] ... contaminant. (*The attainment [of religious practice]) that is freed from lust [4] ..., then that one for the sake of the future (*attainment [of religious practice]) [5] ... for the sake of the future [attainment of religious practice] that is freed from lust, ... not [yet] freed from lust [6] ... becomes ... contaminant. For it is not the case that one states [7] ... future ...

Commentary: Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

Throughout section 4, the last preserved section of our text, extensive manuscript damage precludes a secure reconstruction, determination of changes in speaker, and even a general characterization of the contents. Certain terms shared with both the preceding text and the following fragments suggest connections with the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s fundamental proposition “everything exists,” but other terms are related specifically to religious practice. Thus, this passage might be seen as beginning the transition back to the topic of religious practice with which the preserved portion of our text began.

Since the major portion of the visible verso surfaces of fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v) likely represents an extension of layer 51ssss, similarity in terminology and overall topic with the previous passages is to be expected. Indeed, these fragments contain references to *ruva*, “material form,” and *bhava*, “nature” or “mode,” as well as to *sarvam asti*, “everything exists,” and *adida*, “past,” all of which suggest a connection with the opponent’s fundamental proposition “everything exists” and the proponent’s criticism of the specifications of “everything” and the explications of “existence.” Further, the gerundive form *anuyujidava*, “should be upheld,” which also appears on both 51C(v) and 51F(v), is used to mark an assertion by the proponent that serves as an interim conclusion to an argument, in this case perhaps an argument concerning “nature” or “mode” in relation to the three time periods.³³⁸ Fragment 51D(v), which follows 51C(v) and 51F(v), contains references to the “past” and “future,” and specifically to past and future years, which might indicate a shift to the criticism of the next part of the opponent’s original elaboration (ll. 71–75) that treats the relationship between the time periods and existence. Thus, it would appear that fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v) continue the proponent’s criticism of the opponent’s specifications of “everything” and explications of “existence,” but they then extend this criticism to the next issue in the opponent’s elaboration of his fundamental proposition, namely, the relationship between the time periods and existence.

Fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v) also mark a transition in topic since they contain frequent references to the praxis-related terms *upaśapaḍa*, *upaśapana*, and *anupaśapana*, which figure prominently on the preceding bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and also in the following fragments 51D(v)

³³⁸ For *anuyujidava*, see ll. 86, 87, 104, 109.

and 51A–B(r).³³⁹ Since praxis-related terms appear in the first strip (51A–B(v)) of the manuscript, the appearance of these terms on the verso might indicate a return to the topic with which our text began. And yet, since these following fragments 51D(v) and 51A–B(r) also contain references to the “past,” “present,” and “future,” this concern with religious practice should be seen not a radical shift but as a gradual transition to a related topic. Nonetheless, in order to highlight this transition to the topic of religious practice, this portion of the text from fragment 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] onward has tentatively been designated as a separate fourth and last section of our incomplete text.

Fragment 51D(v) is better preserved than the surrounding fragments, but its relationship to the proponent’s previous criticism, specifically of the opponent’s elaboration of his fundamental proposition, is unclear. Throughout this criticism, the proponent follows the order of the opponent’s elaboration, examining first the opponent’s qualifications of his proposition (ll. 82–98), next the formulaic declarations that form the root passage (ll. 98–115), then his specifications of “everything” (l. 115–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5), and finally his explication of “existence” (51G(v) [51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7). Thus, it would be reasonable to expect this part of the text to contain a criticism of the opponent’s next point in his elaboration, namely, the relationship between the time periods and existence (ll. 71–75). Indeed, fragment 51D(v) cites verbatim a statement offered by the opponent: “A past year exists” ((*a)d(*i)d(*a) v(*a)ṣ(*ag)e asti, l. 72). And in accordance with this pattern, the proponent’s criticism of the final part of the opponent’s elaboration might have appeared in the now missing portion of the manuscript. Despite this correlation between the opponent’s elaboration of his position and the proponent’s criticism that is observed in the earlier passages in the text, certain praxis-related terms throughout this last section suggest either that the proponent raises new issues in his criticism of the opponent’s fundamental proposition, or perhaps returns to the topic of religious practice presented in the first section of the preserved text. These terms include: (1) *upaṣapana* (P/Skt *upasampanna*), its negation *anupaṣapana* (P/Skt *anupasampanna*), and related terms, either in the literal sense of “attained” or in the extended sense of “one who has attained religious practice”; (2) *samunagama* or *samunagaḍa* (P *samannāgama*, Skt *samanvāgama*; P *samannāgata* Skt *samanvāgata*), used here with reference to future factors (*anagaḍasamunagama*) in the sense of “accompaniment”; and (3) *śilavata* (P *śilavat*, Skt *śīlavat*), “observing moral conduct,” *anuśaya* (P *anusaya*, Skt *anuśaya*), “contaminants,” and *viḍaraga* (P/Skt *vītarāga*), the state of being “freed from lust,” all, presumably, in connection with the attainment of religious practice.

Upaṣapana, *anupaṣapana*, and related terms occur throughout this last section of the text, first on bark piece 51jjjj and then repeatedly on fragments 51C(v), 51F(v), and 51D(v). The same terms are likely implied in the discussion on 51A–B(r). These terms unify the final portions of the manuscript and, as the current passage on 51D(r) suggests, are also connected in some way with the topic of the existence of future factors. However, their exact sense in this context is uncertain. The past participle *upaṣapana* (P/Skt *upasampanna*), its negated form *anupaṣapana* (P/Skt *anupasampanna*), and the noun *upaṣapada* (P/Skt *upasampadā*) are all derived from the root *pad* with the prefixes *upa-* and *sam-*. The root *pad* with the single prefix *sam-* has as its

³³⁹ For a discussion of the connotations of *upaṣapana* and *anupaṣapana*, see Commentaries: Criticism of the Opponent’s Second, Third (?), and Fourth (?) Specifications [l. 135–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5]; esp. Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

literal meaning “to meet,” or “unite with,” or “to attain,” but the prefix *sam-* can also convey the connotation of “completely,” hence its frequent sense “to complete,” “to accomplish,” or “to perfect.” In the case of the combination of prefixes in *upa + sam + √pad*, the prefix *upa-* may add its own connotation of “toward” or “near.”³⁴⁰ However, the following formulaic pattern, frequent in both *sūtras* and *abhidharma* texts, provides evidence for a distinction between *upa-panna* and *sam-panna*: “... reached, completely reached, arrived, completely arrived, attained (P *upapanno*), completely accomplished (P *sampanno*), accompanied (P *samannāgata*).”³⁴¹ Even though this pattern of listing terms, especially those that are etymologically related, may have served merely as a rhetorical technique employing terms with synonymous meaning, it is also possible that some difference in connotation between the prefixes *upa-* and *sam-* was intended in the original passage and remained at least in certain contexts in later usage. And it is further possible that later interpreters at a certain point introduced differences among terms in earlier lists that had been intended simply as synonyms. Specifically in this case, the prefixes in the terms *upa-panna* and *sam-panna* may have been intended to represent a difference in level or degree: *upa-*, with its connotation of “toward,” would signify an initial or incomplete stage, and *sam-*, a stage of “completion.” In the case of G *upa-ṣa-pana* (P/Skt *upasampanna*), the two prefixes are combined within a single term, and if a distinction between the two prefixes were tentatively accepted, the additional prefix *upa-*, with the sense of “toward” or “near,” might then suggest a stage preparatory to *sam + √pad*; that is to say, *upa + sam + √pad* would refer to a stage of “attaining” in which one is just on the point of “accomplishment” when completion is finally reached. The common Pali commentarial gloss P *paṭilābha*, “acquisition,” for the noun P *upasampadā* further reinforces this more literal interpretation of *upa + sam + √pad* as an initial stage of “attaining.”³⁴² Notable also in the frequent formulaic pattern in Pali referred to above is the final term P *samannāgata* (Skt *samanvāgata*), “accompanied,” which, if differences in connotation among the various terms were tentatively accepted, would represent the culmination of the serial process by which certain factors, qualities, or states are achieved. In this case then, *upa + sam + √pad* could represent a preliminary state of “attaining” that leads to “completion” and concludes with the condition of “accompaniment.”

This literal sense of *upa + sam + √pad* as an initial state of “attaining” is further reinforced by the Sarvāstivāda model of “possession” or “acquisition” (Skt *prāpti*), which was developed to account both for the coherence among the various factors constituting the experience of one sentient being and for the connection of a given factor to a particular sentient being that “possesses” it. Later Sarvāstivāda interpretations of this model claim that while “acquisition” (Skt *pratilambha*), “accompaniment” (Skt *samanvāgama*), and “possession” (Skt *prāpti*) are basically synonymous, there are also subtle differences, in particular between “acquisition” and “accompaniment.” One such difference reflects a succession of stages in possession, whereby the initial moment of attaining a given factor is labeled “acquisition,” and the second and subsequent moments of its

³⁴⁰ MW s.v. *sampad*, *sam*², *upa*.

³⁴¹ P ... *upeto hoti samupeto upāgato samupāgato upapanno sampanno samannāgato* (Ps I 153). Cf. MN I 244; Mp-t (VRI-CST4) 2.213; Vibh 195, passim, 246, passim; Paṭis-a I 14; It-a II 86; ŚAŚ 13 p. 617b27–28.

³⁴² Vibh-a 305; Sv II 479; Mp II 81; Ps IV 21; Nett-a (VRI-CST4) 234. Cf. Vibh 217, 257; Dhs 167; Paṭis II 189.

possession then become “accompaniment.”³⁴³ The frequent identification of *upa + sam + √pad* with *prati + √labh* suggests that it too might refer to the first moments of possession, or an initial stage of “attaining” in contrast to continued possession indicated by *sam + anu + ā + √gam*. And in this context of the discussion of future factors, our text might then use the terms *upaśapana* and *anupaśapana* in this literal sense of “attained” or “not attained,” specifically in reference to the process by which future factors arise, or “attain” the present.

Even though this more literal sense of *upaśapana* and *anupaśapana* as “attained” and “not attained” would fit the present discussion of future factors, a second extended sense is perhaps more consistent with certain other terms found in this last section of our preserved text. On the basis of this literal sense as “attaining,” terms derived from *upa + sam + √pad* acquire their most frequently encountered and extended sense of “attaining religious practice,” which refers to undertaking the religious life or, in its nominal form, undergoing monastic ordination. Terms derived from *upa + sam + √pad* can thus be connected with those derived from *prati + √labh* and *sam + anu + ā + √gam*, both common in the context of religious practice: for example, “acquisition” (P *paṭilābha*, Skt *pratilābha*, or more often *pratilambha*) is contrasted with “discarding” (P/Skt *tyāga*), which together describe the process by which one progresses along stages in the path; and “accompaniment” (P *samannāgata*, Skt *samanvāgata*) designates one’s status as characterized by various virtuous or unvirtuous qualities.

Both the more literal and the extended senses of *upa + sam + √pad* are evident in its most frequently occurring derivative, the absolutive form P *upasampajja* (Skt *upasampadya*), which carries the more literal sense of “entering into” or “attaining” in a formula detailing one’s progress through meditative states or stages of religious practice. Specifically, one is said to “abide having attained” (P *pasampajja viharati*), where P *upasampajja* is glossed in the Pali commentaries with P *paṭilābhivā*.³⁴⁴ In interpreting this formula, the *Mahāvibhāṣā glosses “attaining” (具足, Skt **upasampadya*) with “acquisition” (得獲, Skt **pratilambha*), and “abides” (住, Skt **viharati*) with “accompaniment” (成就, Skt **samanvāgama*). This clearly associates derivatives of *upa + sam + √pad* with an initial stage of “acquisition,” which is then followed by a condition of “accompaniment” (*sam + anu + ā + √gam*).³⁴⁵ A similar distinction of successive stages is implied by the Dharmaskandha in its commentary on “worthy persons” (善士, Skt **satpuruṣa*), who are described repeatedly with the phrase, “... having attained, are accompanied by ...” (具足成就, Skt **upasampadya samanvāgata*), which is used in reference to the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment.³⁴⁶ Thus, given this common usage of *upaśapana* for a state of having “attained religious practice,” it is possible that the term is used in this extended sense in our Gāndhārī text as well.

Although *upaśapana*, *anupaśapana*, and related terms occur repeatedly in these final passages, none of these occurrences is undamaged and without potential ambiguity. However, the context for several occurrences offers clues that support a connection specifically with religious practice. In the

³⁴³ AMVŚ 162 p. 823a20ff.; Cox 1995: 79ff.

³⁴⁴ P ... *paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati* (DN I 37; Sv I 313; MN I 164; Ps II 170; passim).

³⁴⁵ AMVŚ 80 p. 415c25–27, 80 p. 416b11–13, 81 p. 417a1–3, 84 p. 433a14–15, 84 p. 433c8–10. Cf. DhSk 7 p. 484a12–15.

³⁴⁶ DhSk 2 p. 458c24–27.

text in this last section comes full circle, returning to the overarching topic of religious practice that precipitates the long intervening discussion of past and future factors and existence in the three time periods. However, the polemical pattern in the final line of the text makes it clear that the argument between the proponent and the opponent in this last section extended beyond the end of the current manuscript: “For it is not the case that one states ...” (*n(*a)hi ahadi ...*, 51A–B(r) l. 6). Hence, the abhidharma text as preserved in this manuscript certainly represents only one portion of a longer, and possibly much longer, original text.

Description of the Manuscript

Like all of the manuscripts in the BL Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī collection, prior to its arrival at the British Library, Fragment 28 (BL 28) was transferred from the clay pot in which it had been stored from ancient times to a modern glass jar, in this case, jar number 13. During conservation, it became clear that jar 13 contained the manuscript remnants of two different texts; these were designated Fragment 28 (conserved in frames 51–52) and Fragment 29 (in frames 53–55). As a rule, when the scrolls were originally placed in the modern glass jars, if a jar contained more than one scroll, this was noted (e.g., jar 2 appeared to contain two fragments, 1 and 2).¹ In the case of jar 13, however, it was only later that conservators at the British Library recognized that it contained two scrolls. A substantial piece of the outer layer of the scroll containing Fragment 28 has been conserved in frame 53 stuck to the outer verso strip of Fragment 29.² Thus, it would appear that Fragments 28 and 29 were not rolled together as a single composite scroll but rather were separate scrolls whose outer layers became stuck together while stored in the clay pot. These two scrolls, still adhering to one another, were then placed together into jar 13 and only separated during the process of conservation.

II.1.1. Physical Description of the Manuscript

Fragment 28 comprises two large parts of a single manuscript. These two parts are referred to as “51” and “52” based on the numbers of the glass frames in which they are conserved (BL accession numbers Or. 14915.51 and Or. 14915.52). Originally rolled together as a single scroll, they became separated only during the conservation process. This is clearly indicated by the fact that the remnants of the upper portions of syllables in the first line of the verso segment of manuscript part 51 are found at the bottom edge of the verso segment of manuscript part 52, to which it was originally glued.³ It is also supported by physical evidence, such as the similar widths of the two parts (51 ≈ 11.5 cm, 52 ≈ 12 cm) and the decreasing height of the horizontal strips into which the manuscript parts broke during conservation. Both manuscript parts were originally constructed from segments of birch bark that were glued together, as is evident from glue-line junctures that can be discerned at certain points in each part. During the long period it was stored in the clay pot, the scroll (like most of the scrolls in this collection) became flattened. Upon being unrolled, it

¹ Salomon 1999: 19 [§ 2.1.1].

² Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

³ Manuscript Notes: ll. 98–102. For a further description of the construction of the manuscripts in the collection, see Salomon 1999: 92–96 [§ 5.1.2], 107–108 [§ 5.4.1]; Baums 2014: 199ff.

broke into horizontal strips, with the height of each corresponding to half the circumference of the rolled-up scroll. The height of these strips decreases from the outer layers to the interior of a scroll, corresponding to the more tightly rolled interior layers, with heights ranging from 3.5 cm for the outermost strip in frame 51, to 1.5 cm for the innermost strip in frame 52.

The birch bark of both manuscript parts 51 and 52 is generally uniform in texture, with regular lenticels and few knot holes or other irregularities. In its conserved state between two sheets of glass, its thickness cannot be determined, but it appears to be quite thin, even though there are some delaminated areas and fragments whose recto and verso are displaced, suggesting that the bark originally had at least two layers. The color of the recto surfaces of both manuscript parts is largely consistent and lighter than the verso. By contrast, the verso surfaces show greater variation between light and dark, and in certain sections appear almost speckled. Also, according to the conservators, the outside layer of the scroll containing the two manuscript parts seems to have been sprayed with a fixative before being brought to the British Library, thus heightening the dark appearance of the outer layers of the verso of manuscript part 51, in particular fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v).⁴

As in the case of most if not all ancient birch bark manuscripts, Fragment 28 was damaged during conservation, breaking into pieces of various sizes, including horizontal strips, individual fragments, and other smaller chips and bits. As a convention in this study, “Fragment,” with an uppercase F, will be reserved as the designation for the manuscript as a whole, namely, Fragment 28. The portions of the manuscript conserved in the two frames 51 and 52 are referred to as “manuscript parts,” while the larger pieces of each manuscript part are referred to as “segments,” “strips,” or “fragments” (with a lowercase f), and smaller pieces as bark “chips” or “bits.” The larger pieces are designated by their frame number and an uppercase letter. For example, 51A is fragment A in frame 51. Smaller bark pieces, the chips and bits, are also designated with the frame number but with lowercase letters, their letters continuing from those allocated to the larger pieces. All identifying numbers have been assigned according to the piece’s placement in the frames, that is, as the unreconstructed manuscript has been conserved, beginning at the top right of the recto side of the frame and proceeding in order from right to left, top to bottom. A descriptive list of the larger pieces as well as the smaller chips and bits can be found in the appendix of this volume.

II.1.2. Reconstruction of the Scroll

II.1.2.1. Size and Format

Despite the patterns of damage discussed below (see II.1.2.2.), the manuscript parts conserved in glass frames 51 and 52 are largely complete. They are presented in plates 1–4 in their unreconstructed state.⁵ Manuscript part 51 has been conserved largely in its original form, with the only significant misplaced pieces found among its outer fragments. The reconstruction of the outer fragments of part 51 is presented in plates 5 and 10, while the reconstruction of its major portions is presented in plates 6 and 9. A separate reconstruction of the outer strip of part 51 is presented in plates 11a and 11b. By contrast, the digital reconstruction of manuscript part 52 entailed relocating major pieces of the manuscript that had become jumbled in the process of conservation. Its reconstruction,

⁴ Personal conversation with Mark Barnard, British Library, January 1999.

⁵ All plates appear in order following p. 554.

restored as closely as possible to its original form, is presented in plates 7–8. In addition, the relocation of certain displaced smaller fragments and chips, infrared images revealing obscured text, and other digital reconstructions of the manuscript can be found in plates (5–10) as well as in the smaller figures (1–11).

As described above, each individual piece of Fragment 28, both large and small, as conserved in the two frames 51 and 52 has been labeled to aid the clear description of the manuscript and the reconstruction of the text. The larger pieces of the two parts are labeled, as mentioned, with the frame number and an uppercase letter beginning from the top right corner of the recto, moving first horizontally from right to left and then top to bottom, and then continuing on the verso. For example, 51A is the first large fragment in the upper right corner of frame 51 as seen from the recto side. After the labeling of the larger fragments, the smaller bark pieces including bits and chips are labeled, again in sequence, from the top right corner of the recto to the bottom left. Also as mentioned above, they are likewise identified by the frame number but with lowercase letters continuing from those allocated to the larger pieces. For example, the final larger fragment in manuscript part 51 is 51H, making the first smaller piece 51i, located at the top right corner of the recto side of the frame.

Manuscript part 52 constituted the interior of the original scroll; at its bottom edge the text continues from recto to verso, that is, what was the bottom edge of the text on the recto became the top edge when the scribe turned the scroll over, top to bottom, to continue writing on the verso. This bottom edge shows no evidence either in the form of damage or holes that would suggest that the manuscript was originally fastened to an interior roller.⁶ The presence of blank spaces with no writing on pieces at the bottom of the recto of manuscript part 51 and the bottom of the verso of manuscript part 52 indicates clearly that the two manuscript parts were at one time glued together, with one part overlapping the other.

Most of the damage to the original scroll made up of manuscript parts 51 and 52 has been to its outer cycles, which were more exposed while it was stored in the clay pot, and to its right edge, which was the edge the scroll stood on in glass jar 13. Since manuscript part 51 formed the outermost portion of the scroll, there has been considerable damage to its upper sections, the scroll's first two cycles (or four strips). These two cycles have broken into seven large fragments, and one of these fragments adheres to a piece of the outer layer of Fragment 29.

As currently conserved, manuscript part 51 has a maximum width of 11.5 cm and a length of approximately 43 cm. The length includes 32.5 cm for the longer contiguous sections of the manuscript (51G–H) and at least 10.5 cm for the initial fragments (51A–F). On the verso, approximately 10 cm of the original surface length—the lower portion of fragment 51G and the entirety of fragments 51C and 51F—are covered by an extraneous layer of birch bark with script, a fragment that has been labeled 51ssss. On the basis of its physical characteristics, scribal hand, and contents, this fragment can also be identified as part of our original manuscript. Conversely, as seen from the recto side of the frame, approximately 10 cm in length of layer 51ssss are covered by fragment 51G and fragments 51C and 51F. If 51ssss had been conserved as a separate fragment, the reconstructed manuscript part would total approximately 53 cm in length.

⁶ See Baums 2014: 198–199.

Manuscript part 52 is in overall better condition, with most damage found at the breaks between the horizontal strips into which the manuscript split during conservation. Since this part represents the interior section of the original scroll, it was protected by the outer section, manuscript part 51. Hence, its outer cycles suffered little damage, and its size is easier to estimate.⁷ Its current width is 12 cm at its widest point; its length is 22.3 cm.

Thus, Fragment 28, as made up of the two manuscript parts 51 and 52, totals approximately 75 cm in length. Of the surviving BL manuscripts, it is neither one of the longest nor one of the shortest.⁸

Fragment 28 has the format of a combined scroll consisting of several manuscript segments glued together. However, the length of the original scroll is impossible to determine. Since its text lacks a parallel among other known texts, it is possible that the original text was much longer. From the patterns of damage, it is clear that when placed in the clay pot, the single scroll consisted of manuscript part 51 as its outside portion and manuscript part 52 as its interior portion and the scroll's bottom edge. But it is possible that these two manuscript parts represent the surviving portion of a longer text, whether originally written on a single scroll or on more than one.⁹ Thus, it is possible that at some point in time prior to being placed in the pot, one or more additional manuscript segments preceded our manuscript part 51, or that manuscript parts 51 and 52 represent the surviving portion of a much longer multi-scroll text.

Among the BL manuscripts with long, narrow formats of this type, birch bark segments of various lengths were used. However, in other manuscripts the individual segments are considerably longer than those used for our manuscript. For example, the bark segments in EĀ-G range from 23.5 cm to over 30 cm in length,¹⁰ those in AG-G^L, from 27 to 49 cm,¹¹ and those in BL 7, 9, 13 and 18, from 19.8 cm to 29 cm.¹² By contrast, our manuscript appears to have been constructed from much smaller segments of birch bark, averaging in most cases only 6–7 cm.

Manuscript part 51 consists of four segments: (1) from the beginning to 51G–H(r) line 3 (with the verso hidden by layer 51ssss), of uncertain original length since there is no evidence of a glue-line juncture at the top of these initial fragments; (2) 51G–H(r) lines 4–11 (with the verso hidden by layer 51ssss) \approx 7 cm; (3) 51G–H(r) lines 12–20 (corresponding to verso ll. 122–133) \approx 7.5 cm; and (4) 51G–H(r) lines 21–43 (corresponding to verso ll. 102–121) \approx 15 cm. Manuscript part 52 consists of three segments: (1) 52(r) lines 43–49 (corresponding to verso ll. 96–101) \approx 6 cm; (2) 52(r) lines 50–61 (corresponding to verso ll. 85–95) \approx 6.5 cm; and (3) 52(r) lines 62–73 (corresponding to verso ll. 74–84) \approx 9 cm. The longest segment of bark, at approximately 15 cm (manuscript part 51: recto ll. 21–43; verso ll. 102–121), is more than twice the average length of the other segments used in our manuscript. One might thus suspect that it was formed from two separate segments of bark of a length similar to those used elsewhere. However, although there is a crack in the

⁷ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61; ll. 62–66.

⁸ Salomon 1999: 44–45 [§ 2.3]; 88 [§ 5.1.1].

⁹ For a discussion of the multi-scroll texts in the Gāndhārī collections, see Salomon 2011: 182–183.

¹⁰ Allon 2001: 43–44 [§ 3.2.1].

¹¹ Salomon 2008: 85–86 [§ II.1.1].

¹² Baums 2009: 71 [§ 2.3].

manuscript just below 51G–H(r) line 31 at the midpoint of this 15 cm segment, no clear glue-line juncture can be discerned.

The damage to the right margins of both manuscript parts 51 and 52 suggests that the scroll was placed in the modern glass jar with its right margin on the bottom. Very few sections of the right margin remain, and these only in manuscript part 51: 51G–H(r) lines 19–21 (corresponding to verso ll. 122–124); 51G–H(r) lines 27–28 (corresponding to verso ll. 116–117); and 51G–H(r) lines 36–37 (corresponding to verso ll. 107–108). The left margin is generally preserved throughout manuscript part 51 and averages 0.75–1 cm in width. In manuscript part 52, portions of the left margin ranging from 0.25–1 cm wide are preserved: next to 52(r) lines 43–59 (corresponding to verso ll. 89–101) and 52(r) lines 69–70 (corresponding to verso ll. 77–78). Although much of the left margin is preserved in manuscript part 51, impressions from a line of stitching sewn about 1 cm in from the edge of the manuscript are visible in only a few places: next to 51G–H(r) lines 10–20, 35–37, 51G–H(v) lines 106, 122–124, 131–134. In the case of manuscript part 52, sewing-line impressions are visible in the left margin next to 52(r) lines 43–46, 52–53 and 69, and 52(v) lines 98 and 100. Evidence of the line of sewing can also be found at the end of 52(v) line 102 in the left margin on the verso of manuscript part 51. Here, no impression of the sewing line remains, but the final syllable in the line is written close to the left edge of the manuscript at a distance of about one syllable to the left of the preceding portion of the line, suggesting that the scribe attempted to avoid the line of stitching along the left margin.¹³

The text is usually written continuously from the right to left margin with only a few shorter lines. In all but one case these shorter lines result from an attempt to avoid writing over a glue-line juncture (ll. 4, 11, 42, 49, 61, 96; cf. l. 88, as yet unexplained). Several complete lines of text are preserved, averaging approximately thirty-two syllables, but several lines contain thirty-four syllables (ll. 2, 38, 46), and the longest lines have thirty-five (l. 39) or possibly thirty-seven syllables (est., l. 48). Lines are written with only a minimal downward slant, and the interlinear space is regularly 0.6 cm and 0.8 cm, with occasionally wider spaces perhaps resulting from defects in the writing surface (e.g., ll. 6–8; 51A–B(r) ll. 1–7).

II.1.2.2. Patterns of Damage

The present manuscript suffered the same patterns of damage as seen in all of the manuscripts in the BL Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī collection, including horizontal splitting due to the scroll being flattened, with attendant loss of text along the resulting cracks in the manuscript, deterioration of the outer layers of the scroll and of the margins, caused at least in part by the modern glass jar into which the scrolls were placed after they were discovered, and various types of disturbance to the manuscript, such as delamination and incorrect ordering or superimposition of the bark fragments. Much of the latter two problems most likely occurred during the conservation process.¹⁴ Our manuscript provides excellent examples of several of these patterns of damage.

First, regular patterns of displacement usually of smaller but in some cases of larger fragments by a distance of one cycle, or two strips, in the scroll occur along the damaged right edge of the

¹³ Text Notes: [102] *tena uvahaḍāidria*«na» [103] + /// [n].[g].[d].*idriya*.

¹⁴ Allon 2001: 46 [§ 3.2.2].

correct order of the strips can be determined on the basis of physical evidence on both the recto and verso, such as the color and striations of the bark surface, as well as by realigning lines of text.¹⁷

A third pattern involves delamination and overlying pieces of bark. Like all manuscripts in this collection, the present manuscript contains many such examples, but two are particularly important. The first example is a delaminated area found in 51G–H(r) lines 14–19 on the recto of manuscript part 51. The top portion of the delaminated bark has slipped downward (51aaa) from its original position in the manuscript (ll. 14–15). The lower portion of the delaminated bark broke into four fragments (51aaaa, 51bbbb, 51eee, and 51iii) and is found adhering to the verso surface, 51G–H(v) lines 118–121. Although only the blank undersurface of this delaminated bark is exposed in the conserved manuscript, syllables on the hidden recto surfaces of all four fragments become visible in the infrared images of their blank surfaces. These revealed syllables support a partial reconstruction of the beginning portions of 51G–H(r) lines 15–19.¹⁸ The second example involves a large layer of bark (51ssss) and several smaller pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo) that cover approximately 10 cm in length of the verso surface of manuscript part 51, specifically the final portion of fragment 51G and the entirety of fragments 51C and 51F. This overlying bark definitely belongs to the same original manuscript as parts 51 and 52, since the exposed verso is written in the same scribal hand and contains terms similar to those used elsewhere in the text. Optical backlighting indicates that the final portion of fragment 51G, as well as the entirety of fragments 51C and 51F, are much thicker than other fragments. Here, too, infrared images reveal letters on the underlying hidden surfaces. However, since there are two hidden inscribed surfaces in addition to the two visible surfaces on the recto and verso, and no parallels or other clues as to which letters belong to which interior surface, the infrared image is of little assistance in reconstructing the fourteen or more lines on each of the two hidden surfaces.¹⁹

A fourth pattern of damage is observed in the continuing deterioration of the manuscripts due to movement of the glass frame in which they are conserved. This type of deterioration usually takes two forms. First, the edges of the manuscript break into small chips, which then shift from their initially conserved position. This can be observed in the case of chips 51sss, 51ttt, 51uuu, 51vvv, 51www, and 51xxx along the upper edge of 51H(v), or 52k, 52m, and 52n along the upper and right edge of 52A(r). Also, larger fragments break into smaller pieces, as in the case of 51ppp, 51qqq, and 51rrr. Since the damage continues with each movement of the glass frame, the initial black and white photographs that were made immediately after Fragment 28 was placed in the two frames are invaluable for reconstructing the manuscript at the time of conservation.

Finally, this manuscript provides an excellent example of a fifth and final pattern of damage found in all of the birch bark manuscripts in this collection. Especially in the case of manuscript part 52, damage occurred at the breaks between the horizontal strips into which the manuscript broke because of being flattened. During conservation, such strips frequently fail to separate completely,

¹⁷ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61; ll. 62–66.

¹⁸ Manuscript Notes: ll. 7–17; ll. 17–20. Text Notes: [16] ^[51iii+51bbbb]*[a].[d].da avivakavivaga asti ?*; [17] ^[51bbb-b ga as]^[51bbbb+51eee(v)]*ti [di n]*. ^[51bbbb]*[bho]* + +; [18] ^[51ggg(r)]*añeş[u] ca a[s]*..^[51H(r)]+ +; [19] ^[51aaaa]*[k].mas[vag]*. • ^[51aaaa+51H(r)]*[ma]*^[51H(r)]*da na akuşalaka[masva]go*.

¹⁹ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A; 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r); ll. 135–141; 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5.

with pieces of bark from one strip remaining stuck to the contiguous strip at the junctures between them. Such attached pieces of bark are then not separated out fully during conservation and as a result, remained folded over, hiding portions of the original surface. Although these pieces of bark obscure the readings of certain lines, they can provide proof that certain horizontal strips were contiguous, as for example in the case of fragments 52r, 52ff, and 52ll described below.

II.1.2.3. The Reconstructed Text and Layout

Fragment BL 28 preserves a prose polemical text comprising 134 lines in the continuous sections of the manuscript as conserved. These sections are formed of 51G, 51H and all of 52, as well as approximately 50 partial lines in the various damaged outer layers of manuscript part 51. The text treats a set of topics that are presented together also in other abhidharma texts, namely, certain types of religious practice, the existence of past and future factors, the operation of karma in relation to other causal processes, and the abstract question of what exists. However, since no textual parallel has as yet been identified, it is impossible to determine which, if any, of these topics served as the text's focus, either for the portions preserved in our manuscript, or for the original text as a whole. It also remains unclear whether the text preserved in this manuscript originally stood alone as a shorter, perhaps even single-scroll treatise examining only a limited set of topics, or whether it was part of a much longer single- or multi-scroll text covering a range of topics, much like the Kathāvatthu or the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra.²⁰ Thus, in the absence of a textual parallel, reconstruction of the text preserved in the present manuscript must depend upon physical clues and, where possible, analogous arguments or discussions in abhidharma texts.

The prose of the text is divided into four sections marked by three larger punctuation marks. Although these punctuation marks may have functioned to demarcate sections on the basis of their content, they do not provide any clues about the overall structure of the original text or its length (see Paleography and Orthography § II.2.5 Punctuation and Marginal Marks). The manuscript contains one marginal notation, namely, a set of inverted, v-shaped symbols branching downward toward the right and left along a central vertical line. This symbol possibly functioned in conjunction with an interlinear letter or numeral that can be found nearby.²¹ However, it is unclear whether this marginal notation marks a section division, indicates some notable content in the text, or has another function.

²⁰ Introduction § I.1.1. General Character of the Manuscript and Text, § I.1.3 Comparison with Other Abhidharma Texts.

²¹ Text Notes: [27] *saṅha voharovi[va]ga yaṣa ya⟨sa⟩* [28] *sa[rja]nadi taṣa taṣa voharadi.*

Chapter II.2

Paleography and Orthography

BL Fragment 28 is the only manuscript in the British Library Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī collection written by BL scribe 21. Throughout this chapter, specific characters that occur within the continuous portion of manuscript pieces 51G–H and 52A–H are referred to by line and syllable number in the line, from right to left, including punctuation marks as they appear in the edition: for example, l. 3.14 refers to line 3 of the transcription, fourteenth visible character from the right. References to characters on independent fragments will also include the fragment number. In keeping with the conventions established in chapter 4 of the EĀ–G, characters that vary with respect to the presence or absence of a foot mark will be called “forms,” while characters in which there is a structural difference in terms of stroke order or direction will be referred to as “types.” Unless otherwise indicated, when an equal sign is used to connect two related forms, the first form is Gāndhārī and the second, Sanskrit.

II.2.1. Writing Instrument

The scribes in the British Library collection all used the same basic writing tool, a broad-edged reed pen, sometimes called a *calamus*. However, there is considerable variation among the individual scribes in the ways they cut and held their pens. One of the principal differences seems to have been the frequency with which they trimmed the nib, which tends to soften in the course of its use. The scribes of the Khvs-G and the Avadānas trimmed the nib regularly to maintain a clean writing edge, whereas the scribe who wrote the EĀ–G, the AG-G^L, and the Dhp-G^L allowed his nib to become quite soft, almost brush-like. The nib widths in the present manuscript are very consistent, with an average of 0.8 mm. The only exception is found on fragment 51B(v), which contains characters that are noticeably thicker, but even here the characters throughout the fragment are of consistent thickness, suggesting that the nib may simply have been cut wider. It has, therefore, not been possible to determine when the scribe recut his nib on the basis of variations in the nib width, as was the case with the Khvs-G. However, since the narrow horizontal strokes average from 0.3 to 0.5 mm and are clearly distinguished from the broad vertical and diagonal strokes, we can assume, either, that the nib is being recut quite regularly, or, that other factors led to greater durability of the nib. One possibility is that this was a wooden pen. This pen has a split nib to improve ink flow as can be clearly seen in some characters, for example, *de* in *anagadehi* (51A–B(r) l. 2.6; fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Detail of *de*, 51A–B(r) l. 2.6.

Harder nibs tend to be less absorbent than the softer brush-like nibs and therefore reveal more clearly when they are running out of ink. BL scribe 21 appears to dip his pen at least once per line, as indicated by distinctive patterns in the flow of the ink throughout this manuscript. It is believed that the frequent cracking and clumping of the ink is caused by relatively high carbon powder content in the traditional mixture of carbon, water, and gum Arabic. When the scribe dips his pen, undissolved carbon powder in the ink gathers at the tip of the nib due to the effect of gravity. As a result, the first characters written after reloading have high, undissolved carbon content. As the ink dries, this excess carbon gathers into clumps on the writing surface. In the course of writing, the amount of excess powder on the nib decreases and the ink tends more toward staining the bark. Fig. 2 shows a typical segment of the text, with clumping characteristic of a freshly dipped pen at the right, gradually turning into stained characters, before abruptly turning back into clumps once more when the scribe dips his pen again before making the punctuation dot.



Fig. 2. Detail showing variations in ink texture.

II.2.2. General Features of the Hand

The writing in this manuscript generally has a small, neat appearance with characters usually evenly proportioned and spaced, and with straighter lines than in most other manuscripts in the BL collection. These factors suggest that the scribe worked slowly and with care. Nevertheless, in certain sections, characters have a more cursive appearance lacking foot marks or other flourishes and thus appear to have been written more quickly (e.g., ll.97–101; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–7). Cursivization is also apparent in the writing of specific characters. In particular, the vowel diacritics *i* or *e* are also often linked through a faint stroke to the base character: for example, in the independent vowels *i* (e.g., ll. 42.8, 99.18, 103.4, 116.7) and *e* (e.g., ll. 79.16, 93.14, 119.18; 51A–B(r) l. 4.8), which are written as a continuous stroke, and in *di* (l. 93.27), *ni* (ll. 53.25, 54.4), *ne* (ll. 42.6, 99.16), *hi* (l. 3.8), and *sti* (ll. 69.3, 123.5). Base characters can also undergo cursivization as in *k-*, in which the right-hand loop once forms a complete circle connected to the vertical stem (l. 29.15) or the entire right side is once written as one continuous stroke (l. 107.15), and *p-*, in which the right-hand loop is several times connected to the pseudo-anusvāra foot mark at the base of the vertical stem, forming a circle (ll. 60.11, 122.8, 125.14, 128.14).

The pen angle to the writing line varies between 20° (l. 2) and 11° (l. 38), a lower angle than the 20° to 30° pen angle of the scribe of the Khvs-G. Given that the natural writing angle for a right-handed scribe is between 30° and 45°, it would appear that our scribe cut his nib with a right-oblique slant. However, the thin line connecting the base of the *n-* to the left end of the *i*-vowel diacritic in *ni* (l. 65.15) suggests that the nib may have been cut with the customary left-oblique slant, as only the right side of the nib touched the bark (fig. 3).



Fig. 3. Detail of *ni*, l. 65.15.

The pen angle here is consistent with the rest of the manuscript, so we should not conclude that this *ni* reflects a random variation in the cut of the nib. Rather, it would suggest that the scribe wrote with a slight left-oblique cut to his nib but rotated the writing surface about 60° counterclockwise so that the writing line was perpendicular to his forearm. The straightness of the lines of writing also suggests that the bark was turned, thereby minimizing the distortion from pivoting his hand about his elbow. If so, this would explain why the lines of writing are fairly straight in this manuscript. Many of the verticals have a strong slant, some more than 25°, but most are around 20°, which is similar to the Khvs-G.¹ This italic appearance supports the hypothesis that the scribe rotated the writing surface. Interline spacing, the distance from the top of one line to the top of the next, varies between 0.6 cm and 0.8 cm, with occasional larger spacing due to defects in the writing surface (e.g., ll. 6–8; 51A–B(r) ll. 1–7). The height of the central portion of the letters, or the “x-height,” averages just over 0.4 cm. This gives a weight of 1:5 (the ratio of nib width to x-height), which is equal to the scribe of the EĀ-G/Dhp-G^L (1:5), fractionally more elongated than the Khvs-G (1:4), and somewhat more compact than BL scribe 2 (1:7).

II.2.3. Foot Marks

Foot marks, or flourishes at the base of vertical stems, are encountered to a greater or lesser extent in the hands of all Kharoṣṭhī scribes.² Even though such foot marks are not phonetically significant, particular scribal hands reveal foot mark patterns that can assist in identifying damaged characters in manuscripts written by that scribe. In any given scribal hand, certain characters may be strongly associated with one foot mark, others may be written with two or even more foot marks, and virtually all characters that might otherwise be written with one or more foot marks can also appear without them. Commonalities in the application of foot marks to particular character groups can also be discerned across the hands of various scribes, suggesting an association between a given foot mark and that character group. For example, several of the foot marks as well as the pattern of their application in this manuscript are consistent with patterns observed in the Khvs-G written by BL scribe 9.³ However, such shared patterns of application and their possible significance require a more systematic comparison of Kharoṣṭhī scribal hands.

BL scribe 21 uses nine foot marks distinguished primarily on the basis of the direction of pen movement. Foot marks can be found with the independent vowels *a* and *i*, but the vowel *e* is usually written cursively with the diacritic stroke rising from and therefore connected to the base of the vertical stem. Vertical stems and other downward strokes on other base characters frequently appear with foot marks.

¹ The suggestion in the Khvs-G that “the nib was probably cut square or perhaps slightly right oblique, although a right oblique cut would be the opposite of later scribal practice in India, which uses a left oblique nib (Lambert 1953: 5; Johnston 1971: 71–72)” (Salomon 2000: 54 [§ I.5.2]) should be reconsidered. Since the Khvs-G and the present manuscript are similar in both pen angle and vertical slant, there is a distinct possibility that the scribe of the Khvs-G also rotated his manuscript, and cut his nib left oblique.

² For detailed treatments, see Glass 2007: 88–91 [§ 4.4]; Salomon 2000: 55–57 [§ I.5.4]; Glass 2000: 21–28 [§ 4.0].

³ Salomon 2000: 55–57 [§ I.5.4].

Type 0: The absence of a foot mark indicated by a vertical stem that terminates abruptly or tapers to a point after bending slightly to the left. With the exception of *c-*, all base characters with a vertical stem that can occur with other foot marks are also found with type 0.

Type 1: A tapered vertical stem or an attenuated form of another foot mark, usually type 4 or 5, followed by a dot of ink. Rather than a distinct foot mark, this may represent simply a slight hesitation before lifting the pen to begin the next character.⁴

Type 2: A short stroke that moves upward toward the left from the base of the vertical stem, usually with a slight acute angle. This type is quite common since it is the product of the natural pen movement upward, either to complete the remainder of the character or to move toward the next character.⁵

Type 3: A straight or very slightly upwardly curved horizontal stroke extending toward the left from the base of the vertical stem.

Type 4: A short stroke that curves slightly upward toward the left and then downward toward the right and back to the left, forming a small hook that is open to the left.⁶ In certain cases, possibly as a result of having been written quickly, this hooked stroke is attenuated as a small blotch at the tip of the vertical or right-hand limb of the base character: *a* (l. 57.18); *ka* (51D(r) l. 5.4); *kha* (l. 80.30); *ga* (l. 82.2); *bha* (l. 78.1); *ṣe* (l. 84.24); and *sa* (l. 67.8).

Type 5: An angular hook open to the right formed by a stroke that moves slightly toward the left then sharply back toward the right.⁷ This foot mark resembles type 4 but ends without curving back toward the left; hence, the hook is open to the right rather than the left.

Type 6: A horizontal stroke, either straight or with a slight downward curve, extending toward the right from the base of the vertical stem.⁸

Type 7: A horizontal stroke centered on the base of the vertical stem, which occurs only with the base character *g-*.⁹

Type 8: The final foot mark occurs only in the case of the base character *p-* with all vowels other than *u*.¹⁰ It resembles a normal Kharoṣṭhī anusvāra that extends horizontally the width of the character toward the right, bends downward, and finally turns back toward the left forming a large curve open to the left. In eight cases this foot mark occurs where an anusvāra is either morphologically or etymologically expected: *apaṃ* = *alpam* (adj., nom. sg. n., l. 25.19); *paṃcama* = *pañcama* (ll. 85.24, 89.29, 91.12, 120.13); and *rupoṃ* = *rūpam* (nom. sg. n., ll. 127.15, 128.14; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4.15. However, in the vast majority of cases it appears to represent a mere foot mark with no phonetic significance. Two examples of a type-3 foot mark, namely with *tha* (l. 36.16) and *na* (l. 6.14), resemble this pseudo-anusvāra foot mark but in a much more abbreviated form.

⁴ Glass 2000: 22 [table 1, type 10].

⁵ Allon 2001: 54 [§ 4.3].

⁶ Glass 2000: 22 [table 1, type 5]; Salomon 2000: 56 [table 1, type 1].

⁷ Glass 2000: 22 [table 1, type 6].

⁸ Glass 2000: 22 [table 1, type 4]; Salomon 2000: 56 [table 1, type 6].

⁹ Glass 2000: 22 [table 1, type 3]; Salomon 2000: 56 [table 1, type 5].

¹⁰ Glass 2000: 64–65 [§ 2.8]; Glass 2007: 96 [§ 4.5.2.10].

Table 2. Summary of foot mark types¹¹

| Type | Shape | Characters with this foot mark |
|------|---|--|
| 0 |  | All characters ending with vertical stem except <i>ca</i> |
| 1 |  | <i>ka, ca, dha, ba, mi, ra, kṣa</i> |
| 2 |  | <i>a, i, ga, ja, ṭha, ḥha, ta, na, bha, ra, la, va, sta</i> |
| 3 |  | <i>cha, ja, tha, ḥha, da, na, ra, va, ṣa, kṣa</i> |
| 4 |  | <i>a, ka, kha, ga, ca, cha, ja, jā, ña, tsa, da, dha, ni, pa, bha, ya, ra, va, śa, ṣa, sa, kṣa</i> |
| 5 |  | <i>ka, kha, ga, ja, jā, ña, tha, dha, bha, mi, ya, ra, ṣa</i> |
| 6 |  | <i>ga, ḍa, bha</i> |
| 7 |  | <i>ga</i> |
| 8 |  | <i>pa</i> |

¹¹ This table is adapted from a template created by Andrew Glass: Glass 2000: 22 [table 1]. For a simplified list of foot marks, see Glass 2009: 80.

II.2.4. Analysis of Individual Character Forms

Table 3. Kharoṣṭhī script as written by British Library scribe 21¹²
Basic signs (see II.2.4.1)

| | <i>a</i> | <i>i</i> | <i>u</i> | <i>e</i> | <i>o</i> |
|------------|-----------------------|----------|-----------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Vowels | 3.14 | 93.29 | 44.21 | 78.19 | 2.34 |
| <i>k-</i> | 2.25 | 29.7 | 92.10 | 51A–B(v)+53A 5.19 | |
| <i>kh-</i> | 80.29 | | 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 4.6 | | |
| <i>g-</i> | 66.16 | | 41.7 | 51D(r) 5.9 | 19.26 |
| <i>gh-</i> | | | | | |
| <i>c-</i> | 2.24 | 38.15 | 128.23 | 85.28 | |
| <i>ch-</i> | 23.2 | 82.7 | | 66.26 | |
| <i>j-</i> | 43.26 | 65.10 | | | |
| <i>ḥ-</i> | 53.20 | | | | |
| <i>ñ-</i> | 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 4.8 | | | 18.2 | |
| <i>ṭ-</i> | | | | | |
| <i>ṭh-</i> | 91.22 | | | | |
| <i>ṭh-</i> | 78.15 | 53.6 | | | |
| <i>d-</i> | 69.20 | 20.16 | | | |

¹² This table is based on Glass 2000: table 4.

| | <i>a</i> | <i>i</i> | <i>u</i> | <i>e</i> | <i>o</i> |
|---------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------|----------|
| <i>dh-</i> | | | | | |
| <i>ñ-</i> | | | | | |
| <i>t-</i> | 𐌲 53.9 | 𐌲 7.13 | 𐌲 66.30 | 𐌲 66.12 | 𐌲 66.11 |
| <i>th-</i> | 𐌲 36.21 | 𐌲 123.18 | | 𐌲 51D(v) 5.7 | |
| <i>d-/d̄-</i> | 𐌲 60.16
𐌲 69.24 | 𐌲 15.18 | 𐌲 1.10 | 𐌲 51A-B(r) 2.6 | 𐌲 36.20 |
| <i>dh-</i> | 𐌲 50.20
𐌲 66.8 | | | | |
| <i>n-</i> | 𐌲 15.26 | 𐌲 53.18
𐌲 54.4 | 𐌲 66.5 | 𐌲 15.25 | 𐌲 69.12 |
| <i>p-</i> | 𐌲 27.10 | 𐌲 86.3 | 𐌲 17.8 | 𐌲 109.6 | |
| <i>ph-</i> | | | | | |
| <i>b-</i> | 𐌲 94.18 | | 𐌲 18.24 | | |
| <i>bh-</i> | 𐌲 132.13
𐌲 74.28
𐌲 73.17 | 𐌲 79.3 | 𐌲 88.11 | | 𐌲 65.25 |
| <i>m-</i> | 𐌲 3.3 | 𐌲 28.26 | 𐌲 51D(v) 5.22 | 𐌲 85.25 | 𐌲 36.16 |

| | <i>a</i> | <i>i</i> | <i>u</i> | <i>e</i> | <i>o</i> |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------|-------------------|
| <i>y-</i> | 𑂣 15.16 | 𑂤 80.20 | 𑂥 87.24 | 𑂦 69.17 | 𑂧 51A–B(r)
3.4 |
| <i>r-</i> | 𑂨 1.7 | 𑂩 63.9 | 𑂪 53.19 | 𑂫 2.26 | 𑂬 50.23 |
| <i>l-</i> | 𑂭 57.16 | 𑂮 41.19 | | 𑂯 58.10 | 𑂰 57.22 |
| <i>v-</i> | 𑂱 3.5 | 𑂲 51D(r) 2.19
𑂳 51D(r) 5.7 | 𑂴 51D(r) 1.9 | 𑂵 68.6 | 𑂶 74.16 |
| <i>ś-</i> | 𑂷 114.26 | 𑂸 51D(v) 6.11 | 𑂹 111.20 | 𑂺 133.24 | |
| <i>ṣ-</i> | 𑂻 76.7 | 𑂼 51D(v) 4.6 | 𑂽 102.10 | 𑂾 84.22 | 𑂿 51D(v) 4.3 |
| <i>s-</i> | 𑃀 82.21 | | 𑃁 2.28 | 𑃂 69.32 | 𑃃 59.7 |
| <i>ṣ-</i> | 𑃄 44.20 | 𑃅 66.28 | | | 𑃆 36.4 |
| <i>h-</i> | 𑃇 32.17
𑃈 83.5 | 𑃉 51A–B(r) 2.7 | | 𑃊 1.9 | 𑃋 34.12 |

Characters with Anusvāra/Pseudo-anusvāra (see II.2.4.2)

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>pa^m</i> 𑃌 28.20 | <i>pe^m</i> 𑃍 115.13 | <i>po^m</i> 𑃎 127.23 | <i>ma^m</i> 𑃏 120.15 | <i>ra^m</i> 𑃐 93.9 |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|

Conjunct Consonants (see II.2.4.3)

| | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| <i>kṣa</i> 𑃑 81.11 | <i>kṣi</i> 𑃒 115.9 | <i>khkṣa</i> 𑃓 60.15 | <i>gra</i> 𑃔 115.27 | <i>gri</i> 𑃕 46.20 |
| <i>tra</i> 𑃖 67.14 | <i>tre</i> 𑃗 87.20 | <i>tva</i> 𑃘 78.5 | <i>tve</i> 𑃙 84.14 | <i>tsa</i> 𑃚 46.22 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| <i>dri</i> 𑀢 102.24 | <i>dhva</i> 𑀣 70.3 | <i>pra</i> 𑀤 15.17 | <i>pro</i> 𑀥 36.6 | <i>bra</i> 𑀦 45.4 |
| <i>bro</i> 𑀧 28.25 | <i>rja</i> 𑀨 90.8 | <i>rta</i> 𑀩 12.20 | <i>rti</i> 𑀪 32.11 | <i>rtha</i> 𑀫 49.11 |
| <i>rthi</i> 𑀬 65.17 | <i>rya</i> 𑀭 62.32
𑀮 63.16 | <i>rye</i> 𑀯 36.26 | <i>rva</i> 𑀰 67.8
𑀱 68.9 | <i>rve</i> 𑀲 105.5 |
| <i>sti</i> 𑀳 82.18 | <i>smi</i> 𑀴 41.2 | <i>sva</i> 𑀵 100.15 | | |

Punctuation (see II.2.5)

| | |
|---------|---------|
| 𑀶 78.18 | 𑀷 66.24 |
|---------|---------|

II.2.4.1. Basic Signs

II.2.4.1.1 𑀸 *a*, 𑀹 *i*, 𑀺 *u*, 𑀻 *e*, 𑀼 *o*

The base character of all independent vowels is formed similarly in a single stroke from left to right with a curved top that is clearly distinguishable from *va*. It is usually written with a slanted, vertical stem that often curves near the bottom very slightly toward the left. The independent vowel *a* can be marked by a foot mark of types 2 or 4, but it also frequently simply tapers to a point or ends abruptly (type 0). The vowel *i* is usually written with two strokes, often with a type-2 foot mark that results from the movement of the pen from the character base toward the left end of the horizontal *i*-vowel diacritic, but it can also be written cursively in an almost continuous stroke connecting the base to the diacritic. The vowel *u* is formed with a closed loop extending from the base toward the left and then back to the vertical stem. The vowel *e* is usually written cursively in a single stroke from the character base, with the diacritic extending upward from the bottom along the vertical stroke and then curving toward the right and slightly downward. The vowel *o* is written with a separate stroke, beginning from the midpoint of the vertical stem and extending downward toward the left. Usually, in the case of the vowel *o*, the base character has no foot mark but simply comes to an abrupt end.

II.2.4.1.2. 𑀽 *ka*

The base character *k-* takes the earlier form in which the first stroke begins with a straight top, which then curves gently downward forming a vertical stem with a leftward slant, while the second stroke forms a partial loop added to the right and about midway down the first stroke. With all vowel diacritics except *u*, the vertical stem frequently ends with a type-4 foot mark, which, in two instances, is attenuated and followed by a dot forming a type-1 foot mark (II. 21.5, 62.7). In one case (I. 29.15), the right-hand loop is written in a cursive form as a complete circle that is connected

to the vertical stem. In a second, even more cursive example (l. 107.15), *ka* takes the later Kuṣāṇa form in which the first stroke comprises both the top curve and right loop and the second stroke begins within the top curve and is slanted downward toward the left. However, even in this more cursive example, the single, first stroke does not take the more developed form of a continuous curve or arc as found in SĀ-G^{SS}.¹³

II.2.4.1.3. *kha*

The top of the base character *kh-* is marked by a tight curve that begins in the middle of the arc and moves toward the right and upward, usually extending above the line of writing, although not as markedly as in the Khvs-G and Dhṛ-G^K.¹⁴ This single stroke then moves downward slightly toward the left, then back toward the right, and finally sharply toward the left, forming a tight, leftward-facing curve prior to the final tip of the character. Only *kha* and *khu* occur in our manuscript: *kha* can appear with foot marks of type 4 or 5, or with none at all; *khu* has no foot mark since the *u*-vowel diacritic is formed with a loop at the tip of the character.

II.2.4.1.4. *ga*

Although the form of the base character *g-* is generally consistent throughout this manuscript, it appears with a wide range of foot marks. It is usually written with one stroke that begins above the remainder of the character at the upper left, curves down and then horizontally toward the right and then upward and back toward the left forming an open loop from which it descends at an angle slightly toward the left forming the vertical stem. The characters *ga*, *ge*, and *go* can end with a foot mark of types 2, 4, 5, 6, or 7, and *go* occurs twice without a foot mark (ll. 62.34, 63.18). A type-2 foot mark (l. 103.27) turns up toward the left at the base of the vertical stem, and type 4 (l. 44.11) turns up toward the left and then downward, ending in a hook open to the left. The type-6 foot mark, consisting of a horizontal stroke toward the right, can be straight (51D(r) l. 4.16; l. 19.25), resulting in possible confusion with the postconsonantal *r*, or curved downward (l. 2.7). The most common foot mark is type 7, a horizontal stroke centered at the base of the vertical stem, which, like a type-6 foot mark, can be either straight (l. 20.9) or curved (l. 19.16).

II.2.4.1.5. *ca*

The base character *c-* takes the continuous form typically found in the BL manuscripts. The single stroke begins at the top left, moves downward and up to the top right in a v-shaped stroke, and then curves downward toward the left with a bend to the right and back toward the left just prior to the base of the stem. In at least one case (*ce*, l. 85.30), the top appears to be written with two strokes, the first from the top left to the bottom of the “v,” and the second upward to the top right. With the exception of *cu*, which never has a foot mark, the base character *c-* virtually always ends with a foot mark of type 4, regardless of the vowel with which it is written. In one case (l. 2.24), this type-4 foot mark is attenuated, ending in a dot as a foot mark of type 1. The character *cu* appears

¹³ Glass 2007: 95 [§ 4.5.2.2].

¹⁴ Brown 1965: 57 [§ 3]; Salomon 2000: 63–64 [§ I.5.5.2.2].

to be more prone to cursivization and often occurs with a gently curved rather than v-shaped top (ll. 128.23, 126.28, 114.18; con. l. 14.4).

II.2.4.1.6.  *cha*

The base character *ch-* is formed with three strokes: an initial continuous, upward-facing, semicircular top, a second slightly curved vertical stem extending from the midpoint of this semicircular top, and a third distinctly curved, downward-facing crossbar that intersects the vertical stem just underneath the semicircular top.¹⁵ The characters *cha*, *chi*, and *che* can occur either with a type-3 foot mark (l. 66.26), which extends straight toward the left from the base of the stem, or type 4 (ll. 81.28, 82.7), which is marked by a slight hook open to the left.

II.2.4.1.7.  *ja*

The base character *j-* takes the older Kharoṣṭhī form in two strokes, with a short, first stroke written from the top left downward toward the right, and a second continuous stroke written from the top right meeting the bottom of the first stroke to form a “v” and extending downward, often ending with a bend toward the right prior to the base of the stem. The characters *ja* and *ji* can appear with various foot marks, most frequently with type 3, a horizontal stroke toward the left (ll. 41.14, 43.26), but also with type 2, a short stroke upward to the left (l. 92.20), and type 5, a hook toward the left that is open toward the right (l. 53.27).

II.2.4.1.8.  *ḥa*

As in the case of several other BL manuscripts, BL scribe 21 uses the base character *j-* marked by a horizontal superscript stroke to represent MIA *jh-* as found in the following examples: *nirūḥadi* (P *nirujjhati*, Skt *nirudhyate*: l. 53.20); *ḥana* (P *jhāna*, Skt *dhyāna*: ll. 55.17, 56.14); and *aḥatva* (P *ajjhatta*, Skt *adhyātma*; l. 81.25).¹⁶ However, in three other occurrences, P *nirujjhati* = Skt *nirudhyate* appears as *nirujadi* without the horizontal superscript (ll. 53.27, 53.34, 54.15). The character *ḥa* can occur with foot marks of type 4 (ll. 56.14, 81.26) or type 5 (l. 53.20).

II.2.4.1.9.  *ña*

The base character *ñ-* is written with two strokes. The first stroke begins from the upper right and makes a series of sharp curves, initially toward the left, back to the right, and then back toward the left and upward, and finally meeting the vertical stem. This vertical stem begins from a point higher than the tip of the curved right-hand stroke and extends downward slanting gently toward the left. In most of the examples of *ñ-* in this manuscript, the lower portion of the character is obscured, but where visible, it occurs with type-4 (l. 93.17) or type-5 (l. 50.29) foot marks. It is found only with the *e*-vowel diacritic, which descends toward the left into the head of the character (l. 18.2).

In one case, the character *ña* occurs with what might be a horizontal hatch mark across, or two dots on either side of, the lower portion of the vertical stroke (l. 111.2). However, this mark is faint

¹⁵ Glass 2000: 63 [§ 2.7].

¹⁶ Salomon 2000: 65 [§ I.5.5.2.8], 778 [§ I.5.9.5]; Glass 2000: 65–66 [§ 2.8.1].

in both the digital color and infrared images, and it does not appear in any other example of the base character *ñ-*.

II.2.4.1.10.  *tha*

The base character *th-* appears in the two-stroke form used in all periods of Kharoṣṭhī. The first stroke includes the horizontal top from left to right extending downward to become the vertical stem, and the second stroke is a horizontal arm that meets the vertical stem from the left side. In this manuscript, it is found only three times in the word *ṣeṭha* = *ṣaṣṭha* (ll.84.25, 89.3, 91.22). *tha* can appear with a type-2 foot mark.

II.2.4.1.11.  *tha*

The modified character *ṭh-*, with an upward, vertical extension of the left arm, occurs more frequently, representing the correspondent to *ṣṭh-* once in the word *ṣaṭha* = *ṣaṣṭha* (l. 53.3 in the compound *ṣaṭhai(ṣṭa)na-ṭhida* = *ṣaṣṭhāya(ṣṭa)na-sṭhitam*), *ṣṭ-* once in *aṭhanan* = *aṣṭānām* (51xxx), and elsewhere, *sṭh-* (ll. 30.12, 30.17, 30.23, 53.3, 78.15, 79.12, 80.8).¹⁷ *ṭha* can appear with a type-2 foot mark, and *ṭha* and *ṭhi* can also appear with a type-3 foot mark.

II.2.4.1.12.  *da*

In contrast to the two-stroke form common in inscriptions, the base character *d-* is written with a single stroke that includes both the left arm and the vertical stem. The left arm is rounded forming a semicircular top portion that is easily distinguishable from *j-*. In all cases where the base of the vertical stem is preserved, both *da* and *ḍi* appear with a foot mark of type 6, which is usually straight but in at least one instance, curves downward (l. 89.10).

II.2.4.1.13.  *ta*

The base character *t-* takes the regular single-stroke form, with a prominent top left portion that begins above the remainder of the character, and a usually rounded or at times slightly pointed right shoulder. The base character *t-* occurs with all vowel diacritics and, when written with all vowels other than *i*, is usually distinguishable from *d-*. However, in at least four cases *ta* is vertically shortened or horizontally narrowed so that it resembles a *da* (ll. 3.19, 8.12, 10.12, 28.7), and in one case it is rounded like *ta* yet aligned vertically like *da* (l. 4.17).

When either the base character *t-* or *d-* appears with the vowel *i*, the resulting characters *ti* and *ḍi* are virtually indistinguishable except when *ti* appears with a preconsonantal *r* (ll. 32.11, 33.2, 34.7). In only three cases in which a *ti* is etymologically expected and appears alone, the character *ti* takes a slightly broader and more rounded form (ll. 7.13, 96.12, 129.2). However, the scribe also occasionally writes an etymologically expected *ḍi* with this broader and more rounded form (ll. 7.14, 47.15, 65.26, 66.23).

With all vowels other than *u*, the base character *t-* can occur either without a foot mark or with a foot mark of type 2, a short stroke that rises toward the left from the base of the vertical stem.

¹⁷ Brough 1962: 75–77 [§§ 18a, 18b].

II.2.4.1.14.  *tha*

The base character *th-* takes the typical two-stroke form with a slightly slanted vertical stem and a straight horizontal crossbar. Most often, it appears with a type-3 foot mark, a relatively straight horizontal stroke extending toward the left from the base of the vertical stem (ll. 122.27, 123.18). In two cases the type-3 foot mark is preceded by a slight curve toward the right near the bottom of the vertical stem (ll. 36.21, 75.18). The single instance of *the* (51D(v) l. 5.7) occurs with a type-5 foot mark, a hook open to the right formed by a stroke that moves slightly toward the left then back toward the right.

II.2.4.1.15.  *da* and  *da*

BL scribe 21 clearly distinguishes voiced dental unaspirated consonants with the vowel *a* in initial positions from those in intervocalic positions. In its four occurrences in initial position, the character *da* appears with the typical rounded, s-shaped form, and in the three occurrences where the bottom is visible, it takes a type-4 foot mark: *dajadi* (ll. 60.16, 60.27); and *dada_vo* (ll. 7.2, 31.1). For *da* in intervocalic position, the scribe consistently uses a modified character transcribed with an underbar as *da*, which takes a more angular, upright form and is marked at the base of the stem by an oblique stroke (*cauda*) that bends back toward the right and downward.

For *di*, *du*, and *do*, only one form of the base character is used in both initial and intervocalic positions. The characters *di* and *do* are rounded as in the case of initial *da* but do not appear with foot marks. The characters *du* and *de* have a more upright appearance resembling *da*, but neither appears with a foot mark. Finally, the character *de* takes a special form in which the *e*-vowel diacritic is not written as a separate oblique line at the top right but rather resembles a foot mark written as a continuation of the base character curving from the base of the stem back toward the right.¹⁸

II.2.4.1.16.  *dha*

The base character *dh-* is written with a single stroke that has a gently curved shape throughout. It begins from the top left, moves toward the right with either a relatively straight or slightly curved top, extends downward toward the left, then back toward the right, and finally bends again toward the left. Only the syllabic form *dha* is found and occurs most frequently with a type-4 foot mark or no foot mark at all. In one case, *dha* appears with an attenuated type-4 foot mark, which ends with a dot (l. 43.17) forming a type-1 foot mark, and in one case with a foot mark resembling type 5 (l. 66.8), which curves back from the left tip toward the right but without an angular hooked form.

II.2.4.1.17.  *na*

BL scribe 21 uses only the base character *n-* for both original dental and original retroflex nasals. Written with a single stroke, the character begins with a tight, rightward-facing curve that becomes a straight or slightly curved vertical stem slanting toward the left. The character *na* occurs with a type-2 or type-3 foot mark or without a foot mark. In the case of *ni*, if the *i*-vowel diacritic is written

¹⁸ The special ligature *de* occurs in other Gāndhārī manuscripts such as Nird-G^{L2} as well as in the Niya documents (Glass 2000: 79 [§ 2.18]).

with a separate, horizontal stroke from left to right, the base character occurs with a type-2 or type-4 foot mark or none at all. However, *ni* can also be written cursorily with the *i*-vowel diacritic beginning from the bottom tip of the base character and extending in a large curve upward toward the left and across the vertical stem from left to right. The character *ne* is also written cursorily in a single stroke with the *e*-vowel diacritic extending upward from the base of the vertical stem and curving toward the right and downward. The character *no* occurs either with a type-2 foot mark or none at all.

II.2.4.1.18.  *pa*

As usual in Kharoṣṭhī, the base character *p-* is written with two strokes: the first, a leftward-slanted, straight vertical stem, and the second, a right-hand, open loop that begins near the middle of the vertical stem. In five occurrences, the base character *p-* appears in a more cursive form in which the right-hand loop is connected to the stem, forming a circle (51D(r) l. 3.5; ll. 60.11, 122.8, 125.14, 128.14). Most often, *pa* is written with a pseudo-anusvāra foot mark, but it also frequently appears without a foot mark, especially in its more cursive form, perhaps as a result of having been written quickly. In the six clear occurrences of *pi*, the base character *p-* appears with a type-4 foot mark. Among the five occurrences of the character *pe*, two appear with a pseudo-anusvāra (ll. 115.13, 117.3), and two take an irregularly compressed or expanded form, perhaps resulting from correction, appearing with a type-4 foot mark (ll. 99.29, 109.6). In the final example of *pe* (l. 118.11), the bottom of the character is obscured. The character *po*, which occurs four times, always appears with a pseudo-anusvāra and a type-4 foot mark.

II.2.4.1.19.  *ba*

The base character *b-*, with its markedly curved, horizontally aligned, s-shaped top and more vertical, slightly slanted, stem, is clearly distinguishable from both *r-* and *t-*. In all cases the top left portion of the top extends only slightly above the rest of the character, but one instance of *ba* (l. 93.10) displays greater cursivization with a less curved and more extended horizontal top. Three of the four occurrences of *ba* are written without a foot mark and simply taper to a point. The fourth occurrence (l. 93.10) appears with a type-1 foot mark represented by a dot separated from the base of the vertical stroke. The single occurrence of *bu* bears the typical horizontally aligned s-shaped top.

II.2.4.1.20.  *bha*

For the base character *bh-*, BL scribe 21 consistently uses a “butterfly”-shaped form written with two strokes.¹⁹ The first stroke begins from the left tip of the top, extends horizontally to the middle of the top, and then descends with a leftward slant to form the left leg; the second stroke begins from the right tip of the top, meets the first stroke in the middle of the top, descends sharply toward the right, and then curves toward the left forming the right-hand loop. Most often, the top takes the form of an upward-facing “v,” but in some occurrences, even though the character is still written in the same way, the top appears as a gently curved or even a virtually straight line (e.g., ll. 74.1, 74.28, 132.13). The left leg of *bha*, *bhi*, and *bho* can be written with a foot mark, most often of

¹⁹ Glass 2009: 82–83.

type 4 but occasionally of type 2. One instance of *bha* (l. 73.17) occurs with a type-6 foot mark, a straight, horizontal stroke extending from the base of the left leg toward the right, and one instance (l. 74.28), with type 5, a hook open to the right.

II.2.4.1.21.  *ma*

The base character *m-*, with all vowels except *u*, conforms to the common semicircular type found in all periods of Kharoṣṭhī, with an open center and arms of approximately equal height extending upward. Nonetheless, it shows considerable variety in form. For example, it can appear with a higher right arm (l. 50.20) or a higher left arm (l. 33.9), with an inward bend in one (l. 13.9) or both arms (l. 2.30; however, this may be the result of the rough surface bark), with a stroke extending downward from the right arm (ll. 32.21, 33.27), or even as a partially closed circle (l. 41.9). The right arm of the character *me* usually ends with a pronounced blob of ink, and in one occurrence (l. 49.13) it appears as a small, closed loop.

Even though the characters *ma*, *me*, and *mo*, which lack a downward vertical, cannot support a foot mark, a horizontally mirrored, downward-facing semicircle occurs eight times below *ma*. In three occurrences, an anusvāra is not expected and thus the semicircle should be construed as a pseudo-anusvāra foot mark: *upaḍa-dhama^m* = *utpādidharmaḥ* (l. 46.7); and *ma^mda* = *matam* (l. 19.6; 51jjjj l. 1.1).²⁰ The *i*-vowel diacritic in *mi* is often written with a type-5 foot mark formed with a hook open to the right and occurs once with a foot mark of type 1 (l. 73.30) in which an attenuated type-5 foot mark is followed by a dot.

II.2.4.1.22.  *ya*

Both the base characters *y-* and *ś-* are written with two strokes: the first stroke forms a horizontal top and right leg, and the second, the left leg. Both *y-* and *ś-* have a flat top, and often, a type-4 foot mark on the left leg. However, they can usually be distinguished by the angle of their flat top, which in the case of *y-* is slanted upward from left to right, and by an occasional inward bend in the middle of the right leg in the case of *y-*.

II.2.4.1.23.  *ra*

The base character *r-* is consistent throughout the manuscript with an angular hook at the top left, a straight, horizontal top, an angular shoulder at the top right, and usually a long, straight vertical stem slanted toward the left. The characters *ra*, *ri*, *re*, and *ro* often simply taper to a point but can occur with foot marks of type 2, 3, 4, or 5, or, in one case (l. 3.23), with a type-1 foot mark ending with a dot. In at least one clear case of the word *[a]raṃbana* (l. 93.9), *ra* occurs with an etymologically expected anusvāra. The *u*-vowel diacritic in *ru* curves in a relatively wide sweep toward the left but is usually left open at the top.

²⁰ Cf. Phonology § II.3.2.3.4 Clusters with Nasals; Morphology and Syntax § II.4.1.1.1.2 Nominative Singular Neuter.

II.2.4.1.24.  *la*

The base character *l-* is written with two strokes: the first, a curved left arm, which occasionally begins with a tight bend forming a loop open to the bottom or even to the right; and the second, a straight vertical slanted toward the left. Although the vertical stem usually simply tapers to a point, it can also terminate with a type-2 foot mark.

II.2.4.1.25.  *va*

Written with a single stroke from left to right, the base character *v-* has a horizontal or gently rounded top and a slightly curved vertical stem slanted toward the left. Occasionally, the curved vertical stem is marked by an inward bend that results in a wavy stroke (e.g., 51D(r) l. 5.17). Although its head may be relatively short, *va* can usually be clearly distinguished from the independent vowel *a*, whose head has a tighter and more pronounced curve. The base character *v-* appears with all vowel diacritics and can be written without a foot mark, but it is also frequently written with foot marks of type 2, 3, and 4. As in the case of *ru*, the *u*-vowel diacritic in *vu* is usually left open at the top.

II.2.4.1.26.  *śa*

Like *y-*, the base character *ś-* is written with two strokes and can also occur with a type-4 foot mark on the left leg. However, *ś-* can be distinguished from *y-* by its top, which is relatively horizontal in all cases except when combined with the vowel *e* in *śe*, when it can be curved (l. 129.11).

II.2.4.1.27.  *ṣa*

The base character *ṣ-* takes the regular two-stroke form with an initial, usually tightly curved top stroke and a second stroke slanted toward the left forming the vertical stem. The curved top stroke occasionally touches the vertical on either the right or left side. Whereas the character *ṣa* occurs frequently and is written with a type-5 or occasionally type-4 foot mark, *ṣi*, *ṣe*, and *ṣo* each occur only once and are found respectively with a foot mark of type 3 (*ṣi*, 51D(v) l. 4.6), type 4 (*ṣe*, l. 84.24), or without a foot mark (*ṣo*, 51D(v) l. 4.3).

II.2.4.1.28.  *sa*

BL scribe 21 uses the third type of the base character *s-* written in one stroke beginning at the upper left with a distinct head portion and continuing to form the stem, which descends from the lowest point of the head, curving first toward the left, then back markedly toward the right, and finally toward the left.²¹ This regular *s-* occurs frequently with the vowels *a* and *u*, several times with the vowels *o*, twice with *e*, but never with the vowel *i*. In the case of *sa*, *se*, and *so*, it regularly appears with a type-4 foot mark.

²¹ Glass 2000: 106 [§ 2.32].

II.2.4.1.29.  *śa*

This manuscript contains over 100 instances of the modified sibilant *ś-*, which has been transcribed with an underbar. In form, it resembles the regular sibilant *s-* but is marked at the base of the stem by an extra oblique stroke (cauda) extending back toward the right and downward. The base character *ś-* would not be expected to occur with the vowel *u*, whose formation at the base of the stem would preclude an additional stroke. It appears most frequently with the vowel *a*, three times with the vowel *i*, only once with the vowel *o*, but never with the vowel *e*.

In contrast to many other Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts, *ś-* is used in certain environments with a fair degree of etymological consistency.²² For example, among the approximately forty-five clear occurrences of the masculine or neuter genitive singular ending *-śya*, twenty-seven have the modified sibilant *śa*, and eighteen, the regular sibilant *sa*. Even more striking is the rendering of original intervocalic *-th-* or *-dh-*, which among approximately thirty clear occurrences are written with the modified sibilant *-ś-* in all but two cases of *-th-*. These two exceptions are *'kadha = katham* (l. 58.5), the only instance of this interrogative indeclinable, and a single instance of the relative indeclinable *yasa = yathā* (l. 77.21), which occurs five times elsewhere with the expected spelling *yāśa*. Similarly, the indeclinable *tathā* occurs six times, each time as *taśa* with the modified sibilant. In other environments, the use of the regular or modified sibilants appears to have little linguistic significance or etymological justification. In intervocalic environments other than the genitive singular ending *-śya* or original *-th-* or *-dh-*, whether in a word or termination, following a verbal prefix or within a compound, the two sibilants appear with relatively equal frequency, with twenty-two cases of the modified sibilant *-ś-* and eighteen cases of the regular sibilant *-s-*. For example, the modified sibilant *-ś-* occurs in finite verb forms in *brośi* (l. 139.10) and *icheaśi* (l. 66.28), following a verbal prefix in *upaśapana* (51C(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3.3; *anu[va]śapana* 51D(v) l. 3.4) and in *paḍiśavededi* (ll. 20.17, 35.22), following a privative prefix in *aśabhina* (l. 70.8) and *aśakhaḍa* (ll. 66.19, 80.28), and within a word in *-vaśa* (in the compound *bromi-cia-vaśa* (ll. 34.19, 36.4, 38.18, 45.9, 65.24; *a-bromi-cia-vaśa* l. 39.29). The regular sibilant *-s-* occurs following a privative prefix in the various forms of the participle *asata-* (l. 71.21, *passim*), following a verbal prefix in *abhisamedi* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 5.16), and at the beginning of the following member of a compound in *arya-saca* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 2.4; ll.85.28, 90.1, 9.171, 120.18). However, there is a noteworthy distinction in the distribution of *-s-* and *-ś-* in initial position; the modified sibilant *-ś-* occurs only five times in initial position in contrast to approximately 100 clear occurrences of the regular sibilant *-s-*.

II.2.4.1.30.  and  *ha*

The base character *h-* takes the regular single-stroke form, with a tightly curved top that descends slanting slightly toward the left and then bends toward the right forming the horizontal bottom stroke. In all cases the vertical descender transitions to the bottom horizontal at a sharp angle, and it is possible that the scribe stopped or even lifted his pen before writing the bottom stroke. In fact,

²² Brough 1962: 67–70 [§ 13]; Glass 2000: 107–109 [§ 2.32.1]; Salomon 2000: 70 [§ I.5.5.2.33], 75–76 [§ I.5.9.2].

in three occurrences of the character *ha*, the bottom horizontal is clearly written as a separate stroke extending on both sides of the base of the vertical stem: in *arahadabhava* (l. 74.26); and in *ahasu* (l. 83.5; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6.6). Although the leftward extension of the bottom stroke might be taken as the *o*-vowel diacritic as in the character *ho*, the reading in each case is clearly *ha*. Further, in the single occurrence of the character *ho* in this manuscript (l. 34.12), the *o*-vowel diacritic meets the bottom horizontal of the base character forming an obtuse, oblique angle, not a straight line.

II.2.4.2. Characters with Anusvāra

As is true of many Kharoṣṭhī scribes, BL scribe 21 generally does not write anusvāra where it is etymologically expected. In fact, an anusvāra-like foot mark (type 8) occurs with only three characters: over seventy times with the base character *p*- with the vowels *a*, *e*, and *o*; eight times with *ma*; and twice with *ra*. In almost all cases this should be viewed as a simple foot mark or pseudo-anusvāra. For example, among the approximately forty-eight occurrences of the OIA past passive participle form *-panna*, the form *pana* containing an anusvāra is found twenty times in contrast to twenty-eight instances of *pana* without an anusvāra.

Even though all anusvāra-like foot marks could be viewed as pseudo-anusvāras reflecting scribal habit, in fifteen cases they appear where an anusvāra is either morphologically or etymologically expected. Two of these occur in the indeclinable form *amaṃ* = *ām* (ind.: 51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]; l. 10.9). Six are found in inflectional endings: nominative singular neuter—*akamaṃ* = *akarma* (l. 3.16), *apaṃ* = *alpam* (l. 25.19), *paṃcamaṃ* = *pañcamam* (l. 120.15), *rupoṃ* = *rūpam* (ll. 127.15, 128.14); and accusative singular neuter—*rupoṃ* = *rūpam* (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4.15). And seven occur in the stem of a word: *araṃbana* = *ālambana* (ll. 93.9, 94.17; con. *arabane*: 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 3.21, 4.4); *[e]k(*a)[-m-aṃśa]* = *ekāṃśaḥ* (l. 25.7); and *paṃcama* = *pañcama* (ll. 85.24, 89.29, 91.12, 120.13).

II.2.4.3. Conjunct Consonants

II.2.4.3.1. *kṣa*

The special character for the conjunct *kṣ*-, which occurs with the vowels *a* and *i*, takes the typical form written in two strokes with a semicircular top and a vertical stem descending from the midpoint of the upper stroke. Where the base of the vertical stem is visible, *kṣ*- bears a type-1, type-3, or type-4 foot mark.

II.2.4.3.2. *khkṣa*

This manuscript contains one possible example of the conjunct consonant *khkṣa* (l. 60.15) in the compound *[he]m[u]khkṣa* = Skt **hemokhāyām* (P **hemokkhāya*). It is formed by combining the complete forms of the independent consonants vertically into a single character, here with a superscript but smaller character *kha* written over the character *kṣa*.²³ The exact phonetic equivalent of this conjunct is uncertain, but it appears to correspond to the OIA consonant conjunct *kṣa*.²⁴

²³ Text Notes: [60] *[he]m[u]khkṣa*.

²⁴ Brough 1962: 72–73 [§ 16], 73 [nts. 1–2]; Hirayama frag. 25 A 2.10; Salomon 2016: 372.

II.2.4.3.3.  *tsa*

The conjunct consonant *tsa* occurs twice in the same word *latsadi* = P *lacchati* (Il. 45.10, 46.22), the third-person singular future form of the root *labh*. The conjunct in this text represents the later form that combines *t-* at the top and *sa* at the bottom, with a stem descending from the midpoint. As a result, this conjunct resembles the conjunct *t- + śa*.²⁵ Here, the stem descends at a slant toward the left and is marked at the bottom by a short hook toward the right, resembling a type-4 foot mark.

II.2.4.3.4.  *sti*

The conjunct *sta* occurs in the character *sti* and is represented by the special character that appears in all periods of Kharoṣṭhī and is formed from two strokes: the first, a stroke that extends horizontally from the top left toward the right and then curves gently before descending downward; and the second, a horizontal stroke across the middle of the vertical stem. It is frequently written with a type-2 foot mark.

II.2.4.3.5.  *smi*

The combined character *smi* occurs twice and is written with a complete base character *s-*, marked by an *i*-vowel diacritic, both inserted within a complete base character *m-* at the bottom.

II.2.4.3.6. Preconsonantal *r*:  *rja*, *rta*, *rtha*, *rya*, *rva*

Preconsonantal *r* is found with the base characters *j-*, *t-*, *th-*, *y-*, and *v-*, which occur with the vowels *a*, *i*, and *e*. It is written in the form common from the period of the BL manuscripts onward with a stroke that begins at the bottom tip of the vertical stem of the base character, curves up toward the left, back toward the right intersecting the stem, and then downward and back toward the left. In some cases the loop formed at the base of the vertical stem is attenuated forming a simple hook toward the right.²⁶

II.2.4.3.7. Postconsonantal *r*:  *gra*, *tra*, *dri*, *pra*, *bra*

As is typical of all periods of Kharoṣṭhī, in this manuscript also postconsonantal *r* is indicated by a horizontal stroke toward the right at the bottom tip of the vertical stem of the base character. It occurs with the base characters *g-*, *t-*, *d-*, *p-*, and *b-* and the vowels *a*, *i*, *e*, and *o*. The stroke indicating the postconsonantal *r* varies in its curvature and in the angle at which it meets the stem, but it is relatively short in all cases.

II.2.4.3.8. Postconsonantal *v*:  *tva*, *dhva*, *sva*

Postconsonantal *v* is marked by a sweeping stroke that curves upward and toward the right from the bottom tip of the base character. It occurs with *t-*, in one case marked by the vowel diacritic *e*,

²⁵ See Glass 2000: 130–131 [§ 3.3.10]; Brough 1962: 73–74 [§ 17]. Email communication from Stefan Baums, April 26, 2018.

²⁶ Glass 2000: 122 [§ 3.2.2].

with *dh-*, and with *s-*. Although in the case of *t-*, the curved stroke extends upward to the top of the base character, with *dh-* and *s-*, it is confined to the bottom of the character and can be distinguished from a postconsonantal *r* by its curvature.

II.2.5. Punctuation and Marginal Marks

BL scribe 21 uses two different punctuation marks: a small single dot (•) and a larger cluster of dots (❁), both usually centered vertically within the line. The small single dot is used consistently both to separate clauses or complete sentences and to mark short formulaic patterns or occasionally lists. Clauses marked by exegetical operators, common in scholastic texts, are regularly set off by a small punctuation mark: for example, “it should be asked” (*prochiḍava = praṣṭavyam*), “if” (*yadi/yidi = yadi*), “then” or “therefore” (*tena = tena*), “with regard to that it should be said” (*tatra vatava = tatra vaktavyam*), “or else” (*aśa = atha*), “surely” (*nanu = nanu*), “in this way” (*eva = evam*), and the quotative particle *di = iti*. It is also found marking short, formulaic patterns as in the following passage: *aha vatava jive asti • bhudatve asti • pugale asti • seṭṭha (*kadha asti) • t(*r)e- <*ḍaśa) ayadana asti • ekunaviśadi dhadu asti • paṃcame aryasace (*asti)* (“[If] one states, [o] ‘(*That which exists) is everything,’ [P] it should be said that a soul exists, creaturehood exists, a person exists, a sixth (*aggregate) exists, a thirteenth sense sphere exists, a nineteenth element exists, and a fifth noble truth (*exists),” ll. 84–86 and following).²⁷ In at least one case, this single dot demarcates items in a simple list: *(*ekasa dhama)ś(*a) t(*ra)ya bhava asti • adiḍabhava ca • anagaḍabhavo ca pacup(*a)nabhavo ca • “(*One factor) possesses three ‘natures:’ a past ‘nature,’ a future ‘nature,’ and a present ‘nature’” ll. 126–127).*

The larger punctuation mark consisting of a cluster of dots appears three times (ll. 3.18, 28.27, 66.24). In one location (l. 3.18), which coincides with a glue-line juncture, it appears to be extended with a line of dots along the top edge of the lower manuscript segment.²⁸ Given the scribe’s consistent use of the smaller single dot to separate clauses, one would expect these larger punctuation marks to have a specific function as well. It is unlikely that they distinguish divisions of the text on the basis of length since the final division is more than twice as long as the first two: twenty-five lines (ll. 3–28); thirty-eight lines (ll. 28–66); and seventy-five lines (ll. 66–141). A larger punctuation mark may have appeared at a comparable distance within this final longer division in the manuscript, for example, between line 90 and line 110, and may have been lost or obscured as a result of manuscript damage. However, no suitable location for a now missing larger punctuation mark can be identified. The left margin is generally preserved throughout the manuscript, and damaged areas within lines in this division of the text are not large enough to have contained a larger punctuation mark. And since it is doubtful that a line would begin with a larger punctuation mark, it would not have been lost in the damaged right margin.

As a second possibility, the larger punctuation marks might have been used to separate topical sections regardless of length. Indeed, in two of its three occurrences, the larger punctuation mark appears to coincide with a possible change in topic. The larger punctuation mark in line 3 might conclude the discussion that cites and presents an initial summary criticism of the opponent’s three

²⁷ For similar patterns, see ll. 66–69, 88–91, 107–115.

²⁸ Text Notes: [3] *akamaṃ di* ❁.

karma-related categories of existent factors, which begins in 51D(r) and continues through the now only partially preserved section of the manuscript prior to line 3.²⁹ In this discussion, the proponent first presents the opponent's view concerning the three categories (51D(r) ll. 3–4) and then offers a brief criticism of the first category (51D(r) ll. 4–6) and begins a criticism of the second (51D(r) ll. 6ff.). Presumably, the criticism of the second category was concluded and a brief criticism of the third category offered in the heavily damaged portion of the manuscript following 51D(r). It is then possible that the proponent concludes this initial presentation and brief criticism of the opponent's view in lines 1–3. The next passage from lines 3–28 contains a more in-depth criticism only of the opponent's third category of existent past factors with karmic efficacy. Even though this next passage treats the same general topic as the previous discussion, its demarcation as a separate section might be justified by the fact that the proponent focuses his discussion and offers more detailed arguments against only one of the opponent's three categories of existent factors.³⁰

However, the punctuation mark in line 28 presents a problem for the theory that the larger punctuation marks separate topical sections. The detailed criticism of the third category of existent past factors dominating the previous discussion (ll. 3–28) continues into this next passage (ll. 29–36, 51–61), which is then interspersed with criticisms of the existence of future factors (ll. 36–51, 62–66). Nonetheless, a structure of sorts can be observed among the various arguments that might justify grouping together the criticism of both past and future factors in a single and separate section. Specifically, the proponent first presents two parallel arguments against the existence of past factors (ll. 28–36) and then future factors (ll. 36–45), and next he offers three distinct arguments alternating between future factors (ll. 45–51, 62–66) and past factors (ll. 51–61).

The third larger punctuation mark in line 66 clearly separates sections treating different topics. Here, the proponent begins his presentation of the view of another opponent, the *mahasravastivāda*, who upholds the proposition “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*).³¹ After presenting the opponent's own view (ll. 66–82), the proponent offers both general criticisms of the opponent's proposition and specific criticisms of each of his following assertions. If the previous larger punctuation marks in lines 3 and 28 function to separate the initial presentation and summary criticism of an opponent's view from the proponent's detailed criticism, we might then expect a similar larger punctuation mark in lines 81–82. In fact, a larger punctuation mark might have appeared within the now missing three-syllable space at the beginning of line 82. However, given the limited quantity of preserved text, this theory that the larger punctuation marks separate distinct topical sections cannot be confirmed.

This manuscript contains one partially preserved set of marks in the right margin of line 28.³² These marginal marks consist of vertically aligned, v-shaped symbols, branching toward the right and left along a central vertical line. It is uncertain whether they were written by scribe 21 himself or by some later reader of the manuscript, but their correlation with the larger punctuation mark

²⁹ Commentary: General Criticism Opponent's Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3].

³⁰ Commentary: (1) Criticism Opponent's Third Category [ll. 3–7].

³¹ Commentary: Opponent's Fundamental Proposition And Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69].

³² Manuscript Notes: ll. 21–28. Text Notes: [27] *sañā voharovi[va]ga yaṣa ya⟨ṣa⟩* [28] *sa[rja]nadi taṣa taṣa voharadi*; [29] *prochidava*.

appearing at the end of line 28 raises the possibility that they served as a quick visual indicator of a section change. Indeed, such marginal marks coincide with punctuation marks designating the ends of sections in at least one scroll of another BL manuscript, namely the text written in BL fragments 7, 9, 13, and 18.³³ It is also possibly significant that in the case of our manuscript, a faint interlinear insertion, possibly an *a*, *e*, a numeral 10 with an unusually narrow top, or some other text marker, appears between lines 28 and 29 near these marginal marks. Since it almost certainly cannot be read here as a correction or text insertion, it might function to number or otherwise label the major section of the text beginning in line 29. Unfortunately, this interpretation of these margin marks and interlinear notation as indicating a section change cannot be corroborated since the right margin is not preserved in the case of any of the other larger punctuation mark, and they are not accompanied by interlinear notations. As a final interpretation, since scriptural citations appear in lines 25–28, it is possible that the margin marks, if not also the interlinear notation, do not signal a section change but instead are correlated with these scriptural citations. However, since no other quotations from sūtra appear in the text, this interpretation also cannot be confirmed.

II.2.6. Errors and Corrections

Like all scribes, BL scribe 21 made errors that were left uncorrected including writing incorrect base characters and vowel signs, adding, and omitting others, and in some cases aborting the writing of a character, which was then left incomplete. Such errors have been corrected in the reconstruction where possible on the basis of parallel passages or more often of context. Letters that are presumably incorrect have been corrected and enclosed in angle brackets in the reconstruction: *vivaga do* > *vivaga d<*>i* (l. 22.4); [*dudo*] → *du<*>ve* (l. 26.11); *upadiṣadi* → *upa<*>j*ṣadi (l. 45.24); *unupaḍa* → *<*>nupaḍa* (l. 47.33); *pa[cam]*. → *pa<*>d*am(**a*) (l. 56.12); *yi* → *<*>p*i (l. 77.22); *t.e*^{52B(r)+52qq}śaḍ. → > *t(<*>r)e<*>d*(<*>a)<*>śa (l. 85.4–5); *adiḍakaranena* ^{51H(v)+51yyy(v)}*anaga-*^{51H(v)}*ḍakaranena* → *adiḍa<*>g*ar{an}ena *anagaḍa<*>g*ara{na} (ll. 110.4, 110.13); *anagaḍakarena* *adiḍakare* → *anagaḍa<*>g*arena *adiḍa<*>g*are (ll. 110.24, 110.30); *trayaatva* → *trayaa<*>dh*va (l. 123.15); *japoṃ* → *<*>ru*pom (l. 127.14); *japo di* → *<*>ru*po di (l. 127.22); [*j*]. [*p*]. → *<*>ru*p(<*>o) (l. 129.18); [*o*]va → *<*>e*va (51oooo l. 2.8); and [*ye*]sti → *<*>na*sti (51D(v) l. 3.17). In four cases superfluous letters appear to have been mistakenly added by the scribe. These are indicated by curly brackets in the reconstruction and have been disregarded in the translation: *pro[ch]*. → {*proch*.} (l. 20.22–33); *aśagrahida* → {*a*}śagrahida (l. 69.27); and *adiḍakaranena* ^{51H(v)+51yyy(v)}*anaga-*^{51H(v)}*ḍakaranena* → *adiḍa<*>g*ar{an}ena *anagaḍa<*>g*ara{na} (ll. 110. 7, 110.15).

Omissions have been corrected through the insertion in the reconstruction of the probable letter enclosed within angle brackets: *anupurva* ^{53A+51B(v)}[*s*].^{51B(v)}[*m*]. [*ye*] → *anupurva<*>bhi*-s(<*>a)m(<*>a)ye (51A–B(v)+53A l. 4.20); (<*>a)/// ^{51F(r)}ida asti → (<*>a)ida<*>na asti (51C+51F(r) l. 3.12); *vivaga nivartiṣadi* → *vivaga <*>na* nivartiṣadi (l. 34.5); *ka[r]. [n]*. → *kar(<*>a)<*>ne*n(<*>a) (l. 46.28); *ṣaṭhaināḥida* → *ṣaṭhai<*>da*nāḥida (l. 53.5); [*p*]. [*d*]. [*jana*] → *p(<*>a)d*(<*>a)<*>ma jana (l. 55.17); *nanu [e]* → *nanu <*>d*e (l. 61.10); *adiḍa naga[d]*. → *adiḍa <*>a*nagaḍ(<*>a) (l. 74.9); *yata* → *ya<*>r*a (l. 128.8); and +/// ^{51D(v)}[*l*]. [*n*]. [*g*]. *do* → (<*>si)l(<*>a) <*>n(<*>a)g(<*>a)do (51D(v) l. 6.2). Finally, aborted letters, or letters left incomplete, are sometimes found at the ends of lines but

³³ Baums 2009: 3 [§ 1.1], 108–109 [§ 3.7].

more often between letters within a word: *paḍi?ñade* (l. 10.19); *a?sti* (l. 38.34); *upaṃjiśadi • ?* (l. 40.26); *niru ?* (l. 59.32); *sa?khaḍaṣa* (l. 81.6); and *a?yaḍana* (l. 96.6). Only one case of probable dittography has been tentatively identified: $|^{52m(r)}vata|^{52A(r)}va •$, line 47.1–3, which concludes a sentence that also begins with *vatava* and precedes a sentence that also begins with *vatava*.³⁴

In many cases the scribe has corrected his own errors either by simply writing the correct letter over the incorrect letter or by inserting omitted letters above or within the line. He never crosses out a letter or erases a letter with a smudge mark. Most of these corrections involve simple overwriting: *a* in $[a]viva$ (51D(r) l. 3.30); *sti* over a prior *ga* in *asti* (l. 8.10); *rta* in *nivartadi* (l. 20.12); $[k]$ over a prior *ga* in $[a]vi[v].[k].vivaga$ (l. 22.17); and *a* over a prior *ya* in $br[o]mici[a]vaṣa$ (l. 34.17); *va* over a prior *ga* in *pavagana* (l. 47.22); *d* in $[p].[d]. [jana]$ (l. 55.16); *g* and *d* in $[g].[d].[bh].[v]$ (l. 73.1–2); *na* over a prior *a* in *nasti* (l. 86.4); *pe* in *peyala* (l. 99.29); *yi* in $y[i]di$ (l. 122.1); *ya* in *paḍi[ya]nadi* (l. 122.10); *va* in $[va]tava$ (l. 122.15); *yi* in *yidi* (l. 123.8); and *ru* in *ruva* (l. 131.3). In only seven cases has the scribe corrected his own omission with the insertion of a smaller letter within or above the line: interlinear *ma* in *nama* (l. 2.17); marginal *ṣa* in *yaṣa* written in the left edge (l. 27.31); marginal *sti* in *a?sti* written at the left edge (l. 38.34); $[ha]$ inserted in *nastiḍa [ha] vatava* (l. 71.6); *ra* inserted in *parabhava* (l. 100.5); marginal *na* in *idriana* written at the left edge (l. 102.26); and $[da]$ inserted in $[ś]uṇa[da]garena$ (l. 111.3).

Finally, although attempts to identify the reason for any particular error are speculative at best, certain mistaken letters as well as blank spaces might be attributed to an unclear written archetype. Among the cases of incorrect letters listed previously, the following examples could reasonably result from difficulty in reading the archetype: reading *di* for *ji* in *upajiśa/śadi* (ll. 40.7, 64.29, 65.10); *ca* for *ḍa* in *paḍama* (ll. 55.15,³⁵ 56.12); *yi* for *pi* in *yasa yi* (l. 77.22); *tva* for *dhva* in *trayaatva* (l. 123.15); *ja* for *ru* in *japo* (ll. 127.14, 127.22, 129.18); and *ye* for *na* in *nasti* (51D(v) l. 3.17). There are also cases of blank spaces that cannot be explained on the basis of rough surface bark or other physical conditions of the manuscript and might signal omissions resulting from difficulty in reading a written archetype: between *pra* and *na* of *pranadivaḍa* (l. 2.13–14); between the punctuation mark and *paḍiṣavededi* (l. 20.14–15); six syllables at the beginning of 52(v) line 76; and between the punctuation mark and $cakhaḍa|^{52A(v)}na$ (l. 95.7–8).

II.2.7. Paleographic Dating

The following table compares sample test characters found in this manuscript (BL scribe 21) with the script of the EĀ-G (BL scribe 1), the Khvs-G (BL scribe 9) and BL fragments 16 + 25 (avadānas, BL scribe 2).³⁶ In the case of BL scribe 21, these test characters do not deviate significantly from the forms typical of those of other BL scribes whose manuscripts have been assigned to the likely date of the first half of the first century CE.³⁷

³⁴ Text Notes: $[47] |^{52m(r)}vata|^{52A(r)}va •$.

³⁵ Text Notes: $[55] yena [sa] kama[do p].[d]. [jana]$.

³⁶ Lenz 2003; Lenz 2010.

³⁷ Salomon 2000: 73–74 [§ I.5.8].

Table 4. Test characters for paleographic dating

| BL scribe | <i>ka</i> | <i>ca</i> | <i>cha</i> | <i>ya</i> | <i>sa</i> |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1 | 𑀓 | 𑀚 | 𑀛 | 𑀜 | 𑀝 |
| 2 | 𑀓 | 𑀚 | 𑀛 | 𑀜 | 𑀝 |
| 9 | 𑀓 | 𑀚 | 𑀛 | 𑀜 | 𑀝 |
| 21 | 𑀓 | 𑀚 | 𑀛 | 𑀜 | 𑀝 |

II.2.8. Orthography

Aside from the variation in word-final vowels common in Gāndhārī, BL scribe 21 is consistent in his spelling with only a handful of examples of a single word written in different forms. Certain examples represent attested phonological alternations: *upa-/uva-* = *upa-*; and *-ś-/-ṣ-* = *-ś-/-ṣ-* in the context of a following original *y* as in *avaśa/[ava]ṣiyo* = *avaśyam* and *-iśa-/-iṣa-* = *-iṣya-* in future *seṭ* forms from the same root as in *upajīśadi/upa[*j]iṣadi* and *ni[va]r[t](*i)śadi/nivartīśadi*. One example is probably the result of scribal confusion in a highly repetitive passage: *akara/agara* = *ākara*.³⁸ The vowel alternations in the remaining examples are more difficult to explain: *brami-/bromi-* = *brahma-* (the *o* vowel in the reading *bromi* is questionable);³⁹ and *yadi/yidi* = *yadi*.⁴⁰

The distribution of the dental consonants *t*, *d*, and *ḍ* and of the sibilants *s* and *ṣ* are treated under each character, and the scribe's use of the anusvāra is discussed above under Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.2 Characters with Anusvāra. BL scribe 21 uses the dental nasal exclusively and does not distinguish between retroflex nasal *ṇ* and dental nasal *n*. Since no word containing an original *gh* occurs in the manuscript, the absence of the aspirated, voiced consonant *gh* indicates nothing about the scribe's use of this voiced aspirate. However, the scribe uses the unaspirated, unvoiced labial *p* for both original *p* and aspirated *ph* appearing in both initial and medial position, notably in the word *pala* = *phala*. This may reflect the scribe's orthographic habit, or it may represent another example of the leveling of the aspirate/nonaspirate opposition, which has been noted elsewhere, particularly in the case of voiced aspirates.⁴¹

³⁸ Text Notes: [110] *adiḍakaranena* |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}*anaga*|^{51H(v)}*ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adidakare asti •*

³⁹ Text Notes: [34] *na hode br[o]mici[a]vaṣa*.

⁴⁰ For both forms *yadi* and *yidi*, see also BC 11 (v) 1.6.

⁴¹ Salomon 1999: 127–128 [§ 6.4.2]; Salomon 2008: 96–97 [§ III.2.2.2].

Among the diacritic additions to consonant signs, BL scribe 21 uses only the horizontal line placed above the character \bar{j} , which represents MIA $j(jh)$ corresponding to OIA dhy . This modified character \bar{j} occurs in all but two cases of original dhy : $a\bar{j}atva = adhy\bar{a}tmam$; $\bar{j}ana = dhy\bar{a}nam$; and $niru\bar{j}adi = nirudhyate$; con. $nirujadi$ [2x].

Finally, this manuscript contains two examples of the indirect notation of a geminate consonant through a preconsonantal r , in both cases representing the geminate $-jj-$ as the palatalized MIA form for conjuncts with y as the second member: $vivarjavada = vibhajyav\bar{a}d\bar{a}h$ (P $vibhajjav\bar{a}d\bar{a}$); and $sa[ma]varjadi = sam\bar{a}padyate$ (P $sam\bar{a}pajjati$).⁴² In one case, the preconsonantal r represents the cluster $-\bar{n}j-$: $sa[rja]nadi = sa\bar{n}j\bar{a}n\bar{a}ti$ (P $sa\bar{n}j\bar{a}n\bar{a}ti$).⁴³

⁴² Text Notes: [27] $sa\bar{n}a\ voharovi[va]ga\ ya\sa\ ya\langle\langle sa \rangle\rangle$ [28] $sa[rja]nadi\ ta\sa\ ta\sa\ voharadi$; [55] $sa[ma]-varjadi$ •; [90] $[ha]ta\ vivarjavada\ bho\sa$ •.

⁴³ Salomon 1999: 122–123 [§ 6.4.2]; Salomon 2000: 77–78 [§ I.5.9.4]; Lenz 2003: 63–64 [§ 6.2.8]; Salomon 2008: 97 [§ III.2.2.2].

Phonology

The phonology of the text preserved in BL 28 is similar to that of contemporaneous Gāndhārī manuscript texts and conforms to the middle-period Gāndhārī typical of the other texts in the BL collection.¹ The following discussion will present an overview of the general phonological characteristics of our text, highlighting the distinctive features that it displays. Additional discussions of the phonology of Gāndhārī manuscript texts can be found in previous volumes of the Gandhāran Buddhist Text series.²

As a convention throughout this chapter, a single number in parentheses indicates the total number of occurrences of a particular form, ending, and so forth. Numbers referring to lines will be clearly indicated as such. When only one example of a particular noun, adjective, or finite verb form occurs, the inflected form is cited; when multiple forms occur, one example is cited in the case of finite verbs, and the stem form in the case of nouns or adjectives. Unless otherwise indicated, when an equal sign is used to connect two related forms of a word, the first form is Gāndhārī, and the second, Sanskrit.

II.3.1. Vowels

Since the Kharoṣṭhī script used in this manuscript does not distinguish vowel length, both long and short simple vowels are represented by the basic Kharoṣṭhī characters *a*, *i*, and *u*. Further, since this text is written entirely in prose, meter provides no clues for vowel length, which can only be determined on etymological grounds. As a result, differences between the phonological treatment of long and short simple vowels have not been noted in the following discussion.

II.3.1.1. Changes Affecting Original *a*

This text contains numerous examples of the palatalization of *a*, which can become *i* or *e* under the influence of either a preceding or following palatal. Palatalization in an environment with *c* is found in both the words *[bra/bro]mi* and *cia* in the compound *[bra/bro]mi-cia-vaṣa* = *brahmācārya-vāsa*. In the first member *[bra/bro]mi*, the final vowel *a* of the original *brahma* becomes *i* under the influence of the following palatal *c*. The word *cia* is derived from the original *cārya* with possible elision of the cluster *-ry-* > *-y(y)-* > \emptyset and palatalization of *a* due to a preceding *c*.³

¹ Salomon 1999: 124–130 [§ 6.4]; Salomon 2000: 79.

² Salomon 2000; Allon 2001; Lenz 2003; Glass 2007; Salomon 2008; Lenz 2010; Schlosser 2022. See also Baums 2009.

³ Salomon 2008: 123 [§ II.3.2.2.3]; Brough 1962: 81 [§ 22a].

The change of original *ya* > *i* through palatalization of *a* and elision of *-y-* can also be observed in *aiḍana*, the compound-final form taken by *ayaḍana* = *āyatana*, before which the final vowel of the preceding member of the compound is usually elided: *cakh(u)-aiḍana* = *cakṣurāyatana*; *man(a)-aiḍanena* = *manaāyatanena*; *ruv(a)-aiḍana* = *rūpāyatana*; *[r](*)u[va]-cakh(u)-aiḍana* = *rūpacakṣurāyatanāni*; and *ṣaṭh(a)-aiḥ(*ḍa)na-ḥiḍa* = *ṣaṣṭhāya(*ta)na-sṭhitam* (con. *-para-aiḍana* = *parāyatana*, l. 106). A similar change *ya* > *e* can be observed in *same*, in the compound *same-praṣana* = *samyak-pradhānam*, as well as in the dative singular masculine and oblique feminine ending *-ae*: *ś(*a)m(*ae)* = *śamāya*; *⟨*a⟩nupaḍa(*e)* = *anutpādāya*; and *[metra]e* = *maitrāyāḥ*.

The contraction of medial *aya* > *e*, regular in Gāndhārī and in MIA generally, occurs in denominative and causative verb forms such as *abhisamedi* = *abhisamayati*, *dharedi* = *dhārayati*, *bhavedi* = *bhāvayati*, and *paḍiṣavededi* = *pratiṣamvedayati*. Accordingly, the word *tre* = *trayo*, which occurs regularly in the compound *tre-ḍaśa* = *trayo-daśa* (4), might also result from the contraction of medial *aya* > *e*. In the case of the change *theraśa* = *sthavirasya*, the original sequence *avi* appears to have been reduced to *e*. However, the Gāndhārī word *thera* could also represent a form of this common Buddhist term as inherited from the MIA source dialect, without undergoing the phonological changes expected in Gāndhārī.⁴ The apparent change *a* > *e* in *ṣeṭha* (P *chaṭṭho*, Skt *ṣaṣṭhaḥ*) remains unexplained: *ṣe[ṭha]*, l. 84; *ṣ[e]ṭha*, l. 89; and *ṣ[e]ṭha*, l. 91 (con. *ṣaṭh(a)-aiḥ(*ḍa)na-ḥiḍa*, l. 53).⁵

Labialization of vowels also occurs in a labial environment, for example, in the case of the simple change *a* > *u* or *o* before or after *m*, *a* > *o* with a preceding *p*, *a* > *o* with a following *v*, or the contraction of medial *ava* > *o*. The influence of a preceding *m* can be observed in the change *a* > *u* in *samunagada* = *samanvāgata*, and *samunag[a]mo* = *samanvāgamaḥ* in the compound *anagad(*a)-samunag[a]mo* = *anāgata-samanvāgamaḥ*.⁶ The influence of a following *m* is evident in the compound *[bra/bro]mi-cia-vaśa* = *brahma-carya-vāsa*. In two of six occurrences (ll. 38, 45), the reading *brami* is clear, but in the remaining four occurrences (ll. 34, 35–36, 39, 65), the medial vowel appears to be *o* rather than *a*, yielding *bromi* = *brahma*, which could represent the change *a* > *o* as influenced by the following labial *m*. In the gerundive *prochidava* = *praṣṭavya* (P *pucchitabbam*) and the apparent preterite finite form *prochi* = *aprākṣīt* (P *pucchi/apucchi*), the change from *a* > *o* suggests the influence of labialization resulting from the preceding *p* despite the intervening *r*. Similar labialization from *a* > *o* following *pr-* is attested in the Gāndhārī Niya documents, which contain numerous examples of the gerundive forms *prochidavo* (12) and *pruchidavo* (3).⁷ The change *a* > *o* with a preceding or following *v* can be observed in the passive form of *pra* + *√vac*, *provucadi* = *procyate* and in forms of the root *brū*, such as *bromi* = *bravīmi* and *broṣi* = *bravīṣi*.

The reduction of medial *ava* > *u* or *o* is found in *samuśana* = *samavadhānam* and in forms of the root *bhū*, such as *bhodi* = *bhavati*, *bhoṣa* = *bhavatha*, and *hode* = *bhavet*. In the case of *voharadi* = *vyavaharati* and *voharo* = *vyavahāra* in the compound *voharo-vi[va]ga* = *vyavahāra-*

⁴ Salomon 2008: 103 [§ II.3.1.1].

⁵ Text Notes: [84] *ṣe[ṭha]*; [89] + /// ^{52A(v)}*[st]i ṣ[e]ṭha*; [91] *ṣ[e]ṭha*.

⁶ Fussman 1989: 469–470 [§ 29.2].

⁷ GD s.v. *puchidava*.

vipākā, the original initial cluster *vy-* becomes *v-*, and *ava* is reduced to *o*. The word *doṣa* = *dveṣa*, in the compound *a[di]ḍa-raga-doṣa-moha* = *atīta-rāga-dveṣa-mohāḥ*, presents a problematic case in which *ve* appears to be reduced to *o*.⁸

II.3.1.2. Changes Affecting Original *ā*, *i*, *e*, *ai*, *u*, and *o*

This text contains one example of *ā* represented by *e*: *sarvevadu* = *sarvāvat*. A change from original *i* > *a* is found in the case of the indefinite interrogative *kica* = *kiṃcit*, which appears in seventeen occurrences as opposed to five for the form *kici*. A similar change occurs in *upaḍa* = *utpādi* and *anupaḍa* = *anutpādi* as prior members of a compound.⁹ However, this change from *i* > *a* in both *kica* and *upaḍa/anupaḍa* might also be explained as a result of the tendency toward the neutralization of final vowels in Gāndhārī. An etymologically expected *i* appears as *e* in *[nera]a* = *niraya* and possibly also in the locative singular present participle *sate* = *sati* (Morphology and Syntax § II.4.4.8.1 Present Participles). In two words, original *e* appears as *i*: *ukṣividav[u]* = *utkṣeptavyam*; and *ikaṣa* = *ekasya*.

As elsewhere in Gāndhārī and MIA generally, the MIA original complex vowel *ai* regularly appears as *e*: *neraiya* = *nairayika* (ll. 42, 99, 103); *[metra]e* = *maitrāyāḥ* and *me[t](*)[a]* = *maitrā* (l. 25 [2x]); and *veśia* = *vaiśya/vaiśyika/vaiśika* (l. 74, in the compound *veśia-bhavo* = *vaiśya/vaiśyika/vaiśika-bhāvāḥ*). This change *ai* > *e* also occurs in the dative singular feminine ending *-ae* with usual elision of the intervocalic *-y-*: *parinipanaḥḍae* = **pariniṣpannasthatāyai* (ll. 78, 79 con. *[p](*)[rinipana]ḥḍaye* = **pariniṣpannasthatāyai*, l. 80 where *-y-* is not elided); and *anagaḍae* = *anāgatāyai* (51A–B(r) ll. 4, 5). In the case of *traya* = *traiya* in the compound *traya-adhva* = *triyadhvāḥ/traiyadhvikāḥ* (ll. 70, 123), the etymologically expected *e* < *ai* is represented by *a*.

In Gāndhārī and MIA alternation of *u* and *o* is common.¹⁰ However, in this text, only one example of *u* > *o* occurs: *so* = P *su* (Skt *svid*, ll. 55, 57). Original *o* appears as *u* in *ekuna* = *ekona* (P *ekūna*) in the compound *ekuna-viśadi* = *ekona-viṃśatiḥ*. However, this is perhaps better understood as a result of elision of the final vowel of the prior member at a compound juncture, in this case *ek(a)-una*, a sandhi phenomenon attested elsewhere in this text and in MIA generally (Morphology and Syntax § II.4.1.4 Nominal Compounds; Phonology § II.3.5.1 Vowel Sandhi).

II.3.1.3. Developments of OIA *r̥*

Reflexes of OIA syllabic *r̥* include *a*, *ri*, *ra*, *ro*, and *ur*. Since each of these reflexes, with the exception of *a*, is represented by only one word, the data are not sufficient to discern significant patterns. OIA syllabic *r̥* appears as *a* in *sakhaḍa* = *samskṛta*, in *aśakhaḍa* = *asamskṛta*, both independently and in the compound *adiḍanagaḍa-[p](*)[acup](*)[n](*)[s](*)[kh](*)[ḍ](*)* = *atīta-anāgata-pratyutpanna-asamskṛtāḥ*, and in *s(*ad)[i]* = *smṛti* (P *sati*) in the compound *k(*a)y(*a)-s(*ad)[i]* = *kaya-smṛtiḥ*. The reflex *ri* is found only in *grihi* = *grhi* in the compound *grihi-bhava* = *grhi-bhāva*. Syllabic *r̥* is represented by *ra* in *śagrahiḍa* = *saṃgrhīta*, both independently and in the compound

⁸ Geiger 1994: 18 [§ 25.3]; von Hinüber 2001: 132 [§ 134].

⁹ Text Notes: [3] + /// ^[51D(n)][ś].[k]. *ca u[pa]ḍadhama anu[pa]ḍadhama kato •*.

¹⁰ Allon 2001: 76 [§ 5.1.8]; Salomon 2008: 104–105 [§ II.3.1.4].

duaḍaśa-[a]yaḍa[n]a-[sag]()rahiḍa* = *dvādaśa-ayatana-saṃgrhītam*. Alternatively, the *ra* in *sagrahiḍa* might also have been derived analogically from forms such as Skt future *grahīṣyati*.

The final two reflexes *ro* and *ur*, containing the labial vowels *o* and *u*, occur after labials and hence may suggest a pattern of labialization for syllabic *r* in labial environments. In the verb form *p[r](*)ochadi* = *prcchati*, the reflex *ro* represents a syllabic *r* in conjunction with the preceding labial *p*, and in the participial forms *nivurta* < **nivruta* < *nivṛtta* and *anivurta* < **anivruta* < *anivṛtta*, the reflex *ur* underwent further metathesis following the preceding labial *v*.

II.3.2. Consonants

II.3.2.1. Consonants in Initial Position

In this text, as in Gāndhārī generally, original OIA single initial consonants are usually preserved unchanged. This is true also of the initial consonants of posterior members of compounds, which are not treated as intervocalic but are retained in all but one case. Exceptions to this marked tendency toward the preservation of single initial consonants include enclitic forms such as the second-person genitive singular pronominal form *de* = *te* and certain indeclinables whose initial consonants in some occurrences undergo the changes expected in intervocalic position. For example, in addition to one tentative instance of *yi* for the enclitic conjunction *ca*, the particle Skt *iti* consistently appears as *di*, but Skt *api* can appear as either *pi* (6) or *vi* (4), and Skt *punar* as *puna* (6), *vuna* (2), and possibly *mana* (1).¹¹ Voicing, which is typical for intervocalic *-t-*, may also occur in the case of the apparent indeclinable *de*, whose function and equivalent are as yet uncertain, but which may correspond to the OIA *-tas* suffix of source or reason.¹² Only one other clear change in a single initial consonant is found, namely *bh* > *h* in the verb form *hode* = *bhavet* of the root *bhū*, a change in verbal constructions of the root *bhū* that is well attested in MIA.¹³

Certain other apparent changes in initial consonants are problematic. In the case of the word *jatva*, clearly an absolutive in form, both its underlying verb root and hence its formation are uncertain. If taken from the root *han*, as is likely in context, it might represent a change in the initial consonant from *h* to *j*, namely *jatva* = *hatvā*.¹⁴ Also problematic is a change from *r* > *j* suggested by the form *japo*, which occurs twice for *rupo* = *rūpa*. However, this more likely represents orthographic confusion between *r* and *j* perhaps resulting from the scribe's difficulty in reading the written archetype.¹⁵ Initial *ph-* is always written as *p-*, and even though initial aspirated consonants generally remain stable in Gāndhārī, and many do appear in this fragment, Burrow has noted a tendency toward the loss of consonant aspiration in the Central Asian Gāndhārī of the Niya documents. However, since the scribe never uses the consonant *ph*, this also may represent an orthographic rather than a phonological issue.¹⁶

¹¹ Text Notes: [3] *tena avaro ma[4]*^{51D(v)}*[na] vaṣo [ava]ṣiyo •*.

¹² Text Notes: [4] *[ta]ṣa [de so]palo di*; Morphology and Syntax § II.4.3.1 Indeclinable Particles and Conjunctions.

¹³ Pischel 1981 [1957]: 164 [§ 188], 395–396 [§ 475]; von Hinüber 2001: 147 [§ 164].

¹⁴ Text Notes: [41] *aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki n[u] khu*.

¹⁵ Text Notes: [127] *japoṃ asti nasti [tra]e japo di •*.

¹⁶ Burrow 1937: 9 [§ 24]. For the change *ph* > *p*, also observed in RS 5, see Glass 2007: 117 [§ 5.2.1.5]. Cf. Salomon 2008: 107 [§ II.3.2].

II.3.2.2. Developments of Intervocalic Consonants

This text displays the voicing of single consonants in intervocalic position typical of middle-period Gāndhārī, but in comparison to the other Gāndhārī manuscript texts edited to date, it contains fewer examples of other types of changes in intervocalic consonants including elision. Exceptions can be found in the frequent changes *-th-/-dh-* > *-s-* and *-p-* > *-v-*, as well as in the less frequent changes *-k-* > *-y-* and *-j-* > *-y-*, all discussed below.

Intervocalic consonants are always retained following the privative prefix *a-* and generally retained following a verbal prefix or in the initial position in posterior members of compounds. The only exceptions include three examples of the change *-p-* > *-v-* after verbal prefixes and the retroflexion of the initial dental *-d-* in *ḍaśa = daśa* in the compounds *tre-ḍaśa = trayo-daśa* and *dua-ḍaśa = dvā-ḍaśa*. The comparative rarity of changes in intervocalic consonants, other than voicing, and the preservation of intervocalic consonants in word-initial positions following prefixes or within compounds may indicate that our text represents an earlier stage in the linguistic development of Gāndhārī and supports the possibility that our text represents a Gāndhārī “transposition” from some other MIA dialect.¹⁷ However, it might also reflect scribal habits or perhaps the stylistically conservative nature of the scholastic genre.

The following table (5) presents the reflexes of the original single intervocalic consonants that occur in this text. Multiple reflexes for a given intervocalic consonant are given in order of frequency; those that occur only in a single word are marked by square brackets, and those that are uncertain are marked by an asterisk.

Table 5. Single intervocalic consonants

| Original OIA consonant | Reflex(es) in BL 28 |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>k</i> | <i>g, k, y, ∅</i> |
| <i>kh</i> | <i>[h], [*khkṣ]</i> |
| <i>g</i> | <i>g, [∅]</i> |
| <i>c</i> | <i>[c]</i> |
| <i>(c)ch</i> | <i>ch</i> |
| <i>j</i> | <i>y, [j], [*j], [ñ]</i> |
| <i>t</i> | <i>d/ḍ, d, t, [*t]</i> |
| <i>th</i> | <i>s, [s], [dh], [ḍ]</i> |
| <i>d</i> | <i>ḍ/d, ḍ</i> |
| <i>dh</i> | <i>s, dh</i> |

¹⁷ For a discussion of “transposition” in the case of Gāndhārī texts, see Salomon 2002: 122–124, 126–127.

| Original OIA consonant | Reflex(es) in BL 28 |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>p</i> | <i>v, p</i> |
| <i>b</i> | <i>b</i> |
| <i>bh</i> | <i>bh, v, [*v], [h]</i> |
| <i>y</i> | <i>∅, y, [g], [h]</i> |
| <i>r</i> | <i>r</i> |
| <i>l</i> | <i>l</i> |
| <i>v</i> | <i>v</i> |
| <i>ś</i> | <i>ś</i> |
| <i>ṣ</i> | <i>ṣ</i> |
| <i>s</i> | <i>ś, s</i> |
| <i>h</i> | <i>h</i> |

II.3.2.2.1. Velars

Original intervocalic *-k-* is most often voiced, becoming *-g-*. It remains unchanged following the privative prefix *a-* as in *akamaṃ = akarma*, as the initial consonant in posterior members of compounds as in *adiḍa-kala = aṭīta-kālaḥ*, and following a verbal prefix, as in *paḍikakṣiḍava = pratikāṅkṣitavyāni*. As is regular in Gāndhārī, it is also preserved in all forms with *eka*. In words formed with the *-ka* or *-ika* suffix, intervocalic *-k-* usually becomes *-y-*: *aramiya = ārāmika* in the compound *aramiya-bhava = ārāmika-bhāvāḥ*; *[ava]ṣiyo = avarṣakaḥ*; *nirartheta = nirarthikaḥ*, and possibly also *anathariya = anarthikaḥ*; and *neraiya = nairayika*. However, the change *-k- > -g-* is found as well: *asvago = asvakaḥ*; *kaigam = kāyikam*; *(*ja)[n](*)[g]o = janakaḥ*; *vaṣaga = varṣaka*; *svago = svakaḥ*; and also possibly *(*viva)jaga = *vibhājaka*.¹⁸ The elision of intervocalic *-k-* in suffixal *-ka*, frequently attested in other Gāndhārī manuscript texts,¹⁹ is found in *heduo* in the compound *kama-heduo = karma-hetukaḥ*, and possibly also in *veśia* in the compound *veśia-bhavo = vaiśyika/vaiśika-bhāvāḥ*.²⁰

In its only certain occurrence, original intervocalic *-kh-* becomes *-h-* in *suha = sukha* in the compound *suhaḡar(*) = sukhākāraḥ*. The interpretation of the compound *[he]m[u]khkṣa* is problematic, and hence its equivalent is unclear.²¹ In the conjunct character read as *khkṣ*, the character *kṣa* is written with a superscript *kha*, and although the exact phonetic equivalent of

¹⁸ Text Notes: [82] + ^{52F(v)?} *jaga eṣa prochi •*.

¹⁹ Salomon 2008: 108 [§ II.3.2.1.2]; Brough 1962: 91 [§ 38].

²⁰ Phonology § II.3.4 Epenthesis (Svarabhakti).

²¹ Text Notes: [60] *[he]m[u]khkṣa*.

this conjunct is uncertain, it appears to represent the OIA consonant cluster *kṣa*.²² In its present context, the resulting compound *[he]m[u]khkṣa* occurs in an example including the words “gold” (*hema*) and “burning” (*dajati*), which suggest the possible equivalent *[he]m(a)-[u]khkṣa* = **hema-ukhāyām*, “in a gold cauldron,” or “in a crucible.” According to this interpretation, the original intervocalic *-kh-* in *ukhāya* is represented by the conjunct character *khkṣ*.

Original intervocalic *-g-* is stable, with the possible exception of *yo(a)* as the final member of the compound *para-kadha-para-aīdana-para-dhadu-yo(a)* = *para-skandha-parāyatana-paradhātu-yogaḥ* (l. 106). Here, it is possible that the compound-final member *yo(a)* = *yoga* has undergone elision of intervocalic *-g-*, *yoga* > *yoa*, which was then combined in non-compound sandhi with the following verb *a[thi]* = *asti*. However, since the elision of intervocalic *-g-* occurs in no other case in this manuscript, it is more likely that the final syllable *-ga* of *-yoga* was simply lost through scribal error.²³

II.3.2.2.2. Palatals

Original intervocalic *-c-* occurs only in the word *vaca* = *vāc*, where it is unchanged.

Since geminates are not represented in Kharoṣṭhī, original intervocalic *-(c)ch-* is represented by *-ch-* in *icheaṣi* = *iccheḥ* and *p[r](*)ochadi* = *prcchati*.

Intervocalic *-j-* is retained following the privative prefix *a-* in *ajada* = *ajātāḥ* and possibly also in the word tentatively reconstructed as *(*viva)jaga* = **vibhājakaḥ*. In the two forms of *prati* + *√jñā* that occur, intervocalic *-j-* becomes *-y-*: *paḍi[ya]nadi* = *prati jānāti*; and *paḍi[ya]naṣa* = *prati jānītha*.

II.3.2.2.3. Retroflexes

This text contains no reflexes of a single original retroflex in intervocalic position.

II.3.2.2.4. Dentals

Although the scribe of this text distinguishes the dentals *t* and *d* in most environments, in some instances the characters merge graphically (Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.1.13 *ta*, § II.2.4.1.15 *da* and *ḍa*). However, the likelihood of such graphic confusion depends upon the position of the consonant and the particular consonant-vowel combination. For example, although *ta* and *da* in initial position can be confused, they are most often distinguished; by contrast, *ti* and *di* in all positions are virtually identical. In both initial and medial positions, the scribe of our text distinguishes *tu* from *du* and *to* from *do* and adopts a special ligature for *de*, which can be clearly distinguished from *te*. Further, for *-da-* in medial position, the scribe uses a modified character transcribed as *ḍa*, which resembles *d* but is marked at the bottom by a hook or curve back toward the right. This modified character *ḍa* is found only in intervocalic position and only in combination with the vowel *a*.

Regardless of the consonant-vowel combination, original intervocalic *-t-* is regularly voiced. In only five occurrences does the scribe use what appears graphically to be a clear *-t-*. In three

²² Brough 1962: 72–73 [§ 16], 73 [nn. 1–2].

²³ Text Notes: [106] *parakadhaparaaīdanaparadhaduyoa[thi]* •.

occurrences, *-t-* represents the single intervocalic consonant in the abstract suffix *-tā*: *(*d)[ukh]-(*a)ta = duḥkhatā* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 4); *astita = astitā* (l. 70); and *a[thi]ta = astitā* (l. 123). In the other two occurrences, *-t-* represents the geminate *-t(t)-* from the OIA cluster *-pt-*: *-prataṣa = -prāptasya* in the compound *ara[ha]tva-prataṣa = arhattva-prāptasya* (51D(v) l. 2); and *prata = prāptaḥ* (l. 33). Apart from these cases, intervocalic *-ta-* is consistently represented by the modified character *ḍa*. For intervocalic *-tu-* and *-to-*, the scribe uses the regular character *-d-* in combination with the respective vowel, and for *-te-*, the special ligature for *de*. The only exceptions are the locative singular present participle *sate = sati* (l. 101) and *ca[t>(*u)[n>(*a) = catūrṇām* (l. 94), whose reading is tentative.

This consistent voicing of original intervocalic *-t-* with the vowels, *a*, *u*, *o*, and *e*, suggests that *-ti-/di-* in intervocalic position should also be understood as voiced *di*. In only three cases has intervocalic *-ti-/di-* been transcribed as *-ti-* primarily on contextual grounds since it corresponds to an original cluster. In *bhavati = bhavanti*, the third-person plural present of the root *bhū*, the nasal of the cluster *-nt-* is not written and the following *-t-* remains (con. *[bho]di*, l. 131, which, though regularly representing the third-person singular, has been construed by context as plural). In *prati = prāpti*, both as an independent noun and as the final member of the compound *[h>(*e)[d>(*u)-[p>(*a)[l>(*a)-[p>(*ra)ti = hetuphalaprāptiḥ*, *-t-* represents the cluster *-pt-*. Following the semivowel *r* in the verbal prefix *prati-*, original intervocalic *-ti-* regularly becomes *-ḍi-*, reflecting retroflexion from the preceding *-r-*, which is then lost: for example, *paḍikakṣidava = pratikāṅkṣitavyāni*.

Original intervocalic *-th-* usually becomes the modified sibilant *ṣ*: *aṣa = atha*; *taṣa = tathā*; *yaṣa = yathā* (con. *yasa = yathā*, l. 77); *paḍi[ya]naṣa = pratijānītha*; and *bhoṣa = bhavatha*. However, in the single occurrence of the interrogative indeclinable *kadha = katham*, the original intervocalic *-th-* is simply voiced. In the word *paḍama = prathamam*, original intervocalic *-th-* is represented by the unaspirated retroflex *-ḍ-*, again due to retroflexion from the preceding *-r-* in *pra-*, now lost, as well as the anomalous deaspiration of the following voiced aspirated dental *-th-*.²⁴

Original intervocalic *-d-* is retained, but as in the case of *-t-*, when occurring with the vowel *a*, it is represented by the modified character *ḍ*, and when occurring with the vowel *e*, it is represented by the special ligature for *de*. Retroflexion of original intervocalic *-d-* occurs under the influence of a preceding *-r-* in *-ḍaṣa = -daṣa* in the compound *treḍaṣa = trayodaśam*. Similar retroflexion from *-d-* to *-ḍ-* in *duaḍaṣa = dvāḍaṣa* might be explained by analogy with the case of *treḍaṣa*.

As in the case of *-th-*, original intervocalic *-dh-* is represented by the modified sibilant *ṣ*: *aṣi[p>(*ad)[i] = adhipatiḥ*; *niro[ṣa] = nirodhe* in *dukha-niro[ṣa] = duḥkha-nirodhe*; and *viroṣa = virodhaḥ* in *sutra-viroṣa = sūtravirodhaḥ*.

II.3.2.2.5. Labials

With approximately equal frequency, original intervocalic *-p-* is retained or becomes *-v-*. Following verbal prefixes, *-p-* is usually retained. However, the change *-p- > -v-* occurs after verbal prefixes in *-adivada = -atipātaḥ* in *pranadivada = prāṇātipātaḥ*, and in forms from *sam + ā + √pad* including *samavanaṣa = samāpannasya* and *sa[ma]varjadi = samāpadyate*. Intervocalic *-p-* is also retained in the verbal prefix *upa-*, with the exception of *anu[va]ṣapano = anupasampannaḥ* and *uvahaḍa-*

²⁴ Text Notes: [56] *pa[cam]. jāna samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di •*.

idriana = *upahatendriyāṇām*, where *-p-* becomes *-v-*. In the word *rūpa*, intervocalic *-p-* is preserved in four declined forms as well as in *rupino* = *rūpī*, but it becomes *-v-* in two declined forms and in the compounds *eva-ruva* = *evaṃ-rūpam*, *ruv(a)-āḍana* = *rūpāyatanam*, *[r](*)u[va]-cakh(u)-āḍana* = *rūpa-cakṣur-āyatanāni*, and *ru[v](*)a-[bh](*)a*va = *rūpa-bhāvaḥ*. Intervocalic *-p-* also becomes *-v-* in *avara* = *apara* and *pava* = *pāpa*, as well as in all examples of the frequently occurring word *vivaga* = *vipāka*, whether independently, in compound, or with the *-tva* suffix in *vivagatva* = *vipākatvam*. A similar change from *-p-* to *-v-* is also observed in the gerundive *ukṣividav[u]* = *utkṣeptavyam* after the addition of the gerundive *seṭ* suffix element *-itava* = *-itavya*.

Original intervocalic *-bh-* is almost always retained, whether word medially, in the verbal prefix *abhi-*, or following a verbal prefix. In one instance of the verbal prefix *abhi-*, *a[vis](*)a-[kh](*)a*rodi = *abhisamkaroti* as well as in *vivarjavada* = *vibhajyavādāḥ*, *-bh-* becomes *-v-* through the deaspiration of the intervocalic consonant *-bh-* > *-b-* and the regularly encountered deocclusion in Gāndhārī from *-p-* or *-b-* > *-v-*.²⁵ It becomes *-h-* in the regular Gāndhārī instrumental ending *-ahi* for feminine *ā*-stem nouns and adjectives, as in *prañahi* = *prajñābhiḥ*.

II.3.2.2.6. Semivowels

Whether surrounded by the vowel *a* or by two dissimilar vowels, original intervocalic *-y-* is most often retained both word-medially or following a verbal prefix.²⁶ Among all intervocalic consonants, only *-y-* undergoes frequent elision, but such elision is limited to select environments. The change *-y-* > \emptyset is observed both medially in *idriana* = *indriyāṇām* in the compound *uvahada-idriana* = *upahatendriyāṇām*, in *[ubha](*)e*h(*)i = *ubhayaiḥ*, and in *[nera]a* = *nirayam*, as well as prior to a suffixal *-ika* in *kaḡgam* = *kāyikam* and in *neraiya* = *nairayika*, both independently and in the compound *neraiya-bhava* = *nairayikabhāva*, and possibly in *veśia* = *vaiśyika/vaiśika* in the compound *veśia-bhavo* understood as *vaiśyika/vaiśika-bhāva* rather than *vaiśya-bhāva*.²⁷ Finally, original intervocalic *-y-* becomes *-h-* in *samahe* = *samaye*, and *-g-* in *pracaga* = *pratyaya* in the compound *sarva-pracageha* = *sarvapratyayaiḥ*.²⁸

Original intervocalic *-l-* remains unchanged. Rather than reflecting a change, the Gāndhārī word *arambana/arabana* = *ālambana* (5) might reflect a dialect variant as attested in P *ārammaṇa*.

Original intervocalic *-v-* is invariably retained whether medially within a word, following a privative prefix, or following a verbal prefix.

II.3.2.2.7. Sibilants and *h*

As usual in Gāndhārī, the three OIA sibilants *ś*, *ṣ*, and *s* are generally preserved. Original intervocalic *-h-* is also retained in all cases.

²⁵ Brough 1962: 87 [§ 34], 96–97 [§ 44]; Burrow 1937: 8 [§ 20].

²⁶ Brough 1962: 90–91 [§ 37]; Salomon 2000: 86 [§ I.6.2.1.6]; Allon 2001: 85 [§ 5.2.2.7].

²⁷ Phonology § II.3.4 Epenthesis (Svarabhakti).

²⁸ Brough 1962: 91–92 [§ 38]; Lenz 2003: 130 [§ 9.2.1.5]; Lenz 2010: 27 [§ 3.2.1.6.1]; Salomon 2008: 116 [§ II.3.2.1.7].

II.3.2.3. Consonant Clusters

The development of OIA consonant clusters in this text is summarized in the following table (6), which lists also original geminates, homorganic nonaspirated + aspirated stops, and nasal + homorganic stops, whose reflexes in this text are generally regular and, with only a few exceptions, will not be discussed further below. Geminate reflexes of OIA clusters are represented in the table with the implied member in parentheses. Multiple reflexes for the same cluster are listed in order of frequency, with those occurring only once in square brackets, and those in a word whose reading is tentative marked by an asterisk. A hyphen at the end of the cluster indicates a reflex found in word-initial position.

Table 6. Consonant clusters

| Original OIA cluster | Reflex(es) in BL 28 |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| <i>ḥkh</i> | <i>[(k)kh]</i> |
| <i>kt</i> | <i>t(t)</i> |
| <i>ky</i> | <i>[k(k)]</i> |
| <i>kr</i> | <i>[*(k)r]</i> |
| <i>kv</i> | <i>[k(k)]</i> |
| <i>kṣ</i> | <i>kṣ</i> |
| <i>gr</i> | <i>gr</i> |
| <i>ṅk</i> | <i>[(k)k]</i> |
| <i>ṅkṣ</i> | <i>[kṣ]</i> |
| <i>ṅg/mg</i> | <i>g</i> |
| <i>cch</i> | <i>(c)ch</i> |
| <i>cy</i> | <i>[c(c)]</i> |
| <i>jñ</i> | <i>ñ(ñ)</i> |
| <i>jy</i> | <i>[rj]</i> |
| <i>ñc</i> | <i>c, [mc]</i> |
| <i>ñj</i> | <i>[rj]</i> |
| <i>tkṣ</i> | <i>[(k)kṣ]</i> |
| <i>tt</i> | <i>t(t)</i> |
| <i>ttv</i> | <i>(t)tv</i> |

| Original OIA cluster | Reflex(es) in BL 28 |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| <i>tp</i> | <i>p(p)</i> |
| <i>tm</i> | <i>tv</i> |
| <i>ty</i> | <i>c(c)</i> |
| <i>tr</i> | <i>tr</i> |
| <i>try</i> | <i>[tr]</i> |
| <i>tv</i> | <i>tv, [t(t)]</i> |
| <i>dg</i> | <i>(g)g</i> |
| <i>ddh</i> | <i>(d)dh</i> |
| <i>dy</i> | <i>j(j), [rj]</i> |
| <i>dv</i> | <i>du, [do]</i> |
| <i>dhy</i> | <i>ĵ(ĵ), [j(j)]</i> |
| <i>dhv</i> | <i>dhv</i> |
| <i>nt</i> | <i>(n)t</i> |
| <i>nd</i> | <i>[d]</i> |
| <i>ndr</i> | <i>[(n)dr]</i> |
| <i>ndh</i> | <i>[(n)dh]</i> |
| <i>ny</i> | <i>ñ(ñ)</i> |
| <i>pt</i> | <i>t(t)</i> |
| <i>pr</i> | <i>pr, p(p)</i> |
| <i>br</i> | <i>[br]</i> |
| <i>mp</i> | <i>(m)p</i> |
| <i>mb</i> | <i>[ṃb], [(m)b]</i> |
| <i>mbh</i> | <i>[(m)bh]</i> |
| <i>my</i> | <i>m(m)</i> |
| <i>rg</i> | <i>[g(g)]</i> |
| <i>rṇ</i> | <i>[n(n)]</i> |
| <i>rt</i> | <i>t(t), rt</i> |

| Original OIA cluster | Reflex(es) in BL 28 |
|----------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>rth</i> | <i>[rth], [(t)th]</i> |
| <i>rdh</i> | <i>[(d)dh]</i> |
| <i>rm</i> | <i>m(m)</i> |
| <i>ry</i> | <i>ry, ∅, [y(y)]</i> |
| <i>rv</i> | <i>rv, v(v), [∅]</i> |
| <i>rṣ</i> | <i>ṣ(ṣ)</i> |
| <i>rh</i> | <i>[rah]</i> |
| <i>ṃr</i> | <i>[(ṃ)r]</i> |
| <i>lp</i> | <i>[p(p)]</i> |
| <i>vy</i> | <i>v(v)</i> |
| <i>śc</i> | <i>[(c)c]</i> |
| <i>śy</i> | <i>ś(ś), [ṣ(ṣ)]</i> |
| <i>ṃś</i> | <i>[(ṃ)ś], [ṃś]</i> |
| <i>ṣṭ</i> | <i>[(ṭ)ṭh], [(c)ch]</i> |
| <i>ṣṭh</i> | <i>[(ṭ)ṭh], [(ṭ)ṭh]</i> |
| <i>ṣp</i> | <i>(p)p</i> |
| <i>ṣph</i> | <i>[(p)p]</i> |
| <i>ṣy</i> | <i>ś(ś), ṣ(ṣ)</i> |
| <i>sk</i> | <i>[k(k)]</i> |
| <i>ṃsk</i> | <i>(ṃ)kh</i> |
| <i>st</i> | <i>st, (t)th</i> |
| <i>sth</i> | <i>(ṭ)ṭh, th-</i> |
| <i>sm</i> | <i>sm</i> |
| <i>sy</i> | <i>ṣ(ṣ), s(s), [ś(ś)]</i> |
| <i>sv</i> | <i>sv</i> |
| <i>hm</i> | <i>[m(m)]</i> |
| <i>hy</i> | <i>[j(j)]</i> |

II.3.2.3.1. Stop + Stop Clusters

Since geminates are not usually represented in Kharoṣṭhī script, geminates, whether original or resulting from assimilation, are represented by a single consonant. Clusters formed from a nonaspirate + corresponding aspirate are represented by the simple aspirate as, for example, *ddh* > *(d)dh* in *nirudha* = *niruddham*. And as in MIA generally, other stop + stop clusters undergo assimilation with the second stop usually predominating: for example, *kt* > *t(t)* in *vatu* = *vaktum*.

II.3.2.3.2. Clusters with Semivowels

For clusters involving sibilants and semivowels, see Phonology § II.3.2.3.3 Clusters with Sibilants, and for certain nasals and semivowel clusters not listed in this section, see Phonology § II.3.2.3.4.2 Nasal + Consonant Clusters.

II.3.2.3.2.1. Consonant + Semivowel Clusters

As in MIA generally, in clusters of the form consonant + *y*, *y* is assimilated to the preceding consonant, resulting in a geminate represented by the consonant alone: *ky* > *[k(k)]* in *śaka* = *śakyā*; *cy* > *[c(c)]* in *provucadi* = *procyate*; *my* > *m(m)* in *anagamo* = *anāgamyam*; and *vy* > *v(v)* in *vatava* = *vaktavya*. If the preceding consonant is a dental, it is palatalized: *ty* > *c(c)* in *saca* = *satya*; *dy* > *j(j)* in *upajadi* = *utpadyate*, *upajisadi* = P *uppajjissati* (Skt *utpatsyate*, **utpadyiṣyate*); *dhy* > *ḥ(j)*, usually written with the modified character *ḥ* as in *aḥatva* = *adhyātma*, *ḥana* = *dhyāna* (P *jhāna*) and in *nirujadi* = *nirudhyate* (con. *dhy* > *[j(j)]* in *nirujadi* = *nirudhyate*, ll. 53–54, 54); and *ny* > *ṅ(ṅ)* as in *aṅeṣu* = *anyeṣu*.

In two clusters of the form consonant + *y*, the resulting geminate is not represented by the preceding consonant alone but becomes *r* + consonant in which the preconsonantal *r* functions as a pseudo-diacritic indicating gemination rather than as an etymological *r*: *jy* > *jj* > *[rj]* in *vivarjavaḍa* = *vibhajyavādāḥ* (P *vibhajjavādā*); and *dy* > *jj* > *[rj]* in *sa[ma]varjadi* = *samāpadyate* (P *samāpajjati*) with regular palatalization of the dental consonant.²⁹ The cluster *hy* appears as *[j(j)]* in two occurrences of the word *dajadi* = *dahyate*. A similar change is attested in DhP-G^K in the word G *ḍajamaṇo* < Skt *dahyamāna* (v. 75), where Brough understands the modified character *ḥ* as a notation for *[z̥]* on the basis of other examples of the change *hy* > *ś*.³⁰ Although both occurrences of *dajadi* in this text contain the simple consonant *j* without the horizontal superscript stroke, it is possible that *dajadi* = *dahyate* also reflects a change *hy* > *ś(ś)* > *z(z)* > *j(j)*.³¹

Clusters of the form consonant + *r* are in most cases retained: *gr* = *gr* as in *samagri* = *sāmagrī*; *tr* = *tr* as in *atra* = *atra* and *traya* = *trayaḥ*; *pr* = *pr*, which only occurs as a word initial, as in *praṇahi* = *prajñābhīḥ*; and *br* = *[br]*, also only occurring as a word-initial in *bromi* = *bravīmi* and *[bra/bro]mi* = *brahma* in the compound *[bra/bro]mi-cia-vaṣa* = *brahma-carya-vāsaḥ*. However, the development *pr* > *p(p)* also appears in one occurrence of the prefix *pra-*, as in *prathama* > *paḍama*, and in most occurrences of the verbal prefix *prati-* as in *paḍisavededi* = *pratisamvedayati*

²⁹ Salomon 1999: 122–123 [§ 6.3]; Salomon 2000: 77–78 [§ 1.5.9.4]; Lenz 2010: 29 [§ 3.2.2.1]; Lenz 2003: 63–64 [§ 6.2.8].

³⁰ Brough 1962: 105 [§ 61].

³¹ Glass 2007: 124 [§ 5.2.2.8], 161.

(con. *pracageha* = *pratayaiḥ* in the compound *sarva-pracageha* = *sarva-pratayaiḥ*, l. 68), and apparently also in the case of *pacupana* = *pratyutpanna*, which however could be considered a loanword from a non-Gāndhārī MIA dialect, since it more frequently occurs in this text in the form *pracupana* = *pratyutpanna*).

The semivowel *v* is usually retained in clusters that occur as the last member of a word: *tv* = *tv* as in *astitva* = *astitvam* (con. *tv* > [t(t)] in *bhavita* = *bhūtivā*, l. 125 [2x]); *ttv* > (t)tv in *satva* = *sattvāḥ* in the compound *sarva-satva* = *sarva-sattvāḥ*; and *dhv* = *dhv* as in *-adhva* = *-adhvāḥ* in the compound *traya-adhva* = *traiyadhvāḥ/traiyadhvikāḥ*. The cluster [kv] does undergo change, becoming *k(k)* in *avivaka-vivaga* = *avipakvavipākāḥ*, and *dvā* > *dua* in *duaḍaṣa* = *dvāḍaṣa* and *dve* > [do] in *-doṣa-* = *-dveṣa-* in the compound *a[di]ḍa-raga-doṣa-moha* = *atīta-rāga-dveṣa-mohāḥ* (Phonology § II.3.1.1 Changes Affecting Original *a*).

II.3.2.3.2.2. Semivowel + Consonant Clusters

Virtually all of the clusters with a semivowel as a prior member are of the form *r* + consonant in which *r* is assimilated to the following *g* consonant: *rg* > [g(g)] as in *mago* = *mārga* in the compound *arya-mago* = *ārya-mārgaḥ*; *rṇ* > [n(n)] as in *ca[t](*)u[n](*)a* = P *catuṇṇaṃ* (Skt *catasṣṇām*); *rt* > *t(t)* as in *kato* = *kartum*; *rtha* > [(t)th] in *anathariya* = *anarthikaḥ*; *rdh* > [(d)dh] in *sadha* = *sārdham*; *rm* > *m(m)* as in *kama* = *karma*; *ry* > [y(y)] in *peyala* = *peyālam/piyālam/paryāyam*³²; *rv* > *v(v)* as in *niviṣeṣa* = *nirviṣeṣa*; and *rṣ* > [ṣ(ṣ)] as in *vaṣaga* = *varṣaka*. Less frequently, *r* + consonant clusters undergo different developments. For example, preconsonantal *r* can be preserved before dentals, *y*, and *v*: *rt* = *rt* as in *nivartadi* = *nivartate*; *rth* = [rth] in *nirarthiya* = *nirarthikaḥ*; *ry* = *ry* as in *arya* = *ārya*; and *rv* = *rv* as in *sarva* = *sarvam*. In very few cases, the clusters *ry* and *rv* undergo elision with palatalization or labialization of the remaining vowels, or the original *y* can be considered to be represented by *i* as a glide vowel: *ry* > Ø as in *-cia-* = *-carya-* in the compound [bra/bro]mi-cia-vaṣa = *brahma-carya-vāsaḥ*; and *rv* > [Ø] in *karodi* = *kurvanti*. Finally, as in MIA generally, in forms of the word *arhat*, the cluster *rh* undergoes epenthesis to become [rah] in *arahada* = *arhataḥ* (Phonology § II.3.4 Epenthesis (Svarabhakti)).

This text contains a single occurrence of preconsonantal *l*, which is assimilated to the following consonant: *lp* > [p(p)] in *apaṃ* = *alpam*.

II.3.2.3.3. Clusters with Sibilants

II.3.2.3.3.1. Consonant + Sibilant Clusters

The original OIA cluster *kṣ* usually undergoes no change and is rendered with a ligature transliterated as *kṣ*, even though its exact pronunciation is not certain: thus, *kṣ* = *kṣ* as in *lakṣana* = *lakṣaṇa*.³³ Similarly, the cluster *tkṣ* becomes [k(k)ṣ] in *ukṣivīḍav[u]* = *utkṣeptavyam* through the assimilation of the initial *t* in the triple cluster and the expected preservation of the remaining

³² The MIA word *peyala* (P *peyyāla*, BHS *peyāla*) has been interpreted as from **payyāya* (Skt *paryāya*) with palatalization of an original vowel *a* prior to the geminate semivowel *-yy-* corresponding to the cluster *-ry-*. See Norman 1990: 220 (refers to Trenckner 1908: 117). For other occurrences of *peyala*, see ll. 109, 115, 117, 118.

³³ Brough 1962: 72–73 [§ 16]; Allon 2001: 95 [§ 5.2.3.6]; Salomon 2008: 124–125 [§ II.3.2.2.4.1].

cluster *kṣ* (Phonology § II.3.2.3.1 Stop + Stop Clusters). However, in *cakhu* = *cakṣus* (P *cakkhu*), *kṣ* becomes *[(k)kh]*, suggesting a loanword from a non-Gāndhārī MIA dialect form of this important Buddhist term.

II.3.2.3.3.2. Sibilant + Consonant Clusters

The original cluster *śc* appears as the simple nonaspirate *[(c)c]* in *paca-* = *paścāt* in the compound *paca-bhata-kalo* = *paścād-bhakta-kālaḥ*.³⁴ Original *śy* regularly goes to *ś(ś)* as in *avaśa* = *avaśyam*, *(*ka)[yanu]paśa* = *kāyānupaśyī*, *paśadi* = *paśyati*, and possibly also in *veśia* = *vaiśya/vaiśyika* in the compound *veśia-bhavo* understood as *vaiśya/vaiśyika-bhāva* rather than *vaiśika-bhāva*.³⁵

Original *ṣt* occurs as *[(t)ṣh]* only in the word *aṣhana* = *aṣṭānām*.³⁶ The cluster *ṣth* appears in four occurrences of the single word *ṣaṣṭha*: three times *ṣth* appears as *[(t)ṣh]* in *ṣeṭha* = *ṣaṣṭhaḥ* used as an independent adjective,³⁷ and once *ṣth* is represented by *[(t)ṣh]* in *ṣaṣṭha* = *ṣaṣṭha* in the compound *ṣaṣṭha(a)-ai(*da)na-ṣhida* = *ṣaṣṭhāyatana-sthitam*.³⁸ The reflex of original *ṣp* is *(p)p* as in *abhinipana* = *abhinispannaḥ* in the compound *astitvabhinipana* = *astitvābhinispannaḥ*, and *ṣph* likewise becomes *[(p)p]* in *n[i](*pala)* = *niṣphalam*. As is regular in Gāndhārī, original *śy* usually becomes *ś(ś)* through palatalization of the retroflex *ṣ* prior to *y* as in *manuśa* = *manuśyān*. This reflex is also observed in the most common Gāndhārī future verb form in which the marker corresponding to *-iṣya-* of OIA undergoes the change *śy* > *ś(ś)* as in *kariśadi* = *kariśyati*.³⁹ However, in the case of two verbs, two different future forms occur. One displays this change *śy* > *ś(ś)*, and the other, *śy* > *ṣ(ś)*, which retains the retroflex of the future marker: *nivartiśadi* and *nivartiśadi* = *nivartiśyati*; and *upajiśadi* and *upa(*j)iśadi* = *utpatsyate*.

The cluster *sk* becomes *[k(k)]* in *kadha* = *skandhaḥ*. In almost 200 occurrences of the verb *asti* = *asti* and derivative forms such as *astiḍa* = *astitā* and *astitva* = *astitvam*, original *st* is written by the special character conventionally transliterated as *st*. Only three times does *st* become *th*, perhaps reflecting a non-Gāndhārī MIA source: *a[thi]* = *asti* (ll. 106, 122); and *a[thi]ta* = *astitā* (l. 123). In accordance with the pattern observed for certain other Gāndhārī scribes, the reflex for the OIA cluster *sth* differs depending upon its word position as well as the derivation of the word involved.⁴⁰ In word-initial position the cluster *sth* becomes *th* in *thamena* = *sthāmnā* (P *thāmena*) and *theraśa* = *sthavirasya* (P *therassa*), both of which are common Buddhist terms that may have been adopted directly from an MIA source dialect. In medial position in derivatives of the root *sthā*, *sth* becomes *(t)ṣh* as in *ekaṣṭha* = *ekastham* or *adiḍa-ṣṭhanena* = *atīta-sthānena*. The original cluster *sm* is retained in the pronominal locative singular masculine or neuter forms *[tasmi]* = *tasmin* and *[ya]smi* = *yasmin*, but appears as *[s]* in *-s(*ad)[i]* = *-smṛtiḥ* in the compound *k(*a)y(*a)-s(*ad)[i]*

³⁴ For *śc* > *c̄*, or the nonaspirate *c* with an overbar, which is not found in this text, see Burrow 1937: 19 [§ 49]; Glass 2000: 62–63 [§ 2.6.1].

³⁵ Phonology § II.3.4 Epenthesis (Svarabhakti).

³⁶ Burrow 1937: 20 [§ 49].

³⁷ For the *e* vowel in *ṣeṭha*, see Phonology § II.3.1.1 Changes Affecting Original *a*.

³⁸ For *ṣha* and *ṭha*, see Brough 1962: 75–77 [§§ 18, 18a, 18b].

³⁹ Brough 1962: 104 [§ 59]; Allon 2001: 94 [§ 5.2.3.6]; Salomon 2008: 126 [§ II.3.2.2.4.2].

⁴⁰ Salomon 2008: 126 [§ II.3.2.2.4.2].

= *kāya-smṛtiḥ*. In over half of the genitive singular masculine or neuter nominal and pronominal forms, the cluster *sy* is rendered as *ś(ś)*, which employs the modified form of the sibilant *ś* as in *adiḍaṣa* = *atītasya* (con. *sy* > *s(s)* in *tasa* = *tasya*, 51D(v) l. 4; l. 55). Finally, the original cluster *sv* is regularly retained as in *sva-bhave* = *sva-bhāvah*.

II.3.2.3.4. Clusters with Nasals

II.3.2.3.4.1. Consonant + Nasal Clusters

In all derivatives of the root *jñā*, the cluster *jñ* becomes *ñ(ñ)*, as in *sañā* = *sañjñā*. The OIA cluster *tm* appears as *tv* in two words, *aḥatva* = *adhyātmam* and *atva* = *ātma*,⁴¹ and *hm* goes to *[m(m)]* in *[bra/bro]mi-* = *brahma-* in *[bra/bro]mi-cia-vaṣa* = *brahma-carya-vāśah*.

II.3.2.3.4.2. Nasal + Consonant Clusters

Just as for several Kharoṣṭhī scribes whose manuscripts have been edited thus far, the scribe of our text usually does not represent nasal clusters in the form anusvāra + consonant/consonant cluster. Instead, nasal clusters are represented by the unchanged single consonant or consonant cluster alone⁴²: *ṅk* > *[(ṅ)k]* in *akuraṣa* = *aṅkurasya*; *ṅkṣ* > *[(ṅ)kṣ]* in *paḍikakṣiḍava* = *pratikāṅkṣitavyāni*; *ṅg* > *(ṅ)g* as in *agudī-mala* = *Aṅgulimālah*; *mḡ* > *(m)g* as in *śagrahiḍa* = *saṅgrhītāḥ*; *ñc* > *(ñ)c* in *kica/kici* = *kiṃcit*; *nt* > *(n)t* as in *śata-* = *śānta-* in the compound *śatagare* = *śāntākārah*, and in *bhavati* = *bhavanti* (con. *karodi* = *kurvanti*, l. 50 and *[bho]di* = *bhavanti*, l. 96, both perhaps examples of third-person singular verbs used with plural nominatives); *nd* > *[(n)d]* in *cha[d](*)chandaḥ*; *ndr* > *(n)dr* in *idriya* = *indriya*; *ndh* > *[(n)dh]* in *kadha* = *skandhaḥ*; *mp* > *(m)p* in *upaṣapaḍa* = *upasampadā*; *mb* > *(m)b* in *arabana* = *ālambana*; *mbh* > *[(m)bh]* in *asabhina* = *asambhinnāḥ*; *mṛ* > *(m)r* in *eva-ruva* = *evamrūpam*; *mś* > *(m)ś* in *ekuna-viśadi* = *ekonaviṣātiḥ/ekonaviṣāḥ*; and *mśk* > *(m)kh* as in *sakhaḍaṣa* = *saṃskṛtasya*.⁴³ However, the scribe of our text does on occasion include an anusvāra in the case of nasal + consonant clusters: *ñc* > *ṃc* in *paṃcama* = *pañcamam* (ll. 85, 89, 91, 120)⁴⁴; *mb* > *ṃb* in *araṃbana* = *ālambana*; and *mś* = *ṃś* in *[e]k(*)[-m-aṃśa]* = *ekāṃśah*. Finally, in one case a nasal + consonant cluster would appear to be represented by a preconsonantal *r* + consonant: *ñj* > *[rj]* in *sa[rja]nadi* = *sañjānāti*.⁴⁵ In other occurrences in this as well as other BL manuscripts, this pseudo-diacritic *r* indicates gemination (Phonology § II.3.2.3.2.1 Consonant + Semivowel Clusters).

⁴¹ Salomon 2008: 126 [§ II.3.2.2.5].

⁴² Allon 2001: 88 [§ 5.2.3.1]; Glass 2007: 119 [§ 5.2.2.2]; Salomon 2008: 117–118 [§ II.3.2.2]; Lenz 2010: 31 [§ 3.2.2.3.2.4].

⁴³ For *sk* > *(k)kh*, see Glass 2007: 124 [§ 5.2.2.7].

⁴⁴ The presence of the anusvāra in *paṃcama* might also be understood as a result of the scribe's tendency to write *-p-* with an anusvāra-like footmark, or pseudo-anusvāra. See Text Notes: [91] *yadi [taṣa] nasti pa[m]came*; Paleography and Orthography § II.2.3 Foot Marks, § II.2.4.1.18 *pa*, § II.2.4.2 Characters with Anusvāra.

⁴⁵ Text Notes: [27] *sañā voharovi[va]ga yaṣa ya[śa]* [28] *sa[rja]nadi taṣa taṣa voharadi*.

II.3.2.3.5. Clusters with Visarga

In its single occurrence in *dukha* = *duḥkha* (P *dukkha*), the original cluster *ḥkh* goes to *[(k)kh]*.

II.3.3. Metathesis

This text contains only one clear case of metathesis. Within the clause *t.eśaḍ. aya[ḍa]na asti* (l. 85), the compound *t.eśaḍ.* can be securely reconstructed as *t(*r)e(ḍaśa)* on the basis of frequent references to the “thirteenth sense sphere” (*treḍaśa ayaḍana*) elsewhere in the text (ll. 89, 91–92, 117). Thus, metathesis of the adjacent syllables *śa* and *ḍa* has occurred in the compound as written.⁴⁶

A second possible case of metathesis is suggested by a parallel to a cited scriptural passage. The statement *apaṃ hi [e]ḍa [a].nala [ś].[m].[a].*, “for this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility” (l. 25), finds a parallel in the Pali passage *appaṃ hi etaṃ na alaṃ samāya*.⁴⁷ It is then possible that metathesis has occurred in the Gāndhārī word *anala* yielding *na alaṃ*, which might then be taken as an alternative and synonymous construction. However, it is also possible that this statement employs the synonymous compound *anala* (P/Skt *analam*) formed with the privative prefix *an-*.

Finally, it is likely that metathesis has occurred in the problematic compound *anathariya* (l. 75). Although *ānantarya* is perhaps a less problematic equivalent on phonological grounds, its sense of “without interval,” often used in reference to past action that produces a matured effect immediately, does not fit the context in this case. If *anathariya* is understood as equivalent to P **anathika* (Skt *anarthika*), that is, “without purpose,” which better fits the context, it would result from the loss of the preconsonantal *r* in the cluster *rth* and the addition of an epenthetic *r* before the pleonastic suffix *-ika*, or possibly from the metathesis of the preconsonantal *r* in *rth*, the insertion of an epenthetic *a* within the resulting cluster *thr*, and the final addition of the pleonastic suffix *-ika*. In either case, the intervocalic *-k-* in the suffix has become *-y-*.

II.3.4. Epenthesis (Svarabhakti)

Clear epenthesis occurs only in only two words. In *arhat*, the cluster *rh* is resolved through the insertion of the vowel *a*: *arahada* = *arhataḥ*; *ara[ha]tva-* = *arhattva-* in the compound *ara[ha]tva-prataṣa* = *arhattva-prāptasya*; and *arahada-* = *arhad-* in the compound *arahada-bhava* = *arhadbhāvaḥ*. Another possible case of epenthesis occurs in the word *veśia* in the compound *veśia-bhavo*, but the process of change here is uncertain. The context suggests that the equivalent is a form of the word Skt *vaiśya*, either *vaiśya* alone or perhaps *vaiśyika* with the addition of the *-ika* suffix. From *vaiśya*, the form *veśia* could be explained through the assimilation of *y* to the preceding consonant in the cluster *śy*, thus *śy* > *ś(ś)*, and the insertion of the vowel *i*: *vaiśya* > *veśa* > *veśia*. From the same equivalent, it might also be explained through the insertion of *i* in the preserved cluster *śy* and the elision of the remaining intervocalic *-y-*: *vaiśya* > *veśya* > *veśiya* > *veśia*.⁴⁸ A change from *vaiśyika*, or possibly *vaiśika*, would be more straightforward, involving

⁴⁶ Text Notes: [85] + + + + /// • *t.e*^{52B(r)+52q9}*śaḍ. aya[ḍa]na a*^{52B(r)}*sti • ekuna*^{52ff+52B(r)}*viśadi dha*^{52B(r)}*du.*

⁴⁷ Sn no. 896 p. 175; Pj II 2.557.

⁴⁸ Geiger (1994: 22 [§ 30.2]) under svarabhakti gives Skt *kāluśya* > P *kāluśiya*, and Turner (1966: 702 [§ 12127]) lists *vēśiya* as used metrically for *vēśyā*. Cf. Norman 1958: 47, 49; Salomon 2008: 131 [§ II.3.6].

third case is more problematic and concerns the string *parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyoa[thi]*, which presumably consists of a compound followed by the finite verb *a[thi] = asti*: thus, *parakadha-para-aiḍana-para-dhadu-yo-a[thi]*. Although it is possible that the compound ends with the simple syllable *-yo* perhaps from a suffixal *-ka*, it is more likely that it ends with the noun *-yo(a) = -yoga*, which has undergone elision of both the intervocalic *-g-* in the final syllable and the remaining vowel *a* in a non-compound sandhi combination with the following *a[thi]*. However, since this would constitute the only example of the elision of intervocalic *-g-* in this manuscript, it is more likely that no intervocalic or sandhi elision has occurred and the final syllable *-ga* of *-yoga* has simply been omitted through scribal error.⁵⁴

This text contains many more cases of vowel sandhi in compound environments, most of which involve the combination *-ā + ā-*. As in the case of non-compound environments, *-ā + ā-* within compounds could be understood as resulting in either *-ā-* through vowel coalescence or *-'ā-* through elision of the prior vowel: *atvagara = ātmākāra*; *adiḍa⟨*g⟩ara = atītākāra*; *adiḍanagaḍa-[p]⟨*r⟩-[acup]⟨*a⟩[n]⟨*a⟩[s]⟨*a⟩[kh]⟨*a⟩[ḍ]⟨*a⟩ = atītānāgatapratyutpannāsamskṛtāḥ*; *anagaḍ⟨*ag⟩-ara = anāgatākāra*; *anatvagara = anātmākāra*; *anupurva⟨*bhi⟩[s]⟨*a⟩[m]⟨*a⟩[ye] = anupūrvābhisamaye*; *⟨*a⟩sacagara = asatyākārah*; *a[s]⟨*a⟩r[v]a[ga]ro = asarvākārah*; *astitvabhiniḥpana = astitvābhiniḥspanaḥ*; *⟨*ka⟩[yanu]paśa = kāyānupaśyī*; *kuśalakuśala = kuśalākuśalāḥ*; *dukhagarena = duḥkhākāreṇa*; *pranadivaḍa = prāṇātipātāḥ*; *maha-sarvastivaḍa = *mahāsarvastivādāḥ*; *śatagara = śāntākāra*; *śu[ñā]ḍagara = śūnyatākāra*; *ṣaṭhai⟨*ḍa⟩na-ḥiḍa = ṣaṣṭhāya⟨*ta⟩na-sṭhitam*; *sacagar[en]⟨*a⟩ = satyākāreṇa*; *sarvagarena = sarvākāreṇa*; and *suhagar⟨*a⟩ = sukhākārah*. In one set of compounds, the final member *-ayaḍana = -āyatana* takes a special form *-aiḍana*,⁵⁵ which would appear to be regularly joined to the prior member of the compound through elision of the final vowel of this prior member rather than through vowel coalescence. Such elision is clearly indicated by the example *cakh'aiḍana = cakh(u)-aiḍana = cakṣurāyatana* reflecting the combination *-u + ā-* > *-'ā-*. The combination *-a + ā-* in such compounds with *-aiḍana* also presumably results in elision, or *-'ā-*: *ruv'aiḍana = ruv(a)-aiḍana = rūpāyatana*; and *ṣaṭh'ai⟨*ḍa⟩na-ḥiḍa = ṣaṭh(a)-ai⟨*ḍa⟩na-ḥiḍa = ṣaṣṭhāya⟨*ta⟩na-sṭhitam*. The compound *man'aiḍanena = man(a)-aiḍanena = manāyatanena* provides an analogous example of elision of the final vowel in the case of the compound-initial stem *mana(s)*, which also undergoes a regular sandhi change in the compound *mano-viñana = mano-vijñāna*.

In contrast to these cases of either sandhi coalescence or elision in compound environments, in several cases of the collocation *-ā + ā-*, both vowels are preserved even in what has been construed on the basis of context as a compound: *[a]⟨*d⟩[iḍa]-anagaḍa = atītānāgatāḥ* (ll. 138–139); *traya-adhva = traiyadhvāḥ/traiyadhvikāḥ* (ll. 70, 123); and *duaḍaśa-[a]yaḍa[n]a-[saḡ]⟨*a⟩hiḍa = dvādaśāyatanasamgrhītam* (ll. 116–117). Such vowel hiatus remains also in other compounds containing a collocation of the dissimilar vowels *a + i* and *u + a*: *⟨*a⟩[n]⟨*a⟩[g]⟨*a⟩[ḍ]⟨*a⟩-idriya = anāgatendriyāṇi* (l. 103); *uvahaḍa-idriana = upahatendriyāṇām* (l. 102); and *hedu-avinaśa⟨*do⟩ = hetvavināśāt* (51D(v) ll. 4–5).

⁵⁴ Text Notes: [106] *parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyoa[thi]* • Phonology § II.3.2.2.1 Velars.

⁵⁵ For the regular compound form *aiḍana*, see the discussion of the treatment of the palatalization of *a* and the change in original *ya > i*, see Phonology § II.3.1.1 Changes Affecting Original *a*.

II.3.5.2. Retention of Original Final *m*

Original final *m*, whether representing an inflectional ending or an adverbial or indeclinable form, is generally not retained. However, it is preserved, with varying degrees of regularity, in three cases. First, original final *m* appears in every occurrence (16) of the clause *sarvam asti* but not when *sarvam* alone occurs at the end of a clause or sentence (*asti sarva • asti no ca sarva = asti sarvam, asti no ca sarvam*, l. 69) nor when it occurs prior to a word other than *asti* (*sarva nasti = sarvaṃ nāsti*, l. 75; *sarva di = sarvam iti*, ll. 95, 97, 98; and *[sa]rva ukṣivīdav[u] = sarvam utkṣeptavyam*, l. 117).

The second case concerns an original final *m* followed by the indeclinable particle *eva*.⁵⁶ In four of its ten occurrences, *eva* follows a declined noun or adjective ending in *-m* with the prior *-m* retained in each case: *kaṅgam eva = kāyikam eva* (l. 52); *adiḍam eva = atītam eva* (l. 76); *a[na](*gaḍam) eva = anāgatam eva* (ll. 76–77); and *pracupanam eva = pratyutpannam* (l. 77). By contrast, final *-m* is not retained before words other than *eva* that begin with the vowel *e*, including the indeclinable particle *evam* and compounds: *yoyīdava eva = yuktavyam evaṃ* (l. 80); *viñāna evaruva = vijñānam evaṃrūpam* (l. 93; see also *vatave eva = vaktavyam evaṃ*, l. 101); and *aryasaca ekunaviśaḍa = āryasatyam ekonaviṃśati* (l. 120).

The third case in which original final *m* appears to be preserved is more problematic since it may reflect a combination of as yet unclear phonological and paleographic features.⁵⁷ It is preserved prior to the quotative particle *di = iti* in *amaṃ di = ām iti* (51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]; l. 3) and in *akamaṃ di = akarmeti* (l. 3). However, in other cases the syllable *-maṃ* appears prior to the dentals *di* and *ḍa* where it is not otherwise expected: *upaḍadhama^m* as masculine nominative singular in *upaḍadhama^m di = utpādidharma iti* (l. 46 con. *upaḍadhama di = utpādidharma iti*, l. 46); and *ma^mḍa = mataṃ* (51jjjj l. 1; l. 19).

II.3.5.3. Sandhi Consonants

This text contains only one clear example of an inorganic “hiatus-bridging” consonant: *[e]k(*a)[-m-amaṃsa]* = *ekāṃśaḥ* in which *-m-* is inserted as a sandhi consonant to avoid the vowel hiatus between *eka* and *amaṃsa*.⁵⁸ In the passive form *provucadi = procyate* (P *pavuccati*), the initial *v-* of the root portion could be viewed as an organic “glide sound,” or as a “fossilized sandhi form,” which is “derived from the guṇa grade of the root.”⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Geiger 1994: 58 [§ 66.1.i]; Salomon 2008: 96 [§ II.2.2.1].

⁵⁷ Glass 2000: 131–132 [§ 3.3.13], 134–134 [§ 4.1]; Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.1.21 *ma*.

⁵⁸ For the hiatus bridging consonant *-m-*, see BHSG 35–36 [§§ 4.57–60]; Lenz 2003: 107 [§ 7.8]; Allon 2001: 102 [§ 5.6.5]; Glass 2007: 125 [§ 5.5.4]; Salomon 2008: 109 [§ II.3.2.1.2], 128 [§ II.3.3.2].

⁵⁹ Geiger 1994: 57 [§ 66.1]; Norman’s note 5 on Geiger 1994: [§ 66.1]; von Hinüber 1986: 208 [§ 270]; Allon 2001: 101 [§ 5.6.4]; Glass 2007: 125 [§ 5.5.4].

Morphology and Syntax

As one of the longer Gāndhārī manuscript texts published to date, the text preserved in BL 28 might be expected to provide ample material to expand our knowledge of Gāndhārī morphology. However, since no parallel text has yet been identified, and since the syntactic function of individual words is frequently open to interpretation, the morphological description for this text should be viewed as tentative. Further, as a scholastic text structured by repetitive patterns of catechesis and polemical argumentation, it is limited in syntactic variety, word usage, and verbal constructions. And yet, like any text representing the scholastic genre, this text is a rich source for doctrinal terms and nominal compounds, many of which are familiar from scholastic texts extant in other languages. Thus, whereas this text may yield only tentative observations for a general morphology of Gāndhārī and offer little new material for certain morphological features such as verbal conjugation, it does contain abundant evidence of technical terminology and compounds, which were to become so important within the emerging scholastic genre.

The manuscript containing our text is the only one written by BL scribe 21 and therefore might also be expected to display distinctive morphological features. However, despite differences in the relative frequency of certain nominal endings and syntactic patterns dictated by its scholastic style, the morphology of our text is generally consistent with that of other Gāndhārī documents studied thus far, and it reinforces the conclusion that Gāndhārī texts, in broad terms at least, share a common morphological system. As a result, the description presented in this chapter presumes the morphological analyses of Gāndhārī manuscript texts given in the previous volumes of the Gandhāran Buddhist Text series.¹ Further, since full morphological details are provided under each entry in the Word Index at the end of this volume, the general description here will include neither an exhaustive list of all occurrences of each form nor comprehensive comparisons with the morphological characteristics of other Gāndhārī documents. Instead, it will focus on the distinctive aspects of the morphology of this text and will cite examples only in so far as they clarify these aspects.

As a convention throughout this chapter, a single number in parentheses reflects the total number of occurrences of a given form, and two numbers separated by a slash in parentheses indicate the total number of occurrences followed by the total number of distinct lexical words. An asterisk indicates an uncertain reading or, in certain cases, uncertain gender. Unless otherwise indicated, when an equal sign is used to connect two related forms of a word, the first form is Gāndhārī, and the second, Sanskrit.

¹ For these previous treatments, see Salomon 2000; Allon 2001; Lenz 2003; Glass 2007; Salomon 2008; Lenz 2010; Schlosser 2022.

II.4.1. Nominal Forms

II.4.1.1. Stems in *a*, Masculine, Neuter, and Feminine

Morphological distinctions for stems in *a*, in particular between the masculine and neuter declensions, appear to have become eroded in Gāndhārī, undermining any unequivocal assignment of gender to Gāndhārī words, regardless of their conventional OIA gender identification. This is certainly the case for our text in which *a*-stem nouns and adjectives of all genders appear most frequently with the ending *-a* in both the nominative and accusative, singular and plural. Although this apparent conflation of forms might be taken to indicate a collapsing of gender or number distinctions in Gāndhārī generally, it might instead result from other factors such as the tendency toward the neutralization of final vowels, or the fact that vowel length is not represented in Kharoṣṭhī script of the period of the BL manuscripts, or this particular scribe's habits and preferences, or possibly even scribal confusion.² As a result, it is often difficult to determine declensional distinctions among nouns or adjectives of various genders, and hence the extent to which middle-period Gāndhārī, at least as represented in this text, preserved or abandoned the OIA gender attribution of particular words remains unclear. Thus, here genders have been assigned to Gāndhārī words on the basis of the gender of the corresponding word in Pali or Sanskrit.

This apparent conflation of *a*-stem noun and adjective forms of different genders is evident in the following table (7), which summarizes the declensional endings of *a*-stem nouns and adjectives of all three genders as they appear in our text. The table includes all simple nouns and adjectives, verbal adjectives, ordinal numbers, and compounds, but omits pronominally declined adjectives, which are treated below in Morphology and Syntax § II.4.2.6 Pronominally Declined Adjectives. For each case, number, and gender listed in the table, the endings have been listed in the order of their relative frequency. Once again, the two numbers in parentheses following each ending indicate the total number of occurrences and the total number of distinct words respectively, and an asterisk marks an uncertain reading. For example, under the nominative singular masculine, the ending *-a* (131/51) occurs most frequently with 131 total occurrences in fifty-one distinct words, followed by *-o* (36/26), and finally *-e* (8/7). A single number in parentheses indicates only the total number of occurrences. For example, in Senior scroll 5 (SĀ-G⁵⁵) as cited in this chapter, the ending *-e* (6) is attested in six occurrences. However, it is important to note that these tallies are approximate since nouns and adjectives whose readings or case identifications are uncertain have been omitted, and morphological distinctions, especially between nominative and accusative and between singular and plural, are often unclear.

² For a discussion of the variety of endings for nominal forms of a particular case and number, and the similarity of endings across different cases and numbers in Gāndhārī, see Salomon 1999: 130–132 [§ 6.5.1]. See also Fussman 1989: 484–485 [§ 37.2].

Table 7. Endings of stems in *a*: masculine, neuter, and feminine
(total occurrences/distinct words)

| | Singular | | | Plural | | |
|--------------|--|---|---------------------------|--|--|----------|
| | Masculine | Neuter | Feminine | Masculine | Neuter | Feminine |
| Nominative | - <i>a</i> (131/51)
- <i>o</i> (36/26)
- <i>e</i> (8/7) | - <i>a</i> (178/50)
- <i>o</i> (13/10)
- <i>am/-m</i> (24/7)
- <i>e</i> (6/5)
- <i>u</i> (3/2)
- <i>om</i> (2/1) | - <i>a</i> (25/12) | - <i>a</i> (48/23)
- <i>e</i> (3/3) | - <i>a</i> (8/8)
- <i>ani</i> (1/1)
- <i>o</i> (1/1) | — |
| Accusative | - <i>a</i> (7/4)
- <i>o</i> (1/1) | - <i>a</i> (12/8)
- <i>e</i> (2/1)
- <i>om</i> (1/1) | - <i>a</i> (2/2) | - <i>a</i> (2/2) | - <i>a</i> (1/1) | — |
| Instrumental | - <i>ena</i> (47/31) | | — | - <i>ehi</i> (9/5)
- <i>eha</i> (2/2) | - <i>ahi</i> (1/1) | |
| Dative | - <i>ae</i> (2/2) | | - <i>ae/-aye</i>
(6/4) | — | | — |
| Ablative | - <i>do/-do</i> (7/4)
- <i>da</i> (1/1)
- <i>de</i> (1/1) | | - <i>de</i> (1/1) | — | | — |
| Genitive | - <i>sa</i> (16/13)
- <i>sa</i> (9/4)
*- <i>sa/-sa</i> (3/3) | | - <i>ae</i> (1/1) | - <i>ana</i> (6/6) | | — |
| Locative | - <i>a</i> (14/9)
- <i>e</i> (9/8) | | *- <i>a</i> (1/1) | — | | — |
| Vocative | — | | — | — | | — |

II.4.1.1.1. Masculine and Neuter Singular

II.4.1.1.1.1. Nominative Singular Masculine

For the nominative singular masculine, this text presents the three endings *-a* (131/51), *-o* (36/26), and *-e* (8/7).³ Thus, the ending *-a* is found in almost four times as many occurrences and twice as many distinct words as *-o*, and sixteen times as many occurrences and seven times as many distinct words as *-e*. Even though multiple endings are the norm for many morphological categories in virtually all Gāndhārī texts, the pattern found in this text for the nominative singular masculine, that is, of a marked predominance of *-a* coupled with the complete absence of *-u*, contrasts sharply with all but two of the other Gāndhārī texts published thus far: the Gāndhārī London Dharmapada in the BL collection (Dhp-G^L) and Senior scroll 5 (SĀ-G^{SS}), both of which also show a preference for *-a* and lack the ending *-u* entirely.⁴ One might conclude that the preference for the ending *-a* represents yet another case of the “leveling” of morphological distinctions or of the neutralization of the final vowel that is well attested in Gāndhārī, with both tendencies becoming more pronounced over time. However, Senior scroll 14 (AG-G^S), which, like Senior scroll 5 (SĀ-G^{SS}), lacks the ending *-u*, nonetheless uses *-e* (6) and *-o* (6) twice as frequently as *-a* (3).⁵ An explanation for these differences among texts from different collections and over time may emerge as the sample of edited texts representing Gāndhārī of various periods increases. However, at this point, the preference for the *-a* ending in the Gāndhārī London Dharmapada (Dhp-G^L), Senior scroll 5 (SĀ-G^{SS}), and this text, which differ in relative dating, are written by different scribes, represent different genres, and are preserved in two separate manuscript collections, appears to support the tentative conclusion that the relative frequency of particular endings may be a function largely of scribal convention, personal preference, or other scribal idiosyncrasies.⁶

In the case of this text, the possibility that endings in a particular morphological category are determined by a scribal idiosyncrasy rather than by stem type or other phonological or orthographic factors is reinforced through a review of the distribution of the endings that appear with different types of nouns and adjectives in the nominative singular masculine.⁷ A comparison of words appearing with the *-a* and *-o* endings reveals a slight preference for *-a* in the case of simple nouns (*-a* 45/8 and *-o* 7/5), and an approximately equal distribution of adjectives (*-a* 38/13 and *-o* 12/11), including similar numbers of past participles and gerundives, as well as adjectival compounds. Further, even though there is a preference for the ending *-a* in the total number of occurrences, the same word can be found with both the *-a* and *-o* endings: *vivaga* (24), *vivago* (2); *anagaḍa* (12), *anagaḍo* (2); and *upaḍa-dhama* (8), *upaḍa-dhamo* (6). The only marked disparity between the

³ The tally of *-a* endings (131/51) includes one case of the apparent ending *-am* for a compound that is clearly nominative singular masculine: *upaḍa-dhama* (*upaḍadhama^m di*, l. 46). However, this likely reflects a paleographic convention of a pseudo-anusvāra used after a word-final *-ma* before the particle *di*: Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.1.21 *ma*.

⁴ Salomon 2008: 135 [Table 9]; Glass 2007: 127 [§ 6.1.1.1] (*-a* (12/9), *-e* (6/5), *-o* (2/2)); Lenz 2003: 47 [§ 5.1.1.1] (*-a* (7/2), *-o* (1/1)). Cf. Allon 2001: 108 [§ 6.1.1.1.1]; Salomon 2008: 133–135 [§ II.4.1.1.1].

⁵ Salomon 2008: 344–345 [Table 16].

⁶ Salomon 1999: 130–132 [§ 6.5.1]; Allon 2001: 106–107 [§ 6.1.1]; Salomon 2008: 134 [§ II.4.1.1.1].

⁷ For the distribution of endings on the basis of stem type as noun, adjective, or participle, see Lenz 2003: 47 [§ 5.1.1.1]; Salomon 2000: 94 [§ I.7.1.1.1.1].

use of the *-a* and *-o* endings occurs in the case of nominal compounds functioning as nouns where *-a* (46/29) occurs almost three times more frequently than *-o* (17/10).

The ending *-e* is much more restricted than either *-a* or *-o* and occurs only in simple nouns (3/2: *pugale*, l. 84; *vaṣage*, l. 72 [2x]) and nominal compounds that function as nouns (5/5: *adiḍa*⟨*g⟩*are*, l. 110; *pacupanatva-svabhava*, l. 79; *para-bhav[e]*, l. 100; *śatagare*, l. 111; and *sva-bhave*, l. 100). Here, it is important to note that in all occurrences, the ending *-e* appears in conjunction with other forms ending in *-e* regardless of their case and therefore may result simply from an “affinity” with these forms or from the scribe’s habit in using a particular ending within a given passage. For example, it can occur in a series of similarly declined nominatives: *vaṣage* (l. 72 [2x]); *jive* (n.), *bhutatve* (n.), *pugale* (m.) (l. 84)⁸; and *adiḍa*⟨*g⟩*are* (m.), *śatagare* (m.) (ll. 110–111). The *-e* ending can also occur in conjunction with locatives ending in *-e*: *svabhav[e] parabhav[e] asti • parabhava svabhava asti •* (l. 100).⁹

II.4.1.1.1.2. Nominative Singular Neuter

Nominative singular neuter *a*-stem endings include *-a* (178/50), *-o* (13/10), *-am/-am̐* (24/7), *-e* (6/5), and *-u* (3/2), and *-om̐* (2/1). As in the case of the nominative singular masculine, here also the ending *-a* is the most frequent by far, representing almost four times the number of occurrences and twice the number of distinct words as compared to all of the other endings combined. Further, as in the case of the masculine, so also in the nominative singular neuter, the same word occurs with multiple endings, although, for certain words, there is a preference for *-a* in the total number of occurrences: *viñana* (2), *viñano* (1); *arya-sace* (1), *arya-saca* (1); *anuyujidava* (3) *anuyujidavo* (2), *anuyujidavu* (1); *so/sapala* (8), *so/sapalo* (2); *bhudatva* (1), *bhudatve* (1); and *vatava* (43), *vatave* (1). Words ending in *-a* include simple nouns (51/19), nominal compounds functioning as nouns (14/7), participial adjectives (25/6), gerundives (56/6), and nominal compounds functioning as adjectives (32/12).

The ending *-o* (13/10) is represented by four nouns (*anagamo*, l. 63; *viñano*, l. 128; ⟨*ru⟩[p]-(*)*o*, l. 129 corrected from *j(*a)p(*o)*; *karano*, l. 133) and six adjectives, including three nominal compounds functioning as adjectives (*anagaḍo*, 51D(v) l. 6; *apalo*, l. 57; *sapalo*, ll. 4, 57) and three gerundives (*anuyujidavo*, 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 2; l. 86; *daḍavo*, ll. 7, 31; *p(*ro)[chi]ḍavo*, 51A–B(v)+53A l. 6).

Among the twenty-four occurrences of the ending *-am/-am̐* (24/7), three are followed by the independent particle *eva*: *kaḍgam eva* (l. 52), and two in the same pattern *adiḍa adidam eva vatava • anagaḍa ana(*gaḍam e)v(*a) v(*a)tava • pracupana pracupanam eva vatava •* (ll. 76–77). The only other nominative singular neuter form that occurs before *eva* has the ending *-e*: *vatave eva* (l. 101). This *-am* ending might then be assumed to preserve the original final *m* of the OIA nominative singular neuter ending *-am* before a word beginning with a vowel.¹⁰ The original final *m* is also usually preserved in the set phrase *sarvam asti* (18) (con. *s(*a)rva asti*, l. 101).

⁸ Cf. *jiva*, *bhutatva*, *pugala*: ll. 88, 92, 118, 119.

⁹ Allon 2001: 107 [§ 6.1.1.1].

¹⁰ For the treatment of original final *m* in Gāndhārī, see Brough 1962: 111 [§ 71]; Allon 2001: 101 [§ 5.6.3]; Glass 2007: 125 [§ 5.5.3].

However, in the vast majority of cases of the OIA ending *-am* before a vowel-initial word, the ending becomes simply *-a* for the neuter nominative as well as for the neuter and masculine accusative singular.¹¹ In the three remaining occurrences of the nominative singular neuter ending *-am/-aṃ* (*akamaṃ*, l. 3; *apaṃ*, l. 25; *paṃcamaṃ*, l. 120), the anusvāra might be viewed as a mere paleographic convention, which is encountered regularly in the case of the base character *p-* and also occasionally in the case of *ma*. In the case of a word-final *p-* or *ma*, an anusvāra is observed six times in both nominative and accusative neuter forms, as well as in independent adverbs that precede the particles *di*, *hi*, and *ca*. The greatest number (4) appear before *di* (P/Skt *iti*): *akamaṃ di* (l. 3); *amaṃ di* (51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]; l. 10); and *rupoṃ di* (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4). One occurrence precedes *hi* (P/Skt *hi*) (*apaṃ hi*, l. 25), and one precedes *ca* (P/Skt *ca*) (*paṃcamaṃ ca*, l. 120). However, the probability that these word-final anusvāras are the result of paleographic convention is strengthened by etymologically unexpected anusvāras and their appearance in forms that cannot be explained through the merging of masculine and neuter forms: for example, in the nominative singular masculine form *upaḍa-dhama^m di* (l. 46. Cf. the nominative singular masculine form *[u]paḍa-dhama di* also in l. 46); the nominative plural neuter form *japo^m di* (l. 127 corrected to *⟨*ru⟩po*); and in the word in *ma^mḍa = matam* (51jjjj l. 1; l. 19).

As in the case of the masculine, the ending *-e* (6/5) representing the nominative singular neuter is very restricted and is found only in the two simple nouns *jive* (l. 84) and *bhūḍatve* (l. 84), the nominal compound *ar[ya]-sace* (l. 85), and two adjectives, the ordinal number *paṃcame* (ll. 85, 91) and the gerundive *vatave* (l. 101). Thus, our text contains an approximately equal number of such *e*-ending forms in both the nominative singular masculine (8/7) and neuter (6/5). This presents a contrast with other Gāndhārī texts edited thus far in which the nominative singular masculine form ending in *-e* is common and the neuter form rarely occurs.¹² With the exception of the gerundive *vatave* (l. 101), these nominative singular neuter forms ending in *-e* appear in repeated patterns of similarly declined words and hence may be the result of “affinity” or of the scribe’s habit in a particular passage within the manuscript: *jive* and *bhūḍatve* in *vatava jive asti • bhūḍatve asti • pugale asti* (l. 84); and *paṃcame* and *arya-sace* in *paṃcame ar[ya]sace (*asti)* (l. 85. Cf. *pa[m]came aryasaca*, l. 91).

Again, in contrast to its frequent appearance in certain other previously edited Gāndhārī texts (AG-G^L, EĀ-G, and Dhp-G^K), the nominative singular neuter ending *-u* (3/2) occurs in only two words, both gerundives: *anuyujidavu* (l. 109); and *ukṣivīḍav[u]* (ll. 115, 117).¹³

Finally, in the ending *-oṃ* (2/1), which occurs twice in the single word *rupoṃ* (ll. 127, 128, *⟨*ru⟩poṃ* corrected from *japoṃ*), the final anusvāra may simply result from paleographic convention in the base character *p-*.

¹¹ See *a + a*: *adiḍa anagaḍa* (l. 72); *aya[ḍa]na asti* (l. 85); *avivakavivaga asti* (ll. 4, 8); *avivakavivaga adiḍa adiḍaḥanena* (ll. 29–30); *kama avivagena* (51D(r) l. 5); *treḍaṣa ayaḍana* (l. 89); *nirudha ani(*rudha)* (ll. 55–56); *pala asti* (l. 28); *pala[kara]na astikarana* (l. 5); *(*sa)[rva] aha* (l. 84); *[sa]rva ukṣivīḍav[u]* (l. 117); *sarva [aṣ](*a) [na t](*a)[ṣ](*a) sarva anupaṣapana* (51jjjj l. 1). For *a + e*: *aryasaca ekunaviṣaḍa* (l. 120). For *a + e* and *a + u*: *viṇana evaruva upajadi* (l. 93).

¹² Salomon 2008: 135 [§ II.4.1.1.1 and Table 9], 136 [§ II.4.1.1.2 and Table 10].

¹³ Salomon 2008: 136 [§ II.4.1.1.2 and Table 10].

II.4.1.1.1.3. Accusative Singular Masculine and Neuter

Given the prevalence of copula constructions typical of its scholastic style, this text contains markedly fewer accusative forms than would be encountered in other literary genres.

Masculine: Accusative singular masculine forms ending in *-a* (7/4) include the two simple nouns *vivaga* (l. 35) and *[nera]a* (l. 44), the nominal compound *anupaḍa-dhama* (51D(r) l. 3; ll. 36–37, 63, 66), and the nominal compound *anagaḍa* (l. 63). The ending *-o* (1/1) is represented only by the nominal compound (**anupaḍa-dha*)[*mo*] (l. 141), whose final syllable is damaged.

Neuter: Accusative singular neuter forms ending in *-a* (12/8) include the four simple nouns *kama* (l. 35), *karana* (l. 37), *jana* (ll. 55, 56), and *dukha* (51A–B(v)+53A ll. 1, 5), one nominal compound *same-praṣana* (ll. 48, 49–50), and three adjectives including the ordinal *paḍama* (ll. 55, 56), the past participle *[pr](*)[c](*)[p](*)[n](*)* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 1), and the bahuvrīhi compound *eva-ruva* (l. 93). The ending *-e* (2/1) occurs only in the word *arabane*, which appears twice in contiguous lines (51A–B(v)+53A ll. 3, 4). The ending *-om* (1/1) appears in the word *rupom* (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4), in which the final anusvāra once again might be explained by the paleographic convention of a pseudo-anusvāra with the base character *p-*.

II.4.1.1.1.4. Singular Oblique Cases Masculine and Neuter

Instrumental: For all stem types, including simple nouns and nominal compounds functioning as nouns as well as verbal adjectives and nominal compounds functioning as adjectives, the regular Gāndhārī ending *-ena* (47/31) is used consistently for the instrumental singular masculine and neuter.

Dative: This text contains only two probable dative singular forms, both in the masculine with the probable ending *-ae* (2/2). Unfortunately, since both occurrences are damaged, the ending cannot be confirmed: *[ś](*)[m](*)* or *[ś](*)[m](*)ae* (l. 26); and *⟨*a⟩unupaḍa* + or *⟨*a⟩nupaḍa(*e)* (ll. 47–48). In the case of *[ś](*)[m](*)ae*, the final syllable is clearly a vowel-carrying sign read as *[a]*., and would thus form part of a likely dative ending *-ae*.

Ablative: The most frequent ablative ending for both the masculine and neuter is *-do/-do* (7/4), with *-da* (1/1) (*[pr](*)[cup](*)naḍa*, l. 52) and *-de* (1/1) (*[s](*)[p](*)lade*, l. 6) also attested.

Genitive: The genitive singular is represented most frequently by *-ṣa* (16/13) with the modified sibilant *ṣ*, although the standard sibilant *s* is also found (9/4). In the three remaining occurrences of the genitive, the reading is uncertain as either *-ṣa* or *-sa* (3/3). Thus, this text appears to conform to the pattern of using *-ṣa* for the genitive singular as found in Central Asian Kharoṣṭhī documents and in certain inscriptions.¹⁴ However, it is interesting to note that in the case of the word *kamasa*, the standard sibilant form *-sa* is used in all five of its occurrences (Phonology § II.3.2.3.3.2 Sibilant + Consonant Clusters).

Locative: Locative singular forms end in *-a* (14/9) or *-e* (9/8). Locatives in *-a* occur in a comparable number of masculine (8/5) and neuter (6/4) forms, but the *-e* ending appears much more frequently in the masculine (8/7) than the neuter (1/1). With regard to the distribution of nouns and adjectives, the two endings display a marked disparity. Whereas the ending *-a* appears in a similar number of nouns (8/5) and adjectives (6/3), *-e* occurs only with nouns (9/8). When the distribution of nouns and adjectives is combined with gender, a striking disparity emerges also in

¹⁴ Brough 1962: 67–70; Salomon 2000: 70 [§ I.5.5.2.33], 75–76 [§ I.5.9.2].

the use of the *-a* ending. In the case of the masculine, nouns (7/4) far outnumber adjectives (1/1), and in the case of the neuter, adjectives (5/3) outnumber nouns (1/1). In other words, the *-a* ending appears rarely in the case of masculine adjectives and correspondingly rarely in the case of neuter nouns. However, given the small sample of locative singular forms of both genders in our text, it is impossible to determine whether these disparities represent a significant pattern.¹⁵

II.4.1.1.2. Masculine and Neuter Plural

II.4.1.1.2.1. Nominative and Accusative Plural, Masculine and Neuter

Nominative plural masculine: The most frequently attested ending for the nominative plural masculine is *-a* (48/23) with an equal distribution of nouns (24/10) and adjectives (24/13). The ending *-e* (3/3) occurs only three times. In one occurrence, the reading is uncertain (*pav[e]*, l. 48), and in the two remaining occurrences the use of the *-e* ending may be influenced by affinity with surrounding forms ending in *-e*: *bhave* preceded by the nominative plural cardinal number, *catvare* (l. 103); and *sarva-bhave* preceded by the locative compound *neraiya-bhave* (l. 99).

Nominative plural neuter: As in the case of the masculine, the most frequent nominative plural neuter ending is *-a* (8/8). The ending *-e* does not occur at all, and the ending *-ani* (1/1) is found in only one word, which appears in a scriptural citation: “[Or] it is proclaimed, ‘For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes’” (*prov(*u)c(*a)di hedun(*a) hi ca sa palani paḍikakṣiḍava* •, ll. 26–27). The ending *-o* (1/1) is also found only once in the word *⟨*ru⟩po* (corrected from *japo*), which occurs twice in the same line: “If one states, [o] ‘Material form exists through [various] “modes,” but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form’” (*yi(*di) ah(*a)di bhavehi ⟨*ru⟩poṃ asti nasti traē ⟨*ru⟩po di* •, l. 127).¹⁶ The first occurrence has been interpreted as nominative singular neuter, referring to “material form” in the abstract, but the second occurrence, modified by the cardinal number adjective “three” (*traē*), is clearly plural. Once again, it is likely that the anusvāra in the first occurrence, *⟨*ru⟩poṃ*, is a pseudo-anusvāra with the base character *p-*. The *-o* in the second occurrence, which would be unique among neuter plural endings, might then also be explained as a result of affinity with the preceding word *⟨*ru⟩poṃ* in the same sentence.

Accusative plural, masculine and neuter: In all three occurrences, the accusative plural ending for both the masculine (2/2) and neuter (1/1) is *-a*: *manuṣa* (m., l. 41); *anupaḍa-dhama* (m., l. 50); and *[n]ana-vila[kṣa]na* (n., 51A–B(v)+53A l. 5).

II.4.1.1.2.2. Plural Oblique Cases, Masculine and Neuter

Instrumental and genitive plural, masculine and neuter: This text contains examples of plural masculine and neuter forms in the instrumental and genitive, all of which conform to the expected Gāndhārī declensional pattern. The instrumental ending is *-ehi* (9/5) for both the masculine (4/3) and the neuter (5/2). The ending *-eha* (2/2) also occurs in the case of two compounds in a single line: *sarva-bhaveha* and *sarva-pracageha* (l. 68). The ending *-ana* (6/6) is used for the genitive plural in both the masculine (5/5) and the neuter (1/1): *[dha]mana* (m., l. 47); *akuṣa[lana]* (m., l. 47); *anupanana* (m., l. 47); *neraiyana* (m., l. 103); *pavagana* (m., l. 47); and *uvahaḍa-idriana* (n., l. 102).

¹⁵ Salomon 2008: 139–140 [§ II.4.1.1.5]; Fussman 1989: 471–472 [§ 31.1–3].

¹⁶ Text Notes: [127] *japoṃ asti nasti [tra]e japo di* •.

II.4.1.1.3. Feminine Stems in Original *ā*

Nominative and accusative singular feminine: The nominative singular forms of feminine stems in original *ā* appear only with the ending *-a* (25/12): adjectives (4/4) include past participles (2/2) and bahuvrīhi compounds (2/2); nouns (21/8) include simple nouns (8/5) as well as abstract nouns ending with the original suffix *-tā* (13/3). The accusative singular feminine, also ending in *-a*, is represented only by nouns (2/2): *mala* (l. 41); and *[ved](*)a[n](*)a* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 3).

Oblique cases singular and plural feminine: Singular oblique cases follow the pattern observed in the declension of masculine and neuter stems in *a*. The dative usually ends in *-ae* (5/3) with one occurrence in *-aye* (1/1): *[p](*)a[rinipana]-īhadāye* (l. 80). The ablative singular ending in *-de* occurs only in *paḍiñade* (l. 10), and the genitive singular ending *-ae* is found in *[metra]e* (l. 25). One possible locative ending in *-a* is found in *[he]m(a)-[u]khkṣa* (l. 60). In the plural, the regular Gāndhārī feminine instrumental ending *-ahi* appears in *prañahi* (l. 115).

II.4.1.2. Other Vocalic Stems

II.4.1.2.1. Stems in Original *i, ī*

Masculine: There is only one example of a masculine stem in original *i*, which is in the nominative singular: *aṣi[p](*)ad[i]* (l. 94). There are no examples of neuter *i* stems.

Feminine: In Gāndhārī, feminine stems in original *i/ī* are declined as a single category of stems ending in *-i* (12/8). Feminine stems in original *i* are all nouns (5/5). Nominative singular forms in *-i* are found in *prati* (l. 129), *jadi* (l. 43), *[h](*)e[d](*)u-[p](*)a[l](*)a-[p](*)ra]ti* (l. 7), and *k(*)ay(*)a-s(*)ad[i]* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 3). The genitive plural ending *-ina* for an original *i*-stem noun appears in *agulina* (l. 41). Only one feminine stem in original *ī* is found (5/1); the nominative singular ends in *-i* in *samagri* (ll. 130, 134, 140), and the accusative singular also has *-i* in *samagri* (ll. 45, 46).

II.4.1.2.2. Stems in Original *u*

Stems in *u* are represented by two nouns (9/2). The masculine noun *hedu* occurs with the ending *-u* in the nominative in compound-final position (l. 3) and in the accusative as an independent noun (ll. 1, 2), with *-uha* in the instrumental plural (l. 68), and with *-una* in the genitive plural (l. 27). The *u*-stem noun *dhadu* appears only in the nominative singular with the ending *-u* (ll. 85, 89, 92, 120) and could be taken as masculine, in accordance with its declension in Sanskrit, or as feminine, in accordance with its declension in Pali. It has been tentatively construed as feminine in this text.

II.4.1.2.3. Stems in Original *r*

This text contains only one example of a stem in original *r*, the agent noun *kata* (P *kattar*, Skt *kartṛ*), which takes the ending *-a* (1/1) in the nominative singular masculine (l. 54).

II.4.1.3. Original Consonantal Stems

II.4.1.3.1. Stems in Original *in*

The only stem in original *in* is *rupino* (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4).¹⁷ Even though *rupino* appears to represent an oblique form, perhaps genitive singular, it has been interpreted on the basis of context as a nominative singular masculine: “With regard to that it should then be said that that ‘nature’ consists of material form, [since] visual perceptual consciousness should perceive material form” (*tatra vatava tena t(*a) bh(*ava) rupino cakhuviñana viñeadi rupom di •*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 3–4). This is syntactically parallel with the next statement in which the corresponding word *dhama* is clearly in the nominative: “If one states, [o] ‘[It is perceived by] mental perceptual consciousness,’ [p] then [its] ‘nature’ should be said to be [constituted by] the factor [sense sphere]” (*yidi aha manoviñanena tena bhava dhama vatava*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 4–5). Thus, it would appear that in this case *rupino* is declined on the basis of the extended stem ending in *-ina*, which then takes the nominative singular masculine *a*-stem ending *-o*. Hence, it is impossible to determine on the basis of this single word the extent to which, at least for the scribe of this text, the declension of stems in original *in* has merged with or remains distinct from other Gāndhārī vowel-stem declensions, in particular stems in original *i* and *a*.¹⁸

II.4.1.3.2. Stems in Original *an*

The only example of a stem in original *an* is *adhva* (P *addhan*, Skt *adhvan*), which is treated as an *a*-stem noun declined in the nominative plural masculine: *a[dh](*v)[a]* (l. 70).¹⁹

II.4.1.3.3. Stems in Original *ant/vant*

Apart from the parasmaipada present participle *sada/asada* treated in Morphology and Syntax § II.4.4.8.1 Present Participles, stems in original *ant/vant* are represented only by three distinct words (4/3): *arahaḍa*; *bhagavaḍa*; and *[a]śilavata*. Gāndhārī forms corresponding to OIA stems in original *ant* of the participial type such as *arhant* are, with the exception of certain oblique cases such as the instrumental singular, usually based on an extended thematized *a*-stem ending in *-anta/-ata*. Either the strong form is preserved throughout the declension as is generally the case in other Prakrits, or the weak forms are distinguished from the strong by intervocalic voicing of *-t-* to *-d-*.²⁰ This text contains the independently declined form *arahaḍa* (l. 75) in the genitive singular masculine, which conforms to the weak stem of the OIA consonant-ending declension (P *arahato*, Skt *arhataḥ*). The same word also occurs as the prior member of a compound in *arahaḍa-bhava* (l. 74), where it appears to take the extended stem in its weak form ending in *-ata* with voicing of the intervocalic *-t-*.

¹⁷ Two other possible *in*-stems are *upaḍi-* and *anupaḍi-* from Skt *utpādin* and Skt *anutpādin* as the hypothetical prior members of the compounds *upaḍa-dhama* and *anupaḍa-dhama*. See Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] + ///^[51D(r)][ś].[k]. *ca u[pa]ḍadhama anu[pa]ḍadhama kato •*.

¹⁸ Salomon 2000: 99 [§ I.7.1.4.1]; Salomon 2008: 142 [§ II.4.1.3.1].

¹⁹ Lenz 2010: 41 [§ 4.1.2].

²⁰ Burrow 1937: 29 [§ 72]; Pischel 1981 [1957]: 449 [§ 560], 323–328 [§§ 396–398]; Salomon 2008: 144 [§ II.4.1.7.2], 160 [§ II.4.5.7].

In the case of OIA stems in original *vant* of the possessive type, several forms are attested in Gāndhārī, including those that reflect the consonant-ending declension in OIA, those based on the weak extended stem ending in *-ada* with voicing of the intervocalic dental *-t-*, and those based on the reduced stem ending in *-va*.²¹ In our text, the form *[a]śīlavata* (51D(v) l. 6) represents the nominative plural masculine with the preservation of the original unvoiced dental as would be expected in the case of the underlying cluster *nt* in the OIA form (Skt *aśīlavantaḥ*). The form *bhagavaḍa* (l. 34) represents the instrumental singular masculine based on the OIA weak stem (Skt *bhagavatā*) with voicing of the intervocalic *-t-*. The final occurrence of a stem in *vant* also appears as *bhagavaḍa* (l. 47), but, according to the context, it is nominative singular masculine: “And it should be said that the Bhagavat states ...” (*vatava ca bhagavaḍa ahadi*, l. 47). In this case, the Gāndhārī nominative singular masculine form *bhagavaḍa* takes the form of an extended stem ending in *-anta* based on the weak stem *bhagavata* with voicing of the intervocalic *-t-*.²²

II.4.1.4. Nominal Compounds

This text contains nominal compounds of all types familiar from Pali and Sanskrit. However, in the absence of a textual parallel, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a compound from a collocation of independently declined words. In view of the tendency toward the neutralization of final vowels in Gāndhārī in general, and the prevalence of the *-a* ending in this text in particular, words may actually be functioning as separate declined forms, even though they appear to be in stem form or as prior members of a compound.²³ An analogous difficulty also applies in the case of the compound *voharo-vivaga* (l. 27). According to the Pali semi-parallel *vohāra-vepakka*, these two words should be taken as in compound.²⁴ However, given the preservation of what would appear to be an *-o* ending on *vohara*, this might be better described as a pseudo-compound, that is, two or more words functioning as a compound but preserving case terminations of the prior members.²⁵ Given this flexibility and variability, it is possible, especially in the case of karmadhāraya compounds with adjectival or noun appositional relationships, that a given group of words construed as a compound might instead represent separately inflected, independent words. Nonetheless, compounds have often been assumed, even in the absence of a confirming textual parallel, due to the frequent use of compounds in scholastic compositions generally and, in certain cases, the presence of analogous compounds attested in other Buddhist scholastic texts.

Since no explicit compound analysis is presented in the text itself, and since internal relationships within a compound are rarely made clear through syntactic paraphrase, the interpretation of certain compounds remains open to question. Among the compound-types represented, simple karmadhārayas (115/55), including *dvigus* (5/3), are the most numerous by far, followed by

²¹ Allon 2001: 113–114 [§ 6.1.4.4]; Salomon 2008: 144 [§ II.4.1.7.2].

²² For a detailed discussion, see Allon 2001: 113–114 [§ 6.1.4.5].

²³ Glass 2007: 130 [§ 6.1.5].

²⁴ Text Notes: [27] *saṅga voharovi[va]ga yaṣa ya[sa]* [28] *sa[rja]nadi taṣa taṣa voharadi*.

²⁵ For examples of pseudo-compounds in which the prior member ends with an *o* vowel, see Salomon 2000: 100 [§ I.7.1.5]; Allon 2001: 114 [§ 6.1.5]. Cf. BHS 49 [§ 8.12], 125 [§§ 23.5–9].

tatpuruṣas (60/40), *nañ-* or privative karmadhārayas (52/14), bahuvrīhis (47/20), and finally dvandvas (2/1).²⁶

Karmadhārayas functioning as nouns (104/48) are in most cases straightforward and comprise the adjective-noun as well as the appositional noun-noun subtypes. Adjectival karmadhārayas (6/4), taking the form adjective-adjective and in one case noun-adjective, are comparatively uncommon: *adiḍanagaḍa-pracupana-sakhaḍa* (l. 83); *adiḍa-anagaḍa* (ll. 138–139); *kuśalakuśala* (l. 114); and *astitvabhiniḍana* (ll. 78–80 [3x]). Among the *nañ-* karmadhārayas (52/14) formed with the privative prefixes *a-/an-*, only one compound functions as a noun: *akamaḍ*, “something other than action” (l. 3). The remaining examples function as adjectives with a variety of adjective types as second members. The most numerous are past participles (41/9) including *aḍaḍa*, *anagaḍa*, *anirudha*, (**aniv*)(**rta*), *anupanana*, *anupaṣapana/anuvaṣapana*, *avivagatva*, *aṣakhaḍa*, and *asabhina*. The compound *anagaḍa* (P/Skt *anāgata*), “future,” itself occurs twenty-nine times, which is to be expected given the focus of this abhidharma text on the existence of past and future factors. Simple adjectives (4/3) are found in *akuśala* (51C+51F(r) l. 5; l. 47), (**a*)*nala* (l. 26), and *as(*vago)* (l. 18), and the present participle of root *as* (6/1) occurs as both *asaḍa/asata* (nom. sg. m./n.) and *asaḍa* (gen. sg. n.).

Tatpuruṣa compounds (60/40) exhibit a variety of internal relationships, with the genitive the most common. This text contains three examples of compounds that function as proper names, all three tatpuruṣas: *aguḍi-mala* (l. 41); *vivarja-vaḍa* (l. 90); and *sarvasti-vaḍa*, which appears as *maha-sarvasti-vaḍa* in a karmadhāraya relationship with the first member (ll. 82, 82–83; 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6, 7).

All bahuvrīhi compounds (45/19) are internally karmadhārayas, with the exception of *kayanupaśa* (51A–B(v)+53A l. 3). If interpreted as a compound as suggested by the Pali parallel, this clearly functions as nominative singular masculine, but it is uncertain whether it should be interpreted as equivalent to the *-in* suffix form *kayanupaśi* (P *kāyānupassī*, Skt *kāyānupaśyī*), formed with the possessive *-in* suffix and a neutralized final vowel, or as a bahuvrīhi ending in *-anupaśa* (P **anupassa*, Skt *anupaśya*) without the *-in* suffix.²⁷ Even though most of the bahuvrīhis are based on adjective-noun or noun-noun karmadhārayas, many are formed with prefixes including the privative prefix *a-/an-* (*apala*, *avaṣiyo*, *avivaga*, and *anathariya* corresponding to P *anathiko*, Skt *anarthika*, with the pleonastic suffix *-ika*), the prefix *ni-/nir-* (*ni(*pala)*, and *nirarthiya* corresponding to P **niratthiko*, Skt *nirarthika*, also with the pleonastic suffix *-ika*), and the comitative prefix *sa-/so-* (*sapala*, *sopalo*, and *savivaga*).

While most compounds contain only two members, several three-member compounds, two four-member compounds, and one seven-member compound also occur. Three-member tatpuruṣas

²⁶ Since this section is concerned primarily with compound formation, examples of compounds are cited in a regularized stem form in which transcriptional marks are preserved only when large or particularly significant portions of the compound have been reconstructed. The transcribed reading for particular compounds, the inflected forms in which they appear, and their location can be found in the Word Index at the end of this volume.

²⁷ The textual parallel clearly suggests the *-in* suffix: P *bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati* (MN I 55ff.; DN II 289ff.; SN V 138ff.; AN IV 456ff.; Vibh 191ff.). It is also possible that *kaya (a)nupaśa* constitutes a phrase in which *anupaśa*, as an absolutive form, governs *kaya* in the accusative as its direct object.

include *a(*did(a)-ana)gaḍa-bhava* (ll. 72–73), *(*anagaḍa-vaṣaga)-samunagado* (51D(v) ll. 4–5), *abromi-cia-vaṣa* (l. 39), *duḍaśa-ayaḍana-sagrahida* (ll. 116–117), *[bra/bro]mi-cia-vaṣa* (ll. 38, 45, 34, 35–36, 39, 65), *ṣaṭh(a)-ai(*ḍa)na-ḥida* (l. 53), and *hedu-pala-prati* (l. 7). Three-member karmadhārayas include *paca-bhata-kala* (ll. 107, 108), *pure-bhata-kala* (ll. 107, 108), and *ruva-cakh(u)-aiḍana* (ll. 96–97), and there is one example of a three-member bahuvrīhi (*akuśala-kama-svago*, l. 19). Longer compounds are represented by two four-member compounds and one seven-member compound. One four-member compound (*adiḍa-raga-doṣa-moha*, ll. 75–76) consists of a three-member dvandva modified by a preceding adjective: “past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion.” The second four-member compound (*adiḍ(a)-anagaḍa-pracupan(a)-asakhada*, l. 83) contains two dvandva units; the first unit has three members, *adiḍ(a)-anagaḍa-pracupan(a)*, each modifying an understood, nominally used adjective, *sakhada*, and the second unit is an adjective, *asakhada*, also used nominally: “past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors].” The longest compound attested is seven members, *para-kadha-para-aiḍana-para-dhadu-yo(a)* (l. 106), consisting of three standard two-word units in dvandva relationships, *para-kadha*, *para-aiḍana*, and *para-dhadu*, followed by the noun *yo(a)* in a tatpuruṣa, probably instrumental relationship with all three prior members: “connection with the aggregates of another, the sense-spheres of another, and the elements of another.”

II.4.2. Pronouns, Pronominals, and Numerals

II.4.2.1. Personal Pronouns

This text contains only two forms of the first- and second-person pronouns, both enclitic: *me* as first-person genitive singular (l. 81); and *de* as second-person genitive singular (l. 105).

II.4.2.2. Third-Person/Demonstrative Pronouns

II.4.2.2.1. Base *sa-/ta-*

Demonstrative pronouns from the base *sa-/ta-* display remarkable variety, and possibly contamination, across the nominative singular and plural forms of all three genders. Once again in the following table (8), a single number in parentheses represents the total number of occurrences, and an asterisk indicates an uncertain gender or number.

Table 8. Demonstrative pronouns: masculine, neuter, and feminine
(total occurrences)

| | Singular | | | Plural | | |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | Masculine | Neuter | Feminine | Masculine | Neuter | Feminine |
| Nominative | <i>so</i> (7) | <i>ta</i> (12) | <i>sa</i> (3) | <i>te</i> (2) | <i>ṣa</i> (1) | — |
| | <i>ta</i> (5) | <i>so</i> (4) | <i>se</i> (1) | <i>ta</i> (1) | | |
| | <i>sa</i> (2) | <i>sa</i> (1) | | <i>se</i> (1) | | |
| | * <i>so</i> (2) | | | | | |
| Accusative | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Instrumental | <i>tena</i> (8) | | | — | — | — |
| Dative | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Ablative | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Genitive | <i>tasa</i> (4) | <i>taṣa</i> (1) | <i>taṣa</i> (1) | — | — | — |
| | <i>taṣa</i> (1) | | | | | |
| | <i>tasa/ṣa</i> (4) | | | | | |
| Locative | <i>tasmi</i> (1) | — | — | — | — | — |

In the case of the nominative singular third-person pronoun, forms expected from OIA occur most often for all three genders: *so* (7) and *sa* (2) as masculine; *ta* (12) as neuter; and *sa* (3) as feminine. However, especially in the case of the masculine and neuter, forms typical of the other gender appear with noticeable frequency: *ta* (5) as masculine; and *so* (4) and *sa* (1) as neuter. Since comparison with a textual parallel is not possible in the case of our text, the gender identification of certain of these unexpected forms might be open to question, but in most cases the referent is clear from the context. For example, the five occurrences of the form *ta* in the masculine nominative singular refer to the masculine nouns *vipaka*, *dharmā*, and *bhava*. Similarly, all five occurrences of the neuter nominative singular forms *sa* and *so* refer to the neuter noun *kama*. The nominative singular feminine form *se* (l. 97) presumably refers to the feminine noun *pradiṇa*, which appears in a similar pattern in lines 10, 15, and 50.

In the case of the nominative plural, the expected masculine form *te* or *ta* occurs three times, and *se*, although not unequivocal in number or gender, is likely a masculine plural referring to the understood referent *dharmā*. Even if the referents of these pronouns can be clarified by context, the number often remains uncertain, especially given their frequent use with the verb *asti*, which can occur with both singular and plural nominative subjects. The masculine nominative form *te* is used once with the clearly plural verb *kareasu* (l. 2), and once with the possibly plural noun *pav[e]* (l. 48), but *ta* (l. 116) and *se* (l. 69) occur in a parallel pattern, in both cases with the verb *asti*, and have been construed as plural on the basis of context alone. In the case of the neuter, the form *ṣa* clearly refers to the neuter noun *palani* and hence would be plural. This text follows the general Gāndhārī pattern of blurring m./n. gender distinction especially among nouns, but in our text, pronouns display this pattern particularly prominently.

Oblique forms, which occur only in the singular, show greater regularity for all three genders. The masculine and neuter instrumental form is consistently *tena*, and the locative masculine, with only one occurrence, appears as *tasmi*. Genitive forms are generally regular, with *tasa/taṣa* (P *tassa*, Skt *tasya*) for the masculine and neuter, and *taṣa* (P *tassā*, Skt *tasyāḥ*) for the feminine. Unfortunately, manuscript damage in the case of four occurrences of the genitive singular pronoun prevents a secure determination as to whether the sibilant has the modified form \underline{s} or the standard form *s*.

II.4.2.2.2. Base *eṣa-/eta-*

Among the three attested forms of the demonstrative pronoun base *eṣa-/eta-*, the nominative singular neuter form *eḍa* (3) is regular. The form *[et](*a)* (1) modifies *vivaga* and is therefore presumably masculine and, from context, probably nominative singular. The form *eṣa* (1) is found only in a partially preserved sentence where it could be either a nominative singular masculine or an accusative singular neuter. Even though its form would suggest the nominative singular masculine, it has been very tentatively interpreted as an accusative singular neuter on the basis of context.²⁸

II.4.2.2.3. Base *aya-/iḍa-/ima-*

Only two examples of the demonstrative base *aya-/iḍa-* occur. The form *aya* modifies the nominative singular neuter noun *kama* and therefore represents an extension of this Sanskrit masculine form to the neuter.²⁹ The genitive singular neuter form *iḍasa* (3) is the expected Gāndhārī form.

II.4.2.3. Relative Pronouns

Relative pronouns display greater consistency than their demonstrative counterparts, despite the usual variation in their final vowels. In the following table (9), a single number in parentheses represents the total number of occurrences, and an asterisk indicates an uncertain gender or number.

²⁸ Text Notes: [82] + ^{[52F(v)]?} *jaga eṣa prochi* •.

²⁹ Salomon 2008: 148 [§ II.4.2.3.3].

Table 9. Relative pronouns: masculine, neuter, and feminine
(total occurrences)

| | Singular | | | Plural | | |
|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|--------|----------|
| | Masculine | Neuter | Feminine | Masculine | Neuter | Feminine |
| Nominative | <i>ya</i> (2)
<i>yo</i> (1) | <i>ya</i> (2)
<i>yo</i> (2) | <i>ya</i> (1) | <i>ye</i> (2)
<i>ya</i> (2) | — | — |
| Accusative | <i>ya</i> (1) | <i>ya</i> (1) | — | — | — | — |
| Instrumental | <i>yena</i> (3) | | — | — | — | — |
| | * <i>yena</i> (1) | | | | | |
| Dative | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Ablative | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Genitive | <i>yaśa</i> (3)
<i>yasa</i> (3) | | — | — | — | — |
| Locative | <i>yasmi</i> (1) | | — | — | — | — |

The nominative in both the masculine and neuter appears as either *ya* (m. 2, n. 2) or *yo* (m. 1, n. 2), virtually equally distributed in each case, while the accusative singular takes the form *ya* (m. 1, n. 1). The nominative singular feminine also takes the regular form *ya* (1). For the plural, only the nominative masculine is found in the forms *ye* (2) and *ya* (2).

Among the oblique cases, *yena* (3) occurs as the instrumental singular masculine, and once as instrumental singular of indeterminate gender. For the genitive singular neuter, *yaśa* (3) and *yasa* (3) are equally common, thus suggesting no preference for the modified sibilant *ṣ* in the case of the relative pronoun. The locative singular masculine takes the regular form *yasmi* (1).

II.4.2.4. Interrogative Pronouns

II.4.2.4.1. Base *kad-*

The nominative singular form appears as *ki* in both the masculine (1) and the neuter (3). Since the single example of the masculine occurs together with two neuter forms in two contiguous lines, the unexpected form *ki* for the masculine may be the result of affinity with the surrounding neuter forms. The regular neuter instrumental singular form *kena* (2) also occurs.

II.4.2.4.2. *katara*, *kadama*, and *kati*

Both the comparative interrogative *kuḍara* and especially the superlative *kaḍama* are used throughout with the generalized interrogative sense “which.” Corresponding to P/Skt *katara* is *kuḍarahi* (1) in the instrumental plural neuter. The P/Skt interrogative *katama* is represented by several forms: *kaḍama* (1) in the nominative plural masculine; *kaḍama* (1) in the nominative singular neuter; *kaḍamena* (3) in the instrumental singular neuter; *kaḍamaḍa* (2) in the ablative singular neuter; and *kaḍamaśa* (1) in the genitive singular neuter. The interrogative P/Skt *kati* appears once as *kadi*, which is used with a nominative plural masculine.

II.4.2.5. Indefinite Pronouns

The adjectival indefinite pronoun in the nominative singular neuter corresponding to P *kiñci* (Skt *kiñcit*) is represented by *kici* (5) and by *kica* (15), with neutralization of the final vowel. Where the final vowel diacritic is unclear as *i* or *a*, the reconstruction as *kici* or *kica* follows the form of the indefinite pronouns that occur in the surrounding lines.

II.4.2.6. Pronominally Declined Adjectives

The most frequently encountered pronominally declined adjective is *sarva*, which occurs forty times in various cases and numbers of the masculine and neuter. Given the prominent position in the text of the Sarvāstivāda proposition “everything exists,” the nominative singular neuter form *sarvam* ending in *-am* within the formulaic pattern *sarvam asti* (20) constitutes half of these occurrences. However, the form *sarva* in the nominative singular neuter with the ending *-a* also occurs eleven times. Among these eleven occurrences, *s(*a)rva asti* (l. 101) occurs once instead of the usual *sarvam asti*, and *sarva* occurs twice before another word beginning with a vowel: *(*sa)[rva] aha* (l. 84); and *[sa]rva ukṣivīḍav[u]* (l. 117). In the other eight occurrences, *sarva* precedes a consonant or appears at the end of a sentence. In addition to *sarvam* and *sarva*, the form *sarve* also appears twice, presumably as nominative singular neuter: *[s](*ar)[ve n](*a)[st](*i)* (l. 101); and *[sa]rve asti* (l. 105). The nominative plural occurs only in the masculine, once with the expected form *sarve* and twice as *sarva*: *sarve bhava* (ll. 114–115); *sarva* (51jjjj l. 1); and *sarva anupaṣāpāna* (51jjjj l. 1). However, in all three cases the readings and hence interpretations are tentative. Oblique forms are represented by *sarvaṣa* (1) in the genitive singular neuter, and *sarveṣu* (3) in the locative plural masculine.

Besides *sarva*, other pronominally declined adjectives include *añeṣ[u]* (l. 18) as locative plural masculine, *avaro* as nominative singular masculine (51D(v) l. 3), *ubhaye* as nominative plural neuter (l. 31 [2x]), *[ubha](*e)h(*i)* as instrumental plural neuter (l. 30), *[e]k(*a)* as nominative singular masculine (l. 25), *ikaṣa* as genitive singular masculine (l. 106), and *ekaca* as nominative plural masculine (ll. 122, 123).

II.4.2.7 Numerals

II.4.2.7.1. Cardinal Numerals

The numeral “one” occurs once in the nominative singular masculine as *[e]k(*a)* (l. 25), and once in the genitive singular masculine as *ikaṣa* (l. 106). It also appears as *eka* as the prior member in three compounds: *[e]k(*a)[-m-aṃśa]* (l. 25); *eka-deśa* (51D(r) l. 1 [2x]); and *ekañha* (l. 30 [2x]).

“Two” is represented only by *du(*ve)* (l. 26), which has been tentatively corrected from *[dudo]*.³⁰

“Three” is attested as *traya* in the nominative plural neuter (l. 81) and masculine (ll. 126, 131), and as *[tra]e* (l. 127), which is tentatively understood as nominative plural neuter.

“Four” occurs only twice, as *catvare* (l. 103) in the nominative plural masculine, and in the form tentatively read as *ca[t](*u)[n](*a)* (l. 94) in the genitive plural masculine.

³⁰ Text Notes: [25] *apam* [26] *hi [e]ḍa [a].nala [ś].[m].[a]. [dudo] vi[vatas]. p.la[n]. [bromi] .[i]*.

“Eight” appears only once in a damaged fragment as *aṭhana* (51xxxx), presumably as the genitive plural, either masculine or neuter.

“Twelve” occurs five times in this text as *duaḍaśa*, in all cases together with the noun *ayaḍana*. In one occurrence, *duaḍaśa-ayaḍana-* appears to function as the prior members of the compound *duaḍaśa-[a]yaḍa[n]a-[sag](*ra)hiḍa* (ll. 116–117), even though elsewhere in our text *ayaḍana* takes the special form *aiḍana* when in compound. This one occurrence might suggest that *duaḍaśa* should also be construed as in compound in its three occurrences with the instrumental plural form *ayaḍaneha/i*. However, in these three cases *duaḍaśa* could also function not as the prior member of a compound, but as an independent and undeclined adjective modifying the following instrumental plural noun *ayaḍaneha/i*.³¹ Thus, the uninflected form *duaḍaśa* would be understood once as the nominative (l. 96), and possibly also as the instrumental plural neuter (ll. 69, 115; 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 1). In contrast to Sanskrit in which *duaḍaśa* regularly takes an uninflected form in the nominative and accusative and is declined in other oblique cases such as the instrumental plural, Gāndhārī presents examples of lists of possibly independent adjectives or nouns in which only the final member is declined. In such cases, it is impossible without a parallel to determine whether such words are to be construed as in compound or as independent words with their declension understood on the basis of the final member of the list.³²

“One hundred” occurs in the instrumental plural neuter as *śadehi* (ll. 86, 87).

II.4.2.7.2. Ordinal Numerals

The ordinal “first” appears twice presumably as *paḍama* (2) in the accusative singular neuter with *jāna*. Even though the context referring to the “first trance state” confirms the sense, the readings are problematic in both cases: $[p](*a)[ḍ](*a)⟨*ma⟩$ [*jāna*] where the syllable *ma* was omitted (l. 55); and $pa⟨*ḍ⟩[am](*a)jāna$ in which the syllable $⟨*ḍ⟩[a]$ has been corrected from an apparent $[ca]$ (l. 56).

The remaining ordinals appear in a formulaic list of nonexistent entities, which includes the fifth noble truth (*paṃcama aryasaca*), the sixth aggregate (*ṣeṭha kadha*), the thirteenth sense-sphere (*treḍaśa ayaḍana*), and the nineteenth element (*ekunaviśadi dhadu*). “Fifth” appears with at least two and perhaps three different endings in its four occurrences, all modifying *arya-saca* in the nominative singular neuter: *paṃcama* (1) in $[paṃc](*a)[m](*a\ aya)-[s](*a)ca$ whose reading is uncertain (ll. 89–90); *paṃcamam* (1) in *paṃcamam ca arya-saca* (l. 120); and *paṃcame* (2) in *paṃcame arya-sace* (ll. 85, 91). “Sixth” appears as *ṣeṭha* three times (ll. 84, 89, 91) in the nominative singular masculine and once as *ṣaṭha* (l. 53) in the compound *ṣaṭh(a)-ai⟨*ḍa⟩na-ḥiḍa*. The expected Gāndhārī equivalent for Skt *ṣaṣṭha* (P *chaṭṭha*) would be *ṣaṭha*, and in two of the occurrences of *ṣeṭha* (ll. 89, 91), the *e*-vowel diacritic is uncertain. In the third occurrence (l. 84), the *e*-vowel diacritic is clear, but it may result from affinity with preceding words in the line that end in *-e*: $(*asti\ sa)rya\ aha\ vatava\ jive\ asti \bullet bhudatve\ asti \bullet pugale\ asti \bullet \text{ṣeṭha} (*kadha\ asti)$, ll. 84–85. “Thirteenth” occurs four times in the nominative singular neuter as *treḍaśa* (ll. 85 corrected from

³¹ Pischel 1981 [1957]: 370 [§ 442]. Cf. Whitney 1971 [1889]: 183 [§ 486c]. Text Notes: [69] *ye duaḍaśa ayaḍaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti* •.

³² Glass 2007: 130 [§ 6.1.5].

*t(*r)e[śad](*a)*, 89, 91–92, 117). Finally, “nineteenth” appears as *ekunaviśadi* (ll. 85, 89, 92, 120) in the nominative singular feminine, or possibly masculine depending upon the gender of the noun *G dhadu*. The ordinals “thirteenth” and “nineteenth” are not formed by the addition of a suffix either to the cardinal or to a different stem but rather are based on the cardinals with thematization and accent shift.³³

II.4.3. Indeclinables and Adverbs

II.4.3.1. Indeclinable Particles and Conjunctions

As would be expected from its relatively formal scholastic style, this abhidharma text is a rich source of indeclinable particles and conjunctions (330/28) that serve as operators in polemical arguments: *amaṃ* (2: P *āma*, Skt *ām*); *eva* (10: P/Skt *eva*); *va* (1: P/Skt *eva*); *eva* (13: P *evaṃ*, Skt *evam*); *khu* (3: P *kho*, Skt *khalu*); *ca* (41: P/Skt *ca*); *jaḍa* (1: P/Skt *jātu*); *di* (79: P/Skt *iti*); *na* (102: P/Skt *na*); *na ca* (2: P/Skt *na ca*); *nanu* (5: P/Skt *nanu*); *nama/o* (5: P/Skt *nāma*); *nahi* (4: P *na hi*, Skt *nahi*); *nu* (3: P/Skt *nu*); *no* (1: P/Skt *no*); *pi* (6: P *api/pi*, Skt *api*); *⟨*p⟩i* corrected from *yi* (1: P *api/pi*, Skt *api*); *vi* (4: P *api/pi*, Skt *api*); *puna* (6: P *puna*, Skt *punar*); *mana* (1: P *puna*, Skt *punar*); *vuna* (1: P *puna*, Skt *punar*); *va* (7: P/Skt *vā*); *so* (2: P *su*, Skt *svid*); *ha* (2: P/Skt *hi*); *[ha]ta* (1: P *handā*, Skt *hanta*); and *hi* (8: P/Skt *hi*).

The apparent indeclinable particle or possibly suffix *de* is unclear in both its function and its OIA equivalent. It occurs twelve times, always following other indeclinables or adverbs. In eight cases *de* follows the adverbial instrumental pronoun *tena* = *tena*, “as a result of that” (ll. 12, 46, 52, 97, 98, 105, 122; 51jjjj l. 1), twice it occurs with the indeclinable *nanu* = *nanu*, “then surely” (ll. 59, 61), and once each with *taṣa* = *tathā*, “in accordance with the fact that” (l. 4), and *yaṣa* = *yathā*, “insofar as” (l. 94). Thus, it is possible that the frequent ablative suffix *-de*, corresponding to the OIA *-tas* suffix of source or reason functions here in Gāndhārī as an independent particle indicating or reinforcing the sense of reason in conjunction with other oblique or indeclinable forms.³⁴

The word *śaka* (9) can be understood either as a gerundive in the nominative singular neuter (P *sakkaṃ*, Skt *śakyam*) or as an indeclinable (P *sakkā*, Skt *śakyā*) originally derived from the OIA aorist optative form *śakyāt* (Morphology and Syntax § II.4.4.7 Infinitives).³⁵ The greater frequency of the indeclinable *sakkā* in Pali sources supports the interpretation of *śaka* as an indeclinable. However, an optative sense is suggested by the consistent use of *śaka* to introduce potential alternatives in an argument, which are then individually considered and rejected.

³³ For the Gāndhārī system of numerals, see Baums 2006: 40–41 (ordinal numbers).

³⁴ The Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī Aśokan inscriptions contain two instances of an apparent conjunction *tenada*, which Hultsch translates as “therefore”: eighth rock edict Shāhbāzgaṛhī *tenada dhramma-yatra* (Hultsch 1925: 59–60); eighth rock edict Mānsehrā *tenada dhrama-yada* (Hultsch 1925: 77–78). Cf. eighth edict Girnār (Hultsch 1925: 14–15); eighth rock edict Kālsī (Hultsch 1925: 36–37); and eighth rock edict Dhauri (Hultsch 1925: 89–90). See also Tieken 2023: 82–83, 394 n. 36.

³⁵ Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] + /// |^{51D(r)}[ś].[k]. *ca u[pa]ḍadhama anu[pa]ḍadhama kato* •. BHSD s.v. *śakyā*; PTSD s.v. *sakkā*; Pischel 1981 [1957]: 386 [§ 465].

II.4.3.2. Indeclinable Demonstratives, Relatives, and Interrogatives

This text contains numerous examples (101/10) of indeclinables formed through the addition of suffixes to the demonstrative, relative, and interrogative pronominal bases or to pronominally declined adjectives: *atra* (1: P/Skt *atra*); *tatra* (17: P *tatra/tattha*, Skt *tatra*); *yat*⟨*r⟩*a* (1: P *yatra/yattha*, Skt *yatra*); *sarvatra* (4: P *sabbattha*, Skt *sarvatra*); *aṣa* (21: P/Skt *atha*); *taṣa* (4: P/Skt *tathā*); *taṣa taṣa* (2: P/Skt *tathā tathā*); *yaṣa* (4: P/Skt *yathā*); *yaṣa yaṣa* (2: P/Skt *yathā yathā*); and *kadha* (1: P *katham*, Skt *katham*). For the conditional particle “if” (P/Skt *yadi*), both the forms *yadi* (15) and *yidi* (29) occur.

II.4.3.3. Adverbs

Adverbs are formed from pronominal bases (54/7): *ta* (3: P *taṃ*, Skt *tad*); *ya* (1: P *yaṃ*, Skt *yad*); *tena* (31: P/Skt *tena*); *yena* (2: P/Skt *yena*); *yava* (4: P *yāva*, Skt *yāvat*); *ki* (6: P *kiṃ*, Skt *kim*); and *kica* (7: P *kiñci*, Skt *kiṃcid*). Adverbs are also based on adjectival or nominal stems (15/6): *aḷatva* (1: P *ajjhataṃ*, Skt *adhyātmam*); *avaśa* (5: P *avassaṃ*, Skt *avaśyam*); *nirartha* (1: P *niratthaṃ*, Skt *nirartham*); *peyala* (3), *peyale* (1), and *peyalo* (1) (P *peyyālaṃ*, Skt *peyālam/piyālam/paryāyam*); *sadha* (2: P *saddhiṃ*, Skt *sārdham*); and *sarvevadu* (1: P *sabbāvato*, Skt *sarvāvato*).

II.4.4. Verbal Forms

II.4.4.1. Present Tense

Bromi (2) and *broṣi* (1) are the only cases of the first- and second-person singular present respectively. The forms *bhoṣa* and *paḍi[ya]naṣa* may represent either the second-person plural present or the second-person plural imperative with the present ending *-tha* generalized to the imperative.³⁶ Their contexts could support either possibility.³⁷

Third-person present forms are much more frequent. However, since the scribe of this text does not distinguish clearly between the characters *d-* and *t-* when combined with the vowel *i*, it is impossible to determine whether a given third-person present verb form in isolation should be construed as the singular ending in *-di*, with the voicing of the intervocalic consonant *-t-* in the ending *-ti*, or as plural ending in *-ti*, with the preservation of the unvoiced consonant reflecting the original ending *-nti*. Further, since *-a* is the most prevalent ending for both the nominative singular and plural, the nominative forms provide meager evidence for identifying the number of the associated third-person verb forms. As a result, the identification of particular third-person verb forms as singular or plural is based only on context and therefore tentative.

Third-person singular present forms (44/13) include *abhisamedi* (2), *a[vis](*a)[kh](*a)-rodi* (1), *upajadi* (3), *karodi* (4), *nivartadi* (11), *paḍi[ya]nadi* (1), *paśadi* (1), *p[r](*o)chadi* (1), *bhodi* (16), *sa[ma]varjadi* (1), *sa[rja]nadi* (1), *viharadi* (1), and *voharadi* (1). The third-person plural present is represented only by *karodi*, *bhavati*, and possibly *[bho]di* (l. 131), which, despite its apparent singular form, has been read as plural on the basis of context.

³⁶ BHS 132 [§§ 26.10–15].

³⁷ Text Notes: [90] *[ha]ta vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa •*; [90] *astiḍa paḍi[ya]naṣa •*.

The most common present tense form is *asti*. It occurs 149 times representing the third-person singular but is also used nineteen times in a context that suggests a plural nominative subject. Since in Pali, the third-person singular verb P *atthi* can function as a fossilized form used also with plural nominatives, the appearance of the third-person singular form in this and other Gāndhārī texts in a context that suggests a plural might be attributed to a similar pattern in Gāndhārī or possibly to the influence of the source dialect.³⁸ The form *atthi* based on the assimilated MIA form (P *atthi*) also appears in our text, once in the third-person singular (l. 106), and once in the third-person plural (l. 122), but in both cases the readings are tentative since the character *th-* is either irregularly formed or abraded, perhaps reflecting uncertainty on the part of the scribe.³⁹

II.4.4.2. Optative

This text contains three optative forms with stems in *e(y)a*. The optative stem is extended with the addition of appropriate primary endings in the second- or third-person singular: *icheaṣi* as second-person singular (l. 66); and *viñeadi* as third-person singular (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4). It also occurs in the third-person plural form *kareasu* (l. 2) marked by the modified secondary or preterite ending *-su*, which is found in the preterite form *ahasu*.⁴⁰

One additional form has also been understood as an optative: *hode* (l. 34), which would correspond to the OIA optative form *bhavet*. Although *hode* as an optative in Gāndhārī has not yet been confirmed, this interpretation has been tentatively adopted primarily on the basis of context: “Or else, [if] there were no action whose matured effect will <*not> occur, there **would be** no life of religious practice” (*aṣa nasti kica kama yas(*a) vivaga <*na> nivartiṣadi • na hode bromiciavaṣa*, ll. 33–34). The form *hode* also appears in a Bajaur fragment (BC 11) in a construction that would justify interpretation as an optative: “Even if one did not wish, there would inevitably be joy ...” (*yadi va ṇa [ichi]jea, ta avaṣa hode pridi ...*, BC 11 (v) ll. 1.3–4).⁴¹ If this sentence follows the regular syntactic pattern of conditional constructions in which optative verbs are used in both the protasis and apodosis, the regular optative *[ichi]jea* in the protasis would suggest that *hode* in the apodosis also be interpreted as optative.⁴²

II.4.4.3. Passive

Three passive verb forms are attested: *dajadi* (2); *nirujadi* (5); and *provucadi* (2). In all three cases, the passive base, which is formed with the passive suffix *-ya*, has conditioned the palatalization of

³⁸ Brough 1962: 101–102 [§ 51].

³⁹ Text Notes: [106] *parakadhaparaaīdanaparadhadyoa[thi] •*; [122] *a[thi] •*. For a third example, also with an irregularly formed character *th*, see Text Notes: [123] *yidi aha trayaatva va a[thi]ta di*. Cf. Brough 1962: 101–102 [§ 51].

⁴⁰ Burrow 1937: 46–47 [§ 100]; Brough 1962: 117 [§ 79]; Salomon 2000: 101 [§ I.7.3.2]; Salomon 2008: 151–152 [§ II.4.5.2]; Glass 2007: 133 [§ 6.3.2]. Cf. BHSG 144 [§ 29.36–37]; for second-person forms, BHSG 144 [§ 29.36–37] and *sattkareyyāsi* BHSG 207 [§ 43]. For the third-person plural form, see Text Notes: [2] *kareasu • kamaheduo*.

⁴¹ For *hode*, see also BC 11 (v) 1.8–9 [2x].

⁴² For less likely interpretations, see Text Notes: [34] *na hode br[o]mici[a]vaṣa*.

the preceding consonants, as usual in MIA. All three forms also take the present tense active ending *-di/-ti*. (For *provucadi*, see Phonology § II.3.1.1 Changes Affecting Original *a*.)

II.4.4.4. Future

All of the future forms are third-person singular (13/5) and with one exception have the *seṭ* suffix *iṣa* corresponding to *iṣya* of OIA: *kariśadi* (2); *upajiśadi* (5); *nivartiśadi* (3); and *(*v)i(*ñi)[śadi]* (1). Two occurrences retain the retroflex sibilant *ṣ* of the future marker reflecting the change *ṣy > ṣ(ṣ)*, in contrast to other future forms from the same root that display the change *ṣy > ś(ś)*⁴³: *nivartiṣadi* (l. 34); and *upa<*>iṣadi* (l. 45 corrected from *upadiṣadi*).

In the case of the verb *latsadi* (2), the future form corresponds to the P *lacchati* and reflects the OIA *aniṭ* suffix *sya* instead of the *seṭ* suffix *iṣya*. In both of its occurrences, *latsadi* is written with a rare Kharoṣṭhī cluster *tsa*.

II.4.4.5. Preterites⁴⁴

Even though preterite verb forms occur frequently (34/4) in our text, all but one are derived from the OIA perfect of the root *ah*, “to state” or “to claim,” as expected in the scholastic style typical of this abhidharma text.⁴⁵ The majority of these are third-person singular (29/2) and, in relatively equal frequency, appear as either *aha* (15) or *ahadi* (14), which is extended through the addition of the primary ending *-di*. The third-person plural form *ahasu* (4/1) includes the preterite ending *-su*, which occurs also in the third-person plural optative form *kareasu*.

The only remaining possible preterite form, *prochi* (l. 82), occurs in a damaged portion of the manuscript, which precludes a clear understanding of the syntax of the sentence. *Prochi* has been tentatively understood as a third-person singular aorist in *-i* from which the preterite augment of the OIA aorist form has been omitted.

II.4.4.6. Absolutives (Gerunds)

Only two absolute forms are found: *jatva* (1) formed with the suffix *-tva* (l. 41 P **jhatvā, hatvā*)⁴⁶; and *bhavita* (2) formed with the suffix *-ita* (l. 125 P *bhavitvā, Skt bhūtvā*).

II.4.4.7. Infinitives

The infinitive occurs in possibly three forms (6/3). In two cases the reading and hence interpretation are secure: *kato* (4); and *vatu* (1). The third form, *u(*padido)* (1), represents a tentative reconstruction in a heavily damaged portion of the manuscript within a sentence whose syntax requires an infinitive: “If it is a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action] ... for hell inevitably should not be reached by him” (*yidi upaḍadhamo*

⁴³ Allon 2001: 94 [§ 5.2.3.6]; Salomon 2008: 126 [§ II.3.2.2.4.2]. For the retention of the retroflex in future forms in the Dhp-G^K, see Brough 1962: 104 [§ 59].

⁴⁴ For general comments on Gāndhārī preterites, see Salomon 2008: 153–154 [§ II.4.5.5.1].

⁴⁵ Salomon 2008: 158 [§ II.4.5.5.7].

⁴⁶ Text Notes: [41] *aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki n[u] khu*.

*na tena śaka tatra jadi u(*padido •) ? ? ? (*a)vaśa nahi tena gatava neraa di •*, ll. 43–44).⁴⁷ An infinitive is warranted here given the preceding *śaka*, which governs two of three occurrences of the infinitive in our text. The only other case is *vatu* (l. 66), which is governed by the finite verb *icheaṣi* (OIA √iṣ), “you might wish.”

II.4.4.8. Participles

II.4.4.8.1. Present Participles

This text contains fourteen occurrences of the present participle *sata/saḍa* of the root *as*. Whereas the nominative singular forms in both the masculine and neuter are based on an extended thematized *a*-stem ending in *-anta/-ata*,⁴⁸ oblique forms appear to reflect the regular weak stem in *at* of the OIA *ant*-stem. However, irregularities occur in both forms, specifically in exceptions to the normal preservation of the unvoiced intervocalic *-t-* representing the original cluster *nt* of the extended ending *anta*, and in exceptions to the normal voicing of the original single intervocalic consonant *-t-* in forms based on the weak stem.

The nominative singular masculine and neuter are found in the expected forms *sata* from the extended stem (ll. 71, 86; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5) and *asata* (ll. 71, 87; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5). However, context suggests that *saḍa/asada* (n., 51D(r) l. 5; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6, and m., 51D(r) l. 5) also be understood as nominative singular (Phonology § II.3.2.2.4 Dentals; Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.1.15 *da* and *ḍa*).⁴⁹

The locative singular *sate* (l. 101), which appears in a clear locative absolute construction, presents a similar problem. In Gāndhārī, oblique cases of present participles can be based on the weak stem, here in the locative as *sadi* or possibly *sade*. However, in the absence of the voicing of the intervocalic *-t-*, the form *sate* might also be understood as the regular locative singular form of the extended stem **sa(n)ta* inflected according to the *a*-stem declension.

II.4.4.8.2. Past Participles

Past participles appear both independently and in compound, and they include forms with the original suffixes *-ta/-ita* (113/18) and *-na* (43/8). Given that the overall topic of this abhidharma text is existence in the three time periods, it is not surprising that the following past participle forms account for 111 occurrences: *adida* “past” (36: P/Skt *atīta*); *anagaḍa* “future” (47: P/Skt *anāgata*); and *pracupana* “present” (28: P *paccupanna*, Skt *pratyutpanna*).

Almost all of these past participles show regular formation from OIA, which had undergone the phonological changes typical of MIA languages. One exception is *nivurta* and *anivurta* equivalent to OIA *nivṛtta* from *ni* + √vṛt. Among the various Gāndhārī reflexes of the original OIA vowel *r* is *ru*, which, in the case of the OIA past participle *nivṛtta*, would yield *nivruta* (Phonology § II.3.1.3

⁴⁷ Text Notes: [43] + + /// |^{52A(r)?} ? ? |^{52A(r)+52j(r)}ma |^{52A(r)}aśa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka tatra jadi u [44] + + + + /// ? ? ? [a].va[śa nahi] tena gatava [nera]a di •.

⁴⁸ Pischel 1981 [1957]: 449 [§ 560]; Salomon 2008: 144 [§ II.4.1.7.2], 160 [§ II.4.5.7.1].

⁴⁹ Text Notes: 51D(r) [4] [et]. [vi]vaga tasa heduvinaśa [5] + + + /// |^{51D(r)}[ta] ? ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asada na bhodi •.

Developments of OIA *r*). The form *nivurta* occurring in this text can be understood as resulting from metathesis in rhotic syllables, which is common in Gāndhārī.⁵⁰

II.4.4.8.3. Future Passive Participles (Gerundives)

Given its formal scholastic style, this abhidharma text is a rich source of future passive participles (gerundives) (69/10), which function regularly in polemical arguments. Six examples (64) occur in common polemical patterns that signal formulaic questions, assertions, or conclusions in arguments: *anuyujidava* (6); *ukṣividavu* (2); *prochidava* (7); *yoyidava* (1); *vatava* (46); and *vedidava* (2). The remaining four examples (5) occur in reference to more specific doctrinal assertions: *katava* (1); *gatava* (1); *daḍava* (2); and *paḍikakṣidava* (1).⁵¹ As would be expected from their use in impersonal and formulaic polemical patterns, the nominative singular neuter predominates, and with the exception of *prochidava*, *gatava*, and *vatava*, all other gerundives appear only in clause-final position. The most frequently occurring gerundive, *vatava*, is found in clause-initial position in this impersonal polemical usage either alone or following the indeclinable *tatra*, or in clause-final position, following the particle *iti*. In 12 cases *vatava* is found in clause-final position functioning as a predicate adjective in the nominative singular neuter (8), nominative singular masculine (1) (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5), or nominative plural masculine (3) (ll. 70 [2x], 121).

As in the case of the declension of masculine and neuter *a*-stems, the *-a* ending is by far the most frequent (59 including 2 m., 57 n.). The other attested endings occur most frequently or exclusively in the neuter: *-o* (6 including 1 m., 5 n.); *-u* (3 n.); and *-e* (1 n.).

II.4.4.9. Secondary Conjugations: Causatives

The causative is represented only by three distinct forms, all based on OIA forms in *aya/e*: *dharedi* (1); *bhavedi* (2); and *paḍiṣavededi* (2) where strengthening of the root *vid* is also evident.

II.4.5. Syntax

The syntax of our text is familiar from other prose Gāndhārī texts in general, but it also shares specific patterns with other early Buddhist scholastic texts such as the Kv, the ŚAŚ, and the ĀVSS. Like these other early scholastic texts, this Gāndhārī abhidharma text follows regular syntactic patterns, but it is less regimented than the more simple and straightforward catechesis employed in the Kv and the ŚAŚ. In addition, our text contains more developed polemical argumentation. Together, these characteristics would suggest that the text records a later stage of doctrinal elaboration but a lesser degree of textual revision and harmonizing (Introduction § I.1.2.2 Polemical Scholastic Style).

II.4.5.1. Verbal Constructions

Only three distinctive verbal constructions in this text will be noted. The first is familiar both from Pali and from other Gāndhārī texts, namely the singular form *astī* used not only with singular but

⁵⁰ For the example of *-vurti* = *-vṛtti*, see Salomon 2000: 80 [§ I.6.1.5], 90 [§ I.6.2.2.3], 91–92 [§ I.6.3].

⁵¹ Gerundive forms are cited here in a regularized stem form without transcriptional marks and inflectional endings. The exact reading for individual occurrences can be found in the Word Index at the end of this volume.

also with presumably plural nominative subjects (51D(r) l. 4; ll. 31 [2x], 38, 39, 69, 73, 76, 83, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139; 51D(v) l. 3).⁵²

The second construction involves a possible pattern observed in the distribution of the singular and plural finite forms, *aha/ahadi* and *ahasu*. As is typical of scholastic prose, the singular *aha/ahadi*, which occurs twenty-eight times, is used to introduce a statement or assertion, usually representing in our text a polemical or rhetorical alternative with which the proponent disagrees. The plural *ahasu* occurs only four times, three of which clearly introduce positions intended to represent the views of the opponent. The first reference (51D(r) l. 3) marks the view of the unidentified opponent within the first half of the preserved text (51D(r) l. 3–l. 66). The third (l. 83) and fourth references (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6) present views explicitly attributed to the *mahasravastivada*, the opponent in the second part of the text (l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7). Only the second reference (l. 51) is less clear and would appear to mark simply a rhetorical or polemical alternative in the course of the proponent’s argument. However, it is also possible that it is intended to signal a question originating specifically from the opponent within this first half of the text.

The third construction concerns a distinctive use of forms of the root *kṛ*, which would appear to have a reflexive, as if intransitive, idio-passive, or ergative sense, as in the English sentence using the verb “to make,” “This breed of cat makes a good pet.”⁵³ Ten of the thirteen occurrences of the root *kṛ* in this text carry this distinctive sense and appear in a variety of finite forms such as the present, optative, and future, as well as in the infinitive (51D(r) l. 3; ll. 1, 2, 37, 38, 50, 63 [2x], 66, 141).⁵⁴ Regardless of the particular form, the verb or verbal is found with two nouns, one of which functions as the nominative grammatical subject and agent, and the other as a direct object, presumably in the accusative case. However, the force of the verb would appear to be intransitive; that is to say, rather than the agent and grammatical subject “making” or “effecting” the paired noun as a true direct object, it “acts as,” “functions as,” “serves as,” or “becomes” the paired noun.

Two of the ten occurrences of this pattern appear in discussions of causation with the noun *hedu* (P/Skt *hetu*): “And therefore, certainly it is not the case that precisely these past [factors] and future [factors], so long as they are unborn in this way, would **act as** in some way the cause of that” (*ta ca na adida va ya anagada eva yava ajada na⟨ma⟩ te tasa hedu kica kareasu •*, ll. 1–2). Here, “past and future factors” are the agent and grammatical subject of the finite optative verb *kareasu*, which then stands in a relation of identity with another noun, the “cause” (*hedu*). Clearly, the point of this argument is not that these past and future factors cannot “make” or “produce” some other cause, but rather that they cannot “act as,” “function as,” “serve as,” or “become” the cause themselves. The remaining eight occurrences appear in discussions of future factors that are subject to or not subject to arising: “It should be asked, ‘Is it possible for a future factor subject to arising, by virtue of [its] strength or energy to **act as** a factor not subject to arising?’” (*prochidava saka upadadhamo anagado thamena va viryena va thamena va viryena va anupadadhama kato di •*,

⁵² Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]*^{51D(r)}*[ka]vivaga asti •*; [38] *yadi upadadhama anagada a?⟨sti⟩* [39] *anupadadhama anagada nasti •*; [83] *adidanagada[p].[acup].[n].[s].[kh].[d].[asti di]*. Salomon 2008: 163 [§ II.4.6.2].

⁵³ For various syntactic uses of forms of the root *kṛ* in Pali, see Oberlies 2001: 210–212. English example suggested by Stefan Baums (7/2018).

⁵⁴ Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] + ///^{51D(r)}*[ś].[k]. ca u[pa]dadhama anu[pa]dadhama kato •*.

ll. 36–37). Here, the factor “subject to arising” (*upaḍadhamo*) is the agent and grammatical subject of the infinitive form *kato*, which then stands in relation to another noun, a “factor not subject to arising.” The argument clearly is intended to reject the possibility of a “factor subject to arising” **acting as** or **becoming** a “factor not subject to arising.” Hence, the infinitive *kato* must function here not with the true transitive sense, to “effect,” but rather with a more intransitive sense, to “act as,” “function as,” “serve as,” or “become.”

Since the verb *kṛ* in all of these constructions appears to carry this “intransitive” sense, both the grammatical subject and paired noun that it governs might be expected to be in the nominative case as if in a double nominative construction. However, the absence of a clear distinction between the inflection of the nominative and the accusative cases in Gāndhārī generally and in our text in particular precludes an unequivocal identification of the case of the noun paired with the grammatical subject, or agent, of the verb. Thus, despite the intransitive sense of this construction, the case of the noun paired with the nominative grammatical subject has very tentatively been understood as accusative on the basis of more ordinary transitive constructions with the verb *kṛ*.

CHAPTER II.5

Transcribed Text, Reconstruction, and Translation

Chapter II.5 includes the complete transcription, reconstruction, and translation of the text preserved in BL Fragment 28. The transcribed text is presented as it appears in the reconstructed manuscript and has been divided into three parts that correspond to larger physical groupings of larger manuscript fragments and smaller fragments and chips. Small fragments with little or no significant content have been omitted from the reconstruction and translation in this chapter but are reconstructed, translated, and discussed in the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6). The text reconstruction and translation are organized by topical sections and subsections as given in both the Contents for this volume and the Topic Outline of Text Contents (§ I.2), but these section headings also contain references to fragments and line numbers that will allow the reader to consult relevant sections in the Annotated Text Edition and Notes (§ II.6). Both fragment or chip labels and line numbers are provided in the case of smaller fragments or chips, but for the larger manuscript fragments 51G–H and 52A–H, only the continuous line numbers 1–141 are given.

Within the line-by-line transcription, the fragments on which each portion of the text is found are indicated by small superscript labels, separated by a thin vertical line. For physical descriptions of the separate fragments, see the Description of the Manuscript (§ II.1) and the Appendix: Descriptive List of Fragments. For formatting conventions used in the transcription, including the symbols indicating incomplete or uncertain akṣaras and the like, see Conventions (p. xix). In addition to these conventions, square brackets are also used for references to fragment and line numbers within the transcription, reconstruction, and translation, as well as for identifications of the speaker as the proponent [P] or opponent [O], or, where the speaker cannot be identified, as [P/O?].

51C+51F(r)

1. /// |^{51F(r)}? ? ? ? ///
2. /// |^{51C(r)}? ? ? ? na [n]i[viś].[ś]. [•] tena ta na [yen]. /// + + + + /// |^{51F(r)}? ka adida ava[r]. ///
3. /// |^{51C(r)}niviśeṣa • i ca ma [sa] /// + + + + + /// |^{51F(r)}ida asti ? ? idana ///
4. /// |^{51C(r)}[u] asti di [yidi] vatava |^{51C(r)+51o(r)}śa|^{51o(r)+51n(r)+51m(r)+51l(r)}ka vivaga a /// + /// |^{51F(r)}[di] viva[ga]. [i]/.[e g]. ///
5. /// |^{51C(r)}[a]kuśalasa a /// + + + + + + + /// |^{51F(r)+51oo(r)}[ś].la .[i]/.[e] ? ///

51C(r)[51ssss(r)]

3. /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)]}1.3[pa]la so na [t]. ///
4. /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)]}1.4[vurta] ///
5. /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)]}1.5? ? ? ///

51ee

/// |^{51ee}tra ta vivaga ? ? ? ? ///

51ff

/// |^{51ff}? [kṣaya] va [tasa] viva ? ///

51hh

/// |^{51hh}? dehi vi[v].[g]. ? ///

51ii

/// |⁵¹ⁱⁱ? ? ? ? ? ///

51jj(r)

/// |^{51jj(r)}adida[ś]a kama

51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]

/// |^{51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]}? ? ? di ama[m] di [a]ha ? ? ///

II.5.1.2. Manuscript Fragments: 51G–H+52A–H, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)]

1. + + + + + + + + + + + /// |^{51G(r)}[n]i ? ? [y]. akuraṣa hedu kica karodi • ta ca na a-
2. [dida] va ya anagaḍa eva yava ajaḍa na«(ma)» te tasa hedu kica kareasu • kamaheduo
3. ca nama vivago nahi vivagahedu akamaṃ di * [t]. kena karanena
4. adida avivakavivaga asti di ahadi [ta]śa [de so]palo di ta
5. + + + + /// |^{51E(r)}yadi pala|^{51ss+51E(r)+51G(r)}[ka]|^{51G(r)}[ra]na astikarana [t]ena [yo] sopala so asti yo n[i]

33. [va]r[t].śadi tena ta kama avivakavivaga nasti [•] aśa nasti ki[ca] ka[ma] ya-
34. [s]. vivaga nivartīśadi • na hode br[o]mici[a]vaśa eva hi vuta bhagavaḍa ya[śa]
35. [y].śa aya kama |^{51H(r)+51yyy(r)}a[vis].|^{51H(r)}[kh].rodi [taśa taśa] vivaga paḍi[śave]dedi [•] na bhodi br[o]
36. + /// [c].[avaśo •] prochidava śaka upaḍadhama anagado thamena va viryen[a] va anu-
37. paḍadhama kato di • y[i]di na śaka na so upaḍadhama ya karana śaka upaḍadhama
38. [ka]to • aśa na śaka nirarthiya bramiciavaśa bhodi • yadi upaḍadhama anagaḍa a?⟨sti⟩
39. anupaḍadhama anagaḍa nasti • kaḍamaśa dukhaniro[śa abromi]ciavaśa • [u]paḍa[dha]mo
40. hi avaśa upajīśadi • anupaḍadhama. + [v].śa na upajīśadi • ?
41. [ya]smi samahe aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki n[u] khu
42. [tas]|^{51H(r)+51ttt(r)}[mi] |^{51H(r)}samahe neraīyabhava
43. + + /// |^{52A(r)?}? |^{52A(r)+52j(r)}ma |^{52A(r)}aśa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhama na tena śaka tatra jadi u
44. + + + + /// ? ? ? [a].va[śa nahi] tena gatava [nera]a di • aśa upaḍa[dh].mo [•]
45. |^{52k(r)}[t].[n]. [n]. |^{52k(r)+52A(r)}bra|^{52A(r)}miciavaśa • ahadi yidi samagri latsadi upaḍiśadi di tena k.[r].-
46. |^{52n(r)}[n].|^{52A(r)}[na] upaḍadhama di • vatava tena d[e] yadi samagri latsadi tena ka[r].[n]. [u]-paḍadhama di
47. |^{52m(r)}vata|^{52A(r)}va • vatava ca bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśa[lanā dha]mana unupaḍa
48. + /// [s].[mepr].[ś].[na bhavedi] • k[i n]u khu te pav[e] akuśaladhama upaḍadhama aśa na upaḍadhama [•]
49. [yi]di anupaḍadhama nirartha same
50. + ///[ś].na bhavedi • aśa upaḍadhama [ta] ca anupaḍadhama karodi hina pradiña
51. + + ///[ḍa]dhama avaśa upajadi di • [a].[h].su [kaḍa]mado kama[d]. vi[v].[g]. /// + + + +
52. + ///[s]. [p]r..u[pan].[do] + ? ? ? + + + [pr].[cup].naḍa v[i]vaga nivartadi tena [de] kaigam=eva śi-
53. [la] śaḥhainaḥhida • ta puna kama maranaśa nirujadi aśa na nirujadi di yidi niruja
54. + + /// diḍado nivartadi di • aśa na nirujadi sa kata bh.di tasa kamasa • ya[di] p[un]. [t].[s].
55. (///) vivaga [ni]vartadi • yena [sa] kama[do p].[ḍ]. [jana] sa[ma]varjadi • ki so tasa nirudha ani
56. + + /// di anirudha sutravirośa pa[cam]. jana samavanaśa vaca nirudha di • aśa adida[ś].
57. + + /// ? vivaga nivartadi di ki so kama sapala • aśa apalo di • yi[di a].[h].[di sapal]o [•]
58. + + /// vatava kadha nasti na palena [sapal]. [yidi] |^{52A(r)+52C(r)}[ca] nasti |^{52C(r)}na palena sapalo tena nasti na putrena
59. + /// |^{52bb}[n].|^{52C(r)}[g]o • yidi ca so kama śapala śavivaga nanu de so kama sapala savivaga niru ?

60. + /// ^{52bb+52C(r)}[d]. ^{52C(r)}vatava yaṣa hema ta sapala [he]m[u]khkṣa dajadi na ca [ta] sadha palena dajadi • e[va s].[p].
61. + /// [so] kama nirudha • nanu [e] sadha ^{52C(r)+52z(v)+52B(v)}vivagena ? + ? ///
62. + + + + /// ^{52B(v)}gaḍa upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa prac[u]panadhamo yaṣa anagaḍa upaḍadhama aryamago
63. + + + /// ? a.nupaḍadhama kariśadi • nanu ar[y]amago anagamo anagaḍa kariśadi [yadi]
64. + + + /// ^{52y(r)}[g].[d]. ^{52B(v)+52F(r)}[a].[p].[d].[dh].[m]. pi anupaḍadhama pi • ya ca upaḍadhama ta ^{52F(r)}[ava] + [up].[j].[ś]. /// + +
65. + + + /// [n].[pa]ḍadhama ta na upajiśadi tena nirarthiya br[o]miciavaṣa bhodi aṣa śaka upa
66. + + + + /// nagaḍa anupaḍadhama kato tena anagaḍa aṣa[kha]ḍa ^{52F(r)+52D(r)}bho^{52D(r)}di ✱ ^{52F(r)+52D(r)}iचेाशि watu [sar]..
67. + /// ^{52D(r)}[st]. • sarvakala sarvam=asti • sarvatra sarva^{52hh(v)+52rr+52D(r)}[ma]^{52rr+52D(r)}sti ^{52D(r)}• sarvagarena sarvam=asti • sarvaka^{52ii(r)+52D(r)}ra^{52ii(r)}nen.
68. + + + /// ^{52D(r)}[sti] • sarvabhavaḥ sarvam=asti • sarvaheduha sarvam=asti • ^{52D(r)+52E(r)}sarvapracaḥ sarvam=asti [•]
69. + /// ^{52ji+52E(r)}[v].^{52E(r)}[ma]sti • asti sarva • asti no ca sarva • ye duaḍaṣa ayaḍaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti •
70. + /// ^{52kk}[y].^{52E(r)}adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava • aṣa a[dh].[a] astita di • ya asti ta [ha] astiḍa vatava •
71. + + /// ^{52gg}[i] ^{52gg+52G(r)}[t]. ^{52G(r)}nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava • adiḍa anagaḍa pra
72. + + + + + + + /// ^{52G(r)+52H(r)}[d].[d]. [v].[ś]..e [a]sti • ana^{52G(r)+52oo}ga^{52G(r)+52H(r)}ḍa vaṣage asti • adiḍa anagaḍa [a]
73. + + + /// ^{52H(r)}[g].[d].[bh].[v]. asti • adiḍa anagaḍa grihibhava asti • adiḍa anagaḍa aramiya-
74. ^{52H(v)}bhava asti • adiḍa naga[d]. [v]eśiabhavo asti • anagaḍa arahadabhava asti [•]
75. + /// ^{52H(v)+52mm(v)+52ll}[v].^{52H(v)}m=a^{52H(v)+52ll}sti • na sarvam=asti • na sarva ^{52H(v)+52G(v)}nasti [• adi]ḍa anathariya asti • arahada a[di]-
76. ^{52G(v)+52ll}ḍara^{52G(v)}gadoṣamoha asti • adiḍa adidam=eva vatava • anagaḍa a[na]
77. + + + /// ^{52G(v)+52E(v)}[v]. [v].tava • pracupana pracupanam=eva vatava • yasa yi adiḍaṣa adi
78. + + + /// ^{52E(v)}[bha]va astitvabhiniḍa parinipanaḥḍae • eva adiḍaṣa anagaḍatvasvabha
79. + + /// ^{52E(v)+52D(v)}[sti]tvabhiniḍa [parinipa]naḥḍae • eva adiḍaṣa pacupanatvasvabhava asti[tv].
80. + + /// ^{52D(v)}[p].[n]. [p].[rinipana]ḥḍaye • eva anaga^{52D(v)+52hh(r)}[de]^{52D(v)}[na] yoyidava eva yava aṣakhadana • ^{52ii(v)}[va]

81. + /// |^{52D(v)}[v]. [c]. [tr].[ya] sa?khaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa • |^{52D(v)+52F(v)}[sarva] ta ca asti me aḥatva cha[d].
82. + /// |^{52F(v)?} jaga eṣa prochi • tatranuyoga sarvam=asti • mahasarvastivaḍa • tatra maha
83. + + /// |^{52y(v)+52F(v)+52B(r)}[sti]vaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nam[a] • adidaṇagaḍa[p].[acup].[n].[s].-[kh].[d]. [asti di]
84. + + + /// |^{52B(r)}[rva] aha vatava jive asti • bhudatve asti • pugale asti • ṣe[ṭha]
85. + + + + /// • t.e|^{52B(r)+52qq}ṣaḍ. aya[da]na a|^{52B(r)}sti • ekuna|^{52ff+52B(r)}viśadi dha|^{52B(r)}du asti • paṃcame ar[ya]sace
86. + + /// |^{52C(v)}[• ya] pi nasti ta pi asti di • na|^{52C(v)+52z(r)}sti |^{52C(v)}śadehi su|^{52ff+52C(v)}tre|^{52C(v)}hi anuyujidavo • sata asti
87. + + /// [t].va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śad[e]hi sutrehi anuyujidava •
88. + + /// |^{52C(v)}[a].hadi nasti jiva • nasti bhudatva • nasti pugala •
89. + /// |^{52A(v)}[st]i ṣ[e]ṭha kadha • nasti treḍaṣa ayadana • nasti [ekuna]v[i]ś.[d]. dha[du] nasti [paṃc].[m]. [a].
90. + /// [s].ca • [ha]ta vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa • kici astiḍa paḍi[ya]naṣa • kic. [nastid]. • [na ca] na vata
91. + + /// [rva]m=asti di • yadi [taṣa] nasti pa[m]came aryasaca • nasti ṣ[e]ṭha kadha • nasti tre
92. + /// [śa] ayadana • nasti ekunaviśadi dhadu • nasti jiva • nasti bh[u]datv. • nasti pu[gala] •
93. + /// [d].[s]. viṇanasa ki [a]raṃbana • ya eḍa viṇana evaruva upajadi di • idasa cita
94. + /// [k]i [a].[r]..[b].[na] • ki aṣi[p]..[i] • yaṣa de ara|^{52r+52A(v)}[m]|^{52A(v)}banabhava nasti • upajadi ca[t].[n]. [t].
95. + + /// |^{52A(v)}cita di • asti [ca] sarva di |^{52r+52A(v)}• cakraiḍa|^{52A(v)}na ca asti • te|^{52III+52A(v)}[n]. [c].[kh].-[i]|^{52A(v)}[d].[na]
96. (///) duḍaṣa a?yaḍana bhavati • [y].[di r].[v].[ca]khai-
97. ḍana asti • [na] ca ta sarva di • tena de asti sarva se ca nasti • asti kica sarva [ki]-
98. [c]. na [sa]rva di • vatava tena [de sarva] ki|^{52mmm+52A(v)}[c]. [asti] |^{52A(v)}• [kica] na vatava a[st]i • sarvat[r]a sarva
99. + /// |^{52m(v)+52A(v)}[sti] |^{52A(v)}di • tena cakraiḍana ruvaiḍana neraiyabhava sarvabhava asti • peyala
100. |^{52m(v)+52n(v)}[sva]|^{52A(v)}bhav[e] parabhav[e] asti • parabhava svabhava asti • yadi ahadi na vatava [sa].[va]-
101. |^{52k(v)}[t].. [s].|^{52A(v)}rva asti [di] • tatra vatave eva sate sarva[t].e [s]..[ve n].[st].
102. + + /// |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51xxx(v)}[c]. |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51www(v)}asti |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[k].[c]. [n].[st]. [• s].|^{52A(v)+51H(v)}rve[ṣu] [s].rvam=a|^{51H(v)}sti di • tena uvahaḍaḍria⟨na⟩
103. + /// [n].[g].[d].idriya asti • neraiyana catvare bhava asti • eva sarvaga [•]

104. + /// |^{51tt(v)+51H(v)}d[r]iya |^{51H(v)}anuyujidava • yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam=asti di •
105. [te]na de sarveṣ[u] kica asti kica nasti + .[u] khu de vata[va sa]rve asti • yidi
106. puna sarvaṣa sarvam=asti ikaṣa parakadhaparaaīdanaparadhaduyoa[thi] •
107. sarvakala sarvam=asti di • purebhatakale pacabhatakalo asti • pacabha-
108. taka[l]. purebhatakala asti • pacupanakale anagaḍakala ca adida-
109. [ka]la ca asti peyale kalena anuyujidavu • sarvagarena sar[va]m=asti [d]i
110. adidaḍakaranena |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}anaga|^{51H(v)}ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adidaḍakare asti •
111. [ś]uṅga[da]garena • śatagare asti • śatagarena śu[ṅga]ḍagara asti • sacagar[e]-
112. [n]. [a].sacagara asti • dukhagarena suhagar. • anavagarena atvagara asti •
113. atvagarena anavagaro a[sti] • sarvagarena a[s].r[vaga]ro asti • adi[ḍa]-
114. [k].[r].[nena p]. [a].[n].[g].[ḍ].[k].[r].[nen]. • ? [p]i pacupanakaranena kuśalakuśala ṣa-
115. rve vi bhava praṅhi ukṣividav[u] peyala ya duaḍaṣa aya[ḍa]n[e]hi sagrahi[ḍa]
116. [ta] asti di cakhaīdana ca asti di tena cakhaīdana duaḍaṣa[a]yaḍa[nasag]..-
117. hiḍa peyal[o sa]rva ukṣividav[u] • ayadanehi • nasti treḍaṣa ayadana yava nasti
118. |^{51kkk(v)}[ji]|^{51H(v)}[va • n].[st]i + [g].[l]. [vedid]. + peyal. tatra vatava ka[ḍa]mena viṅanena vi[ry].[n].
119. ? [n].[sti [j]. + + + [p].[g].[l]. [vedi] ? [v]. [di aha] manaīdanena di manoviṅanena di [•]
120. [tatra vatava man].[v].[ṅ].[n].[s]. ca paṃcamam ca aryasaca ekunaviṣaḍa ca dhadu
121. |^{51mmm(v)}jiva ca pugala ca dha|^{51H(v)}ma va[tav]. di • eva hi v[u]ta [manoviṅana] ? ? [m]. [di]
122. y[i]di puna dhama di paḍi[ya]nadi tatra [va]tava tena de ekaca dhama a[thi] •
123. [e]kaca nast[i] di • yidi aha trayaatva va a[thi]ta di tatra vatava jaḍa a-
124. nagaḍa pracu[p].[n]. bhodi • pracupana adida bhodi yidi aha anaga-
125. |^{51ggg(v)}ḍa bhavita pa|^{51H(v)+} ? [na bhodi] • [p].[a]cupana bhavita adi[ḍ]. [bho].i • tatra vatava
126. + /// ? ? ? ? [s]. [t]..ya bha[va a]sti • adidaḍabhava ca • anagaḍabhavo ca pacu-
127. [p].nabhavo ca • [yi] + a[h].[di] bhavehi japoṃ asti nasti [tra]e japo di • tatra
128. vatava ki puna yata anagaḍa rupoṃ yava viṅano tatra pacupanaṣa bhavaṣa
129. prati di ahadi [s].mag[r].vaṣe[n]. + [n].[g].[ḍ].[bh].[vo j].[p]. .[r]..[up].[n].[bh]. + |^{51zz(v)}[di] •
vatava
130. |^{51H(v)}[s]. [v].na samagri asti nasti di • yidi aha[di] asti di tena pacupana ru[v].-
131. [bh].va ruva na bhodi • adida traya ru[va bho]di anagaḍa kaḍama bhava anaga-
132. ḍa ahadi anagaḍa anagaḍ.bhavo pacupanabhava anagaḍ. di vatava ki

II.5.2. Reconstruction and Translation

II.5.2.1. Section 1–Religious Practice: Present Factors [51A–B(v)+53A]

II.5.2.1.1. Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A]

51A–B(v)+53A

[1] + + + + pr(*a)cupana dukhañ(*a)n(*a) pr(*a)c(*u)p(*a)n(*a) dukha a(*bhisa)m(*e)di •
yena kalena k(*a)y(*a) + [2] + + + ? (*a)ry(*a)s(*a)c(*a) yidi dukha di • ? + + pr(*acupana)
+ + + + + [3] (*ka)yanupaśa viharadi prochiḍav(*a) k(*a)y(*a)s(*ad)i ved(*a)n(*a) arabane
karodi • [4] (*yi)di na arabane karodi • n(*an)u (*d)ukh(*a)ta anupurva(*bhi)s(*a)m(*a)ye
bhodi • yidi aha [5] + + di nanavilakṣana paśadi • dukha abhisamedī kena ñanena • kici sva [6]
+ + + + + + ? ? ? p(*ro)chiḍavo • kadi dukhañana di • yidi aha [7] + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + ? ? ? + + .e/.i .e/.i + + + +

51ddddd

... ? ? ñan(*a) • ...

53c

... kica ? ...

51xxxx

... ? śadi aṭhana śa ...

II.5.2.2. Section 2–Existence of Past and Future Factors [51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

II.5.2.2.1. The Opponent's Three Categories of Existent Factors [51D(r) ll. 1–4]

51D(r)

[1] + + + + + + + + + + ekadeśa vivaga nivurta • ekadeśa vivaga (*aniv)u(*rta)[2] + + +
+ + + + aśa arahatvaprataśa asti so pranadivāḍa avivakavivaga [3] ś(*a)k(*a) ca upaḍadhama
anupaḍadhama kato • ahasu avivagatva vivagatva aviva[4]kavivaga asti •

II.5.2. Reconstruction and Translation

II.5.2.1. Section 1–Religious Practice: Present Factors [51A–B(v)+53A]

II.5.2.1.1 Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A].

51A–B(v)+53A

[1] [P/O?] ... the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering. [P] At the time when the body ... [2] noble truth. If [one states], [O] “It is suffering,” [P] ... present ... [3] one abides observing the body. It should be asked, “Does mindfulness of the body take feelings as its object-support?” [4] [Even] if [you respond that mindfulness of the body] does not take [feelings] as its object-support, surely [you would admit that] the nature of suffering becomes [an object-support] in gradual clear comprehension. If one states, [5] [O] “... one sees various distinguishing characteristics,” [P] by means of which knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering? Some self- ... [6] It should be asked, “How many [instances of] the knowledge of suffering [are there]?” If one states, [O] ...

51dddd

... knowledge ...

53c

... some ...

51xxxx

... will ... six ... of eight ...

II.5.2.2. Section 2–Existence of Past and Future Factors [51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

II.5.2.2.1. The Opponent’s Three Categories of Existent Factors [51D(r) ll. 1–4]

51D(r)

[1] ... [P] in the case of one division [of past action], the matured effect has occurred, [and] in the case of another division [of past action], the matured effect has not occurred. [2] Or else, one who has acquired arhatship possesses [prior action, specifically that of] taking life, whose matured effect has not yet matured. [3] And is it possible for a [future] factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising? They state, [O] “The state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, [and action] whose matured effect has not yet matured [4] [all] exist.”

II.5.2.2.2.General Criticism of the Opponent's Three Categories of Existent Factors [51D(r) l. 4-1. 3]

51D(r)

[4] [P] It should be said that if that “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” exists, this matured effect [exists] due to the non-destruction of its cause. [5] It should be said that [if] that action, [even though] not possessed of a matured effect, is existent, the matured effect is not nonexistent. [However,] if [one states], [O] “This [action] is past,” [6] [P] [then] the matured effect does not exist. [As for] the “state of being a matured effect,” since [one states] [O] “It is not possessed of a matured effect,” [P] the past ...

51dd(r)

... has not occurred ...

51C+51F(r)

[1] ... [2] ... not without distinction. Then that is not ... by which ... it is possible for another ... in the past ... [3] ... without distinction. ... sense sphere exists. ... sense sphere ... [4] ... exists.” If it should be said that it is possible for a matured effect ..., the matured effect ... [5] ... of the unvirtuous ... virtuous (*or*, unvirtuous) ...

51C(r)[51ssss(r)]

[3] ... the fruit, that does not ... [4] ... occurred/not occurred ... [5] ...

51ee

... In that case, that matured effect ...

51ff

... or destruction. ... the matured effect of that ...

51hh

... by means of ... matured effect ...

51jj(r)

... of past action ...

51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]

... [one states], [O] “Yes.” [P] One states [O] ...

51G–H(r)

[1] [P] ... in some way acts as the cause of the sprout. And therefore, certainly it is not the case that [2] precisely these past [factors] and future [factors], so long as they are unborn in this way, would act as in some way the cause of that. [3] And yet the matured effect certainly has action as its cause, for it is not [claimed] that the cause of maturation is [something] other than action.

II.5.2.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 1–7) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 3–36]

- (1) [3] t(*a) kena karanena [4] adida avivakavivaga asti di ahadi taṣa de sopalo di ta[5](**tra* vatava) yadi palakarana astikarana tena yo sopala so asti yo ni[6](**pala* so na)sti • yadi ca asti s(*a)-p(*a)lade di tena sarvakala pa[7]la daḍavo astitva h(*e)d(*u)p(*a)l(*a)p(*ra)ti di •
- (2) [7] prochiḍava yeneva [8] (*ka)r(*a)nen(*a adida aviva)kavivaga asti • t(*e)neva karanena pac(*u)pana a[9](**vivakavivaga* asti • tena de) adi(*ḍa avivakavivaga asti • p)r(*ac)up(*a)-n(*a) [10] (**avivakavivaga* asti) • yidi aha amam di • tatra vatav(*a) paḍiṇade [11] adida vivaga asti di • [12] tena yadi ta asti tena de pracupana vivaga nivartadi yidi aha [13] nivartadi • tena kamaṣa ca vivagaṣa ca samuṣana • aṣa n(*a) nivartadi [14] tena pracupana avivakavivaga nasti • aṣa asti c(*a p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a a)viv(*a)k(*a)[15]vivaga • na ca tas(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) nivartadi ya pradiṇa yeneva karanena [16] ad(*i)ḍa avivakavivaga asti (*•) t(*e)neva k(*a)-ranena pracupana avivakaviva[17]ga asti di n(*a) bho(*di) •
- (3) [17] prochiḍava vatava puna so tena hi kamena [18] aṇeṣu ca as(*vago •) yidi (*a)h(*a)di (*svago) katavo ten(*a) na vat(*a)v(*a) tena budhas(*a) c(*a) [19] k(*a)masvag(*o) • maḍa na akuṣalakamasvago • aṣa na vatava svago [20] kuḍarahi ya so vivaga nivartadi • paḍiṣavededi • {proch.}
- (4) [21] prochiḍava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi • yadi aha adidaḍo [22] vivaga d(*i) • tat(*r)a vat(*a)va kaḍ(*a)ma aviv(*a)k(*a)vivaga ca viv(*a)g(*a) yaṣa nivartadi •

II.5.2.2.3. Detailed Criticism (8: 1–7) of the Opponent’s Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 3–36]

- (1) [3] [P] Then for what reason [does one state], [4] [O] “Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?” [P] One states, [O] “[It is] in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit.” [5] [P] (*With regard to that it should be said that) if the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, then that [action], which is possessed of a fruit, exists, [and inversely] that [action], which is not [6] (*possessed of a fruit, does not) exist. And if [one states], [O] “[Action] exists due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,” [P] then the fruit [7] should be presented at all times since existence is [understood] as the acquisition of fruits from causes.
- (2) [7] [P] It should be asked, [8] “[Is it the case that] present [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) for the same reason that (*past) [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists, [namely, due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,] [9] (*and as a result of that,) past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) [and] present [action] [10] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)?” If one states, [O] “Yes,” [P] with regard to that it should be said in accordance with this proposition, [11] since the matured effect of past [action] exists, [12] then [similarly], if that [present action] exists, as a result of that, [its] matured effect occurs in the present. If one states, [13] [O] “It does occur [in the present],” [P] then there is a concurrence of both action and [its] matured effect [in the present, which is precluded by the successive nature of karmic causal functioning]. Or else, [the matured effect of present action] does not occur [in the present]. [14] Then present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured does not exist [since it cannot be said to be possessed of a fruit.] Or else, present [action] whose matured effect (*has not yet matured) exists [as possessed of a fruit], [15] and yet its matured effect does not occur. [Then, your prior] proposition, [16] “present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists for the same reason that past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists),” [17] does not hold.
- (3) [17] [P] It should be asked, “Should it further be said that the [matured effect, which occurs] through that action, [18] belongs to others and is not (*one’s own)?” If one states, [O] “[The matured effect] should be brought about (*as one’s own),” [P] then it should not be said in the case of the Buddha that [19] he is one for whom the [matured effect of] action, [which occurs] through that [action], is his own. [This is because] it is held [in the scriptures] that he is not one for whom the [matured effect of] unvirtuous action is his own. Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect of action] is one’s own. [20] [In that case,] by means of which [actions is it said that] one experiences that matured effect which occurs?
- (4) [21] [P] It should be asked, “From which action does the matured effect occur?” If one states, [O] “The matured effect [occurs] from past [action],” [22] [P] with regard to that it should be said, “And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?”

- (5) [23] pr(*o)chadi asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma yasa kamaṣa vivago asti • aṣa nasti kica kama [24] yaṣa vivaga asti di • vatav(*a) asti kici kama yaṣa kamaṣa vivaga asti • [25] metrae ca ek(*a)-m-aṃśa p(*a)la sa ca met(*r)a asti sa ca pala asti di • apaṃ [26] hi eḍa (*a)nala ś(*a)m(*ae) du(*ve) vivatas(*a) p(*a)lan(*i) bromi (*d)i prov(*u)cadi • pro[27]v(*u)c(*a)di hedun(*a) hi ca ṣa palani paḍikakṣiḍava • saṅa voharovivaga yaṣa yaṣa [28] sarjanadi taṣa taṣa voharadi eva asti taṣa ca pala asti di bromi ✽
- (6) [29] prochidava asti kica kama asti nasti kica kama asti di • asti kica kama avi[30]vakavivaga adida adidaṭhanena ekaṭha • yidi ekaṭha tena ubha(*e)h(*i) pal(*a) [31] d(*a)d(*a)vo ubhaye va asti ubhaye va nasti di •
- (7) [31] asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma avivakavivag(*a) [32] y(*a)sa vivaga na kica nivartiṣadi (*•) yidi aha asti kama (*yasa) vivaga na ni[33]vart(*i)ṣadi tena ta kama avivakavivaga nasti • aṣa nasti kica kama ya[34]s(*a) vivaga (*na) nivartiṣadi • na hode bromiciavaṣa eva hi vuta bhagavaḍa yaṣa [35] y(*a)ṣa aya kama avis(*a)kh(*a)rodi taṣa taṣa vivaga paḍiṣavededi • na bhodi bro[36]-(*mi)c(*i)avaṣo •

- (5) [23] One asks, [o] “Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action [24] whose matured effect exists?” [P] It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists, [as indicated by the following scriptural passages]. [For example,] [25] “A little bit of loving kindness [results in] a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists.” [26] [Or] it is proclaimed, “For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute.” [27] [Or] it is proclaimed, “For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes.” [Or] “I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way [28] one conceives, in that way one declares, ‘It exists in this way.’ And the fruit of that [conception] exists.”
- (6) [29] [P] It should be asked, “Is there some action that exists, or is there no action that exists?” [o] “There is some action [that exists, namely,] [30] past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, which constitutes one part within the region of the past.” [P] If [action whose matured effect has not yet matured exists as possessed of a fruit and] constitutes one part [of the past], then the fruit should be presented by both [31] [parts, that is, by past action whose matured effect has not yet matured and by past action whose matured effect has already matured]. [It should be said that] either both [parts of the past] exist [as possessed of a fruit] or both do not exist [as not possessed of a fruit].
- (7) [31] [P] Is there some action whose matured effect has not yet matured, [32] of which the matured effect will not occur at all? If one states, [o] “There is action (*whose) matured effect [33] will not occur,” [P] then that action is not [to be referred to as action] “whose matured effect has not yet matured.” Or else, [if] there were no action whose [34] matured effect will not occur, there would be no life of religious practice. For it has been spoken thus by the Bhagavat, [35] “[If it is said that] in whatever way this one instigates an action, in that way one experiences the matured effect, then there is no life of [36] religious practice.”

II.5.2.2.4. Detailed Criticism (7: 1–5) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 36–51]

- (1) [36] prochiḍava śaka upaḍadhama anagado thamena va viryena va anu[37]paḍadhama kato di • yidi na śaka na so upaḍadhama ya karana śaka upaḍadhama [38] kato • aṣa na śaka nirarthyā bramiciavaṣa bhodi •
- (2) [38] yadi upaḍadhama anagaḍa asti [39] anupaḍadhama anagaḍa nasti • kaḍamaṣa dukhaniroṣa abromiciavaṣa •
- (3) [39] upaḍadhama [40] hi avaṣa upajiśadi • anupaḍadham(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajiśadi • [41] yasmi samahe aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki nu khu [42] tasmi samahe neraīyabhava [43] (*upaḍadha)ma aṣa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhama na tena śaka tatra jadi u[44](*padido •) ? ? ? (*a)vaśa nahi tena gatava neraa di • aṣa upaḍadh(*a)mo • [45] t(*e)n(*a)n(*a) bramiciavaṣa •
- (4) [45] ahadi yidi samagri latsadi upa(*j)iśadi di tena k(*a)r(*a)[46]n(*e)na upaḍadhama di • vatava tena de yadi samagri latsadi tena kar(*a)(*ne)n(*a) upaḍadhama di [47] vatava •
- (5) [47] vatava ca bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśalana dhamana (*a)nupaḍa- [48](*e) s(*a)mepr(*a)s(*a)na bhavedi • ki nu khu te pave akuśaladhama upaḍadhama aṣa na upaḍadhama • [49] yidi anupaḍadhama nirartha same[50](*pra)s(*a)na bhavedi • aṣa upaḍadhama ta ca anupaḍadhama karodi hina pradiña [51] (*upa)ḍadhama avaṣa upajadi di •

II.5.2.2.4. Detailed Criticism (7: 1–5) of the Opponent’s Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 36–51]

- (1) [36] [P] It should be asked, “Is it possible for a future factor subject to arising, by virtue of [its] strength or energy, [37] to act as a factor not subject to arising?” If it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], it is not a factor subject to arising since it is possible for a factor subject to arising [38] to act. Or else, [if] it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], the life of religious practice is without purpose.
- (2) [38] [P] If future factors subject to arising exist, [39] [and] future factors not subject to arising do not exist, to which of these [two categories] does the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice [belong]?
- (3) [39] Indeed, [you contend that] “a factor subject to arising [40] will inevitably arise, [and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise.” [41] When Aṅgulimāla, having killed human beings, wears a garland of finger bones, now how possibly [42] at that time is [his future] nature as a hell-being [43] either (*a factor subject to arising), or else not a factor subject to arising? If it is a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action] [44] ... for hell inevitably should not be reached by him. Or else, [if] it is a factor subject to arising, [45] then [there is] no life of religious practice [for him].
- (4) [45] One states, [O] “If [a factor] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] and reaches the point of arising, for that reason [46] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.” [P] It should be said that, as a result of that, if [a factor merely] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions], for that reason [alone] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.
- (5) [47] And it should be said that the Bhagavat states, “One cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen.” [48] Now how possibly are those evil unvirtuous factors either factors subject to arising, or else factors not subject to arising? [49] If they are factors not subject to arising, one cultivates right exertion without purpose. [50] Or else, [if] they are factors subject to arising and thereafter act as factors not subject to arising, the [previous] proposition is worsted: [51] [namely, that] “A factor subject to arising inevitably arises.”

II.5.2.2.5. Detailed Criticism (8: 8) of the Opponent's Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 51–61]

- (8) [51] (*a)h(*a)su kaḍamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) adidado [52] (*a)ṣ(*a) pr(*ac)upan(*a)-do (*nivartadi di • yidi) pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi tena de kaīgam eva śi[53]la ṣaḥai(*ḍa)naḥiḍa • ta puna kama maranaṣa niruḍadi aṣa na niruḍadi di yidi niruḍa[54](*di a)diḍado nivartadi di • aṣa na niruḍadi sa kata bh(*o)di tasa kamasa • yadi pun(*a) t(*a)s(*a) [55] vivaga nivartadi • yena sa kamado p(*a)d(*a)⟨*ma⟩ jāna samavarḍadi • ki so tasa nirudha ani[56](*rudha) di anirudha sutraviroṣa pa(*ḍ)am(*a) jāna samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di • aṣa adidaṣ(*a) [57] (*kamaṣa) vivaga nivartadi di ki so kama sapala • aṣa apalo di • yidi (*a)h(*a)di sapalo • [58] (*tatra) vatava kadha nasti na palena sapal(*a) yidi ca nasti na palena sapalo tena nasti na putrena [59] (*ja)n(*a)go • yidi ca so kama ṣapala ṣavivaga nanu de so kama sapala savivaga niru[60](*ja)d(*i) vatava yaṣa hema ta sapala hemukhḱṣa daḍadi na ca ta sadha palena daḍadi • eva s(*a)p(*a)[61](*la) so kama nirudha • nanu ⟨*d⟩e sadha vivagena (*nirudha) ...

II.5.2.2.6. Detailed Criticism (7: 6–7) of the Opponent's Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 62–66]

- (6) [62] (*yadi ana)gaḍa upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa pracupanadhamo yaṣa anagaḍa upaḍadhama aryamago [63] (*anagamo a)nupaḍadhama kariṣadi • nanu aryamago anagamo anagaḍa kariṣadi
- (7) [63] yadi [64] (*ca ana)g(*a)d(*a u)p(*a)d(*a)dh(*a)m(*a) pi anupaḍadhama pi • ya ca upaḍadhama ta ava(*śa) up(*a)j(*i)ś(*adi) • [65] (*ya ca a)n(*u)paḍadhama ta na upajiṣadi tena nirarṭhiya bromiciavaṣa bhodi aṣa śaka upa[66](*ḍadhama a)nagaḍa anupaḍadhama kato tena anagaḍa aṣakhaḍa bhodi ❄

II.5.2.2.5. Detailed Criticism (8: 8) of the Opponent's Third Category of Existent Factors: Past Actions with Matured Effects [ll. 51–61]

- (8) [51] They state, [o] “From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from past action), [52] or else from present [action]?” [P] (*If) the matured effect occurs from present [action], as a result of that, [with regard to] that very corporeal moral conduct [53] that is stationed in the sixth sense sphere, now does that action cease after death, or else does it not cease? If it ceases, [54] [then the matured effect] occurs from past [action]. Or else, [if that present corporeal moral conduct] does not cease, there is an agent of that action. Further, if the matured effect of that [present action] [55] occurs, when one gains the first trance state after [that] action, has then [the present action] of that one ceased, [56] [or] not ceased? [If that present action] has not ceased, there is a contradiction of scripture, [which states,] “Speech has ceased for one who has gained the first trance state.” Or else, [if] [57] the matured effect of past (*action) occurs, is then [that past] action possessed of a fruit, or else not possessed of a fruit? If one states, [o] “It is possessed of a fruit,” [58] [P] (*with regard to that) it should be said, “How is it that there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit?” And if there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit, then there exists no father other than through [the existence of] the son. [59] And if that action, which is possessed of a fruit, is [also] possessed of a matured effect, then surely that action, which is possessed of a fruit, ceases together with its matured effect. [60] It should be said that just as that gold [as the cause], being possessed of a fruit, is consumed by fire in a crucible, isn't it the case that that [cause] is consumed together with [its] fruit? In this way, [when] that action possessed of a fruit [61] has ceased, then surely it has ceased together with its matured effect. ...

II.5.2.2.6. Detailed Criticism (7: 6–7) of the Opponent's Second Category of Existent Factors: Future Matured Effects [ll. 62–66]

- (6) [62] [P] (*If) a future [factor] is a factor subject to arising, surely a future [factor] is a present factor. [It is] just like the case of the future noble path that is a factor subject to arising, [63] which, (*as the stage of “not yet having reached,”) will act as a factor not subject to arising. Surely the noble path [of] the stage of “not yet having reached” will [still] act as future [and therefore must still be a factor subject to arising].
- (7) [63] (*And) if [64] future [factors] are both factors subject to arising and factors not subject to arising, and a factor that is subject to arising will inevitably arise, [65] and a factor that is not subject to arising will not arise, then the life of religious practice is without purpose. Or else, it is possible [66] for a future factor (*subject to arising) to act as a factor not subject to arising; therefore, a future [factor, as not subject to arising,] is unconditioned.

II.5.2.3. Section 3–Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

II.5.2.3.1. The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]

[66] icheaṣi vatu sar(*va)[67](*m a)st(*i) • sarvakala sarvam asti • sarvatra sarvam asti • sarvagarena sarvam asti • sarvakaranen(*a) [68] (*sarvam a)sti • sarvabhava sarvam asti • sarvaheduha sarvam asti • sarvapracageha sarvam asti • [69] (*sar)v(*a)m asti •

II.5.2.3.2. The Opponent’s Elaboration of “Everything Exists”: Two Qualifications of the Fundamental Proposition; Four Specifications of “Everything”; Two Explications of “Existence” [ll. 69–82]

(1) [69] asti sarva • asti no ca sarva • ye duaḍaṣa ayaḍaneha {a}ṣagrahiḍa se asti • [70] (*tra)y(*a)-adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava • aṣa adh(*v)a astita di • ya asti ta ha astiḍa vatava • [71] (*ya nasti) i t(*a) nastiḍa ha vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava • aḍiḍa anagaḍa pra-[72](*cupana va astiḍa di a)d(*i)d(*a) v(*a)ṣ(*ag)e asti • anagaḍa vaṣage asti • aḍiḍa anagaḍa a[73](*diḍana)g(*a)d(*a)bh(*a)v(*a) asti • aḍiḍa anagaḍa grihibhava asti • aḍiḍa anagaḍa aramiya[74]bhava asti • aḍiḍa (*a)nagaḍ(*a) veṣiabhavo asti • anagaḍa arahaḍabhava asti • [75] (*sar)v(*a)m asti •

(2) [75] na sarvam asti • na sarva nasti • aḍiḍa anathariya asti • arahaḍa adi[76]ḍaragadoṣamoha asti • aḍiḍa aḍiḍam eva vatava • anagaḍa ana[77](*gaḍam e)v(*a) v(*a)tava • pracupana pracupanam eva vatava • yasa (*p)i aḍiḍaṣa adi[78](*ḍatvasva)bhava astitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍaḍe • eva aḍiḍaṣa anagaḍatvasvabha[79](*va a)stitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍaḍe • eva aḍiḍaṣa pacupanatvasvabhava astitv(*a)[80](*bhini)p(*a)n(*a) p(*a)rinipanaḥḍaḍe • eva anagadana yoyiḍava eva yava aṣakhadana •

[80] va[81](*ta)v(*a) c(*a) tr(*a)ya sakhadaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa • sarva ta ca asti me aḍatva chad(*a) [82] (*di) ...

II.5.2.3. Section 3–Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

II.5.2.3.1. The Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69]

[66] [p] You might wish to say, [67] [o] “Everything exists. Everything exists at all times. Everything exists everywhere. Everything exists with every aspect. (*Everything exists) through every reason. [68] Everything exists through all modes. Everything exists through all causes. Everything exists through all conditions. [69] (*Everything) exists.”

II.5.2.3.2. The Opponent’s Elaboration of “Everything Exists”: Two Qualifications of the Fundamental Proposition; Four Specifications of “Everything”; Two Explications of “Existence” [ll. 69–82]

(1) [69] [o] “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything. Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist. [70] [Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence. Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence. That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; [71] (*that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence. The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence. [Or] the past, future, [72] and present (*should be said to be existence). A past year exists; a future year exists. [73] The modes of the past and future exist as past and future. The mode of the householder exists as past and future. The mode of the monastery worker exists as past and future. [74] The mode of the merchant exists as past and future. The mode of the arhat exists as future. [75] Everything exists.”

(2) [75] [o] “It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist. A past [factor] without efficacy exists; [for example], an arhat possesses [76] past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion. The past should be said to be the past alone; the future [77] should be said to be the future alone; the present should be said to be the present alone. Just as, [78] for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of pastness is established as having existence, in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of futureness [79] is established as having existence, [and] in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of presentness [80] is established as having existence. In this way, it should be applied in the case of the future, continuing on in this way through the unconditioned.

[80–81] Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence. And ‘everything’ [in] that [sense is suggested by the scripture passage that states], ‘I have longing internally’” [82]

II.5.2.3.3. Criticism of the Opponent's First Qualification of the Fundamental Proposition: "That Which Exists Is Everything" [ll. 82–98]

- [82] (*viva)jaga eṣa prochi • tatranuyoga sarvam asti • mahasarvastivaḍa • tatra maha[83]-
 (*sarva)stivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama • aḍiḍanaḡaḡap(*r)acup(*a)n(*a)s(*a)kh(*a)ḡ(*a)
 asti di
- (1) [84] (*asti sa)rva aha vatava jive asti • bhudatve asti • pugale asti • ṣeṭha [85] (*kadha asti) •
 t(*r)e(*ḡ)(*a)(*ś)a ayaḡana asti • ekunaviśadi dhadu asti • paṃcame aryaśace [86] (*asti) •
 ya pi nasti ta pi asti di • nasti śadehi sutrehi anuyujidavo • sata asti[87](ḡa va)t(*a)va • asata
 nastiḡa vatava • eva śadehi sutrehi anuyujidava •
- (2) [88] (*yidi a)hadi nasti jiva • nasti bhudatva • nasti pugala • [89] (*na)sti ṣeṭha kadha • nasti
 treḡaśa ayaḡana • nasti ekunaviś(*a)d(*i) dhadu nasti paṃc(*a)m(*a a)[90](*rya)s(*a)ca • hata
 vivarjavadā bhoṣa • kici astiḡa paḡiyanaṣa • kic(*i) nastiḡ(*a) • na ca na vata[91](ḡa sa)rvam
 asti di • yadi taṣa nasti paṃcame aryaśaca • nasti ṣeṭha kadha • nasti tre[92](ḡa)śa ayaḡana •
 nasti ekunaviśadi dhadu • nasti jiva • nasti bhudatv(*a) • nasti pugala • [93] (*i)ḡ(*a)s(*a)
 viṇanaśa ki araṃbana • ya eḡa viṇana evaruva upajadi di • iḡasa cita[94](ḡa) ki (*a)r(*aṃ)-
 b(*a)na • ki aṣip(*ad)i • yaṣa de araṃbanabhava nasti • upajadi cat(*u)n(*a) t(*a)[95](ḡa ta)
 cita di •
- (3) [95] asti ca sarva di • cakhaīḡana ca asti • ten(*a) c(*a)kh(*a)īḡ(*a)na [96] duaḡaśa ayaḡana
 bhavati • y(*a)di r(*u)v(*a)cakhaī[97]ḡana asti • na ca ta sarva di • tena de asti sarva se ca
 nasti • asti kica sarva ki[98]c(*a) na sarva di • vatava tena de sarva kic(*a) asti • kica na vatava
 asti •

II.5.2.3.3. Criticism of the Opponent's First Qualification of the Fundamental Proposition: "That Which Exists Is Everything" [ll. 82–98]

[82] [P] The distinguisher asked about this [position elaborated previously by the opponent]. With regard to that there is a point of discussion, [that is, concerning] the Mahāsarvāstivādins [and their proposition] "everything exists." With regard to that [83] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] "Certainly there is nothing that does not exist. Past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors] exist."

- (1) [84] [If] one states, [O] "(That which exists) is everything," [P] it should be said that a soul exists, creaturehood exists, a person exists, a sixth [85] (*aggregate) exists, a thirteenth sense sphere exists, a nineteenth element exists, and a fifth noble truth [86] (*exists). [The statement,] "even that which does not exist also exists," should not be upheld by hundreds of scriptures. "The existent [87] should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be the nonexistence." In this way, it should be upheld by hundreds of scriptures.
- (2) [88] (*If) one states, [O] "There exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, [89] there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no fifth [90] noble truth," [P] well then, it is you who maintain distinctions! [Since] you admit something to be existence and something to be nonexistence, isn't it the case that it should not be said [91] that "everything exists?" If in that way there exists no fifth (*noble) truth, there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no [92] thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, [93] what is the object-support of this perceptual consciousness since this perceptual consciousness arises with the form of [these nonexistent entities]? [94] What is the object-support of this moment of thought, what is the sovereign condition, insofar as the "nature" of the object-support does not exist, [and yet] (*that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] [95] in that way?
- (3) [95] And [one states], [O] "That which exists is everything." [P] And the visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, [96] the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere. If [one states], [O] "[Since both] the material-form [sense sphere] and the visual sense sphere [97] exist, it is not the case that that [visual sense sphere] is everything," [P] as a result of that, the [proposition,] "that which exists is everything," is not upheld. [If you respond,] [O] "that which exists is in some cases everything [98] [and] in some cases not everything," [P] it should be said that, as a result of that, everything in some cases [should be said to] exist [and] in some cases should not be said to exist.

II.5.2.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent's Seven Declarations Expanding upon "Everything Exists"
[ll. 98–115]

- (1) [98] sarvatra sarva[99](**m a*)sti di • tena cakhaīḍana ruvaīḍana neraīyabhava sarvabhava asti peyala [100] svabhava parabhave asti • parabhava svabhava asti • yadi ahadi na vatava sa(**r*)-va[101]t(**ra*) s(**a*)rva asti di • tatra vatave eva sate sarvat(**r*)e s(**ar*)ve n(**a*)st(**i*) [102] (**di ki*)c(**a*) asti k(**i*)c(**a*) n(**a*)st(**i*) •
- (2) [102] s(**a*)rveṣu s(**a*)rvam asti di • tena uvahaḍaīḍriana [103] (**a*)n(**a*)g(**a*)ḍ(**a*)īdriya asti • neraīyana catvare bhava asti • eva sarvaga [104] (**i*)driya anuyujīḍava • yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam asti di • [105] tena de sarveṣu kica asti kica nasti (**ki n*)u khu de vatava sarve asti •
- (3) [105] yidi [106] puna sarvaṣa sarvam asti ikaṣa parakadhaparaaīḍanaparadhaduyoathi •
- (4) [107] sarvakala sarvam asti di • purebhatakale pacabhatakalo asti • pacabha[108]takal(**e*) purebhatakala asti • pacupanakale anagaḍakala ca aḍiḍa[109]kala ca asti peyale kalena anuyujīḍavu •
- (5) [109] sarvagarena sarvam asti di [110] aḍiḍa(**g*)ar{an}ena anagaḍa(**g*)ara{na} asti • anagaḍa(**g*)arena aḍiḍa(**g*)are asti • [111] śuṇaḍagarena • śatagare asti • śatagarena śuṇaḍagara asti • sacagare[112]n(**a a*)sacagara asti • dukhagarena suhagar(**a*) • anatvagarena atvagara asti • [113] atvagarena anatvagarō asti • sarvagarena as(**a*)rvagarō asti •
- (6) [113] aḍiḍa[114]k(**a*)r(**a*)nena p(**i a*)n(**a*)g(**a*)ḍ(**a*)k(**a*)r(**a*)nen(**a*) • pi pacupanakaranena kuśalakuśala
- (7) [114] ṣa[115]rve vi bhava praṇahi ukṣividāvu peyala

II.5.2.3.4. Criticism of the Opponent's Seven Declarations Expanding upon "Everything Exists"
[ll. 98–115]

- (1) [98] [One states,] [o] "Everything exists everywhere." [99] [p] Therefore, the material-form sense sphere [exists] in the visual sense sphere, all natures exist in the nature of a hell-being, and so on, [100] other-nature exists in intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature exists in other-nature. If one states, [o] "It should not be said that everything [101] exists everywhere," [p] with regard to that it should be said that it being thus, everything does not exist everywhere. [102] [Therefore, you should not maintain that everything exists but rather] something exists [and] something does not exist.
- (2) [102] [One states,] [o] "Everything exists in all [factors]." [p] Therefore, [even] impaired controlling faculties possess [103] future [unimpaired] controlling faculties, and hell-beings possess the four natures [of other beings]. In this way, [104] it should be upheld that the controlling faculties are everywhere." If one states, [o] "It should not be said that everything exists in all [factors]," [105] [p] as a result of that in all [factors], something exists, [and] something does not exist. Now how possibly could it be said by you that "everything exists?"
- (3) [105] If [106] further [o] "everything exists as belonging to everything," [p] one [sentient being] possesses a connection with the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another.
- (4) [107] [One states,] [o] "Everything exists at all times." [p] [In that case,] at the time before the meal, the time after the meal exists; at the time after the meal, [108] the time before the meal exists. At the present time, both future and past times [109] exist; and so on, it should be upheld by means of [other] times.
- (5) [109] [One states,] [o] "Everything exists with every aspect." [110] [p] [In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect. [111] The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of tranquility. The aspect of untruth [112] exists with the aspect of truth. The aspect of happiness exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. [113] The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self. The aspect of what is not everything exists with the aspect of everything.
- (6) [113–114] Virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past [factors], by reason of future [factors], and by reason of present [factors].
- (7) [114–115] And [as for the declarations concerning] all "modes," [namely, "everything exists through all modes,"] and so on, it should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight.

II.5.2.3.5. Criticism of the Opponent's Four Specifications of "Everything" [l. 115–51G(v)
[51ssss(v)] l. 5]

- (1) [115] [One states,] [o] "Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres [116] exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres; [117] and so on, [the scope of] 'everything' should be expanded through the [other] sense spheres. It should be known that there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, continuing on through [the previously cited list], there exists no [118] soul, there exists no person, and so on." [P] With regard to that it should be said, "By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy [119] should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?" One states, [o] "[It is] by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness." [120] [P] With regard to that it should be said that a fifth noble truth, nineteenth element, [121] soul, and person should be said to be factors [that are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness, for in this way it has been said, "Factors [are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness." [122] Now if one admits that [these nonexistent entities are] factors, with regard to that it should be said that, as a result of that, certain factors exist [123] [and] certain factors do not exist.
- (2) [123] If one states, [o] "Or [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence," [P] with regard to that it should be said that [124] undoubtedly a future [factor] is present, and a present [factor] is past. If one states, [o] "A [factor] having been future [125] becomes present, and having been present becomes past," [P] with regard to that it should be said that [126] (*one factor) possesses three "natures": a past "nature," a future "nature," and [127] a present "nature." If one states, [o] "Material form exists through [various] 'modes,' but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form," [P] with regard to that [128] it should be said, "Now how is there the acquisition of a present 'nature' in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?" [129] One states, [o] "Material form possessed of a future 'mode' [comes to] be possessed of a present 'mode' due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions]." [P] It should be said, [130] "Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?" If one states, [o] "[The complete collocation] exists," [P] then the "nature" of material form in the present [131] is not material form, [but should instead be that of the separately existing complete collocation]. [Since you maintain that] in the past, there are three ["natures" of] material form, in the future, which "natures" [of material form] are future? [132] One states, [o] "In the future, a future 'mode' and a present 'mode' [of material form] are future." [P] It should be said, "For what [133] reason is that [present 'nature,' if still future, said to be] present?" One states, [o] "[Because the present 'mode'] is acquired. Or else, it possesses the present 'mode' due to the force of the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions]." [134] One states, [o] "Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all"
- (2–4?) [P/o?] [135] If ... [136] ... future," of that ... [137] ... [138] ... [P] ... [139] past and future [factors] do not exist. And you say, [o] "(*)Due to the force) of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] ... [140]" [P] If the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists ... [141] acts as a factor (*not subject to arising). The future ...

51jjjj

[1] ... (*tena) de sutre ? maḍa sarva aṣ(*a) na t(*a)ṣ(*a) sarva anupaṣapana di ... [2] ... ? sa ?
asti ? ? ... [3] ... • ? ? (*a)sti ...

51llll

[1] ... ? n(*a)h(*i) v(*atava) ? ... [2] ... ? v. i • asti (*a)n(*a)g(*aḍa) ...

51oooo

[1] ... ? ? ? ? + ? ? ? .o ? ? ... [2] ... • yidi anagaḍ(*a) (*e)va viry(*ena) ... [3] ... ? + ? + ?
? ? ? .i/.e .i/.e + ...

51G(v)[51ssss(v)]

[1] ++++++ (*dua)d(*a)śa ayaḍan(*e)h(*i)r u(*vaī)[2](*ḍana) +
+++++ ? nasti bh(*a)ve ? ? kaḍamen(*a) [3] (*viñanena ruvabhava
v)i(*ñi)śadi • aha cakhuviñanena di tatra vatava tena t(*a) bh(*a)[4](*va) rupino cakhuviñana
viñeadi rupom di • yidi aha manoviñanena tena bha[5]va dhama vatava

II.5.2.3.6. Criticism of the Opponent's Two Explications of "Existence" [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7]

51G(v)[51ssss(v)]

[5] saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava mahasa[6]rvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti
nama nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo • cadu ? ? [7] (*pa)ḍig. + + a. ? s(*a)ḍ(*a) bh(*a)va asti •
bh(*a)v(*a) + + asaḍa nasti atra mahasa(*r)v(*a)sti[8](*vaḍa) ...

II.5.2.4. Section 4—Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v),
51A–B(r)]

II.5.2.4.1. Time periods, Existence, Religious Practice

51C(v)[51ssss(v)]

[1] ... ? na neva ? ? aṣa ta va ... [2] ... ? gehi anuyujidavo • ruvaṣa ... [3] ... upaṣapad(*a) ye
sarvasatva upaṣap(*ana/ḍa) ... [4] ... a ḍa/na ? ? ? ...

51jjj

[1] ... [P] ... (*as a result of that,) it is held in the scripture that all [have not attained religious practice]. Or else, it is not the case in that way that all have not attained [religious practice] ...
[2] ... exists ... [3] exists ...

51lll

[1] ... for it should not be said ... [2] There are future ...

51oooo

[1] ... [2] [P] If a future [factor] alone by virtue of [its] energy ... [3] ...

51G(v)[51ssss(v)]

[1] ... [P] ... the material form (*sense sphere) within the twelve sense spheres ... [2] it is not the case that [its] “nature” By means of which [3] (*perceptual consciousness) will one perceive (*its “nature” as material form)? One states, [O] “[It is perceived] by visual perceptual consciousness.” [P] With regard to that it should then be said that that “nature” [4] consists of material form, [since] visual perceptual consciousness should perceive material form. If one states, [O] “[It is perceived by] mental perceptual consciousness,” [P] then [its] “nature” [5] should be said to be [constituted by] the factor [sense sphere].

II.5.2.3.6. Criticism of the Opponent’s Two Explications of “Existence” [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7]

51G(v)[51ssss(v)]

[5] [P] It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist. [6] [And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist.” [P] [In that case,] there is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist. The four [7–8] ... in the case of the existent ..., a “nature” exists; a “nature,” in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist. With regard to this, the Mahāsarvāstivādins ...

II.5.2.4. Section 4–Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

II.5.2.4.1. Time periods, Existence, Religious Practice

51C(v)[51ssss(v)]

[P/O?] [1] ... not at all Or else that ... [2] ... it should be upheld in the case of Of material form ... [3] ... the attainment [of religious practice]. All sentient beings who ... having attained/the attainment [of religious practice] ... [4] ...

51l(v)+51m(v)+51n(v)+51o(v)

[1] ... present ... [2] ...

51C(v)

[4] ... With regard to that it should be said ...

51F(v)[51ssss(v)]

[1] ... everything exists ... [2] ... past ... past ... [3] ... [P] ... should not be said. If one states, [O] “There is no attainment [of religious practice],” [P] it is not the case that suffering ... [4] ... should be upheld that “nature” ...

51gg

... one having attained (*or*, not having attained) [religious practice] ...

51aaaa

... both ...

51D(v)

[1] ... [P] ... one who has not attained [religious practice] ... [2] ... does not exist. That accompaniment of future [factors] also does not exist. [If one states,] [O] “It is the case that the attainment [of religious practice] exists,” [P] [then] by what means [3] does one who has not attained [religious practice become] one who has attained [religious practice]? In this way, future [factors] do not exist.

[3] [One states,] [O] “A past year exists,” [P] [but] then [4] yet another [future] year is not possessed of [past] years. [One states,] [O] “A future year exists with future years.” If [5] [one states,] [O] “One is accompanied by (*future years),” [P] [then] an elder [should] also possess a [future] year, [but] indeed he is not accompanied by that [future year].

[5] [P/O?] Moral conduct [6] ... [O] [one states], “... moral conduct is future,” [P] then all who are not observing moral conduct ... moral conduct in entirety [7] ...

51A–B(r)

[1] ... [2] ... [P] ... and together with future ... present [3] ... contaminant. (*The attainment [of religious practice]) that is freed from lust [4] ..., then that one for the sake of the future (*attainment [of religious practice]) [5] ... for the sake of the future [attainment of religious practice] that is freed from lust, ... not [yet] freed from lust [6] ... becomes ... contaminant. For it is not the case that one states [7] ... future ...

Annotated Text Edition and Notes

Chapter II.6 presents a detailed study of the text preserved in BL Fragment 28. This detailed study is organized first by the four larger topical section headings that mark content divisions as found in both the contents of this volume and the Text and Commentary (§ I.3), and second, by sub-headings that give only fragment and line numbers referring to the physical divisions within the text. In the case of smaller fragments or chips, the fragment or chip labels as well as line numbers are provided, but for the larger manuscript fragments 51G–H and 52A–H, only the continuous line numbers 1–141 are given. In the footnotes, references to separate occurrences within the same fragment are separated by a comma; those in separate fragments or chips, by a semicolon.

The discussion of every text section contains several parts. Each portion of the manuscript is introduced by a section titled “Manuscript Notes,” which discusses physical characteristics and manuscript problems that are significant for the transcription of the text. This is followed by the sections “Transcribed Text,” “Reconstruction,” and English “Translation,” as also found in the Transcribed Text, Reconstruction, and Translation (§ II.5). Here, however, all small fragments and chips are included. Various problems of the transcription and reconstruction are then discussed in the section “Text Notes.” Each problem discussed is introduced by a reference to a line number and passage in the transcribed text. Further details on paleography, orthography, phonology, and morphology can be found in the relevant chapters as well as in the word index. For an overview of the continuous argument presented in the text and extended discussions of the contents of each text section, the reader should consult the Text and Commentary (§ I.3). Here various issues raised by the text are examined, where possible, in relation to other exegetical texts and scholastic treatises. A brief summary of the entire text and a more general discussion of exegetical methods and Buddhist abhidharma scholastic treatises can be found in the Introduction (§ I.1).

Small superscript labels within the line-by-line transcription indicate the fragment on which each portion of the text is found. These are separated by thin vertical lines. For physical descriptions of the individual fragments, see the Description of the Manuscript (§ II.1), and the Appendix: Descriptive List of Fragments. For formatting conventions used in the transcription, including the symbols indicating incomplete or uncertain akṣaras and the like, as well as for the labeling and numbering of fragments and abbreviations used in footnote references to certain sections of this volume, see Conventions (p. xix). In addition to these conventions, square brackets are also used for references to fragment and line numbers within the transcription, reconstruction, and translation, as well as for identifying the speaker as the proponent [P] or opponent [O], or, where the speaker cannot be identified, as [P/O?].

II.6.1. Section 1—Religious Practice: Present Factors [51A–B(v)+53A]

II.6.1.1 51A–B(v)+53A

Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A

The three initial strips, or outer one-and-a-half cycles of the manuscript part conserved in frame 51, are made up of six relatively large fragments, 51A–F, whose original orientation and placement vis-à-vis the remainder of the manuscript are not immediately apparent (plts. 1, 4). A seventh fragment, 53A, is found on the outermost verso layer of an otherwise unrelated manuscript part conserved in frame 53. Originally belonging to one of the two outer strips of manuscript part 51, fragment 53A presumably became stuck to the scroll containing manuscript part 53 during its long period of storage in the clay pot and was subsequently torn away from its original location on manuscript part 51 when the scrolls were separated and placed in individual glass jars prior to conservation.

Only one of these seven fragments, 51E, can be securely placed in its original location. As conserved in the third strip of manuscript part 51, fragment 51E was displaced during the conservation process and should be returned to a large hole at the right edge of fragment 51G in the fifth strip of the manuscript between lines 5 and 7 on the recto, or lines 138 and 140 on the verso.¹ The displacement of fragment 51E upward by one cycle, or two strips, in the scroll, helps to clarify the probable original locations of the other six large fragments that belong to the three outermost strips of manuscript part 51. Apparently, the space vacated by fragment 53A in one of the two outer strips of the scroll containing manuscript part 51 was not noticed during the conservation process, and so as each cycle in the scroll was unrolled, fragments shifted upwards, filling in the vacant spaces in preceding cycles. This successive displacement of fragments in each scroll cycle ceased with the beginning of fragment 51H, which is better preserved than either the heavily damaged outer strips of the scroll or the first larger fragment 51G. Due to this apparent pattern of displacement, fragment 51C should be moved downward by the distance of one cycle, or two strips, to the hole vacated by 51E, and fragment 53A, downward by one cycle to the hole vacated by 51C. No physical evidence unequivocally establishes that the strip constituted by fragments 51A–B represents the outermost strip in the surviving manuscript. However, the content of these fragments differs from the following discussions and may provide their context. It is therefore likely that this strip preceded the remainder of the preserved text. If the order of the two outer strips as conserved is tentatively accepted, the probable original locations of the fragments within the three outer strips of manuscript part 51 are as follows: the first and outermost strip contains 51A–B and 53A; the second strip contains 51D; and the third strip closest to fragment 51G contains 51C and 51F (plts. 5, 10).

In addition to the secure placement of fragment 51E within fragment 51G, probable connections between some of the six remaining larger outer fragments can be determined on the basis of both

¹ Commentary: (1) Criticism Opponent's Third Category [ll. 3–7]. Text Notes: [5] + + + + ///
^{51E(r)}yadi pala^{51ss+51E(r)+51G(r)}[ka]^{51G(r)}[ra]na astikarana [t]ena [yo] sopala so asti yo n[i]; [6] + + + + ///
^{51E(r)}sti • yadi [ca] ^{51tt(r)+51G(r)}[a]sti ^{51G(r)}[s].[p].lade; [7] ^{51kk(r)+51ll(r)+51E(r)}[la] daḍavo astitva [h].[d].[p].-
^{51E(r)+51G(r)}[l].^{51G(r)}[p]..ti di •; [139] ^{51kk(v)+51ll(v)+51E(v)}[iḍa]anagaḍa nasti ^{51E(v)+51G(v)}bro^{51G(v)}si ca samagri[v].
 /// + + + + + + + + + +; [140] + + + + + /// ^{51E(v)}di • yidi [sa]mag[ri] a^{51E(v)+51G(v)}[sti] ^{51G(v)}? + + + +
 + + + + + + + + + +.

similarity in content and physical characteristics such as bisected syllables, character appearance and size, line spacing, the presence of multiple layers, and the consistency of the bark surface. Similar content indicates that these larger fragments and the remainder of manuscript part 51 represent a unified discussion. On the recto, these initial fragments contain many terms appearing in the subsequent discussions of the causal efficacy of past and future factors and their existence in the three time periods: for example, “present” (*pacupana*), “past” (*adida*), “cause” (*hedu*), “object-support” (*arabana*), “matured effect” (*vivaga*), action “whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivakavivaga*), and future “factors subject to” (*upaḍadhama*) and “not subject to arising” (*anupaḍadhama*). Similarly on the verso, the final fragments contain the terms “present” (*pracupana*) and “future” (*anagaḍa*), as well as the phrase “everything exists” (*sarvam asti*), all of which figure in the preceding discussion of the proposition “everything exists.”

Apart from these general content similarities, the actual placement of the larger outer fragments vis-à-vis the remainder of the manuscript must take into account certain physical characteristics, the most important being the presence of a layer of bark (51ssss) covering the final portion of the verso surface of the manuscript. Optical backlighting reveals that both the final portion of 51G as well as fragments 51C and 51F consist of two layers of bark; layer 51ssss and related pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo) extend from line 135 to the end of fragment 51G and cover the original verso surfaces of fragment 51G as well as fragments 51C and 51F (fig. 4). On the verso, the shared terms *upaṣapana* and *anupaṣapana* unite fragment 51D(v) with the various pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo), chips, and continuous bark constituting layer 51ssss. This supports the conclusion that these pieces of bark and chips overlying the verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F, as well as 51D(v), all belong to the same original manuscript layer 51ssss.² Chip 51gg, which adheres to the recto of fragment 51F, also contains the term *up(*a)/(an)up(*a)s(*a)p(*a)n(*a)* and was probably originally connected with layer 51ssss that covers the verso of fragment 51F. As a result, chip 51gg was likely turned over verso to recto in the process of conservation.




Fig. 4. Backlighting 51G ll. 1–5.

² Text Notes: 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5 /// ^{51jjjj}1.1[de] sutr[e] ? [ma]ḍa sarva [as]. [na t].[s]. *anupaṣapana* [di] ///.

Even though the content of this overlying bark layer can be connected in general terms with that of the remainder of the manuscript represented by fragments 51G–H and part 52, it is important to consider the complications it presents to reconstructing the text on both the recto and verso. On the verso, bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss cover approximately fourteen lines of text on the original verso surfaces of both the final portion of fragment 51G (ll. 135ff.) and fragments 51C and 51F. Similarly, on the recto, approximately fourteen lines of text from the recto surfaces of bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss are likewise hidden by fragments 51C, 51F, and 51G to which they adhere. As a result, the exact placement of bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss in relation to the preceding and following portions of the manuscript is unclear.

Two scenarios appear possible for the original location of the overlying layer 51ssss vis-à-vis the two outer strips of the manuscript formed by 51A, 51B, 53A, and 51D. As a first scenario, layer 51ssss originally included bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo (ll. 135–139), as well as the continuous portion of the manuscript represented by layer 51ssss itself (ll. 139ff.). This layer would have extended as a single continuous segment that included, in order, the fragments of the two outer strips of the scroll, namely, 51D in the second strip and 51A–B in the outermost strip. According to this first scenario, on the verso, approximately fourteen lines of text from the original but now-hidden verso surfaces of fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F would have immediately followed line 134 and preceded the continuous layer of bark represented by bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo, layer 51ssss, and the remaining fragments. Thus, originally the order of fragments of the end of the manuscript on the verso would have been as follows: fragment 51G(v) (\approx 10 hidden lines); 51C(v) and 51F(v) (\approx 4 hidden lines); bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss; 51D(v); and 51A–B(r). On the recto, approximately fourteen lines of text from the recto surface of bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss would thus be hidden by fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) as well as by lines 1–8 of fragment 51G(r). These fourteen lines would have to be inserted between fragment 51D(r) in the second strip and 51C(r) and 51F(r) in the third strip of the manuscript. Thus, the order of fragments on the recto from the beginning of the manuscript would have been as follows: 51A–B(v)+53A; 51D(r); layer 51ssss(r) including bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo (\approx 14 hidden lines); 51C(r)+51F(r); and 51G(r).

As a second scenario, the portion of the manuscript preserved on layer 51ssss was originally located either between the two outer strips, 51D and 51A–B, or above fragments 51A–B. If the latter case, it constituted the outermost portion of the surviving manuscript. According to this second scenario, on the verso, approximately fourteen lines of text from the original but now-hidden verso of fragments 51G(v), 51C(v), and 51F(v) would have begun from line 134 and been followed immediately by fragment 51D(v). The text on the visible verso surface of layer 51ssss and bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo would then have been inserted either between fragments 51D(v) and 51A–B(r) or beyond the outermost strip containing fragments 51A–B(r). On the recto, approximately fourteen lines of text from the now-hidden recto surfaces of bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss would have to be inserted either at the very beginning of the manuscript before the outermost strip containing 51A–B(v) or between this outermost strip and fragment 51D(r).

Unfortunately, the content does not definitively favor either scenario. For example, nearly all of the fragments contain the terms *anagaḍa* or *adiḍa* on both the recto and verso, terms common throughout the text. On the recto, fragment 51D(r) examines the topic of existence in the three time periods in terms of the specific issues of matured effects (*vivaga*, P/Skt *vipāka*), in particular

past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured (*avivakavivaga*, P *avipakkavipāka*, Skt *avipakvavipāka*), as is discussed immediately thereafter in lines 4ff. Similarly, on the verso, the distinctive terms *upaṣapana/anupaṣapana* shared among bark pieces 51jjjj, layer 51ssss, the chips located on the visible verso surfaces of 51C and 51F, and the verso of fragment 51D suggest that these pieces of bark, chips, and fragments likely constitute a connected portion of the manuscript. However, unfortunately once again, these shared terms do not allow us to determine the placement of the various pieces of bark and chips relative to one another. Further, since the terms *upaṣapana* and *anupaṣapana* do not appear on the intervening layer of bark (51G(v)[51ssss(v)]), it is likely that bark piece 51jjjj has been displaced upward and should be connected in some way to the visible verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F, or to 51D(v). Thus, these similarities in content are not sufficient for determining the placement of bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 and layer 51ssss in relation to fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F on either the recto or the verso.

Nonetheless, one piece of evidence related to the content does appear to preclude at least one of the two possibilities outlined in the second scenario: specifically the placement of overlying layer 51ssss beyond the outermost strip of the surviving manuscript containing fragments 51A–B. The praxis-related topic treated in fragments 51A–B(v) and 53A differs markedly from the topic of existence in the three time periods that begins with fragment 51D(r); hence it may constitute the end of a preceding section or perhaps the topic that sets the context for the remaining discussion within the surviving manuscript. If so, 51A–B(v) and 53A would be expected to precede bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 and layer 51ssss, whose topic seems more linked to 51D(r).

Although neither scenario can be proven by either physical evidence or content, the first and simpler scenario has been tentatively adopted, namely, that the overlying layer of bark 51ssss, which covers both the final portion of manuscript 51G(v) and fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v), also includes the larger fragments in the outer two strips of manuscript part 51. In other words, the overlying layer, consisting of bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 and 51ssss, begins at line 135 and covers the original verso surfaces of fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F. It then extends continuously, including, in order, fragments 51D and 51A–B, both the recto and verso surfaces, in the two outer strips of the scroll. On the recto of the original manuscript, the now-hidden lines of this layer would have been placed between the strip containing fragments 51C and 51F, which are contiguous with 51G, and fragment 51D (plts. 1, 5). Although this scenario has been tentatively adopted, the exact relationships among the pieces that make up this overlying layer of bark and the transitions from piece to piece are still tentative.

The recto surface of the outermost strip of manuscript part 51 can be pieced together from the larger fragments 51A–B(v) and 53A and the smaller chips 53b, 53c, 51t(v), 51cc(v), and 51xxxx (plts. 5, 11a). Even though the suggested reconstruction of this outermost recto strip presumes a complicated process of conservation that involved the turning over, inversion, and displacement of its various fragments and chips, the proposed reconstruction is supported by shared content and physical connections, as well as by general characteristics of the script, in particular by the distinctive heavily inked letters of a similar size, which indicate that the reed pen used by BL scribe 21 was worn to the same degree when used to write the section of manuscript now forming all these fragments and chips.

The determining clue for the proposed combined reconstruction of these fragments and chips is fragment 53A. Its location on the outermost verso portion of manuscript part 53 indicates that its visible surface belongs to the recto of one of the two outer strips of manuscript part 51, while its verso surface is hidden by manuscript part 53 to which it adheres. The broken right edge of fragment 53A ends approximately 2–3 cm from the right edge of manuscript part 53, and the upper portion of its left edge is covered by a blank portion of bark also 2–3 cm wide. However, the original left and lower edges of fragment 53A can be clearly discerned. The fourth line of the fragment, not covered by the above-mentioned blank piece of bark, is also visible. This indicates that the width of fragment 53A is limited to approximately its exposed area of 6–7 cm by 2.5 cm. This would fit within the gap in the outer strip of the recto of manuscript part 51 that was left open by fragment 51C once it is returned to its original location next to fragment 51F in the third cycle of the scroll. On the basis of their script and the quality of their ink, two other chips adhering to manuscript part 53 can be connected to fragment 53A and hence ultimately to the outer strip of manuscript part 51. Chip 53b, located about 1.5 cm to the left of the first line of fragment 53A, contains the syllables *radi*, which can be combined with the two final syllables at the end of the first line on fragment 53A to form the finite verb form *viharadi*.³ Chip 53c is located on the verso of manuscript part 53 at the bottom edge of the third strip from the end of the scroll, that is, the next cycle of the scroll just underneath the strip that contained 53A in the rolled-up scroll. This suggests that its original location in manuscript part 51 would have been on the same strip but perhaps below fragment 53A. However, no direct physical evidence connects chip 53c with any other fragment or chip, and its content is not sufficiently distinctive to suggest a probable placement. As a result, in the tentative reconstruction of the manuscript, chip 53c is simply placed below fragment 53A within the outermost recto strip of manuscript part 51, at a point aligned horizontally with its location on the third strip in manuscript part 53. The transcription of chip 53c is also given separately from that of the other fragments and chips, which have been combined in the reconstruction of this outermost recto strip of manuscript part 51.

Since fragment 53A must have originally belonged to the recto of manuscript part 51, it might be expected to share terms with other fragments that were assumed in the conservation process to represent the recto of the manuscript, in particular fragments 51A–B(r), which would have also originally been located within the outer strip of manuscript part 51. However, in both general topic and specific terms, fragment 53A more closely resembles 51A–B(v), and in fact certain letters are shared between fragments 53A and 51B(v) (plts. 5, 11a).⁴ As a result, it seems definite that fragments 51A–B were turned over recto to verso during the conservation process. Chips 51t(v), 51xxxx, and 51cc(v), conserved on the verso surface of manuscript part 51, can also be linked by their heavily inked letters to fragments 51A–B(v) and must have also been turned over recto to verso. In addition, fragment 51A(v) and chip 51t(v) were also inverted, top to bottom, during the conservation process.

³ Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A [3] + /// |^{53A}[yanu]paśa viha|^{53b}radi |^{51t(v)}[pro]chiḍav. k.y.s.|^{51B(v)}[i ved].[n]. arabane karodi •.

⁴ Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A [6] + + + + + + + + /// |^{53A}? ? ? p..[chi]ḍavo • ka|^{53A+51B(v)}di |^{51B(v)}dukhañana di •.

These various fragments and chips that make up the recto surface of the outer strip of manuscript part 51 can be assembled in their probable original order on the basis of their location in the conserved manuscript, their physical connections, and their content. Fragment 51A(v), although turned over and inverted, remains in its current location vis-à-vis the other fragments within the outermost recto strip and should, in the tentative reconstruction, be placed above fragment 53A on the right end of the strip. Chip 51t(v) adheres to what was originally the upper edge of inverted fragment 51C(v), and even though there is no physical connection linking it to any other fragment, its location on the right side of manuscript part 51 suggests placing it on the right side of the outermost recto strip. Its content also fits well into the reconstruction of 51A–B(v)+53A line 3.⁵ Chips 51cc(v) and 51xxxx cannot be connected physically with any other fragment or chip, but their location on the left side of manuscript part 51 argues for their placement to the left of the reconstructed outermost recto strip. The content of chip 51cc(v) suggests that it precedes the discussion in fragments 53A and 51B(v), but the few words remaining on chip 51xxxx do not permit even a tentative placement. Hence, as in the case of chip 53c, chip 51xxxx is simply placed below fragment 51B(v) at a point aligned horizontally with its location on fragment 51F(v).

Despite this relative placement of the various fragments and chips that constitute the recto of this outermost strip of manuscript part 51, their absolute location vis-à-vis one another within the original manuscript cannot be determined. The left margin of this outermost recto strip is largely preserved on fragment 51B(v), but its right edge on fragments 51A(v) and 53A is heavily damaged. Nonetheless, an attempt has been made to estimate the number of missing syllables at the beginning and end of each line on the basis of the average line length of thirty-two syllables for manuscript part 51 as a whole. However, since the relative placement of the chips and fragments is often questionable, and the number of missing syllables between individual fragments remains uncertain, a triple solidus (///) has been used in both the transcription and the suggested reconstruction to indicate an incompletely preserved line whose length cannot be estimated with confidence. The transcription of those chips whose placement is uncertain, such as 53c, 51xxxx, and 51dddd, has also been given separately.

51A–B(v)+53A

Transcribed text

1. + + + + /// ^{51A(v)}[pr].cupana du[khañ].[n]. [pr].[c].[p].[n]. du[kha a]. /// ^{51cc(v)}+ + [m].di • yena kalena [k].[y]. /// +
2. + + + + /// ? ^{51A(v)}[a].[ry].[s].[c]. [yidi dukha di] • ? /// + + /// ^{51B(v)?} pr. ? ? /// + + + + + + +
3. + /// ^{53A}[yanu]paśa viha^{53b}radi ^{51t(v)}[pro]chidav. k.y.s.^{51B(v)}. [i ved].[n]. arabane karodi •
4. + /// ^{53A}[di na] arabane karodi • [n]. [u] .[ukh].ta anupurva ^{53A+51B(v)}[s]. ^{51B(v)}[m.ye] bhodi • yidi [aha]
5. + + /// ^{53A}[di na]navila[kṣa]na pa[śa]di • dukha [a]bhisa^{51B(v)}[me]di kena ñanena • kici sva

⁵ Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A [3] + /// ^{53A}[yanu]paśa viha^{53b}radi ^{51t(v)}[pro]chidav. k.y.s.^{51B(v)}. [i ved].[n]. arabane karodi •.

51xxxx

Transcribed text

/// |^{51xxxx?} *ṣa[di a]ṭha[na] ṣa* ///

Reconstruction

... ? *ṣadi aṭhana ṣa* ...

Translation

... will ... six ... of eight ...

Text Notes: 51A–B(v)+53A

[1] + + + + /// |^{51A(v)} *[pr].cupana du[khañ].[n]. [pr].[c].[p].[n]. du[kha a].* /// |^{51cc(v)} + + *[m].di • yena kalena [k].[y].* /// +: Only the left vertical of the first syllable in line 1 of fragment 51A(v) remains, but the reading *[pr].* is supported by the following three syllables, *cupana*. Although the upper portions of the next eleven syllables are lost at the upper edge of fragment 51A(v), their lower portions permit secure readings with the exception of *[p].[n].* and the final *[a].*. For *[p].[n].*, only two vertical strokes are visible with no remnant of the curved arm of *[p].*. Only the left, curved stroke remains of the final syllable, which might be read either as *[a].* or possibly *[t].*. Even though the reading *[t].* would support *dukhata*, as found in 51A–B(v)+53A line 4, the reading *[a].* would support the reconstruction *dukha abhisamedi*, as found in 51A–B(v)+53A line 5, or possibly *abhisamaya* in the compound *dukha-abhisamaya*. The suggested reconstruction *a(*bhisa)m(*e)di*, completed by *[m].di* with which fragment 51cc(v) begins, would in turn reinforce the reading *[a].* and the reconstruction *dukha a* for the prior syllables as expected on the basis of parallelism with 51A–B(v)+53A line 5.

Even though chip 51cc(v) is not physically connected to any other fragment or chip on this outer strip, its probable reference to *kaya* suggests a connection with the word *kaya* that appears in line 3 on fragment 53A and chip 51t(v). Chip 51cc(v) cannot be placed within 51A–B(v)+53A line 2 since it contains nine syllables, which would exceed the empty space of only seven syllables that remains from the broken upper edge of fragment 51B(v) to the probable left edge of the manuscript. Fragment 51F(v) to which chip 51cc(v) adheres, has become darkened and contains multiple chips and overlying layers, making it difficult to distinguish the lower right-hand edge of chip 51cc(v) from the underlying layer representing fragment 51F(v). Nonetheless, the few dots of ink that precede chip 51cc(v) appear to belong to the underlying layer. Further, the blank upper right-hand portion of chip 51cc(v) would not preclude combining it with fragment 51A(v). As a result, it is probable that the first legible syllables *[m].di* on chip 51cc(v) complete the verb *a(*bhisa)m(*e)di*, which would begin with the final *[a].* in line 1 on fragment 51A(v). In fact, if sufficient space is left for the intervening syllables (**bhisa*), chip 51cc(v) fits perfectly into the space within 51A–B(v)+53A line 1 that remains before the estimated left edge of the manuscript (plts. 5, 11a).

[2] + + + /// ? |^{51A(v)} *[a].[ry].[s].[c]. [yidi dukha di] • ?* /// + +: Fragment 51A(v) preserves only the upper tips of twelve syllables along its lower edge. A long chip, 51dddd, as yet unplaced, obscures the first two partially legible syllables in 51A–B(v)+53A line 2: a curved stroke from the

initial *[a]*. and the right leg together with a portion of the preconsonantal *r* of *[ry]*., both within the word *(*a)ry(*a)s(*a)c(*a)*. Unlike fragment 51A(v), chip 51ddddd is not inverted, and preserves the remnants of five syllables that are tentatively read as *? ? ña[n]*. • Both the placement of fragment 51B(v) vis-à-vis the other fragments and chips in the outermost strip and the average line length of approximately thirty-two syllables suggest that two syllables are missing between the left edge of fragment 51A(v) and the continuation of line 2 on fragment 51B(v) (plts. 5, 11a).

[2] *///*^{51B(v)?} *pr. ? ? /// + + + + + +*: At the upper edge of fragment 51B(v), the remnants of four syllables are visible, of which only one is legible as *pr*. Given the context and the syntax of the preceding conditional clause, it is likely that this *pr*. initiates the word *pracupana*.

[3] *+ ///*^{53A}*[yanu]paśa viha*^{53b}*radi*^{51(v)}*[pro]chidav. k.y.s.*^{51B(v)}*[i ved]. [n]. arabane karodi* • The first line on fragment 53A(v) preserves six syllables. The final two syllables *viha* can be combined with *radi* on chip 53b to complete the present verb form *viharadi* (plts. 5, 11a). The suggested reconstruction of this first phrase *(*ka)yanupaśa viharadi* is aided by the pattern describing the first of the four applications of mindfulness (P *satipaṭṭhāna*, Skt *smṛtyupasthāna*) found frequently in scriptural accounts: “A monk abides observing the body with regard to the body.”⁶ Chip 51t(v), adhering to the lower edge of fragment 51C(v), contains the remnants *[k].[y].[s]*., which, with its apparent reference to *kaya*, appears to be connected to this pattern in 51A–B(v)+53A line 3 and would also fit within the space between the end of chip 53b and the beginning of the second line of fragment 51B(v). Fragment 51B(v) begins with the upper portions of four syllables read conservatively as *.[i] .[e] [d]./[n]. [n]./[d]*.. Given the probable context of the four applications of mindfulness, the final three syllables can be read as *[ved].[n]*. for *vedana*, or “feelings” (P/Skt *vedanā*), which constitutes the second of the four applications of mindfulness. The first syllable *.i* can then be interpreted as marking the syllable *di*, which combines with the preceding *k.y.s.* on chip 51t(v) to yield *k(*a)y(*a)s(*a)d**i* (P *kāyasati*, Skt *kāyasṛti*), “mindfulness of the body.”

[4] *[n]. [u] .[ukh].ta anupurva*^{53A+51B(v)}*[s].*^{51B(v)}*[m]. [ye] bhodi • yidi [aha]*: On chip 53A, only a long vertical stroke remains from the syllable read tentatively as *[n]*., and the syllables *.[u] .[ukh]*. are almost entirely covered by a cluster of chips that, given their color and the form of the few strokes that they contain, belong to manuscript part 53. Underneath this cluster of chips, the infrared image reveals two clear *u*-vowel diacritics as well as a bottom hook with an upward curving stroke typical of *kh*.. The upper portion of *[s]*. is visible at the left edge of fragment 53A, and its lower tip is found at the right edge of fragment 51B(v), thus confirming the physical connection between fragments 53A and 51B(v). On the right edge of fragment 51B(v), above and to the left of this lower tip of *[s]*., is one stroke, presumably representing the left arm of the following *[m]*.. The final syllables *[aha]* in line 4 on fragment 51B(v) are extremely faint but become more legible in the infrared image.

For the word *anupurva[s].[m].[ye]*, both parallel terminology and the context of religious practice throughout this first section of the text suggest the emendation *anupurva(*bhi)s(*a)m(*a)-ye* (P *anupubbābhisamaya*, Skt *anupūrvābhisamaya*) forming a compound whose final member is equivalent to P/Skt *abhisamaya*, “clear comprehension,” a term significant in discussions of practice.⁷ It is possible that the unemended word *anupurvasamaya* is used here in the same

⁶ P *bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati* (MN I 55ff.; DN II 289ff.; SN V 138ff.; AN IV 456ff.; Vibh 191ff.).

⁷ Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A].

reconstructed as *aṭhana*, possibly the genitive plural masculine/neuter form of the numeral “eight” (P *aṭṭha*, Skt *aṣṭan*). Although the following word beginning with *ṣa* is uncertain, the *ṣa* may signal some form of the numeral six.

II.6.2. Section 2—Existence of Past and Future Factors [51D(r), 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r), ll. 1–66]

II.6.2.1. 51D(r)

Manuscript Notes: 51D(r)

Fragment 51D(r), containing six whole or partial lines, is relatively well preserved and extends across the entire width of the manuscript. The right-hand margin in the first two lines is damaged, with approximately thirteen syllables missing from the beginning of the first line, and six or seven syllables, from the beginning of the second. The third and fourth lines contain thirty-two and thirty-three syllables, respectively, which is typical of the longer lines in manuscript part 51; the fourth line with thirty-three syllables appears to be complete. The sixth and final line on fragment 51D(r), preserved along its irregular lower edge, contains only sporadic but often legible syllable tops.

Like the various fragments and chips that have been assembled to form the outermost strip of manuscript part 51, fragment 51D consists only of a single layer of bark, but unlike fragments 51A, 51B, 51cc, and 51t, it appears to be conserved in its correct orientation recto to verso. This is indicated by the fact that the verso of fragment 51D contains the terms *upaṣapana* and *anupaṣapana* that can be linked with bark piece 51jjjj, which likely belongs to layer 51ssss adhering to the verso of fragment 51G (ll. 139ff.). Further, on the basis of content, specifically the terms *nivurta* and *anivu(*r)t(*a)*, the recto of fragment 51D can be linked with the underlying layers of fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r), and possibly also with chip 51dd.

Despite its well-preserved condition, fragment 51D cannot be connected physically with any of the other fragments of the three outer strips of manuscript part 51, nor with the continuous portion of the manuscript beginning with fragment 51G. Hence, as discussed above in the scenarios for the initial fragments, it is possible that the order of the two outer strips was reversed in the process of conservation. If so, the reconstruction of fragments and chips tentatively proposed for the outer strip of manuscript part 51 might actually constitute the second strip of the original manuscript, and fragment 51D, the outer strip.⁸ According to the most likely scenario for the reconstruction of the fragments, layers, and segments of manuscript part 51, certain exposed syllables on fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) would represent the only visible portion of underlying layer 51ssss(r), and this would support the view that fragment 51D and layer 51ssss formed a single continuous portion of the original manuscript. The remainder of the recto of bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss, which comprise approximately fourteen lines of text, would then be covered by the fragments 51C, 51F, and 51G to which the pieces of bark and layer adhere. In the original manuscript, these now-hidden fourteen lines of layer 51ssss(r) were most likely located between fragment 51D(r) and fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r).⁹

⁸ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

⁹ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

51dd(r)

Transcribed text

///^{51dd(r)? ? ?} + .[c] ? ? [ni an]i[v]u.[t]. ///

Reconstruction

... ? ? ? + .c ? ? ni anivu(*r)t(*a) ...

Translation

... has not occurred ...

Text Notes: 51D(r)

[1] *ekadeśa vi*^{51D(r)+51w(r)}*vaga* ^{51D(r)? ?} .[u] ? : The upper portions of *vaga* appear on a cluster of two chips constituting 51w(r), which is still attached to the upper edge of fragment 51D(r) in the initial black-and-white photograph. The lower tips of three additional syllables concluding 51D(r) line 1 are also preserved. Although these remnants permit only the partial reading .[u] for the second of these three syllables, the prior pattern [*ekadeśa [viva]ga nivurta*] suggests the contrasting term (**aniv*)u(**rta*) as the final word in 51D(r) line 1.

[2] + + + + + + + ///^{51D(r)}[a]śa ara[ha]tvaprataśa asti so pranadivada: The syllables [a]śa ara appear on a piece of bark on the right edge of the strip, which has rotated slightly counterclockwise and drifted away from the remainder of 51D(r) line 2. The upper left tip and lower horizontal stroke of the next syllable found on the remainder of fragment 51D(r) are sufficient to support the reading [ha]. Just above [ha] is chip 51u, as yet unplaced, containing the remnants of two illegible syllables. Between *pra* and *na* of *pranadivada* is a blank space that does not appear to be delaminated and cannot be explained on the basis of bark irregularities. It is thus possible that the space was intentional and resulted from the scribe's difficulty in reading the written archetype.¹⁰

[3] + ///^{51D(r)}[ś].[k]. ca u[pa]dadhama anu[pa]dadhama kato •: 51D(r) line 3 begins with the lower portion of a syllable read as [ś]., which can be aligned vertically with the second syllable in 51D(r) line 4. Since the context suggests that no syllables have been lost at the beginning of 51D(r) line 4, it is possible but not certain that 51D(r) line 3 contained one additional syllable prior to [ś]. 51D(r) line 3 has been interpreted as a rhetorical question and contains the first clear example of a syntactic pattern utilizing the term *śaka*, which is common throughout our text.¹¹ In this pattern, *śaka* can be understood in one of two ways: (1) as a nominative singular neuter gerundive (P *sakkaṃ*, Skt *śakyam*), or (2) as an indeclinable (P *sakkā*, BHS *śakyā*) originally derived from the OIA aorist optative form *śakyāt*.¹² Both forms are used in similar syntactic patterns conveying the sense of “capability” or “possibility” and can appear with infinitive forms, which can then be understood either actively or passively. Since the Gāndhārī term *śaka* could support either form, the

¹⁰ For other blank spaces that might indicate difficulty in reading a written archetype, see Text Notes: [20] *ya* ^{51H(r)}s[o] *vivaga nivartadi* • *paḍiṣavededi*; [75] *a[di][76]* ^{52G(v)+52I}*dara* ^{52G(v)}*gadoṣamoha asti* •; [95] *asti [ca] sarva di* ^{52r+52A(v)}• *cakhaīda* ^{52A(v)}*na*.

¹¹ Cf. 51D(r) l. 3; 51C+51F(r) ll.2, 4; ll. 2, 36, 37, 38, 43, 65.

¹² BHS s.v. *śakyā*; PTSD s.v. *sakkā*; Pischel 1981 [1957]: 386 [§ 465].

indeclinable equivalent Skt *śakyā* (P *sakkā*) has been tentatively adopted on the basis of its greater frequency in Pali sources.

The syllable *[pa]* in *u[pa]dadhama* takes a distinctive form, with a truncated left vertical that curves to meet the right-hand curved stroke from which this vertical extends downward.¹³ The syllable *[pa]* in *anu[pa]dadhama* is abraded, and its lower portion is covered by a blank chip. Even though the prior members, *upaḍa* or *anupaḍa*, in the compounds *upaḍadhama* or *anupaḍadhama*, are clearly derived from *ut + √pad*, the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents for these terms are uncertain. The verbal past participle derivatives Skt *utpanna/anutpanna* (P *uppanna/anuppanna*) cannot be justified either by phonology or by context. The Gāndhārī terms *upaḍa* and *anupaḍa* consistently end in *ḍa* and not *na*, as would be expected in the case of the Gāndhārī past participle form of the root *pad*.¹⁴ Further, the discussion here clearly concerns future factors, and although such future factors could be described with the negative participial adjective “not arisen” (Skt *anutpanna*, P *anuppanna*), the participial adjective “already arisen” (Skt *utpanna*, P *uppanna*) cannot be applied to the future. The noun derivatives Skt *utpatti/anutpatti* (P *uppatti/anuppatti*) can convey the sense required in this context of “subject to” or “not subject to arising”¹⁵ but are phonologically unlikely as equivalents for *upaḍa* and *anupaḍa*, since the geminate consonant *-tt-* would be expected to be represented in Gāndhārī with the unvoiced consonant *-t-*. The noun derivatives Skt *utpāda/anutpāda* (P *uppāda/anuppāda*) would be the closest phonological equivalents, but their use is very restricted in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist materials. Further, these nouns Skt *utpāda* and *anutpāda* convey the simple stative sense of “arising” or “not arising,” and not the potential sense of “subject

¹³ For other occurrences of this distinctive character *pa*, see ll. 60, 122, 125, 128.

¹⁴ Burrow 1937: 51–52 [§ 107].

¹⁵ For example, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh 1.39c p. 27.21) clearly distinguishes the terms Skt *utpanna* and Skt *utpattidharma* in the phrase, “if in that case that perceptual consciousness is either arisen or subject to arising, ...” (Skt *yadi tatra tad vijñānam utpannam bhavaty utpattidharmi vā ...*). Since the meaning of Skt *utpanna* must be “already arisen,” Skt *utpatti* should have the contrastive sense of being “subject to arising.” In another passage from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh 1.6cd p. 4.17ff.), the terms Skt *utpattidharma* and Skt *anutpattidharma* appear in a tetralemma specifying the application to factors of the two terms “cessation resulting from consideration” (Skt *pratisamkhyānirodha*) and “cessation not resulting from consideration” (Skt *aprasamkhyānirodha*). In commenting on the statement that only cessation resulting from consideration applies to Skt *atītapratyutpannotpattidharma*, Yaśomitra (AKVy 18.20ff.) clearly interprets the compound as “past factors, present factors, and factors subject to arising.” He states that cessation not resulting from consideration does not occur with regard to past or present factors “since they have already undergone arising” (Skt *atītapratyutpannānām utpādasya kṛtatvāt*). The remaining member of the compound *-utpatti-* refers to a separate group of factors, presumably future factors, for which “presence is inevitable” (Skt *utpattidharmānām cāvaśyambhāvāt*). This suggests that the compound Skt *utpattidharma* is to be interpreted with the sense of “factors destined for” or “subject to arising” (Skt *utpatti*). Commenting on the compound Skt *anutpattidharma* in the same passage, Yaśomitra explains that factors are described as “not subject to arising” “due to the fact that their arising is absolutely obstructed” (Skt *atyantaviḥnitotpādatvād eṣām anutpattidharmatvam*). Hence, these passages suggest that the terms Skt *utpattidharma* and Skt *anutpattidharma* can indeed have the sense of “subject to” or “not subject to arising.” Unfortunately, the difficulty of determining the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of the Chinese translations that might correspond to the terms Skt *utpatti/anutpatti-*, Skt *utpanna/anutpanna-*, and Skt *utpādi/anutpādi-* limits our ability to track their distinctive use in northern Indian Buddhist sources extant only in Chinese.

to” or “not subject to arising.” However, P *anuppāda* does appear in the prior position within the Pali compound *anuppādadhama*, where it functions as a bahuvrīhi adjective with the sense “not possessed of arising” or “without arising”: “It is abandoned, its root is cut off, it is made like an uprooted palm, it is destroyed, it is a factor without arising in the future”¹⁶ Similarly, the terms P *uppāda* and P *vaya* function as a bahuvrīhi in the prior position within the Pali compound *uppādavayadhamma*, which has the sense, “factors possessing arising and passing away” (DN II 67; SN I 6). Thus, although the Gāndhārī compound *anupaḍadhama* could be understood as equivalent to *anutpādadhama*, in which *anupaḍa* = *anutpāda* functions as a bahuvrīhi adjective, “not possessed of” or “subject to arising,” such an interpretation would not be possible in the case of *upaḍadhama* with the simple noun *upaḍa* in the prior position.

Now, it is also possible that the Sanskrit terms *utpādadhama* and *anutpādadhama* may have been used occasionally with the extended connotation of potentiality as factors “subject to” or “not subject to arising.” However, the more likely Sanskrit or MIA equivalents are respectively *utpādidharma* and *anutpādidharma*, in which the compound-initial members *utpādi/anutpādi* are formed with the possessive *-in* suffix, namely, factors “possessed of” or “not possessed of arising.” In fact, such an interpretation is strongly suggested by a passage in the Kathāvatthu, similar in content to the present discussion in our text, which uses the phrases P *uppādinō dhammā* and P *anuppādinō dhammā* (Kv 153ff.). The loss of the *i* vowel in the final position of a prior member within a compound is not expected, but the Gāndhārī terms *upaḍa-dhama* and *anupaḍa-dhama*, rather than *upaḍi-dhama* and *anupaḍi-dhama*, respectively, may result from a looseness in rendering vowel finals, which is encountered frequently in Gāndhārī.¹⁷

The verb *kṛ* appears to be used here in an intransitive sense without an object with the sense that the verbal action is both carried out by and affects the agent. Of the thirteen forms of the verb *kṛ* that occur in our text, including the present, future, optative, infinitive, and gerundive, ten carry this “quasi-reflexive” sense: eight are found in the context of the present argument concerning whether future factors “subject to arising” can “act as” factors “not subject to arising” (51D(r) 3; ll. 37, 38, 50, 63 [2x], 66, 141); two, in the context of factors “acting as” a cause of another factor (ll. 1, 2); and one, a gerundive and hence passive (l. 18), carries the sense of “should be brought about” (ll. 18, 19) but implicitly in reference to being brought about “as one’s own” (*svago*, P *sako*, Skt *svakaḥ*), which occurs three times nearby. In only two occurrences does the present form *karodi* have an expected transitive sense as “take as” or “make” in the case of a double accusative construction (51A–B(v)+53A ll. 3, 4). Thus, the translation adopted here, which is dictated by the argument of the opponent, reflects this reflexive sense: “And is it possible for a [future] factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising?” (*ś(*a)k(*a) ca upaḍadhama anupaḍadhama kato*).¹⁸

[3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]*^{51D(r)}*[ka]vivaga asti •*: With the third-person plural verb form *ahasu*, “they state,” the proponent presents the view of his first opponent, who is not identified in the text. This plural form *ahasu* occurs only four times in the text, and in three of

¹⁶ P *pahīnaṃ ucchinnaṃ tālāvattthukataṃ anabhāvaṅkataṃ āyatim anuppādadhamaṃ* (MN I 487–488). Cf. SN III 27, 161; AN I 135; Kv 85, passim.

¹⁷ Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

¹⁸ For the grammatical concept of the reflexive, see the entry on the *karṣ* in Renou 1957: 121–122. On the rich variety of syntactic uses of forms of the root *kṛ* in Pali, see Oberlies 2001: 210–212.

the four occurrences it clearly introduces positions associated with doctrinally distinguished and in two cases explicitly identified opponents: this case in 51D(r) line 3 presents the first reference to the view of the unidentified opponent in the first part of the text (51D(r) ll. 3–l. 66); two other cases (l. 83; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6) present views explicitly attributed to the *mahasarvastivāda*, the opponent in the second part of the text (l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7). The final occurrence (l. 51) appears merely to introduce simply an additional argument, but it is perhaps intended to introduce a question that originates with the opposing party rather than just a rhetorical or an abstract polemical rejoinder offered to further an argument.

The third-person singular verb form *asti* can be construed here either as singular agreeing with the final nominative in the preceding series of three singular nominatives, or as semantically plural in accordance with the series understood as plural: “the state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, [and action] whose matured effect has not yet matured” (*avivagatva vivagatva avivakavivaga*, 51D(r) ll. 3–4). The fossilized third-person singular verb form P *atthi* used with plural nominatives appears frequently in the Kathāvatthu¹⁹ and is also encountered elsewhere in this and other Gāndhārī texts.²⁰ The three final syllables *[a]viva* in 51D(r) line 3 begin the word *[a]viva[ka]vivaga*, which is concluded at the beginning of 51D(r) line 4. The syllable *[a]* is marked by extra vertical and diagonal strokes that may indicate a corrected syllable. Just beyond the left edge of fragment 51D lies the unplaced chip 51y, which, although blank on the recto, preserves the remnants of three syllables on the verso.²¹

[4] *[et]. [vi]vaga tasa heduavinaśa* [5] + + + /// ^[51D(r)]*[ta] ? ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asaḍa na bhodi* •: The syllable tentatively read as *e* in *[et]*. lacks the lower portion of the vertical stroke below the *e*-vowel diacritic and could possibly be read as *[ha]*. A hole in the manuscript obliterates the middle portions of the next two syllables *[t]. [vi]*. The top of the first syllable would support the readings *[t].*, *[s].*, or *[d]./[ḍ].*, but the absence of an extended lower portion below the hole precludes *[s].*, and the extended loop toward the right suggests *[t]*. rather than *[d]./[ḍ].*. The resulting reading *[et]*. has been understood as the pronoun *eta*, even though it appears elsewhere in our text as *eḍa* with the expected voiced intervocalic consonant *-ḍ-*. Despite the fact that in this manuscript the voiced consonants *da/ḍa* are usually clearly distinguished from the unvoiced consonant *ta*, there are nonetheless several instances of graphic confusion between them.²² From the context, the third syllable is read as *[vi]*.

The final compound in 51D(r) line 4, *heduavinaśa*, is followed by approximately three missing syllables at the beginning of 51D(r) line 5. Two partial, diagonal strokes of ink appear at the beginning of 51D(r) line 5, but the verso clearly reveals that these must be on the separate and unplaced chip 51z. Context suggests that *heduavinaśa* functions as an ablative and provides the reason for the preceding statement: “this matured effect ... due to the non-destruction of its cause”

¹⁹ For example, Kv 151ff.: “Past factors whose matured effects have not yet matured exist, and past factors whose matured effects have already matured do not exist” (P *atītā avipakkavipākā dhammā te atthi, atītā vipakkavipākā dhammā te n’ atthīti*).

²⁰ BL 28: ll. 31, 38, 39, 69, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 76, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 122, 126, 139. Cf. Salomon 2008: 163 [§ II.4.6.2]; Geiger 1994: 138 [§ 141.1]; BHS 129 [§ 25.4].

²¹ Text Notes: 51D(v) [4] *yi[ḍi a]. (///) [5] + + + + + /// ^[51D(v)]*[s].[mu]nagad[o d]i*.*

²² Text Notes: [4] *[ta]śa [de so]palo di*; [25] *apaṃ* [26] *hi [e]ḍa [a].nala [ś].[m].[a]. [dudo] vi[vatas]. p.la[n]. [bromi] .[i]*.

(*et(*a) vivaga tasa heduavinaśa + + +*, 51D(r) ll. 4–5). Even though *heduavinaśa* alone could be interpreted as an ablative ending in *-a*,²³ since all other *a*-stem ablatives in this manuscript are marked by the suffix *-do* or in some cases *-da/-de*, the first two missing syllables in 51D(r) line 5 have been tentatively reconstructed as the ablative ending *-do* followed by the quotative particle *di*, which would complete the proponent’s statement governed by the preceding *vatava* in 51D(r) line 4: “[P] It should be said that if that ‘state of not being possessed of a matured effect’ exists, this matured effect [exists] due to the non-destruction of its cause” (*vatava yadi avivagatva ta asti et(*a) vivaga tasa heduavinaśa(*do di)*, 51D(r) ll. 4–5. The two syllables (**do di*) are followed by one more missing syllable and then a partial syllable whose upper portion is obscured by chip 51z but whose lower portion suggests the reading [*ta*]. The upper portion of the next visible syllable, possibly corrected, appears as a simple horizontal stroke, but the lower portion is distorted by two curving vertical strokes, holes in the manuscript, and miniscule chips marked with dots of ink. Nonetheless, the context suggests the tentative reconstruction (**va*)*ta*(**va*), which would also account for the remaining missing syllable at the beginning of 51D(r) line 5.

The words *saḍa* and *asaḍa* have been construed here as nominative singular forms of the present participle of the root *as*. In most cases of *saḍa* and *asaḍa* attested in Gāndhārī, the masculine parasmaipada present participle is declined on the basis of a thematized *a*-stem ending in *-anta/-ata*, in which the intervocalic conjunct *-nt-* would be represented in Gāndhārī by unvoiced *-t*.²⁴ Neuter forms are as yet unverified. As a result, the forms *saḍa* and *asaḍa* with the voiced intervocalic consonants *-ḍ-*, which can be clearly distinguished from the unvoiced consonant *-t-*, would be expected to represent oblique forms of the present participle formed from the weak stem.²⁵ However, the simple copula construction used in this passage as well as the placement of *saḍa* and *asaḍa* as the second term immediately preceding the verb *bhodi* suggest that *saḍa* and *asaḍa* should both be interpreted as nominative forms: *saḍa* as nominative singular neuter modifying *kama*, and *asaḍa* as nominative singular masculine modifying *vivaga*.

[5] [*yadi a*]. [*ḍa*] *adi*[*ḍ*]. . [*i*]: The lower portions of the final eight syllables in 51D(r) line 5 are lost at the lower edge of fragment 51D(r). For the third syllable among these five, only the upper portion of a vowel-carrying sign remains, but it has been reconstructed as (**e*) to form the pronoun (**e*)*ḍa*. For the final two syllables, only one dot of ink and the top of an *i*-vowel diacritic remain, but they have been reconstructed on the basis of context as *ḍ(*a d)i* in the phrase *adiḍ(*a d)i*.

[6] + + /// |^{51D(r)}[*g*]. [*nast*]*i* •: 51D(r) line 6 preserves only sporadic upper portions of syllables along the lower edge of fragment 51D(r). The first syllable, represented by a high curved stroke, is tentatively read from the context as [*g*]., and the preceding two missing syllables at the beginning of the line have been reconstructed to form (**viva*)*g*(**a*). The third syllable is clearly [*sti*], and the narrow upper portion of the second syllable suggests the reading [*na*] rather than [*a*]. to form [*nast*]*i*.

²³ Cf. Glass 2007: 128 [§ 6.1.1.2].

²⁴ Salomon 2008: 160 [§ II.4.5.7]; Allon 2001: 113 [§ 6.1.4.4]; von Hinüber 2001: 196–197 [§ 490].

²⁵ For (*a*)*saḍa* as an oblique form, see 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7. For (*a*)*sata* as the nominative, see ll. 71, 86, 87; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5. Text Notes: 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7 [5] |^{51G(v)}[51ssss(v)]^{1.5}*saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*. Cf. line 101, where *sate* appears as the locative singular, presumably neuter, present participle.

[6] *viva*[g]. ? *yena* [tas]. ? ? *va* ? [di] + [di] ///: The lower edge of fragment 51D(r) is uneven, with protrusions containing partial syllables interspersed with holes, above which only dots of ink are preserved. A hole obliterates all but two dots from the syllable read from the context as [g]., and the next syllable is represented by a mere trace of ink above a hole. Similarly, a hole following *yena* obliterates the lower left portion of [ta] and all but the upper left and right tips of the next syllable read tentatively as [s]. The minimal ink remaining from the following two syllables does not permit even a tentative reading. The second of the next three syllables *va* ? [di] is covered by a cluster of two overlapping and unplaced chips (51aa) containing short strokes of ink. The original but now covered syllable appears to have been marked by a high diagonal stroke, but even a tentative reading is impossible. The final syllable contains a clear *i*-vowel diacritic and the upper left tip of the base character *d*- presumably representing [di].

51dd(r) ///|^{51dd(r)}? ? ? + .[c] ? ? [ni an]i[v]u.[t]. ///: Chip 51dd(r) found near the top of fragment 51F(r) contains the lower tips of approximately eleven syllables, the last four of which can be read as [an]i[v]u.[t]., which suggests a connection with *nivurta* in line 1 of fragment 51D(r). Chip 51dd(r) may have originally belonged to the recto of fragment 51D(r) or possibly to the largely hidden recto surface of layer 51ssss, which is now largely covered by fragments 51C, 51F, and 51G. The underlying layers of fragments 51C and 51F also presumably represent this hidden recto surface of layer 51ssss and also contain a reference to the term (**ni*)*virta* or possibly (**ani*)*virta* (51C(r)[51ssss(r)] l. 4).

II.6.2.2. 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r)

Manuscript Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r)

Of the seven fragments constituting the three outer strips, or one-and-a-half cycles, of manuscript part 51, the final two fragments, 51C and 51F, can be connected to one another primarily on the basis of distinctive physical characteristics. Fragment 51C, as conserved, is inverted and located on the outer strip of manuscript part 51. However, it can be relocated next to fragment 51F within the third strip of the scroll in the space vacated by fragment 51E, which can be securely placed within fragment 51G (recto ll. 5–7; verso ll. 138–140). Fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) share similar line spacing and a smoother bark surface that resembles fragment 51G(r) but differs from the mottled appearance of the other initial fragments on the recto of manuscript part 51. This suggests that fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) should be placed within the same strip of the scroll and, further, originate from the same large segment of bark as fragment 51G(r). Optical backlighting reveals that both fragments 51C and 51F consist of multiple layers; hence they likely preserve on their verso surface a portion of the overlying layer of bark (51jjjj–oooo, 51ssss) that also covers the verso of fragment 51G (ll. 135ff.). This further supports their placement in the strip contiguous with fragment 51G. As a result, the fourteen now-hidden lines of text from the recto of bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss should be inserted between fragment 51D(r) and the strip containing fragments 51C and 51F or between 51D(r) and the outermost strip containing fragments 51A–B.²⁶

On fragment 51C(r), the right edge of the smooth surface layer is visible approximately 0.5 cm from the right edge of the fragment, and the underlying and otherwise hidden recto surface of layer

²⁶ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

51ssss is partially exposed. The edges of several larger chips (51r, 51s, 51t, 51v), which are fused onto the verso of fragment 51C, are visible above the upper edge of its recto surface. Of these four chips, only chip 51t(v) can be placed. On fragment 51F(r), the smooth surface layer extends approximately 2–3 cm from its right edge, to the left of which are multiple chips and pieces of bark covering or perhaps constituting the underlying recto surface of layer 51ssss. The chips separated by obvious junctures on the recto of 51C and 51F are labeled individually, but it is also possible that several of these chips once belonged to the same original surface of fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) or possibly of underlying layer 51ssss.

These overlying chips and pieces of bark support the placement of fragments 51C and 51F together within the same strip of the manuscript. Unfortunately, however, they often preclude secure readings and render a secure reconstruction of the original strip as a whole virtually impossible. The tentative reconstruction assumes that the smooth layers on fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) constitute a single layer of bark that was originally continuous with fragment 51G(r). The length of lines spanning fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) has therefore been estimated at approximately thirty-two syllables, which is typical for the remainder of manuscript part 51. However, since it is impossible to determine how much of the manuscript is missing on both the right and left margins of fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r), their relative placement vis-à-vis the original edges of the manuscript as well as the number of syllables missing between them cannot be established with certainty. The reconstruction of line 4 of fragment 51C(r) offers a rough estimate of the line length in this portion of the manuscript since this fragment can be connected physically with several smaller chips (51l, 51m, 51n, 51o) that presumably are to be placed within the intervening space between fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r). Context then suggests that at least five syllables are missing between the last of these chips, 51l, and fragment 51F(r) (plt. 5).²⁷ The number of intervening missing syllables in line 4 of fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) can then be used as a guide for the missing syllables in the other lines as well. Given the typical line length of approximately thirty-two syllables in manuscript part 51, six or even more additional syllables might be missing from the beginning or end of 51C+51F(r) line 4. However, since it is impossible to determine the relative placement of fragments 51C and 51F vis-à-vis the original left or right edge of the manuscript, no attempt has been made to estimate missing syllables at the beginning and end of each line. Thus, the reconstruction of fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) is presented as a whole but includes a triple solidus (///) as a reminder that line lengths cannot be estimated with confidence and that the number of estimated missing syllables is tentative. The transcriptions and reconstructions of the separate chips and pieces of bark on fragment 51F(r) that cannot be connected to any of the initial fragments or to the remainder of manuscript part 51 are presented separately.

²⁷ Text Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r) [4] [yidi]vatava |^{51C(r)+51o(r)}śa|^{51o(r)+51n(r)+51m(r)+51l(r)}ka vivaga a /// + ///
|^{51F(r)}[di] viva[ga] .[i]/.[e g]. ? ///.

51C+51F(r)

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51F(r)}? ? ? ? ///
2. /// |^{51C(r)}? ? ? ? na [n]i[viś].[ṣ]. [•] tena ta na [yen]. /// + + + + /// |^{51F(r)}? ka adida ava[r].
///
3. /// |^{51C(r)}niviśeṣa • i ca ma [sa] /// + + + + + /// |^{51F(r)}iḍa asti ? ? iḍana ///
4. /// |^{51C(r)}. [u] asti di [yidi] vatava |^{51C(r)+51o(r)}śa|^{51o(r)+51n(r)+51m(r)+51l(r)}ka vivaga a /// + /// |^{51F(r)}[di]
viva[ga] .[i]/.[e g]. ///
5. /// |^{51C(r)}[a]kuśalasa a /// + + + + + + + /// |^{51F(r)+51oo(r)}[ś].la .[i]/.[e] ? ///

Reconstruction

- [1] ... ? ? ? ? [2] ... ? ? ? ? na niviś(*e)ṣ(*a) • tena ta na yen(*a) + + + + (*śa)ka adida
avar(*a) ... [3] ... niviśeṣa • i ca ma sa + + + + + (*a)iḍa(*na) asti ? ? (*a)iḍana ... [4]
... .u asti di yidi vatava śaka vivaga a + di vivaga .i/.e g. ? ... [5] ... akuśalasa a + + + +
+ + + + (*ku)ś(*a)la .i/.e ? ...

Translation

- [1] ... [2] ... not without distinction. Then that is not ... by which ... it is possible for
another ... in the past ... [3] ... without distinction. ... sense sphere exists. ... sense sphere
... [4] ... exists.” If it should be said that it is possible for a matured effect ..., the matured
effect ... [5] ... of the unvirtuous ... virtuous (or, unvirtuous) ...

51C(r)[51ssss(r)]

Transcribed text

3. /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)]}1.3 [pa]la so na [t]. ///
4. /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)]}1.4 [vurta] ///
5. /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)]}1.5 ? ? ? ///

Reconstruction

- [3] ... pala so na t. ... [4] ... (*ni/ani)vurta ... [5] ... ? ? ? ...

Translation

- [3] ... the fruit, that does not ... [4] ... occurred/not occurred ... [5] ...

51ee

Transcribed text

/// |^{51ee}tra ta vivaga ? ? ? ? ///

Reconstruction

... (*ta)tra ta vivaga ? ? ? ? ...

Translation

... In that case, that matured effect ...

51ff

Transcribed text

/// |^{51ff?} [kṣaya] va [tasa] viva ? ///

Reconstruction

... ? kṣaya va tasa viva(*ga) ...

Translation

... or destruction. ... the matured effect of that ...

51hh

Transcribed text

/// |^{51hh?} dehi vi[v].[g]. ? ///

Reconstruction

... ? dehi viv(*a)g(*a) ? ...

Translation

... by means of ... matured effect ...

51ii

Transcribed text

/// |^{51ii?} ? ? ? ? ? ///

51jj(r)

Transcribed text

/// |^{51jj(r)} adida[s]a kama

Reconstruction

... adidaṣa kama(*sa)

Translation

... of past action ...

51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]

Transcribed text

/// |^{51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]} ? ? ? di ama[m] di [a]ha ? ? ///

Reconstruction

... ? ? ? di amaṃ di aha ? ? ...

Translation

... [one states], [O] “Yes.” [P] One states [O] ...

Text Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r)

[1] ///^{51F(r)} ? ? ? ? ///: Along the upper edge of fragment 51F(r) on the layer of smooth bark constituting the recto surface of fragments 51C and 51F are the lower tips of four illegible syllables. Just above these syllables on the upper edge of fragment 51F is chip 51bb(r), which contains the lower tips of two illegible syllables. These syllables might represent the recto surface of fragment 51F, layer 51ssss, or perhaps a piece of bark that can be connected with fragment 51D.

[2] ///^{51C(r)} ? ? ? ? *na [n]i [viś].[ś]. [•]*: In the first visible line on fragment 51C(r) constituting the second line of the combined fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r), the smooth surface layer begins with the remnants of four syllables, under which there are dots of ink from other syllables located both on the underlying layer of bark and on separate chips. The next seven syllables *na [n]i[viś].[ś]. [•]* are covered by chip 51q, which has broken into two parts: ///^{51q-1} [*d*]. [*n*]. [*ś*]./[*y*]. /// and ///^{51q-2} [*ta*] *na va* ? ///. The original location of chip 51q has not been determined. A piece of bark that has been dislodged and forced upward by chip 51q contains the upper tips of three syllables that can be moved downward and realigned with *na [n]i[vi]* on fragment 51C(r) line 2.

[2] ///^{51F(r)} *ka adiḍa ava[r]*. ///: An underlying layer, presumably layer 51ssss(r), is visible just underneath the right edge of fragment 51F(r) at the beginning of 51C+51F(r) lines 2 and 3. Unfortunately, the physical connection between layer 51ssss and the remainder of 51F(v) is obscured on the verso by blank chip 51yyyy, which covers the right edge. Line 2 on fragment 51F(r) continues with the lower tip of one illegible syllable followed by a clear *ka*. The final syllable in line 2 on the smooth surface layer of fragment 51F(r) is represented only by its right portion read tentatively as [*r*]. as part of the word *avar(*a)*. Since the word *avara/o* is not used in our text in the nominative singular masculine to refer to an alternative party or opinion, it is likely used here either as an accusative singular neuter adverb with the sense “afterward” or “later on,” or more likely as an adjective of unknown case and gender modifying an undetermined referent.²⁸

[3] ///^{51C(r)} *niviśeṣa • i ca ma [sa]* ///: To the right of the beginning of 51C+51F(r) line 3 are five syllables probably located on underlying layer 51ssss(r) read as ///^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)] 1.3} [*pa*] *la so na [t]*. ///. The lower portion of the final syllable [*sa*] on the smooth surface layer of 51C(r) line 3 is lost at the left edge of the fragment. The four final syllables on fragment 51C(r) in line 3, *i ca ma [sa]*, follow a punctuation mark and hence initiate one or more words, but the equivalent word or words are uncertain. The occurrence in sentence-initial position of the finite verb *icheaṣi* from the root *iṣ*, “you might wish” (l. 66), suggests the possibility of a finite verb *icama*, also from the root *iṣ*, but here in the first-person plural present tense, “we wish (or maintain).” However, the reading here is clearly *icama* instead of the expected aspirated *ichama*. Although it is possible that the unaspirated *ca* here is simply an error, since the aspirated palatal *ch* appears consistently elsewhere in the manuscript, it is unlikely that the scribe forgot it only in this case.

[3] ///^{51F(r)} *iḍa asti ? ? iḍana* ///: The underlying layer probably representing 51ssss(r), which is visible in 51C+51F(r) line 3 at the right edge of fragment 51F(r), contains the upper portion of a syllable that might be read as [*di*] or [*ri*]. The first two clearly legible syllables *iḍa* in 51C+51F(r) line 3 on the smooth surface layer of fragment 51F(r) could represent a nominative or accusative pronominal form. However, the three syllables *iḍana* that appear later in 51C+51F(r) line 3 suggest

²⁸ Text Notes: 51D(v) [3] *tena avaro ma*[4]^{51D(v)}[*na*] *vaṣo [ava]ṣiyo •*.

the term *aiḍana* used consistently in this manuscript in compound-final position for *ayaḍana* (P/Skt *āyatana*), usually with elision at the compound juncture of the final vowel of the prior member.²⁹ These two syllables in 51C+51F(r) line 3 might then also represent *aiḍa*⟨*na⟩ with the accidental omission of the final *na*. Even though the two syllables prior to both possible occurrences of ⟨*a⟩-*iḍana* in this line are missing or obscured by blank chips, other compounds ending in -*aiḍana* suggest three possible readings: *cakhaiḍana* (ll. 95, 96–97, 99, 116); *ruvaiḍana* (l. 99); or *manaiḍana* (l. 119). Unfortunately, context does not permit determination of which is the most likely.

[4] + /// |^{51C(r)}.*[u]* *asti di*: The smooth surface layer in line 4 on fragment 51C(r) begins with *. [u] asti di*, prior to which are two syllables /// |^{51C(r)[51ssss(r)] 1.4}*[vurta]* /// located on the recto surface of underlying layer 51ssss. These two syllables probably represent either ⟨*ni⟩*vurta* or possibly ⟨*ani⟩-*vurta*, which suggests a connection with fragment 51D(r) line 1. The syllable *di* is partially covered by a portion of the smooth surface layer of fragment 51C(r) that has migrated upward.

[4] [*yidi*] *vatava* |^{51C(r)+51o(r)}*śa*|^{51o(r)+51n(r)+51m(r)+51l(r)}*ka vivaga a* /// + /// |^{51F(r)}*[di] viva[ga] . [i] / . [e g]*.
///: The lower portions of [*yidi*] on fragment 51C(r) are partially covered by a piece of surface bark displaced from the next line and are followed by an unexplained blank space of approximately two syllables. Adjacent to 51C+51F(r) line 4 of fragment 51C(r), two larger chips are recorded in the initial black-and-white photograph. In the subsequent digital image, these two chips have broken into four smaller chips (51l, 51m, 51n, 51o), which have migrated upward toward fragment 51A. The syllable *śa* in 51C+51F(r) line 4 spans chip 51o(r) and fragment 51C(r), and the following syllables *ka vivaga a* can be reconstructed by combining all four chips (plt. 5). Hence, these four smaller chips belong to the layer of smooth surface bark that covers fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) and can be securely placed in 51C+51F(r) line 4 between these two fragments. At the lower edge of fragment 51F(r), the final visible syllables *[ga] . [i] / . [e g]* in 51C+51F(r) line 4 have lost their lower portions, but one dot of ink possibly from one of the two syllables *. [i] / . [e]* or *[g]* is preserved on unplaced chip 51mm(r) located just below the lower edge of fragment 51F.

Even though the placement of chips 51l–o at the end of line 4 on fragment 51C(r) is certain, it is unclear how many syllables are missing between chip 51l(r) and the continuation of line 4 on fragment 51F(r). Elsewhere in our text, the indeclinable *śaka*, whether in a question or a statement, is found in one of two patterns: (1) preceding both affirmative and negative alternatives in constructions with a verbal infinitive (51D(r) l. 3; ll. 36–38, 65–66); or (2) preceding one possible alternative, also probably appearing with a verbal infinitive in at least one instance (ll. 38, 43–44).³⁰ It is impossible to determine which pattern appears here, but it is likely that at least five syllables are missing between the final *a* on chip 51l and the probable quotative particle *di* that begins line 4 on fragment 51F(r). Given the typical line length of approximately thirty-two syllables in manuscript part 51, the twenty-one syllables preserved on the smooth layer of bark on fragments 51C(r), 51F(r), and chips 51l–o, together with the five intervening syllables, would leave approximately six syllables missing at the beginning or end of 51C+51F(r) line 4. This suggests that the smooth surface layer of bark on fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r) would then constitute almost an entire strip of the manuscript.

²⁹ Text Notes: [52] *kaḥgam=eva śi*[53]/*[la] śaḥhainaḥhiḍa* •; [69] *ye duḍaśa ayaḍaneha aśagrahiḍa se asti* •.

³⁰ Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] + /// |^{51D(r)}*[ś] . [k]*. *ca u[pa]ḍadhama anu[pa]ḍadhama kato* •.

[5] /// |^{51C(r)}[a]kuśalasa a ///: The lower right corner of the recto of underlying layer 51ssss(r) is obscured by blank chips, but the lower tips of perhaps three illegible syllables are preserved. The smooth surface layer containing line 5 of fragment 51C(r) is on a piece of bark that has moved upward, covering the lower portions of several syllables in 51C+51F(r) line 4.

[5] /// |^{51F(r)+51oo(r)}[ś].la .[i]/.[e] ? ///: Chip 51oo(r) can be rotated slightly clockwise and realigned with dots of ink on the lower corner of fragment 51F(r) to form *la* (plt. 5). The previous two vertical strokes of ink on chip 51oo(r) are then read from context as [ś]. together with the following *la* to form either (*ku)ś(*a)la, “virtuous,” or perhaps (*aku)ś(*a)la, “unvirtuous.”

51ee /// |^{51ee}tra ta vivaga ? ? ? ? ///: Chip 51ee begins immediately to the left of the smooth surface layer of fragment 51F(r) in line 2 and is followed by chip 51ff.

51ff /// |^{51ff}? [kṣaya] va [tasa] viva ? ///: Chip 51ff has been forced upward by chip 51ee and extends to the left edge of fragment 51F(r). Given the shared term *vivaga*, it is possible that chips 51ee and 51ff may have been contiguous, perhaps belonging to the same portion of bark in the original manuscript. The term *kṣaya* (P *khaya*, Skt *kṣaya*), “destruction,” is employed regularly in discussions of practice, specifically in the context of the “destruction of the fluxes” (P *āsavakhaya*, Skt *āsravakṣaya*), which constitutes the final stage of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience and the penultimate stage in the later abhidharma accounts of the path.³¹ This might suggest continuity in topic with the discussion of the arhat’s past defilements and of antidotes to the efficacy of past actions produced through practice as presented in fragment 51D(r). As in the case of chip 51dd(r), it is possible that chips 51ee and 51ff, rather than constituting overlying chips or pieces of bark from an as yet unknown location on the recto of manuscript part 51, represent the recto surface of the underlying layer 51ssss or possibly other pieces of bark that have broken away from the lower edge of fragment 51D(r).³²

51hh /// |^{51hh}? dehi vi[v].[g]. ? ///

51ii /// |⁵¹ⁱⁱ? ? ? ? ? ///

51jj(r) /// |^{51jj(r)}adida[s]a kama

51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn] /// |^{51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn]}? ? ? di ama[m] di [a]ha ? ? ///: The lower left portion of fragment 51F consists of a cluster of chips (51hh, 51ii, 51jj(r), 51nn) whose original placement and relationship to one another are uncertain. Chip 51hh is located at the upper right of this cluster, immediately after the smooth surface layer of fragment 51F ends in line 3. Chip 51ii is wedged between chips 51hh and 51nn and preserves the upper portions of approximately five illegible syllables. Located at the extreme left edge of fragment 51F, chip 51jj(r) has broken in half but can be easily restored. Unlike the other chips on 51F(r), the verso of chip 51jj is also visible and contains the term *upaśapada*, which can be connected with the discussion that appears on bark piece 51jjjj (l. 1) located on the verso.³³ Hence, chip 51jj probably belongs to the layer of bark comprising bark pieces 51jjjj–oooo and layer 51ssss, which covers the verso from line 135 onward. As a result, this recto surface of chip 51jj becomes one of a few visible portions that can

³¹ Cox 1988.

³² Text Notes: 51D(r) /// |^{51dd(r)}? ? ? + .[c] ? ? [ni an]i[v]u.[t]. ///

³³ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A; 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5; Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v); esp. 51D(v).

[2] *kareasu* • *kamaheduo*: The optative third-person plural form *kareasu* and plural pronominal form *te* in the following sentence in line 2 would suggest that the preceding relative pronominal *ya anagaḍa ... ajaḍa* should also be interpreted as plural. The apparently nominative singular masculine ending *-o* appended to the compound *kamahedu* suggests the presence of an underlying pleonastic *-ka* suffix from which the initial intervocalic *-k-* has been elided. This reduction of the *-ka* suffix to *-o*, common in Gāndhārī, can be seen, for example, in *ujuo* (P *ujuka*).³⁵ Here, the *-ka* suffix would mark the function of *kamaheduo* as a bahuvrīhi.

[3] *ca*: Fragment 51G has broken away immediately below *ca*, revealing ink from the recto surface of underlying layer 51ssss. The position of *ca* as the first syllable in line 3 is suggested by the reading of line 6 on layer 51G(v)[51ssss(v)], where the context confirms that the first syllable is preserved. Even though 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 6 is found on the overlying manuscript layer, its margins appear to align well with those of the underlying main manuscript represented by fragment 51G.

[3] *akamaṃ di* ✽: Below the syllable *maṃ* and extending to the left of the following large punctuation mark are unmistakable dots of ink along the upper edge of the lower manuscript segment at the glue-line juncture between lines 3 and 4. These dots of ink might be interpreted as the lower tips of syllables from an additional line that has become covered by the lower manuscript segment. However, the absence of any remnants of ink in the comparatively large space between the initial portion of line 3 and the lower manuscript segment situated just above line 4 suggests that the upper and lower segments of the manuscript have not slipped together to cover an original additional line between. Hence, these ink dots are perhaps best interpreted as extensions of the large punctuation mark in line 3.

II.6.2.4. II. 3–7

Manuscript Notes: II. 3–7

Line 3 is approximately three syllables shorter on the left margin than the surrounding lines, and there is no bark irregularity that would account for the empty space. However, the jagged appearance of the syllables at the end of line 3 suggests pen wear, and it is possible that the scribe simply resumed with the next full word at the beginning of line 4 after sharpening or changing his pen. In lines 5–8, the right edge of the manuscript has broken away for a distance of approximately ten to twelve syllables, and the lines are separated by an atypically greater distance of approximately 1 cm. Fragment 51E, one of the six fragments located at the top of frame 51, is also marked on the recto by atypically wide line spacing and therefore likely belongs in this large hole at the right edge of the manuscript. This placement is supported by the regular pattern of the displacement of chips and fragments by a distance of one cycle in the scroll, and it is confirmed by certain syllables that span the juncture between fragments 51E(r) and 51G(r) in lines 5–7 (plts. 1, 5). Fragment 51E preserves the initial portions of lines 5–7, with approximately four syllables missing at the beginning of lines 5 and 6 and only one partial syllable missing at the beginning of line 7.

³⁵ Dhp-G^K v. 97; Brough 1962: 91–92 [§ 38].

ll. 3–7

Transcribed text

3. [t]. *kena karanena*

4. *adiḍa avivakavivaga asti di ahadi [ta]ṣa [de so]palo di ta*

5. + + + + /// |^{51E(r)}yadi pala|^{51ss+51E(r)+51G(r)}[ka]|^{51G(r)}[ra]na astikarana [t]ena [yo] sopala so
asti yo n[i]

6. + + + + /// |^{51E(r)}sti • yadi [ca] |^{51tt(r)+51G(r)}[a]sti |^{51G(r)}[s].[p].lade di tena sarvakala pa-

7. |^{51kk(r)+51ll(r)+51E(r)}[la] daḍavo astitva [h].[d].[p].|^{51E(r)+51G(r)}[l].|^{51G(r)}[p]..ti di •

Reconstruction

(1) [3] *t(*a) kena karanena* [4] *adiḍa avivakavivaga asti di ahadi taṣa de sopalo di ta*[5]-
*(*tra vatava) yadi palakarana astikarana tena yo sopala so asti yo ni*[6]*(*pala so na)sti •*
*yadi ca asti s(*a)p(*a)lade di tena sarvakala pa*[7]*la daḍavo astitva h(*e)d(*u)p(*a)l(*a)-*
*p(*ra)ti di •*

Translation

(1) [3] [P] Then for what reason [does one state], [4] [O] “Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?” [P] One states, [O] “[It is] in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit.” [5] [P] (*With regard to that it should be said that) if the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, then that [action], which is possessed of a fruit, exists, [and inversely] that [action], which is not [6] (*possessed of a fruit, does not) exist. And if [one states], [O] “[Action] exists due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,” [P] then the fruit [7] should be presented at all times since existence is [understood] as the acquisition of fruits from causes.

Text Notes: ll. 3–7

[3] [t].: The syllable read as [t]. is markedly shortened and possibly merely an aborted, or interrupted, syllable. However, similarly shortened or narrowed characters also appear in lines 8, 10, and 28, where the reading *ta* is more secure. The jagged appearance of the remaining syllables in line 3 suggests that the atypical appearance of this *ta* may be a result of pen wear.

[4] *adiḍa avivakavivaga asti di*: Clues for the referent and hence the gender of *avivakavivaga* can be found in several passages in which the compound is clearly used to refer to the neuter noun *kama* (P *kamma*, Skt *karman*) (51D(r) ll. 3–6; ll.12–17, 29–33). If the compound *avivakavivaga* is construed as neuter, the singular nominative forms in lines 4 and 5 (*sopalo*, *yo*, *so*) can also be taken as neuter referring to the neuter noun *kama*. Ambiguity in both the number and gender of the nominative forms of certain nouns and more commonly pronouns suggests a more general pattern of the neutralization of the endings *-a/-o*.

[4] [ta]ṣa [de so]palo di: The shape of the syllable read as [ta] is atypical: it is rounded in shape like *ta* and yet is aligned vertically like *da*. Similar characters appear on fragment 51E(r) line 7, probably to be read as *da*, and line 19, where the reading is uncertain. Although there is graphic conflation of *ti* and *di* throughout this manuscript, *ta* and *da/da* are normally clearly distinguished.

The lower portion of *[de]* is abraded. The function and possible Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of the apparently indeclinable element *de* are unclear. In all but four cases (*[ta]sa [de]*, l. 4; *nanu de*, l. 59 [2x]; and *yaṣa de*, l. 94), *de* appears in conjunction with the instrumental pronoun *tena* (ll. 12, 46, 52, 97, 98, 105, 122; 51jjjj l. 1). The regular function of the ending *-de* in Gāndhārī, which perhaps represents the ablative related to the ablative suffix Skt *-tas*, suggests the possibility that *de* may serve as an independent particle indicating a reason when used in conjunction with other oblique or indeclinable forms.³⁶ Thus, in the frequent combination *tena de*, *de* might simply emphasize the function of the instrumental of reason, namely, “as a result of that” or “in that case,” and here with the independent indeclinable *taṣa* (P/Skt *tathā*), the combination *taṣa de* might indicate manner in the sense “in accordance with the fact that ...” However, it is also possible that the element *de* serves some other function or is simply used pleonastically in conjunction with other indeclinables or adverbially used declined forms.

The syllable *[so]* in *[so]palo* is severely abraded but is distinctive in several respects. It appears to be marked at the bottom by both a flourish and a horizontal line, whose significance is unclear. Further, its *o*-vowel diacritic meets the top horizontal at its leftmost tip. However, the reading *[so]* is strongly suggested by the similar and somewhat more legible compound *sopala* in line 5. The interpretation of *[so]* in lines 4 and 6, not as a separate demonstrative pronoun but rather as the prefix element *sa-* in compound, is based on both context and the use of the compound in the pattern *yo sopala so asti* in line 5. In this pattern, *sopala* appears in a relative-clause construction with an independent correlative pronoun *so*, which would preclude understanding *so* in *sopala* as a separate demonstrative pronoun. The prefix element *sa-*, with no *o*-vowel diacritic mark, also appears repeatedly in the form *sapala* in lines 57–60. Hence, the reason for the use of *so-* rather than *sa-* in *sopala* here is unclear. The construction of the previous sentence as well as similar passages in lines 29–33 and 57–59 suggest that *sopalo* be construed as a *bahuvrīhi* in the singular neuter modifying the implied referent *kama*: that is, “that [action], which is possessed of a fruit” (Skt *saphalam*). Since the aspirated consonant *ph* does not occur at all in this manuscript, the unaspirated consonant *pa* within the word *pala* (P/Skt *phala*) may result the leveling of the aspirate and nonaspirate consonants, especially in the case of voiced aspirates, or it may simply reflect the scribe’s orthographic habit of not using the unaspirated consonant *ph*.³⁷

[5] + + + + /// |^{51E(r)}*yadi pala*|^{51ss+51E(r)+51G(r)}*[ka]*|^{51G(r)}*[ra]na astikarana [t]ena [yo] sopala so asti yo n[i]*: As indicated by the syllables remaining on fragment 51E(r) at the beginning of line 7, there is sufficient space for approximately four syllables on the missing right edge of fragment 51E(r) prior to *yadi* in line 5. The lower portion of the vertical stroke of *pa* in *pala* on fragment 51E(r) can be realigned with its upper portion on fragment 51G(r). Similarly, the upper portion of *ka* on fragment 51E(r) is found on 51ss, whose original position connected to fragment 51G(r) is evident in the initial black-and-white photograph. These syllables spanning fragment 51E(r) and fragment

³⁶ Burrow 1937: 23 [§ 56]. An apparent conjunction *tenada* appears twice in the Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī Aśokan inscriptions within virtually the same phrase: eighth rock edict Shāhbāzgaṛhī *tenada dhramma-yatra* (Hultsch 1925: 59–60); and eighth rock edict Mānsehrā *tenada dhrama-yada* (Hultsch 1925: 77–78). See also Tieken 2023: 82–83, 394 n. 36.

³⁷ See Phonology § II.3.2.1 Consonants in Initial Position; Paleography and Orthography § II.2.8 Orthography.

51G(r) confirm the placement of fragment 51E(r) in this hole in the manuscript at the beginning of lines 5 and 7 (plt. 5).

The word *karana* occurs twice in line 5, presumably in both cases as the final member of the compounds *pala-karana* and *asti-karana*. However, both the Sanskrit or MIA equivalent and the sense of *karana* within these two compounds are uncertain.³⁸ The upper left portion of the syllable [yo] is lost to delamination, leaving only the lower tip of the left leg, which abuts the subsequent syllable *so*. The middle portion of the final syllable *n[i]* in line 5 is covered by a small blank chip, but to the left and below this chip are preserved the remnants of the probable *i*-vowel diacritic. Despite their apparently nominative singular masculine form, the pronouns *yo* and *so* are both nominative singular neuter referring to action.

[6] + + + + /// |^{51E(r)}sti • yadi [ca] |^{51tt(r)+51G(r)}[a]sti |^{51G(r)}[s].[p].lade: The punctuation mark after the initial syllable *sti* in line 6 at the beginning of fragment 51E(r) is followed by an area of rough surface bark and a blank space of approximately four syllables. The entire upper portion of [ca] is located on fragment 51E(r), and its lower tip is found on fragment 51G(r). The upper right portion of [a] is also located on fragment 51E(r), while its upper left portion as well as the top of the following *sti* are found on chip 51tt(r), which has slipped underneath the initial portion of line 6 on fragment 51G(r). The lower tip of [a] and the major portion of *sti* can be found on fragment 51G(r), just below chip 51tt(r). Chip 51tt is followed by chip 51uu, which has also slipped underneath fragment 51G(r), but its darker color suggests that it might not be correctly placed here. The minimal ink on the visible portion of chip 51uu on both the recto and the verso (l. 139) does not permit secure placement. All that remains of the proposed initial syllable [s]. is the presumably lower stroke curving toward the left, which would not be inconsistent with the foot mark found on *so* in lines 4 and 5. Only the left vertical stroke of the second syllable [p]. is preserved. Hence, the reading [s].[p].lade is based largely on the context and the readings of similar phrases in lines 4 and 5.

[7] |^{51kk(r)+51ll(r)+51E(r)}[la] daḍavo astitva [h].[d].[p].|^{51E(r)+51G(r)}[l].|^{51G(r)}[p]..ti di •: The right vertical stroke on [la] is found on chip 51kk(r) originally located to the right of fragment 51E(r). The bark striations on chip 51kk(r) support a clockwise rotation for correct alignment with fragment 51E(r). The upper portion of the initial *da* in *daḍavo* is found on fragment 51E(r), and the lower portion is on chip 51ll(r), located at the bottom right of fragment 51E(r). After a clockwise rotation, chip 51ll(r) can also be aligned with fragment 51E(r) (plt. 5). In the Pali commentarial literature and less frequently in sutta materials, the gerundive P *dātabbāṃ* of the root *dā* in the sense “to be presented” is encountered together with P *phala* and P *vipāka* in discussions of the production or occurrence of the effects of action.³⁹ For example, the Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā, explaining the compound P *kammadāyāda*, “one whose inheritance is action,” states, “The inheritance is the fruit that is ‘to be presented’ by action.”⁴⁰ In the later technical vocabulary developed in Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts to explain the causal efficacy and functioning of all factors, derivatives of the root *dā* are used

³⁸ Commentary: (1) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 3–7].

³⁹ MN I 379; SN I 98. Cf. Text Notes: [30] [ubhaa].[h].pa[l]. [31] [d].[d].[vo] ubhaye va asti ubhay[e] va nasti di •.

⁴⁰ P *kammena dātabbāṃ phalaṃ dāyam* (Mp V 40).

to refer to the second stage in a two-stage causal process: specifically the “presentation” of the effect, which refers to the efficacy that causes the effect to arise in the present.⁴¹

The vertical stroke of *[l]* is found on fragment 51E(r), and a small ink dot, possibly the upper left tip of the horizontal stroke of *[l]*., appears on fragment 51G(r). The syllable *[p]*.. in *[p]*..*ti* on fragment 51G(r) is abraded, and its upper portion is obscured by a small chip marked with one dot of ink. The tentative reading *[p]*.. representing *p(*ra)* in *p(*ra)ti* (P *patti*, Skt *prāpti*) is hence suggested primarily from context. Although *di* and *ti* are generally not distinguished in this manuscript, the syllable read as *ti* here strongly resembles the common Gāndhārī rounded form of *ti*, and the reading *ti* is warranted here for the geminate *-t(t)i < -pti*, where intervocalic voicing would not be expected. The following syllable read as *di* (P *iti/ti*, Skt *iti*) strongly resembles *ti* rather than *di*, but given the regular form *di* elsewhere in the manuscript, it may have been influenced in its form by the preceding syllable *-ti* in *[p]*..*ti*.

II.6.2.5. ll. 7–17

Manuscript Notes: ll. 7–17

Approximately eight to eleven syllables are missing at the right edge of the manuscript in lines 7–10, but in lines 11 to 42, the initial syllables in each line at the right edge are generally preserved. The continuous portion of manuscript part 51 is clearly divided into two larger fragments, 51G and 51H, by a break between lines 8 and 10 (corresponding to verso l. 135). The lower portions of several syllables at various points along the upper edge of fragment 51H just above line 10 as well as chip 51xx, which is wedged between fragments 51G and 51H, raise the possibility that there is at least one missing line between lines 8 and 10. Immediately below line 11, a glue-line juncture extends across the width of the manuscript, gradually moving upward into the blank space following the line 11, which has only ten syllables. At a point approximately eight syllables from the beginning of line 12, the bark along the upper edge of this glue-line juncture has become folded over, obscuring the upper portions of several syllables. There is no clear evidence of a glue-line juncture on the verso lines 129–134, but it may coincide with the crack extending through lines 129–130.

Line 14 is bisected by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript, and a portion of bark approximately 4 cm by 2.5 cm at the right edge of the manuscript immediately below this crack has become delaminated. The initial eleven syllables in line 15 and the lower portions of several syllables at the beginning of line 14 are found on a layer of bark (51aaa) that has slipped downward approximately two lines within this delaminated area on the right edge of the recto. The remaining bark from this delaminated area on the recto (ll. 14–18) is found adhering to the verso (ll. 118–121) in four fragments: 51aaaa, 51bbbb, 51eee, and 51iii. The recto surface of fragment 51iii is visible at the right edge of the manuscript between lines 23 and 24, and the recto surfaces of fragments 51aaaa and 51bbbb are revealed through the infrared image of the verso surface. Manipulation of these infrared images makes it possible to discern several syllables from the beginning of lines 16 and 17. Fragment 51eee, visible on the verso and intersecting lines 125–127, was also originally located in this area (plts. 6, 9).

⁴¹ Commentary: General Criticism Opponent’s Three Categories [51D(r) l. 4–l. 3].

effect: “then there is the concurrence of both action and the matured effect [in the present]” (*tena kamaṣa ca vivagaṣa ca samuṣana* •, l. 13). The logic of the argument in this passage suggests that the pronoun *ta* here refers specifically to present action.⁴⁴

The upper portions of *t[e]na de pracupanavivaga* are hidden by folded bark along a crack at a glue-line juncture between lines 11 and 12. Even though preconsonantal *r* is normally preserved in Gāndhārī, the verb *nivartadi* must have the sense “to come forth” or “occur” as in the case of *nir* + √*vrt*, and not “to turn back,” as in *ni* + √*vrt*. The form Skt *nivartati/te* is also noted in Buddhist Sanskrit sources in the sense “to occur, take place.”⁴⁵

[13] *vivagaṣa ca samuṣana* • *aṣa n. nivartadi*: Between *vi* and *va* in *vivagaṣa* is a blank space of approximately one syllable containing an apparent punctuation mark that is actually a dot of ink on a minute overlying chip. To the upper left of *mu* in *samuṣana* is a dot of ink whose significance is unclear. The lower portion of *n.* is covered by a blank chip, and the lower portion of *di* is covered by chip 51zz, which also obscures the final four syllables in line 14.

[14] *pracupa*^{51H(r)+51aaa}*na avivakaviva[ga na]*^{51H(r)}*sti* [*• aṣa asti c*]. [*pr*]..*[up]*..*[n]*. + ^{51zz(v)}*[viv]*..*[k]*.. The lower tips of *na avivakaviva[ga na]* are found on a layer of bark (chip 51aaa) that has slipped downward approximately one line on the right edge of the recto and settled in the midst of a delaminated area in lines 14–18 (plt. 6). Beginning with [*aṣa asti*], the remaining syllables in line 14 are bisected and shortened by a crack extending across the width of the manuscript (corresponding to verso ll. 128–130). The middle portions of [*aṣa asti*] are found on a piece of the recto layer of bark that has been pushed upward and slightly clockwise by a small chip (51yy) protruding from within the crack. Even though blank on the verso (l. 129), the recto of chip 51yy appears to contain two syllables. The first is an *i*- or *e*-vowel on the base character *d*-, *t*-, or possibly *s*-, and the second syllable appears to have a curved top stroke typical again of *d*-, *t*-, or *s*-. The correct placement of chip 51yy has not been determined.

The crack that extends the width of the manuscript obscures the middle and upper portions of the final legible syllables in line 14: [*c*]. [*pr*]..*[up]*..*[n]*. + ^{51zz(v)}*[viv]*..*[k]*.. Following [*c*]. [*pr*]..*[up]*..*[n]*., the manuscript surface is covered by chip 51zz(r), which reads [*d*]. • *vatava*. This chip should be turned over and placed on the verso at the end of line 129.⁴⁶ A sliver of the verso surface of chip 51zz(v) is visible through a crack on the verso at the end of line 129, revealing the remnants of three syllables that are accordingly to be read here at the end of line 14. The infrared image presents a clearer reading: the first syllable contains both a curved vertical and a diagonal stroke that would support the reading [*vi*], the second syllable is marked by a curved vertical that would support the reading [*v*]., and the fourth, by a curved horizontal supporting [*k*]., all together supporting the reconstruction *viv(*a)k(*a)* (fig. 5). Presumably, the syllable *a* is covered by 51zz(r) and would begin the expected compound *(*a)viv(*a)k(*a)vivaga* that continues into line 15.

⁴⁴ Commentary: (2) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 7–17].

⁴⁵ BHSD s.v. *nivartati*.

⁴⁶ Text Notes: [129] [*s*].*mag[r]*..*vaṣe[n]*. + [*n*].*[g]*..*[d]*..*[bh]*..*[vo j]*..*[p]*. .*[r]*..*[up]*..*[n]*..*[bh]*. + ^{51zz(r)}*[di]* • *vatava*.




Fig. 5. Detail of 51zz(v) l. 14 (syllables traced).

[15] |^{51aaa+51iii}[v]ivaga • na ca tas. vi[v].[g].: This initial portion of line 15 is on fragment 51aaa. The lower tips of [v]i and na ca tas. are found on fragment 51iii, which has been displaced downward by one cycle in the scroll and has come to rest in a hole at the right edge of the manuscript between lines 23 and 24. The blank verso surface of fragment 51iii (corresponding to verso l. 121) is consistent with its original location within the delaminated area in lines 14–18. The remaining surface bark from this delaminated area, with the exception of fragment 51eee, is found adhering to the verso lines 119–121 (plt. 6).

[16] |^{51iii+51bbbb}[a].[d].da avivakavivaga asti ?: The lower portions of these first eleven syllables in line 16 as well as the initial syllables in line 17 are found on another piece of recto surface bark (fragment 51bbbb) that also originated from this delaminated area and now adheres to the verso lines 119–121. These syllables from the hidden recto surface of fragment 51bbbb are revealed in the infrared image (fig. 6). Fragment 51iii, located in a hole at the right edge of the manuscript between lines 23 and 24, should be returned to its original location at the beginning of line 16 (plt. 6). This placement is confirmed by the fact that the recto of fragment 51iii, revealed through the infrared image, contains the lower tips of several syllables from line 15 as well as the upper portions of the first five syllables in line 16.




Fig. 6. Detail of 51aaa, 51iii, 51bbbb, 51eee(v), 51ggg ll. 14–18 (syllables traced).

[16] ^{51H(r)}[t].[n]e[va k].ranena: The lower portion of [t]. is abraded, and the upper portions of the following [n]e[va] are obscured in a crack. However, both the remaining portions of these syllables and parallelism with the constructions in lines 7–8 and 15 support the reading [t].[n]e[va]. The lower portion of *ra* is covered by chip 51bbb, which contains minimal ink from the lower portions of three illegible syllables. The correct placement of chip 51bbb has not been determined.

[17] ^{51bbbb}ga as^{51bbbb+51eee(v)}ti [di n]. ^{51bbbb}[bho] + +: The delaminated initial portion of line 17 has been pushed downward on the recto by chip 51ddd, which was originally located at the beginning of line 8. This initial blank space of approximately eight or nine syllables at the beginning of line 17 is sufficient for the conclusion to the relative clause begun in line 15 (*ya pradiṅa ...*), which restates the proposition first offered in lines 7–9. The infrared image of the recto surface of fragment 51bbbb found adhering to the verso lines 119–121 reveals both *ga asti di*, which forms the conclusion to the relative clause, and [n]. [bho] +, which contains the anticipated negative particle *n(*a)* constituting the first portion of the correlative main clause. The lower tips of *ga asti* are found on the original recto surface of fragment 51eee(v), which was bent backward and turned over during the unrolling process (corresponding to verso ll. 125–127). The verso surface of fragment 51eee has become darkened to the point of illegibility, but the infrared image reveals the lower tips of *ga asti*, which can be realigned with their upper portions revealed by the infrared image of fragment 51bbbb (fig. 6).

II.6.2.6. ll. 17–20

Manuscript Notes: ll. 17–20

A horizontal crack, extending across the width of the manuscript, bisects line 18 (corresponding to verso ll. 124–125). By shifting the lower segment of fragment 51H(r) upward and approximately one syllable to the left, the upper and lower portions of the syllables in line 18 and the left edge of the manuscript can be realigned (plt. 6). Lines 124–126 on the verso are continuous and therefore confirm that no text is missing between lines 18 and 19. On the right edge of the manuscript at line 18 is a hole of approximately eight syllables, but it is evident on the verso (l. 125) that this hole is the result of the movement of fragment 51ggg at the right edge of the manuscript downward on the recto and upward on the verso. Hence, the six syllables *añeṣ[u] ca a[s]*. that appear on fragment 51ggg(r) immediately below this hole on the recto should be moved up to form the initial portion of line 18. Whereas the juncture between the initial, intact portion of line 124 and fragment 51ggg(v) is evident on the verso, this same juncture between 51ggg(r) and line 19 on the recto is obscured by chip 51hhh. It is therefore possible either that the syllables *ku[ḍar].[hi]*, which appear immediately below fragment 51ggg on the recto, are to be moved up to form the beginning of line 19 or should be left in their current location to form the beginning of line 20. Significant in this determination is the fact that one piece of the surface bark (51aaaa), originally located within the delaminated area of the recto (ll. 14–18) and now adhering to the verso (ll. 118–121), could not be placed between lines 14 and 18 in the manuscript. Given the current location of fragment 51aaaa on the verso above the pieces of the recto surface bark that have been placed successfully within lines 14–18, it should have been originally located on the recto below these pieces of bark. Further, fragment 51aaaa is clearly separated from the other pieces of recto surface bark, indicating that it may not have originally been contiguous with them. The infrared image of fragment 51aaaa reveals the syllables

k.mas[vag]., which might then be placed at the beginning of either line 19 or 20 (fig. 7). Context would suggest that fragment 51aaaa be placed immediately before the first syllable [*ma*]*ḍa* in line 19; *ku[ḍar].[hi]* has been left in its current location at the beginning of line 20.



Fig. 7. Detail of 51ggg, 51aaaa, 51hhh ll. 18–20 (syllables traced).

Immediately following the hole at the beginning of line 18 are two chips (51eee, 51fff) that have become wedged within the crack bisecting the line. On the recto, only the upper portion of fragment 51eee is visible, containing one minuscule dot of ink on its right edge. On the verso, fragment 51eee appears as a long chip lying vertically between lines 125 and 127, but its surface has darkened to the point of illegibility. The infrared image reveals the lower tips of three syllables *ga asti*, which can be realigned with the syllables at the beginning of line 17 (fig. 6).⁴⁷ Originally a piece of bark from the now delaminated recto surface in lines 14–18, fragment 51eee then became dislodged from its original location, slipped through the hole of the manuscript at the beginning of line 18, and was turned over, coming to rest on the verso between lines 125 and 127. The second chip 51fff is wedged underneath the lower segment of fragment 51H(r) within the crack between lines 18 and 19. On the recto, only the remnants of the upper portions of two or three syllables are visible, suggesting the tentative reading [*ve/i s*]./[*c*]. [*ji*]. On the verso, only the upper blank portion of chip 51fff protrudes above the first two legible syllables in line 125. It is thus possible that chip 51fff(r) is to be inserted either within the delaminated area on the recto between lines 14 and 18, or within the area where the recto surface bark has shifted between lines 19 and 20. It is also possible that chip 51fff, like fragment 51eee, was turned over in the process of unrolling and that the syllables visible on the recto actually belong to the verso, a possibility supported by the slightly darker color and consistency of the small portion of chip 51fff that is visible on the recto. At this point, however, both the reading and hence the placement of chip 51fff(r) are uncertain.

Several syllables at the beginning of line 20 are obscured by chip 51hhh, which can be placed within another delaminated area immediately to its lower left and realigned with syllables at the beginning of line 20 (plt. 6). Between lines 20 and 21 (corresponding to verso ll. 121–122), a glue-line juncture is clearly indicated both by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript and by the larger than normal space between lines 20 and 21, which results from the separation between the upper and lower segments of the manuscript. On the upper edge of the lower manuscript segment, two comparatively large ink marks are visible near the left margin, which, when the gap between the upper and lower segments is closed, can be realigned to form the lower portion of *pr*: and the *o*-vowel diacritic, both in *pro*, as found at the end of line 20 (plt. 6).

⁴⁷ Text Notes: [17] |^{51bbbb}*ga as*|^{51bbbb+51eee(v)}*ti [di n]*. |^{51bbbb}*[bho]* + +.

ll. 17–20

Transcribed text

17. |^{51bbbb+51H(r)}prochi|^{51H(r)}ḍava vatava puna so tena h[i] kamena
 18. |^{51ggg(r)}añeṣ[u] ca a[s]..|^{51H(r)+} + [yi]di [a].[h].[di] ? + [ka]tavo te[na vat].[v]. [te]na
 bu[dhas]. [c].
 19. |^{51aaaa}[k].mas[vag]. • |^{51aaaa+51H(r)}[ma]|^{51H(r)}ḍa na akuśalaka[masva]go • aṣa na vatava
 svago
 20. ku[ḍa]|^{51hhh+51H(r)}[rahi] ya |^{51H(r)}s[o] vivaga nivartadi • paḍiṣavededi • pro[ch].

Reconstruction

- (3) [17] *prochidava vatava puna so tena hi kamena* [18] *añeṣu ca as(*vago •) yidi (*a)-h(*a)di (*svago) katavo ten(*a) na vat(*a)v(*a) tena budhas(*a) c(*a)* [19] *k(*a)mas-vag(*o) • maḍa na akuśalakamasvago • aṣa na vatava svago* [20] *kuḍarahi ya so vivaga nivartadi • paḍiṣavededi • {proch.}*

Translation

- (3) [17] [P] It should be asked, “Should it further be said that the [matured effect, which occurs] through that action, [18] belongs to others and is not (*one’s own)?” If one states, [O] “[The matured effect] should be brought about (*as one’s own),” [P] then it should not be said in the case of the Buddha that [19] he is one for whom the [matured effect of] action, [which occurs] through that [action], is his own. [This is because] it is held [in the scriptures] that he is not one for whom the [matured effect of] unvirtuous action is his own. Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect of action] is one’s own. [20] [In that case,] by means of which [actions is it said that] one experiences that matured effect which occurs?

Text Notes: ll. 17–20

[17] |^{51bbbb+51H(r)}prochi|^{51H(r)}ḍava vatava puna so tena h[i] kamena: The upper right portion of *pro* and the upper tip of the righthand upward stroke on *chi* are visible on the infrared image of fragment 51bbbb adhering to the verso lines 119–121 (fig. 6). The middle portion of the syllable read as *h[i]* is covered by unplaced chip 51ccc, which contains a horizontal stroke of ink and abuts the preceding syllable *na*. Even though the middle and lower portions of *h[i]* are also abraded, remnants of ink below chip 51ccc could be interpreted as an *i*-vowel diacritic. Line 17 ends with sufficient space for one or two syllables, but the stray dots of ink scattered at the end of the line are on separate chips, and the infrared image also presents no evidence of any additional syllables. It is thus probable that the scribe reserved the next complete word *añeṣu* for the beginning of line 18.

[18] |^{51ggg(r)}añeṣ[u] ca a[s]..|^{51H(r)+} +: These six syllables are on fragment 51ggg(r), which has slipped downward along the right edge and underneath the adjacent layer of surface bark at the beginning of line 19. Fragment 51ggg(r) should be moved up one line to form the beginning of line 18 (cf. verso l. 125). The lower portions of *ñeṣ[u]* are covered by chip 51hhh, which should be placed near the beginning of line 20. The clearer context for the alignment of fragment 51ggg(v) within line 125 suggests that two syllables are missing between the final partially covered syllable *[s]*. on the recto of fragment 51ggg and the remainder of line 18.

Despite the difficulty in reconstructing this portion of the manuscript, the general context suggests that the issue here is whether both actions and their resultant matured effects can be considered “one’s own” (*svago*), or whether the matured effects of actions accrue to others (*añeṣu*). In accordance with this general theme and with the negative alternative *aṣa na vatava svago*, “Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect of action] is one’s own,” which is clearly given in line 19, the space of three or four syllables *a[s]*. *///* + + has been tentatively reconstructed as *as(*vago •)*, “not (*one’s own).”

[18] *///* ^{51H(r)}+ + *[yi]di[a].[h].[di] ?* + *[ka]tavo te[na vat].[v]. [te]na bu[dhas]. [c]*.: The entirety of the first two syllables on 51H(r) and the lower portions of the remaining syllables in line 18 are obscured by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript and by the resulting damage to the surface bark. The *[di]* in *[a].[h].[di]* is also partially covered by a blank chip, which is followed by the upper tip of one syllable and an apparently blank space. Since it is difficult to determine whether *[a].[h].[di]* was followed by one or two syllables, the reconstruction of the final syllables of the protasis here, that is, *yidi ahadi* (**svago*), is based on the contrasting and negative alternative *aṣa na vatava svago* in line 19. Following *[ka]tavo*, the remaining syllables in line 18 are bisected and misaligned on either side of a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript. The syllables can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of fragment 51H(r) upward and to the left by a space of one syllable (plt. 6). The reading *[ka]tavo* is tentative since the lower portion of the initial *[ka]* is lost in the crack, but faint ink smudges to the right of the vertical diagonal stroke would support *ka*.

[19] ^{51aaaa}*[k].mas[vag]. •* ^{51aaaa+51H(r)}*[ma]*^{51H(r)}*ḍa na akuśalaka[masva]go*: The first five or possibly six syllables in line 19 are found on a delaminated piece of recto surface bark (51aaaa) adhering to the verso (ll. 118–119). Since the blank underside of fragment 51aaaa is visible on the verso surface, the initial syllables in line 19 on the hidden recto surface become visible only in the infrared image (fig. 7). The first five syllables can be confidently read as *k.mas[vag]. •* and are followed by two faint vertical strokes of ink that might represent the tops of the two arms of *[ma]*, which is the first visible syllable on fragment 51H(r) immediately following fragment 51aaaa. Hence it has been assumed that *[ma]* is not preceded by another syllable, resulting in the tentative reading *[ma]ḍa* (P/Skt *mata*), “it is held,” used in arguments to refer to a position supported by tradition or presented in the scriptures.⁴⁸ The syllables *[masva]* within *akuśalaka[masva]go* are obscured by a blank overlying chip, but a faint outline of the *[ma]* and possibly of the postconsonantal *[v]* in *[sva]* are visible in the infrared image.

[20] *ku[ḍa]*^{51hhh+51H(r)}*[rahi]*: The two syllables following *ku* are covered by chip 51hhh, whose straight bottom edge is consistent with its placement within the now delaminated area following the third syllable in line 20, just above the glue-line juncture that extends below line 20. Fortunately, the infrared image reveals the two obscured syllables to be *ḍa* and *ra* or possibly *tra*. Chip 51hhh preserves the lower portions of three syllables, confirming the reading *ra* followed by *hi* and *ya*, which yield the word *kuḍarahi*, clearly an instrumental plural masculine or neuter in form. The apparent stem *kuḍara* suggests the comparative interrogative pronoun P/Skt *katara*, “which,” but the *u* vowel in the initial syllable *ku* is unexpected, since the analogous superlative form P/Skt *katama*

⁴⁸ Text Notes: 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5 *///* ⁵¹ⁱⁱⁱⁱ ^{1.1}*[de] sutr[e] ? [ma]ḍa sarva [aṣ]. [na t].[s]. sarva anupaṣapana [di] *///*.*

appears consistently in Gāndhārī as *kaḍama* (ll. 21, 22, 39, 51, 118, 131; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 2; 51D(v) l. 2). It is possible that this represents the comparative interrogative adjective *kuḍarahi* derived from the alternative interrogative stem *ku-*, but the reason for the use of different stems in the sole case of this comparative interrogative is unclear.⁴⁹ It is also possible that the *u* vowel in the syllable *ku* is a scribal error. Despite the absence of other corroborating examples, *kuḍarahi* has been tentatively accepted as an alternative Gāndhārī form of the comparative interrogative adjective P/Skt *katara* rather than the result of scribal error.

The vertical shifting of the recto surface bark along the right edge of the manuscript has resulted in the misalignment of the initial and final portions of line 20. As a result, the piece of bark containing the initial portion of line 20 must be shifted slightly downward and clockwise to accommodate chip 51hhh (plt. 6).

[20] *ya* |^{51H(r)}*s[o]* *vivaga nivartadi* • *paḍiṣavededi*: Several dark lenticels, not to be confused with ink, occur throughout this portion of the manuscript and run underneath *so* and then through the middle of *vi* of *vivaga* and *va* of *nivartadi*. The syllable *rta* is shortened with a smudge of ink on the right side and may have been corrected. A blank space of approximately three or four syllables occurs between the punctuation mark and *paḍiṣavededi*. Given the absence of any apparent irregularity in the bark surface, it is possible that the space is intentional and indicates the omission of syllables resulting from the scribe's difficulty in reading the archetype. Context would suggest that at least a neuter accusative singular pronoun *ta*, functioning as a correlative to the previous relative pronoun *ya*, could have been included in this clause prior to *paḍiṣavededi*.

[20] • *pro[ch]*.: On the upper edge of the lower segment of fragment 51H(r) at the glue-line juncture between lines 20 and 21 are two large dots of ink that can be realigned with the lower portions of both *pr.* and the *o*-vowel diacritic at the end of line 20 (plt.6). The syllable *pro* is followed by two curved upward and downward facing strokes that could represent the upper portion of *[ch]*.. Since line 21 also begins with the word *prochidava*, it is possible that the scribe began to write *prochi* at the end of line 20 but encountered difficulty at the glue-line juncture. He might then have simply continued on to line 21, writing *prochidava* without crossing out his initial attempt at the end of line 20. This interpretation has been tentatively adopted in the reconstruction, from which this *pro[ch]*. at the end of line 20 has been omitted.

II.6.2.7. ll. 21–28

Manuscript Notes: ll. 21–28

A horizontal crack from the mid-point to the left edge of fragment 51H(r) between lines 20 and 21 and a blank space of approximately 1 cm, caused by the separation of the upper and lower segments of the manuscript, clearly indicate that lines 20 and 21 straddle a glue-line juncture. Between lines 22 and 23 (corresponding to verso ll. 121–122), two cracks extend across the width of the manuscript, bisecting and distorting the syllables in both lines.

The first eight syllables in line 23 are obliterated by a triangular hole at the right edge of the manuscript. The first eight syllables in this line are found on three chips that were displaced downward by a distance of one cycle of the scroll from their original location within this hole: chip

⁴⁹ For *ku-* in place of an expected *ka-*, see *k«u»tare* for *katara* (Skt *kāntāra* ?) AG-G¹(r) l. 102 [v. 72e], Salomon 2008: 184 [§ 6], 302 [§ II.7.6], 304 [§ II.7.6], 427.

51mmm(r), now wedged between the upper and lower segments of the manuscript on the right edge in line 31; and chips 51nnn and 51ooo, now located in the middle of line 32 (plt. 6). Fragment 51iii positioned immediately above line 24 on the lower edge of this hole should be returned to its original location at the beginning of line 16.

The first third of lines 25–27 is obscured by numerous horizontal cracks, small overlying chips, and a large hole, all making secure readings impossible. The remaining syllables in line 26 (corresponding to verso l. 117) are bisected by a crack and can be realigned by moving the lower segment of fragment 51H approximately one syllable to the left (plt. 6). In lines 27–28, the right margin is virtually intact and marked by a distinctive graphic formation consisting of vertically aligned, v-shaped symbols, branching outward along a central vertical line. This graphic formation does not appear elsewhere in this manuscript in the few other places where the right margin is intact (recto ll. 19–21; verso ll. 122–125), and its significance here is uncertain. Possible explanations, such as, for example, that it indicates the end of a major division of the text correlated with a large punctuation mark (l. 28) or scriptural citations (ll. 25–28), cannot be corroborated given the deteriorated state of the right margin in other test locations.

ll. 21–28

Transcribed text

21. *prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi • yadi aha adidado*
 22. *vivaga do • tat.a va[t].va ka[d].ma [a]vi[v].[k].vivaga [ca] vi[v].g. yaṣa nivartadi [•]*
 23. ^{|51mmm(r)+51nnn+51ooo}*p[r].cha[di asti kic].* ^{|51mmm(r)+51H(r)}*[k].* ^{|51H(r)}*[ma] yasa ka[ma]sa vivago*
asti • aṣa nasti kica kama
 24. *yaṣa vivaga asti di • vata[v]. asti [k]ici [kama] yaṣa kamaṣa vivaga asti [•]*
 25. *[metra]e ca [e]k.=[m=amśa p].la [sa] ca me[t].[a] asti sa ca pala asti di • apam*
 26. *hi [e]ḍa [a].nala [ś].[m].[a]. [dudo] vi[vatas]. p.la[n]. [bromi] .[i] prov.cadi • [p]ro-*
 27. ^{|51kkk(r)+51H(r)}*[v].* ^{|51H(r)}*[c].di [he]du[n]. [hi] ca ṣa palani paḍikakṣiḍava • saña voharovi-*
[va]ga yaṣa yaḥṣa
 28. *sa[rja]nadi taṣa taṣa voharadi eva asti taṣa ca pala asti di bromi ✽*

Reconstruction

- (4) [21] *prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi • yadi aha adidado* [22] *vivaga d[*i] • tat[*r]a vat[*a]va kaḍ[*a]ma aviv[*a]k[*a]vivaga ca viv[*a]g[*a]yaṣa nivartadi •*
 (5) [23] *pr[*o]chadi asti kic[*a] k[*a]ma yasa kamaṣa vivago asti • aṣa nasti kica kama*
 [24] *yaṣa vivaga asti di • vatav[*a] asti kici kama yaṣa kamaṣa vivaga asti •* [25] *metrae*
*ca ek[*a]-m-amśa p[*a]la sa ca met[*r]a asti sa ca pala asti di • apam* [26] *hi eḍa*
*([*a]nala ś[*a]m[*ae] du[*ve] vivatas[*a] p[*a]lan[*i] bromi [*d]i prov[*u]cadi • pro-*
 [27] *v[*u]c[*a]di hedun[*a] hi ca ṣa palani paḍikakṣiḍava • saña voharovivaga yaṣa yaṣa*
 [28] *sarjanadi taṣa taṣa voharadi eva asti taṣa ca pala asti di bromi ✽*

Translation

(4) [21] [P] It should be asked, “From which action does the matured effect occur?” If one states, [O] “The matured effect [occurs] from past [action],” [22] [P] with regard to that it should be said, “And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?”

(5) [23] One asks, [O] “Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action [24] whose matured effect exists?” [P] It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists, [as indicated by the following scriptural passages]. [For example,] [25] “A little bit of loving kindness [results in] a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists.” [26] [Or] it is proclaimed, “For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute.” [27] [Or] it is proclaimed, “For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes.” [Or] “I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way [28] one conceives, in that way one declares, ‘It exists in this way.’ And the fruit of that [conception] exists.”

Text Notes: ll. 21–28

[21] *prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi* •: The upper portions of both of the final two syllables of *prochidava* and the initial syllables of *kaḍamado* are partially covered by a long horizontal piece of bark that has become folded over at the glue-line juncture between lines 20 and 21. Since the final preconsonantal *r* on *rta* in *nivartadi* is much darker than both the remainder of that syllable and preceding *va*, it would appear that the scribe either re-inked his pen in the middle of a word while writing *rta* or wrote over the preconsonantal *r* after re-inking. A space of about one syllable between *vivaga* and *nivartadi* is undoubtedly the result of irregularity in the bark surface, possibly caused by a knothole (corresponding to verso l. 122).

[22] *vivaga do* •: Extending across the manuscript both below and through line 22 are multiple cracks that bisect and shorten all syllables in the line. Context suggests that *do* be read as *di*, but no evidence of the upper portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic is visible even in the infrared image. It is possible that *di* was miswritten as *do* under the influence of the final *do* in the preceding word *adiḍado*.

[22] *ka[d].ma [a]vi[v].[k].vivaga [ca] vi[v].g. yasa nivartadi [•]*: The syllable read as *[k]*. in *[a]vi[v].[k].vivaga* is heavily smudged and was probably corrected from *ga* to *ka*. Only a few dots of ink from the top horizontal stroke of the middle syllable *[v]*. within the following *vi[v].g.* remain, but there is evidence of an abraded curve that follows the shape of a downward diagonal stroke of *va*. The reading *va* is also strongly supported by context. At the end of line 22, the left edge of the manuscript following *nivartadi* has broken apart, but two dots of ink remain as evidence of what might have been a punctuation mark.

The interpretation of the question raised here by the proponent is clouded by syntactic irregularities. If *[ca]* functions to connect this question to either of the two preceding statements in line 21, its expected position would be after *ka[ḍa]ma*. Further, if as in lines 23–24 *yasa* were interpreted as a relative pronoun in the genitive referring to *[a]vi[v].[k].vivaga*, that is, to the action that possesses *vi[v].g.*, *yasa* would more naturally be placed before *vi[v].g.* Despite these

syntactic irregularities, this question in line 22 has been interpreted according to the pattern of *yasa* preceding *vivaga*, as presented in lines 23–24 and again in line 32.

[23] ^{51mmm(r)+51nnn+51ooo}*p[r].cha[di asti kic].* ^{51mmm(r)+51H(r)}*[k].* ^{51H(r)}*[ma]*: The first eight syllables in line 23 have disappeared in a triangular hole at the right edge of the manuscript. Fragment 51iii, positioned on the lower edge of this hole, is to be moved up to the beginning of line 16. Chip 51mmm(r), currently wedged between the upper and lower segments of the manuscript on the right edge in line 31, as well as chips 51nnn and 51ooo, located in the middle of line 32, contain remnants of eight syllables that are to be inserted here at the beginning of line 23. The bulk of the phrase *p[r].cha[di asti kic]. [k].* is preserved on chip 51mmm(r), supplemented by chip 51nnn, which preserves the lower tips of *cha[di]*, and chip 51ooo, which preserves the lower half of *[a]* and the lower tip of *[sti]*. The placement of chip 51mmm(r) is confirmed by the alignment of the tips of several syllables with dots of ink on the main manuscript both above and below the hole between lines 22 and 24 (plt. 6; verso l. 114).

[23] *kama*: The upper portion of *ma* is obscured by chip 51jjj, which contains the remnants of three or four syllables, which are as yet unplaced.

[24] *asti di • vata[v].*: The upper portions of *sti* and *di* are partially covered by a blank chip and by surface bark that has slipped downward below the triangular hole at the beginning of line 23. A dot of ink below *ta* in *vata[v].* is actually found on the recto surface of the delaminated bark adhering to the verso (ll. 118–121); it is visible through a small hole in the manuscript.

[24] *[kama]*: All but the top horizontal stroke and part of the left leg of *[ka]* have disappeared in a hole in the middle of line 24, and only portions of the two arms of *[ma]* remain on a sliver of bark lodged within the hole. However, the infrared image supports the reading *[kama]*.

[24] *asti [•]*: The initial black-and-white photograph preserves the left edge of fragment 51H(r) in line 24 and clearly indicates that *sti* is the final syllable in the line. The infrared image preserves a dark spot following *sti*, which could be the remnant of an expected punctuation mark.

[25] *[metra]e ca [e]k. = [m=amśa p].la [sa] ca me[t]. [a] asti sa ca pala asti di •*: By comparison with lines 24, 26, and 28, which preserve the initial syllables in each line, *[me]* constitutes the first syllable in line 25. The first four syllables *[metra]e ca* are bisected by cracks in the bark through which the recto surface of the delaminated bark adhering to the verso (ll. 118–119) is visible. The lower portion of the initial syllable *[me]* is distorted by a piece of the recto surface bark that has shifted toward the left, but there is no evidence of ink suggesting that the *e*-vowel diacritic should be read as *i*. The second syllable read as *[tra]* is not marked by an *i*- or *e*-vowel diacritic, and the postconsonantal *r* is suggested by a slight curve of the lower tip toward the right. The syllables *[e]k.* are distorted by cracks that obscure the initial syllables in line 25, but the readings are clearer in the infrared image. The following syllable tentatively read as *[mam]* is abraded on both the top and the bottom, but the remaining middle portion leaves no other possibility for the reading of the syllable. The lower portions of the syllables *[śa p].la* are lost in a large, irregularly shaped hole that extends from line 25 to 27. The resulting word *ek(*a)mamśa* has been interpreted as a compound formed with a “hiatus-bridging” or sandhi consonant *-m-* inserted to eliminate the vowel hiatus between *eka* and *amśa*, thus *eka-m-amśa* (P *ekamśa*, Skt *ekāmśa*), “one part,” a “little bit.” Such

compounds formed with hiatus bridging consonants, common in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist texts, are also not infrequent in Gāndhārī.⁵⁰

In the middle of line 25, a portion of the right-hand segment of the manuscript has slipped upward along a vertical split between *[me]* and *[t].[a]* in the word *me[t].[a]*. Although the reading *[me]* seems fairly certain, the reconstruction *t(*r)a* for *[t].[a]* is tentative since the split and resulting hole in the manuscript obscure both the top and bottom of the syllable, in particular the point at which a vowel diacritic would have intersected the base consonant at the top and any postconsonantal *r* at the bottom. What appears to be an *e*-vowel diacritic at the top of the syllable read as *[t].[a]* might instead be simply a portion of the left arm of the preceding syllable *me*. Both *me[t].[a]* and the preceding word *[metra]e* presumably represent different singular forms of *metra*, a feminine stem in *ā* (P *mettā*, Skt *maitrā*). Even though the argument pattern suggests that this line cites a scriptural passage, no parallel has yet been identified, and hence the syntax of the sentence is uncertain.

In the two parallel clauses *[sa] ca me[t].[a] asti* and *sa ca pala asti*, the first pronoun *[sa]* is understood as nominative singular feminine referring to *me[t].[a]*, and the second *sa*, as nominative singular neuter referring to *pala*. In line 27, the pronoun *sa* is presumably used in the nominative plural neuter to refer to *palani*. However, the similarity to the more legible clause in line 28, *taṣa ca pala asti di*, also suggests the possibility of scribal omission here in line 25: *⟨*ta⟩sa ca pala asti di*. In this case, *⟨*ta⟩sa* would be construed as genitive singular feminine referring back to the feminine *metri*.⁵¹

[25] *apaṃ* [26] *hi [e]da [a].nala [ś].[m].[a]. [dudo] vi[vatas]. p.la[n]. [bromi] .[i]*: The first seven syllables in line 26 are obscured by fragmented surface bark, small overlying blank chips, and a hole in the manuscript. However, a parallel passage permits the probable reconstruction of this line, which offers a scriptural citation supporting the proponent's prior statement that action does indeed have a matured effect: "For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute."⁵² This parallel might suggest metathesis of the two initial syllables *na* and *a* in *[a].nala*, which would then be reconstructed as *⟨*na a⟩la*. However, it is also possible that our text uses instead the synonymous compound *anala* (P/Skt *analam*) formed with the privative prefix *an-*.

The word *[a].nala* is followed by a hole that obliterates all but the upper right tip of the next syllable, which would not be inconsistent with the reading *[ś]*. in *(*śa)m(*ae)* as suggested by *samāya* in the Pali parallel. The syllables following the hole are bisected and distorted by a crack that extends across the width of fragment 51H, but they can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of the manuscript approximately one syllable to the left (plt. 6). Immediately after the hole, the upper left portion of the following syllable is preserved and would not be inconsistent with the reading *[m]*.. The final syllable *[a]*. in *[ś].[m].[a]*. is represented only by its lower portion

⁵⁰ For the hiatus bridging consonant *-m-*, see Phonology § II.3.5.3 Sandhi Consonants; BHSG 35–36 [§§ 4.57–60]; Lenz 2003: 107; Allon 2001: 102 [§ 5.6.5]; Glass 2007: 125 [§ 5.5.4]; Salomon 2008: 109 [§ II.3.2.1.2], 128 [§ II.3.3.2].

⁵¹ Salomon 2008: 147 [§ II.4.2.3].

⁵² P *apaṃ hi etaṃ na alaṃ samāya, duve vivādassa phalāni brūmi* (Sn 896 p. 175; Pj II 2.557). Cf. Nidd I 2.306–307; 少自知有慚羞。諍變本說兩果 (T 198 *xia* p. 183a6).

typical of either a vowel-carrying sign or *v*. However, it is also possible that this remaining stroke represents the right leg of *ya* whose upper portion is obscured and whose left leg has been abraded, omitted, or obscured by small overlying blank chips.⁵³ The seeming irregularly shaped *o*-vowel diacritic in this syllable is revealed by the infrared image to be a lenticel.

The *u*-vowel in the first of the next two syllables [*dudo*] is indicated by the flaring of the vertical stroke toward the left and right just above the crack through line 26. The second syllable is distorted and shortened by the crack and can be only tentatively reconstructed by moving the lower segment of the manuscript one syllable to the left. The resulting syllable most closely resembles a [*do*] or possibly [*to*], neither of which would be consistent with *e/i* or *ve/vi*, as suggested by the usual Gāndhārī nominative forms for “two,” *duve*, *duvi*, *due*, *dvi*,⁵⁴ and *tvi*, and by the Pali parallel *duve*. The resulting form *du[do]* might be assumed to represent an ordinal form for “second” with an anomalous or possibly miswritten final vowel *-o* rather than the expected *i*.⁵⁵ However, the ordinal form “second” would be inconsistent with the following plural nominative *p(*a)lan(*i)*. Hence, the reconstructed text has been emended to *du<*ve>* to reflect the Pali parallel.

The presence of an unvoiced *ta* instead of voiced *ḍa* in *vi[vatas]*., though not expected, is attested in the Khvs-G: for example, *patumaṃ* for P *padumī* or *mutita* for P *mudita*.⁵⁶ Even though *ta* and *da/ḍa* are usually clearly distinguished in our text, there are a few instances of graphic confusion between the two.⁵⁷ The crack through line 26 causes severe distortion of [*n*]. [*bromi*] [*i*], and the reconstruction of the final syllable as *(*d)i* is based on context since no portion of the base character remains.

[26] *prov.cadi* • [*p*]ro[27]^[51kkk(r)+51H(r)][*v*].^[51H(r)][*c*].*di* [*he*]du[*n*]. [*hi*]: In *provucadi*, the vowel *o* in the prefix *pro-* results from the palatalization of an original *a* vowel in the prefix *pra-* before the semivowel *v*. In Pali sources, the passive form *pavuccati/te* appears primarily in explanations or definitions of terms and can be rendered as “is called”: for example, “such a one is called ‘brahman.’”⁵⁸ However, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, forms from *pra* + √*vac*, especially in the passive participle form Skt *prokta*, are used to signal a doctrinal declaration, a statement based on scripture, or a scriptural quotation.⁵⁹ Since in this passage of our text *provucadi* is clearly not used simply to mark a defined term, but rather appears twice, once following *bromi* in line 26 and again at the beginning of another statement in line 27, it likely accords with the function of Skt *prokta* attested in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and thus suggests the presence of scriptural citations.

⁵³ For *ya* with an obscured left leg, see Text Notes: [62] *aryamago* [63] + + + /// ? *a.nupaḍadhama*; [85] *ar[ya]sace*.

⁵⁴ Baums 2004: 8–10.

⁵⁵ For the Gāndhārī ordinal forms *dutia*, *duḍia*, [*du*]diya, *bidiga*, *dviti*, *biti*, *biḍi*, and *dvi[ti]ya*, see Baums 2006: 34.

⁵⁶ Salomon 2000: 81 [§ I.6.2.1].

⁵⁷ Text Notes: 51D(r) [4] [*et*]. [*vi*]vaga *tasa* *heduavinaśa* [5] + + + /// ^[51D(r)][*ta*] ? *ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asaḍa na bhodi* •; [4] [*ta*]sa [*de so*]palo di.

⁵⁸ P *tādi pavuccate sa brahma* (Sn 519 p. 96).

⁵⁹ For Skt *prokta* used to introduce scriptural citations, see AKBh 3.8ab p. 118.10, 6.3 p. 331.21. Cf. AKBh 3.3cd p. 114.8, 8.1b p. 432.11.

The upper portion of *[p]ro* following the punctuation mark is abraded, but the long vertical stroke curving toward the right and the sharp diagonal stroke toward the left strongly suggest *pro*. Even though there is space for one additional syllable at the end of line 26, *[p]ro* is followed only by one dot of ink with no clear evidence of another syllable. The initial black-and-white photograph indicates that chip 51kkk(r), located on the fragmented right edge of fragment 51H(r) at the beginning of line 27 should be rotated slightly clockwise and moved left toward the edge. The beginning of line 27 is further obscured by overlying chip 51lll, which contains the remnants of three or possibly four syllables but is as yet unplaced. Hence, neither the initial black-and-white photograph nor the later digital image definitively indicates whether the relatively clear *[di]* near the beginning of line 27 is preceded by one or two syllables. The ink remaining on chip 51kkk(r) would support the reading *[v].* or *[y].*. If it represents the syllable *[v].*, the ink spots at the beginning of line 27 could be read as the separate syllable *[c].* suggesting *pro[v].[c].di*, which would function to introduce the following statement tentatively interpreted as a scriptural citation: “For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes” (*hedun(*a) hi ca śa palani paḍikakṣiḍava* •, l. 27). However, no parallel for this statement has yet been identified. Since P *pavuccati* and Skt *prokta* are used exclusively in sentence-final position, it is also possible that *prov(*u)c(*a)di* should not be construed as introducing the following statement in line 27. In that case, *prov(*u)c(*a)-di* spanning lines 26–27 would be the result of dittography. However, if the ink on chip 51kkk(r) were combined with the subsequent ink at the beginning of line 27 to form a single syllable, they would form the syllable *[y].*, which could be combined with the next syllable in line 27 to form the indeclinable conditional particle *[y].di*. In this case, the single syllable *[p]ro* at the end of line 26 would presumably be the result of dittography. However, the initial statement in line 27 makes little sense as a conditional clause, and the absence of the transitional indeclinable *tena* in the following clause in line 27, typically used to signal the apodosis, lends support to the first interpretation, whereby the first two syllables in line 27 are read as *[v].[c].* in *pro[v].[c].di*.

Since the upper portions of the four syllables *[he]du[n]. hi* are lost in a hole in the manuscript between lines 26 and 27, their reading is tentative. The lower left portion of *[hi]* is partially covered by a blank chip, but the lower horizontal stroke of the base character *h-* and the *i*-vowel diacritic are visible.

[27] *sañña voharovi[va]ga yaśa ya⟨śa⟩* [28] *sa[rja]nadi taśa taśa voharadi*: A blank chip obscures a portion of the left leg of the initial *ya* in *yaśa ya⟨śa⟩*, and the final *śa* is written beyond the left margin, which suggests that it was perhaps added after the scribe had begun line 28. Lines 27–28 contain a scriptural citation supporting the proponent’s assertion that action has a matured effect. According to the Pali parallel, “I declare, O monks, conception to have conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way one conceives, in that way one says: ‘I have had a conception in this way.’ This is said, O monks, to be the matured effect of conceptions.”⁶⁰ Even though *voharo*, the prior member of the compound *voharo-vivaga*, ends with a possible nominative singular masculine ending *-o* rather than the expected stem form in *-a*, the Pali parallel suggests that *voharovi[va]ga* be taken as a compound. Such anomalous pseudo-compounds, with the prior

⁶⁰ P *vohāravepakkaṃ, bhikkhave, saññaṃ vadāmi. yathā yathā naṃ sañjānāti tathā tathā voharati, evaṃ saññī ahoṣiṃ ti. ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, saññānaṃ vipāko* (AN III 413). Cf. Mp III 407; 云何知想有報。謂說也。隨其想便說。是謂知想有報 (MĀ 27 no. 21 pp. 599c29–600a1).

member apparently ending in the nominative singular, are attested in Sanskrit Buddhist texts and possibly in other Gāndhārī texts, although their interpretation remains problematic.⁶¹

In the intact right margin in lines 27–28 is a distinctive graphic formation consisting of a vertical line with diagonal strokes branching off upward to the right and left in a repeated v-shaped pattern.⁶² This graphic formation does not appear elsewhere in the manuscript and its significance here is unclear. Prior to and slightly above the first syllable in line 29 is a faint interlinear insertion that might be taken as *a*, *e*, the numeral 10 with an unusually narrow top, or as some other text marker. It is doubtful whether this interlinear notation, if read as *a* or *e*, constitutes a correction for either *sa[rja]nadi*, the initial word in line 28, or *prochidava*, the initial word in line 29. As the numeral 10, it might demarcate a major division in the text, beginning from the large punctuation mark at the end of line 28. However, there are no other interlinear or marginal numerals in this manuscript. Finally, this interlinear notation might function together with the v-shaped graphic formation as a symbol marking scriptural citations or have some other as yet unclear textual function. The right margin of this manuscript is preserved in only a few other locations (recto ll. 19–21; verso ll. 122–125), which do not correspond with a large punctuation mark. Hence, the possible interpretation of this graphic formation as *a*, *e*, the numeral 10, or some other type of textual marker cannot be corroborated.⁶³

The upper left portion of *[rja]* is covered by a vertically lying chip (51lll) whose correct placement has not been determined. The lower portion of the syllable contains a curved foot mark that is not typical of *ja* but resembles a preconsonantal *r*. A similar *-rj-* cluster is used elsewhere to represent the geminate *-jj-* as the palatalized MIA form for conjuncts with *y* as the second member.⁶⁴ Given the secure identification of a parallel for this statement, the *-rj-* cluster in *sa[rja]nadi* should be construed as representing the cluster *-ñj-* in the finite verb form P *sañjānāti* (Skt *sañjānāti*).

II.6.2.8. ll. 29–36

Manuscript Notes: ll. 29–36

Several cracks extending across the width of the manuscript begin at the right edge of fragment 51H in line 31 and terminate at the left edge in line 30. Chip 51mmm(r), wedged in the crack at the right edge in line 31 (corresponding to verso l. 114), and chips 51nnn and 51ooo, adhering to the middle of line 32, should be returned to their original location at the beginning of line 23 (corresponding to verso l. 121). Another crack just below line 35 widens to a hole approximately 2.5 cm from the right edge and then extends across the width of the manuscript, separating the manuscript into two segments and bisecting the remaining syllables in line 35. These bisected syllables on both the recto (l. 35) and verso (l. 109) can be realigned by rejoining the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H (plts. 6, 9).

⁶¹ BHS 49 [§ 8.12], 125 [§ 23.7]; Salomon 2000: 100 [§ I.7.1.5], 173–174; Salomon 2008: 280 [§ II.7.5].

⁶² Manuscript Notes: ll. 21–28.

⁶³ For the varied placement of interlinear numerals used to number verses in AG-G^S, see Salomon 2008: 356 [§ III.7], 387 [§ III.7], 396 [§ III.7], 398 [§ III.7].

⁶⁴ Text Notes: [55] *sa[ma]varjadi* •; [90] *[ha]ta vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa* •.

Lodged within this separation between lines 34 and 35 are three chips, 51ppp, 51qqq, and 51rrr, which in the initial black-and-white photograph form a single large chip. These chips are blank on the verso but are marked on the recto with bits of ink from the upper tips of several syllables. Given the blank verso surfaces of all three chips, the relatively straight upper edge of chip 51ppp, and their current location one cycle from the end of fragment 51H, it is likely that they were all originally located along the lower edge of this fragment. The bottom of the recto surface of fragment 51H was left blank to allow for the glue-line juncture with the contiguous fragment 52A (ll. 42–43; plts. 6, 7). Hence, the blank verso surfaces of these chips should be placed on the recto of fragment 51H below line 42, and their recto surfaces contain ink from the upper portions of syllables along the top edge of the verso of fragment 52A to which fragment 51H was affixed, but probable locations for chips 51ppp(r), 51qqq(r), and 51rrr(r) have been tentatively identified just above line 102, near the right edge of the verso of fragment 51H (fig. 8).



Fig. 8. Detail of 52(v) and 51(v), 51ppp(r), 51qqq(r), 51rrr(r), 51xxx(v), 51www(v) l. 102.

ll. 29–36

Transcribed text

29. *prochidava asti kica kama [ast]i nasti kica kama asti di • asti kica kama avi-*
 30. *vakavivaga adida adidaḥanena ekaḥa • y[i]di ekaḥa tena [ubhaa].[h]. pa[l].*
 31. *[d].[d].[vo] ubhaye va asti ubhay[e] va nasti di • asti ki[c]. [k].ma avivakaviva[g].*
 32. *[y].sa vivaga [na] kica nivartiṣadi + yi[di]aha asti [kama] ? ? vivaga na ni-*
 33. *[va]r[t].ṣadi tena ta kama avivakavivaga nasti [•] aṣa nasti ki[ca] ka[ma] ya-*
 34. *[s]. vivaga nivartiṣadi • na hode br[o]mici[a]vaṣa eva hi vuta bhagavaḍa ya[ṣa]*
 35. *[y].ṣa aya kama ^[51H(r)+51yyy(r)]a[vis].^[51H(r)][kh].rodi [taṣa taṣa] vivaga paḍi[ṣave]dedi [•]*
na bhodi br[o]
 36. *+ /// [c].[avaṣo •]*

Reconstruction

- (6) [29] *prochidava asti kica kama asti nasti kica kama asti di • asti kica kama avi*[30]-
*vakavivaga adida adidaḥanena ekaḥa • yidi ekaḥa tena ubha(*e)h(*i) pal(*a)* [31] *d(*a)-*
*d(*a)vo ubhaye va asti ubhaye va nasti di •*
- (7) [31] *asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma avivakavivag(*a)* [32] *y(*a)sa vivaga na kica nivartiṣadi*
(•) yidi aha asti kama (*yasa) vivaga na ni*[33] *vart(*i)ṣadi tena ta kama avivakavivaga*
nasti • aṣa nasti kica kama ya[34] *s(*a) vivaga <*na> nivartiṣadi • na hode bromiciavaṣa*

*eva hi vuta bhagavaḍa yaṣa [35] y(*a)ṣa aya kama avis(*a)kh(*a)rodi taṣa taṣa vivaga paḍiṣavededi • na bhodi bro[36](*)mi)c(*)i)avaṣo •*

Translation

(6) [29] [P] It should be asked, “Is there some action that exists, or is there no action that exists?” [O] “There is some action [that exists, namely,] [30] past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, which constitutes one part within the region of the past.” [P] If [action whose matured effect has not yet matured exists as possessed of a fruit and] constitutes one part [of the past], then the fruit should be presented by both [31] [parts, that is, by past action whose matured effect has not yet matured and by past action whose matured effect has already matured]. [It should be said that] either both [parts of the past] exist [as possessed of a fruit] or both do not exist [as not possessed of a fruit].

(7) [31] [P] Is there some action whose matured effect has not yet matured, [32] of which the matured effect will not occur at all? If one states, [O] “There is action (*whose) matured effect [33] will not occur,” [P] then that action is not [to be referred to as action] “whose matured effect has not yet matured.” Or else, [if] there were no action whose [34] matured effect will not occur, there would be no life of religious practice. For it has been spoken thus by the Bhagavat, [35] “[If it is said that] in whatever way this one instigates an action, in that way one experiences the matured effect, then there is no life of [36] religious practice.”

Text Notes: ll. 29–36

[29] *prochidava*: Between lines 28 and 29 on the right margin is a faint symbol resembling an *a*, *e*, or possibly the numeral 10. If it represents an *a* or *e*, it would have been inserted to correct an omission, as in line 2, but it cannot be read with *sa[rja]nadi*, the initial word in line 28, nor with *prochidava*, the initial word in line 29. The proximity of this symbol to the vertically aligned, v-shaped graphic formation found at the beginning of line 28 may be significant, since the combination of this distinctive graphic formation together with a large punctuation mark and either a letter or numeral or both may have been used to demarcate major divisions in the manuscript. However, since the right margin is not intact in the case of the other large punctuation marks preserved in the manuscript (ll. 2–4, 65–67), this interpretation cannot be verified, and hence the reading or function of this symbol is unclear.

[30] *adiḍaṭhanena ekaṭha •*: Although the compound *adiḍaṭhanena* is declined in the instrumental singular, it is better construed here with a locative or genitive sense, “in the region of the past” or “belonging to the region of the past.”⁶⁵

[30] *[ubhaa].[h]. pa[l]*. [31] *[d].[d].[vo] ubhaye va asti ubhay[e] va nasti di •*: The final six syllables in line 30 are bisected and shortened by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript from the right margin in line 31 to the left margin in line 30. The lower portions of the syllables at the end of line 30 are lost in the crack, with the exception of *pa*, whose lower portion is preserved on the lower manuscript segment. The reading *[ubha]* seems secure given the appearance of *ubhaye* twice in the next line, but the remaining upper portions of the two following

⁶⁵ BHSG 44 [§§ 7.30–32].

syllables do not permit a secure reading. The first rounded syllable resembles a vowel-carrying sign, but the lower portion and hence any vowel diacritic is lost in the crack. The second more angular syllable could also be a vowel-carrying sign or possibly *h.*, which would support the more likely instrumental plural form *ubha(*e)h(*i)*. The lower portions of the first three syllables *[d]. [d]. [vo]* in line 31 are obscured by the same crack that bisects the final six syllables in line 30, as well as by chip 51mmm(r), which is wedged within this crack and should be returned to its original location at the beginning of line 23. The following ten syllables in this initial portion of line 31 are also bisected by this crack, but can be securely reconstructed by rejoining the upper and lower segments of the manuscript (plt. 6).

Despite the damage to the manuscript in lines 30–31, the reading *[ubhaa].[h]. pa[l]. [d].[d]. [vo]* and the reconstruction *ubha(*e)h(*i) pal(*a) d(*a)d(*a)vo* are supported by the use of the gerundive *daḍavo* in similar patterns elsewhere in our text. For example, *daḍavo* is used with the noun *pala* earlier: “the fruit should be presented” (*pala daḍavo*, ll. 6–7).⁶⁶ An analogous passage from the *Āṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā*, “the gift is the fruit that is to be presented by action,”⁶⁷ suggests that the gerundive *dātabba*, when used with the noun *phala*, appears with an agent in the instrumental. In this passage of our text, the instrumental neuter plural form *[ubhaa].[h].* would then be construed as the agent: “then the fruit should be presented by both [parts]” (*tena ubha(*e)-h(*i) pal(*a) d(*a)d(*a)vo*, ll. 30–31).

Both instances of the pronominally declined adjective *ubhaya*, “both,” in line 31 are assumed to be plural in number on the basis of the clear instrumental plural form *ubha(*e)h(*i)* in line 30. As throughout this manuscript, here also the singular form *asti* is used with the plural nominative form *ubhaye*.⁶⁸ Context suggests that the referent of *ubhaye* is the two possible types of past action: past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, which constitute one part of the past, and past actions whose matured effects have already matured, which constitute the remaining part of the past. In this context, *ubhaye* would be expected to be nominative plural neuter, even though the *-e* ending might suggest the masculine. In our text, the only example of a pronominally declined adjective in the nominative plural neuter ends in *-a* (*śa*, l. 27), and nominative plural masculine pronominal forms end in either *-e* or *-a*. Hence, there is insufficient evidence to preclude the possibility that *ubhaye* here represents a nominative plural neuter form. Such variability in the formation especially of plural pronominal forms has been noted in other studies of Gāndhārī texts.⁶⁹

[31] *asti ki[c]. [k].ma avivakaviva[g].* [32] *[y].sa*: Multiple cracks and shifted pieces of bark obscure the six syllables *asti ki[c]. [k].ma*, and the upper portions of *[c]. [k].* are lost in a hole in the manuscript. Following *viva* at the end of line 31 is the abraded upper portion of a syllable whose lower portion is covered by blank chips. The left tip and the curved right-hand stroke of the remaining upper portion suggest the reading *[g].*, which is supported by context. The right

⁶⁶ Text Notes: [7] |^{51kk(r)+51ll(r)+51E(r)}*[la] daḍavo astitva [h].[d].[p].*|^{51E(r)+51G(r)}*[l].*|^{51G(r)}*[p].ti di •.*

⁶⁷ P *kammena dātabbaṃ phalaṃ dāyam* (Mp V 40).

⁶⁸ Cf. 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 31[2x], 38, 39, 69, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 76, 83, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139; 51D(v) l. 3. Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]*|^{51D(r)}*[ka]vivaga asti •.* For *asti* with a plural sense, see Morphology § II.4.5.1 Verbal Constructions.

⁶⁹ Salomon 2008: 147 [§ II.4.2.3]; Baums 2009: 227 [§ 5.1.2.2].

margin at the beginning of line 32 has broken apart, with considerably greater damage evident since the initial black-and-white photograph. For the initial *[y]*., only the left leg and the tip of the right leg are preserved, but the reconstruction *y(*a)sa* is supported by similar patterns in lines 22, 23, 24, and 33–34.

[32] *nivartiṣadi + yi[di] aha asti [kama] ? ?*: The left portion of *di* in *nivartiṣadi* and the expected following punctuation mark are covered by chip 51nnn, and all but the left tip of *[di]* in *yi[di]* is covered by chip 51ooo. The four syllables *[kama] ? ?*, which have been reconstructed as *kama (*yasa)*, have been largely abraded. There is ample support in the remaining ink for the reading *ka*, but the reconstruction of the other syllables is based largely upon context and parallel phrasing in lines 33–34. A similar *ma* with a flourish extending downward from the right arm is also found in *ka[ma]* at the end of line 33.

[33] *aṣa nasti ki[ca] ka[ma] ya[34][s].:* The syllable *sti* in *nasti* is followed by an ink smudge that context suggests should be read as a punctuation mark. The lower portion of *[ca]* in *ki[ca]* has been abraded, but its remaining upper portion justifies the reading *ca*. The syllable *ma* in *ka[ma]* is written with a slight downward flourish on the right arm (cf. *[kama]*, l. 32). At the beginning of line 34, only the upper and lower left portions of *[s]* remain on the deteriorated right margin, but the reconstruction *yasa* is likely given similar phrasing in lines 22, 23, and 24.

[34] *vivaga nivartiṣadi •*: In this passage (ll. 31–36), the argument conforms to the typical pattern of an objection in the form of a question or assertion, here a polar question, followed by two logically complementary or simple contrasting alternatives, each of which is demonstrated to result in an untoward consequence. The initial question states, “Is there some action whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect will not occur at all?” (*asti kic(*a) k(*a)ma avivakavivag(*a) y(*a)sa vivaga na kica nivartiṣadi (*•)*, ll. 31–32). This is followed first by the affirmative alternative: “If one states, [o] ‘There is action whose matured effect will not occur, ...’” (*yidi aha asti kama (*yasa) vivaga na nivart(*i)ṣadi*, ll. 32–33). According to the typical argument pattern, the second negative alternative given in lines 33–34 would be expected simply to negate the initial question as a whole. However, in its restatement of the initial question, the second alternative as written omits the particle *na* negating the verb *nivartiṣadi*: “Or else, [if] there were no action whose matured effect will occur, ...” (*aṣa nasti kica kama yas(*a) vivaga nivartiṣadi •*, ll. 33–34). It is therefore probable that this second alternative should be emended to conform to the syntax of the initial question through the inclusion of the negative particle *na*: “Or else, [if] there were no action whose matured effect will **not** occur, ...” (*aṣa nasti kica kama yas(*a) vivaga (*na) nivartiṣadi •*, ll. 33–34). This emendation would also be more consistent with the sense of the following scriptural citation.⁷⁰

[34] *na hode br[o]mici[a]vaṣa*: The Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of the Gāndhārī form *hode* in this clause are uncertain, with four possible interpretations. Given its location following the negative particle *na*, *hode* could reasonably be taken to represent either a finite or participial form of the root *bhū*. As a first interpretation, since the present form *asti* appears in the protasis of this Gāndhārī statement, and the present form P *hoti* is used in the Pali parallel for the scriptural passage,

⁷⁰ Commentary: (6–7) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

which is cited (ll. 35–36) by the proponent to buttress his criticism of the opponent’s position,⁷¹ *hode* might be expected to be a present verb form. However, the Gāndhārī form *hode* clearly ends with the special ligature *de*, which cannot be confused paleographically with *di*. Nonetheless, given the somewhat arbitrary vowel alternation of *i* and *e* in Gāndhārī, it is possible that *hode* represents the frequent Gāndhārī form *bhodi/hodi*, the third-person singular present verb form of the root *bhū*.⁷² However, *hode* as the present finite verb form *hodi* would be unique in our text, which otherwise uses *bhodi* exclusively. Second, even though ātmanepada forms of finite verbs are rare in Gāndhārī,⁷³ *hode* could represent the third-person singular ātmanepada present of the root *bhū* (Skt *bhavate*). Third, *hode* could represent the third-person singular optative of the root *bhū* (Skt *bhavet*). Even though no confirmed instance of the third-person singular optative of the root *bhū* is attested in Gāndhārī, *hode* would be consistent with the stem formation of the well-attested Gāndhārī form *hodi* and is analogous to the attested third-person singular optative form *caret* for Skt *caret*, “one should wander.”⁷⁴ This interpretation of *hode* as an optative is further supported by a passage in Bajaur fragment 11: “Even if one would not wish, there would inevitably be joy ...” *yadi va na [ichi]ea, ta avaśa hode pridi ...*, BC 11 (v) ll. 1.3–4).⁷⁵ Here, the regular syntactic pattern of optative forms in both the protasis and apodosis of a conditional construction, and the unequivocal optative form *[ichi]ea* in the protasis would suggest that *hode* be construed in the optative. As a final interpretation, *hode* might be understood not as a finite verb form but as the past participle from root *bhū* (Skt *bhūta*), with the ending *-e* representing either the locative singular or, more likely in this clause, the nominative singular masculine. The interpretation yielded by this final interpretation would differ from the prior three, since *hode* as the past participle Skt *bhūta* would most likely be understood with the adjectival sense “real” or “true” and hence “reliable”: “Or else, [if] there is no action whose matured effect will not occur, the life of religious practice is not **reliable**” (*aśa nasti kica kama yas(*a) vivaga (*na) nivartiṣadi • na hode bromiciavaśa*, ll. 33–34). Despite the absence as yet of any absolute confirmation of *hode* as the Gāndhārī equivalent of the Sanskrit *bhavet*, the third interpretation is supported by the passage from the probable sense of BC 11 and would best fit the context in this passage. Hence, *hode* has here been taken to represent a third-person singular optative: “Or else, [if] there were no action whose matured effect will not occur, there **would be** no life of religious practice.”

The syllable *[a]* in *br[o]mici[a]vaśa* appears to have been corrected from a prior *ya* (cf. other occurrences of this word, all with *a* rather than *ya* ll. 35–36, 38, 39, 45, 65). The possibility of an *o* vowel in the initial *br[o]* is more problematic given the certain equivalent Skt *brahmacaryavāsa* (P *brahmacariyavāsa*), as suggested by the scriptural passage quoted in lines 34–36. Two of the six occurrences of this word clearly present the reading *bra* (ll. 38, 45). Since the reading *bro* in

⁷¹ Commentary: (6–7) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 29–36].

⁷² Allon 2001: 75 [§ 5.1.6]; Lenz 2003: 40 [§ 4.1.3], 127 [§ 9.1.2]; Salomon 2008: 104 [§ II.3.1.3]; Glass 2000: 127 [§ 5.1.2.5]. Brough (1962: 80 [§ 21]) notes that “[i]n the final position in a word, (-i) regularly appears as -i, while (-e) may be written either -e or -i, with a definite preference for the latter.”

⁷³ Burrow 1937: 44 [§ 94]. For possible ātmanepada future forms, see Allon 2001: 117 [§ 6.3.4]; Lenz 2010: 48 [§ 4.3.4].

⁷⁴ Salomon 2000: 101 [§ I.7.3.2].

⁷⁵ See also BC 11 (v) ll.8–9 [2x]. Email communication from Ingo Strauch, June 29, 2010.

the case of the other four occurrences (ll. 34, 35–36, 39, 65) is based on an *o*-vowel diacritic that appears as a small dot of ink to the lower left of *bra*, the reading *bro* is by no means certain. By contrast, in the case of *bromi/broṣi* (ll. 26, 28, 139), *bro* has an extended and unmistakable *o*-vowel diacritic. Further complicating the reading in the case of *br[o]mici[a]vaṣa* here in line 34 is an unexplained dot of ink that appears to the upper right above *br[o]*. This unexplained dot of ink is also present in the syllable *bro* in line 39 but not in the case of the syllable *bra* in lines 38 and 65; the occurrences in lines 35–36 and 45 are unclear on this point. The term Skt *brahmacarya* (P *brahmacariya*) occurs in several different forms in Gāndhārī: for example, *bramacarya*,⁷⁶ *bramacaria*,⁷⁷ *bramayirya*,⁷⁸ *bramaīya*,⁷⁹ *bramayia*,⁸⁰ and *bramahia*.⁸¹ In *bromicia*, the form found here, the vowel *i* in *[bra/bro]mi* can be explained as resulting from palatalization of *a* in contact with a palatal consonant, whether or not that palatal consonant is still written.⁸² The form *cia* for Skt *carya* (P *cariya*) can be explained through representation of the cluster *-ry-* as the geminate *-yy-*, palatalization of the vowel *a*, and elision of the semivowel *y*: *carya* > *cayya* > *ci(y)a* > *cia*.

[35] *kama* |^{51H(r)+51yyy(r)}*a[vis]* |^{51H(r)}*[kh].rodi*: The lower tip of the left leg of *ka* as well as the lower portions of the following *ma* and *a* are on a small piece of the manuscript that has broken away from fragment 51H(r) and is located in a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript through line 35. This piece can be rotated slightly clockwise and returned to its original position. Immediately after *[vi]* the crack expands to a hole; the upper portion of both the base character *v*- and the *i*-vowel diacritic are visible just prior to the hole, and one dot of ink from the next largely missing syllable appears at the lower edge of the manuscript just above the hole. Chip 51yyy(v), adhering to the verso of fragment 51H in line 102, contains *anaga*, which can be securely placed within this hole in line 110 on the verso.⁸³ Only the bottom edge of the recto surface of chip 51yyy is visible just beyond the lower recto edge of fragment 51H, but it contains one dot of ink presumably from the lower portion of this largely missing syllable in line 35. Remnants of ink immediately following the hole would not be inconsistent with the reading *kh*. for the syllable after this missing syllable. These readings *[vi]* and *[kh]*. on either side of the hole suggest that the intervening syllable be read as *[s]*., yielding the verb form *avis(*a)kh(*a)rodi*, which would be consistent with the context.

[35] *br[o][36] + /// [c].[avaṣo •]*: The right margin of the manuscript has broken into numerous small chips at the beginning of line 36, and considerable deterioration has occurred since the initial black-and-white photograph. Only the lower portions of three partially legible syllables remain from the beginning of line 35, but the infrared image would support the reading *[c].[avaṣa]* expected

⁷⁶ Nird-G^{L1} (r) l. 67; BL 14 (v) l. 107; Akṣs-G (r) 1F l. 37, 3H l. 43, (v) 8A' l. 6, 4F' l. 8, 4F' l. 9.

⁷⁷ Akṣs-G (v) 9A' l. 4, 4D' l. 15.

⁷⁸ Dhṛp-G^K vv. 8, 77.

⁷⁹ Nird-G^{L2} (r) ll. 9–10.

⁸⁰ SaṅCm-G (30r) ll. 19–20, 30; (31r) ll. 3–7, (31v) l. 57.

⁸¹ RS 19 (r) l. 13, (v) l. 30; RS 22 (r) l. 27.

⁸² Brough 1962: 81 [§ 22a]; Salomon 2000: 79 [§ I.6.1.1]; Allon 2001: 73 [§ 5.1.1]; Salomon 2008: 102 [§ II.3.1.1].

⁸³ Text Notes: [110] *adiḍakaranena* |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}*anaga* |^{51H(v)}*ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adiḍakare asti •*.

from the context. Extending toward the left from the lower portion of *śa* is a thin stroke that is lower than would ordinarily be expected for an *o*-vowel diacritic. The remnants of a punctuation mark, which are also visible following *br[o] + /// [c].[avaśa]*, would not be expected to include this thin stroke. Hence, in the absence of any other explanation, this stroke has been interpreted as an *o*-vowel diacritic despite its low placement.

II.6.2.9. ll. 36–45

Manuscript Notes: ll. 36–45

In the initial black-and-white photograph, fragment 51H is largely intact at both the right and left margins in lines 36–38. A crack begins at the right edge in line 40, extends across the width of the manuscript, and terminates in line 39. This crack results in the distortion of syllables in the first third of line 40, a hole that obliterates at least one syllable in the middle of line 40, and the compression of the syllables in the last half of line 39.

Manuscript part 51 comes to an end at line 42. There is approximately 1 cm of blank space below the line, which provided space for the gluing of manuscript part 51 on top of manuscript part 52 (plts. 6, 7). Line 42 contains only eleven syllables and appears to have been shortened to avoid writing over the glue-line juncture. Manuscript parts 51 and 52 are clearly contiguous, as demonstrated by the syllables that span both parts in line 102 (fig. 8; plts. 8, 9).⁸⁴ Beyond the lower edge of fragment 51H(r) are a number of small chips (51sss, 51ttt, 51uuu, 51vvv, 51www, 51xxx) that are preserved in frame 51. These became separated from the right and lower edges of the manuscript between the time the initial black-and-white photograph was taken and the digital images were made. Most of these chips are blank on the recto since they originate from the lower portion of manuscript part 51, which was left blank to accommodate the gluing. However, several chips can be placed on the basis of ink preserved on the recto or the verso (plts. 6, 9).

Numerous chips along the upper and right edges of fragment 52A (ll. 45–47) shifted when frame 52 was turned over from recto to verso during the initial black-and-white photographing. Still further shifting of these chips occurred between the initial black-and-white photographs and the digital images. On the basis of the initial black-and-white photograph of the recto, it is possible to determine the original location of some of these chips (52j, 52k, 52m, 52n) along the right edge of the manuscript, but one of the larger chips (52i) along the top of manuscript part 52 and the majority of the smaller chips remain unplaced (plt. 7).

Multiple cracks extend across the width of the manuscript through line 44 and terminate in a narrow hole about four syllables from the left edge; the corresponding location on the verso (l. 101) is marked by a curved crack and a bark fold. It is likely that these cracks on the recto and verso were caused by the stress at the glue-line juncture between manuscript parts 51 and 52 and resulted in severe compression of the remaining syllables in the first half of line 44. Dots of ink prior to the first legible syllables [*a*].*va[śa]* in line 44 suggest that several syllables at the beginning of the line became obscured by the cracks or disappeared in the delamination also resulting from these cracks.

⁸⁴ Manuscript Notes: ll. 36–45.

II. 36–45

Transcribed text

36. *prochidava śaka upaḍadhamo anagado thamena va viryen[a] va anu-*
 37. *paḍadhama kato di • y[i]di na śaka na so upaḍadhamo ya karana śaka upaḍadhamo*
 38. *[ka]to • aśa na śaka nirarthyā bramiciavaśa bhodi • yadi upaḍadhama anagaḍa*
a?⟨sti⟩
 39. *anupaḍadhama anagaḍa nasti • kaḍamaśa dukhaniro[śa abromi]ciavaśa • [u]-*
paḍa[dha]mo
 40. *hi avaśa upajiśadi • anupaḍadham. + [v].śa na upajiśadi • ?*
 41. *[ya]smi samahe aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki n[u] khu*
 42. *[tas]^[51H(r)+51tu(r)][mi] |^[51H(r)]samahe neraīyabhava*
 43. *+ + /// |^[52A(r)]? ? |^[52A(r)+52j(r)]ma |^[52A(r)]aśa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka*
tatra jadi u
 44. *+ + + + /// ? ? ? [a].va[śa nahi] tena gatava [nera]a di • aśa upaḍa[dh].mo [•]*
 45. *|^[52k(r)][t].[n]. [n]. |^[52k(r)+52A(r)]bra|^[52A(r)]miciavaśa •*

Reconstruction

- (1) [36] *prochidava śaka upaḍadhamo anagado thamena va viryena va anu*[37]*paḍadhama kato di • yidi na śaka na so upaḍadhamo ya karana śaka upaḍadhamo* [38] *kato • aśa na śaka nirarthyā bramiciavaśa bhodi •*
- (2) [38] *yadi upaḍadhama anagaḍa asti* [39] *anupaḍadhama anagaḍa nasti • kaḍamaśa dukhanirośa abromiciavaśa •*
- (3) [39] *upaḍadhamo* [40] *hi avaśa upajiśadi • anupaḍadham(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajiśadi •* [41] *yasmi samahe aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki nu khu* [42] *tasmi samahe neraīyabhava* [43] *(*upaḍadha)ma aśa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka tatra jadi u*[44]*(*padido •) ? ? ? (*a)vaśa nahi tena gatava neraa di • aśa upaḍadh(*a)mo •* [45] *t(*e)n(*a) n(*a) bramiciavaśa •*

Translation

- (1) [36] [P] It should be asked, “Is it possible for a future factor subject to arising, by virtue of [its] strength or energy, [37] to act as a factor not subject to arising?” If it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], it is not a factor subject to arising since it is possible for a factor subject to arising [38] to act. Or else, [if] it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], the life of religious practice is without purpose.
- (2) [38] [P] If future factors subject to arising exist, [39] [and] future factors not subject to arising do not exist, to which of these [two categories] does the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice [belong]?
- (3) [39] Indeed, [you contend that] “a factor subject to arising [40] will inevitably arise, [and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise.” [41] When Aṅgulimāla,

having killed human beings, wears a garland of finger bones, now how possibly [42] at that time is [his future] nature as a hell-being [43] either (*a factor subject to arising), or else not a factor subject to arising? If it is a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action] [44] ... for hell inevitably should not be reached by him. Or else, [if] it is a factor subject to arising, [45] then [there is] no life of religious practice [for him].

Text Notes: ll. 36–45

[36] *thamena va viryen[a] va anu*[37]*paḍadhama*: The syllable *n[a]* in *viryen[a]* appears to be marked by a short horizontal stroke that intersects with the bottom tip of the left leg of the prior consonant *rye*. If this apparent stroke is indeed ink, it might be interpreted as an abbreviated *e*-vowel diacritic forming *viryleneva*, or *viryen(a) eva* in sandhi combination. However, the absence of an *e*-vowel in the previous phrase *thamena va* and the frequent use of *thāma* and *vīriya* together in Pali suggests that the two words are syntactically parallel here as well.⁸⁵ Hence, it has been assumed that this apparent stroke is not ink, and *viryen[a] va* has been interpreted as instrumental singular neuter *viryen[a]* with the enclitic disjunctive particle *va* (P/Skt *vā*). Whereas *pa* in *anupaḍadhama* at the beginning of line 37 is clear in the initial black-and-white photograph, deterioration at the right edge of the manuscript has resulted in the drifting of the upper portion of the *pa* to the right in the subsequent digital image.

[37] *y[i]di na śaka*: The syllable *[yi]* is abraded, with only the top horizontal stroke and the upper portion of the legs of the base character *y-* and the upper portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic remaining. The reading *[yi]* is clearer in the infrared image and is supported by context. The infrared image also confirms that an apparent postconsonantal *r* on the lower right leg of *śa* is not ink.

[38] *yadi upaḍadhama anagaḍa a?*«*sti*» [39] *anupaḍadhama anagaḍa nasti •*: Between *a* and *sti* is an ink smudge that is best interpreted as an aborted syllable (cf. ll. 10, 40, 59, 81, 96). The final *sti* in line 38 is written outside the left margin and was probably added to complete the word *asti* prior to the end of line 38, thus further reinforcing the interpretation of the smudge preceding it as an aborted syllable.

Despite the singular verb form *asti*, an analogous discussion in the Kathāvattu suggests that the nominative in this sentence is best construed in the plural: “Future factors subject to arising exist and future factors not subject to arising do not exist.”⁸⁶ If so, this would constitute yet another example of a fossilized singular verb form *asti* used with a plural nominative.⁸⁷

[39] *dukhaniro[sa abromi]ciavaṣa • [u]paḍa[dha]mo*: Immediately below *niroga* is a hole from which a crack extends to the left edge of fragment 51H, bisecting and shortening the remaining syllables in line 39. For the syllable *[bro]*, only the upper portion of the base character *b-* and the lower tip of the postconsonantal *r* are clearly visible. A dot of ink on the lower manuscript segment below the crack also suggests the vowel diacritic *o*. To the upper right of *[bro]* is an unexplained

⁸⁵ For example, AN I 236; Mp III 222; Ps I 140, III 30.

⁸⁶ *P anāgatā uppāḍino dhammā athi, anāgatā anuppāḍino dhammā te n' atthīti* (Kv 154).

⁸⁷ Cf. 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 30, 31[2x], 39, 69, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 76, 83, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139; 51D(v) l. 3. Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]*^{51D(r)}*[ka]vivaga asti •*. For *asti* with a plural sense, see Morphology § II.4.5.1 Verbal Constructions.

dot of ink that also appears above the syllable *bro* of *bromiciavaṣa* in line 34 but is absent in other occurrences.⁸⁸ The analysis of the compound [*abromi*]ciavaṣa and its syntactic function in conjunction with *dukhaniroṣa* are uncertain, and in this case both depend solely upon contextual meaning.⁸⁹ As will be discussed in the following general commentary (ll. 36–45), it is more likely here that *dukhaniro[ṣa]* functions as a nominative in relation to the genitive *kaḍamaṣa* and that [*abromi*]ciavaṣa functions as a locative in relation to *dukhaniro[ṣa]*.

[40] *anupaḍadham.* + [*v*].śa na upajiśadi • ? [41] [*ya*]smi: The final *m*. in *anupaḍadham*. appears on the right edge of a hole in the middle of line 40, and the upper left tip of [*v*]. appears on the left edge of the hole. For the one syllable missing within the hole, parallelism with the preceding phrase strongly supports the reconstruction of an initial **a* in *(*a)v(*a)śa*. Following the punctuation mark near the end of line 40 is a partial or aborted syllable, consistent with the beginnings of a *ya*, the very syllable with which the next line 41 begins (cf. ll. 10, 38, 59, 81, 96). Sufficient space remains for approximately four syllables after the punctuation mark near the end of line 40, and although there is a crack and separation in the manuscript in its current state, it is impossible to determine whether the original condition of the manuscript would have prompted the scribe to abort writing *yasmi* in line 40 and to begin it anew in line 41.

[41] *aguḍimala manuśa jatva • agulina mala dharedi • ki n[u] khu*: This sentence is not clearly marked as a scriptural citation, but at the very least it alludes to a passage for which a parallel can be found in the *Aṅgulimālasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*: “Having slain people repeatedly, he wore a garland of fingers.”⁹⁰ The term *jatva* appears in the same position as P *vadhītvā* and presumably carries a similar sense of “having slain” or “having killed.” Although undoubtedly an absolutive in form, the derivation and the probable Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of *jatva* are uncertain. The term appears four times in the *Dhp*-G^K, twice⁹¹ where the Pali has *hantvā*, and twice⁹² where the Pali has *jhatvā*. The Pali absolutive *jhatvā* or *jhatvāna* appears together in formulaic lists of synonyms with *vadhītvā*⁹³ or in a list of three terms with *vadhītvā* and *hantvā*.⁹⁴ It clearly presented a problem to Pali textual transmitters and commentators, since it has been variously glossed or replaced in

⁸⁸ Text Notes: [34] *na hode br[o]mici[a]vaṣa*.

⁸⁹ In Pali, P *abrahmacariya* occurs alone as a simple karmadhāraya (DN I 4; MN I 179; AN I 211; passim), and in *abrahmacariyavāsa*, as a tatpuruṣa (MN I 514ff.). Thus, it is unlikely that either the prior portion or the compound as a whole functions as a bahuvrīhi in this context. Although it is possible that *dukhaniro[ṣa]* and [*abromi*]ciavaṣa are themselves to be construed in compound with no elision of the final vowel of the prior member, since the meaning of the resulting compound is somewhat contorted, it is more likely that they function as separate nominal compounds. Further, given the openness of Gāndhārī case terminations and this particular syntactic context with a prior genitive (*kaḍamaṣa*), either compound could function as a nominative singular or locative singular ending in *-a*.

⁹⁰ P *so manusse vadhītvā vadhītvā aṅgulīnaṃ mālaṃ dhāredi* (MN II 98). 今王國界有賊名騫掘魔。爲人兇暴。無有慈心。殺於一切眾生。人亡國虛皆由此人。又取人指以爲華鬘 (EĀ 31 no. 6 p. 719b2–5). Cf. SĀ (tr. G) 38 no. 1077 p. 280c18ff.; Th 80–82; Avs I 148.9; DPPN 1.22–23.

⁹¹ Brough 1962: 120 [vv. 12, 13].

⁹² Brough 1962: 164 [vv. 288, 289].

⁹³ Jā IV 57, VI 299.

⁹⁴ Jā II 262.

the Burmese manuscripts with *chetvā* or *jhitvā*.⁹⁵ John Brough attempts to explain the Pali form *jhatvā* as a “dialectical archaism, [which] is in origin the same word as Skt *hatvā*, although possibly reinforced by Skt **kṣatvā* (*kṣan-*).”⁹⁶ This hypothesis is not accepted by Morgenstierne, who does not, however, offer an alternative explanation.⁹⁷ Thus, although its equivalents are problematic, G *jatva*, like P *vadhivā* and *hantvā*, presumably conveys the sense of “having slain” or “having killed.”

Just below the syllable read as *n[u]* are several ink spots, of which at least one is on a separate chip. Together, they do not form the typical rounded shape of the *u*-vowel diacritic, although the context clearly suggests the reading *nu*. The resulting formulaic phrase *ki n[u] khu* is regularly used to introduce a rhetorical question, which in this case raises a contradiction between the case of Aṅgulimāla and the opponent’s position concerning the status of future factors as subject to arising. A similar construction appears in lines 47–48, where a rhetorical question, also beginning with P *ki nu khu*, follows an explicitly acknowledged citation from scripture. This similarity in construction further supports the possibility that the reference to Aṅgulimāla in line 41 represents a scriptural citation or paraphrase.

[42] [*tas*]^{51H(r)+51ttt(r)}[*mi*]: Since the initial black-and-white photograph, considerable deterioration has occurred along the bottom and right edges of fragment 51H. The initial black-and-white photograph of the verso of manuscript part 51(v) indicates the location of certain of these chips (51www, 51xxx), but others are too small or have become too fragmented to be repositioned (fig. 8; plts. 6, 9). In the initial black-and-white photograph, the beginning of line 42 is preserved with the first syllable *ta* and the upper portion of the next syllable *smi* in their original positions. The presence of visible ink on both the recto and verso surfaces of chips 51sss and 51ttt, which are found at the lower right corner of the manuscript, suggests that their original location was not along the lower edge of fragment 51H, since in this location at the glue-line juncture with fragment 52A, they would have been blank on the recto. Instead, these chips should be placed along the deteriorated right margin, possibly at the beginning of line 42. The curved stroke as well as the bark striations and color of chip 51ttt(r) suggest that it contains the lower curve of *smi* in [*tasmi*]. The original location of chip 51sss has not been determined (plt. 6).

[43] + + /// ^{52A(r)?} ? ^{52A(r)+52j(r)}*ma* ^{52A(r)}*aśa na upaḍadhama yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka tatra jadi u* [44] + + + + /// ? ? ? [*a*].*va[śa nahi] tena gatava [nera]a di •*: The first legible syllable *a* in line 43 is preceded by sufficient space for five or possibly six syllables. In the initial black-and-white photograph, chips 52i and 52j precede *a* within this space, but it is possible that they migrated to this location from elsewhere in the manuscript. Even though chip 52i contains too little ink to permit a reading, chip 52j preserves what appear to be the two arms of the syllable *ma*, immediately preceding the syllables *aśa*. This would support the reconstruction (**upaḍadha*)*ma* for these first five syllables in line 43, which is supported by context and parallelism with a similar construction in line 48.

Between *upaḍa* and *dhamo* of the compound *upaḍadhamo* following *yidi* is a blank space of approximately two syllables likely resulting from an area of uneven surface bark that the scribe

⁹⁵ SN I 41; Spk I 96. Cf. SN I 19, 161; Nett 145.

⁹⁶ Brough 1962: 265–266, nn. 288, 289.

⁹⁷ Morgenstierne 1964: 180.

avoided. A similar blank space appears in the same location in lines 44–45. The bark surface at the beginning of line 44 is cracked and partially delaminated due to stress caused by the glue-line juncture between manuscript parts 51 and 52. The reconstruction of the sentence spanning lines 43–44 is hindered by three problems: (1) the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents and the probable sense of *jadi* in line 43; (2) the uncertain reconstruction of the beginning of line 44; and (3) the function of *tena* in line 44. Especially in the context of this discussion of rebirth, P/Skt *jāti*, “birth,” seems a reasonable equivalent for *jadi*, but it might also be possible to construe *jadi* as representing the adverb P/Skt *jātu*: “it will not be possible **at all** ...” (*na ... śaka ... jad⟨*u⟩ ...*). However, *i* in place of original *u* is not one of the typical Gāndhārī alternation patterns for word-final vowels (cf. *jadā* for P/Skt *jātu*, l. 123). The initial, partially legible syllables [*a*].*va*[*śa nahi*] in line 44 could have been preceded by as many as six syllables in the original manuscript, but only the faint illegible remnants of three syllables can be discerned. The indeclinable *śaka* (Skt *śakyā*) at the end of line 43 would be expected to govern an infinitive and thus provides a clue for the reconstruction of at least a portion of the beginning of line 44.⁹⁸ The context of rebirth and presence of the initial *u* at the end of line 43 suggest the infinitive of *ut* + \sqrt{pad} or possibly *upa* + \sqrt{pad} . Both Pali and Sanskrit sources attest to forms of *upa* + \sqrt{pad} in the special sense “to be reborn” used with a locative or an indeclinable of locative sense, in this sentence possibly represented by *tatra*. However, given this specialized usage of *upa* + \sqrt{pad} as “to be reborn,” the prior term *jadi* would appear redundant as its agent and unlikely as its object. Hence, if P/Skt *jāti* is accepted as the equivalent for *jadi*, the infinitive of *ut* + \sqrt{pad} would be more likely. Unfortunately, Pali sources do not provide corroboration for either reconstruction, since they contain no examples of *jāti* with either *upa* + \sqrt{pad} or *ut* + \sqrt{pad} . Together with the indeclinable *śaka*, the proposed infinite *upadido* from the intransitive verb *ut* + \sqrt{pad} would have the sense “to arise.” However, the reconstruction (**padido* •) would account for only four of the possible seven missing syllables at the beginning of line 44. Finally, although the referent of *tena* in line 43 is not specified, the context of rebirth and the narrative of Aṅgulimāla suggest that it probably refers to that action (*kama*, P *kamma*, Skt *karman*) through which or due to which one is reborn. Thus, in the absence of any parallel, the following very tentative interpretation for this sentence spanning lines 43 and 44 has been adopted: “If it is a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (*to arise) there by means of that [action] ... for hell inevitably should not be reached by him” (*yidi upaḍadhamo na tena śaka tatra jadi u(*padido) ? ? ? (*a)vaśa nahi tena gatava neraa di •*, ll. 43–44).

[44] *aśa upaḍa[dh].mo [•]* [45] ^{|52k(r)}[*t*].^[n]. [*n*]. ^{|52k(r)+52A(r)}*bra*^{|52A(r)}*micivaśa •*: The upper portions of [*dh*]. and *mo* in *upaḍa[dh].mo* are lost in a horizontal hole between lines 43 and 44. A dot of ink just above a crack following *mo* has been interpreted as a punctuation mark, but there is no evidence of additional syllables in the line. At the time of the initial black-and-white photograph, chip 52k was located at the beginning of line 45 (plts. 7, 8); the partial ink strokes preserved on chip 52k(r) would support reading three syllables preceding *brami* as [*t*].^[n]. [*n*]., which suggests that *bramiciavaśa* is negated: “... then [there is] no life of religious practice” (*t(*e)-n(*a) n(*a) bramiciavaśa •*, l. 45). The lower diagonal stroke of *va* in *bramiciavaśa* extends across the bottom of the following *śa*.

⁹⁸ Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] + /// ^{|51D(r)}[*ś*].^[k]. *ca u[pa]ḍadhamā anu[pa]ḍadhamā kato •*.

II.6.2.10. ll. 45–51

Manuscript Notes: ll. 45–51

A crack that begins at the right edge of the manuscript bisects and shortens the syllables in the initial portion of line 48 and widens into a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A, obscuring the final quarter of line 47. These segments of fragment 52A can be realigned by shifting the lower segment approximately one syllable to the left (plt. 7; verso l. 98). Line 49 contains only thirteen syllables, presumably as a result of the scribe's attempt to avoid a glue-line juncture, which extends upward as it progresses through the middle portion of the manuscript and then downward toward the left edge. The stress at the corresponding glue-line juncture on the verso resulted in a crack below line 51 (corresponding to verso l. 95), which begins at the right edge of the manuscript, widens to a separation at the midpoint of the line, and terminates at the left edge of the manuscript. Within the separation in the middle of line 51, a long horizontal piece of bark (52r) has become folded over from the verso showing portions of several syllables in lines 94–95.

ll. 45–51

Transcribed text

45. *ahadi yidi samagri latsadi upadiṣadi di tena k.[r].-*

46. ^[52n(r)][n].^[52A(r)][na] upaḍadhama di • vatava tena d[e] yadi samagri latsadi tena ka[r].-
[n]. [u]paḍadhama di

47. ^[52m(r)]vata^[52A(r)]va • vatava ca bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśa[lana dha]-
mana unupaḍa

48. + /// [s].[mepr].[s].[na bhavedi] • k[i n]u khu te pav[e] akuśaladhama upaḍadhama
aśa na upaḍadhama [•]

49. [yi]di anupaḍadhama nirartha śame

50. + ///[s].na bhavedi • aśa upaḍadhama [ta] ca anupaḍadhama karodi hina pradiña

51. + + ///[da]dhama avaśa upajadi di •

Reconstruction

(4) [45] *ahadi yidi samagri latsadi upa<*j>iṣadi di tena k(*a)r(*a)[46]n(*e)na upaḍadhama
di • vatava tena de yadi samagri latsadi tena kar(*a)<*ne>n(*a) upaḍadhama di [47]
vatava •*

(5) [47] *vatava ca bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuśalana dhamana <*a>-
nupaḍa[48](*e) s(*a)mepr(*a)s(*a)na bhavedi • ki nu khu te pave akuśaladhama
upaḍadhama aśa na upaḍadhama • [49] yidi anupaḍadhama nirartha śame[50](*pra)-
s(*a)na bhavedi • aśa upaḍadhama ta ca anupaḍadhama karodi hina pradiña [51] (*upa)-
ḍadhama avaśa upajadi di •*

Translation

(4) [45] One states, [o] “If [a factor] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] and reaches the point of arising, for that reason [46] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.” [p] It should be said that, as a result of that, if [a factor merely]

obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions], for that reason [alone] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.

(5) [47] And it should be said that the Bhagavat states, “One cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen.” [48] Now how possibly are those evil unvirtuous factors either factors subject to arising, or else factors not subject to arising? [49] If they are factors not subject to arising, one cultivates right exertion without purpose. [50] Or else, [if] they are factors subject to arising and thereafter act as factors not subject to arising, the [previous] proposition is worsted: [51] [namely, that] “A factor subject to arising inevitably arises.”

Text Notes: ll. 45–51

[45] *yidi samagri latsadi upadiṣadi di*: As in lines 43–44, there is a blank space of approximately one syllable between the syllables *la* and *tsa*, presumably resulting from rough surface bark. The conjunct character read as *tsa* appears also in line 46 and is formed at the top by the character *t-* and at the bottom by *sa*, whose stem descends from the midpoint and is marked at the bottom by a foot mark.⁹⁹ The third-person singular future form *latsadi* is unique as the only non-*seṭ* future form in our text. Both the context and the clear future form *latsadi* suggest that *upadiṣadi* is a third-person future form of the root *pad*, even though it differs in its retroflex sibilant from the future form *upajiṣadi* found elsewhere in this manuscript (ll. 40, 65). Both *iṣa* and *iśa* are attested as the future markers both in this manuscript and elsewhere in Gāndhārī: *nivartiṣadi*, ll. 32–33; *nivartiṣadi*, l. 34.¹⁰⁰ However, the form *upadiṣadi* with *di* instead of *ji* is unexpected (ll. 40, 64, 65). It might be explained as resulting from attraction to the following *di* or perhaps from an unclear or damaged *ji* in the manuscript archetype. The latter explanation would imply that the scribe was copying from another written manuscript, rather than writing from memory or taking down oral recitation.¹⁰¹

As future verb forms, both *latsadi* and *upadiṣadi* might be expected to be translated with the simple future as “will obtain” and “will arise.” However, used here following the conditional particle “if,” they refer to the point in the future at which factors come together with, or “obtain,” the causes necessary for their arising and hence “reach the point of arising.” Thus, *latsadi* and *upadiṣadi* have been translated here using the present tense, much like the use of the English present tense for future actions after certain conjunctions such as “when.”

The verb *upadiṣadi* is followed by the single syllable *di*, which might be assumed to function as the quotative particle concluding the opponent’s statement. However, the opponent’s statement continues to the middle of line 46, where it is clearly terminated with the quotative particle. As a result, this *di* concluding the conditional clause in line 45 would not be expected to signal the end of the opponent’s statement but could perhaps be explained as the result of dittography or as anticipating the subsequent quotative particle that concludes the statement in line 45.

⁹⁹ See Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.3.3 *tsa*.

¹⁰⁰ Burrow 1937: 45–46 [§ 99]; Allon 2001: 117 [§ 6.3.4]; Salomon 2008: 152–153 [§ II.4.5.4].

¹⁰¹ For other textual problems that might indicate difficulty in reading a written archetype, see Text Notes: [55] *yena [sa] kama[do p].[d]. [jana]*; [56] *pa[cam]. jana samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di •*; [77] *yasa yi adidaṣa adi[78] + + + /// [52E(v)] [bha]va astitvabhiniṣana parinipanaṣaḥadāe •*; [123] *yidi aha trayaatva va a[thi]ta di*; [127] *japoṃ asti nasti [tra]je japo di •*; 51D(v) [3] *eva anagaḍa [ye]sti • adida va[ṣ].ga asti d[i]*.

[45] *tena k.[r].*[46]^{52n(r)}*[n].*^{52A(r)}*[na] upaḍadhama di •*: A long chip (52l), marked by the lower tips of two syllables and as yet unplaced, covers the lower portions of the final three syllables in line 45. The initial black-and-white photograph suggests that chip 52n(r), located just beyond the right edge of the manuscript, should be rotated counterclockwise and moved slightly downward into the beginning of line 46, yielding the reading *n.* for the initial syllable in line 46 (plt. 7).

[46] *tena d[e]*: The syllables *na* and *d[e]* are written so close together that they appear to be a single syllable, but both the vertical alignment of the base character *d-* and the slight movement of its lower tip toward the right, which is clearer in the infrared image, support the reading *d[e]*. Although the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of an independent indeclinable element *de* are unclear, the regular function of the ending *-do/-da/-de* to signal the ablative in Gāndhārī suggests that *de* may carry the ablative sense of reason when used in conjunction with other oblique or indeclinable forms.¹⁰²

[46] *ka[r].*[*n.*] [*u*]*paḍadhama*: The syllables between *ka* and *pa* are severely abraded and illegible. Even though both parallelism with the previous sentence and context suggest the reconstruction *ka[ranena u]paḍadhama*, the abraded area allows the reconstruction of at most three syllables. The remaining ink supports the reading of a full *u* vowel prior to *paḍadhama*, preceded by the remnants of two syllables. The first of these syllables, represented by the upper left portion of a faint horizontal stroke, would support the reading *ra*. Since the next syllable contains no evidence of an *e*-vowel, the reconstruction adopted assumes that it corresponds to the final *n(*a)*, prior to which the penultimate syllable ⟨**ne*⟩ was omitted.

[47] ^{52m(r)}*vata*^{52A(r)}*va •*: The initial black-and-white photograph of manuscript part 52(r) indicates that chip 52m(r), containing remnants of *vata*, was originally located on the right edge of the manuscript at the beginning of line 47 (plt. 7). *Vatava* concluding the preceding sentence at the beginning of line 47 seems redundant given its use in line 46 at the beginning of that same sentence. *Vatava* is regularly used in our text in clause- or sentence-initial position, especially when introducing the apodosis in a conditional construction. Hence, *vatava* would be expected at the beginning of the apodosis in line 46 but not concluding the sentence at the beginning of line 47. As a result, it is possible that this sentence-ending *vatava* at the beginning of line 47 is the result of dittography, perhaps anticipating *vatava* that begins the following sentence, and this interpretation has been tentatively adopted in the translation.

[47] *bhagavaḍa ahadi anupanana pavagana akuṣa[lana dha]mana unupaḍa* [48] + /// [*s*].- [*mepr*]. [*s*]. [*na bhavedi*] •: The syllable read as *va* in *pavagana* resembles the character *ṭha* but could also be understood as a correction, that is, as *va* written over the mistaken beginning of the next syllable *ga*. The probable parallel for the initial portion of this citation confirms the reading *pavagana*. Beginning with *ku* in *akuṣa[lana]*, all remaining syllables in line 47 are bisected by a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A. A crack also bisects and shortens the syllables in the first half of line 48 and eventually extends upward to merge into the separation that obscures the last quarter of line 47. Both the syllables in line 47 and the syllables at the beginning of line 48 can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of fragment 52A approximately one syllable to the left (plt. 7).

¹⁰² Text Notes: [4] [*ta*]*ṣa* [*de so*]*palo di*; [12] *yadi ta asti t[e]na de pracupanavivaga nivartadi*.

The reconstruction of the end of line 47 and the beginning of line 48 is reasonably secure given the remaining upper and lower portions of the initial syllables and the repetition of a similar clause in lines 49–50. It is also aided by the syntax of the probable scriptural passage cited in lines 47–48. Although a parallel for the citation as a whole has not been identified, the syntax of the initial portion clearly resembles certain scriptural passages concerning the four right exertions (P *padhāna*, Skt *pradhāna*). These passages follow various patterns, some enumerating and describing each of the four exertions separately, others providing a general description of the four exertions as a group without connecting each particular exertion to an expanded descriptive phrase.¹⁰³ The first part of the citation in this passage contains a formula that appears frequently in descriptions of the four right exertions: “For the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen ... one undertakes exertion ...” (P *anuppannānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ anuppādāya ... padahati ...*). It is found in general descriptions of the four right exertions as a group¹⁰⁴ as well as in the definitions of the exertion of restraint (P/Skt *saṃvara*)¹⁰⁵ and the exertion of abandoning (P *pahāna*, Skt *prahāna*).¹⁰⁶ These parallels clearly indicate that *unupaḍa* in this passage should be read as ⟨*a⟩*nupaḍa* and suggest that ⟨*a⟩*nupaḍa* should be construed as a dative. The dative singular masculine ending in Gāndhārī is regularly *-ae*. It is possible that the final *-e* was recorded as the initial missing syllable in line 48, which would yield the adopted reconstruction *anupaḍa(*e)*. However, it is also possible that the dative here ends simply in *-a*, reflecting the weak pronunciation of vowels in final position or the omission of the *e* ending.¹⁰⁷ In this latter case, the initial syllable in line 48 would remain unreconstructed. The concluding portion of the Gāndhārī scriptural citation, ... *samepraṣana bhavedi*, does not find a parallel in these scriptural formulae describing the right exertions, but it does appear in statements introducing these formulae or in generic descriptions of the exertions.¹⁰⁸ Passages in the Paṭisambhidāmagga contain both the introductory statements describing the particular exertions and the term P *sammappadhāne*, as, for example, “... right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen.”¹⁰⁹ Passages containing P *sammappadhāne/am* used with the causative verb P *bhāveti* also occur.¹¹⁰

[48] *k[i n]u khu te pav[e]*: The upper portions of *k[i n]u khu* are obscured in the crack that extends across the width of the manuscript in line 47. The apparent horizontal line at the top of the *[n]u* is actually on a miniscule separate chip. The *e*-vowel diacritic in *pav[e]* is uncertain, appearing as a shortened stroke at an atypical angle close to the vertical stroke of the base character

¹⁰³ For a detailed discussion and comparison of citations, see Allon 2001: 244–253 [§ 10.1].

¹⁰⁴ DN III 221ff.; MN II 11; SN V 244–245; AN II 15, 16–17, 74; Vibh 208; SĀ (tr. G) 31 nos. 875–879 p. 221a9–221c8; DĀ 8 no. 9 p. 50c13–16; EĀ 18 nos. 1–4 pp. 635b11–636a5. Cf. Allon 2001: 7–8 [§ 1.2], 244–249 [§ 10.1.2].

¹⁰⁵ AN II 74; SĀ (tr. G) 31 no. 877 p. 221a27–28, 31 no. 878 p. 221b8–9, 31.

¹⁰⁶ SĀ (tr. G) 31 no. 879 p. 221b20–21. Cf. AN II 15, where each of the four exertions is defined, but without the phrase cited in this passage of the Gāndhārī text.

¹⁰⁷ Lenz 2003: 49 [§ 5.1.1.2].

¹⁰⁸ MN II 11; SN V 245.

¹⁰⁹ P *anuppannānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ anuppādāya sammappadhāne ...* (Paṭis II 15–17). Cf. Paṭis-a III 541.

¹¹⁰ SN V 246; Dhs 73. Cf. Paṭis-a I 170.

v-. Given the use of plural masculine forms in the previous scriptural citation, a nominative plural masculine form would be expected here as well. Even though nominative plural masculine forms ending in *-a* are typical for Gāndhārī,¹¹¹ forms in *-e* are also attested.¹¹²

[49] *[yi]di anupaḍadhama nirartha same[50] + ///[s].na*: This partial *[yi]* is likely the first syllable in line 49, since in the corresponding line 97 on the verso, the context confirms that the first syllable is preserved. The interference of the glue-line juncture immediately below the beginning of line 49 presumably accounts for the shortened line 49, which contains only thirteen syllables. Below *nu* and immediately above and partially covered by the glue-line juncture is ink without any obvious purpose that resembles the upper portion of the character *kṣa*. Since this ink cannot be understood as an interlinear insertion correcting some omitted syllable either at the beginning of line 50 on the recto or line 97 on the verso, its original location is uncertain. The middle portion of the first visible syllable in line 50 is obscured by the unplaced chip 52o, which contains only one dot of ink. However, the upper left portion of this obscured syllable appears at the right edge of the manuscript, and a dot of ink from the lower portion remains below chip 52o, which suggests a relatively long letter supporting the reading *[s]*..

[50] *anupaḍadhama*: A blank space of approximately one syllable was left between *nu* and *pa*, probably due to the uneven bark surface also observed in lines 43–45 and 51.

[51] + + ///[da]dhama avaśa upajadi di: Chip 52p, marked by a diagonal stroke of ink and as yet unplaced, partially covers the left portion of *[da]* at the beginning of line 51, which as a result resembles an extremely narrow *ñā*. An irregularity of the bark surface accounts for the space of approximately one syllable between *u* and *pa* of *upajadi*. Beginning below *ja* and extending for approximately thirteen syllables is a separation in the crack immediately below line 51. Within this separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A, a horizontal piece of bark (52r) has become folded over from the verso. Fragment 52r contains a punctuation mark and a blank area of approximately six syllables followed by a possible anusvāra from the syllable *ra[m]* in line 94, as well as the upper portions of *[cakhāid]*., which can be realigned with the lower portions of these syllables in line 95. The blank space between the punctuation mark and the upper portions of these syllables also conforms to the blank space also found in the middle of line 95 (plt. 8).

II.6.2.11. ll. 51–61

Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61

Manuscript part 52 is marked by regular horizontal cracks and, in certain places, separations between horizontal strips. The strips decrease slightly in height as they approach the inside of the scroll (plts. 2, 3). This pattern of breaking into horizontal strips, typical of most of the scrolls in the British Library collection, resulted from the compression of the scroll during its long period of storage in the clay pot.¹¹³ Beginning immediately below line 51, a crack extends across the width of the manuscript and virtually obliterates the first twelve syllables in line 52 (corresponding to

¹¹¹ Salomon 2000: 97 [§ I.7.1.1.1.5]; Allon 2001: 110 [§ 6.1.1.1.5]; Glass 2007: 128 [§ 6.1.1.1.7]; Salomon 2008: 133 [§ II.4.1.1].

¹¹² Lenz 2003: 137 [§ 10.1.1.1.5]; Burrow 1937: 22 [§ 52].

¹¹³ Salomon 1999: 104–106 [§ 5.3.3].

verso ll. 94–95). In the middle of line 51, this crack widens to a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A, but the bisected syllables can be realigned by shifting the lower segment approximately half a syllable to the left. At the lower edge of this separation, a long horizontal piece of bark (52r) has become folded over, revealing a punctuation mark, a blank space, the lower portion of a syllable from line 94, and the upper portions of syllables from line 95. This separation widens to a triangular hole at the end of line 51, which obliterates the final five syllables in the line. Another crack extends across the width of the manuscript immediately under line 55, where it obscures syllables in the middle of line 55 and bisects the syllables in line 54 from its midpoint to the left edge of the manuscript.

From line 58 on the recto (corresponding to verso l. 89 and preceding), the horizontal strips in manuscript 52 have become separated and are not conserved in their original order. This is indicated first by the fact that lines of text bisected by the cracks between strips cannot be realigned, and secondly by the lighter color of the bark of strip 52B(v), which is typical of the lighter bark of the recto. The disordering of these horizontal strips can be explained through the following hypothetical conservation process. Fragment 52A comprises four horizontal pieces of bark, which, during the regular process of turning the scroll over as the scrolls were unrolled in conservation, remained connected and in their correct order and orientation recto to verso. At this point, the separate strip 52B was eased down toward fragment 52A, but it became oriented incorrectly, with the recto surface down and the verso surface up. Strips 52C and 52D were then unrolled with the correct orientation through the regular process of turning the scroll over. Next, strips 52E and 52F were placed down together and strip 52E, which was on top, was moved upward toward strip 52D. Finally, strips 52G and 52H were unrolled in their proper order through the regular process of turning the scroll over. As a result of this rather complicated process, manuscript part 52 was conserved with strip 52B turned over recto to verso, and strips 52C and 52F out of order. Despite this disordering, the original orientation and order of the horizontal strips can be established both by context and by the realignment of syllables bisected by the cracks between the various strips. The correct original order of the strips on the recto, from top to bottom, is as follows: 52A(r), 52C(r), 52B(v), 52F(r), 52D(r), 52E(r), 52G(r), and 52H(r) (plt. 7).

Approximately the first half of line 58 is on the upper segment of fragment 52A(r). The middle portion of line 58 straddles fragment 52A(r) and strip 52C(r) and the final portion of the line is wholly on strip 52C(r); hence, it is clear that strip 52A is contiguous with 52C. The final line (61) on strip 52C(r) slants downward, extending at its midpoint beyond the lower edge of the strip. The upper portions of the final two syllables *gena* visible at the midpoint in line 61 on strip 52C(r) cannot be realigned with the lower portions of syllables that appear at the upper edge of any of the strips preserved on the recto of manuscript part 52. However, they can be realigned with the lower portions of two syllables that appear in the middle of the upper edge of strip 52B as conserved on the verso of manuscript part 52. Further, numerous partial syllables at the lower edge of the verso of strip 52F (l. 83) can be realigned with their lower portions on the upper edge of the recto of strip 52B. Therefore, these bisected syllables on both the recto and the verso of strips 52B and 52F prove that strip 52B was turned over in the process of conservation and must be turned back recto to verso for the correct reconstruction. The fact that strip 52B was turned over is further confirmed by the context on both the recto (ll. 61–64) and the verso (ll. 83–86). The line numbering adopted

in both the text edition and reconstruction corresponds to the reconstructed manuscript, in which the horizontal strips have been reordered and, in the case of strip 52B, returned to its correct recto-to-verso orientation.

At its midpoint, line 61 extends below the lower edge of fragment 52C(r), and the contiguous upper edge of 52B(v) contains the lower portions of approximately seven syllables also found on 52C(r). However, no ink from any additional syllables in line 61 is preserved at the top edge of strip 52B(v). Although line 61 may have originally contained approximately fifteen to seventeen syllables beyond the final legible syllables at the lower edge of 52C(r) and top of 52B(v), it is equally possible that line 61 was shorter than the surrounding lines. An apparent glue-line juncture visible near the upper edge of strip 52B(v) suggests the scribe may have left the remainder of line 61 blank in order to avoid this glue-line juncture.

ll. 51–61

Transcribed text

51. [a].[h].su [kaḍa]mado kama[d]. vi[v].[g]. /// + + + +
 52. + ///[s]. [p]r.. u[pan].[do] + ? ? ? + + + [pr].[cup].naḍa v[i]vaga nivartadi tena [de] kaḡgam=eva śi-
 53. [la] ṣaḡhaiṅnaḡhiḍa • ta puna kama maranaṣa niruḡjadi aṣa na nirujadi di yidi niruja
 54. + + /// diḍado nivartadi di • aṣa na nirujadi sa kata bh.di tasa kamaṣa • ya[di] p[un]. [t].[s].
 55. (///) vivaga [ni]vartadi • yena [sa] kama[do p].[ḍ]. [jana] sa[ma]varjadi • ki so tasa nirudha ani
 56. + + /// di anirudha sutraviroṣa pa[cam]. jana samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di • aṣa adida[s].
 57. + + /// ? vivaga nivartadi di ki so kama sapala • aṣa apalo di • yi[di a].[h].[di sapal]o [•]
 58. + + /// vatava kadha nasti na palena [sapal]. [yidi] |^{52A(r)+52C(r)}[ca] nasti |^{52C(r)}na palena sapalo tena nasti na putrena
 59. + /// |^{52bb}[n].|^{52C(r)}[g]o • yidi ca so kama ṣapala ṣavivaga nanu de so kama sapala savivaga niru ?
 60. + /// |^{52bb+52C(r)}[d]. |^{52C(r)}vatava yaṣa hema ta sapala [he]m[u]kḡkṣa dajadi na ca [ta] sadha palena dajadi • e[va s].[p].
 61. + /// [so] kama nirudha • nanu [e] sadha |^{52C(r)+52z(v)+52B(v)}vivagena ? + ? (///)

Reconstruction

(8) [51] (*a)h(*a)su kaḍamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)g(*a) adidado [52] (*a)ṣ(*a) pr(*ac)-upan(*a)do (*nivartadi di • yidi) pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi tena de kaḡgam eva śi[53]la ṣaḡhaiṅnaḡhiḍa • ta puna kama maranaṣa niruḡjadi aṣa na nirujadi di yidi niruja[54](*di a)diḍado nivartadi di • aṣa na nirujadi sa kata bh(*o)di tasa kamaṣa • yadi pun(*a) t(*a)s(*a) [55] vivaga nivartadi • yena sa kamado p(*a)d(*a)ḡ*maḡ jana samavarjadi • ki so tasa nirudha ani[56](*rudha) di anirudha sutraviroṣa pa(*ḍ)am(*a) jana samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di • aṣa adidaṣ(*a) [57] (*kamaṣa) vivaga nivartadi di ki so kama sapala • aṣa apalo di • yidi (*a)h(*a)di sapalo • [58] (*tatra) vatava kadha nasti

*na palena sapal(*a) yidi ca nasti na palena sapalo tena nasti na putrena [59] (*ja)n(*a)-go • yidi ca so kama śapala śavivaga nanu de so kama sapala savivaga niru[60](*)ja)d(*i)vatava yaśa hema ta sapala hemukhḥṣa dajadi na ca ta sadha palena dajadi • eva s(*a)-p(*a)[61](*)la so kama nirudha • nanu <*d>e sadha vivagena (*nirudha) ...*

Translation

(8) [51] They state, [O] “From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from past action), [52] or else from present [action]?” [P] (*If) the matured effect occurs from present [action], as a result of that, [with regard to] that very corporeal moral conduct [53] that is stationed in the sixth sense sphere, now does that action cease after death, or else does it not cease? If it ceases, [54] [then the matured effect] occurs from past [action]. Or else, [if that present corporeal moral conduct] does not cease, there is an agent of that action. Further, if the matured effect of that [present action] [55] occurs, when one gains the first trance state after [that] action, has then [the present action] of that one ceased, [56] [or] not ceased? [If that present action] has not ceased, there is a contradiction of scripture, [which states,] “Speech has ceased for one who has gained the first trance state.” Or else, [if] [57] the matured effect of past (*action) occurs, is then [that past] action possessed of a fruit, or else not possessed of a fruit? If one states, [O] “It is possessed of a fruit,” [58] [P] (*with regard to that) it should be said, “How is it that there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit?” And if there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit, then there exists no father other than through [the existence of] the son. [59] And if that action, which is possessed of a fruit, is [also] possessed of a matured effect, then surely that action, which is possessed of a fruit, ceases together with its matured effect. [60] It should be said that just as that gold [as the cause], being possessed of a fruit, is consumed by fire in a crucible, isn’t it the case that that [cause] is consumed together with [its] fruit? In this way, [when] that action possessed of a fruit [61] has ceased, then surely it has ceased together with its matured effect. ...

Text Notes: ll. 51–61

[51] *[a].[h].su [kaḍa]mado*: The crack that extends across the width of the manuscript below and eventually through line 51 widens to a separation at the punctuation mark preceding *[a].[h].su*. Within this separation, a long horizontal piece of bark (52r) has become folded over from the verso and covers the middle and lower portions of *[a].[h].su [kaḍa]mado*, but the *u*-vowel diacritic in *su* is visible in the infrared image, and the lower portion of *do* is visible below fragment 52r.

[51] *vi[v].[g]. /// + + + + [52] + ///[s]. [p]r. u[pan].[do] + ? ? ? + + [pr].[cup].naḍa*: Only the lower tips of *[v].[g].* are visible below a triangular hole at the end of line 51, and the final four or five syllables in the line are completely lost. Approximately the first fourteen syllables in line 52 are obscured by dislodged chips and delamination resulting from the crack that extends across the width of the manuscript just below line 51. The first three or four of these initial syllables in line 52 are completely obliterated at the deteriorated right margin, but immediately thereafter and below the delaminated area are ink remnants from five syllables that would support the reading *[p]r. u[pan].[do]*. Chip 52q, located within the delaminated area, may preserve the upper portion

of the character *p.*, which could be combined with either of the syllables read as *p.* in *[p]r. u[pan]. [do]*. The final syllable is read as *[do]* on the basis of the remaining lower tip of the base character *d-* and the probable lower portion of the *o*-vowel diacritic.

The reconstruction of the final portion of line 51 and the beginning of line 52 is entirely speculative and is based on both the logic of the argument presented in this passage and parallelism with other similar passages in the text. Particularly problematic are the reading and placement of chip 52s, which partially covers the first three syllables of the phrase *[pr].[cup].naḍa* and the preceding one or two syllables in line 52 (plt. 7). Chip 52s is obscured by several smaller overlying blank chips and contains a vertical crack at the syllable that resembles *ro*, with the left portion of the chip overlapping the right. It is thus possible either that chip 52s was originally a single chip, or that it is a composite containing two distinct chips with different original locations. Among the five to eight partial syllables preserved on chip 52s, none can be read with any confidence, nor can any be realigned with the ink spots visible below the delaminated area at the beginning of line 52. However, it is possible that these ink spots are on separate chips or layers of bark, and that chip 52s was originally located at the beginning of line 52. Since both the reading and the original placement of chip 52s are uncertain, it has not been used in the suggested reconstruction of this passage.

Despite these problems with chip placement, the reconstruction of the sentence spanning lines 51–52 is aided by parallelism with other passages in the text and by the typical argument patterns that the proponent employs. The initial legible phrase *(*a)h(*a)su kadamado kamad(*a) viv(*a)-g(*a)* resembles a statement in line 21 in which the proponent inquires about the time period of the action from which the matured effect occurs: “It should be asked, ‘From which action does the matured effect occur?’” (*prochidava kaḍamaḍa kamaḍa vivaga nivartadi* •, l. 21). Parallelism with this passage suggests that the verb *nivartadi* might also have been included in this initial question in lines 51–52. Further, the proponent once again uses the typical argument pattern consisting of two mutually exclusive logically complementary or simple contrasting alternatives: in this case, the occurrence of the matured effect from either present action or past action. The second of these two alternatives, that of the occurrence of matured effects from past action, is clearly presented in lines 56–57: “Or else, [if] the matured effect of past (*action) occurs, ...” (*aṣa adiḍaṣ(*a) kamaṣa vivaga nivartadi di*, ll. 56–57). The other alternative, namely, the occurrence of the matured effect from present action, appears to be raised in line 52: “... the matured effect occurs from present [action], ...” (*pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi*, l. 52). Immediately afterward, in line 52, the proponent offers an untoward consequence beginning with *tena de*, for which a preceding conditional clause is expected. Hence, the first alternative concerning present action offered in line 52 would be expected to begin with the indeclinable conditional particle *yidi*: “(*If) the matured effect occurs from present [action]” (*(*yidi) pr(*a)cup(*a)naḍa vivaga nivartadi*, l. 52). At the beginning of line 52, prior to this first alternative, is another *[p]r. u[pan]. [do]*, which presumably belongs to the initial question, specifically citing this first alternative of present action. The initial question would also be expected to include the other alternative of past action as well as the particle *aṣa* marking the contrast between the two alternatives. Thus, the suggested reconstruction includes the alternative of past action (*(*adiḍado)*) at the end of line 51, followed by *(*a)ṣ(*a)* in the two-syllable space at the beginning of line 52. The verb *(*nivartadi)* is then inserted following *pr(*ac)-upan(*a)do* in the remaining four-syllable space at the end of the initial question and prior to

the reconstructed indeclinable conditional particle (*yidi) in the middle of line 52. Hence, the final suggested reconstruction reads: “They state, [O] ‘From which action does the matured effect (*occur: from past action) or else from present [action]?’” (*a)h(*a)su kadamado kamad(*a)viv(*a)g(*a)adiḍado *a)ḡ(*a)pr(*ac)upan(*a)do (*nivartadi di •), ll. 51–52).

[52] *kaḡgam=eva śi*[53][*la*] *ṣaḡhaināḡhiḍa* •: In *kaḡgam eva* (P *kāyikaḡ eva*, Skt *kāyikam eva*), the nominative singular neuter ending *-am* is preserved prior to the following particle *eva*. This preservation of an original nasal prior to *eva* is also observed in *adiḍam eva* (l. 76) and in *pracupanam eva* (l. 77).

This passage presents a number of problems in both reading and interpretation. Given the similarity between the characters *śa* and *ya*, the correct reading of the final syllable in line 52 can be determined only from context. Delamination has destroyed the right portion of the first visible syllable in line 53, and comparison with the following line 54 suggests that there may have been another obliterated syllable at the beginning of line 53 preceding this partial syllable. The term P/Skt *kāyika*, “corporeal,” appears together with P *vācasika* (Skt *vācika*), “verbal,” in frequently cited formulae describing P *sīla* (Skt *śīla*), “moral conduct,” as P *sīlasaḡvara* (Skt *śīlasaḡvara*), “restraint of moral conduct”: “In that case, what is the perfection of moral conduct? The absence of corporeal transgression, the absence of verbal transgression, the absence of corporeal and verbal transgression [together], this is said to be the perfection of moral conduct. The entire restraint of moral conduct is the perfection of moral conduct.”¹¹⁴ The term P/Skt *kāyika* also appears together with P *vācasika* (Skt *vācika*), “verbal,” and often with P *cetasika* (Skt *caitasika*) or P *mānasika* (Skt *mānasa*), “mental,” modifying P *sīla* directly.¹¹⁵ These uses would support construing the final syllable in line 52 as *śi*, that is, as the first syllable of *śīla*; the remaining left portion of the first visible syllable in line 53 would not be inconsistent with the reading *la*. Even though there is sufficient space for another syllable preceding *la* at the beginning of line 53, the reconstruction *kaḡgam eva śi(*la)* has been tentatively adopted.

In *ṣaḡhaināḡhiḍa* near the beginning of line 53, the syllable *ḍa* has presumably been omitted from the intended compound *ṣaḡhaiḡ*ḍa)naḡhiḍa*. In this manuscript, the word *aḡḍana* (P/Skt *āyatana*) is found consistently in compound-final position, usually but not always with the elision of the final vowel of the prior member at the compound juncture: *cakhaḡḍana* (for *cakh(u)-aḡḍana*, ll. 95, 96–97, 99, 116); *ruvaḡḍana* (for *ruv(a)-aḡḍana*, l. 99); *manaḡḍana* (for *man(a)-aḡḍana*, l. 119), but *paraaḡḍana* (in *para-kadha-para-aḡḍana-para-dhadu-yo(a)*, l. 106). However, when appearing independently, the form *ayaḡḍana* is used: *tredaṣa ayaḡḍana* (ll. 85, 89, 92, 117); *ayaḡḍanehi* (l. 117).¹¹⁶

[53] *maranaṣa niruḡḍadi*: The genitive form *maranaṣa* has here been understood as meaning “after death.” Although rare in the case of a simple noun like *marana* that does not explicitly denote time, the genitive rather than the ablative can be used to express the time after which something

¹¹⁴ P *tattha katamā sīlasampadā. yo kāyiko avītikkamo, vācasiko avītikkamo, kāyikavācasiko avītikkamo, ayaḡ vuccati sīlasampadā. sabbopi sīlasaḡvaro sīlasampadā* (Dhs 233). Cf. Pp 25; Vibh 246. For similar definitions of P *soracca* and P *sīlavissuddhi* in terms of P *sīlasaḡvara*, see Dhs 230–233.

¹¹⁵ Peṭ 171–172; Ps III 42.

¹¹⁶ Text Notes: [69] *ye duḡḍaṣa ayaḡḍaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti* •.

occurs.¹¹⁷ The syllable *jā* in *nirujādi*, which is clearly marked with a superscript horizontal line, is expected in rendering MIA *j(j)h-* (Skt *dhy-*), and hence would correspond here to P *nirujjhati* (Skt *nirudhyate*).¹¹⁸ There is, however, no evidence of the superscript stroke in the three other occurrences of *nirujadi* in lines 53–54.

[54] *kata*: A crack that begins below line 55 enters the following line in the middle of *kata*, bisects the remaining syllables in line 54, and extends to the left edge of the manuscript. The word *kata* is interpreted here as an agent noun in the nominative singular masculine with the ending *-a* (Skt *kartā*), which conforms to the declension of nominative singular forms in *-a* of noun stems in *-a*, with nominative singular forms in *-e* and possibly *-u* also occurring.¹¹⁹ However, the declension of *r*-stem agent nouns in Gāndhārī seems to be complicated and inconsistent, at least on the basis of evidence to date.¹²⁰

[54] *p[un]. [t].[s]*. [55] (*///*) *vivaga [ni]vartadi •*: The crack that begins below line 55 bisects the final third of line 54 and causes distortion of the middle and lower portions of *p[un]. [t].[s]* and the complete loss of the upper portions of the final two syllables. As a result, the readings suggested here are highly tentative. Even though the *u*-vowel diacritic is not clearly discernible in *p[u]*, the upward movement toward the left at the bottom of the vertical stroke of the base character *p-*, which would preclude the pseudo-anusvāra occurring frequently with *pa*, *pe*, and *po* in this manuscript, supports the reading *p[u]*. The area prior to *vi* of *vivaga* at the beginning of line 55 is partially covered by an unplaced small chip (52t) containing a single ink stroke and therefore perhaps indicating a preceding syllable. One missing syllable in the corresponding location on the verso at the beginning of line 92 suggests that there may have been an additional syllable at the beginning of line 55 as well. However, no such additional syllable has been assumed in the reconstruction. The lower portion of *[ni]* in *[ni]vartadi* is covered by chip 52u, which contains two strokes of ink on the verso but is blank on the recto. Its correct placement is as yet undetermined.

[55] *yena [sa] kama[do p].[d]. [jana]*: The crack that begins immediately below line 55 extends upward, bisecting and distorting syllables in the middle of the line. The clearly legible bisected syllables *ka* and *ma* indicate that the lower segment of fragment 52A must be shifted approximately half a syllable to the left in order to realign the syllables spanning the crack. *Kama* is followed by a probable *[do]*, but the next two or possibly three syllables are abraded and their upper portions are completely lost in the crack that passes through the line. A diagonal stroke of ink, which is located on a small piece of surface bark that may have shifted slightly downward from its original location, has been interpreted as the *o*-vowel diacritic in *[do]*, but it may instead have belonged to the next syllable. The lower portion of this next syllable resembles the pseudo-anusvāra typical of *pa*, and remnants from its upper portion are likely found on chip 52v, which is lodged in a hole in the manuscript immediately above its lower portion. The following syllable appears to have been corrected; its lower portion includes both a straight vertical typical of *na*, *ḍa*, *ḍha*, or *ja*, and a rightward curve, which could indicate a *ca* or even the pseudo-anusvāra typical of *pa*.

¹¹⁷ Speijer 1993 [1886]: 95–96 [§ 128].

¹¹⁸ Brough 1962: 59–60 [§ 6], 147 [v. 181].

¹¹⁹ Salomon 2008: 143 [§ II.4.15]; Allon 2001: 178 [comm. II. 15–16].

¹²⁰ Burrow 1937: 29 [§ 72].

The next two syllables [*jana*] are clear, with the superscript diacritic stroke on *j* visible above the following [*na*]. The uncertainty of the immediately prior and possibly corrected syllable yields several possible interpretations for the phrase [*p*].*[d]*./[*c*]./[*dh*]. *jana*. First, the reading [*c*]. suggests the phrase *paca jana*, “five trance states.” This reading would be supported by the fact that this character, as well as a questionable letter in what would appear to be the same phrase in line 56, most closely resemble a *ca*.¹²¹ This set of five trance states (P *pañcājjhāna*, Skt *pañcadhyāna*) could refer to one enumeration of the trance states in the realm of form (P/Skt *rūpadhātu*), which are more commonly enumerated as a set of four. The number five results from dividing the second of the four trance states into two: one free from initial inquiry (P *vitakka*, Skt *vitarka*); and the second, free from both initial inquiry and investigation (P/Skt *vicāra*).¹²² There is, however, no reference to this set of five trance states elsewhere in our text, and given the prevalence of the fourfold method of enumeration, this interpretation seems less likely.

As a second interpretation, again based on the reading [*c*]., the word [*p*].*[c]*. might be interpreted as Skt *paścāt* (P *pacchā*), “after.” The Khotan Dharmapada contains the word *pacha*,¹²³ but the Anavataptaḡāthā (BL AG-G^L)¹²⁴ and both Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions and the Niya documents have the form *paā*.¹²⁵ The letter appearing here in the Gāndhārī manuscript cannot be read as *cha*, but *ca* or *ā* remain possibilities since its upper portion is lost in the crack. The adverb *paca*, “after,” might fit the context here, which concerns the interval between a present action and the occurrence of its matured effect, that is to say, a trance state arises after an action is performed and prevents the subsequent occurrence of its matured effect. However, given this context, the sense of “after” would already be implied by the ablative form *kamado*, even without the separate adverb *paca*.

A third interpretation is suggested by similarity with the phrase *pa[cam]. jana* in line 56, which a parallel suggests should be read *pa<*>am(*a)*. It is possible that the corrected syllable in line 55, initially written as [*c*]., was subsequently corrected to the less common character [*d*]., an error that may have resulted from difficulty in reading the syllable *dha* or *da* in the archetype. The original phrase in line 55 might then have been *paḡa jana*, “first trance state” (P *paḡhamam jhānam*, Skt *prathamam dhyānam*), either as a conceivable but otherwise unattested Gāndhārī equivalent for P *paḡama* (Skt *prathama*) without the suffixed syllable *-ma*, or as the result of the mistaken omission of the syllable *ma* (*paḡa<*> jana*).¹²⁶

Unfortunately, the damaged condition of the manuscript throughout this passage provides no clues as to which of these three interpretations might be correct. However, given the similarity to the phrase in line 56, where the scriptural citation supports the reading *pa<*>am(*a) jana*, and the fact that the determining syllable [*d*]. has been corrected here in line 55, the third interpretation and the reconstruction *paḡa jana* or possibly *paḡa<*> jana* have been tentatively adopted.

¹²¹ Text Notes: [56] *pa[cam]. jana samavanaṡa vaca nirudha di •*.

¹²² Dhs 236ff.; As 179; Vibh 263ff.

¹²³ DhP-G^K vv. 34, 122, 283, 336, 337.

¹²⁴ AG-G^L(r) l. 78 [v. 55a], l. 106 [v. 75a].

¹²⁵ Boyer, et al. 1920–1929: esp. 17, 434, 575; Burrow 1937: 19–21 [§ 49], 41–43 [§ 92].

¹²⁶ Text Notes: [56] *pa[cam]. jana samavanaṡa vaca nirudha di •*. Cf. SaṅCm-G (32r) l. 38; Lenz 2003: 177 [§ 11.2.4].

[55] *sa[ma]varjadi* •: The left side of *ma* is obscured by several small blank chips. The preconsonantal *r* in the syllable *rja* can be used to represent the geminate *-jj-* of the palatalized MIA form for conjuncts with *-y-* as the second member. As a result, *sa[ma]varjadi* here could correspond to P *samāpajjati* (Skt *samāpadyate*). A similar phenomenon can be observed in our text in *vivarjavaḍa* (l. 90), which corresponds to P *vibhajjavāda* (Skt *vibhajyavāda*).¹²⁷ By contrast, in the present form from *ut + √pad* (*upajadi* (ll. 51, 94), P *uppajjati*, Skt *utpadyate*), the Gāndhārī form presents a single *j* with no preconsonantal *r*.

[55] *ki so tasa*: The word *so* has been interpreted here not as a nominative singular masculine or neuter pronominal form modifying the following noun “action” (*kama*), but as an indeclinable particle (P *su*, Skt *svid*) used together with the general interrogative *ki* (P *kim*, Skt *kim*).¹²⁸

[56] + + /// *di*: The length of lines 54 on the recto and line 91 on the verso would suggest that there are at most two syllables missing from the beginning of line 56. The typical argument pattern consisting of two contrasting alternatives and the presence of the past participle *nirudha* suggest the past participle form *ani(*rudha)* as the likely reconstruction for these missing syllables. The lower portion of *di*, the first legible syllable in line 56, is covered by unplaced chip 52w, which preserves the faint remnants of one syllable.

[56] *pa[cam]. jāna samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di* •: The lower portion of the syllable read as *[ca]* is abraded so that only a faint remnant of the lower tip of the vertical stroke remains. A small chip 52x marked with two dots of ink lies just below the upper portion of this *[ca]*, but its original location is uncertain. The remaining upper portion could be read as either *[ca]* or *[ja]*, but the symmetrical spacing of the upward arms more closely resembles *[ca]*. Between *[ca]* and *ja* is one dot of ink, which has been taken to represent the center of the syllable *[m]*., a reading that is given some support by the infrared image. Thus, the tentative reading for this clause is *pa[cam]. jāna samavanaṣa vaca nirudha di*.

Fortunately, this passage records a scriptural citation, which in the Pali parallel contains the ordinal adjective “first” (P *paṭhama*, Skt *prathama*), and not “fifth” (P/Skt *pañcama*): “... speech has ceased for one who has gained the first trance state (P *paṭhamam jhānam*).”¹²⁹ In Gāndhārī, the postconsonantal *r* of *prathama* would most commonly be retained with or without voicing or retroflexion of the inter-vocalic *tha*: hence, *pradhama*¹³⁰; *praṭhama*¹³¹; *praḍhama*¹³²; or *prathama*.¹³³ However, also attested are *paḍhama*,¹³⁴ with the loss of the postconsonantal *r* and retroflexion of

¹²⁷ Text Notes: [27] *saṅa voharovi[va]ga yaṣa ya⟨ṣa⟩* [28] *sa[rja]nadi taṣa taṣa voharadi*; [90] *[ha]ta vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa* •. For the Gāndhārī cluster *-rj-* representing the Pali cluster *-ñj-* (P *sañjānāti*, Skt *sañjānāt*), see *sarjanadi* (l. 28). Cf. Salomon 1999: 122–123 [§ 6.3], 2000: 77–78 [§ I.5.9.4]; Lenz 2003: 63–64 [§ 6.2.8], 152; Salomon 2008: 97 [§ II.2.2.2].

¹²⁸ Text Notes: [57] *ki so*.

¹²⁹ P *paṭhamam jhānam samāpannessa vācā niruddhā hoti* (SN IV 216–217). Cf. Kv 201.

¹³⁰ Brough 1962: 120 [v. 13], 155 [v. 227].

¹³¹ Konow 1929: XX.3.

¹³² Konow 1929: XXVI.1.

¹³³ Boyer et al. 1920–1929: 140, 164, 247, 341.

¹³⁴ Konow 1929: XLV.1; Brough 1962: 142 [v. 144].

the following voiced aspirated consonant, and *paḍama*,¹³⁵ with the loss of the postconsonantal *r* and retroflexion and deaspiration of the following voiced aspirated consonant.¹³⁶ This clear parallel thus raises the possibility of scribal error in *pa[cam]*. *jana* here in line 56, a possibility strengthened by the apparent correction of the syllable *ḍa/ca* in the parallel phrase *[p].[c]. [jana]* in line 55. The fact that the Gāndhārī diverges from the Pali parallel on this single syllable *ca/ṭha* is a tantalizing clue suggesting that the scribe may have had difficulty in reading the archetype and introduced an error in writing *ca* rather than *ḍha/ḍa*. It is possible that the rare character *ḍha* (*paḍhama*) was misread or perhaps even emended to the more common *ca*, or that the more familiar *ḍa* (*paḍama*) was simply misread and assumed to be *ca*. Given the rarity of the aspirated retroflex *ḍha* in Gāndhārī, it is perhaps more likely that the archetype read *paḍama jana*. Thus, the Pali parallel strongly suggests that *pa[cam]. jana* (l. 56) should be emended to either *pa<ḍ>am(*a) jana* or *pa<ḍh>am(*a) jana*.

[56] *aṣa adida[s]*. [57] + + /// ? *vivaga*: Line 56 concludes with a very faint, virtually illegible syllable. It does contain a curved upper portion, an extremely faint curved stroke in the middle, and possibly a horizontal stroke at the bottom, all of which would support the reading *[s]* in *adidaṣ(*a)*. With the preceding indeclinable *aṣa*, “or else,” the proponent begins the second alternative that should be paired with the first alternative given in lines 54–55: “Now if the matured effect of that [present action] occurs, ...” (*yadi pun(*a) t(*a)s(*a) vivaga nivartadi •*, ll. 54–55). This pairing is indicated both by the syntactic parallelism of the two alternatives as well as by the following rhetorical questions introduced by *ki so* (P *kiṃ su*, Skt *kiṃ svid*). Judging from the length of lines 56 and 58, there are two or three missing syllables at the beginning of line 57, but since only one dot of ink remains from the syllable preceding *vivaga*, the reconstruction (**kamaṣa*) is based solely on context and the syntax of the phrase in which it is found.

[57] *ki so*: The syllable *so* here, as in line 55, has been interpreted as an indeclinable particle (P *su*, Skt *svid*) construed with the general interrogative *ki*, rather than as a demonstrative pronoun in the nominative singular neuter modifying the following noun “action” (*kama*).¹³⁷

[57] *yi[di a].[h].[di]*: A blank chip covers the middle portions of both *[di]* in *yi[di]* and the following syllable *[a]*. Beginning from the syllable *yi*, the lower portions of the remaining syllables in line 57 are obscured by the deteriorated surface at the separation between fragment 52A(r) and strip 52B(r), which was turned over recto to verso during the unrolling and conservation process. The exact demarcation between fragment 52A(r) and strip 52B(v) in the manuscript as conserved is difficult to determine, but the middle portions of syllables visible in this deteriorated area can be realigned with syllables here in line 57 and hence belong with fragment 52A(r). The lower portions of syllables within the deteriorated area can be realigned with syllables in line 83 and belong with strip 52B(r).

[58] + + /// *vatava kadha nasti na palena [sapal]. [yidi] |^{52A(r)+52C(r)}[ca] nasti*: The length of the preceding and following lines suggests that two syllables are missing from the beginning of line 58. These two syllables have been reconstructed as (**tatra*) to form the phrase *tatra vatava* used frequently in our text to introduce the apodosis following the protasis, such as at the end of line 57. Even though *vatava* alone without *tatra* does occur once following the protasis *yadi ... di*

¹³⁵ Burrow 1937: 38 [§ 89.1].

¹³⁶ Lenz 2003: 177 [§ 11.2.4]; Baums 2009: 175 [§ 4.2.2.3.7].

¹³⁷ Text Notes: [55] *ki so*.

(ll. 45–46), *tatra vatava* is encountered more often following a protasis, either in the form *yadi ... di* (ll. 10, 21–22, 123, 127–28) or *aha ... di* (l. 143).

The word *kadha* has not been interpreted here as a form of the noun *kadha* (P *khandha*, Skt *skandha*), “aggregate,” attested elsewhere in our text (ll. 89, 91) since it would make little sense in this context. Instead, *kadha* has been construed as the indeclinable interrogative *kadha* (P *katham*, Skt *katham*), even though the expected form would be *kaṣa* given the regular Gāndhārī reflex *-ṣ-* for the intervocalic *-th-*, as found in the frequently occurring indeclinables *aṣa* (P/Skt *atha*), *taṣa* (P/Skt *tathā*), and *yaṣa* (P/Skt *yathā*). However, the forms *adha* (P/Skt *atha*), *tadha* (P/Skt *tathā*), and *yadha* (P/Skt *yathā*) are also attested in Gāndhārī.¹³⁸ Here, the interrogative *kadha* (P *katham*, Skt *katham*) has been interpreted as signaling a rhetorical question introducing the subsequent untoward consequence concerning the father and the son.

The *na* in *palena* on fragment 52A(r) can be realigned with a stroke at the upper edge of strip 52C(r), and the tops and bottoms of several syllables are preserved on strips 52A and 52C, specifically the syllables *[ca]* as well as the *na* and the *i*-vowel diacritic in *sti* of *nasti*, all of which confirm the placement of strip 52C immediately after fragment 52A. Only the upper portions of the syllables *[sapal]*. *[yidi]* remain on the lower edge of fragment 52A(r); their lower portions are lost in the deteriorated upper edge of strip 52C(r). Chip 52aa(r) is located at the upper edge of strip 52C, but it is blank and preserves no remnants of *yidi* in line 58.

[59] + + /// |^{52bb}[n].|^{52C(r)}[g]o •: The first partially visible syllable in line 59, *[n]*., is represented only by its lower tip on chip 52bb at the right edge of strip 52C(r).

[59] *niru* ? [60] + + /// |^{52bb+52C}[d]. |^{52C}*vatava*: Immediately following *ru* at the end of line 59 is a large spot of ink that could represent an aborted syllable or possibly a punctuation mark (cf. ll. 10, 38, 40, 81, 96). The final legible syllables *niru* could then form the beginning of the past participle *nirudha* or of a finite form, for example, the present *nirujadi*. Since approximately two syllables are missing at the beginning of line 60, either of these alternatives is possible. However, given the general nature of this declaration and the use of *nirujadi* in a similar declaration concerning present action in lines 53–54, the present finite form *nirujadi* seems the better choice. If the final two syllables *jadi* of *nirujadi* are assumed to have formed the first two syllables in line 60, the ink spot at the end of line 59 should then be interpreted as an aborted syllable. The first legible syllable in line 60, *va*, is preceded by several chips, of which two (52cc, 52dd) are marked with dots of ink but have not yet been placed and may not belong in this location. Another of these chips (52bb) containing two dots of ink can be shifted upward slightly to provide the lower tip of the syllable *na* in *(*ja)n(*a)go* at the beginning of line 59, and the upper right tip of *d(*i)* in *(*ja)d(*i)* at the beginning of line 60.

[60] *[he]m[u]khkṣa*: The *e*-vowel diacritic in *[he]* is abraded and its angle is atypical, extending downward toward the lower horizontal stroke of the base consonant *ha*. The syllable read as *m[u]* has a flattened left arm atypical for *ma*, but the right arm does not extend upward as far as would be expected for *mu*. Hence, the reading *m[u]* is problematic, but it would fit the tentative interpretation of the compound *[he]m[u]khkṣa* as Skt *hema-ukhā* (P *hema-ukkā/ukkhā*) “gold cauldron” or “crucible” for refining gold, with elision of the final vowel of the

¹³⁸ DhP-G^K vv. 50, 59, 65, 160, 330; BL 10 (r) ll. 24, 25, 27, 35, 37, 38, 41, 45, (v) ll. 46, 52, 56, 63, 66, 75.

prior member of the compound as encountered frequently in our text.¹³⁹ For the syllable read as *khkṣa*, the lower consonant *kṣa* appears to have a superscript *kha*, forming a conjunct character whose exact phonetic equivalent is uncertain but which usually corresponds to the OIA consonant cluster *kṣa*. This conjunct is attested in Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions,¹⁴⁰ in the Khotan Dharmapada in the words *cakhhkṣuma* (Skt *cakṣuṣmant*) and *rakhhkṣa* (Skt *vṛkṣa*),¹⁴¹ in Kharoṣṭhī fragments from the Bamiyan region,¹⁴² and in BL 10 in the words *bhikhhkṣu* (Skt *bhikṣu*) and *pakhhkṣo* (Skt *pakṣa*).¹⁴³ Although the compound Skt *hema-ukhā* (P *hema-ukkā/ukkhā*) is not attested, the references in this passage to gold (*hema*) and burning (*dajati*) would make the reconstruction plausible. As further support, the term P *ukkā* for “crucible” is found together with P *jātarūpa*, “gold,” in the example of a goldsmith (P *suvaṇṇakāra*) refining gold, when used to illustrate the process by which a practitioner develops and refines equanimity (P *upekkhā*).¹⁴⁴

[60] *na ca [ta] sadha palena dajadi • e[va s].[p].*: The syllable *ja* is marked by an apparent *o*-vowel diacritic, which is actually on a separate unplaced chip (52ee). The syllable *di* and all remaining syllables in line 60 are bisected by the lower edge of strip 52C, below which their lower portions have become lost. The reading *[p].* for the final syllable in line 60 is highly tentative but is based on the suggested reconstruction *eva sapa(*la)*, which is supported by the appearance of *sapala* in the preceding parallel example in line 60: *vatava yaṣa hema ta sapala [he]m[u]khkṣa dajadi*. In this example, presumably concerning gold heated in a crucible, the phrase *sadha palena* suggests that gold is burned “together with its fruit.” The general term “fruit” (*pala*, P/Skt *phala*) can be used in reference to the effects resulting from any type of cause. However, since the issue here is action, the parallel phrase in the conclusion in line 61 uses the phrase *sadha vivagena*, “together with the matured effect” (P/Skt *vipāka*), which is limited specifically to the fruit of action.

[61] *nanu [e] sadha* ^{52C(r)+52z(v)+52B(v)}*vivagena ? + ? (///)*: Even though the upper portion of the syllable read as *[e]* clearly represents a vowel-carrying sign or possibly *h.*, the ink gradually disappears near the bottom of the syllable. To the right of the downward vertical is an ink stroke that might be interpreted as the lower horizontal stroke of *ha* or an atypical *e*-vowel diacritic. This concluding sentence in lines 60–61 is syntactically parallel to the introductory proposition in line 59, and hence the reconstruction *nanu* < **d* *e*, as in line 59, has been adopted here as well. The upper portions of the final two partially legible syllables *gena* in line 61 can be realigned with the lower portions of syllables that appear in the middle of the upper edge of strip 52B(v). Three and possibly more additional syllables in line 61 are covered by chip 52ff, which has become folded up from the verso along the lower edge of strip 52C(r) (plt. 7). Chip 52ff contains the remnants of several syllables from 52B(r) and 52C(v) on the verso: the lower tips of *viśadi dha* from *ekunaviśadi dhadu* in line 85, and the upper portion of *tre* from *sutrehi* in line 86 (plt. 8).

¹³⁹ For *ukha/ukhā*, see CDIAL 74 [1629–1630]. Text Notes: [52] *kaigam=eva śi*[53][*la*] *ṣaḥhainaḥhida* •.

¹⁴⁰ Brough 1962: 73 [nts. 1–2].

¹⁴¹ Brough 1962: 72–73 [§ 16].

¹⁴² Salomon 2016: 372

¹⁴³ *bhikhhkṣu* BL 10 ll. 30.24, 72.22; *pakhhkṣo* BL 10 l. 39.8. Cf. *khkṣato* BL 10 l. 50.4. See also Paleography and Orthography § II.2.4.3.2 *khkṣa*.

¹⁴⁴ MN III 243.

If line 61 originally extended to the left edge of the manuscript, approximately fifteen to seventeen syllables would have followed *vivagena*. Underneath the folded chip 52ff, slight ink spots from the upper portions of possibly two additional syllables can be discerned. However, any additional syllables in line 61 would have been lost below the lower edge of strip 52C(r), and the upper edge of contiguous strip 52B(v) contains no remnants of any additional syllables. A glue-line juncture is visible above line 62 on strip 52B(v); since line 61 slants downward from right to left and would have intersected the glue-line juncture at its mid-point, it is possible that the scribe left the remainder of line 61 blank in order to avoid this juncture. Parallelism with the introductory proposition in line 59 permits the secure reconstruction of only the predicate element, (**nirudha*), in the final clause preserved in line 61. No further evidence permits the reconstruction of any additional text that might have served to conclude the final sentence of this passage or to introduce the next passage.

II.6.2.12. ll. 62–66

Manuscript Notes: ll. 62–66

Line 62 is the first of two lines wholly preserved on strip 52B(v), which was turned over recto to verso in the process of conservation and must be returned to its correct orientation (plts. 2, 7).¹⁴⁵ Above line 62 is a glue-line juncture, first discernible intersecting the lower portions of the syllables in the middle of line 61 (corresponding to verso ll. 83–84) and extending to the left edge of the manuscript. Only the upper portions of the first eighteen syllables in line 64 are preserved on the lower edge of strip 52B(v), but these upper portions can be realigned with the lower remnants on the upper edge of strip 52F(r), confirming the placement of strip 52F as contiguous with strip 52B. Only the lower tips of four of the final seven or eight syllables in line 64 are preserved on the upper edge of strip 52F, but these syllables have been tentatively reconstructed on the basis of context. Approximately three or four syllables are missing from the beginnings of lines 62–66, but with the exception of those in lines 62 and 63, these syllables also can be confidently reconstructed on the basis of context.

ll. 62–66

Transcribed text

62. + + + + /// |^{52B(v)}*gaḍa upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa prac[u]panadhamo yaṣa anagaḍa upaḍadhama aryamago*

63. + + + + /// ? *a.nupaḍadhama kariṣadi • nanu ar[y]amago anagamo anagaḍa kariṣadi [yadi]*

64. + + + + /// |^{52y(r)}[g].[ḍ].|^{52B(v)+52F(r)}[a].[p].[ḍ].[dh].[m]. *pi anupaḍadhama pi • ya ca upaḍadhama ta* |^{52F(r)}[ava] + [up].[j].[ś]. /// + +

65. + + + + /// [n].[pa]ḍadhama ta na upajiṣadi tena nirartheta br[o]miciavaṣa bhodi aṣa śaka upa

66. + + + + /// *nagaḍa anupaḍadhama kato tena anagaḍa aṣa[kha]ḍa* |^{52F(r)+52D(r)}*bho-* |^{52D(r)}*di* ✽

¹⁴⁵ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61.

Reconstruction

(6) [62] (*yadi ana)gāda upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa pracupanadhamo yaṣa anagaḍa upaḍadhama aryamago [63] (*anagamo a)nupaḍadhama kariṣadi • nanu aryamago anagamo anagaḍa kariṣadi

(7) [63] yadi [64] (*ca ana)g(*a)d(*a u)p(*a)d(*a)dh(*a)m(*a) pi anupaḍadhama pi • ya ca upaḍadhama ta ava(*śa) up(*a)j(*i)ś(*adi) • [65] (*ya ca a)n(*u)paḍadhama ta na upajiṣadi tena nirarthyā bromiciavaṣa bhodi aṣa śaka upa[66](**ḍadhama a*)nagaḍa anupaḍadhama kato tena anagaḍa aṣakhāḍa bhodi ✽

Translation

(6) [62] [P] (*If) a future [factor] is a factor subject to arising, surely a future [factor] is a present factor. [It is] just like the case of the future noble path that is a factor subject to arising, [63] which, (*as the stage of “not yet having reached,”) will act as a factor not subject to arising. Surely the noble path [of] the stage of “not yet having reached” will [still] act as future [and therefore must still be a factor subject to arising].

(7) [63] (*And) if [64] future [factors] are both factors subject to arising and factors not subject to arising, and a factor that is subject to arising will inevitably arise, [65] and a factor that is not subject to arising will not arise, then the life of religious practice is without purpose. Or else, it is possible [66] for a future factor (*subject to arising) to act as a factor not subject to arising; therefore, a future [factor, as not subject to arising,] is unconditioned.

Text Notes: ll. 62–66

[62] + + + + ///^{52B(v)}gāda upaḍadhama nanu anagaḍa: At the glue-line juncture just above line 62, the upper edge of strip 52B(v) has broken away, resulting in minor damage to the upper portions of the first ten visible syllables in the line. The reconstruction of the surrounding lines suggests that an additional two to four syllables are missing at the beginning of line 62. However, since the original length of the preceding line 61 is uncertain and may have contained as many as fifteen to seventeen additional syllables between the final legible syllable in the line and the left margin of the manuscript, the reconstruction proposed for the beginning of line 62 is highly tentative.¹⁴⁶ The first partial word visible in line 62 is presumably (*ana)gāda, which would leave space for two additional syllables at the beginning of the line. The rhetorical conjunctive particle *nanu* in the following statement in line 63 suggests a preceding hypothetical proposition possibly containing a conditional clause introduced by the indeclinable conditional particle *yadi* (cf. ll. 59–60), which could be placed at the beginning of line 62. However, if line 61 extended to the regular left edge of the manuscript with an additional fifteen to seventeen syllables, there would have been more than sufficient space for *prochidava*, frequently used as an indicator of a transition in topic, as well as for a more extensive conditional clause, all prior to the beginning of line 62. Given the absence of clear evidence for any additional syllables in line 61 or for its original length, a more cautious reconstruction has been adopted, which limits the supplied syllables to the beginning portion of line 62: (*yadi ana)gāda upaḍadhama

¹⁴⁶ Text Notes: [61] *nanu [e] sadha* |^{52C(r)+52z(v)+52B(v)}*vivagena ? + ? (///)*.

[62] *prac[u]panadhama*: Between the syllables *pa* and *na* is a blank space of approximately one syllable, presumably resulting from an area of rough surface bark. A similar blank space appears at the same point in line 63 between *r[ya]* and *ma* of *ar[ya]mago*. The blank space in line 63 has become partially delaminated, but it is likely that the scribe originally attempted to avoid an uneven area of surface bark in both lines.

[62] *aryamago* [63] + + + /// ? *a.nupaḍadhama*: Above the initial syllable *a* of *aryamago*, an unexplained diagonal stroke of ink, whose upper portion appears to be on a separate chip, straddles the folded edge at the glue-line juncture. Below the syllable *a* is another dot of ink that appears unconnected either to *a* or to the *i*-vowel diacritic in *di* of *kariśadi* at the end of line 63. However, in view of the certainty of the reading here, these seemingly extraneous ink dots have not been considered significant. Given the damage to the right edge throughout this area of the manuscript, approximately three syllables are estimated to be missing at the beginning of line 63, with only one dot of ink remaining from the fourth syllable. However, parallelism with the phrase *nanu ar[y]-amago anagamo* in the next rhetorical statement in line 63 suggests the probable reconstruction (**anagamo a*), yielding the phrase (**anagamo a*)*nupaḍadhama*.

[63] *kariśadi • nanu ar[y]amago anagamo anagaḍa kariśadi [yadi]*: The punctuation mark following *kariśadi* is partially obscured by a blank chip. The future verb form *kariśadi* has been interpreted both here and in its second occurrence later in line 63 with a subjunctive sense, “would act as.”¹⁴⁷ The syllable in *ar[y]amago* read as *r[y]a* on the basis of context resembles the single-stroke angular *ya* as opposed to the more rounded *ya* typical of this manuscript. However, it is also possible that the left leg of the base character *y*- in its typical more rounded form has been omitted or completely abraded. Following *r[y]a* is an unexplained blank space of approximately one syllable. The term *anagamo* (Skt *anāgamyā*) has been understood as a fossilized absolute used as a neuter noun referring to a specific stage in the path of practice, specifically the stage of “not yet having reached” the first trance state in the realm of form, which constitutes the first moment of the noble path of vision (Skt *darśanamārga*).¹⁴⁸ In this context, *anagamo* could be interpreted either in the nominative singular used in apposition to *ar[y]amago*, that is, “the noble path [of] the stage of ‘not yet having reached,’” or in the locative singular governed by *ar[y]amago*, that is, “the noble path in the stage of ‘not yet having reached.’” The first interpretation has been tentatively adopted on the basis of the ending *-o*, which in this manuscript is used for the nominative singular masculine or occasionally for nominative or accusative singular neuter nouns and adjectives, but never for the locative.

The lower portions of the final six syllables in line 63, *kariśadi [yadi]*, located at the lower edge of strip 52B(v), are covered by the upper portion of fragment 52A(v).

[64] + + + /// |^{52y(r)}[g].[d]. |^{52B(v)+52F(r)}[a].[p].[d].[dh].[m]. *pi anupaḍadhama pi •*: At the beginning of line 64 (corresponding to verso ll. 83–84), the right margin of strip 52B has broken into one larger and several smaller chips that are lodged against its right edge. The largest chip (52y) contains the remnants of two syllables on the recto and a single dot of ink on the verso.

¹⁴⁷ Whitney 1971 [1889]: 338 [§ 948a]; Speijer 1993 [1886]: 266–268 [§ 344]. Cf. Allon 2001: 172–173.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. AKBh 6.20c p. 346.10, 6.47d p. 367.12, where Skt *anāgamyā* is clearly used as a neuter noun, but Yaśomitra (AKVy 569.31–32) glosses it as an absolute.

When chip 52y(r) is rotated counterclockwise, the two syllables visible on the recto can be read as *[g].[d]*., supporting the reconstruction *(*ca ana)g(*a)d(*a)* at the beginning of line 64 on 52B(v), as suggested by the context. Hence, it would appear that chip 52y maintained its original orientation during the unrolling and conservation process, even though the remainder of strip 52B was turned over recto to verso (plts. 7, 8; verso l. 83).¹⁴⁹ Since line 64 straddles strips 52B(v) and 52F(r), the lower portions of the five syllables *[a].[p].[d].[dh].[m]*. are lost at the lower edge of strip 52B(v). They can, however, be securely reconstructed on the basis of context and the parallelism indicated by the appearance of the particle *pi* in both this and the following phrase.

[64] *upaḍadhama ta* ^{|52F(r)}*[ava]* + *[up].[j].[ś]*. /// + + [65] + + + /// *[n].[pa]ḍadhama ta na upajiśadi*: The upper portions of the syllables *dhama ta [ava]* in line 64 are lost at the broken upper edge of strip 52F(r), but the uppermost tip of the right arm of *ma* is visible on the lower edge of strip 52B(v), which confirms its placement contiguous with strip 52F. Of the remaining syllables in line 64, only an *u*-vowel diacritic and the lower tips of the syllables *[up].[j].[ś]*. remain on the upper edge of strip 52F(r). The upper portions of these syllables, originally located at the lower edge of strip 52B(v), are completely obscured by fragment 52A(v), which covers this lower edge of strip 52B(v). However, two small chips (52uu, 52vv), which are visible on the verso at the juncture between strips 52B(v) and fragment 52A(v), may have originally belonged to the latter portion of line 64 but remained embedded in the manuscript after strip 52B was turned over in the process of conservation. Unfortunately, the vertical strokes of ink that these chips contain do not permit a secure placement.

Comparison with the length of line 65 suggests that line 64 might have contained as many as four additional syllables following *[up].[j].[ś]*.; line 65 begins with the partially preserved syllables *[n].[pa]*. However, the reconstruction of this portion of the manuscript at the end of line 64 and the beginning of 65 is aided by parallelism with the following statement in line 65, which refers back to a statement in lines 39–40 concerning factors subject to and not subject to arising: *upaḍadhamo hi avaśa upajiśadi • anupaḍadham(*a a)v(*a)śa na upajiśadi*. In contrast to lines 39–40, this statement in lines 64–65 employs a relative-correlative construction and the adverb *avaśa* occurs only in the first of the two parallel clauses. Nonetheless, the parallelism of the two statements allows for a reasonably secure reconstruction of the missing syllables in lines 64–65: *ya ca upaḍadhama ta ava(*śa) up(*a)j(*i)ś(*adi) • ya ca a)n(*u)paḍadhama ta na upajiśadi*. The referent of the relative and correlative demonstrative pronouns in these clauses is the masculine compound *upaḍadhama*, despite the use of the typically neuter demonstrative pronoun form *ta*. Such neuter pronoun forms are also found in relative-correlative constructions stating general principles elsewhere in our text (ll. 64–65, 70, 86, 93, 115–116).

[65] *upajiśadi tena nirarthiya br[o]micivaśa*: What appears at first to be a very small punctuation mark between *di* and *te* is actually a small hole in the manuscript. Just below *śa* in *br[o]micivaśa* is a diagonal stroke extending toward the left. It appears to have been added after the base character *ḡ*- but is positioned too low for an *o*-vowel diacritic. Hence, its significance is unclear.

¹⁴⁹ Text Notes: [83] + + /// ^{|52y(v)+52F(v)+52B(r)}*[sti]vaḍa*.

II.6.3. Section 3—Fundamental Proposition “Everything Exists” [l. 66–51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7]

II.6.3.1. ll. 66–69

Manuscript Notes: ll. 66–69

The lower edge of strip 52F(r) falls between lines 66 and 67, but the lower tips of several syllables in line 66 appear on the upper edge of strip 52D(r), indicating its placement contiguous with strip 52F(r) (plts. 2, 7). This placement is further confirmed by line 81 on the verso, in which several syllables span strip 52D(v) and 52F(v). Lines 67–69 all have one to three syllables missing from the right margin, but a secure reconstruction based on context is possible for each line.

ll. 66–69

Transcribed text

66. ^{|52F(r)+52D(r)}*icheaṣi vatu [sar]..*

67. + /// ^{|52D(r)}*[st]. • sarvakala sarvam=asti • sarvatra sarva*^{|52hh(v)+52rr+52D(r)}*[ma]*^{|52rr+52D(r)}*sti*
^{|52D(r)}*• sarvagarena sarvam=asti • sarvaka*^{|52ii(r)+52D(r)}*ra*^{|52ii(r)}*nen.*

68. + + + /// ^{|52D(r)}*[sti] • sarvabhveha sarvam=asti • sarvaheduha sarvam=asti •*
^{|52D(r)+52E(r)}*sarvapracageha sarvam=asti [•]*

69. + /// ^{|52jj(r)+52E(r)}*[v].*^{|52E(r)}*[ma]sti •*

Reconstruction

[66] *icheaṣi vatu sar(*va)[67](*m a)st(*i) • sarvakala sarvam asti • sarvatra sarvam asti*
*• sarvagarena sarvam asti • sarvakaranen(*a) [68] (*sarvam a)sti • sarvabhveha sarvam*
*asti • sarvaheduha sarvam asti • sarvapracageha sarvam asti • [69] (*sar)v(*a)m asti •*

Translation

[66] [p] You might wish to say, [67] [o] “Everything exists. Everything exists at all times. Everything exists everywhere. Everything exists with every aspect. (*Everything exists) through every reason. [68] Everything exists through all modes. Everything exists through all causes. Everything exists through all conditions. [69] (*Everything) exists.”

Text Notes: ll. 66–69

[66] *[sar]..* [67] + /// ^{|52D(r)}*[st]. •*: The syllable *[sa]* is bisected by the separation between strips 52F(r) and 52D(r), with only its lower tip remaining at the upper edge of strip 52D(r). For the final syllable in line 66, only the lower right tip of the subscript preconsantal *r* remains, also on the upper edge of strip 52D(r). At the beginning of line 67, the right edge of strip 52D(r) is covered by chip 52gg, which bears the remnants of two syllables whose possible readings include *[a]./[i]* and *[t]./[bh]./[c]./[s]..* The disordering of the horizontal strips into which manuscript part 52 has broken likely occurred during the conservation process. As a result, chip 52gg may have originally been located along the right edge very near its present position, either in strip 52D(r) or in strip 52G, which would have been located on top of strip 52D(r) in the rolled manuscript. Chip 52gg cannot be placed at the beginning of line 67 or 68 in strip 52D(r), but it does fit with the probable readings at the beginning of line 71 in strip 52G, where chip 52gg would contain the lower portion

of the *i*-vowel diacritic in (**asti*) and the right, curved stroke of *t*(**a*) in (**ya nast*)*i t*(**a*).¹⁵⁰ The suggested reconstruction for this portion of lines 66–67, *sar*(**vam ast*)*i*, is based on context but is supported by the upper tip of the base character *st-* in *sti* visible to the left of chip 52gg. The verso of chip 52gg is covered by chip 52qq in line 80, and hence it cannot be placed in the corresponding position of the verso at the beginning of line 76 or 77.

[67] *sarvakala sarvam=asti* •: The interpretation of *sarvakala* as a locative ending in *-a* is supported by the use of the locative in a commentarial gloss on a parallel statement in the Kathāvatthu: “‘All the time’ means everything exists at all times.”¹⁵¹

[67] *sarva*^{|52hh(v)+52rr+52D(r)}*[ma]*^{|52rr+52D(r)}*sti* ^{|52D(r)}• *sarvagarena*: All but the upper tip of the right arm of *[ma]* is lost in a hole at the upper edge of strip 52D(r). The lower portion of *[ma]*, including parts of both its right and left arms, is visible on the verso of chip 52hh (corresponding to verso l. 80), which is resting at the lower edge of this hole. The recto of chip 52hh preserves a portion of the bottom of *[de]* in *anaga[dena]* in line 80.¹⁵² Chip 52rr, also located on the verso (l. 80), contains the upper tip of the left arm of the *[ma]* as well as the upper portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic in the following syllable *sti* (plt. 7). For *sarvagarena*, the Kathāvatthu commentary helps to identify the referent as P/Skt *ākāra*: “‘everything with everything’ means everything exists with every aspect.”¹⁵³

[67] *sarvaka*^{|52ii(r)+52D(r)}*ra*^{|52ii(r)}*nen*. [68] + + + /// ^{|52D(r)}*[sti]* •: The upper left tip of *ra* and all of the next two syllables are on chip 52ii, which has drifted slightly away from the left edge of the manuscript. The *e*-vowel diacritic in *ne* is clearly visible at the left edge of strip 52D(r) in the center portion of the syllable *ra*. In the initial black-and-white photograph, chip 52ii is still connected to strip 52D, and the readings of all syllables are clear. Bark has broken away from the right edge of strip 52D(r) at the beginning of line 68 forming a hole, but the lower portion of *[sti]* is visible below the hole. The reconstruction (**sarvam a*)*sti* is supported by the frequently repeated pattern in this passage.

[68] ^{|52D(r)+52E(r)}*sarvapracageha sarvam=asti* [•] [69] + /// ^{|52jj(r)+52E(r)}*[v]*. ^{|52E(r)}*[ma]sti* •: The split between contiguous strips 52D and 52E bisects the final sixteen syllables in line 68; the lower strip 52E must be shifted approximately half a syllable to the left to realign the syllables in the line. Chip 52jj is lodged under the right edge of strip 52E at the beginning of line 69 and contains remnants of a syllable that would be consistent with the slightly rounded upper portion of the expected syllable *[v]*. It is also possible that the hidden portion of chip 52jj(r) contains a portion of the right arm of the next syllable *[ma]*, whose left arm is visible at the deteriorated right edge of strip 52E. The verso of chip 52jj is blank, resembling the smooth surface that results from delamination, which suggests that the verso of chip 52jj may have originally been covered by the other displaced chips lying over the juncture between strips 52E and 52D(v). The upper tip of the *a* vowel in the syllable *sti* is found on the lower edge of the previous strip 52D. The reconstruction (**sar*)*v*(**a*)*m asti* is confirmed from context.

¹⁵⁰ Text Notes: [71] + + /// ^{|52gg}*[i]* ^{|52gg+52G(r)}*[t]*. ^{|52G(r)}*nastiḍa [ha] vatava* • *sata astiḍa vatava* • *asata nastiḍa vatava* •.

¹⁵¹ P *sabbadā ti sabbasmim kāle sabbam atthīti* (Kv-a 44). Cf. ll. 107–109 for the examination of *sarvakala*.

¹⁵² Text Notes: [80] + + /// ^{|52D(v)}*[p]*. *[n]*. *[p]*. *[rinipana]ḥadaye* • *eva anaga*^{|52D(v)+52hh(r)}*[de]*^{|52D(v)}*[na] yoyiḍava*.

¹⁵³ P *sabbena sabbān ti sabbenākārena sabbam atthīti* (Kv-a 44).

II.6.3.2. ll. 69–75

Manuscript Notes: ll. 69–75

Since the lower edge of strip 52E(r) does not intersect a line of text, the recto contains little evidence as to which of the two remaining strips (52G or 52H) follows strip 52E. However, on the verso, the first line on strip 52E(v) (l. 77) is bisected by the upper edge of the strip, and the upper portions of the syllables in this line are found on strip 52G. Thus, the correct order for the final three strips can be determined to be 52E, 52G, and 52H (plts. 2, 7). A further clue to this contiguous placement of strips 52E and 52G can also be found on the recto in the problematic syllable read as *[dh]*. in line 70 on strip 52E, whose lower tip can be discerned on the upper edge of strip 52G.

A piece of bark (52ll) approximately thirteen syllables in length at the lower edge of the recto of strip 52G has become folded downward over the upper edge of the immediately contiguous strip 52H. As a result, the first nine syllables in line 72 on the underlying surface of bark piece 52ll are completely hidden; only the upper or lower tips of the next five syllables are visible either at the lower edge of strip 52G(r) or just below bark piece 52ll on strip 52H(r). The verso surface of bark piece 52ll, which is exposed on the recto, contains the lower portions of eight syllables that can be realigned with the upper portions of the initial syllables in line 75, thus also confirming the contiguous placement of strips 52G and 52H (plts. 3, 8). Further confirmation of the contiguous placement of these strips is provided by the remnants of several sporadically spaced syllables on both the recto in line 72 and the verso in line 75, which span the separation between strips 52G and 52H. The two strips can be realigned by shifting strip 52H(r) approximately half a syllable to the left.

ll. 69–75

Transcribed text

69. *asti sarva • asti no ca sarva • ye duadaśa ayaḍaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti •*
 70. + /// |^{52kk(r)}[y].|^{52E(r)}*adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava • aṣa a[dh].[a] astita di • ya asti ta*
[ha] astiḍa vatava •
 71. + + /// |^{52gg}[i] |^{52gg+52G(r)}[t]. |^{52G(r)}*nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa*
vatava • aḍiḍa anagaḍa pra
 72. + + + + + + + + + /// |^{52G(r)+52H(r)}[d].[ḍ]. [v].[ṣ]..e [a]sti • ana|^{52G(r)+52oo}ga|^{52G(r)+52H(r)}ḍa
vaṣage asti • aḍiḍa anagaḍa [a]
 73. + + + + + /// |^{52H(r)}[g].[ḍ].[bh].[v]. *asti • aḍiḍa anagaḍa grihibhava asti • aḍiḍa anagaḍa*
aramiḍa-
 74. |^{52H(v)}*bhava asti • aḍiḍa naga[ḍ]. [v]eṣiabhavo asti • anagaḍa arahadabhava asti [•]*
 75. + /// |^{52H(v)+52mm(v)+52ll}. [v]. |^{52H(v)}*m=a*|^{52H(v)+52ll}*sti •*

Reconstruction

- (1) [69] *asti sarva • asti no ca sarva • ye duadaśa ayaḍaneha {a}ṣagrahiḍa se asti • [70]*
*(*tra)y(*a)adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava • aṣa adh(*v)a astita di • ya asti ta ha astiḍa*
*vatava • [71] (*ya nast)i t(*a) nastiḍa ha vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava*
*• aḍiḍa anagaḍa pra[72](*cupana va astiḍa di a)d(*i)ḍ(*a) v(*a)ṣ(*ag)e asti • anagaḍa*

*vaṣage asti • adida anagaḍa a[73](**didana*)g(**a*)ḍ(**a*)bh(**a*)v(**a*) asti • adida anagaḍa grihibhava asti • adida anagaḍa aramiya[74]bhava asti • adida <**a*>nagaḍ(**a*) veśiabhavo asti • anagaḍa arahaḍabhava asti • [75] (**sar*)v(**a*)m asti •*

Translation

(1) [69] [o] “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything. Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist. [70] [Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence. Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence. That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; [71] (**that which does not exist*) should indeed be said to be nonexistence. The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence. [Or] the past, future, [72] and present (**should be said to be existence*). A past year exists; a future year exists. [73] The modes of the past and future exist as past and future. The mode of the householder exists as past and future. The mode of the monastery worker exists as past and future. [74] The mode of the merchant exists as past and future. The mode of the arhat exists as future. [75] Everything exists.”

Text Notes: ll. 69–75

[69] *asti no ca sarva* •: A horizontal stroke of ink below *rva* can be explained as a final flourish concluding the preconsonantal *r* in *rva*, which resembles the clearer preconsonantal *r* in *rva* previously in this line.

[69] *ye duḍaśa ayaḍaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti* •: This sentence presents several problems. The first concerns the number and gender of the pronouns, *ye* and *se*, which represent the only examples of a relative-correlative construction in which the pronoun stems *ya* and *sa* are both inflected with the apparently plural ending *-e*. The most frequent pronominal forms encountered in relative-correlative constructions are *ya* and *ta*, which in context can be singular or plural, masculine or neuter, all conveying an indefinite sense (ll. 64–65, 70, 86, 115–116). There are also cases of *yo* and *so* (ll. 5–6. Cf. ll. 57, 59, 61), which context suggests are also nominative singular neuter, *ya* and *te* (l. 2) in the nominative plural masculine, and *ya* (l. 15) in the nominative singular feminine. The independent pronominal form *te* occurs twice. The first case is the partially preserved sentence in line 2, ... *te tasa hedu kica kareasu*, but this may also constitute the main clause correlated with a prior and now missing relative clause. Here the gender of *te* is indeterminate, but given the verb form in the third-person plural optative, it is certainly plural. The second case is in line 48, *ki nu khu te pave akuśaladhama* ..., where the context strongly suggests that *te* is nominative plural masculine. The only other occurrence of the pronominal form *se* is in line 97, where it appears to function as nominative singular feminine. One other occurrence of the relative pronominal form *ye* (51C(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3) appears to be nominative plural masculine. The verb *asti* provides little help in determining the number of *ye* and *se* in this sentence, since *asti* is used with both singular and plural nominatives, and no distinctive plural finite form of the root *as* appears in this manuscript.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Cf. 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 30, 31[2x], 38, 39, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 76, 83, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139; 51D(v) l. 3. Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]]^{51D(r)}[ka]vivaga asti* •.

Thus, even though it is possible that *ye* and *se* here in line 69 as well as *ya* and *ta* in the parallel phrase in lines 115–116 function as singular neuter, the context and specifically the participial adjective *{a}ṣagrahīḍa*, “included” (P *saṃgahīta*, Skt *saṃgrhīta*), which is used frequently with the plural form of the masculine noun “factors” (P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*), suggests that for both *ye* and *se* the plural masculine is the better choice.¹⁵⁵

The second problem concerns the phrase, “within the twelve sense spheres” (*duaḍaśa ayadaneha*). The retroflexion of *ḍa* in *duaḍaśa* is regular in this manuscript for both the numbers twelve and thirteen (*treḍaśa*) and can be explained by analogy with the expected form *ṣoḍaśa* for sixteen.¹⁵⁶ It is, however, more difficult to determine whether the phrase should be interpreted as a compound. Even though the compounded form P *dvādasāyatana* (Skt *dvādasāyatana*) is regular throughout Buddhist literature, in our text the Gāndhārī word *ayadana* consistently appears in compound-final position as *aīdana*, with elision of the final vowel of the prior member of the compound. As a result, the appearance of the uncompounded form *ayadana* here suggests that it is to be construed as an independent noun.¹⁵⁷ The collocation *duaḍaśa ayadana* appears five times in our text (ll. 69, 96, 115, 116–117; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 1). In lines 116–117, *duaḍaśa-ayadana-* clearly functions as the prior member of the compound *duaḍaśa-ayadana-sag(*r)ahīḍa*, which, given the use of the uncompounded independent form *ayadana*, suggests the possibility of a fossilized compound in the other occurrences as well. In the phrase *duaḍaśa ayadanehi* here in line 69, as in line 115 and 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 1, since *duaḍaśa* does not carry an instrumental plural ending that would be expected if it were an independent adjective modifying the referent (*ayadaneha*, *ayadanehi*), it might be assumed to be in compound. However, it is also possible that *duaḍaśa* functions either as an independent adjective in stem form used as an indeclinable, or as an independent adjective whose case declension must be inferred from its following referent.¹⁵⁸ Such declensional abbreviation in oblique cases is attested elsewhere in Gāndhārī.¹⁵⁹ In *duaḍaśa ayadana* in line 96, *ayadana* is nominative, and *duaḍaśa* likely represents the nominative plural adjective, for which the stem-form is expected. Even though *duaḍaśa ayadana/ehi* may form a compound in lines 69, 96, 115, and 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 1, it has tentatively been understood as uncompounded in these locations; it is taken as compounded in lines 116–117, where the context dictates a compound.

The final problem in this sentence lies in the word *aṣagrahīḍa*, specifically in the interpretation of the initial *a-*. This passage in line 69 is alluded to in lines 115–116, where the word *sagrahīḍa* is used without the apparently privative prefix *a-*: “[One states,] [o] ‘Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist’” (*ya duaḍaśa ayadanehi sagrahīḍa ta asti di*, ll. 115–116). This later statement conforms to the scriptural passage regularly cited by the Sarvāstivādins that specifies “everything” as limited to factors included within the twelve sense spheres.¹⁶⁰ Further,

¹⁵⁵ Kv 335. Cf. AVŚ 12 p. 92a18–26; AMVŚ 23 p. 116b16–25; VŚ 1 p. 417a15–16.

¹⁵⁶ Norman 1992: 209–211. For the retroflex *-ḍ-* in the number 12 in the Brāhmī versions of Aśoka’s edicts, see Baums 2004: 13.

¹⁵⁷ Text Notes: [52] *kaṅgam=eva śi[53]/[la] ṣaḥhaināḥīḍa •*.

¹⁵⁸ Pischel 1981 [1957]: 370 [§ 442]. Cf. Whitney 1971 [1889]: 183 [§ 486c].

¹⁵⁹ Glass 2007: 130 [§ 6.1.5].

¹⁶⁰ Commentary: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

since it immediately follows the proponent’s criticism of the declarations presented in lines 66–69, it presumably initiates his treatment of the current passage in lines 69–71. Thus, the statement in lines 115–116 is likely intended as a direct citation of this very passage in line 69, an interpretation that is reinforced by the fact that the statement in lines 115–116 ends with the quotative particle *di*. As a result, it is likely that the form *aṣagrahiḍa* rather than *sagrahiḍa* in line 69 is the result of scribal error, possibly in anticipation of the word *aṣabhina* in the next sentence. It is remotely possible that the text should be read *a sagrahiḍa*, where *a* represents the separate particle *ca*, but *ca* is not expected at this point in the clause, and this instance of *a* for *ca* would be unique in this manuscript.

Despite the preference that would ordinarily be given to the manuscript as written and hence to the form *aṣagrahiḍa* here in line 69, contextual factors also suggest that the manuscript should be emended to *sagrahiḍa*, or *sagrahiḍa* without the variant sibilant form *ṣa*. First, as noted above, the strict sequential structure of the proponent’s criticism in lines 82–136 strongly suggests that this statement in line 69 is cited again in lines 115–116, which would support the reading *sagrahiḍa*. Second, parallelism in structure between this passage in our Gāndhārī text and analogous discussions in the *Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya also suggests the affirmative form *sagrahiḍa*.¹⁶¹ Finally, the negated form *aṣagrahiḍa* in line 69 produces a statement that contradicts the regular Sarvāstivāda specification of “everything” and demands a more contorted and less plausible interpretation: “Those [factors] that are **not included** within the twelve sense spheres exist” (*ye duḍaśa ayadaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti •*, l. 69). Thus, the reading *aṣagrahiḍa* has been viewed as the result of scribal error, and the emendation of *aṣagrahiḍa* to *{a}sagrahiḍa* without the initial *a-*, has been tentatively adopted.

[70] + /// ^{52kk(r)}[y].^{52E(r)}*adhva astiḍa*: The virtually certain reconstruction of the beginning of line 69¹⁶² indicates that approximately two syllables are missing at the beginning of the next line 70 along the broken right edge of strip 52E. There is no trace of the first syllable in the line, but one spot of ink from what might be the upper left tip of the second syllable, tentatively read as *[y]*., appears on a small separate chip (52kk(r)) lying underneath the left edge of strip 52E. The first legible word in line 70, *adhva*, presumably refers to the three time periods (P *addhan*, Skt *adhvan*) of the past, present, and future. The reconstruction of *traya* for the missing word at the beginning of the line is supported by the subsequent criticism of this passage (l. 123), where *traya* appears in conjunction with *a<*(dh)>va*: *yidi aha trayaa<*(dh)>va va athita di*. However, the interpretation of this phrase in both line 70 and line 123 is complicated by the uncertain syntactic function of *traya* in its relationship to *adhva*. The form *traya* suggests a separate cardinal adjective, most likely nominative masculine, rather than a compound-initial element, for which the form *tre* or possibly *tri* would be expected in Gāndhārī.¹⁶³ If *traya* and *adhva* are then taken as independent words, presumably as nominative masculine forms, the phrase “three time periods” might then function as the subject in a copula construction equated with the following noun *astiḍa*: “The three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence” (*(*tra)y(*a) adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava •*, l. 70. Cf. l. 123). However, the immediately following statement in line 70 begins with the conjunctive

¹⁶¹ MAHŚ 11 p. 961c27ff., 11 p. 963a20ff.; AKBh 5.27c p. 301.7–9.

¹⁶² See Text Notes: [68] ^{52D(r)+52E(r)}*sarvapraccageha sarvam=asti [•]* [69] + /// ^{52jj(r)+52E(r)}[v].^{52E(r)}*[ma]sti •*.

¹⁶³ For *traya* as an apparently nominative neuter, see Text Notes: [80] ^{52ii(v)}[va][81] + /// ^{52D(v)}[v]. [c]. *[tr].[ya] sa?khaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa •*.

indeclinable *aṣa*, signaling an alternative that contrasts with this preceding statement. This next statement also follows a simple copula construction, whereby existence (*astita*) is equated with the time periods (*adhva*) as such, both presumably in the nominative: “the time periods [should be said to be] existence” (*aṣa adh(*v)a astita di •*, l. 70). If the phrase *traya adhva* in the preceding statement were also construed as a nominative referring to the “three time periods,” the two statements would then have virtually the same meaning.

A contrast between these two statements as suggested by the conjunctive indeclinable *aṣa* could be achieved if the nominative *astiḍa* in the preceding statement governed the prior phrase *(*tra)y(*a) adhva* in an oblique, specifically locative case, which would then indicate the locus of existence, “existence in the three time periods is not confused.” Even though *traya* is not the expected locative plural masculine form in Gāndhārī, this could be a compound, or it could represent another case of declensional abbreviation in an oblique case of a prior adjective.¹⁶⁴ A second interpretation emerges if *(*tra)y(*a)adhva* is taken as a compound that does not refer simply to the “three time periods” (Skt *tryadhva*), but is understood to refer to the factors (Skt *dharmā*) or conditioning forces (Skt *saṃskāra*) that belong to the three time periods.¹⁶⁵ The prior member of the compound might be understood as *traya* (P/Skt *traya*), but since the compound *traiyadhva*, or more commonly *traiyadhvika*, is common in Sanskrit Buddhist texts, whereas the compound *trayādhva* does not occur, it is more likely that the Gāndhārī form *(*tra)y(*a)adhva*, interpreted as a secondary derivative, has the sense of “that which is connected to the three time periods.” For the first statement in line 70, *astiḍa* as the predicate nominative would be equated in a copula construction with *(*tra)y(*a)adhva* in the nominative plural masculine, which is then in turn modified by the adjective *aṣabhina*. This second interpretation would present a contrast to the following statement in line 70¹⁶⁶ and would also be consistent with the criticism in lines 123–134, which clearly refers to the status of individual factors within the time periods.¹⁶⁷ Hence, this second interpretation of *(*tra)y(*a)adhva* as a secondary derivative has been adopted in both line 70 and 123: “[Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence” (*(*tra)y(*a)adhva astiḍa aṣabhina vatava •*, l. 70. Cf. l. 123).

[70] *aṣa a[dh].[a] astita di •*: The lower portion of the syllable read as *[dh].[a]* extends below the lower edge of strip 52E(r) and is lost at the broken upper edge of strip 52G(r). Its remaining upper portion resembles a *va* with a strange foot mark and is longer and more rounded than is typical for *dha*, but the reconstruction *dh(*v)a* is supported by the thickness of an additional downward stroke that also appears to curve toward the right just above the lower edge of strip 52E. This stroke would be unexpected even as a foot mark in the case of the simple syllable *va* and hence has been interpreted as the beginning of the lower curve of the base character *dh-* leading into a postconsonantal *va*.

The unvoiced intervocalic dental *-t-* in *astita* in line 70 occurs in only two of the eight occurrences of *astiḍa* in this manuscript, both here and in line 123, in *athita*. Intervocalic dentals are regularly voiced in this manuscript, and the dentals *ḍ/ḍ* and *t* are generally clearly distinguished.

¹⁶⁴ Text Notes: [69] *ye duaḍaṣa ayadaneha aṣagrahiḍa se asti •*; Glass 2007: 130 [§ 6.1.5].

¹⁶⁵ AKBh 1.7cd p. 5.2–3, 1.39b p. 27.15, 2.36d p. 64.7, *passim*.

¹⁶⁶ Commentary: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

¹⁶⁷ Commentary: Criticism Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

There are, however, at least three instances of peculiarly formed letters that could be read as either \underline{d}/d or t : in two cases the questionable letter is read as ta (ll. 4, 10), and in the third case the correct reading is uncertain (l. 19). The probable Sanskrit or MIA equivalents of *astiḍa* are *astitā* and *atthitā*, respectively, whereas, for the Gāndhārī form *astita*, Skt *astitva* would be the more likely equivalent. Even though Skt *astitva* and Skt *astitā* are frequently used interchangeably,¹⁶⁸ the occurrence of *astitva* over *astitā* in both the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Vyākhyā, despite its absence in conjunction with the term Skt *adhvan*, lends some support to Skt *astitva* as the equivalent here. However, the distinct Gāndhārī abstract form *astitva*, with the consonant cluster *tva* preserved, does appear in our text, both in line 7 (51E) and later within this argument in lines 78–80. Thus, the absence here of the consonant cluster *tva*, the proximity of the occurrences of *astita* to *astiḍa*, and the internal parallelism of the arguments in which the terms are used all suggest that the absence of voicing here may reflect mere orthographic flexibility or laxness on the part of the scribe, rather than a distinction similar to that between the Sanskrit equivalents *astitā* and *astitva*.

[70] *ya asti ta [ha] astiḍa vatava •*: The syllable read as *[ha]* has a rounded head typical of a vowel-carrying sign or *ha*, but its bottom horizontal stroke is shorter than is typical of *ha*. Hence, the syllable could be read as either *ha* or possibly *e*. The syllable read as *[ha]* in the parallel construction in the next line is also problematic in appearance, calling into question the reading and the interpretation of these syllables in both clauses.¹⁶⁹ If these syllables are read as *e*, an independent *e* could only be interpreted as *ca*. Even though *e* for *ca* is attested elsewhere in Gāndhārī, it does not occur in this manuscript. As a result, this syllable has been understood as *ha* both here and in line 71, and in both cases it has been interpreted as the Gāndhārī equivalent of the P/Skt particle *hi*.

[71] *+ + /// ^{52gg}[i] ^{52gg+52G(r)}[t]. ^{52G(r)}nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*: Approximately four syllables are missing at the beginning of line 71. No evidence remains of the first two syllables, but remnants of the third and fourth syllables can most likely be found on chip 52gg, which has come to rest at the beginning of line 67, and one spot of ink from the fourth and final syllable appears at the right edge of strip 52G(r) (plt. 7).¹⁷⁰ The two partial syllables on chip 52gg can be read as *[a]./[i]* and *[t]./[bh]./[c]./[s].*, but the parallel relative and correlative clauses in lines 70–71 suggest the correlative pronoun *ta* for the second syllable, which supports the reading *[i t].* in *(*ya nasti) t(*a)*.

The syllable read as *[ha]* following *nastiḍa* in line 71 is written slightly smaller in size, higher in position, and very close to the next syllable *va*. This syllable could simply represent an aborted attempt to write the following syllable *va*, which, as in the case of many other aborted syllables in

¹⁶⁸ This interchangeability is evident in the discussion of the existence of past and future factors in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: “Further, is this past or future [given thing (Skt *vasu*)] said to exist, or not? If it exists, the eternity of conditioned forces results due to [its] **existence** (Skt *astitva*) at all times” (Skt *kim punar idam atītānāgatam ucyate 'sty atha na. yady asti sarvakālāstītvāt saṃskārānām śāśvatatvaṃ prāpnoti*, AKBh 5.25 p. 295.2–4; AKVy 468.24ff.). By contrast, the following verse itself states, “[There is] **existence** (Skt *astitā*) at all times” (Skt *sarvakālāstītā*, AKBh 5.25 p. 295.7). For two additional occurrences of *astitā* in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, see AKBh p. 470.13, p. 472.14. Skt *astitā* does not appear in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā.

¹⁶⁹ Text Notes: [71] *+ + /// ^{52gg}[i] ^{52gg+52G(r)}[t]. ^{52G(r)}nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*.

¹⁷⁰ Text Notes: [66] *[sar].* [67] *+ + /// ^{52D(r)}[st]. •*

this manuscript, was simply abandoned rather than being crossed out or corrected (cf. ll. 10, 38, 40, 59, 81, 96). Inserted syllables are usually written above the line (see, for example, l. 2). Given the higher position of *[ha]* here, the scribe may have attempted to correct an omission immediately after he began to write the next syllable *va*. It is also possible that, after he had written the omitted syllable *[ha]*, he began the remainder of line 71 in a slightly lower orientation. The presence of a syllable resembling *[ha]* in the previous parallel sentence in line 70, although placed before rather than after *astiḍa*, further supports this possibility of an inserted syllable *[ha]* here in line 71.

The strict parallelism of the statement in line 71 suggests that the terms *sata/asata* be understood as *sata*, in its negated form with a privative prefix *a-*. And given the usually clear distinction between the dentals *ḍ/d* and *t* in this manuscript, the readings *sata/asata* with the unvoiced *ta* appear secure. These readings are also supported by a later passage in which *saḍa/asada* and *sata/asata* are distinguished within the same sentence: “[P] It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist” (*saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5).¹⁷¹ The pattern of regular voicing in the case of single intervocalic dentals suggests that *sata* and *asata* correspond to Sanskrit or MIA equivalents with an intervocalic consonant cluster and the consequent preservation of the unvoiced *-ta*. Context offers two possible equivalents: (1) the present participle stem of the root *as* with the feminine abstract suffix *-tā* (Skt *sattā/asattā*) with the sense of “being”; and (2) the nominative singular masculine or neuter form of the simple parasmaipada present participle of the root *as* declined on the basis of a thematized *a*-stem ending in *-anta*.¹⁷² The first equivalent, Skt *sattā*, would consistently preserve a clear distinction between the Gāndhārī forms *sata* and *saḍa* as they appear in our text: *sata* would represent this feminine abstract derivative (l. 71; 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 5),¹⁷³ whereas *saḍa* would represent various oblique cases of the present participle (ll. 71, 86–87).¹⁷⁴ This feminine abstract form Skt *sattā* might further be understood as an etymological gloss for the term *astiḍa* (P *atthitā*, Skt *astitā*) employing the present participle form *sat* of the same root *as* with the same feminine abstract suffix *-tā*, *sat-tā*, “being.” Indeed, in two of its three occurrences in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the feminine abstract form Skt *sattā* appears in grammatical explications of the meanings of roots: for example, “this root *vid* has the sense of knowing, not the sense of being.”¹⁷⁵ In its only remaining occurrence, Skt *sattā* appears in a list of hypostatized entities whose existence is asserted by the Sāṃkhyas (AKBh 2.43cd p.79.25). Thus, it would appear that in general usage, the abstract form *sattā* carries substantialist connotations not consistent with Buddhist ontological positions.

¹⁷¹ Text Notes: 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7 [5] |^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)]}1.5 *saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*.

¹⁷² Text Notes: 51D(r) [4] [et]. [vi]vaga tasa heduavinaśa [5] + + + /// |^{51D(r)}[ta] ? ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asada na bhodi •.

¹⁷³ Con. line 101, where *sate* is locative singular neuter.

¹⁷⁴ Con. *sate* in line 101 and *saḍa/asada* 51D(r) line 5, which appear to function as nominative singular masculine or neuter forms.

¹⁷⁵ Skt *jñānārtho hy eṣa vidir na sattārthaḥ* (AKBh 1.10a p. 6.20–21). For the meaning of the root *pad*, see AKBh 3.28ab p. 138.3: “the root *pad* has the sense of existence” (Skt *padiḥ sattārthaḥ*). Cf. Dhātupāṭha 4.67: Skt *vida sattāyām* (Dhātupāṭha, Westergaard, ed., in Böhtlingk 1971 [1886]: 73*); Pāli Dhātupāṭha 647: Skt *vida sattā-vicintane* (Andersen and Smith 1921: 44).

evidence, the ink on the recto of chip 52mm is not sufficient to indicate readings for syllables in line 72, nor does it confirm the chip's placement. The reconstruction of the first three syllables in line 72 is secure since the final term of the series *adiḍa anagaḍa pra* begun in line 71 is undoubtedly *pra(*cupana)*. In addition, the reconstruction of the last seven of the fifteen obscured syllables in line 72 is aided by the syntactic pattern of the following parallel sentences in which each item is modified by the separate adjectives *adiḍa* and *anagaḍa*. Since the first complete clause in line 72 reads *anagaḍa vaṣage asti*, the preceding and presumably parallel clause should most likely be reconstructed as *(*a)d(*i)d(*a) v(*a)ṣ(*ag)e asti*, a reconstruction supported by the upper portions of the syllables that remain at the broken lower edge of strip 52G(r) and below chip 52ll on strip 52H(r).

These reasonably secure reconstructions account for ten of the approximately fifteen syllables missing at the beginning of line 72, but the reconstruction of the five intervening syllables is mere speculation. For example, the initial clause spanning lines 71–72 could simply have concluded with the simple verb *asti*, yielding the reconstruction *adiḍa anagaḍa pra(*cupana asti)*: “The past, (*present), and future (*exist).” This reconstruction would signal a change in topic from the fundamental proposition “everything exists” (ll. 66–69) and the following specifications of “everything” (*sarva*) as the content of “existence” (*astiḍa*) and explications of “existence” (*astiḍa*) (ll. 69–71), to the separate but related issue of the existence of the three time periods as such. However, it is also possible that this passage continues the discussion of the previous passage and, in particular, expands upon the last of the three specifications of “everything” (*sarva*) as the content of “existence” (*astiḍa*): “Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence” (*aṣa adh(*v)a astita di •*, l. 70). In line 81, immediately prior to the beginning of the proponent's criticism of this Sarvāstivāda position is found yet another specification: “Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence” (*tr(*a)ya sakhadaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa •*, l. 81). This return to the issue of *astiḍa* in line 81 supports the second possibility here, namely, that this passage beginning in line 72 continues the prior discussion of the specifications of “everything,” in particular the third specification that identifies “everything” with the time periods per se. Hence in this case, the initial clause spanning lines 71–72 would conclude with *astiḍa*, yielding the reconstruction *adiḍa anagaḍa pra(*cupana va astiḍa)*: “[Or] the past, future, and present (*should be said to be existence).”

The lower portion of the vertical stroke of *ge* in *vaṣage* is preserved on chip 52oo, which has been folded backwards along the upper edge of strip 52H and is visible in line 75.

[72] [a][73] + + + /// |^{52H(r)}[g].[d].[bh].[v]. *asti •*: The probable reconstruction of line 75 on the verso of strip 52H suggests that there are at most three syllables missing from the beginning of line 73. Chip 52ll, which was originally part of 52G, has been folded down from the verso along the upper edge of strip 52H, covering the upper portions of the next four syllables in line 73. The lower portions of these four syllables are visible just below chip 52ll and support the reading *bh.v.* for *bhava*, possibly preceded by *[d].* and *[g].*, which appear to have been corrected, probably within *anagaḍa*. Despite these difficulties in reading, the tentative reconstruction *a(*diḍana)g(*a)d(*a)-bh(*a)v(*a)* has been adopted, based on the pattern employed throughout this passage.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Commentary: Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

[74] |^{52H(v)}*bhava asti* •: The verso of the manuscript preserved in frame 52 begins in line 74, and given the regularity of the syntactic pattern throughout this passage, it is clear that the text is continuous from 52 recto to 52 verso (ll. 73–74). Chip 52mm(v) overlaps the right edge of the manuscript at the beginning of line 74 and can be placed at the beginning of line 75, where it forms part of (**r*)*va*, the partially preserved second syllable in that line. Even though there is sufficient space for one additional syllable prior to the first legible syllable *bha* in line 74, this would result in an unexplained syllable in the middle of the compound *aramiyabhava* spanning lines 74–75. Hence, the reconstruction assumes that *bha* in *bhava* is the first syllable in line 74.

[74] *adiḍa naga[d]*. [*v*]eśiabhavo *asti* •: Following the pattern found elsewhere in this passage, the two words *adiḍa naga[d]*. have been understood not as in compound but as independent adjectives. The loss of the initial *a* of <**a*>*nagada*, though suggestive of sandhi elision at a juncture within a compound, could also be the result of a scribal omission. The syllables read as [*d*]. [*v*]. are obscured by chip 52nn containing the remnants of two syllables whose original location has yet to be determined. The reading [*d*]. is secure given the context, but the next syllable tentatively read as [*v*]. is uncertain. A faint diagonal stroke above the base character *v*- might be interpreted as an *e*-vowel diacritic. The next syllable read as *śi* could be read equally as *yi*. Only one other possible *śi* occurs in the manuscript, *śi*(**la*) (ll. 53–54), and there, too, the reading is uncertain. The many instances of *yi* vary considerably in their angularity and make the distinction between *śi* and *yi* difficult.¹⁷⁹ Here however, the context renders the reading *śi* and the reconstruction *veśia* more likely.¹⁸⁰ As a possible equivalent, the context suggests Skt *vaiśya* (P *vessa*), “merchant,” which would fit the context of a list of different possible “modes” of life.

[74] *anagaḍa arahaḍabhava asti* [•] [75] + /// |^{52H(v)+52mm(v)+52ll}. [*v*]. |^{52H(v)}*m=a* |^{52H(v)+52ll}*sti* •: The syntactic pattern of the statement *anagaḍa arahaḍabhava asti* is uncertain, since it is not clear whether *arahaḍabhava* should be understood as a compound. If *arahaḍa* is an independent declined noun, it could represent either the nominative singular based on an extended stem ending in *-ata*, or the genitive singular masculine based on the weak OIA stem. If it is in compound with the following noun *-bhava*, it is based on the extended stem in its weak form ending in *-ata* with voicing of the intervocalic *-t-*, so that in accordance with the general pattern of the prior members of the series, the compound *arahaḍabhava* would mean “mode of the arhat.” However, in the following statement, *arahaḍa* clearly functions as a genitive singular masculine: “an arhat possesses past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion” (*arahaḍa adidaragadoṣamoha asti* •, ll. 75–76). Thus, it is also possible that *arahaḍa* here in line 74 should be understood as an independent noun in the genitive singular masculine. Nevertheless, given the repeated syntactic pattern employed in the prior members of the series, *arahaḍa* has been tentatively understood here also as the stem form in compound with the following noun *-bhava*, “mode of the arhat” (*arahaḍabhava*).

Two very small spots of ink follow the *asti* at the end of line 74 and may constitute the remnants of a punctuation mark. The separation between strips 52G and 52H bisects the syllables in line 75, but they can be aligned by shifting strip 52H(v) half a syllable to the right. The lower portions of

¹⁷⁹ For a rounded *y* in *yidi*, see ll. 12, 53, 57, 122, 123, 124, 144. For an angular *y* in *yidi*, see ll. 32, 45, 59, 77, 80, 105, 130, 138.

¹⁸⁰ The reading [*v*]eśia follows the suggestion of Stefan Baums, email communication, June 24, 2015. Commentary: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75].

the syllables at the beginning of line 75 appear on a piece of bark (52ll) that has become folded up over the edge of strip 52H(r) and is visible on the recto covering the first portion of line 72. The right arm of the syllable *[v]* is preserved on chip 52mm(v), which has become dislodged at the right edge, and the tip of its preconsonantal *r*, on chip 52ll (plt. 8).

II.6.3.3. ll. 75–82

Manuscript Notes: ll. 75–82

On the verso, the syllables in line 75 are bisected by a separation between strips 52H(v) and 52G(v); the strips can be realigned by shifting the lower strip 52G(v) half a syllable to the left. The upper portions of the syllables in line 77 preserved at the lower edge of strip 52G(v) can be joined with their lower portions on the upper edge of strip 52E(v). Similarly, the syllables in line 79 are bisected by strips 52E and 52D, and those in line 81 by strips 52D(v) and 52F(v). This confirms the contiguous placement of strips 52H(v), 52G(v), 52E(v), 52D(v), and 52F(v) (plats. 3, 8).

The first nine syllables in line 80 on strip 52D(v) are obscured by chip 52qq, which should be returned to its original location at the lower edge of strip 52B(r), where it supplies the lower portions of the first nine syllables in line 85 (plt. 8).¹⁸¹ This placement of chip 52qq on the recto of strip 52B further confirms that strip 52B has been turned over in the process of unrolling and conservation. Finally, the upper portions of the initial five syllables in line 81 are lost at the upper edge of strip 52F(v), and approximately two syllables are missing from the beginning of lines 81–82 along the damaged right edge of strip 52F(v).

ll. 75–82

Transcribed text

75. |^{52H(v)+52ll}na sarvam=asti • na sarva |^{52H(v)+52G(v)}nasti [[•]adi]ḍa anathariya asti • arahaḍa a[di]-

76. |^{52G(v)+52ll}ḍara|^{52G(v)}gadoṣamoha asti • aḍiḍa aḍiḍam=eva vatava • anagaḍa a[na]

77. + + + /// |^{52G(v)+52E(v)}[v]. [v].tava • pracupana pracupanam=eva vatava • yasa yi aḍiḍaṣa aḍi

78. + + + /// |^{52E(v)}[bha]va astitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍae • eva aḍiḍaṣa anagaḍatvasvabha

79. + + + /// |^{52E(v)+52D(v)}[sti]tvabhiniḍana [parinipa]naḥḍae • eva aḍiḍaṣa pacupanatvasvabhava asti[tv].

80. + + + /// |^{52D(v)}[p].[n]. [p].[rinipana]ḥḍaye • eva anaga|^{52D(v)+52hh(r)}[de]|^{52D(v)}[na] yoyiḍava eva yava aṣakhadana • |^{52ii(v)}[va]

81. + + + /// |^{52D(v)}[v]. [c]. [tr].[ya] sa?khaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa • |^{52D(v)+52F(v)}[sarva] ta ca asti me aḗatva cha[ḍ].

82. + + +

¹⁸¹ Text Notes: [85] + + + + /// • t.e|^{52B(r)+52qq}ṣaḍ. aya[ḍa]na a|^{52B(r)}sti • ekuna|^{52ff+52B(r)}viṣadi dha|^{52B(r)}du.

Reconstruction

(2) [75] *na sarvam asti • na sarva nasti • adiḍa anathariya asti • arahāḍa adi*[76]-
ḍaragadoṣamoha asti • adiḍa adiḍam eva vatava • anagaḍa ana[77]*(*gaḍam e)v(*a)*
*v(*a)tava • pracupana pracupanam eva vatava • yasa <*p>i adiḍaṣa adi*[78]*(*datvasva)-*
bhava astitvabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍae • eva adiḍaṣa anagaḍatvasvabha[79]*(*va*
*a)stivabhiniḍana parinipanaḥḍae • eva adiḍaṣa pacupanatvasvabhava astitv(*a)-*
 [80]*(*bhini)p(*a)n(*a) p(*a)rinipanaḥḍaye • eva anagadena yoyiḍava eva yava*
aṣakhadana •

[80] *va*[81]*(*ta)v(*a) c(*a) tr(*a)ya sakhaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa • sarva ta ca asti me*
*aḥḍatva chad(*a) [82] (*di) ...*

Translation

(2) [75] [o] “It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist. A past [factor] without efficacy exists; [for example,] an arhat possesses [76] past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion. The past should be said to be the past alone; the future [77] should be said to be the future alone; the present should be said to be the present alone. Just as, [78] for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of pastness is established as having existence, in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of futureness [79] is established as having existence, [and] in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of presentness [80] is established as having existence. In this way, it should be applied in the case of the future, continuing on in this way through the unconditioned.

[80–81] Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence. And ‘everything’ [in] that [sense is suggested by the scripture passage that states], ‘I have longing internally’” [82]

Text Notes: ll. 75–82

[75] |^{52H(v)+52ll}*na sarvam=asti • na sarva* |^{52H(v)+52G(v)}*nasti [• adi]ḍa anathariya*: A piece of bark (52ll) originally from the upper verso edge of strip 52G has become folded up along the lower edge of strip 52H(r); the lower portions of the first thirteen syllables in line 75 are visible on this bark piece, located on the recto just above line 73 (plt. 8). Chip 52oo, which contains ink from the recto surface (l. 72), has broken away from the lower edge of strip 52H and become folded upward, obscuring several syllables in the middle of line 75. However, these obscured syllables can be read as [*• adi*] through context.

The syllables in line 75 that are bisected by the separation between strips 52H(v) and 52G(v) can be realigned by shifting strip 52G approximately half a syllable to the left. The initial syllable *a* in *anathariya* is partially covered by a blank chip. A short diagonal stroke of ink at the upper edge of strip 52G(v), which might otherwise be interpreted as the right loop of a preconsonantal *r* in the syllable *rtha*, is actually a miniscule chip of inked bark. The lower portion of *tha*, of which part has been lost at the lower edge of strip 52H, curves first toward the right and then back to the left, ending in a downward hook on the left side. With one exception (*athita*, l. 123), all of the

other examples of the consonant *th-* not preceded by preconsonantal *r* are marked by a similar, distinctive foot mark: *thamena* (l. 36); *athi* (ll. 106, 122); *theraṣa* (51D(v) l. 5). In all examples of the conjunct *rtha*, the vertical stroke extends straight downward with a sweeping curve to the left and then upward toward the right to form the preconsonantal *r* (ll. 38, 49, 65).

The probable compound *anathariya* (l. 75), which qualifies *adiḍa*, or a “past factor,” is still problematic. As further explanation, the text offers the example of an arhat who can still be said to possess various past defilements, even though they have not and will never become efficacious. Thus, this compound *anathariya* appears to have the sense “without efficacy,” but its interpretation is not straightforward. Two interpretations would fit the context, but each presents serious phonological difficulties. In the first interpretation, *anathariya* would be equivalent to P **anathika* (Skt *anarthika*), “without purpose” or “without a goal,” with the loss of the preconsonantal *r* in the cluster *rth* and the addition of an epenthetic *r* before the pleonastic suffix *-ika*, or possibly the metathesis of *r* and *th* and epenthesis with *a*.¹⁸² In a second interpretation, *anathariya* would be equivalent to P **anathakiriya* (Skt *anarthakriya*), “without action toward a purpose,” with the loss of the preconsonantal *r* in the cluster *rth* and the unexpected development *kr* > [**(k)r*], in which the consonant *-k-* is elided and only the postconsonantal *-r-* remains. Even though both interpretations are problematic, the first interpretation as equivalent to P **anathika* (Skt *anarthika*) presents perhaps fewer problems and has been very tentatively adopted. Regardless of which interpretation is adopted, the sense “without efficacy” appears clear in this context and would be supported by either interpretation.

[75] *a[di][76]*^{52G(v)+52ll}*dara*^{52G(v)}*gadoṣamoha asti •*: Unplaced chip 52pp marked with two small strokes of ink obscures the upper portion of a syllable *a*, which, given the lengths of the surrounding lines 74, 76, and 77, would be expected to be the final syllable in line 75. However, a spot of ink from the lower tip of one additional syllable remains at the deteriorated left upper edge of strip 52G(v) at the end of line 75 and could represent the syllable *di* required by context. The upper tip of the first two syllables in line 76, *dara*, are preserved at the bottom edge of chip 52ll, and these are preceded by an unexplained blank space of approximately three syllables. Given the length of line 71, there is sufficient space for an additional three syllables beyond the broken right edge of strip 52G(v). This would suggest as many as six syllables missing from the beginning of line 76. However, since the blank space cannot be explained on the basis of bark irregularity or any other apparent physical cause, it may simply represent an omission resulting from the scribe’s difficulty in reading the archetype. Hence, the suggested reading *adiḍaragadoṣamoha* spanning lines 75–76 is tentative. The number of this compound is also uncertain. The ending *-a* typical of the nominative singular masculine is also the most frequently occurring ending for the nominative plural masculine, and the verb *asti* occurs with both singular and plural nominatives.¹⁸³ In Pali materials, the compound P *rāgadoṣamoha* appears most frequently in the plural, but on occasion also in the singular.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² For such metathesis of postconsonantal *-r-*, see Allon 2001: 92 [§ 5.2.3.6].

¹⁸³ Cf. 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 30, 31[2x], 38, 39, 69, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 83, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139; 51D(v) l. 3. Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]*^{51D(v)}*[ka]vivaga asti •*.

¹⁸⁴ SN IV 139ff.; Peṭ 238.

[80] + + ///^{|52D(v)}[p].[n]. [p].[rinipana]ḥḥaḍaye • eva anaga^{|52D(v)+52hh(r)}[de]^{|52D(v)}[na] yoyiḍava: Chip 52qq covers much of the beginning of line 80, obscuring the middle portion of the first three visible syllables [p].[n]. [p]. and the upper portions of the next five, [rinipana]. The reconstruction (*bhini) p(*a)n(*a) p(*a)rinipanaḥḥaḍaye is based on a pattern repeated elsewhere in this passage. The lower portions of two syllables [dena] are lost in a small hole at the lower edge of strip 52D(v). At the upper edge of this hole are two small chips that were originally located on the recto of strip 52D but slipped through the hole and became turned over. Chip 52hh(v) contains portions of the right and left arms of [ma], and chip 52rr, the upper tip of the left arm of [ma] and the upper tip of the *i*-vowel diacritic, all belonging to *sarvam asti* found in line 67.¹⁸⁷ A portion of the syllable [de] in *anaga[dena]* (l. 80) is preserved on the recto of chip 52hh.

[80]^{|52ii(v)}[va][81] + ///^{|52D(v)}[v]. [c]. [tr].[ya] sa?khaḍaṣa lakṣana va astiḍa •: The final syllable in line 80 is on chip 52ii, which has broken away from the left edge of strip 52D and migrated downward, rotating slightly counterclockwise. In the initial black-and-white photograph of frame 52 recto, the left edge of strip 52D is intact, but the progressive separation and migration of chips along this left edge is evident in the subsequent black-and-white photograph of frame 52 verso and the digital images. Similarly, the right edge of strip 52F has broken away with a loss of two or three syllables at the beginning of line 81, and the upper portions of the first five visible syllables in line 81 have been lost above the broken upper edge of strip 52F.

Given the manuscript damage in this passage, the context remains obscure and thus provides little help in the reconstruction. For the final syllable in line 80, the remaining ink supports either [ya] or [va]. The reading [ya] might suggest the indeclinable particle *yadi* initiating a conditional clause, which, given the pattern typical elsewhere in this manuscript, would signal a position of the opponent offered for subsequent criticism. Line 81 does in fact present a position consistent with the Sarvāstivāda perspective, but the following scriptural citation does not constitute a criticism of this position; hence, it would appear that the reading [ya] is unlikely. If the final syllable in line 80 were read as [va], it could signal *vatava*, which would introduce a statement representing the Sarvāstivāda position followed by a supporting scriptural citation. This would be consistent with the congruity between the following statement and scriptural citation. The length of the surrounding lines suggests room for as many as three syllables at the beginning of line 81, whereas the proposed reconstruction *va(*ta)v(*a)* would fill only one space. Nevertheless, this reconstruction has been retained on the grounds of its contextual appropriateness.

Between *sa* and *kha* of *sa?khaḍaṣa* is a smudge of ink with a diagonal tail, which, given the virtual certainty of the reading *sakhaḍaṣa*, has been interpreted as an aborted syllable (cf. ll. 10, 38, 40, 59, 96). Even though *traya* is most often the nominative plural masculine form in Gāndhārī, here it clearly modifies the neuter noun *lakṣana*.¹⁸⁸

[81]^{|52D(v)+52F(v)}[sarva] ta ca asti me aḥatva cha[d]. [82] + ///: A hole near the upper edge of strip 52F(v) in line 81 obscures the middle portions of the syllables [sarva], but the ink visible below the hole supports the preconsonantal *r* in [rva]. The syllable *ḥa* is marked by a horizontal

¹⁸⁷ Text Notes: [67] *sarva*^{|52hh(v)+52rr+52D(r)}[ma]^{|52rr+52D(r)}sti^{|52D(r)}• *sarvagarena*.

¹⁸⁸ For the shifting of gender forms in declined numeral words and specifically *traya* modifying neuter nouns, see BHS 40 [§ 6.12]; Salomon 2008: 149 [§ II.4.3.1].

stroke extending rightward from the lower diagonal, which might be interpreted as an *e*-vowel diacritic forming the syllable *ĵe*. In the case of the base character *j-*, the *e*-vowel diacritic would be expected to begin above the letter descending into the v-shaped top. In this case of a base character *ĵ-* with a superscript line, an *e*-vowel diacritic could possibly be constructed as a line extending rightward from the lower diagonal. However, the context, which contains a scriptural citation with an identified parallel, clearly supports the reading *aĵatva* with no *e*-vowel diacritic. For the final syllable in line 81, only a slightly curved vertical stroke remains, and judging from the length of line 83, as many as three syllables might be missing from the beginning of line 82. Even though the reading of the first six visible syllables as *jaga eṣa prochi* in line 82 is certain, it is unclear whether these syllables conclude the scriptural citation begun in line 81 or should be construed with the following discussion. It has been tentatively assumed that the scriptural citation concludes with a quotative particle *di*, which can be supplied as the first of the three missing syllables at the beginning of line 82, and that *jaga eṣa prochi* then introduces the following passage.¹⁸⁹

The partial reconstruction and interpretation of this passage are aided by a parallel, but once again uncertainty as to the extent of the scriptural citation in our text and the contorted syntax of the sentence in which the citation appears render the reconstruction and interpretation tentative. The parallel is signaled by the formulaic pattern *asti me aĵatva ...*, which begins the description of the practice of mindfulness of factors directed toward the five hindrances (P/Skt *nīvaraṇa*) as presented in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta: “Here, O monks, with regard to longing for sense pleasure that exists internally, a monk understands ‘I have longing for sense pleasure internally.’”¹⁹⁰ The appearance in this Pali scriptural citation of the compound P *kāmacchando* immediately following the formulaic pattern P *atthi me ajjhataṃ* suggests that the syllable *cha* in this passage might initiate the word *chada* (P/Skt *chanda*), here appearing alone, rather than in compound with *kama*. Indeed, the ink remaining from the final syllable in line 81 would not be inconsistent with the reading [*da*]. Pali materials regularly use the term *kāmachanda* in discussions of the five hindrances, but the Sanskrit or MIA equivalents underlying the Chinese translations of possible parallel passages are ambiguous. In the scriptural passage cited here, the Chinese translation of the Madhyamāgama uses the single character 欲,¹⁹¹ which can be used to represent *chanda* alone, as in the compounded form 貪欲 for *kāmachanda* attested in other passages also in the Chinese translation of the Madhyamāgama.¹⁹² Hence, in its use of the single character 欲, the Chinese Madhyamāgama might be construed as evidence of a tradition similar to that represented by our Gāndhārī text, which uses the isolated term *chanda* in contrast to the compound *kāmachanda* as commonly found in the Pali references to this common list of five hindrances.

In both the Pali and Chinese translations of this scriptural passage, *kāmachanda* or *chanda* is followed by the quotative particle and a form of the verb “to know” (P *pajānāti*, 知). Unfortunately,

¹⁸⁹ Text Notes: [82] + /// |^{52F(v)?} *jaga eṣa prochi* •.

¹⁹⁰ P *idha bhikkhave bhikkhu santaṃ vā ajjhataṃ kāmacchandaṃ atthi me ajjhataṃ kāmacchando ti pajānāti* (DN II 300ff.).

¹⁹¹ 比丘者。內實有欲知有欲如真。內實無欲知無欲如真。若未生欲而生者知如真。若已生欲滅不復生者知如真 (MĀ 24 no. 99 p. 584a24–26).

¹⁹² See, for example, the common list of the ten fetters (P/Skt *saṃyojana*, 結): MĀ 1 no. 4 p. 424c20ff., 9 no. 39 p. 481a26ff.

given the missing syllables at the beginning of line 82 and the difficulty in interpreting the initial visible syllables *? ja ga eṣa prochi*, it is not possible to determine how this scriptural citation in our text ends and where the transition to the next passage begins. In view of this uncertainty, the tentative reconstruction and translation suggested here assume that the scriptural citation ends with *chad(*a)* followed by the quotative particle (**di*), which would then constitute one of the two or three missing syllables at the beginning of line 82.

II.6.3.4. ll. 82–87

Manuscript Notes: ll. 82–87

The uncertain readings for the final syllables of line 81 make determining the context impossible and thus preclude a secure reconstruction of the three missing syllables at the beginning of line 82.¹⁹³ Only the upper portions of the syllables in line 83 are preserved at the lower edge of strip 52F(v), but these can be realigned with the lower portions of syllables appearing at the upper edge of strip 52B(r). This confirms that strip 52B was turned over in the process of conservation and must be reversed recto to verso for the correct reconstruction.

Between lines 83 and 84 (corresponding to recto ll. 61–62) is a glue-line juncture that extends to the left edge of strip 52B. Six syllables from the right edge of strip 52B(r) in line 84 there is a blank space approximately six syllables wide containing a diagonal crack and delamination. Presumably, the scribe left this area blank because the bark surface had become unstable or because of an uneven surface caused by the glue-line juncture evident between lines 83 and 84. The lower portions of the first ten syllables in line 85 are lost at the lower edge of strip 52B(r), but they are preserved on chip 52qq, which is found covering the initial portion of line 80 on strip 52D(v). The presence of this chip from the recto surface of strip 52B preserved on the verso of the manuscript further confirms that strip 52B was turned over recto to verso in conservation (plts. 3, 8).

ll. 82–87

Transcribed text

82. + /// |^{52F(v)?} *jaga eṣa prochi • tatanuyoga sarvam=asti • mahasarvastivaḍa • tatra maha*

83. + + /// |^{52y(v)+52F(v)+52B(r)} [*sti*] *vada ahasu nasti kica nasti nam[a] • adidaṇagaḍa[p]. [acup].- [n]. [s]. [kh]. [ḍ]. [asti di]*

84. + + + /// |^{52B(r)} [*rva*] *aha vatava jive asti • bhudatve asti • pugale asti • ṣe[ṭha]*

85. + + + + /// • *t.e* |^{52B(r)+52qq} *śad aya[ḍa]na a* |^{52B(r)} *sti • ekuna* |^{52ff+52B(r)} *viśadi dha* |^{52B(r)} *du asti • paṃcame ar[ya]sace*

86. + + + /// |^{52C(v)} [*ya*] *pi nasti ta pi asti di • na* |^{52C(v)+52z(r)} *sti* |^{52C(v)} *śadehi su* |^{52ff+52C(v)} *tre* |^{52C(v)} *hi anuyujidavo • sata asti*

87. + + + /// [*t*]. *va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śad[e]hi sutrehi anuyujidava •*

¹⁹³ Text Notes: [81] |^{52D(v)+52F(v)} [*sarva*] *ta ca asti me aṭatva cha[ḍ]*. [82] + ///.

Reconstruction

[82] (*viva)jaga eṣa prochi • tatanuyoga sarvam asti • mahasarvastivāda • tatra maha[83](**sarva*)stivāda ahasu nasti kica nasti nama • adidānagadap(**r*)acup(**a*)n(**a*)-s(**a*)kh(**a*)d(**a*) asti di

(1) [84] (**asti sa*)rva aha vatava jive asti • bhūdatve asti • pugale asti • ṣeṭha [85] (**kadha* asti) • t(**r*)e(**d*)(**a*)<**ś*>a ayaḍana asti • ekunaviśadi dhadu asti • paṃcame aryasace [86] (**asti*) • ya pi nasti ta pi asti di • nasti śadehi sutrehi anuyujidavo • sata asti[87](**da va*)-t(**a*)va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śadehi sutrehi anuyujidava •

Translation

[82] [P] The distinguisher asked about this [position elaborated previously by the opponent]. With regard to that there is a point of discussion, [that is, concerning] the Mahāsarvāstivādins [and their proposition] “everything exists.” With regard to that [83] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist. Past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors] exist.”

(1) [84] [If] one states, [O] “(*That which exists) is everything,” [P] it should be said that a soul exists, creaturehood exists, a person exists, a sixth [85] (*aggregate) exists, a thirteenth sense sphere exists, a nineteenth element exists, and a fifth noble truth [86] (*exists). [The statement,] “even that which does not exist also exists,” should not be upheld by hundreds of scriptures. “The existent [87] should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence.” In this way, it should be upheld by hundreds of scriptures.

Text Notes: ll. 82–87

[82] + /// |^{52F(v)}? jaga eṣa prochi •: At the beginning of line 82 there are approximately two syllables completely missing, with a third syllable represented only by its bottom tip. The first of these syllables has been understood as the quotative particle *di* that concludes the scriptural passage cited at the end of line 81.¹⁹⁴ The reconstruction of the second and third syllables depends upon the reconstruction of the clause ending with the punctuation mark following *prochi*. The *i*-vowel diacritic in the syllable *chi* is clearly visible underneath a narrow blank overlying chip, and the resulting word *prochi* has been construed as a third-person singular preterite verb form of the root *prach*. Derivatives of the root *prach* typically mark a change in speaker and usually indicate an inquiry offered by the proponent himself with regard to the opponent’s previously cited position. The gerundive form *prochidava* of the root *prach* occurs frequently elsewhere in our text with this function of marking the proponent’s challenge to the opponent’s position.¹⁹⁵ Here, the finite form *prochi* is understood to introduce a criticism of the Sarvāstivāda position as signaled by the following clause *tatanuyoga sarvam asti* (l. 82). The verb *prochi* is clearly preceded by *eṣa*, which would ordinarily be taken as nominative singular masculine or possibly neuter, presumably referring to the subject of the verb *prochi*: “**this one** asked.” As a more remote possibility, *eṣa*

¹⁹⁴ Text Notes: [81] |^{52D(v)+52F(v)}[*sarva*] ta ca asti me aḥatva cha[d]. [82] + ///.

¹⁹⁵ Commentary: (4–5) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 21–28].

could be construed as accusative singular with an objective function referring either to the direct or indirect object of the verb *prochi*: “[one] asked about **it**”; or “[one] asked **him**.”¹⁹⁶ Unfortunately, the syntactic function of *eṣa* depends upon the interpretation of the preceding word or words at the beginning of line 82, of which only the two final syllables, *jaga*, remain. It is possible that these two syllables, *jaga*, contain the suffix *-aga* (Skt *-aka*) and refer to the subject of the finite verb *prochi*. In this case, since *eṣa* would then follow the subject, it would more likely refer to the object in the accusative of the verb *prochi*, despite its seemingly nominative form.

Indeed, a subsequent exchange between the proponent and opponent suggests that the proponent may be initiating this criticism of the opponent’s position here with an appellation referring to himself. Later in line 82, the proponent refers to the opponent with the appellation *mahasarvastivaḍa* (Skt **mahāsarvāstivāda*), or “one who maintains that everything exists” in compound with the adjective “great” (Skt *mahā-*). As his argument progresses (l. 90), the proponent offers the criticism that the opponent should in fact be referred to by the designation *vivarjavaḍa* (P *vibhajjavāda*, Skt *vibhajjavāda*) or “one who maintains distinctions”: “Well then, it is you who maintain distinctions!” (*hata vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa •*, l. 90). His purpose is to suggest that *mahasarvastivaḍa* is not an appropriate moniker for the opponent given his apparent equivocation concerning the proposition “everything exists.”¹⁹⁷ Since the opponent persists in maintaining that there are certain nonexistent entities that in fact do not exist, the proponent claims that the opponent cannot be said to assert that “everything exists” but instead distinguishes between “that which exists” and “that which does not exist.” Hence, the opponent would be more correctly described as “one who maintains distinctions.” The sense of *vivarjavaḍa* in this later passage is not made clear; it could serve merely a rhetorical function suggesting equivocation, or it could refer to a specific school group. However, the syntactic structure of this statement and the use of the emphatic particle *hata* (Skt *hanta*) suggest the proponent in our text may be applying an appellation to his opponent that would otherwise have been applied to himself. In other words, the proponent is suggesting to the opponent that “it is **you**, and **not I**, who maintain distinctions!” Despite certain difficulties in determining the ultimate referent of the word *vivarjavaḍa*, it is clear that a contrast with the opponent’s position as a Sarvāstivāda, or here Mahāsarvāstivāda, is intended. Given this use of *vivarjavaḍa* in line 90, it is then also possible that the initial legible syllables *jaga* in line 82 mark the end of a related form, perhaps *vivajaga* (P **vibhajjaka*, Skt **vibhājaka/vibhajaka*), or the “distinguisher,” which the proponent then uses to refer to himself: “[P] The distinguisher asked about this [position elaborated previously by the opponent]” (*(*viva)jaga eṣa prochi •*, l. 82). However, since the equivalent derivative form Skt *vibhajaka/vibhājaka* is not attested in any extant Indian abhidharma text, this suggested reconstruction is tentative.

[83] + + /// |^{52y(v)+52F(v)+52B(r)}[*sti*]vaḍa: Unlike the entirety of strip 52B, chip 52y, which is lodged against the right edge of strip 52B(r) at the beginning of line 83, was not turned over recto to verso in the conservation process. Since the syllables [*g*].[*d*] visible on the recto of chip 52y support its placement at the beginning of line 64, its verso surface should preserve the remnants of syllables in

¹⁹⁶ Burrow 1937: 34 [§ 81].

¹⁹⁷ Text Notes: [90] [*ha*]ta vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa •. Commentary: (2) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 88–95].

line 83.¹⁹⁸ However, the verso of chip 52y contains only one dot of ink, which may form the lower tip of the syllable [*sti*] in line 83; the only other evidence for this syllable is one dot from the upper left tip preserved on the right edge of strip 52B.

[83] *kica nasti nam[a]* •: Between *na* and *sti* of *nasti* is a space of one syllable, which might have resulted from uneven bark just above the glue-line juncture between lines 83 and 84 on strip 52B(r). Below *na* of *nam[a]* is an unexplained horizontal stroke of ink on the upper edge of strip 52B(r) along this glue-line juncture. The bottom of *m[a]* is marked by what might be the beginnings of an *o*-vowel diacritic, but the lower portion of this diacritic is not evident at the upper edge of strip 52B(r). A parallel statement later in the text contains both the forms *nama* and *namo*: *mahasarvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo* (51G(v) [51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6).

[83] *adiḍanagaḍa[p].[acup].[n].[s].[kh].[ḍ]. [asti di]*: Even though the lower portions of the final ten syllables in line 83 are lost at the lower edge of strip 52F, the remaining upper portions allow for a reasonably secure reconstruction: *adiḍanagaḍap(*r)acup(*a)n(*a)s(*a)kh(*a)ḍ(*a) asti di*. Regardless of whether *adiḍanagaḍapracupanasakhaḍa* is to be taken as a compound, the relationship among its various components is subject to two interpretations. First, the three adjectives, *adiḍ(a)*, *anagaḍa*, and *p(*r)acup(*a)n(*a)*, with elision of the final *a* vowel of the *adiḍa* preceding *anagaḍa*, could modify the final adjective, *sakhaḍa*, here construed substantively as “conditioned [factors] that are past, future, and present.” Second, the term might be interpreted not as *sakhaḍa* but as *asakhaḍa*, in this case meaning “unconditioned,” with elision of the final *a* vowel of the preceding term *p(*r)acup(*a)n(a)*. All four terms, *adiḍ(a)*, *anagaḍa*, *p(*r)acup(*a)n(a)*, and *asakhaḍa*, might then be interpreted as independent substantives as “past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors].” Indeed, this fourfold list is attested in a classification into five groups of factors “to be known” (Skt *jñeya*), the first four of which are “past and future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors].”¹⁹⁹ Given its function in this passage of our text elaborating upon the Sarvāstivāda position that “there is nothing that does not exist,” this phrase or compound is presumably intended to refer to all possible existent factors. Hence, the second interpretation that includes both conditioned and unconditioned factors is more likely: “past, future and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors].”²⁰⁰ In view of

¹⁹⁸ Text Notes: [64] + + + /// |^{52y(r)}[g].[ḍ]. |^{52B(v)+52F(r)}[a].[p].[ḍ].[dh].[m]. *pi anupaḍadhama pi* •.

¹⁹⁹ Skt *atītānāgataṃ pratyutpannam asaṃskṛtam* (AKBh 9 p. 463.1–3). Cf. ŚAŚ 21 p. 665c24ff., esp. 21 p. 666a2–3; AMVŚ 156 p. 796a7; TSS 1 p. 242b22–23, 3 p. 260c8ff.

²⁰⁰ In their categorization of factors, the Sarvāstivādins repeatedly stress that the category of “all factors” includes both conditioned and unconditioned factors, which, like factors of the three time periods, are defined in dependence upon one another. Hence, whereas the categories of either the eighteen elements or twelve sense spheres can be said to include all possible existent factors, the category of “five aggregates” (Skt *pañcaskandha*) must be supplemented with unconditioned factors: 言一切者謂五蘊及無為 (AMVŚ 73 p. 378c9). In discussions of the object-field of mental perceptual consciousness, this category of “all factors” is represented by the phrase, “[factors] of the three time periods and unconditioned factors” (三世及無為法, AMVŚ 73 p. 380c23, 156 p. 796a7; AVŚ 37 p. 275a15–16). Cf. NyAŚ 51 p. 630c7–8. Similarly, on the same issue of “things that are to be known” (Skt *jñeya*), the Pudgalanirdeśa section of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya refers to the position of Vātsīputrīyas, who claim that there are “five such [categories of factors] to be known, [including factors] of the past, future and present, uncon-

the elision of the final syllable in these two terms, the list has tentatively been interpreted as a dvandva compound in the plural, despite the use of the singular verb form *asti*.²⁰¹

The final syllable in line 83 could be read as *[di]*, *[ki]* or *[vi]*, but given that the proponent's criticism begins within the first few syllables in line 84, the reading *[di]*, concluding the opponent's prior statement, has been tentatively adopted.

[84] + + + ///^{52B(r)}*[rva]* *aha vatava*: Three syllables are estimated to be missing at the beginning of line 84, which is consistent with the two and four syllables estimated to be missing at the beginning of lines 83 and 85, respectively. The right portion of the first visible syllable in line 84 is on a chip that has slipped slightly underneath the right edge of strip 52B. It is, however, clearer on the initial black-and-white photograph and supports the reading *[rva]*, with *(*sa)* of *(*sa)rva* as the probable reading for the preceding third missing syllable.

The next five syllables in line 84, clearly to be read as *aha vatava*, are followed by a blank space of approximately six syllables, presumably resulting from the obstruction presented by the uneven bark surface at the glue-line juncture between lines 83 and 84. Elsewhere in this manuscript the finite verb forms *aha*, *ahadi*, or *ahasu* appear at the beginning of the clauses they govern and are used either alone or with an immediately preceding *yadi* to introduce a protasis that will be subjected to criticism. These finite forms of the root *ah* do not occur at the end of the clauses they govern, nor do they function in conjunction with *vatava* to govern a following clause. However, since *vatava* is often used in a preceding conditional construction to introduce an apodosis containing an untoward consequence, it is likely that line 84 begins with a dependent conditional clause, concluding atypically here with *aha* and followed by an independent clause beginning with *vatava*.

For the first two missing syllables in the line, there is unfortunately no physical and little contextual evidence. Finite forms of the root *ah* are used in our text to mark the citation of the opponent's position; this is clearly the case for *ahasu* in line 83, where the subject is explicitly given as *mahasarvastivaḍa*, and is thus also likely true of *aha* here in line 84. Further, the list of nonexistent entities in the subsequent clause governed by *vatava* constitutes an untoward consequence, presumably resulting from the opponent's previously stated position. Therefore, it has been assumed that the initial portion of line 84 preceded by the verb *aha* contains a statement representing the Sarvāstivādin opponent's view that "everything exists." As a result, the first two syllables in line 84 have been tentatively reconstructed as *(*asti)* resulting in the clause "[if] one states, [O] '(*That which exists) is everything'" (*(*asti sa)rva aha*), which would refer back to a statement attributed to the opponent in line 69.²⁰² And even though this suggested reconstruction is not consistent with syntactic patterns employing *aha* found elsewhere in our text, it is nonetheless possible in this context: "[If] one states, [O] '(*That which exists) is everything,' [P] it should be said that ..." (*(*asti sa)rva aha vatava ...*).

ditioned factors, and the ineffable" (Skt *pañcavidham jñeyam atītānāgataṃ pratyutpannam asaṃskṛtam avaktavyam iti*, AKBh 9 p. 463.1–2).

²⁰¹ Cf. 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 30, 31[2x], 38, 39, 69, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 76, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139; 51D(v) l. 3. Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva [a]viva[4]*^{51D(v)}*[ka]vivaga asti •*.

²⁰² Commentaries: Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; (3) Criticism Opponent's First Qualification [ll. 95–98].

[84] *ṣe[ṭha]*: The initial syllable *ṣe* is marked by a clear *e*-vowel diacritic, despite the expected reading *ṣaṭha* (P *chatṭha*, Skt *ṣaṣṭha*). Even though the two other instances of this word (ll. 89, 91) also contain faint ink markings that might suggest an *e*-vowel diacritic, an unequivocal reading is not possible in either of these other cases.

[85] + + + + /// • *t.e*^{52B(r)+52qq}*śaḍ. aya[ḍa]na a*^{52B(r)}*sti • ekuna*^{52ff+52B(r)}*viśadi dha*^{52B(r)}*du*: The initial visible syllables in line 85 are bisected by the lower edge of strip 52B, but their lower portions are preserved on chip 52qq, which covers the initial portion of line 80 (plt. 8). Metathesis of the syllables *śa* and *ḍa* has occurred in *t.eśaḍ.*, which, on the basis of similar constructions elsewhere, can be corrected to *t(*r)e(*ḍ)(*a)ḍ(*ś)a*.²⁰³ Immediately below the syllables *eku-* in *ekunaviśadi* is chip 52z, which is lodged in the separation between strips 52B and 52C.²⁰⁴ The ordinal number “nineteenth” appears four times in our text: twice as *ekunaviśadi* (ll. 85, 92); once as *ekunaviśada* (l. 120); and in one occurrence with an uncertain final vowel (*[ekuna]v[i]ś.[ḍ]*, l. 89). Since P/Skt *dhātu* is declined in the masculine in Sanskrit Buddhist sources and in the feminine in Pali, here the gender of G *dhadu* is uncertain, but it has been assumed to be feminine in accordance with its gender in MIA.²⁰⁵ Chip 52ff contains the lower tips of *viśadi dha* from *ekunaviśadi dhadu* in line 85 as well as the upper portion of *tre* from *sutrehi* in line 86 (plt. 8)

[85] *ar[ya]sace*: The left leg of *r[ya]* is very faint, and there appears to be an extraneous diagonal stroke of ink between the lower portions of *sa* and *ce*, but the reading is confirmed by the context.

[86] + + + + /// ^{52C(v)}*[• ya] pi nasti ta pi asti di • na*^{52C(v)+52z(r)}*sti*: The *na* of the first *nasti* appears to have been corrected from a prior *a*, whose upper and lower tips are still visible. The top portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic in the syllable *sti* within the second *nasti* is preserved on chip 52z(r) just below strip 52B(r).

[86] *sata asti* [87] + + + + /// *[t].va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śad[e]hi*: One dot of ink on the right edge of strip 52B(r) is understood as the remnant of *[t]*. in *vatava*, which is supported by both context and the following parallel clause in line 87.²⁰⁶ The punctuation mark prior to *eva* is followed by a space of approximately three syllables, which may have resulted from a crack and irregularity of the bark surface. In the midst of this blank space immediately above the crack are several blank chips, of which one contains a single dot of ink and may have become dislodged from the recto (l. 60). The middle portion of *d[e]* in *śad[e]hi* is covered by unplaced chip 52ss containing only one faint stroke of ink. Context and parallelism with a similar phrase in line 86 would suggest that the syllable be read as *de*, even though it does not carry the low and special *e*-vowel diacritic typical of *de* elsewhere.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ For *tredāśa*, see ll. 89, 91–92, 117. For the numeral three in compound as *tre*, and for the retroflexion of *ḍa*, see Norman 1992: 207 [§ 6.1.11.3]; Baums 2006: 36.

²⁰⁴ Text Notes: [58] + + + + /// *vatava kadha nasti na palena [sapal]. [yidi]* ^{52A(r)+52C(r)}*[ca] nasti*.

²⁰⁵ BHSD s.v. *dhātu*.

²⁰⁶ Text Notes: [71] + + + + /// ^{52gg}*[i]* ^{52gg+52G(r)}*[t]*. ^{52G(r)}*nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*.

²⁰⁷ See Paleography and Orthography § II. 2.4.1.15 *da* and *ḍa*.

II.6.3.5. ll. 88–95

Manuscript Notes: ll. 88–95

Since no ink remains in the last third of line 88 at the bottom of strip 52C(v), it is likely that line 88 ends with the visible punctuation mark just beyond its midpoint. There is no obvious explanation for this shortened line, but it is unlikely that the line was terminated in order to avoid a glue-line juncture since there is a clear glue-line juncture only five lines previously, between lines 83 and 84 in strip 52B(r). In line 89, the upper edge of the remainder of fragment 52A(v) is damaged with folded bark in its middle portion and numerous blank overlying pieces of bark at its left margin. Several unexplained vertical strokes of ink are preserved on two small chips (52uu, 52vv) located along the final third of the upper edge of fragment 52A(v), but their original location is uncertain. They may have been dislodged from the lower edge of strip 52B(v), and then became disordered and turned over recto to verso in conservation.²⁰⁸ In this scenario, chips 52uu and 52vv would originally have contained parts of the syllables at the end of line 64.²⁰⁹ As a second and less likely possibility, chips 52uu and 52vv might be construed as the only evidence of the otherwise completely hidden syllables in the last third of line 88. Unfortunately, neither chip contains sufficient ink to determine its correct placement.

The upper portions of the syllables in line 89 are obscured by bark that has become folded down along the upper edge of fragment 52A(v), possibly as a result of pressure along the juncture between 52A and the contiguous strip 52B. Blank pieces of surface bark and several chips with only a few stray spots of ink completely cover the final three syllables in line 89 and also obscure the final four syllables in line 90. It is possible that the chips containing ink were originally located in the hole at the end of line 95, which corresponds to this position immediately above lines 89–90 in the rolled scroll. However, since chips from the end of line 95 would be expected to have writing on both the recto and verso, the larger blank pieces of bark at the end of lines 89–90 were most likely dislodged from another location, perhaps from some point along this juncture between strip 52B and fragment 52A or from elsewhere in the manuscript.

Immediately below line 91, a crack extends slightly downward across the entire width of the manuscript, obscuring the lower portions of syllables in the first third of line 91 and bisecting the syllables in the latter part of line 92. At the beginning of line 91, the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A have separated; the lower segment should be shifted slightly to the right to realign the syllables in line 91 (corresponding to recto ll. 54–55).²¹⁰ Throughout this passage, the left margin of the manuscript is intact, and with the exception of line 95 only one syllable is missing from the right margin. The syllables at the beginning of line 95 are further damaged by stress along the glue-line juncture between lines 95 and 96.

²⁰⁸ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61.

²⁰⁹ Text Notes: [64] *upaḍadhama ta* ^{|52F(r)}[ava] + [up].[j].[ś]. /// + + [65] + + + /// [n].[pa]ḍadhama ta na *upajīśadi*.

²¹⁰ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61.

II. 88–95

Transcribed text

88. + + /// ^{52C(v)}[a].hadi nasti jiva • nasti bhūdatva • nasti pugala •
 89. + + /// ^{52A(v)}[st]i ṣ[e]ṭha kadha • nasti treḍaśa ayadana • nasti [ekuna]v[i]ś.[d]. dha[du]
 nasti [paṃc].[m]. [a].
 90. + + /// [s].ca • [ha]ta vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa • kici astiḍa paḍi[ya]naṣa • kic. [nastiḍ]. • [na
 ca] na vata
 91. + + /// [rva]m=asti di • yadi [taṣa] nasti pa[m]came aryasaca • nasti ṣ[e]ṭha kadha
 • nasti tre
 92. + + /// [śa] ayadana • nasti ekunaviśadi dhadu • nasti jiva • nasti bh[u]ḍatv. • nasti
 pu[ga]la •
 93. + + /// [d].[s]. viñanasa ki [a]raṃbana • ya eḍa viñana evaruva upajadi di • iḍasa cita
 94. + + /// [k]i [a].[r]..[b].[na] • ki aṣi[p]..[i] • yaṣa de ara^{52r+52A(v)}[m]^{52A(v)}banabhava nasti
 • upajadi ca[t].[n]. [t].
 95. + + /// ^{52A(v)}cita di •

Reconstruction

- (2) [88] (*yidi a)hadi nasti jiva • nasti bhūdatva • nasti pugala • [89] (*na)sti ṣeṭha kadha
 • nasti treḍaśa ayadana • nasti ekunaviś(*a)d(*i) dhadu nasti paṃc(*a)m(*a a)[90](*rya)-
 s(*a)ca • hata vivarjavaḍa bhoṣa • kici astiḍa paḍiyanāṣa • kic(*i) nastiḍ(*a) • na ca na
 vata[91](*va sa)rvam asti di • yadi taṣa nasti paṃcame aryasaca • nasti ṣeṭha kadha •
 nasti tre[92](*ḍa)śa ayadana • nasti ekunaviśadi dhadu • nasti jiva • nasti bhūdatv(*a) •
 nasti pugala • [93] (*i)ḍ(*a)s(*a) viñanasa ki araṃbana • ya eḍa viñana evaruva upajadi
 di • iḍasa cita[94](*sa) ki (*a)r(*aṃ)b(*a)na • ki aṣip(*ad)i • yaṣa de araṃbanabhava
 nasti • upajadi cat(*u)n(*a) t(*a)[95](*śa ta) cita di •

Translation

- (2) [88] (*If) one states, [o] “There exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists
 no person, [89] there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, there
 exists no nineteenth element, there exists no fifth [90] noble truth,” [p] well then, it is you
 who maintain distinctions! [Since] you admit something to be existence and something to
 be nonexistence, isn’t it the case that it should not be said [91] that “everything exists?”
 If in that way there exists no fifth (*noble) truth, there exists no sixth aggregate, there
 exists no [92] thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no
 soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, [93] what is the object-support
 of this perceptual consciousness, since this perceptual consciousness arises with the form
 of [these nonexistent entities]? [94] What is the object-support of this moment of thought,
 what is the sovereign condition, insofar as the “nature” of the object-support does not
 exist, [and yet] (*that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] [95] in that way?

Text Notes: ll. 88–95

[88] + + ///^{52C(v)}[a].*hadi*: On the basis of the length of lines 86–87, approximately two syllables are estimated to be missing from the beginning of line 88. Of the expected initial syllable [a] of [a]-*hadi*, only the upper right tip may be visible beneath several blank chips on the right edge, but the reading is supported by context. Given the frequent use of verb forms of the root *ah* in conditional clauses, the first two syllables in line 88 have been reconstructed with the indeclinable conditional particle *yidi*.

[88] *nasti pugala* •: The bottom portions of *nasti* are preserved on chip 52aa(v), and chip 52tt partially covers the lower portion of the syllable *pu* in *pugala*.²¹¹ Line 88 ends just beyond the midpoint of strip 52C(v), but parallel statements in lines 84–85 and 91–92 strongly suggest that line 88 continues immediately to line 89 without a major lacuna.

[89] + ///^{52A(v)}[st]i ṣ[e]ṭha: Context suggests [st]i for the reading of the first visible syllable in line 89, which is supported by an *i*-vowel diacritic and the remaining upper left tip of the base character *st-*. Context and parallel passages in the text also confirm that the preceding missing syllable is (**na*) in (**na*)[st]i. Across the lower portion of ṣ[e] lies a small chip 52ww, as yet unplaced. The area above ṣ[e] has broken into small chips, of which one contains a diagonal stroke of ink that might, after clockwise rotation, be read as an *e*-vowel diacritic on the base character ṣ-. An *e* vowel is not expected in the ordinal *ṣaṭha* (P *chaṭṭha*, Skt *ṣaṣṭha*), and the other occurrences of the word are inconsistent; in line 84, the reading *ṣe* is clear, but in line 91, the *e*-vowel diacritic is uncertain.²¹² Finally, the lower portion of the syllable *ṭha* is covered by a blank chip.

[89] *treḍaśa ayadana* •: The shape of *tre* here is atypical and has perhaps been altered in anticipation of the following syllable *da* (cf. *tre* in ll. 91, 85, 86, 87, 117, 136). The *e*-vowel diacritic is visible beneath a narrow overlying blank chip. From the word *ayadana* onward, the remaining syllables in line 89 are obscured both by the edge of fragment 52A, which has become folded downward, and by blank pieces of surface bark and stray chips.

[89] [pam̐c].[m]. [a]. [90] + /// [s].ca •: The last four syllables in line 89 are obscured by multiple overlapping pieces of blank surface bark and stray chips with minimal spots of ink, which could have been dislodged from the underlying manuscript layer or possibly from the juncture between strip 52B and fragment 52A. The infrared image reveals the outlines of certain syllables underneath the overlying blank surface bark: for example, the upper portion of [pam̐c], the lower portion of [c]., both arms of [m]., as well as the vertical stroke of [a].. Only the lower tip of the initial syllable [s]. in line 90 remains at the right edge of the manuscript, but both the context and the probable readings of the preceding and following syllables support the reading [s]. in *saca* (P *sacca*, Skt *satya*). Parallelism with similar phrasing in lines 85 and 91 suggests that the first missing syllable in line 90 be reconstructed as (**rya*) in the expected phrase *pam̐c(*a)m(*a arya)saca*.

[90] [ha]ta vivarjavadā bhōṣa •: The lower horizontal stroke of the syllable read as [ha] is partially covered by a small unplaced chip (52xx) containing one small horizontal stroke of ink. The Gāndhārī form *hata* in this statement has been interpreted as an exhortative particle (P

²¹¹ Text Notes: [58] + + /// *vatava kadha nasti na palena [sapal]. [yidi]* ^{52A(r)+52C(r)}[ca] *nasti*; [85] + + + + /// • *t.e* ^{52B(r)+52qq}ṣad. *aya[da]na a* ^{52B(r)}sti • *ekuna* ^{52ff+52B(r)}viṣadi *dha* ^{52B(r)}du.

²¹² Text Notes: [84] ṣe[ṭha]; [91] ṣ[e]ṭha.

handā, Skt *hanta*) translated by “well then,” with the exhortative force indicated in the translation by both the emphatic syntactic pattern inverting the copula construction, “it is you ...,” and the exclamation point.

The probable correspondence between the Gāndhārī form *vivarjavadā* and P *vibhajjavāda* (Skt *vibhajjavāda*) suggests that *va* and *rja* represent Gāndhārī reflexes for the intervocalic voiced aspirate consonant *-bh-* and the consonant cluster *-jy-* (MIA *-jj-*), respectively. Even though intervocalic *-bh-* generally remains in this and other manuscripts in the BL collection,²¹³ it frequently becomes *-v-* elsewhere, such as in the Senior manuscripts or other Gāndhārī texts.²¹⁴ The preconsonantal *r* in the syllable *-rja-* can be interpreted as indicating the MIA geminate *-jj-* corresponding to P *vibhajja*, a phenomenon observed in this manuscript in the form *samavarjadi* (l. 55) corresponding to P *samāpajjati*.

Even though the modified sibilant *ṣ* is not employed consistently in this manuscript, it nonetheless appears frequently in this and other Gāndhārī texts for intervocalic *-th-/dh-*.²¹⁵ In line 90, the modified sibilant *ṣ* in *bhoṣa* would then represent the regular MIA second-person plural present ending *-tha* on the root *bhū*, thus “you are.” It is also possible that the form *bhoṣa* is intended to represent the second-person plural imperative with the present ending *-tha* extended to the imperative.²¹⁶ In this case, it would have the sense “you must be” as an expression of the speaker’s assumption or will.

[90] *astida paḍi[ya]naṣa* •: The syllable read as *[ya]* as well as the preceding syllables *-da paḍi* are all shorter than normal and may have been abbreviated to avoid an area of uneven surface bark. Comparison with a similar finite verb form *paḍi[ya]nadi* in line 122 supports the reading *[ya]* in the finite verb form *paḍi[ya]naṣa* (P *paṭijānātha*, Skt *pratijānātha*), where *y* is the usual Gāndhārī reflex for the MIA intervocalic voiced consonant *-j-*. The reading *paḍi[ya]naṣa* is further supported by forms from the same root *jñā* in the Senior manuscripts: *prayaṇati* RS20: 20 [v3]; *payanaṭi* RS20: 21 [v4]; *payanaṃi* RS19: 31 [v13]; *pariyaṇadi* RS5: 24, 25. As in the case of *bhoṣa* cited above, *paḍiyanaṣa* has been interpreted as the second-person plural present of *prati* + *√jñā* with the ending G *-ṣa* < Skt *-tha*, “you admit.”

[90] *kic. [nastid]*. • *[na ca] na vata*[91] + + /// *[rva]m=asti di* •: The upper portions of *c.* *[nasti]* are covered by chip 52yy, which contains only one stroke of ink and is as yet unplaced. Although an *i*-vowel diacritic on the syllable *c.* is hidden, *kic.* has been reconstructed as *kic(*i)* through parallelism with the following form *kici*. The syllables *[na ca] na vata* are obscured by various overlying blank pieces of surface bark and one unplaced chip 52zz containing two dots of ink. Nonetheless, the infrared image clarifies the outlines of the syllables and suggests the reading *[na ca] na vata*.

²¹³ Salomon 2000: 86 [§ I.6.2.1.5]; Allon 2001: 84 [§ 5.2.2.5]. Cf. l. 35 *avis(*a)kh(*a)rodi* (P *abhisankharoti*, Skt *abhisamkaroti*).

²¹⁴ Salomon 2008: 340 [§ II.6.2.1.5]; Glass 2007: 117 [§ 5.2.1.5].

²¹⁵ Bailey 1946: 776–777; Brough 1962: 94 [§ 43]; Fussman 1989: 481–482 [§§ 35.3–5]; Salomon 1999: 121 [§ 6.3].

²¹⁶ BHSG 132 [§§ 26.10–15]; Salomon 2008: 152 [§ II.4.5.3].

Immediately below line 91 (corresponding to recto ll. 54–55), a crack extends across the entire width of the manuscript and obscures the lower portions of syllables in the first half of the line. The lower segment of fragment 52A should be shifted slightly to the right as indicated by the lower tip of *sti*, which is preserved on the lower segment. Since only the upper left tip of the first visible syllable in line 91 remains, the reading *[rva]* with the reconstruction of the two preceding syllables as *(*va sa)* is based on context and yields the reconstruction *vata(*va sa)rvam asti di*. Unplaced chip 52aaa, marked with one small dot of ink, lies immediately above *ma*.

[91] *yadi [taṣa] nasti pa[m]came*: Unplaced chip 52bbb containing one small dot of ink lies over the right side of *ya*, but the reading *ya* is clear in the infrared image. The shape of the letter read as *[ta]*, with its lower tip trailing off toward the left, is atypical for *ta* and more closely resembles a *ba* (cf. *ta* in *cita*, l. 95). The lower portion of the following syllable is partially covered by chips dislodged from the crack below line 91, but the infrared image suggests that it should likely be read as *sa* or *ṣa*, supporting the reading of the prior syllable as *[ta]* in *taṣa* (P/Skt *tathā*).

When the lower segment of fragment 52A is shifted slightly to the right at the crack below line 91, a curved stroke of ink at the top edge of the lower segment between the *pa* and *ca* becomes an anusvāra on the syllable *pa* in *pa[m]came*. This anusvāra, although warranted in the case of *pa* in *paṃcama* (Skt *pañcama*), is also typical for the base character *p*- as usually written by this scribe.

[91] *ṣ[e]ṭha*: Even though an *e* vowel is not expected in the ordinal *ṣaṭha* (Skt *ṣaṣṭha*) and is uncertain in *ṣ[e]ṭha* in line 89, it is clear in the case of *ṣe[ṭha]* in line 84. Here in line 91, a faint *e*-vowel diacritic, visible on the digital image, is reinforced by the infrared image.

[91] *nasti tre[92] + ///[śa] ayadana* •: The top horizontal stroke of *sti* is almost completely abraded, but the outline of both the upper portion of the base character *st*- and the *i*-vowel diacritic are clearly visible in the infrared image. The lower left leg of *śa* is covered by two chips: on the right, chip 52t, which is blank on the verso; and on the left, unplaced chip 52ccc, which contains a small curved stroke of ink partially covered by chip 52t. The initial missing syllable in line 92 has been reconstructed as *(*ḍa)* to form *tre(*ḍa)śa ayadana*, “thirteenth sense sphere.”

[92] *nasti bh[u]datv. • nasti pu[gala]* •: The upper portion of the *bh[u]* is abraded, and only the upper portion of the *u*-vowel diacritic is preserved, but both letters are legible in the infrared image, which also clarifies the following *ḍa* and *tv*. (ll. 84, 88). The syllable *[ga]* in *pu[gala]* is extremely narrow and compressed, and the lower portion of *[la]* is lost in the deteriorated left margin. Context, however, confirms the reading *pu[gala]*.

[93] + /// *[ḍ].[s]*•: Only a curved vertical stroke is preserved from the first visible syllable in line 93. The second syllable is largely covered by blank chips, but its upper portion supports the reading *[s]*•. On the basis of the length of line 92, only one syllable is estimated to be missing at the right edge of the manuscript in line 93, allowing for the reconstruction *(*i)ḍ(*a)s(*a)*, which is also supported by the phrase *iḍasa cita* later in line 93.

[93] *evaruva*: The syllable *ru* appears to end in a long curving tail, resembling an elongated *sa*, but the infrared image clearly reveals the presence of an *u*-vowel diacritic, indicating that the lower portion of this curve is not ink.

[94] + /// *[k]i [a].[r]..[b].[na] • ki aṣi[p]..[i] •*: On the basis of the length of line 92, one or two syllables are estimated to be missing from the beginning of line 94. The five initial visible syllables in line 94 are severely abraded, and their lower portions are obscured by a crack that

extends across the width of the manuscript under line 94 (corresponding to recto ll. 51–52). For the first syllable *[ki]*, the *i*-vowel diacritic and the top horizontal of the base character *k*- are visible. For the second syllable *[a]*., there appears to be a horizontal stroke of ink cutting across the top curve; this is actually ink on a separate chip. The upper portion of the third syllable *[r]*. and the fifth and final syllable *[na]* are fairly clear, but the fourth syllable *[b]*. can be read only with the aid of the infrared image. An anusvāra-like foot mark clearly appears on the base character *r*- in the word *araṃbana* in line 93, and the reconstruction *(*a)r(*aṃ)b(*a)na* has been adopted here as well.²¹⁷ The lower portion of *[p]*. in *aṣi[p]..[i]* is obscured by unplaced chip 52ddd containing one faint spot of ink. The final two graphs transcribed as *[i •]* are almost completely obscured by overlying and unplaced chip 52eee, but the infrared image clearly reveals three dots of ink visible just above its upper edge. The first two of these three dots have been interpreted as the upper tips of the *i*-vowel diacritic and the base character *d*- in *(*d)i*, and the final dot, as the punctuation mark. Chip 52eee, whose original location has not been determined, contains the remnants of three or possibly four syllables read as *[a].[h].[s]*..²¹⁸

[94] *yaṣa de ara*^{52r+52A(v)}*[ṃ]*^{52A(v)}*banabhava*: Chip 52eee covers the lower left tip of *ya* and the lower tip of *ṣa*, which is revealed by the infrared image to extend toward the right, supporting the reading *ṣa*. The upper portion of the syllable read as *de* is relatively straight and resembles at least one other example of a cursive *ne* (l. 36). The lower portion of *ra[ṃ]* in *ara[ṃ]banabhava* is lost in the crack below line 94, but faint ink in the middle of the folded-over fragment 52r could be construed as an anusvāra in the word *araṃbana*, which clearly appears in the same word in line 93 (plt. 8; recto l. 51).

Even though the compound *ara[ṃ]bana-bhava* likely functions as a tatpuruṣa, two interpretations are possible depending upon how the final member is construed: (1) the “nature (P/Skt *bhāva*) of the object-support,” where *bhava* in this criticism offered by the proponent refers to “nature” in the sense of a factor’s distinguishing characteristic in contrast to its varying “mode”²¹⁹; or (2) the “presence” or the “absence of an object-support,” depending upon whether the final member is taken as *bhava* (*bhāva*) or *abhava* (*abhāva*). According to the first interpretation, the proponent demands that the Sarvāstivādin opponent identify the specific object-support and sovereign conditions for the cognition of nonexistent entities: “... insofar as the ‘nature’ of object-support (*araṃbanabhava*) does not exist, [and yet] (*that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] in that way?” (*yaṣa de araṃbanabhava nasti • upajadi cat(*u)n(*a) ta(*ṣa ta) cita di •*, ll. 94–95). In other words, in the case of the previous list of nonexistent entities such as the fifth noble truth, and so forth, there is no existent entity that can serve as the requisite object-support condition for the arising of cognition. However, since the Sarvāstivādins maintain that all moments of thought arise on the basis of four conditions and that such effective conditions must exist, they must then identify the existent object-support condition even for cognizing nonexistent entities such as the fifth noble truth.²²⁰ In the second interpretation, the compound *ara[ṃ]banabhava* is

²¹⁷ For a discussion of anusvāra and pseudo-anusvāra, see Paleography and Orthography § II.2.2 Characters with Anusvāra.

²¹⁸ Text Notes: [95] *asti [ca] sarva di* |^{52r+52A(v)}*• cakhāḍa*|^{52A(v)}*na*.

²¹⁹ Commentary: Opponent’s Fundamental Proposition and Seven Declarations [ll. 66–69].

²²⁰ Commentary: (2) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 88–95].

understood either as *ara[m̐]bana-bhava*, “presence of the object-support,” or as *ara[m̐]ban(a)-abhava*, “absence of an object-support.” According to the first option, the proponent demands rhetorically that the opponent identify an object-support that is present in this particular case of the cognition of nonexistent entities: “... insofar as there is no presence of an object-support, [and yet] (*that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] in that way?” (*arambanabhava nasti*). According to the second option, the proponent offers a generalized restatement of the Sarvāstivāda assertion that cognition depends upon four existent conditions and hence only occurs with an object-support: “there is no absence of the object-support (*arambanabhava nasti*), and (*this) moment of thought arises from four [conditions].”²²¹ Either of these two interpretations is possible and would, in the end, support the same conclusion; that is to say, if the Sarvāstivādin opponent claims that entities such as the fifth noble truth do not exist, the cognition of such entities cannot be said to rely upon an existent object-support condition, and the Sarvāstivāda assertion that cognition arises on the basis of four existent conditions is thereby violated. However, since the first interpretation of *bhava* as “nature” conforms both to the proponent’s interpretation of *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) and to its function in compound-final position elsewhere, the first interpretation with the sense of *bhava* as “nature” has been tentatively adopted in this passage as well.²²²

[94] *upajadi ca[t].[n]. [t]. [95] + + ///* ^{52A(v)}*cita di •*: The lower portions of the final eight syllables in line 94 are lost in the crack that extends across the width of the manuscript immediately below the line. Nonetheless, the readings of the first five syllables *upajadi ca* are clear. The upper portion of the next syllable would support the readings *t.*, *s.*, or *r.*; its lower portion, which is covered by a blank chip, could have contained an *u*-vowel diacritic yielding *tu*. However, the slightly greater distance between *ca* and this next syllable would also provide ample space for a postconsonantal *v*, yielding *tva*. In the context of this passage, either of these two readings, *catu* or *catva*, would refer to the four conditions (Skt *pratyaya*) employed by the Sarvāstivādins to explain the arising of thought (Skt *citta*) and thought concomitants (Skt *caitta*), namely, the object-support condition (Skt *āmbanapratyaya*) and the sovereign condition (Skt *adhipatipratyaya*), mentioned previously in line 94, in addition to the immediately contiguous condition (Skt *samanantarapratyaya*) and the causal condition (Skt *hetupratyaya*).²²³

Unfortunately, the readings of the final two syllables in line 94 are uncertain. The penultimate syllable could be read as *r.*, *d/d.*, or *n.*, and the final syllable as *t.* or *r.*. The context, which refers to the Sarvāstivāda position that thought arises on the basis of four conditions, suggests an oblique

²²¹ For the sandhi elision of the final vowel of the prior member of a compound, see Text Notes: [83] *adiḍanagaḍa[p].[acup].[n].[s].[kh].[d]. [asti di]*.

²²² Commentaries: Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 69–75]; Criticism Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134]; Criticism Opponent’s Second, Third (?), and Fourth (?) Specifications [l. 135–51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 5]; Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

²²³ VK 3 p. 547a3ff., 11 p. 584a29ff.; PrP (tr. GBh) 4 p. 645b6–7; PrP (tr. Xz) 5 p. 712b12–13; AASKŚ 2 p. 776a2ff., 20 p. 863a20ff.; JñPr 1 p. 921c7ff., passim.; AKBh 2.61c p. 98.5–6; AKVy 232.9; NyAŚ 20 p. 451a9ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (AMVŚ 16 p. 79a26–28) notes that the sūtra mentions only the set of four conditions (Skt **pratyaya*), and not the six causes (Skt **hetu*). It (AMVŚ 21 p. 108c21ff.) further cites the Prajñaptiśāstra as the source for the model of the four conditions, although they do not appear in the sections of the Prajñaptiśāstra extant in Chinese translation (T 1538).

form of “four,” possibly in the genitive masculine *catuna*, here understood with an ablative sense.²²⁴ However, since the first two syllables in line 95 are missing, the reconstruction of the intervening syllables prior to *cita di* is mere conjecture: “... [and yet] (*that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] in that way” (*upajadi cat(*u)n(*a) ta(*ṣa ta) cita di •*, ll. 94–95).

II.6.3.6. ll. 95–98

Manuscript Notes: ll. 95–98

Immediately above the second half of line 95 is a juncture that corresponds to a glue-line juncture visible on the recto between lines 49 and 50. The first ten syllables in line 95, which are written on the upper segment of fragment 52A, are followed by a blank space of approximately seven syllables. However, fragment 52r, now visible on the recto just above and partially obscuring line 51, was originally located here in line 95. Fragment 52r contains a punctuation mark, a blank space of approximately six syllables, and portions of several syllables in lines 94–95.²²⁵ It is possible that this blank space on fragment 52r originally contained additional syllables, but there is no clear evidence of delamination.²²⁶ The middle and latter portions of the syllables in line 95 following fragment 52r are written on the lower segment of fragment 52A below the glue-line juncture.

A blank space also extends approximately 4 cm from the right edge of the verso at the beginning of line 96. It contains a long rectangular delaminated area of which either the upper or lower edge probably represents the beginning of the original glue-line juncture that runs just above line 95. If the lower edge of the delaminated area corresponds to the glue-line juncture, a portion of the upper segment of fragment 52A above the glue-line juncture at the beginning of line 96 would then have become delaminated after the initial gluing. It is also possible that the original glue-line juncture ran above or even through the now delaminated area, and that the surface bark on the lower segment of fragment 52A along the initial portion of the glue-line juncture at the beginning of line 96 broke away at a later point. Neither scenario precludes the possibility that this delaminated area once contained syllables that might be found on a displaced chip.²²⁷ However, since only a few miniscule dots of ink appear either along the lower straight edge of the delaminated area or on otherwise blank chips (52hhh, 52iii), it is more likely that this space at the beginning of line 96 was left blank by the scribe.

A crack between lines 94 and 95, likely caused by stress from the glue-line juncture between these two lines, extends across the width of the manuscript, widening at the midpoint to a long narrow separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A, and at the left margin, to a triangular hole. This crack obliterates the lower portions of several syllables at the beginning and end of line 94, and chips dislodged from this crack obscure the final portion of line 95.²²⁸

²²⁴ BHSG 46 [§§ 7.54–59]; Speijer 1993 [1886]: 93–94 [§§ 125–126]; Renou 1975 [1961]: 305 [§ 222.d].

²²⁵ Text Notes: [51] + + ///[ḍa]dhama avaśa upajadi di.

²²⁶ Text Notes: [95] *asti [ca] sarva di* |^{52r+52A(v)}• *cakhaḍḍa* |^{52A(v)}na.

²²⁷ Text Notes: [96] (///) *duadaśa a?yaḍana bhavati •*. Commentary: (3) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 95–98].

²²⁸ Commentary: (3) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 95–98].

The syllables in line 98 are bisected and shortened by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript widening to a hole at the left edge. The upper and lower portions of these syllables can be realigned by moving the lower segment of fragment 52A approximately one syllable to the right.

ll. 95–98

Transcribed text

95. *asti [ca] sarva di* |^{52r+52A(v)}• *cakhaīḍa*|^{52A(v)}*na ca asti • te*|^{52III+52A(v)}*[n]. [c].[kh].[i]-*
|^{52A(v)}*[d].[na]*

96. (///) *duaḍaśa a?yaḍana bhavati • [y].[di r].[v].[ca]khai-*

97. *ḍana asti • [na] ca ta sarva di • tena de asti sarva se ca nasti • asti kica sarva [ki]-*

98. *[c]. na [sa]rva di • vatava tena [de sarva] ki*|^{52mmm+52A(v)}*[c]. [asti] |*^{52A(v)}• *[kica] na*
vatava a[st]i •

Reconstruction

(3) [95] *asti ca sarva di • cakhaīḍana ca asti • ten(*a) c(*a)kh(*a)īḍ(*a)na* [96] *duaḍaśa ayaḍana bhavati • y(*a)di r(*u)v(*a)cakhai*[97]*ḍana asti • na ca ta sarva di • tena de asti sarva se ca nasti • asti kica sarva ki*[98]*c(*a) na sarva di • vatava tena de sarva kic(*a) asti • kica na vatava asti •*

Translation

(3) [95] And [one states], [o] “That which exists is everything.” [p] And the visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, [96] the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere. If [one states], [o] “[Since both] the material-form [sense sphere] and the visual sense sphere [97] exist, it is not the case that that [visual sense sphere] is everything,” [p] as a result of that, the [proposition,] “that which exists is everything,” is not upheld. [If you respond,] [o] “that which exists is in some cases everything [98] [and] in some cases not everything,” [p] it should be said that, as a result of that, everything in some cases [should be said to] exist [and] in some cases should not be said to exist.

Text Notes: ll. 95–98

[95] *asti [ca] sarva di* |^{52r+52A(v)}• *cakhaīḍa*|^{52A(v)}*na*: The upper portion of [ca] is covered by a small piece of bark that has become folded over from the recto surface along the crack above line 95 (corresponding to recto l. 52). The syllable *di* is followed by a blank area of approximately seven syllables, at the top of which is a straight crack marking the glue-line juncture. A long piece of bark (52r) originally following *di* on the verso slipped through the hole above line 95 and has come to rest on the recto surface in the middle of line 51. This piece of bark contains a punctuation mark followed by a corresponding blank space of approximately seven syllables and then the upper tips of three syllables that can be realigned with *cakhaī* with which line 95 continues after the blank space. Fragment 52r also contains one faint stroke of ink that represents the probable anusvāra at the bottom of the *ra* in *ara[m]bana* in line 94. The realignment of these

syllable fragments with syllables in lines 94 and 95 confirms that fragment 52r was originally located within line 95 (plt. 8).²²⁹

It is impossible to determine whether the blank spaces on both fragment 52r and the main manuscript in line 95 were found in the manuscript when in its original state. If these blank spaces were original, they might be explained as the result of an attempt to avoid irregular surface bark, an intentional omission on the part of the scribe resulting from obscure or damaged portions of the archetype, or the scribe's own difficulty in understanding the passage. A syntactically similar passage in lines 115–117 suggests that this blank space does not signal a substantial omission, intentional or otherwise: “[One states,] [o] ‘Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres [116] exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres’” (*ya duḍaśa ayaḍanehi sagrahiḍa ta asti di cakhaḍdana ca asti di tena cakhaḍdana duḍaśaayaḍanasag(*ra)hiḍa*, ll. 115–117). In this later passage, the phrase *cakhaḍdana ca asti* is marked by the quotative particle *di*, which could indicate a citation, very possibly of this very statement in line 95. This would then suggest that the phrase *cakhaḍdana ca asti* in line 95 also constitutes a complete clause and likely represents the position of the opponent. Alternatively, it remains possible that fragment 52r originally contained syllables that have been abraded or lost, even though it preserves no evidence of effaced ink or clearly demarcated boundaries that would suggest delamination. For example, chip 52eee lying just above line 95 contains the remnants of three syllables read as *[a].[h].[s].*, “they state” (*ahasu*), which might originally have belonged within this blank space introducing the phrase *cakhaḍdana ca asti*. However, the verb *ahasu* adds little to the sense of the statement, which is clearly intended to refer to the position of the opponent, and results in a syntactic pattern inconsistent with that of the following arguments in which no introductory verb *aha* or *ahasu* is employed (ll. 98, 102, 105, 109, 115). Thus, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the blank spaces on fragment 52r and within line 95 have been construed as original. As a result, chip 52eee containing *ahasu* remains unplaced.

[95] *te*^{52lll+52A(v)}*[n]. [c].[kh].[i]*^{52A(v)}*[d].[na]*: The syllables *[n]. [c].* are obscured by a long diagonal unplaced chip (52fff) bearing the remnants of one illegible syllable. The remaining syllables in line 95 are severely abraded, and the final syllable *[na]* is covered by unplaced chip 52ggg, which contains only two faint spots of ink. However, the infrared image of fragment 52A(v) at the end of line 95 reveals the lower portions of *[kh].*, a clear *i*-vowel diacritic, the lower portion of *[d].*, as well as the virtually certain syllable *[na]*. The upper portions of these syllables can be found on chip 52lll located at the end of line 96, which preserves the top of *[kh].*, preceded by the top of *[c].* and a dot of ink that could be construed as the top of *[n].*, and followed by a curved stroke that could be the top of a vowel-carrying sign. Hence, when chip 52lll is placed at the end of line 95, the reading *[c].[kh].[iḍ].[na]* seems secure (plt. 8).

[96] (///) *duḍaśa a?yaḍana bhavati* •: There is a blank space of approximately eleven syllables at the beginning of line 96. Within this blank space is a long horizontal crack, possibly a glue-line juncture, immediately above which a rectangular portion of surface bark has become delaminated. Several dots of ink on otherwise blank chips (52hhh, 52iii) are located near the left edge of the

²²⁹ Text Notes: [51] + + ///[ḍa]dhama avaśa upajadi di.

delaminated area near the beginning of the remainder of line 96; only one miniscule dot of ink appears on the surface bark itself, just below the delaminated area. Since it is impossible to determine whether this area contained syllables that have become lost, and since the following portion of line 96 continues from the final phrase *ten(*a) c(*a)kh(*a)id(*a)na* in line 95, the reconstruction and translation assume that this space was blank in the original manuscript.

Since a punctuation mark is not warranted within the word *a?yaḍana*, the circular spot between *a* and *ya* has been interpreted as a stray ink spot or an aborted syllable, perhaps resulting from an area of rough surface bark (cf. ll. 10, 38, 40, 59, 81).

Even though the syllables *di* and *ti* are generally not distinguished in this manuscript, the syllable read as *ti* in *bhavati* displays the marked curve that would be expected in the case of *ti*, and this reading is warranted as the equivalent of the cluster *nti* in Skt *bhavanti*.

[96] [y].[di r].[v].[ca]khai[97]ḍana asti • [na] ca ta sarva di •: Several chips (52fff, 52ggg, 52jjj, 52kkk, 52lll) and layers of bark obscure the remaining syllables in line 96. The syllables [r].[v]. are partially covered by chip 52lll, which reads [n].[c].[kh].[i] and can be placed at the end of line 95.²³⁰ The lower tip of [r]. curves toward the left and extends upward, but the full *u*-vowel diacritic is not visible. Only the extreme upper right and lower tips of [v]. are visible above and below chip 52lll, and hence the reconstruction *r(*u)v(*a)* is tentative and based largely on context. Since the sense spheres are virtually always cited in the order of organ/object-field (e.g., *cakhu-ruva*), the order *ruva-cakhu* in this dvandva compound is unexpected. The upper portion of the final syllable *i* in line 96 is obscured by chip 52ggg. Chips 52jjj and 52kkk, which both contain only dots of ink, remain unplaced. The upper tip of the syllable read as [na] in line 97 is lost in a small area of delaminated bark, but the remaining vertical stroke leaves few options other than [na].

[97] [ki][98][c]. na [sa]rva di •: Only the upper left tip of the [c]. remains on the right edge of the manuscript, but the reading [c]. is suggested by the final syllable [ki] in line 97.

[98] ki^{52mmm+52A(v)}[c]. [asti] ^{52A(v)}• [kica] na vatava a[sti]i •: A crack bisects line 98, distorting these thirteen syllables and widening to a separation in the final seven syllables in the line. However, the upper and lower portions of the bisected syllables can be realigned by shifting the lower segment approximately one syllable to the right. The middle portions of [c]. [a] as well as the *i*-vowel diacritic in [sti] are on chip 52mmm, which has been forced slightly upward and rotated counterclockwise as a result of this crack. Given the distortion resulting from the crack and chip movement, the reading [a] is uncertain, but the rounded top and short height both suggest [a] rather than [na].

II.6.3.7. ll. 98–102

Manuscript Notes: ll. 98–102

The final seven syllables in line 98 are bisected by a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 52A. These bisected syllables can be realigned by shifting the lower segment approximately one syllable to the right (plts. 8, 7; recto l. 47).

²³⁰ Text Notes: [95] te^{52lll+52A(v)}[n].[c].[kh].[i]^{52A(v)}[ḍ].[na].

In lines 99–101, numerous chips migrated away from their original locations along the right or lower edges of fragment 52A when frame 52 was turned over from recto to verso during the initial black-and-white photographing, and further shifting of these chips occurred in the interval between the initial black-and-white photographs and the digital images. One of the larger chips (52i) and the majority of the smaller chips along the top remain unplaced, but the original location of several of the larger chips (52j, 52k, 52m, 52n) can be determined on the basis of the initial black-and-white photograph of the recto surface of manuscript part 52.²³¹ A blank space of approximately four syllables follows the five initial syllables visible in line 101. From the middle of this blank space a juncture curves upward, intersecting the lower portions of the final eleven syllables in line 100 and terminating at the left margin. The remainder of line 101, which is lower than the initial portion of the line, begins immediately after the blank space and below the juncture. The bark along the lower edge of this crack near the left margin has become folded downward and partially obscures the final three or four syllables in line 101.

The blank space near the beginning of line 101, the lower position of the latter portion of the line, and the bark that has become folded downward at the edge of this juncture at the end of the line all suggest a glue-line juncture above the line, this indicating where manuscript part 51 was glued on top of manuscript part 52. Fragment 52A(v) comes to an end 1 cm below line 101, and approximately 0.5 cm above its lower edge are remnants of the upper portions of syllables in line 102 whose lower portions are located on the upper verso edge of fragment 51H.²³² Even though the verso of fragment 51H as currently conserved begins with line 102, since manuscript parts 51 and 52 were originally glued together to form a single sheet, it is likely that the original upper verso edge of 51H corresponds with the juncture through line 101 on fragment 52A(v). According to this scenario, the initial portion of line 101 was written on fragment 52A(v), while the remainder of the line was written on the original upper verso edge of fragment 51H. When manuscript parts 51 and 52 became separated, the glue-line juncture remained intact, and manuscript part 51 broke away just above line 102, leaving its upper verso portion still attached to the verso of manuscript part 52.

Above the upper edge of fragment 51H(v) are a number of small chips (51sss, 51ttt, 51uuu, 51vvv, 51www, 51xxx) that became separated from the right and upper edges of the manuscript after the initial black-and-white photographs were taken. Even though most of these chips are blank on the recto, several can be placed on the basis of ink preserved on the recto or the verso.

ll. 98–102

Transcribed text

98. *sarvat[r]a sarva*

99. + /// |^{52m(v)+52A(v)}[sti] |^{52A(v)}di • *tena cakhaīḍana ruvaiḍana neraiyabhav sarvabhav asti*
• *peyala*

100. |^{52m(v)+52n(v)}[sva] |^{52A(v)}bhav[e] parabhav[e] asti • *parabhava svabhav asti* • *yadi ahadi*
na vatava [sa].[va]-

²³¹ Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

²³² Manuscript Notes: ll. 36–45; ll. 102–105.

101. |^{52k(v)}[t].. [s].|^{52A(v)}rva asti [di] • tatra vatave eva sate sarva[t].e [s]..[ve n].[st].
 102. + + /// |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51xxx(v)}[c]. |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51www(v)}asti |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[k].[c]. [n].[st]. [•]

Reconstruction

(1) [98] *sarvatra sarva*[99](**m a*)*sti di* • *tena cakhaiḍana ruvaiḍana neraiyabhav*
sarvabhav *asti* • *peyala* [100] *svabhav* *parabhav* *asti* • *parabhava svabhav* *asti* • *yadi*
*ahadi na vatava sa(*r)va*[101]*t(*ra) s(*a)rva* *asti di* • *tatra vatave eva sate sarvat(*r)e*
*s(*ar)ve n(*a)st(*i)* [102] (**di ki*)*c(*a) asti k(*i)c(*a) n(*a)st(*i) •*

Translation

(1) [98] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists everywhere.” [99] [p] Therefore, the material-
 form sense sphere [exists] in the visual sense sphere, all natures exist in the nature of
 a hell-being, and so on, [100] other-nature exists in intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature
 exists in other-nature. If one states, [o] “It should not be said that everything [101] exists
 everywhere,” [p] with regard to that it should be said that it being thus, everything does
 not exist everywhere. [102] [Therefore, you should not maintain that everything exists but
 rather] something exists [and] something does not exist.

Text Notes: ll. 98–102

[98] *sarvat[r]a sarva* [99] + /// |^{52m(v)+52A(v)}[sti] |^{52A(v)}*di* •: Line 98 is bisected by a crack that extends the entire width of the manuscript and widens to a hole seven syllables prior to the end of the line. The upper and lower segments of fragment 52A can be realigned by shifting the lower segment approximately one syllable to the right (plt. 8). The syllable read as *t[r]a* has an attenuated but probable postconsonantal *r*, yielding the reading *sarvat[r]a*, expected on the basis of the opponent’s prior statement *sarvatra sarva[ma]sti* (l. 67), which is the object of criticism in this passage. In the syllable *rva* of *sarva*, the preconsonantal *r*, which is clearly visible in the infrared image, merges with the lower tip of the preceding syllable *sa*. The upper portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic in [sti] at the beginning of line 99 is preserved on fragment 52A, and the lower portion of the base character *st-* can be found on chip 52m(v), which has migrated away from the right edge of fragment 52A (plts. 8, 7; recto l. 47).

[99] *sarvabhav* *asti* • *peyala*: The syllables read as *ve asti* are faint and covered by numerous small blank chips, but the reading is confirmed by the infrared image. The character *pe* here is atypical, with extremely thick and angular strokes, and it may represent a correction written over a previously written *ya*. Among the five occurrences of *peyala* in our text, three end in *-a* (ll. 99, 115, 118), one in *-e* (l. 109), and one in *-o* (l. 117). However, in all occurrences, *peyala* presumably appears in the accusative singular functioning as an adverb.

[100] |^{52m(v)+52n(v)}[sva]|^{52A(v)}*bhav[e] parabhav[e] asti* •: The upper portion of [sva] is preserved on chip 52m(v), and the lower portion, on chip 52n(v); both migrated from their original locations at the right edge of fragment 52A during the initial black-and-white photographing process (plt. 8). A darkened area above the base character *v-* in the final syllable of [sva]*bhav[e]*, also very faint on the infrared image, has been taken to represent an *e*-vowel diacritic in accordance with the “Y locative X nominative *asti*,” or “X exists in Y,” syntactic pattern employed throughout this passage. This pattern is based on the declaration criticized in this passage: “[One states,] [o]

‘Everything exists everywhere’” (*sarvatra sarva(*m a)sti di* •, ll. 98–99). In other words, the nominative, “everything,” exists (*asti*) everywhere (*sarvatra*), with the *-tra* suffix being understood with an abstract locative sense. Despite this probable syntactic pattern reflecting distinct locative and nominative cases, the text uses the same endings for both the nominative and locative in three of the four parallel clauses: in the first clause, the compounds *cakhaīdana* and *ruvaīdana* with the neuter noun *aiḍana* as a final member both appear with the ending *-a*; in the second clause, the compounds *neraiyabhava* and *sarvabhava* with the masculine noun *bhava* (P/Skt *bhava*) as a final member both end in *-e*; in the third clause, the compounds *[sva]bhav[e]* and *parabhav[e]* with the masculine noun *bhava* (P/Skt *bhāva*) as a final member also both have the ending *-e*. Only in the fourth and final clause are the compounds *parabhava* and *svabhava* distinguished. The majority of locative singular masculine and neuter forms in our text have the ending *-a*, although *-e* is also attested. For nominative singular masculine or neuter forms, the most frequent ending is *-a* with occasional instances of the ending *-e*. In this fourth and final clause, the syntactic pattern would suggest *parabhava* (locative) *svabhava* (nominative) *asti*, which, though not reflecting the most frequent endings for the locative and nominative, would conform to the word order of the pattern upon which this series of clauses is based: *sarvatra* (locative) *sarvam* (nominative) *asti di*. Elsewhere in its criticism of another declaration that employs the same “locative-nominative-*asti*” syntactic pattern, the text clearly and consistently distinguishes between the locative and nominative cases (ll. 105–109). Nonetheless, the use of the same endings within a given clause in this passage may result from either affinity or the looseness in rendering vowel finals encountered frequently in Gāndhārī.

[100] *parabhava svabhava asti • yadi ahadi na vatava [sa].[va][101]^{52k(v)}[t].. [s].^{52A(v)}rva asti [di]* •: The syllable *ra* in *parabhava* is very small and may have been inserted as a correction between *pa* and *bha*. The syllables *[sa].[va]* at the end of line 100 are extremely faint, with their lower portions obscured by the glue-line juncture that begins in line 101 and extends to the left margin. Further, all but the upper left tip of *[sa].* is covered by unplaced chip 52nnn marked with one small stroke of ink, which may constitute the diagonal stroke from the upper portion of the syllable. At the beginning of line 101, the upper portion of *[t]..* and the lower portion of *[s].* are preserved on chip 52k(v) (plt. 8). Since the readings of these syllables at the end of line 100 and the beginning of line 101 are questionable, the reconstruction *yadi ahadi na vatava sa(*r)vat(*ra) s(*a)rva asti di* is based largely on context, although it does find support in an analogous statement in line 104: *yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam asti di*. Unplaced chip 52000 marked with one dot of ink obscures the upper left tip of the *sti* and the upper right portion of the quotative particle *[di]* in line 101. Following the punctuation mark that concludes this statement in line 101 is a blank space of approximately four or five syllables, presumably resulting from the glue-line juncture that moves upward through line 101 and extends to the left margin. The beginning of line 44 on the recto is also distorted by cracks and shortened syllables, possibly resulting from the stress of this glue-line juncture connecting manuscript parts 51 and 52.

[101] *tatra vatave eva sate sarva[t].e [s]..[ve n].[st].:* *Vatave* is followed by a blank space of approximately one syllable. Although not the typical ending for a nominative singular neuter form, the *e*-vowel ending in *vatave* perhaps results from affinity with the *e* of the following *eva* or from the scribe’s frequent use of *-e* endings in this portion of the manuscript. In *sarva[t].e*, the lower

portion of *sa* is covered by unplaced chip 52ppp containing one dot of ink, and the lower portion of *[t].e* has peeled away. Nonetheless, the reconstruction *sarvatre* is suggested both by the content of this passage, which criticizes the declaration *sarvatra sarvam asti di* (l. 67), and by the tentative but probable reconstructions *sarvatra* (l. 98) and *sa(*r)vat(*ra)* (ll. 100–101). The presence of the unexpected *e*-vowel in *sarva[t].e* can once again perhaps be explained through affinity with the immediately surrounding words that also end in *-e* (*vatave, sate, sarve*, l. 101).

The remaining syllables in line 101 are almost entirely abraded. The syllable immediately following *sarva[t].e* is represented only by a faint curved stroke, more clearly visible on the infrared image, that is not inconsistent with the upper portion of *[s].*. The remaining upper right portion of the next syllable would support the reading *[v].*, and the apparent *e*-vowel diacritic is on an area of disturbed bark that may not have come from this location originally. Only a straight lower tip is preserved from the next syllable, suggesting the reading *[n].*; the final syllable *[st].* is represented only by a dot of ink presumably from its upper right portion. In view of both the declaration *sarvatra sarva(*m a)sti di* under criticism in this passage and the opponent's immediately preceding suggestion, *na vatava sa(*r)vat(*ra) s(*a)rva asti di* (ll. 100–101), the tentative but probable reconstruction of this line becomes *tatra vatave eva sate sarvat(*r)e s(*ar)ve n(*a)st(*i)*: “[P] with regard to that it should be said that it being thus, everything does not exist everywhere.”

[102] + + /// |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51xxx(v)}[c]. |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51www(v)}asti |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[k].[c]. [n].[st]. [•]: The deterioration of the upper and right edges of the verso of fragment 51H has resulted in the loss of or damage to syllables at the beginning of line 102 (fig. 8; plt. 9).²³³ The location of several chips can be determined on the basis of the initial black-and-white photograph, which clearly preserves the syllables *ca asti [k].[c]. [n]. ?*. However, in the manuscript at the time of the subsequent digital images, the lower portions of *a* and *sti* are located on chip 51www(v), and a portion of the preceding *ca* is presumably found on chip 51xxx(v). The initial black-and-white photograph also preserves the entire lower portion of *[c].* in *[k].[c].*, of which only the lower tip remains on fragment 51H in its current state. Presumably, chips 51uuu and 51vvv represent bark from this hole, but they have become too fragmented to determine their original locations.

Both the spacing of the following lines 103–104 and the syntax of the preceding clause suggest that the first syllable *[c].* in line 102, now consisting merely of remnants, is preceded by one or two syllables. For the immediately preceding syllable, context suggests *(*ki)*, yielding *(*ki)c(*a)*, justified by parallelism with the following *k(*i)c(*a)*. The first syllable in line 102 is then possibly *(*di)*, which would function as a quotative particle setting off the prior clause as the condition indicated by the introductory locative absolute *eva sate*, “it being thus,” which began in line 101. Following *[k].[c].* on fragment 51H(v) are two diagonal vertical strokes, of which the second is partially covered by chip 51yyy(v), displaced to line 102 from its original location in line 110 (plt. 9; recto l. 35).²³⁴ Chips 51ppp(r), 51qqq(r), and 51rrr(r), which belong in line 102 near the right edge along the upper torn edge of fragment 51H, have become displaced by a distance of one cycle in the scroll and are preserved between lines 34–35 (corresponding to verso ll. 109–110) within

²³³ Manuscript Notes: ll. 98–102.

²³⁴ Text Notes: [35] *kama* |^{51H(r)+51yyy(r)}*a[vis].* |^{51H(r)}*[kh].rodi*; [110] *adidakaranena* |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}*anaga* |^{51H(v)}*dakarana asti • anagadakarena adidakare asti •*

a separation between two segments of fragment 51H. When combined with the upper tips of two syllables on chip 51ppp–rrr(r), these two diagonal strokes following *[k].[c]* on fragment 51H(v) support the reconstruction *n(*a)st(*i)*, which parallels the preceding *asti* and yields for the entire clause the tentative reconstruction *(*ki)c(*a) asti k(*i)c(*a) n(*a)st(*i)*: “something exists [and] something does not exist.” This also parallels the proponent’s conclusion to his criticism of the next declaration, “everything exists in all factors”: “[P] As a result of that, in all [factors], something exists, [and] something does not exist” (*tena de sarveṣu kica asti kica nasti*, l. 105). The top of the syllable following *n(*a)st(*i)* in line 102 is preserved on chip 51ppp–rrr(r) and would be consistent with a punctuation mark. Thus, the final yet tentative reconstruction for this sentence (ll. 100–102) becomes *yadi ahadi na vatava sa(*r)vat(*ra) s(*a)rva asti di • tatra vatave eva sate sarvat(*r)e s(*ar)ve n(*a)st(*i) di ki)c(*a) asti k(*i)c(*a) n(*a)st(*i) •*: “If one states, [O] ‘It should not be said that everything exists everywhere,’ [P] in that case it should be said that it being thus, everything does not exist everywhere. [Therefore, you should not maintain that everything exists but rather] something exists [and] something does not exist.”

II.6.3.8. ll. 102–105

Manuscript Notes: ll. 102–105

Chips 51ppp(r), 51qqq(r), and 51rrr(r) located in a separation between lines 34–35 (corresponding to verso ll. 109–110) can be returned to their original locations along the upper and right edges of fragment 51H(v). The upper portions of six syllables preserved in the middle of line 102 along the top of the verso of fragment 51H are found on fragment 52A(v) about 0.5 cm from its lower edge. This confirms that manuscript parts 51 and 52 are contiguous and were originally conjoined (fig. 8; plts. 8, 9). The original glue-line juncture between manuscript parts 51 and 52, which can be discerned on fragment 52A(v) immediately below line 101, remained intact when manuscript part 51 broke away just above line 102. The upper verso portion of manuscript part 51 still adheres to the bottom of the verso of manuscript part 52 and preserves the tops of several syllables in line 102.

The succession of images, beginning with the initial black-and-white photographs and continuing through the most recent infrared images, record increasing deterioration of the upper and right edges of fragment 51H(v) and the displacement of chips 51sss, 51ttt, 51uuu, 51vvv, 51www, and 51xxx from their original locations, presumably along the upper and right edges of manuscript part 51. Fortunately, the correct placement of several of these chips along the upper or right edge in lines 102–104 is evident in the initial black-and-white photographs.²³⁵

Below line 105 (corresponding to recto l. 40), a crack extends across the width of the manuscript, forming a hole in the middle of the manuscript that results in the loss of approximately two syllables. The syllables at the end of line 105 can be realigned by shifting the lower manuscript segment slightly to the left.

²³⁵ Text Notes: [42] *[tas]*^{51H(r)+51ttt(r)}*[mi]*; [102] + + /// ^{51ppp–rrr(r)+51xxx(v)}*[c]*. ^{51ppp–rrr(r)+51www(v)}*asti*
^{51ppp–rrr(r)+51H(v)}*[k].[c]. [n].[st]. [•]*.

II. 102–105

Transcribed text

102. |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[s].|^{52A(v)+51H(v)}rve[ṣu s].rvam=a|^{51H(v)}sti di • tena uvahaḍāidria⟨na⟩
 103. + /// [n].[g].[ḍ].īdriya asti • neraīyana catvare bhava asti • eva sarvaga [•]
 104. + /// |^{51ttt(v)+51H(v)}d[r]iya |^{51H(v)}anuyujidava • yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam=asti di •
 105. [te]na de sarveṣ[u] kica asti kica nasti + .[u] khu de vata[va sa]rve asti •

Reconstruction

- (2) [102] s(*a)rveṣu s(*a)rvam asti di • tena uvahaḍāidriana [103] (*a)n(*a)g(*a)ḍ(*a)-īdriya asti • neraīyana catvare bhava asti • eva sarvaga [104] (*i)driya anuyujidava • yadi aha na vatava sarveṣu sarvam asti di • [105] tena de sarveṣu kica asti kica nasti (*ki n)u khu de vatava sarve asti •

Translation

- (2) [102] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists in all [factors].” [p] Therefore, [even] impaired controlling faculties possess [103] future [unimpaired] controlling faculties, and hell-beings possess the four natures [of other beings]. In this way, [104] it should be upheld that the controlling faculties are everywhere.” If one states, [o] “It should not be said that everything exists in all [factors],” [105] [p] as a result of that, in all [factors], something exists, [and] something does not exist. Now how possibly could it be said by you that “everything exists?”

Text Notes: II. 102–105

[102] |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[s].|^{52A(v)+51H(v)}rve[ṣu s].rvam=a|^{51H(v)}sti: The word [s].rveṣu appears to be preceded by three syllables, *anaga*, but these are actually on a separate chip (51yyy) and can be securely placed in line 110.²³⁶ All but the curved tail and upper left tip of the initial syllable [s]. in [s].rveṣu is covered by chip 51yyy(v), but its upper tip is perhaps found on chip 51ppp-rrr(r). The upper portion of the next syllable *rve* still adheres to the lower edge of fragment 52A(v), supporting the reconstruction s(*a)rveṣu s(*a)rvam asti di, “everything exists in all [factors].” Although this statement is not listed among the opponent’s formulaic declarations offered in lines 66–69, since it is taken up for criticism in the following passage (II. 102–105), it is presumably assumed by the proponent to be included among the opponent’s positions.²³⁷

[102] *tena uvahaḍāidria⟨na⟩* [103] + /// [n].[g].[ḍ].īdriya: The final syllable *na* in line 102 is written beyond the regular end of the line at the left margin at a space of about one syllable from the preceding syllable *a*. This suggests that the scribe may have attempted to avoid a sewing line on the left margin or may have added *na* as a correction after the line was completed. In contrast to *idriya* appearing in lines 103–104, the intervocalic -y- in *idriana* here has been elided. Within the word (*a)n(*a)g(*a)ḍ(*a)īdriya in line 103, the initial black-and-white photograph preserves the

²³⁶ Text Notes: [110] *adidakaranena* |^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)}anaga|^{51H(v)}ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adidakare asti • Cf. Text Notes: [102] + + /// |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51xxx(v)}[c]. |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51www(v)}asti |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[k].[c]. [n].[st]. [•].

²³⁷ Text Notes: [102] |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}[s].|^{52A(v)+51H(v)}rve[ṣu s].rvam=a|^{51H(v)}sti.

syllables *[n]*. and *[g]*., which have been lost in the deterioration of the right edge since this initial photographing.

[103] *sarvaga [•]* [104] + ///^{51ttt(v)+51H(v)}*d[r]iya*: A dot of ink appears to the left of *ga* at the end of line 103, but a punctuation mark is not expected in the middle of this statement. The first visible syllables in line 104, *d[r]i* and *ya*, are preserved in the initial black-and-white photograph but have disappeared in the subsequent digital images as a result of the deterioration of the right edge of the manuscript. Portions of the *i*-vowel diacritic in the syllable *d[r]i* and the upper righthand portion of *ya* are preserved on chip 51ttt(v) (plts. 9, 6; recto l. 42).

[104] *sarvam=asti di •*: The syllable *sti* is marked by an atypical curved flourish on its lower tip, which, despite cracks near the end of the line, does not appear to be on a separate chip. The context, however, leaves no doubt as to the correct reading.

[105] *sarveṣ[u]*: The lower tips of these syllables are obscured by a crack below line 105. The infrared image reveals a flared tip at the bottom of the base character *ṣ-*, suggesting the probability of an *u*-vowel diacritic.

[105] *nasti + .[u] khu de vata[va sa]rve asti •*: A hole immediately after *sti* in *nasti* (corresponding to recto l. 40) obliterates one complete syllable and the upper portion of a second. The remaining lower portion of this second syllable and the following syllable are extremely faint, but the infrared image supports the reading *.[u] khu*. The previously encountered formulaic phrase *ki nu khu* (P *kin nu kho*, Skt *kiṃ nu khalu*) (ll. 41, 48) suggests that (**ki*) is the missing prior syllable, even though no ink remains either above or below the hole.

A small chip with one dot of ink covers the upper portion of the syllable read as *de*, for which the interpretation is uncertain. It could represent the independent particle *de* used in an ablative sense indicating a reason when used in conjunction with other oblique or indeclinable forms such as *tena*, *yaṣa* (Skt *yathā*), or *taṣa* (Skt *tathā*).²³⁸ Even though in all eight of its other occurrences in our text the independent particle *de* occurs together with an oblique or indeclinable form, this interpretation applied here would mean that a prior oblique or indeclinable form has been mistakenly omitted. But it is also possible that *de* represents the genitive singular second-person enclitic personal pronoun form *te*, here with the initial voiced consonant *d*.²³⁹ Indeed, context lends greater support to this second interpretation as an enclitic pronominal form. In its two other occurrences, the formulaic phrase *ki nu khu* is followed not by an independent adverbial but by a pronominal form to be construed with the following clause: “... now how possibly at that time ...” (*ki nu khu tasmi samahe*, ll. 41–42); and “Now how possibly are those evil unvirtuous factors ...” (*ki nu khu te pave akuśaladhama*, l. 48). Even though a pronominal form is not used as the agent with the frequently occurring gerundive *vatava* elsewhere in our text, it is possible for a genitive to be used with that function. Hence, *de* here has been tentatively interpreted as representing the genitive singular second-person enclitic personal pronoun form *te*.

The syllables *[va sa]* in *vata[va sa]rve* are extremely faint, but they are legible in the infrared image. The bolder strokes of the following syllable *rve* suggest that the scribe re-inked after

²³⁸ Text Notes: [4] *[ta]ṣa [de so]palo di*.

²³⁹ For the second-person pronoun *te* as *de* with voiced initial, see Brough 1962: 108 [§ 67]); see also Salomon 2008: 147 [§ II.4.2.3.1], 317.

writing [*va sa*]. A crack extends across the width of the manuscript immediately below line 105 (corresponding to recto l. 39) and intersects the lower tips of *rve asti*, but the lower segment of fragment 51H can be moved slightly to the left to realign these syllables. The top of the syllable read as *rve* is marked with a stroke of ink that could be interpreted as the bottom tail of the syllable *sa* in line 104 rather than as an *e*-vowel diacritic. In that case, the resulting phrase [*sa*]*rva asti* would be interpreted as equivalent to *sarvam asti*, “everything exists,” more typically written in this manuscript as *sarvam asti* with the liaison syllable *ma*. The form *sarva asti*, clearly equivalent to *sarvam asti*, is also encountered in line 101: [*s*].*rva asti* [*di*]. However, even if this phrase is read as [*sa*]*rve asti*, context strongly suggests that it should still be interpreted as equivalent to *sarva asti*, or *sarvam asti*, “everything exists,” echoing the declaration with which this passage began in line 102. In this case, *sarve* would be interpreted as a nominative singular neuter with an indefinite sense, rather than as a nominative plural masculine referring to factors (P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*), “all factors exist.”

II.6.3.9. ll. 105–109

Manuscript Notes: ll. 105–109

Despite the considerable deterioration of the right edge of fragment 51H subsequent to the initial black-and-white photograph, the right margin in this portion of the manuscript is largely intact.

ll. 105–109

Transcribed text

105. *yidi*

106. *puna sarvaṣa sarvam=asti ikaṣa parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyoa[thi] •*

107. *sarvakala sarvam=asti di • purebhatakale pacabhatakalo asti • pacabha-*

108. *taka[l]. purebhatakala asti • pacupanakale anagaḍakala ca adida-*

109. *[ka]la ca asti peyale kalena anuyujidavu •*

Reconstruction

(3) [105] *yidi* [106] *puna sarvaṣa sarvam asti ikaṣa parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyoathi •*

(4) [107] *sarvakala sarvam asti di • purebhatakale pacabhatakalo asti • pacabha*[108]-*taka(*e) purebhatakala asti • pacupanakale anagaḍakala ca adida*[109]*kala ca asti peyale kalena anuyujidavu •*

Translation

(3) [105] If [106] further [o] “everything exists as belonging to everything,” [p] one [sentient being] possesses a connection with the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another.

(4) [107] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists at all times.” [p] [In that case,] at the time before the meal, the time after the meal exists; at the time after the meal, [108] the time before the meal exists. At the present time, both future and past times [109] exist; and so on, it should be upheld by means of [other] times.

Text Notes: ll. 105–109

[105] *yidi*: The word *yidi* is intersected by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript immediately below line 105, but its lower tips can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of fragment 51H slightly to the left.

[106] *parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyo[thi]* •: The reading *thi* for the final syllable in line 106 is uncertain. The syllable is constricted horizontally and differs from two other instances of *rthi* in this manuscript (ll. 38, 65) in its longer *i*-vowel diacritic, the absence of the right-hand portion of the horizontal arm of the base character *th-*, and the shortened vertical above the point of intersection with the left-hand horizontal arm. The shortened vertical and the longer *i*-vowel diacritic do, however, resemble one instance of *thi* in line 123. The curved flourish on its lower tip is also typical of other instances of *tha* without a preconsonantal *r* in this manuscript (ll. 36, 75). The reading *thi* yields *athi*, which has been interpreted as equivalent to *asti*. The OIA consonant cluster *st* usually remains in Gāndhārī,²⁴⁰ despite uncertainties about the phonetic values and relationship between the Kharoṣṭhī characters conventionally transliterated as *sta* and *tha*.²⁴¹ This manuscript regularly preserves the form *asti* in the case of both finite and derivative forms of the root *as*, with only three instances of the assimilated MIA form *athi*, which is regular in Pali: the third-person singular present verb form *a[thi]* here in line 106 and in line 122; and the noun *a[thi]ta* equivalent to Skt *astitā* formed with the feminine abstract suffix *-tā* in line 123. However, the presence of both assimilated and unassimilated forms of the same word in a single Gāndhārī text is not uncommon and might be attributed to isolated dialect forms adapted into Gāndhārī or possibly to the influence of a source dialect.²⁴²

The compound *parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyo-* preceding the verb also presents certain difficulties. The prior members of the compound form a dvandva: “the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another” (*para-kadha-para-aiḍana-para-dhadu-*). The interpretation of the final element *-yo* is much less clear. It could be construed as representing a suffixal *-ka* appended to the compound as a whole with the sense of appurtenance, in which the intervocalic *-k-* has become *-y-*: “characterized by the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another.” However, this is unlikely given the syntax of the statement as a whole, which dictates that the compound is possessed by the preceding genitive: “of one [sentient being] (*ikaṣa*) there is (*a[thi]*) *parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhaduyo-*.” Given this syntactic structure, it is then more reasonable to construe the final member of the compound as a noun, here probably *-yoga*: “one [sentient being] possesses a connection (*yoga*) with the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another.” The form *-yo(a)* or *-yo* understood as *-yoga* here raises two possible interpretations. First, the compound-final form *-yo(a)* could be explained as the nominative singular masculine form *-yoa*, which has undergone elision of the intervocalic *-g-* in the final syllable as well as elision of the remaining vowel *a* in non-compound sandhi combination with the following independent verb *a[thi]*. However, this would then be the only case of elision of intervocalic *-g-* in this manuscript (Phonology § II.3.2.2.1 Velars). Further, the word *yoga* appears

²⁴⁰ Brough 1962: 104–105 [§ 60]; Burrow 1937: 20 [§ 49].

²⁴¹ Brough 1962: 75 [§ 18].

²⁴² Brough 1962: 101–102 [§ 51].

unchanged, without such elision, in the case of *anuyoga* (l. 82). As a second and more likely interpretation, the final syllable *-ga* of the compound was simply omitted by the scribe.²⁴³

[107] *pacabha*[108]*taka*[*l*]. *purebhatakala*: Given the parallel clauses in lines 107–108, the locative is expected for the compound *pacabhataka*[*l*]. The middle portion of [*l*] is obscured by a small chip marked with one dot of ink, and the area that would contain the *e*-vowel diacritic is covered by a blank chip. However, the infrared image reveals a darkened area just below this blank chip, which might represent the beginning of the *e*-vowel diacritic. The apparent *e*-vowel diacritic above *la* in *purebhatakala* is actually a miniscule chip marked with one dot of ink.

[108] *adida*[109]/*ka**la*: The right edge of the manuscript has broken into numerous small chips that contain the remnants, now completely illegible, of the first syllable in line 109. The right edge is more intact in the initial black-and-white photograph and would support the reading [*ka*] for this syllable.

[109] *peyale*: The syllable *pe* is atypical, with a wider loop and a shortened vertical stroke (cf. *peyala*, l. 99). In addition to the form *peyale*, ending with an *e*-vowel as here, *peyala* occurs three times (ll. 99, 115, 118) and *peyalo* once (l. 117), presumably all as adverbs in the accusative singular.²⁴⁴

[109] *anuyujidavu*: A horizontal split in the manuscript immediately below line 109 distorts the syllables following *anuyujidavu* until the end of line 109 (corresponding to recto l. 35). The *u*-vowel diacritic in *vu* is clearly visible on the lower segment of fragment 51H below this split (plt. 9).

II.6.3.10. ll. 109–115

Manuscript Notes: ll. 109–115

Several smaller cracks in the right margin at the beginning of lines 109–110 widen to a hole approximately six syllables from the right edge and thereafter to a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H. The final ten syllables in line 109 are bisected by this separation, but the remnants of their upper and lower portions can be realigned when the upper and lower segments are reconnected. Three chips (51ppp, 51qqq, 51rrr) lie within the separation between the upper and lower segments, but the straight edge of chip 51ppp, the blank verso surfaces of all three chips, and their current location one cycle away from the end of manuscript part 51 all suggest that they belong to the upper edge of fragment 51H(v), from which they became dislodged during the unrolling process. In fact, ink remaining on their recto surfaces permits the placement of all three chips along this upper edge of the verso of fragment 51H (fig. 8; plt. 9).²⁴⁵

From its midpoint to the left margin, line 113 is distorted by several cracks that begin at the right edge in line 114 and extend across the width of the manuscript. Chip 51mmm(v), lodged within this crack at the beginning of line 114, can be placed along the right edge at the beginning of line 121 (plt. 9; recto l. 23).

²⁴³ For the omission of a final *-ya*, see Allon 2001: 98–99 [§ 5.5].

²⁴⁴ Commentary: (1–3) Criticism Opponent’s Second Category [ll. 36–45].

²⁴⁵ Manuscript Notes: ll. 29–36; ll. 102–105. Text Notes: [102] *tena uvahaḍāidria*«na» [103] + /// [*n*].[*g*]-[*ḍ*].*idriya*.

II. 109–115

Transcribed text

109. *sarvagarena sar[va]m=asti [d]i*

110. *adiḍakaranena* ^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)} *anaga* ^{51H(v)} *ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adidakare asti •*

111. *[ś]uñā[ḍa]garena • śatagare asti • śatagarena śu[ñā]ḍagara asti • sacagar[e]-*

112. *[n]. [a].sacagara asti • dukhagarena suhagar. • anavagarena atvagara asti •*

113. *atvagarena anavagaro a[sti] • sarvagarena a[s].r[vaga]ro asti • adi[ḍa]-*

114. *[k].[r].[nena p]. [a].[n].[g].[ḍ].[k].[r].[nen]. • ? [p]i pacupanakaranena kuśalakuśala śa-*

115. *rve vi bhava prañahi ukṣividav[u] peyala*

Reconstruction

(5) [109] *sarvagarena sarvam asti di* [110] *adiḍa<*g>ar{an}ena anagaḍa<*g>ara{na} asti • anagaḍa<*g>arena adidā<*g>are asti • [111] śuñāḍagarena • śatagare asti • śatagarena śuñāḍagara asti • sacagare[112]n(*a a)sacagara asti • dukhagarena suhagar(*a) • anavagarena atvagara asti • [113] atvagarena anavagaro asti • sarvagarena as(*a)-rvagaro asti •*

(6) [113] *adiḍa[114]k(*a)r(*a)nena p(*i a)n(*a)g(*a)ḍ(*a)k(*a)r(*a)nen(*a) • pi pacupanakaranena kuśalakuśala*

(7) [114] *śa[115]rve vi bhava prañahi ukṣividavu peyala*

Translation

(5) [109] [One states,] [o] “Everything exists with every aspect.” [110] [p] [In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect. [111] The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of tranquility. The aspect of untruth [112] exists with the aspect of truth. The aspect of happiness exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. [113] The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self. The aspect of what is not everything exists with the aspect of everything.

(6) [113–114] Virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past [factors], by reason of future [factors], and by reason of present [factors].

(7) [114–115] And [as for the declarations concerning] all “modes,” [namely, “everything exists through all modes,”] and so on, it should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight.

Text Notes: II. 109–115

[109] *sarvagarena sar[va]m=asti [d]i*: These ten syllables straddle a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H, but they can be realigned by closing the separation (plt. 9).

[110] *adiḍakaranena* ^{51yyy(v)+51H(v)} *anaga* ^{51H(v)} *ḍakarana asti • anagaḍakarena adidakare asti •*: At the beginning of line 110, the right edge of the manuscript has deteriorated and broken into small chips, but the probable first syllable *a* in line 110 is still legible in the initial black-and-white

photograph. The upper right portion of *ra* and the upper portions of the following syllables *nena* in *karanena* are located on a small fragment that has drifted upward from fragment 51H and rotated slightly to the left, and the *e*-vowel diacritic in *ne* is revealed by the infrared image. The three syllables in line 110 following *adiḍakaranena* have disappeared in a hole; only a diagonal stroke from the lower portion of the first syllable *a* and the lower tip of the second syllable *na* are visible just below this hole. However, the remainder of these first two syllables *ana* and the complete third syllable *ga* are preserved on chip 51yyy(v), which adheres to line 102 at a distance of one cycle from this hole (plt. 9).²⁴⁶

Even though the readings throughout line 110 are remarkably clear, the context suggests the possibility of scribal error. In this discussion (ll. 109–115), the text offers a series of contrasting statements in lines 109–113 that treat “aspects” (*agara*, P/Skt *ākāra*), and a second series of contrasting statements in lines 113–114 that treat “reasons” (*karana*, P/Skt *kāraṇa*). Indeed, in all of the statements concerning “aspects” with the exception of this first statement in line 110, the text consistently uses the Gāndhārī form *agara* (P/Skt *ākāra*) with the regular and expected voicing of the intervocalic *-k-* to *-g-*. Here in line 110, there is confusion as to whether the contrasted items are understood as “aspects” or “reasons.” The first statement clearly uses the term “reasons” (*karana*, P/Skt *kāraṇa*): *adiḍakaranena anagaḍakarana asti*. And the second statement appears to refer to “aspects” (*agara*, P/Skt *ākāra*): *anagaḍakarena adiḍakare asti*. However, the Gāndhārī form *akara* marked by the absence of the expected intervocalic voicing of *-k-* to *-g-* supports the probability here of scribal confusion between *agara* and *karana*. The mixture of “aspects” and “reasons” in this first example can perhaps be explained as a result of the scribe’s anticipation of the next declaration (ll. 113–114), which focuses on “reasons” (*karana*). If *karana* and *akara* in this first example are emended to *agara* on the basis of presumed scribal error, this first example can be reconstructed as follows: “[In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect” (*adiḍa<*g>ar{an}ena anagaḍa<*g>ara{na} asti • anagaḍa<*g>arena adiḍa<*g>are asti •*, l. 110). This emendation and reconstruction have been tentatively adopted.

[111] [*ś*]/*uṅa*[*ḍa*]*garena •*: The first two syllables in line 111 are partially obscured by small chips that have broken away from the right edge of the manuscript. Despite the atypically rounded top horizontal of the base character *ś-*, the reading [*ś*]/*uṅa* is suggested by the following parallel clause in line 111 and is confirmed by the infrared image. The second syllable *ṅa* appears to be marked by a crosshatch diagonally intersecting its lower vertical as well as an extended foot mark, but these likely represent the lower portion of the syllable *ḍa* that was squeezed in as a correction between *ṅa* and the following syllable *ga*. This syllable *ḍa* is expected on the basis of *śu[ṅa]ḍagara* that occurs in a parallel pattern later in line 111.

[112] [*n*]. [*a*].*sacagara asti •*: The first legible syllable in line 112 is *sa*, which is on a small piece of surface bark that has separated from fragment 51H and rotated slightly clockwise. In the initial black-and-white photograph, the right margin is better preserved and contains remnants of ink suggesting that two syllables preceded this syllable *sa*. The reading [*n*]. [*a*]. offered for these two syllables yields the reconstruction *sacagaren(*a a)sacagare*, which conforms to the syntactic

²⁴⁶ Text Notes: [35] *kama* |^{51H(r)+51yyy(r)}*a[vis]*. |^{51H(r)}*[kh].rodi*; [102] + + /// |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51xxx(v)}*[c]*. |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51www(v)}*asti* |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}*[k].[c]*. [*n*]. [*st*]. [*•*]; [102] |^{51ppp-rrr(r)+51H(v)}*[s]*. |^{52A(v)+51H(v)}*rve[śu s].rvam=a* |^{51H(v)}*sti*.

pattern used throughout this passage. The lower portions of the final two syllables *asti* expected from context are lost in a hole in the manuscript, but the readings of the upper portions are clear.

[113] *anatvagarō a[sti] • sarvagarena a[s].r[vaga]ro asti • adi[da]*: The upper portion of *na* in *anatvagarō* is partially covered by a small chip marked with one dot of ink, and the following syllables *tvagarō* are partially covered by a blank chip. The six syllables *sarvagarena a* are bisected by a crack, but the upper and lower portions can be realigned by moving the lower segment of the manuscript slightly to the left (corresponding to recto l. 31). The following syllables *[s].r[va]* straddle a small hole, but the readings of the remaining portions are relatively clear in the infrared image. A crack bisects the final six syllables in line 113 (corresponding to recto l. 30), which can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of the manuscript slightly to the right. The lower portion of the final syllable in line 113 is lost in the separation resulting from this crack, but the reading *[da]* is confirmed from context.

[114] *[k].r[.nena p]. [a].n.[g].[d].[k].r[.nen]. • ? [p]i pacupanakaranena*: A crack beginning immediately below line 113 extends across the entire width of the manuscript. Wedged within this crack at the right margin is a triangular chip 51mm, which was dislodged from its original location at the beginning of line 121. On the recto (l. 31), remnants of both the upper and lower portions of the syllables on either side of the crack can be successfully realigned. However, here on the verso, the crack and inserted chip 51mm totally obscure the upper portions of the first five syllables in line 114, which must be reconstructed from their lower portions that remain below the crack and from context. Remnants of the upper portions of the next five syllables are evident above the crack; these syllables can be realigned by moving the lower segment of the manuscript slightly to the right.

Immediately after the punctuation mark is a space of two syllables containing evidence of either abraded or smudged syllables. For the first syllable, the infrared image reveals the faint outline of what might have been a *p*. with a possible *e* or *i*-vowel diacritic. The second syllable, although also smudged, contains the upper portion of a clearer *e* or *i*-vowel diacritic and possibly the vertical stroke from the base character *p*-. It is possible that the scribe erased one attempt at writing the syllable *pi* only to have difficulty also in his second attempt. The parallel phrase at the beginning of line 114 offers only minimal help in reconstructing this syllable. The corresponding syllable in the parallel phrase is bisected and almost completely obscured by chip 51mm(v), but it is marked by both a long vertical stroke and increased distance from the previous syllable, which would be expected in the case of *[p]*-. Despite the uncertainty of the readings in both phrases, the reading *pi* has been tentatively adopted for these two syllables largely on the basis of the presumed parallel construction.

[115] *ukṣividaḍ[u]*: The vertical stroke of the syllable *v[u]* ends in a larger dot of ink that may have been intended as an *u*-vowel diacritic. Given the frequent *-u* or *-o* endings for gerundives other than *vatava* and *prochidaḍava*, the reading *ukṣividaḍ[u]* has been adopted (cf. ll. 7, 18, 86, 109, 117).

II.6.3.11. ll. 115–123

Manuscript Notes: ll. 115–123

Lines 118–121 are marked by numerous horizontal cracks, small overlying chips, a hole, and large pieces of bark from the recto surface of manuscript part 51 (chips 51aaaa, 51bbbb) that adhere to the verso, all obscuring the manuscript and resulting in uncertain readings (plts. 4, 9). A crack extending across the entire width of the manuscript distorts the five initial syllables in line 118 and expands to a hole that obliterates the next three syllables. Three or four additional syllables following this hole are obscured by overlying chip 51zzz. Thereafter, the crack continues to the left edge, bisecting syllables both in the middle of line 118 and near the end of line 117 (corresponding to recto l. 26); these can be realigned by moving the lower segment of fragment 51H approximately one syllable to the right (plt. 9).

Approximately the first eight to ten syllables in lines 119–120 are covered by pieces of surface bark that have peeled away from the recto in lines 16–17 and adhere to the verso surface, but the readings for several of the covered syllables can be determined on the basis of the infrared image. A triangular hole at the beginning of line 121 (corresponding to recto l. 23) obliterates the first eight syllables in the line, which can be found on chip 51mmm(v), currently wedged between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H on the right edge in line 114 (plt. 9). From this triangular hole emerge two cracks that extend across the manuscript, bisecting and distorting the remaining syllables in line 121 (corresponding to recto l. 23).

A glue-line juncture immediately above line 122 is indicated by the separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H and a blank space of approximately 1.5 cm below line 121 (corresponding to recto ll. 20–21). Also, the left-hand margin from line 122 through line 124 preserves the impression of a probable sewing line, visible only sporadically elsewhere in the manuscript.

ll. 115–123

Transcribed text

115. *ya duḍaśa aya[ḍa]n[e]hi sagrahi[ḍa]*

116. *[ta] asti di cakhaīḍana ca asti di tena cakhaīḍana duḍaśa[a]yaḍa[nasag]..-*

117. *hiḍa peyal[o sa]rva ukṣivīḍav[u] • ayaḍanehi • nasti treḍaśa ayaḍana yava nasti*

118. ^[51kkk(v)][ji]^[51H(v)][va • n].[st]i + [g].[l]. [vedīḍ]. + *peyal. tatra vatava ka[ḍa]mena viñanena vi[ry].[n].*

119. ? [n].[st]i j]. + + + [p].[g].[l]. [vedī] ? [v]. [di aha] manaiḍanena di manoviñanena di [•]

120. *[tatra vatava man].[v].[ñ].[n].[ḡ]. ca paṃcamam ca aryaśaca ekunaviśaḍa ca dhadu*

121. ^[51mmm(v)]jiva ca pugala ca dha^[51H(v)]ma va[tav]. di • *eva hi v[u]ta [manoviñana] ? ? [m]. [di]*

122. *y[i]di puna dhama di paḍi[ya]nadi tatra [va]tava tena de ekaca dhama a[thi] •*

123. *[e]kaca nast[i] di •*

Reconstruction

(1) [115] *ya duadaśa ayadanehi sagrahiḍa* [116] *ta asti di cakhaḍdana ca asti di tena cakhaḍdana duadaśaayadanasag(*ra)*[117]*hiḍa peyalo sarva ukṣividaḍu • ayadanehi • nasti treḍaśa ayadana yava nasti* [118] *jiva • n(*a)sti (*pu)g(*a)l(*a) vediḍ(*ava) peyal(*a) tatra vatava kaḍamena viñanena viry(*e)n(*a)* [119] *(*va) n(*a)sti j(*iva) nasti* *p(*u)g(*a)l(*a) vedi(*ḍa)v(*a) di aha manaḍdanena di manoviñanena di •* [120] *tatra vatava man(*o)v(*i)ñ(*a)n(*a)ḡ(*a) ca paṃcamam ca aryasaca ekunaviśaḍa ca dhadu* [121] *jiva ca pugala ca dhama vatav(*a) di • eva hi vuta manoviñana(*śa dha)m(*a) di* [122] *yidi puna dhama di paḍiyanadi tatra vatava tena de ekaca dhama athi •* [123] *ekaca nasti di •*

Translation

(1) [115] [One states,] [O] “Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres [116] exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres; [117] and so on, [the scope of] ‘everything’ should be expanded through the [other] sense spheres. It should be known that there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, continuing on through [the previously cited list], there exists no [118] soul, there exists no person, and so on.” [P] With regard to that it should be said, “By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy [119] should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?” One states, [O] “[It is] by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness.” [120] [P] With regard to that it should be said that a fifth noble truth, nineteenth element, [121] soul, and person should be said to be factors [that are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness, for in this way it has been said, “Factors [are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness.” [122] Now if one admits that [these nonexistent entities are] factors, with regard to that it should be said that, as a result of that, certain factors exist [123] [and] certain factors do not exist.

Text Notes: ll. 115–123

[116] *duadaśa[a]yaḍa[nasag]..*: The upper portion of *[a]* and the top right portion of the following syllable *ya* are abraded, but the context leaves no doubt as to the correct reading. The middle and lower portions of *[nasag]..* are covered by blank chips that may have been originally located at the left margin in the separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H in lines 109–110 (corresponding to recto l. 35).²⁴⁷

[117] *peyal[o]*: The apparent horizontal stroke through *ya* is a lenticel. The syllable *l[o]* is marked by a low *o*-vowel diacritic partially covered by a blank chip.

[117] *treḍaśa ayadana*: A crack that begins at the right margin in line 118 and extends across the width of the manuscript intersects line 117 beginning with the syllable *tre*. The upper and lower portions of *treḍaśa aya*, which are bisected by the crack, can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of the manuscript approximately one syllable to the right (plt. 9).

²⁴⁷ Text Notes: [69] *ye duadaśa ayadaneha aśagrahiḍa se asti •*.

[118] |^{51kkk(v)}[ji]|^{51H(v)}[va • n].[st]i + [g].[l]. [vedid]. + *peyal.*: This portion of the manuscript is severely damaged by a crack that extends across the width of the manuscript and bisects syllables in the first half of line 118 and the last portion of line 117. Both the readings and the suggested reconstruction for this portion of the manuscript are highly tentative and based largely upon context. The right edge of the manuscript at line 118 has deteriorated after the initial black-and-white photograph was taken. The lower portion of the first syllable in the line is on chip 51kkk(v), which the black-and-white photograph indicates should be rotated slightly counterclockwise in order to be returned to its original position on the right edge. This yields the reading [ji] in the word *jiva*, which would fit the present context. The upper portion of the next syllable, read as [va], and the following punctuation mark are visible just above a piece of surface bark from the recto (51aaaa; recto l. 19) that adheres to the verso covering lines 118–119.

The first three graphs [jiva •] in line 118 are followed by a hole and a separation between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H, which obscure the next five syllables. The upper tip of the first of these five syllables is preserved above the hole and can be read as [n].; the upper and lower tips of the second syllable are preserved above and below the hole and can be read as [st]i. Only one dot of ink representing the extreme left tip of the fifth syllable is preserved immediately after the hole. Chip 51zzz, which partially covers the syllables following this hole, contains the remnants of three syllables; the lower portions of the first and second syllables would not be inconsistent with the reading [g].[l]., and the final partial syllable represented by a vertical stroke can be realigned with the upper portion of the second syllable after the hole, yielding the reading [ve] (plt. 9). The reading [g].[l]. suggests the reconstruction (*pu)g(*a)l(*a), which is included in the formulaic list of nonexistent entities (ll. 84–85, 88–90, 91–92, 119, 120–121) and is presumably being cited once again here in lines 117–118. This reconstruction is further supported by the subsequent references to both *jiva* and *pugala* in line 121.

Only the upper tips of the three or possibly four syllables immediately after (*pu)g(*a)l(*a) are visible above chip 51zzz. The next three syllables are bisected by the crack that continues after the hole and extends upward through line 117 (corresponding to recto l. 26). By shifting the lower segment of fragment 51H approximately one syllable to the right, these three syllables can be realigned and read clearly as *peyal.* (plt. 9). Given the use of the word *peyala* with a gerundive in three of its five occurrences in our text (ll. 109, 115, 117), it is possible that the four syllables preceding *peyal.* here also represent the expected gerundive. The upper portion of the first of these syllables preserves an *e*-vowel diacritic plus the top horizontal and the upper portion of the right-hand vertical of the base character. The second syllable is marked by an *i*-vowel diacritic, the third by the upper right tip of the base character. The reconstruction *vedid(*ava)* given here is also supported by the parallel phrase *n(*a)sti j(*iva nasti) p(*u)g(*a)l(*a) vedi(*da)v(*a)* in line 119. The abbreviation adverb *peyala* would signal the inclusion of the other members of the list of nonexistent entities not mentioned here, namely, creaturehood (*bhūdatva*), a sixth aggregate (*ṣeṭha kadha*), a thirteenth sense sphere (*treḍaśa ayaḍana*), a nineteenth element (*ekunaviśadi dhadu*), and a fifth noble truth (*paṃcame aṛyasace*).²⁴⁸ However, since *jiva* is followed immediately by *pugala* here and in the abbreviated lists in lines 119 and 121, it is possible that *bhūdatva*, “creaturehood,”

²⁴⁸ Commentary: (1) Criticism Opponent’s First Qualification [ll. 82–87].

which usually appears between *jiva* and *pugala* in the list cited by our text, may not have been intended in these cases.

[118] *vi[ry].[n]*. [119] ? *[n].[sti j]*. + + + *[p].[g].[l]*. *[vedi] ? [v]*. *[di aha]*: The preconsonantal *r* in *[ry]*. of *vi[ry].[n]*. appears only as an enlarged, slightly curved smudge on the right leg of *[y]*.. In the initial black-and-white photograph, the left edge of the manuscript in line 118 is better preserved, confirming that *[n]*. is the final syllable in the line, thus forming *virya(*e)n(*a)*. The initial portions of lines 119–120 are covered by layers of bark that have peeled away from the recto surface in lines 16–17 (51bbbb) and line 19 (51aaaa). Only a few strokes of ink from the first four syllables at the beginning of line 119 are visible through cracks in these overlying layers. The first syllable, represented by a mere dot of ink, is completely illegible, and the next three syllables are only partially legible as *[n].[sti j]*. (fig. 9). Since virtually nothing remains of the first syllable, any reconstruction is merely speculation, but it is possible that the pattern used with *viryena* in line 36 occurs here as well.²⁴⁹ In other words, the initial syllable in line 119 might be understood as the enclitic disjunctive particle *va* (P/Skt *vā*), which would result in a question inquiring about two alternatives, namely, “perceptual consciousness” (*viñānena*) or “energy” (*viryena*). Indeed, the response to this question (l. 119) refers to a type of perceptual consciousness and an organ sense sphere: “... by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness” (*manāḍanena di manoviñānena di •*). Hence, it is possible that “energy” (*viryena*) in the initial question should be understood to refer to the organ sense sphere by which these nonexistent entities would be apprehended.




Fig. 9. Detail of ll. 119–120 (syllables traced).

After a space of approximately three syllables, the infrared image reveals portions of three additional syllables from the underlying verso layer of bark, which have been read as *[p].[g].[l]*. (fig. 9). The seven partial syllables *[vedi] ? [v]*. *[di aha]* visible in line 119 (corresponding

²⁴⁹ Text Notes: [36] *thamena va viryen[a] va anu*[37]*paḍadhama*; 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5 ///
^{51oooo 1.2}• *yidi anagaḍ. [o]va [virya]*. ///.

to recto l. 25) immediately after the area of overlying bark are severely distorted due to cracking, overlapping layers of surface bark, and the downward movement of a portion of the lower segment of the manuscript. As a result, the readings are extremely tentative. The syllable read as [ve] is indicated by an *e*-vowel diacritic that appears above a partially dislodged area of surface bark and possibly by a dot of ink that could represent the upper right tip of the base character *v*-. Following [ve] is the middle portion of a possible [di] with the beginnings of an *i*-vowel diacritic, followed by one or possibly two syllables bisected by a crack, which renders them illegible. The next syllable is marked by a distinctive curved flourish at its lower tip typical of base character *v*. For the next three syllables, [di] is suggested by its upper left tip and the lower portion of an *i*-vowel diacritic, and [aha] by the upper portions of both syllables. Despite the difficulty in reading, a reasonably secure reconstruction is suggested by the context: *n(*a)sti j(*iva nasti) p(*u)g(*a)l(*a) vedi(*da)-v(*a) di aha*.

[119] *di* [•] [120] [*tatra vatava man*].[*v*].[*ñ*].[*n*].[*ś*]. *ca*: Line 119 ends with a short diagonal stroke interpreted as an irregularly formed punctuation mark. The first eleven syllables in line 120 are covered by a layer of bark (51bbbb) that has peeled from the recto surface (l. 16). The infrared image reveals syllables from both the now-hidden surface of bark layer 51bbbb and the underlying verso surface of manuscript part 51 (fig. 9).²⁵⁰ The reading [*tatra vatava*] for the initial syllables in line 120 can be confirmed through specks of ink visible through cracks in bark layer 51bbbb and the infrared image. The next two syllables can be securely read as [*man*]. on the basis of the infrared image, which also makes visible the lower vertical portions of three additional letters, possibly [*v*]., [*ñ*]., and [*n*]., and then [*ś*]. for the final syllable preceding the fully preserved *ca*. The resulting reconstruction *man(*o)v(*i)ñ(*a)n(*a)ś(*a)* echoes the reference to *manoviñana* in lines 119 and 121 (plt. 9).

[120] *ekunaviśada ca dhadu*: Even though the cardinal number *ekunaviśadi* would be expected to end with an *i*-vowel, as it is found in the other two occurrences of the word in this manuscript (ll. 85, 92), it is clearly absent in this case.

[121] |^{51mmm(v)}*jiva ca pugala ca dha*|^{51H(v)}*ma va[tav]*. *di • eva hi v[u]ta [manoviñana] ? ? [m]*. [*di*]: Within a hole at the right margin in line 121 (corresponding to recto l. 23) is a piece of recto surface bark (51iii) that can be placed on the recto in lines 15–16. Chip 51mmm(v), currently located at the right margin in line 114 (corresponding to recto l. 31), can then be inserted here at the beginning of line 121 (l. 23). This placement is confirmed by the realignment of the upper portions of *gala ca dha* on chip 51mmm(v) with their lower portions on fragment 51H(v) (plt. 9). Several cracks bisect and shorten the syllables in line 121 from *va[tav]*. onward, and the final ten syllables in the line, [*manoviñana*] ? ? [*m*]. [*di*], which are obscured by further cracks and small blank chips, become only partially visible in the infrared image. The reading [*manoviñana*] is relatively secure, but the readings for the remaining syllables *-(*sa dha)m(*a) di* are tentative.

As in line 34, the construction *eva hi v[u]ta* near the end of line 121 would suggest a scriptural citation, but too little of the quotation remains to permit identification of a specific passage. However, given the context of the argument throughout this passage, it is likely that the scriptural citation refers either to the triad of mental perceptual consciousness (P *manoviññāna*, Skt *manovijñāna*),

²⁵⁰ Text Notes: [16] |^{51iii+51bbbb}*[a].[d].da avivakavivaga asti* ?.

its sense organ, that is, the mental organ (P *manindriya*, Skt *manāndriya*), and its object-support, namely, factors (P *dhamma*, Skt *dharma*), among the eighteen elements, or to the perceptual relationship between mental perceptual consciousness and factors.²⁵¹

[122] *y[i]di*: The upper portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic in *y[i]* is obscured in the glue-line juncture above line 122. The base character *y-* is partially covered by chip 51cccc marked by one long curved stroke of ink that may constitute the right leg of *y[i]*, which was displaced when the chip was dislodged from its original location. An unexplained diagonal stroke of ink through the lower portion of the *i*-vowel diacritic suggests that this syllable *y[i]* may have been corrected.

[122] *paḍi[ya]nadi tatra [va]tava*: The syllable read as *pa* on the basis of context has a truncated left vertical that curves to meet the right arm from which the bottom vertical extends downward. It resembles the syllable *ḥha* characterized by a vertically extended left arm.²⁵² The syllable *[ya]* appears to have two left legs and was perhaps corrected from a syllable with a left-hand vertical such as *pa*. The word *tatra* is followed by a space of approximately one syllable, presumably resulting from an irregularity in the surface probably caused by a knothole in the bark, which is more apparent on the recto of fragment 51H (corresponding to recto l. 21). The syllable *[va]*, even though clearer in the infrared image, is also distorted, again due to the bark irregularity, or perhaps as a result of a correction from a previous *dha* or *sa*.

[122] *a[thi]* •: The syllable *a* is followed by several faint ink strokes that resemble the syllable *thi*. This reading yields *athi*, which has been interpreted as equivalent to *asti*, the third-person singular present form of the root *as*. An impression from a probable sewing line is also visible between these faint ink strokes and the final punctuation mark.²⁵³

[123] *[e]kaca*: Only the extreme right tip of the *e*-vowel diacritic in *[e]* is visible on the original, but the infrared image reveals that this tip is connected to the vertical of the vowel-carrying sign.

II.6.3.12. ll. 123–134

Manuscript Notes: ll. 123–134

The impression from a probable sewing line runs along the intact left margin in lines 123–125. Although several areas of the manuscript in lines 123–124 are marred by rough surface bark and light ink, perhaps as a result of pen wear or ink fading, the readings of these faded areas are greatly aided by the infrared image. The recto surface clearly reveals a crack extending across the width of the manuscript between lines 18 and 19, but the corresponding area on the verso (ll. 124–125) has become delaminated, and no continuous crack is evident. A piece of bark at the right margin containing the first five syllables in line 125 has shifted upward, obscuring the lower portions of several syllables near the beginning of line 124 (corresponding to recto ll. 19–20). When this piece of bark is moved downward in horizontal alignment with the syllables in line 125, the context suggests that two syllables have been lost between this initial portion and the remainder of the line (plt. 9; recto l. 1).

²⁵¹ Commentary: Criticism Opponent's First Specification [ll. 115–123].

²⁵² For a similar character *pa*, see 51D(r) l. 3; ll. 37, 60, 125, 128.

²⁵³ Text Notes: [106] *parakadhaparaaīḍanaparadhadyoa[thi]* •; [123] *yidi aha trayaatva va a[thi]ta di*.

The initial portion of line 127 is on a piece of bark that has been forced upward by chip 51ddd, which is wedged between lines 127 and 128 at the right margin. The probable placement of chip 51ddd(r) near the beginning of line 8 suggests that, on the verso, it should be placed near the beginning of line 136. After the realignment of these initial portions of lines 125 and 127, the first five or six syllables in the intervening line 126 are completely missing, and the first visible syllables in line 126 are further distorted by bark movement and overlying blank chips of bark. One long darkened chip, 51eee(v) extending from lines 125–127, is revealed by the infrared image to contain the lower tips of three syllables, which can be realigned with *ga asti* at the beginning of line 17 on the recto. This indicates that fragment 51eee was bent backward from the recto surface and turned over during the unrolling process, eventually coming to rest in its current location on the verso.

Two cracks, one of which begins just below line 129, and the other, below line 130, converge at the midpoint of line 129 and obliterate the upper portions of the remaining syllables in the line (corresponding to recto l. 15). The readings at the midpoint of line 129 are further hampered by shifted layers of bark, delamination, and faded ink, as well as an area of rough surface bark that extends vertically from lines 129–132. There is no clear evidence on the verso of the glue-line juncture on the recto between lines 11 and 12. If the crack below line 130 corresponds to this glue-line juncture, then the overlapping bark at the glue-line juncture would be much larger than expected.

From lines 134–138 (corresponding to recto ll. 5–8), a piece of bark approximately ten to twelve syllables wide has broken away from the right edge of the manuscript. As a result, only the upper portions of the first ten syllables in line 134 remain at the lower edge of fragment 51H(v) just above this large gap (plt. 10).

ll. 123–134

Transcribed text

123. *yidi aha trayaatva va a[thi]ta di tatra vatava jaḍa a-*

124. *nagaḍa pracu[p].[n]. bhodi • pracupana aḍiḍa bhodi yidi aha anaga-*

125. ^{|51ggg(v)}ḍa bhavita pa^{|51H(v)+} ? [na bhodi] • [p].[a]cupana bhavita aḍi[ḍ]. [bho].[i] •
tatra vatava

126. + /// ? ? ? [s]. [t]..ya bha[va a]sti • aḍiḍabhava ca • anagaḍabhavo ca pacu-

127. [p].nabhavo ca • [yi] + a[h].[di] bhavehi japom asti nasti [tra]e japo di • tatra

128. *vatava ki puna yata anagaḍa rupom yava viṇano tatra pacupanaṣa bhavaṣa*

129. *prati di ahadi [s].mag[r].vaṣe[n]. + [n].[g].[ḍ].[bh].[vo j].[p]. [r]..[up].[n].[bh].*
+ ^{|51zz(r)}[di] • *vatava*

130. ^{|51H(v)}[s]. [v].na samagri asti nasti di • yidi aha[di] asti di tena pacupana ru[v].-

131. [bh].va ruva na bhodi • aḍiḍa traya ru[va bho]di anagaḍa kaḍama bhava anaga-

132. *ḍa ahadi anagaḍa anagaḍ.bhavo pacupanabhava anagaḍ. di vatava ki*

133. *karano ta pacupana bho[di] a[h]. prata di a[ṣa taṣa] samagravaṣena pacu-*

134. *panabhava [a].[sti a] + [di s]. [vu]na samag.i asti [n]. [kici a].[sti] + + ? /// + + +*
+ +

Reconstruction

(2) [123] *yidi aha trayaa<*dh>va va athita di tatra vatava jaḍa a* [124] *nagaḍa pracup(*a)-n(*a) bhodi • pracupana aḍiḍa bhodi yidi aha anaga* [125] *ḍa bhavita pa(*cupa)na bhodi • p(*r)acupana bhavita aḍiḍ(*a) bho(*d)i • tatra vatava* [126] *(*ekasa dhama)ḡ(*a) t(*ra)ya bhava asti • aḍiḍabhava ca • anagaḍabhavo ca pacu* [127] *p(*a)nabhavo ca • yi(*di) ah(*a)di bhavehi <*ru>poṃ asti nasti trae <*ru>po di • tatra* [128] *vatava ki puna yat<*r>a anagaḍa rupoṃ yava viṇano tatra pacupanaḡa bhavaḡa* [129] *prati di ahadi s(*a)magr(*a)vaḡen(*a a)n(*a)g(*a)ḍ(*a)bh(*a)vo <*ru>p(*o p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a)-bh(*ava) di • vatava* [130] *s(*a) v(*u)na samagri asti nasti di • yidi ahadi asti di tena pacupana ruv(*a)* [131] *bh(*a)va ruva na bhodi • aḍiḍa traya ruva bhodi anagaḍa kaḍama bhava anaga* [132] *ḍa ahadi anagaḍa anagaḍ(*a)bhavo pacupanabhava anagaḍ(*a) di vatava ki* [133] *karano ta pacupana bhodi ah(*a) prata di aḡa taḡa samagravaḡena pacu-* [134] *panabhava (*a)sti a(*ha)di s(*a) vuna samag(*r)i asti n(*a) kici (*a)sti + + ? + + + + +*

Translation

(1) [123] If one states, [O] “Or [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence,” [P] with regard to that it should be said that [124] undoubtedly a future [factor] is present, and a present [factor] is past. If one states, [O] “A [factor] having been future [125] becomes present, and having been present becomes past,” [P] with regard to that it should be said that [126] (*one factor) possesses three “natures”: a past “nature,” a future “nature,” and [127] a present “nature.” If one states, [O] “Material form exists through [various] ‘modes,’ but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form,” [P] with regard to that [128] it should be said, “Now how is there the acquisition of a present ‘nature’ in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?” [129] One states, [O] “Material form possessed of a future ‘mode’ [comes to] be possessed of a present ‘mode’ due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions].” [P] It should be said, [130] “Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?” If one states, [O] “[The complete collocation] exists,” [P] then the “nature” of material form in the present [131] is not material form, [but should instead be that of the separately existing complete collocation]. [Since you maintain that] in the past, there are three [“natures” of] material form, in the future, which “natures” [of material form] are future? [132] One states, [O] “In the future, a future ‘mode’ and a present ‘mode’ [of material form] are future.” [P] It should be said, “For what [133] reason is that [present ‘nature,’ if still future, said to be] present?” One states, [O] “[Because the present ‘mode’] is acquired. Or else, it possesses the present ‘mode’ due to the force of the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions].” [134] One states, [O] “Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all”

Text Notes: ll. 123–134

[123] *yidi aha trayaatva va a[thi]ta di*: The upper portion of *yi* is marked by several large, blurred ink spots, suggesting a possible correction. The syllable *ha* in *aha* is comparatively small and written very close to the preceding *a*, but the reading *ha* is confirmed by the infrared image. The syllable *ha* is followed by a blank space of approximately one syllable, which, given a corresponding blank space in line 124, is presumably caused by an area of rough surface bark. The clearly legible syllables *trayaa* are followed by a space of approximately one syllable, presumably resulting, as in line 123, from another area of rough surface bark. The next four syllables are faint, but the readings are aided somewhat by the infrared image. The context suggests that the first of these syllables should be read as *dhva* yielding *adhva*, “time period,” but both the manuscript and the infrared image suggest the reading *tva*. It is possible that this syllable was damaged in the archetype, especially the top horizontal by which *dhva* and *tva* are distinguished, leading the scribe to misread the syllable as *tva*. The syllable has been emended to < *dh > va in the reconstruction. The syllable read as *[thi]* is marked by a shortened vertical stroke above its horizontal arm, perhaps due to abrasion. The resulting word *athita*, equivalent to Skt *astitā*, represents one of three examples in this manuscript of *athi* corresponding to Skt *asti*.²⁵⁴

[123] *tatra vatava jaḍa*: The function and equivalent of *jaḍa* in this sentence is uncertain. It could represent the indeclinable P/Skt *jātu*, with the loss or neutralization of the final *u* vowel. When used at the beginning of a statement that contains a present verb form, *jātu* can function as a rhetorical particle implying censure, which would fit the present context. Alternatively, *jaḍa* could correspond to the past participle, P/Skt *jāta*, of the root *jan*. However, since it would then presumably modify *anagaḍa*, “future,” the term *ajaḍa*, “unborn,” would be more appropriate than *jaḍa*, “born.”²⁵⁵ Moreover, understanding the equivalent *ajaḍa* here would require either the sandhi elision of the initial *a* of *ajaḍa* after the final *a* of the prior independent word *vatava*, or the emendation of *jaḍa* to < *a > jaḍa. However, such non-compound sandhi elision is rare in this manuscript. Given the absence of the analogous modifiers for either of the other two time periods, specifically as “present” or “past,” the first interpretation of *jaḍa* for P/Skt *jātu* has been tentatively adopted.

[124] *pracu[p].[n]. bhodi • pracupana*: The lower portions of the next three syllables are covered by fragment 51ggg(v), which has shifted upward at the beginning of line 125, as well as by unplaced chip 51ddd, which is lodged just above fragment 51ggg and contains the illegible remnants of two syllables. Following the punctuation mark is a space of approximately one syllable, presumably resulting from irregularity of the bark surface between lines 122 and 124.

[124] *anaga[125]^{51ggg(v)}ḍa bhavita pa^{51H(v)+} ? [na bhodi] •*: The first five syllables in line 125 are on fragment 51ggg(v), which has moved upward, leaving a hole on the right margin. This piece of bark can be moved downward to achieve horizontal alignment with the remainder of line 125 (plt. 9; recto l. 18). Fragment 51eee lies on the verso surface extending from lines 125–127 and covers several syllables in line 125. The lower tips of three syllables *ga asti* visible on the

²⁵⁴ Text Notes: [106] *parakadhaparaaiḍanaparadhadyoa[thi] •*; [122] *a[thi] •*.

²⁵⁵ For an analogous use of the adjective *ajāta*, see AKBh 5.27b p. 298.10: “For that factor that is unborn is future ...” (Skt *yo hy ajāto dharmah so 'nāgataḥ ...*).

verso of fragment 51eee belong at the beginning of line 17 (fig. 6).²⁵⁶ Both the spacing and the context suggest that approximately two syllables have been lost between fragment 51ggg and the continuation of line 125 on fragment 51H. A few dots of ink from the second of these lost syllables are visible at the right edge of fragment 51H(v) immediately after the hole. It is possible that chip 51fff was turned over recto to verso in conservation, and the top remnants of these lost syllables from line 125 are preserved on the recto of chip 51fff visible just above line 18. However, the context permits the secure reconstruction of these two lost syllables in line 125 as (**cupa*) in *pa(*cupa)na*, which would not be consistent with the tentative readings of the syllable remnants on chip 51fff(r) as *[ve/i s]/[c]. [i]*.

[125] *[p].[a]cupana bhavita adi[d]. [bho].[i]* •: The syllable read as *[p]*. is compressed by cracking in the deteriorated verso surface layer. The infrared image clarifies the vertical and right curve, but the lower portion of the syllable remains obscured. The letter read as *[p].[a]* through context has a truncated left vertical that curves to meet the right curved stroke, which then extends downward, resembling the character *īha* marked by a vertically extended left arm (cf. ll. 122, 128). The syllables *adi[d]. [bho].* are obscured by small cracks and a piece of verso surface bark (51eeee) that has shifted downward. The syllable *[d].* in *adi[d].* is represented only by one dot of ink just below bark piece 51eeee, which also covers the upper portion of the next syllable *[bho]*. The following syllable *[i]* is represented only by an *i*-vowel diacritic preserved on bark piece 51eeee, but the context suggests the reconstruction (**d*)*i*.

[126] + /// ? ? ? ? *[s]. [t].ya bha[va a]sti* •: The major portions of approximately five syllables have been lost in a hole at the beginning of line 126. Dots of ink from the upper or lower tips of four of these syllables are visible immediately below the initial portion of line 125 (fragment 51ggg) and above line 127, but these dots are not sufficient either to suggest readings or to confirm a reconstruction. However, the context of this discussion suggests the tentative reconstruction (**ekasa dhama*)*s(*a)*.²⁵⁷ The first two partially legible syllables in line 126 are found at the right margin immediately after the hole on either side of fragment 51eee, which lies vertically over the beginning of line 126. The infrared image reveals the upper right portion of *[s]*. preceding fragment 51eee, and the upper left portion of *[t]*. following fragment 51eee. The next clause in lines 126–127 refers to the three “natures” or “modes” (*bhava*) of past, present, and future, which suggests the reading *tra* in *traya*, “three,” for the syllable following fragment 51eee. The lower portions of *bha[va a]* are obscured by a fused mass of largely blank chips.

[126] *pacu[127][p].nabhavo ca •[yi] + a[h].[di] bhavehi*: The first eight syllables in line 127 are located on a piece of bark that has been forced upward by chip 51ddd, which is wedged between lines 127 and 128 (corresponding to recto ll. 16–17). The syllables *[r].[nen]. [a]*. visible on the recto of chip 51ddd permit its secure placement at the beginning of line 8, which corresponds to line 136 on the verso.²⁵⁸ The syllables on the verso surface of chip 51ddd read *[g].[da di tas].*, but their placement within line 136 cannot be verified due to the uncertainty of the context.

²⁵⁶ Manuscript Notes: ll. 17–20. Text Notes: [17] |^{51bbbb}*ga as*|^{51bbbb+51eee(v)}*ti [di n]*. |^{51bbbb}*[bho]* + +.

²⁵⁷ Commentary: Criticism Opponent’s Second Specification [ll. 123–134].

²⁵⁸ Commentary: (2) Criticism Opponent’s Third Category [ll. 7–17]. Text Notes: [8] + /// |^{51ddd(r)}*[r].[nen]. [a]*. /// + + + + + /// |^{51G(r)}*[ka]vivaga asti* •; [136] + |^{51ddd(v)}*[g].[da di tas]*. /// + + + + + + + /// |^{51G(v)}*[a]*.

[129] *[s].mag[r].vaše[n]. + [n].[g].[d].[bh].[vo j].[p]. .[r].[up].[n].[bh]. + ^{51zz(r)}[di] • vatava*: Two cracks, one beginning just below line 129 and the other below line 130, converge at the midpoint of line 129 just after *[n]*. in *[s].mag[r].vaše[n]*. and obliterate the upper portions of the remaining syllables in line 129 (corresponding to recto l. 15). The syllables *[s].mag[r].vaše[n]*. are bisected by a crack just below line 129. After realignment by shifting the lower segment of the manuscript slightly to the right, the stroke below the upper portion of *g[r]* is revealed to be a postconsonantal *r*. The lower portion of the syllable *[n]*. is found on an area of surface bark that has migrated toward the left and covers the lower portions of the following two syllables. The most likely Sanskrit or MIA equivalents for the Gāndhārī term *samagra* in the two occurrences of the compound *samagravaśena* (ll. 129, 133) are *sāmagrya* and *sāmaggiya*, respectively, which appear in some abhidharma texts as *sāmagrī* or *sāmaggi* with the same meaning.²⁶¹ However, the Gāndhārī form *samagri* is clearly used as a separate word elsewhere in our text (ll. 45, 46, 130, 134, 140) as well as in one other occurrence of the same compound *samagriv(*aśena)* (l. 139). Thus, the equivalent Skt *sāmagrī* (P *sāmaggi*) has been tentatively assumed in these two occurrences as well, but with the loss of the vowel *i* resulting from a looseness in rendering vowel finals encountered frequently in Gāndhārī.

A crack in the manuscript, rough and shifting surface bark, delamination, and faded ink all make the readings for line 129 following *[s].mag[r].vaše[n]*. highly tentative. The lower portions of three syllables that follow *[s].mag[r].vaše[n]*. are found on a displaced piece of surface bark. The second of these syllables is almost certainly *[n]*. followed by *[g]*., and then what could be either an *u*-vowel diacritic or the lower tip of any number of vertically oriented consonants such as *d/d*. Given the context and its references to the time periods, it seems reasonable to interpret these three syllables as the remnants of the syllables *nagaḍa* in the word *anagaḍa*. It is then probable that this piece of surface bark has drifted one syllable to the right and was originally preceded by the syllable *a*, which together with the following three syllables, yields the reconstruction *(*a)n(*a)-g(*a)d(*a)*. Following this piece of surface bark read tentatively as *[n].[g].[d]*., the infrared image reveals the lower portions of two syllables that could be read tentatively as *[bh].[vo]*. Several of the next seven syllables, of which only the lower tips remain, are nonetheless legible: a postconsonantal *r*, undoubtedly part of *pr*, followed by an *u*-vowel diacritic and two vertical strokes, suggesting *pracupana*, which would fit the context. The partial syllable read as *[r]*. and reconstructed as *(*p)r(*a)* is preceded by the lower portions of two syllables: the first would be consistent with *[j]*., and the second with *[p]*.. These suggest the possible reading *japo*, which occurred twice in line 127 in lieu of the expected *rupo*.²⁶²

Immediately following the syllables interpreted as *pracupana* are the curved lower tip of one syllable and a dot of ink from a second syllable. The following three or four partial syllables are actually on the verso of chip 51zz, which is preserved at the end of line 14.²⁶³ Both the color of the recto surface of chip 51zz and its size are consistent with this area at the end of line 129, and

²⁶¹ AKVy 183, 201, 219, passim.

²⁶² Text Notes: [127] *japoṃ asti nasti [tra]e japo di •*.

²⁶³ Text Notes: [14] *pracupa^{51H(r)+51aaa}na avivakaviva[ga na]^{51H(r)}sti [• aṣa asti c]. [pr].[up].[n]. + ^{51zz(v)}[viv].[k]*..

damage to the manuscript raises the possibility that chip 51zz became dislodged and turned over, slipping through the crack across lines 129–130 and eventually coming to rest in its current position on the recto at the end of line 14. When chip 51zz is returned to its probable original location at the end of line 129, the syllables *[di] • vatava* preserved on its recto surface conclude the preceding sentence with the expected quotative particle *d(*i)* and punctuation mark, while *vatava* begins the next sentence, which continues to line 130 (fig. 10).



Fig. 10. Detail of 51zz(r) l. 129.

Thus far, line 129 can be tentatively reconstructed as follows: *prati di ahadi s(*a)magr(*a)-vaśen(*a a)n(*a)g(*a)d(*a)bh(*a)vo <*ru>p(*o p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a) ... di • vatava*. Given the line length of approximately twenty-nine syllables in this portion of the manuscript, at most two syllables can be reconstructed between *pracupana* and *[di] • vatava* on chip 51zz(r). The curved lower tip of the illegible syllable immediately after *pracupana* would support a number of readings, including *a* from a possible *a(*sti)* or *bha* from *bha(*va)*. Nothing remains from the next syllable to give preference to either of these readings, but given the presence of the phrase *pacupana bhava* in the preceding question in line 128 and again in lines 132 and 133–134, the reading *bh.* in *bh(*ava)* has been adopted. This yields the final reconstruction: *prati di ahadi s(*a)magr(*a)vaśen(*a a)-n(*a)g(*a)d(*a)bh(*a)vo <*ru>p(*o p)r(*ac)up(*a)n(*a) bh(*ava) di • vatava*.

[130] ^[51H(v)]*[s]. [v].na samagri asti nasti di • yidi aha[di]*: A crack extends across the width of the manuscript, bisects and shortens the syllables in line 130, and eventually merges at the center of the manuscript with the crack below line 129. The syllables in line 130 (corresponding to recto l. 14) can be realigned by shifting the lower segment of the manuscript slightly to the right. The lower portion of the first syllable in line 130 is lost at the right edge of the manuscript, but a dot of ink further down on the right edge would support the reading *[s]*.. The lower portion of the second syllable is covered by a blank chip, but the remaining upper portion would support the reading *[v]*. or possibly *[h]*.. The similar phrase *s(*a) vuna* found in line 134 is damaged but would suggest *[vu]* in *s(*a) v(*u)na* here as well. Although extremely faint in the original, the reading *• yidi aha[di]* is suggested by the infrared image. These syllables are preceded by a blank space of approximately one syllable, presumably resulting from rough surface bark.

[130] *ru[v].*[131][*bh*].*va ruva*: The *u*-vowel diacritic in *ru* at the end of line 130 appears clearly in the infrared image, which also reveals a long diagonal stroke from one final syllable, not visible on the original manuscript. The reading *ru[v]*. is supported by context. The initial black-and-white photograph preserves more of the right margin at the beginning of line 131 and suggests

that the first clearly legible syllable *va* is preceded by another syllable, possibly [*bh*]. The upper portion of the following *ru* is extremely dark and atypical, suggesting the possibility of a corrected syllable, which is strengthened by an additional but very faint letter resembling *ru* that appears in the infrared image immediately after that correction.

[131] *traya ru[va bho]di*: The syllables prior to *di* are extremely faint, but their reading is aided greatly by the infrared image. The syllable *tra* is followed by a blank space of approximately one syllable, presumably, as in line 130, resulting from rough surface bark.

[132] *anagaḍa anagaḍ.bhavo*: These syllables are extremely faint but are clear in the infrared image. The syllables *anagaḍ.* are followed by a blank space of approximately one syllable, presumably caused, as in the surrounding lines, by an area of rough surface bark.

[133] *karano ta pacupana bho[di] a[h]. prata di a[sa taṣa] samagravaśena*: Many of the syllables in line 133 are faded or abraded, but their readings become clearer in the infrared image. The syllable *na* in *samagravaśena* is followed by a blank space of approximately two syllables, marked by a hole and uneven surface bark. Even though *ta* would appear to be the nominative or accusative singular neuter form of the demonstrative pronoun, it is here understood as nominative singular masculine referring to the understood noun “nature” (*bhava*, P/Skt *bhāva*) that appears in the previous discussion.

[134] *panabhava [a].[sti a] + [di s]. [vu]na*: The lower portions of the first ten syllables in line 134 are lost at the lower edge of the manuscript, which has broken away leaving a hole at the right margin of fragment 51H approximately ten to twelve syllables wide and five lines long. The reading *panabhava* is clear, but only the faintest spot of ink from the following syllable remains at the lower edge of the manuscript. For the next syllable, only an *i*-vowel diacritic is visible, but its position and the context suggest the reading [*sti*], supporting the reconstruction (**ast*)*i*. The upper portions of the first and third of the next three syllables support the readings [*a*] and [*di*], but the middle syllable is completely missing. However, context would support the reconstruction *a(*ha)di*. Even though the middle portion of the following [*s*] has broken away, a dot of ink from its lower tip is preserved at the edge of the manuscript. Part of the lower portion of the next syllable is covered by a blank chip, but the visible ink would support the reading [*vu*]. A similar phrase is found in line 130, but the reading there is also tentative.

[134] [*n*]. [*kici a*].[*sti*] + + ? ///: From this point onward, the syllables in line 134 begin to disappear in the separation between fragments 51H and 51G and are further obscured by numerous small blank chips. The upper portions of these five syllables just above the lower edge of fragment 51H(v) are clarified by the infrared image, but in certain cases only the uppermost tips remain. The first of these syllables is most likely *n.*, followed by an *i*-vowel diacritic in *sti*, *ki*, or *vi*. The third syllable could be read as *ti*, *di*, or *ci*, the fourth as *a*. or *v.*, and the fifth and final syllable as *ti* or *di*. The proponent begins his argument here with a question in lines 129–130: “It should be said, ‘Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?’” (*vatava s(*a) v(*u)na samagri asti nasti di*). The opponent’s first response, which is clearly signaled by “one states” (*ahadi*), is given in line 130: “If one states, [o] ‘[The complete collocation] exists, ...’” (*yidi ahadi asti di*). The five uncertain syllables here in line 134 are preceded by a clause that echoes the proponent’s previous question, but since it is introduced by “one states” (*ahadi*), it likely represents a second response by the opponent: “One states, [o] ‘Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, ...’” (*a(*ha)di s(*a) vuna samag(*r)i asti*). Since both of

1 cm from the left edge of fragment 51G(v) (fig. 11; plt. 10). The final faint syllable in line 138 tentatively read as *[a]* is visible between bark piece 51o000 and the left edge of the manuscript, and hence is presumably located on the underlying fragment 51G(v).



Fig. 11. Detail of 51H(v), 51jjjj, 51kkkk, 51llll, 51nnnn, 51o000, 51ssss ll. 136–140.

[139] ^{|51kk(v)+51ll(v)+51E(v)}.*[ida]anagada nasti* ^{|51E(v)+51G(v)bro}^{|51G(v)si ca samagri[v]}. /// + + + + + + + + + +: The first two syllables on fragment 51E(v) at the beginning of line 139 are partially preserved on chip 51kk(v), which contains a vertical stroke that might represent an *i*-vowel diacritic, and on chip 51ll, which preserves the upper portions of *[da]a* (plt. 10). The two terms *a(*d)ida* and *anagada* have been interpreted as a compound, even though there is no elision of the final vowel of the prior member *a(*d)ida*. Otherwise, a conjunctive particle *ca* would presumably have been used to indicate that both *a(*d)ida* and *anagada* are to be construed separately with the verb *nasti*.

Following *nasti* is a blank space of approximately three syllables, and at the left edge of fragment 51E(v) are two strokes that form the upper and lower right tips of *bro*, which continues on fragment 51G(v). The remnants of *bro* on both fragment 51E(v) and fragment 51G(v) confirm that fragment 51E was originally located in the hole on the right edge of fragment 51G.²⁶⁸ The lower tips of the following *si* and *ca* are obscured by unplaced chip 51uu and by chip 51tt, which is blank on the verso but whose recto surface preserves the remnants of two syllables placed in line 6.²⁶⁹ Immediately to the right of the continuous layer 51ssss and approximately 4 cm from the right edge of fragment 51G is the right portion of a syllable read tentatively as *[v]*., which is marked by an apparent *e*-vowel diacritic that is actually on a small chip. The remainder of the resulting word *samagri[v]*. can presumably be reconstructed as *samagriv(*asena)*, as in the case of the compound in lines 129 and 133. The remainder of line 139 is completely covered by the continuous overlying layer 51ssss (fig. 11; plt. 10).

[140] + + + + /// ^{|51E(v)di • yidi [sa]mag[ri] a}^{|51E(v)+51G(v)[sti]} ^{|51G(v)?} + + + + + + + + + + + + + +: The four initial syllables in line 140 are missing from fragment 51E(v), but the next eight syllables can be confidently read as *di • yidi [sa]mag[ri] a*. The right portion of the following *[sti]*

²⁶⁸ Text Notes: [7] ^{|51kk(r)+51ll(r)+51E(r)}*[la] daḍavo astitva [h].[d].[p].*^{|51E(r)+51G(r)}*[l].*^{|51G(r)}*[p]..ti di •*

²⁶⁹ Text Notes: [6] + + + + /// ^{|51E(r)sti • yadi [ca]} ^{|51tt(r)+51G(r)}*[a]sti* ^{|51G(r)}*[s].[p].lade.*

is preserved at the left edge of fragment 51E(v), and the lower tip of this as well as of the next syllable can be found on fragment 51G(v) just above line 3 of layer 51ssss (plt. 10). After a blank space of approximately three syllables, the remainder of line 140 on fragment 51G(v) is covered by layer 51ssss.

[141] (+ ///) ? ? [mo kar].[di anagaḍa te] ? ? + + ? + + ? + + + + + + + + + + ? : Above the upper edge of the continuous layer 51ssss, the upper tips of fifteen of the approximately twenty initial syllables in line 141 are visible on the verso surface of underlying fragment 51G. Nine of these fifteen syllables become legible with the aid of the infrared image, but they do not provide sufficient evidence for reconstructing this portion of the manuscript. The left edge of layer 51ssss ends approximately 0.5 cm from the left edge of fragment 51G(v), revealing a diagonal stroke from the final syllable in line 141 located on underlying fragment 51G(v).

Even though the final syllables in line 140 and the initial syllables in line 141 are not legible, both the reference to future factors and the presence of the verb *karodi* preceded by the likely reconstruction (**dha*)*mo* suggest the reconstruction (**anupaḍadha*)*mo kar(*o)di*, that is, some future factor acts as a factor not subject to arising.²⁷⁰ Therefore, the four syllables preceding *dhamo* have been tentatively reconstructed as (**anupaḍa-*), yielding the translation, “... acts as a factor (**not subject to arising*)” (**anupaḍadha*)*mo kar(*o)di*, ll. 140–141).

II.6.3.14. 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5

Manuscript Notes: 51jjjj–oooo, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1–5

From lines 135–139, fragment 51G(v) is covered by pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo) that likely originated from layer 51ssss but were dislodged and displaced upward at the juncture between the underlying fragment 51G and the continuous portion of overlying layer 51ssss. Unfortunately, no physical connections can be observed among these various pieces of bark or between the pieces of bark and either layer 51ssss or the underlying fragment 51G(v). Further, even though these pieces of bark, layer 51ssss, and the remainder of the manuscript share several common terms, it is impossible to determine their relative placement or to establish with certainty how much text intervened between these various displaced and fragmentary parts of the manuscript. As a result, the original location of these pieces of bark vis-à-vis the various parts of layer 51ssss remains obscure. Thus, their transcription, reconstruction, and translation appear separately.²⁷¹

Beginning just above line 139, layer 51ssss almost completely covers the remainder of the original verso surface of fragment 51G. The presence of this overlying layer of bark is indicated by several factors: (1) optical backlighting reveals two layers throughout this area resulting in four distinct inscribed surfaces (fig. 4); (2) the upper edge of layer 51ssss can be discerned just above line 139, and its right edge, in lines 138–139, about 4 cm from the broken right edge of fragment 51G(v); and (3) portions of several syllables from the original and underlying verso surface of fragment 51G(v) are visible just above a displaced piece of the overlying layer in line 7 of 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] (plt. 10). This layer 51ssss probably originally included the various pieces of bark

²⁷⁰ For other occurrences of similar phrasing, see 51D(r) l. 3; ll. 2, 36–37, 50, 63, 66.

²⁷¹ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A; Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v).

(51jjjj–0000) above line 139, but their physical relationships with this layer and among themselves are still uncertain.²⁷² Further, optical backlighting confirms that fragments 51C and 51F also consist of multiple layers, and therefore their visible verso surface undoubtedly represents layer 51ssss.

Layer 51ssss and the remainder of manuscript part 51 presumably come from one original manuscript and represent the same text, as indicated both by the same scribal hand as well as by the shared terminology and continuity in general topic. However, it is impossible to determine with certainty either the point at which layer 51ssss and manuscript part 51 were originally joined, or the relationship between layer 51ssss and either bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 or the larger outer fragments 51C, 51F, 51D, and 51A–B+53A. Nonetheless, certain connections seem probable.²⁷³ First, since both the final portion of fragment 51G (ll. 139–141) as well as fragments 51C and 51F consist of two layers, they are presumably covered by layer 51ssss and are likely contiguous. Thus, the visible verso surface located on the final portion of 51G as well as on fragments 51C and 51F preserve the continuous text found on layer 51ssss in addition to other stray chips. However, the original and now-hidden verso surfaces of these fragments and pieces of bark contain text that is continuous with the portion of fragment 51G(v) preceding line 139. Second, concerning the original location of overlying layer 51ssss and its relationship to the other pieces of bark and fragments in these outer strips of the scroll, the simplest and therefore most likely scenario presumes that the layer of bark represented by 51ssss, which includes also bark pieces 51jjjj–0000, covers fragment 51G(v) from line 135 to the end of the manuscript, and extends continuously including in order all of the fragments in the three outer strips of the verso of the scroll: the visible verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F in the third strip, 51D in the second strip, and 51A–B in the outermost strip.²⁷⁴ This continuous layer of bark would be placed just beyond the underlying and now-hidden verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F, which are contiguous with the original verso surface of fragment 51G(v).

Finally, it is important to remember that, regardless of the scenario adopted, bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 and layer 51ssss cover, almost completely, approximately fourteen lines of text on the original verso surfaces of fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F. Similarly, approximately fourteen lines of text on the recto surfaces of bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 and layer 51ssss are hidden by fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F to which they adhere. Even though the infrared images reveal certain letters on these hidden surfaces, since there are four inscribed surfaces, individual letters can be neither read nor placed with confidence. In view of these difficulties in determining the physical relationships among these pieces of bark, layers, and fragments, the transcription, reconstruction, and translation of the text preserved on certain of the bark pieces 51jjjj–0000 and on layer 51ssss are given separately from those on fragments 51G(v) and 51H(v).

²⁷² Manuscript Notes: ll. 135–141.

²⁷³ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

²⁷⁴ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

51jjj

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51jjj1.1}[de] sutr[e] ? [ma]ḍa sarva [aṣ]. [na t].[s]. sarva anupaṣapana d[i] ///
2. /// |^{51jjj1.2}? sa ? a[st]i ? ? ///
3. /// |^{51jjj1.3}[•] ? ? [a].[sti] ///

Reconstruction

[1] ... (*tena) de sutre ? maḍa sarva aṣ(*a) na t(*a)s(*a) sarva anupaṣapana di ... [2] ...
? sa ? asti ? ? ... [3] ... • ? ? (*a)sti ...

Translation

[1] ... [P] ... (*as a result of that,) it is held in the scripture that all [have not attained religious practice]. Or else, it is not the case in that way that all have not attained [religious practice] ... [2] ... exists ... [3] exists ...

51lll

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51lll1.1}? [n].[h]. [v]. + + ? ///
2. /// |^{51lll1.2}? [v]. .[i • asti a].[n].[g]. ? ///

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? n(*a)h(*i) v(*atava) ? ... [2] ... ? v. i • asti (*a)n(*a)g(*aḍa) ...

Translation

[1] ... for it should not be said ... [2] There are future ...

51nnn

Transcribed text

/// |⁵¹ⁿⁿⁿ? .[o k]. [bh]. ? [p]. ? ? ///

51ooo

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51ooo1.1}? ? ? ? ? + ? ? ? .[o] ? ? ///
2. /// |^{51ooo1.2}• yidi anagad. [o]va [viry]. ///
3. /// |^{51ooo1.3}? + ? + ? ? ? ? .[i]/.[e] .[i]/.[e] + ///

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? ? ? ? ? + ? ? ? .o ? ? ... [2] ... • yidi anagad(*a) <*e>va viry(*ena) ... [3] ... ? + ?
+ ? ? ? ? .i/.e .i/.e + ...

Translation

[1] ... [2] [P] If a future [factor] alone by virtue of [its] energy ... [3] ...

scriptures (*sūtre*). A clue to the content of this position is found in the clause that occurs later in the line: “Or else, it is not the case in that way that all have not attained [religious practice] ...” (*aś(*a) na t(*a)ś(*a) sarva anupaśapana di*, 51jjjj line 1). The term *aś(*a)* (P/Skt *atha*), with which this clause begins, suggests a pair of mutually exclusive logically complementary or simple contrasting alternatives, both of which here presumably concern those who have not attained religious practice (*anupaśapana*, P/Skt *anupasampanna*). Thus, the first alternative constituting the proponent’s initial untoward consequence becomes, “... [P] ... (*as a result of that,) it is held in scripture that all [have not attained religious practice]” (*(*tena) de sūtre ? maḍa sarva*, 51jjjj line 1).

Immediately below *sarva* on the second portion of 51jjjj are four syllables along the upper edge of bark piece 51llll. These syllables can tentatively be read as ? [n].[h]. [v]. and are followed by a blank space of approximately two syllables. Along the lower edge of bark piece 51llll are the remnants of the upper portions of nine or ten syllables constituting a second line of text: ? [v]. .[i] • *asti a*].[n].[g]. ?. The blank space along its upper edge precludes the alignment of bark piece 51llll with the partially covered syllables in bark piece 51jjjj, and neither the first nor second line of the syllable remnants on bark piece 51llll can be realigned with any other piece of bark or layer.²⁷⁵

Bark piece 51llll covers the lower portions of the next five syllables on 51jjjj, read tentatively as [*aś*]. [*na t*].[*ś*]. Here, the two syllables [*na t*] are partially obscured by a small chip (51kkkk), which also contains the remnants of the upper tips of two illegible syllables. The final syllable on 51jjjj has broken into four stray dots of ink that would be consistent with the reading [*ś*]. (fig. 11; plt. 10). The three syllables [*na t*].[*ś*] have been tentatively reconstructed as *na t(*a)ś(*a)*, whereby *t(*a)ś(*a)* has been interpreted as the indeclinable adverb corresponding to P/Skt *tathā*.

The upper portion of *śa* and the middle of *pa* in the following *anupaśapana [di]* on bark piece 51jjjj are covered by chip 51mmmm, containing only one stroke of ink, and the final two syllables *na [di]* are abraded and obscured by blank chips. The term *anupaśapana*, a negated past participle of the root *pad* with the prefixes *upa-* and *sam-*, has the sense of “not attained,” or specifically here, “one who has not attained religious practice.”²⁷⁶ The word *anupaśapana* and related terms do not occur on the following pieces of bark (51kkkk–rrrr) nor on layer 51ssss, and reappear only on fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v) and following. Therefore, it is possible that bark piece 51jjjj has become dislodged from its original location as part of the visible verso surface of fragments 51G(v), 51C(v), or 51F(v).

51jjjj /// |^{51jjjj 1.2?} *sa ? a[st]i ? ?* ///

51nnnn /// |^{51nnnn?} .[o k]. [*bh*]. ? [*p*]. ? ? ///: The continuation of line 137 at the right edge of fragment 51G(v) is obscured by overlying small chips and bark deterioration. The infrared image reveals seven partial syllables on bark piece 51jjjj that presumably constitute a second line. Only the second of the first three syllables is clearly legible as *sa*, followed by a syllable that could be read as *a* or *va* and by another syllable, obscured by chip 51llll, which could be *sti* or possibly *vi*, yielding the tentative reconstruction *a[st]i*. Just below bark piece 51llll and prior to the right edge of bark piece 51nnnn are the lower tips of two or possibly three illegible syllables. Bark piece

²⁷⁵ Manuscript Notes: ll. 135–141.

²⁷⁶ Text Notes: 51C(v), 51F(v) [3] /// |^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.3} [*u*]paśapa[*d*]. *ye sarvasatva upaśap*. ///. Commentary: Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

syllables *vata* and *va* is a space of two or three syllables containing a small hole through which ink from underlying fragment 51G(v) is visible.

II.6.3.15. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7

Manuscript Notes: 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7

This section of the text is found on the portion of layer 51ssss that is continuous with the previous portion in 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] lines 1–5 and extends to the bottom edge of fragment 51G(v). Even though layer 51ssss likely comprises the verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F as well as of the remaining final fragments 51D, 51A, and 51B, clear physical relationships cannot be determined among them, and hence it is not clear how much text is missing between 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 7 and the following heavily damaged fragments.

51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7

Transcribed text

5. ^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.5} *saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava mahasa-*
6. ^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.6} *rvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo • cadu
? ?*
7. ^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.7?} *ḍig. + + [a]. ? [s].[ḍ]. [bh].va asti • [bh].[v]. + + asaḍa nasti atra
maha[sa].[v].[sti]*

Reconstruction

[5] *saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava mahasa*[6]*rvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo • cadu ? ? [7] (*pa)ḍig. + + a. ? s(*a)ḍ(*a) bh(*a)va asti • bh(*a)v(*a) + + asaḍa nasti atra mahasa(*r)v(*a)sti*[8]*(*vaḍa) ...*

Translation

[5] [P] It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist. [6] [And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [O] “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist.” [P] [In that case,] there is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist. The four [7–8] ... in the case of the existent ..., a “nature” exists; a “nature,” in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist. With regard to this, the Mahāsarvāstivādins ...

Text Notes: 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7

[5] ^{51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.5} *saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava*: Both *saḍa* and *sata/asata* have been construed here as forms of the present participle of the root *as*; *saḍa* would represent the genitive singular neuter, and *sata/asata*, the nominative singular neuter declined on the basis of a thematized *a*-stem in *-anta*.²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ See Annotated Text Edition and Notes § II.6, n. 25. Text Notes: 51D(r) [4] *[et]. [vi]vaga tasa heduvinaśa* [5] + + + /// ^{51D(r)} *[ta] ? ta kamaavivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asaḍa na bhodi •*; [71] + + /// ^{52eg.} *[i]* ^{52eg+52G(r)} *[t].* ^{52G(r)} *nastiḍa [ha] vatava • sata astiḍa vatava • asata nastiḍa vatava •*; [86] *sata asti* [87] + + /// *[t].va • asata nastiḍa vatava • eva śad[e]hi.*

[6] *nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo* •: The present participle *asaḍa* could be interpreted as nominative or genitive singular neuter, of which either would fit the present context. However, since here the proponent offers an untoward consequence following from the opponent’s immediately preceding statement, the translation follows the syntactic pattern of a simple copula construction with *asaḍa* understood as nominative: “[And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [o] ‘Certainly there is nothing that does not exist.’ [p] [In that case,] there is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist” (*mahasarvastivaḍa ahasu nasti kica nasti nama nasti kica asaḍa nasti namo*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6).

[6] *cadu* ? ? [7] ^{[51G(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.7?} *ḍig.* + + [a]. ? [s].[ḍ]. [bh].va *asti* • [bh].[v]. + + *asaḍa nasti*: The infrared image reveals the faint outline of a possible vertical stroke and one short diagonal stroke of ink from the penultimate syllable in 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 6 as well as a curved vertical and bottom foot mark from a final syllable, of which both may in fact be located on the underlying fragment 51G (l. 145). The word *cadu* may represent some form of the numeral “four,” possibly the nominative plural masculine *cadure/cature*, the genitive plural *caduna/catuna*, or the compounded form *cadu/catu*, but the uncertainty of the readings at the end of 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 6 and the beginning of line 7 precludes even a tentative reconstruction.

Line 7 is the final line on the portion of 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] that covers fragment 51G, and the upper portions of most of the first ten syllables are preserved to varying degrees along its irregular lower edge. The first two legible syllables *ḍig.* are preceded by one dot of ink that most likely represents the syllable *pa* in the Sanskrit prefix *prati-*, which in Gāndhārī can become *paḍi-*: *paḍiṣavededi* (Skt *pratisamvedayati*, ll. 20, 35); *paḍikakṣiḍava* (Skt *pratikāṅkṣitavya*, l. 27), *paḍiyanāṣa* (Skt *pratiḍānītha*, l. 90); and *paḍiyanadi* (Skt *pratiḍānāti*, l. 122). Possible Sanskrit equivalents for *(*pa)ḍig.* include the following: (1) *pratigha*, “resistance” used in the definition of material form, “impingement” in reference to sense impressions, or “aversion” in the case of mental factors; (2) some form of *prati* + √*grah*, to “seize” used to refer to the causal efficacy exerted in the first of two stages according to the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika causal model, that is, the “seizing” of the effect that occurs when the cause itself is present; (3) some form of *prati* + √*gam*, to “go toward” or “return”; (4) *pratyeka*, “singly,” or “each one”; and (5) *pratīka*, “initial word.” Among these various equivalents, only *pratigha* has a standard connection with the term “four” when it is used in the phrase, “due to passing beyond conception of (based on) resistance” (Skt *pratighasañḍānām astāṅgamāt*, P *paḍighasañḍānaṃ atthaṅgamā*), which occurs in the description of the “sphere of the infinity of space” (P *ākāsānañcāyatana*, Skt *ākāsānantyāyatana*). This is the first of the four formless (Skt *ārūpya*, P *āruppa*) spheres, or trance states, all of which can also be said to have only four aggregates excluding material form.²⁸¹ However, since a connection between these formless spheres and the present context is not apparent, both the word represented by *(*pa)ḍig.* and the referent of “four” (*cadu*) at the end of 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 6 remain unclear.²⁸²

The word containing *(*pa)ḍig.* may continue for one or two more syllables, but the following four syllables + + [a]. ? in 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 7 are largely lost at the lower edge of layer 51ssss. Following these illegible syllables is the clause *s(*a)ḍ(*a) bh(*a)va asti*: “... in the case of

²⁸¹ DN I 223; Vibh 245; AKVy 275; AKBh 8.2c p. 234.4ff.

²⁸² Commentary: Criticism Opponent’s Two Explications [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7].

the existent . . . , a ‘nature’ exists.” As in 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 5, *saḍa/asada* have been interpreted here as genitive singular neuter forms of the present participle of the root *as*.²⁸³ The punctuation mark concluding this clause is followed by an apparently blank space of approximately four syllables, but a split in layer 51ssss within this blank space (51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7) reveals the upper portions of six illegible syllables from the otherwise hidden original verso surface of fragment 51G (plt. 10). Further, just below the split is a piece of layer 51ssss that has migrated downward from its original position within the now blank space immediately following the punctuation mark. The upper edge of this piece of bark is relatively straight and presumably indicates a glue-line juncture, which continues above the remainder of line 7 to the left edge of layer 51ssss. On the lower edge of this piece of bark are the upper tips of two syllables that would support the reading *[bh].[v]*., followed by a hole that may have contained approximately two syllables prior to the next legible syllables *asada nasti*. The legible portion of this clause *bh(*a)v(*a) + + asada nasti* resembles the immediately preceding clause in 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 7, *s(*a)d(*a) bh(*a)va asti*. If this prior clause originally included another word constituted by two of the syllables lost at the beginning of 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 7, the missing syllables prior to *asada* in the second clause might also have contained the same word. In the interest of presenting at least a tentative translation, it has been assumed that the two clauses are parallel, with the same missing word(s) indicated by ellipses prior to a comma: “in the case of the existent . . . , a ‘nature’ exists; a ‘nature,’ in the case of the nonexistent . . . , does not exist” (*s(*a)d(*a) bh(*a)va asti • bh(*a)v(*a) + + asada nasti*, 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7). Thus, in the absence of other contextual clues, this first portion of 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] line 7 remains only partially reconstructed and translated.

II.6.4 Section 4—Religious Practice: Present and Future Factors [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)]

II.6.4.1. 51C(v), 51F(v)

Manuscript Notes: Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v)

The three final strips of the original manuscript part in frame 51 contain six large fragments (51A–F), several of which have become turned over, inverted, or displaced in the process of conservation (plts. 1, 4).²⁸⁴ Nonetheless, probable locations for all fragments can be determined on the basis of physical characteristics and, to a lesser extent, content. Only fragment 51E, conserved in the third strip of the manuscript, can be placed with certainty in a hole on the right edge of fragment 51G in the fifth strip from the end of the scroll (recto ll. 5–7; verso ll. 138–140). Fragment 51C, conserved in the first strip of manuscript part 51, can then also be returned to its original location in the third strip next to fragment 51F, in the hole vacated by fragment 51E. Similarly, fragment 53A, which adheres to a separate scroll, of which a portion is conserved in frame 53, can be returned to the hole vacated by fragment 51C. Finally, as conserved in frame 51, fragments 51A–B are turned over recto to verso, and fragments 51C and 51A are inverted top to bottom (plts. 5, 10, 11a, 11b).

²⁸³ Text Notes: 51D(r) [4] *[et]. [vi]vaga tasa heduavinaśa [5] + + + /// [51D(r)]ta ? ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asada na bhodi •; [71] + + + /// [52gg].[i] [52gg+52G(r)]ti. [52G(r)]nastida [ha] vatava • sata astida vatava • asata nastida vatava •; [86] sata asti [87] + + + /// [t].va • asata nastida vatava • eva śad[e]hi; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–7 [5] [51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l.5]saḍa sata asti di vatava saḍa asata nasti di vatava.*

²⁸⁴ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

The reconstruction of these final strips in the manuscript is also complicated by layer 51ssss, which completely covers the original verso surface of fragment 51G from line 139 and extends also to cover fragments 51C and 51F. According to the most likely scenario for the reconstruction of these larger outer fragments, the verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F, and the entirety of 51D, 51A, and 51B (including both their recto and verso surfaces) represent layer 51ssss (plts. 5, 10). The original verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F are thus hidden by layer 51ssss, and the verso surfaces of the other fragments and chips including 53A, 53b, 53c, 51t(v) and 51cc(v), which were combined in the reconstruction of the recto surface of the outermost strip of manuscript part 51, are hidden by the various bark surfaces to which they adhere.²⁸⁵

On the recto, fragments 51C and 51F can be connected on the basis of their smooth bark and the probable reconstruction of 51C+51F(r) line 4, which extends across both fragments. However, on the verso, even though the major part of the visible verso surfaces of both fragments likely represents layer 51ssss, no physical characteristics clearly indicate that a continuous layer of bark connects the two fragments. Further, the exterior of the scroll containing manuscript part 51 was treated with lacquer fixative spray prior to conservation in an attempt to prevent further deterioration. As a result, a darker discoloration of the original verso surfaces of most of the final fragments in the final two strips of the scroll has occurred. In addition, the spray fused the various smaller chips, especially on the visible verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F, and obscured the junctures among them. Thus, it is impossible to use physical characteristics of the bark surface to determine whether these chips belong to the original underlying verso surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F, which would be contiguous with the original verso surface of fragment 51G, or to the various pieces of bark (51jjjj–oooo) and layer 51ssss that cover the verso of 51G from line 135 through the end of the scroll.

Despite these difficulties, it would appear that the major part of the verso surface of 51C consists of chips and pieces from layer 51ssss, with the exception of chip 51t, which adheres to the lower edge of 51C, and a large blank piece of bark that obscures its lower left portion (51C(v) ll. 3–4). Visible at the end of lines 2–4 on fragment 51C(v) just beyond the left edge of layer 51ssss are several partial syllables from an underlying layer that presumably represents the otherwise hidden original verso surface of fragment 51C. In addition, the initial black-and-white photograph indicates that four small chips below and to the left of fragment 51C—51o, 51n, 51m, and 51l—can be combined to form two larger chips. Since on the recto the final syllable *śa* in line 4 of 51C(r) can be combined with its lower left tip on chip 51o(r), it is clear that fragment 51C(r) and chips 51l–o were originally connected and belonged to the manuscript represented by fragments 51C, 51F, and 51G.²⁸⁶ Thus, the physical connections among these chips on the recto indicate that the two partial lines preserved on the verso surfaces of chips 51l–o(v) also represent the original verso of fragment 51C(v) and not the overlying layer 51ssss (plt. 10).

As in the case of fragment 51C, the visible verso surface of fragment 51F is marked by numerous junctures, but it too appears to consist primarily of a series of partial lines representing layer 51ssss, which is in turn also covered by additional separate chips. The junctures among these

²⁸⁵ Commentary: Objects of Knowledge [51A–B(v)+53A].

²⁸⁶ Text Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r) [4] [*yidi*] *vatava* |^{51C(r)+51o(r)}*śa*|^{51o(r)+51n(r)+51m(r)+51l(r)}*ka vivaga a /// + ///* |^{51F(r)}*[di] viva[ga] .[i]!.[e g]. ///*

chips and hence the determination of lines of text are tentative. It is also possible that some of these chips or lines may have belonged to the original verso surface of fragment 51F rather than layer 51ssss. Chip 51gg is conserved on the recto of fragment 51F, but it can be connected to the verso of layer 51ssss on the basis of the term *up(*a)/(*an)up(*a)s(*a)p(*a)n(*a)*, and hence it was likely turned over verso to recto in the process of conservation. Since the original locations of the various chips and pieces of bark adhering to 51C(v) and 51F(v) remain uncertain, the transcription, reconstruction, and translation of these various fragments on the verso are presented separately, in contrast to the recto surfaces of fragments 51C and 51F.

51C(v)[51ssss(v)]

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.1}? *na neva ? ? aṣa [ta va] ///*
2. /// |^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.2}? *gehi anuyujidav[o •] ruvaṣa ///*
3. /// |^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.3}[*u*]paṣapa[*d*]. *ye sarvasatva [u]paṣap. ///*
4. /// |^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.4}*a [da/na] ? ? ? ///*

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? *na neva ? ? aṣa ta va* ... [2] ... ? *gehi anuyujidavo • ruvaṣa* ... [3] ... *upaṣapad(*a) ye sarvasatva upaṣap(*ana/da)* ... [4] ... *a da/na ? ? ?* ...

Translation

[P/o?] [1] ... not at all Or else that ... [2] ... it should be upheld in the case of Of material form ... [3] ... the attainment [of religious practice]. All sentient beings who ... having attained/the attainment [of religious practice] ... [4] ...

51l(v)+51m(v)+51n(v)+51o(v)

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51C(v)[51l(v)+51m(v)+51n(v)+51o(v)] 1.1}? ? + ? [*pr*]..[*u*] ///
2. /// |^{51C(v)[51l(v)+51m(v)+51n(v)+51o(v)] 1.2}[*s*]/[*r*]. [*e/ve vi di*] ? ///

Reconstruction

[1] ... ? ? + ? *pr(*ac)u(*pana)* ... [2] ... *s./r. e/ve vi di ?* ...

Translation

[1] ... present ... [2] ...

51C(v)

Transcribed text

4. /// |^{51C(v) 1.4}[*ta*]tra [*va*] ///

Reconstruction

[4] ... *tatra va(*tava)* ...

Translation

[4] ... With regard to that it should be said ...

51F(v)[51ssss(v)]

Transcribed text

1. /// |^{51oo(v)+51F(v)[51ssss(v)]} 1.1 .[v].m=asti ? ///
2. /// |^{51F(v)[51ssss(v)]} 1.2 ? [adida] ? [did]. ? ///
3. /// |^{51F(v)[51ssss(v)]} 1.3 [n]. [v].ta[v]. + yidi ahadi nasti /// |^{51ij(v)?} [u]paṣapaḍa • na [dukh].
4. /// |^{51F(v)[51ssss(v)]} 1.4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? bhava anuyujidava ? ? ? ///

Reconstruction

[1] ... (*sar)v(*a)m asti ? ... [2] ... ? adida (*a)did(*a) ? ... [3] ... n(*a) v(*a)tav(*a •) yidi ahadi nasti ? upaṣapaḍa • na dukh(*a) [4] ... ? ? ? ? ? ? ? bhava anuyujidava ? ? ? ...

Translation

[1] ... everything exists ... [2] ... past ... past ... [3] ... [P] ... should not be said. If one states, [O] “There is no attainment [of religious practice],” [P] it is not the case that suffering ... [4] ... should be upheld that “nature” ...

51gg

Transcribed text

/// |^{51gg?} ? .[up].[s].[p].[n]. ///

Reconstruction

... ? up(*a)/(•an)up(*a)s(*a)p(*a)n(*a) ...

Translation

... one having attained (or: not having attained) [religious practice] ...

51aaaa

Transcribed text

/// |^{51aaaa?} .[ubh].[y]. ///

Reconstruction

... ? ubh(*a)y. ...

Translation

... both ...

51dd(v)

Transcribed text

/// |^{51dd(v)} ga ///

51bb(v)

Transcribed text

///^{51bb(v)}[*di*] • ///

Text Notes: 51C(v), 51F(v)

51C(v)[51ssss(v)] [1] ///^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.1?} *na neva ? ? aṣa [ta va]* ///: A hole at the upper edge of 51C following *na neva* in 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 1 obliterates all but the lower tips of the next two syllables.

51C(v)[51ssss(v)] [2] /// [*•*] *ruvaṣa* ///: The punctuation mark preceding *ru* is partially obscured by a small cluster of blank chips. At the end of 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 2, just above *va* and to the left of *ṣa*, are partial syllables visible from the otherwise hidden original verso surface of fragment 51C.

51C(v)[51ssss(v)] [3] ///^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.3} [*u*]*paṣapa[d]*. *ye sarvasatva upaṣap*. ///: Unplaced chip 51ccccc, which preserves only one stroke of ink, covers the upper portion of the first partially visible syllable in 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 3, but a dot of ink remaining from the upper left tip and a curved vertical stroke support the reading *u* rather than *nu*. The lower portion of the final syllable in [*u*]*paṣapa[d]*. is abraded, but the relatively short height of the syllable suggests the reading [*d*]. rather than [*n*]. and thus the noun form *upaṣapaḍa*, “attainment” with the probable extended sense, “the attainment of religious practice.”²⁸⁷

Following *sarva-*, the lower tips of the remaining syllables in 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 3 are obscured by a blank piece of bark that covers the lower left portion of fragment 51C(v). As in the case of the previous and following lines, a portion of one syllable from the underlying original verso surface of fragment 51C is visible just beyond [*p*]. at the end of 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 3. As a result, the final syllable in [*u*]*paṣap*.- is not preserved, and it is therefore impossible to determine whether the word should be understood as the past participle *upaṣap.[n]*., “one who has attained religious practice,” or as the noun *upaṣap.[d]*., “the attainment of religious practice.”

51C(v)[51ssss(v)] [4] ///^{51C(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.4} *a [ḍa/na] ? ? ?* ///: The lower portions of the first five partially visible syllables in 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 4 are covered by chip 51t(v), and most of the remainder of 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] line 4 is obscured by a blank piece of bark that covers the lower left portion of fragment 51C(v). As in the case of the previous two lines, several syllables, presumably from the otherwise hidden original verso surface of fragment 51C, are visible to the left of the blank piece of bark. These syllables can be read tentatively as ///^{51C(v) 1.4} [*ta*]*tra [va]* ///, and reconstructed as *tatra va*(**tava*).

51F(v)[51ssss(v)] [1] ///^{51oo(v)+51F(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.1} [*v*].*m=asti ?* ///: The last of the three partial syllables on chip 51oo(v) can be realigned with the lower portion of a syllable on the upper tip of fragment 51F(v) to form the syllable *sti* (plt. 10). Chip 51oo(v) also preserves the upper left tip of an initial syllable [*v*]. and the complete following syllable *ma*, forming (**sar*)*v*(**a*)*m asti*.

51F(v)[51ssss(v)] [2] ///^{51F(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.2?} [*adiḍa*] ? [*diḍ*]. ? ///: The second visible syllable [*di*] in 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] line 2 is partially covered by unplaced chip 51www, which contains remnants of perhaps two illegible syllables. The upper portions of the following [*ḍa*] and the next three

²⁸⁷ Commentary: Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

syllables are lost at the upper edge of fragment 51F(v). However, the second and third of these three following syllables can be read as *[did]*.. Unplaced chip 51mm(v) likely preserves the upper portions of two syllables possibly from 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] line 2, which are no longer legible.

51F(v)[51ssss(v)] [3] /// ^{51F(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.3} *[n]. [v].ta[v]. + yidi ahadi nasti* /// ^{51jj(v)?} *[u]paṣapaḍa • na [dukh].*: The lower portion of the initial syllable read as *[n]*. is followed immediately by chip 51yyyy, underneath which the infrared image reveals a vertical stroke possibly from the covered syllable *[v]*.. The next syllables *ta[v]*., also clearer in the infrared image, are followed by unplaced chip 51zzzz, which covers a probable punctuation mark. Thereafter, the remainder of 51F(v) [51ssss(v)] line 3 is partially preserved on layer 51F(v)[51ssss(v)]. The nine syllables beginning with ? *[u]paṣapaḍa* are on a single layer of bark (51jj(v)) that once belonged to layer 51ssss(v). These syllables on chip 51jj(v) appear to continue from the prior portion of 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] line 3 and are followed by a blank space indicating the left margin. The first syllable on chip 51jj(v) is not legible, and although the *u*-vowel of the second syllable *[u]* in *[u]paṣapaḍa* is clear, its upper portion is obscured. It is thus possible that the syllables ? *[u]paṣapaḍa* should then be understood as *(*a)[n]upaṣapaḍa*. However, in the absence of other contextual clues, the reading *upaṣapaḍa* preceded by an unknown syllable has been tentatively adopted.

51F(v)[51ssss(v)] [4] /// ^{51F(v)[51ssss(v)] 1.4} ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *bhava anuyujidava* ? ? ? ///: The first eight syllables in 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] line 4 are represented by faint remnants visible only in the infrared image. The final illegible syllable in 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] line 4 is obscured by unplaced chip 51bbbb with only one stroke of ink. Remnants of several syllables, all on a single layer of bark, are visible to the left and above the end of 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] line 4, revealing what may be the underlying original verso surface of fragment 51F, or possibly another piece of bark that has broken away from the lower edge of fragment 51D(v).²⁸⁸

51gg /// ^{51gg?} ? .*[up].[s̄].[p].[n]*. ///: Chip 51gg, located immediately below chips 51ee and 51ff on the recto surface of fragment 51F, contains seven partial syllables, five of which can be reconstructed either as *up(*a)s(*a)p(*a)n(*a)* or as *(*an)up(*a)s(*a)p(*a)n(*a)*, largely on the basis of similar terms that appear on bark piece 51jjjj and layer 51ssss. This similarity in terminology suggests that chip 51gg, even though conserved on the recto, is connected with these pieces of bark and fragments on the verso and was likely turned over verso to recto in the process of conservation.²⁸⁹

51aaaa /// ^{51aaaa?} .*[ubh].[y]*. ///: Bark piece 51aaaa is located near the left edge of fragment 51F(v) and contains the lower tips of four partially legible syllables. The second of these syllables contains an *u*-vowel diacritic followed by *bh.* or *k.* and the lower tips of *y.* or *ś.*, tentatively read together as *[ubh].[y]*.. Just above bark piece 51aaaa are the faint upper portions of four largely obscured syllables that may originally have been connected to the syllables on 51aaaa. Since the surface of fragment 51F(v) was treated with lacquer fixative spray prior to conservation, the junctures among the chips have become obscured, and it is impossible to determine the original location of bark piece 51aaaa or its relationship to the syllables that it covers.

²⁸⁸ Text Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r) /// ^{51ff?} *[kṣaya] va [tasa] viva* ? ///.

²⁸⁹ Commentaries: Criticism Opponent's Second, Third (?), and Fourth (?) Specifications [l. 135–51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 5]; Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

51dd(v) /// ^{|51dd(v)}ga ///: Whereas the recto of chip 51dd contains the largely legible remnants of eleven syllables, only the single syllable *ga* is legible on 51dd(v). The remainder of chip 51dd(v) is covered by chip 51cc(v) and blank pieces of bark.

51bb(v) /// ^{|51bb(v)}[di] • ///: These two graphs are located at the lower edge of fragment 51F(v) on chip 51bb, which differs in appearance from much of the surrounding bark. If it originated from layer 51ssss(v), its different appearance might result from its not having been treated with lacquer fixative spray prior to conservation. It is also possible that it represents the underlying original verso surface of fragment 51F, or perhaps a separate piece of bark that should be connected with fragment 51D.²⁹⁰

II.6.4.2. 51D(v)

Manuscript Notes: 51D(v)

The verso surface of fragment 51D is relatively well preserved with six or seven lines of text, of which at least one line may be entirely preserved. The first line consists only of sporadic syllables along the irregular upper edge of the fragment. No more than two or three syllables are missing from the beginning of the second line, one from the third, and the fourth line may be complete. Damage to the lower right edge of fragment 51D has resulted in the loss of six or seven syllables at the beginning of line 5 and of approximately thirteen syllables in line 6.

Unlike certain other fragments in the last few strips of manuscript part 51, fragment 51D has been conserved in its correct orientation. In content, specifically in its references to *upaṣapana*, *anupaṣapana*, and related terms, 51D(v) can be linked to bark piece 51jjjj and to the portion of layer 51ssss that covers fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v). However, the original location of fragment 51D in relation to fragment 51G, to these other outer fragments, and in particular to layer 51ssss is uncertain. According to the most likely scenario, the overlying layer of bark 51ssss comprising also 51jjjj–oooo begins from line 135 of fragment 51G(v) and extends continuously, including in order all of the fragments in the three outer strips of manuscript part 51: the visible verso surface of fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v) in the third strip from the end, both the verso and recto of 51D in the second strip, and the verso and recto of 51A–B in the outermost strip (plts. 10, 11b).²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Text Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r) [1] /// ^{|51F(r)}? ? ? ? ///; 51C(v), 51F(v) [4] /// ^{|51F(v)[51ssss(v)]}14? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *bhava anuyujidava* ? ? ? ///.

²⁹¹ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

Text Notes: 51D(v)

[1] + + + + + /// ^{51D(v)}? ? + + + [p].[sapan]. + + ? ? /// + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + : The first line on 51D(v) consists of the lower tips of eight largely illegible syllables preserved on protrusions of bark along the upper edge of the fragment. These lower tips support the reading [p].[sapan]., which is clearly a participial form, but nothing remains from the prior syllables that would determine whether the word in question is *upaśapana* or *anupaśapana*. Hence, the reconstruction (*anu)p(*a)sapan(*a) is tentative and is based on a speculative interpretation of the argument presented in the first three lines of fragment 51D(v).²⁹²

[2] *asti upaśapada asti* [k].[d].[m].[na u]: The upper tips of the six syllables *paśapada asti* are lost at the upper edge of the fragment, and the final four visible syllables are partially covered by chip 51cc(v). The final syllable in 51D(v) line 2 appears to be the simple vowel *a*, but the infrared image reveals an upward stroke at the bottom typical of an *u*-vowel diacritic. Only the lower portions of the preceding three or four syllables, read tentatively as [k].[d].[t].[m].[n]., are visible below chip 51cc(v). They are construed as the interrogative form *kadamena*, with *d* resembling a *t* in form, and *m*. written very close to the upper portion of this preceding *d*.

[3] + /// ^{51D(v)}[s].[pa]no: The tips of two syllables on chip 51z(v) at the beginning of 51D(v) line 3 would appear to form the upper portions of the first two syllables [s].[pa], whose lower portions remain on fragment 51D(v). However, differences in the intensity of the ink, the distortion of the upper stroke of [pa], and the failure to align chip 51z(r) with any syllables in line 5 of 51D(r), suggest that chip 51z does not belong in this location.²⁹³ As a result, chip 51z remains unplaced. The missing initial syllable in 51D(v) line 3 can be reconstructed as (*pa) from context, which, when combined with the final syllable *u* in 51D(v) line 2, forms *u(*pa)s(*a)pano*.

[3] *eva anagaḍa* [ye]sti • *adida va[s].ga asti d[i]*: Even though the reading [ye] appears clear, the resulting word [ye]sti makes little sense, and it is possible that the scribe misread the archetype, which contained an obscured or possibly corrected syllable. In fact, the right leg of *y*. combined with the *e*-vowel diacritic resembles the syllable *na*, which would yield the word *nasti* and would make better sense in this context. Hence, the reading [ye]sti has been corrected to <*na>sti. The statement *eva anagaḍa* <*na>sti would then constitute a summary conclusion to the prior argument: “In this way, future [factors] do not exist.” Even though *asti* is a third-person singular form, it can be used with both singular and plural nominatives, and the general summary nature of the statement suggests that the subject *anagaḍa* be understood as having a plural referent, “future factors.”²⁹⁴

A hole extends from *va* to *ga* in *va[s].ga*, obliterating the lower portion of [s]., but *va* and *ga* remain intact.

[3] *tena avaro ma*[4]^{51D(v)}[na] *vaṣo* [ava]ṣiyo •: The syllable *ma* is probably the final syllable in 51D(v) line 3 since it is aligned vertically with [u], also probably the final syllable in 51D(v) line 2. Even though the syllable [na] at the beginning of 51D(v) line 4 is aligned vertically with [s]. in 51D(v) line 3, which has been determined from context to be the second syllable in the line, it

²⁹² Commentary: Time Periods, Existence, Religious Practice [51C(v), 51F(v), 51D(v), 51A–B(r)].

²⁹³ Text Notes: 51D(r) [4] [et]. [vi]vaga *tasa heduavinaśa* [5] + + + /// ^{51D(r)}[ta] ? *ta kama avivagena saḍa bhodi vivaga asaḍa na bhodi* •.[vi]vaga *tasa*

²⁹⁴ Cf. 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 30, 31[2x], 38, 39, 69, 73 [2x], 74 [2x], 76, 83, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 122, 123, 126, 139. Text Notes: 51D(r) [3] *ahasu avivagatva vivagatva* [a]viva[4]^{51D(r)}[ka]viva *asti* •.

APPENDIX

Descriptive List of Fragments

The numbering of fragments constituting manuscript parts 51 and 52 within BL Fragment 28 follows the same pattern. Both larger and smaller fragments first receive the number of the frame in which they are located. Larger fragments are labeled with an uppercase letter in order from the top right to left and top to bottom on the recto and continuing on the verso. Smaller bark fragments, pieces, and chips are labeled in the same order, top to bottom and recto to verso, beginning from the lowercase letter following those allotted to the larger fragments within a given frame. Even though all smaller bark fragments, pieces, and chips have been labeled, the following list includes only those that are important for the reconstruction of the text and whose location within the larger reconstructed manuscript can be determined.

1. Frame 51

Since the manuscript conserved in frame 51 was located on the outside of the single scroll as discovered, it sustained the greatest damage. The outer three strips, or one and a half cycles of the scroll, contain six relatively large fragments, 51A–F, and the subsequent continuous portion of the manuscript consists of two large fragments, 51G–H. The six initial fragments are disordered in various ways and in some cases even inverted top to bottom or turned over recto to verso. In addition, one fragment (53A), which was originally located within the outermost cycle, or two initial strips, of the scroll, is conserved in frame 53.¹ Fragments 51A, 51B, and 53A can be combined to form a single strip, 51D forms its own strip, and fragments 51C and 51F originate from a single strip, which is contiguous with the continuous portion of the manuscript beginning with 51G. However, the relative order within the original manuscript of the strip containing 51A, 51B, and 53A and the strip consisting of 51D cannot be determined with certainty.

In addition to these larger fragments, frame 51 contains 100 smaller bark fragments, pieces, and chips, which are numbered from 51i through 51dxxxx. Although a thorough discussion of all of these smaller fragments is presented in the text notes, only those that illustrate typical patterns of damage or are particularly important for the reconstruction of the text will be mentioned in the following sections.

1.1. Larger Fragments

51A: Largely on the basis of physical evidence, 51A, 51B, 53A 53b, 53c, 51p, 51t, 51cc, and 51xxxx can be combined within the same strip of the manuscript. Although the relative order of the

¹ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

first two strips cannot be determined on the basis of physical evidence, the contents of the text on these fragments constituting this particular strip suggest that it likely preceded the remainder of the text.² As placed in the glass frame, fragment 51A is conserved inverted top to bottom and turned over recto to verso, and 51B is conserved turned over recto to verso. As a result, fragment 51A(v) combines with fragments 51B(v) and 51cc(v) to form the first two lines of the text on the original recto surface of the manuscript, and 51A(r) combines with 51cc(r) to form the final two lines of the text on the original verso surface.

51B: Conserved turned over recto to verso within what is likely the first and outermost strip of manuscript part 51. Letters shared between fragments 51B(v) and 53A confirm that these two fragments originally belonged to a single strip. Fragment 51B(v) combines with 51A(v), 53A, and 51t(v) to form 51A–B(v)+53A lines 2–7 of the text on the original recto surface, and 51B(r) combines with 51p(r) to form portions of the final seven lines of text on the verso.

51C: Conserved inverted top to bottom within what is likely the first strip of manuscript part 51. Fragment 51C was dislodged during conservation from its original location within the third strip of the scroll. Since both 51C and 51F, which is conserved within the third strip, consist of at least two distinct layers of bark, it is clear that layer 51ssss, which covers 51G(v) from line 139 through the end of the manuscript part, also covers the verso surfaces of 51C and 51F. This confirms the placement of 51C and 51F in the third strip, which is contiguous with 51G. Fragment 51C(r) contains four partial lines of text and is relatively clear of overlying fragments or chips; 51C(v) also contains four partial lines, but the final line is obscured by a large piece of blank bark. On the recto, 51C and 51F can be demonstrated to represent the same layer of bark based on their similar consistency and the probable continuous reconstruction of one line of text (51C+51F(r) l. 4). However, no such connection can be established between their verso surfaces.

51D: Conserved in the second strip of manuscript part 51 and consisting of only one layer of bark. Since it does not consist of two layers of bark, 51D could represent either the first or second strip of the surviving manuscript. However, content suggests that it likely represents the second strip.³ The recto of 51D contains six lines of text, three of which are relatively complete, and the verso, seven lines of text, two of which are relatively complete.

51E: Conserved in the third strip of manuscript part 51 but can be securely placed in the fifth strip within a hole on the right edge of fragment 51G. Its placement within the fifth strip can be confirmed by syllables shared between 51E(v) and 51G(v) in lines 139–140. Even though lines 135–139 of 51G–H(v) are partially covered by fragments presumably connected with layer 51ssss, its center portion remains uncovered and represents the same original verso layer as fragment 51E(v).⁴ On the recto, 51E contains the beginnings of lines 5–7, and on the verso, the beginnings of lines 138–140.

51F: Conserved in its original location in the third strip of manuscript part 51 contiguous with 51G. Fragment 51F consists of two layers of bark, and its recto surface is also obscured by

² Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A; Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v).

³ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A; 51D(r); Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v).

⁴ Manuscript Notes: ll. 135–141.

a number of smaller fragments and chips (51bb–51jj, 51mm–51qq), whose original locations are undetermined. Since the exterior of the scroll was treated with a lacquer fixative spray at some point prior to conservation, the fragments and chips within the outer strips of the verso of the scroll became fused, and it is difficult to distinguish overlying fragments or chips from the underlying verso surface. This is particularly true in the case of 51F(v), which appears to be covered by many smaller chips, 51www–51bbbb, as well as by layer 51ssss.

51G: The first segment of the continuous portion of the manuscript, from 51G(r) lines 3–8 on the recto, and 51G(v) lines 135ff. on the verso. In the second strip of 51G(r), or the fifth strip of manuscript part 51, a piece of bark approximately 5 cm wide by 3 cm high has been torn away from the right edge, part of which remains as fragment 51E conserved in the third strip of the scroll. On the recto, a glue-line juncture is evident between lines 3 and 4 of 51G(r), and the concentric rings of a knothole result in wider than normal line spacing in 51G(r) lines 6–8. On the verso, most of the original surface of 51G(v) from lines 135–139 is obscured by numerous smaller fragments (51jjjj–oooo), which were originally part of layer 51ssss covering 51G(v) completely from line 141 to the end of the fragment. Even though portions of layer 51ssss cover 51G(v) from lines 139–141, part of the original verso surface of 51G(v) is visible in this area of the manuscript and can be combined with fragment 51E(v), which is not covered by layer 51ssss.

51H: The major segment of manuscript part 51, which is separated from 51G by a break in the manuscript (recto ll. 8–10; verso ll. 134–136). Despite various holes, pieces of overlying bark, and deteriorated edges, 51H is largely intact and includes lines 10–42 on the recto and lines 102–134 on the verso.

1.2. Smaller Fragments

51o, 51n, 51m, 51l: Four small chips conserved between fragments 51A and 51C within what is likely first strip of manuscript part 51. In the initial black-and-white photograph, these four chips form two fragments that are connected to the larger fragment 51C, but in the subsequent digital image they became separated into smaller chips due to movement of the glass frame after conservation. On the recto, these chips can be combined to form six syllables, which can be placed in line 4 in the intervening space between fragments 51C(r) and 51F(r).⁵ On the verso, they contain the remnants of syllables from two lines with only two legible syllables. Since the recto of these chips can be connected with the manuscript piece represented by 51C(r) and 51G(r), the syllables on the verso would also belong to the original verso surfaces of fragments 51C(v) and 51F(v) and not to layer 51ssss or the other chips that cover 51C(v) and 51F(v).⁶ However, since the remaining portions of the original verso surfaces of 51C and 51F are covered by layer 51ssss and other chips, the legible syllables on the verso of chips 51l–o cannot be connected with either fragment.

51xx: Small chip wedged between fragments 51G and 51H (recto ll. 8–10; verso ll. 134–136). Although the original location of this chip is uncertain, it has tentatively been read as part of the

⁵ Manuscript Notes: 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r).

⁶ Manuscript Notes: Final Fragments, 51C(v), 51F(v).

largely missing line 9 on the recto of 51G–H and line 135 on the verso, both of which have become almost completely lost in the separation between fragments 51G and 51H.

51zz: Small chip conserved on the recto at the left margin in line 14 and covering the final portion of a crack that runs the width of the manuscript piece. This chip has been turned over recto to verso, and the five syllables visible on the recto surface can be read at the end of line 129. The verso surface of this chip contains four syllables, which are partially visible through a crack in the manuscript in line 129 and can be read at the end of line 14.

51aaa, 51aaaa, 51bbbb, 51eee, 51iii: Fragment 51aaa is a layer of bark within a delaminated area at the right edge of the manuscript between lines 14 and 18. It has slipped downward from its original location and contains the lower portions of seven syllables that belong to the beginning of line 14, as well as eleven syllables that belong to the beginning of line 15. The remaining bark from this delaminated area on the recto (ll. 14–18) adheres to the verso of fragment 51H (ll. 118–121) in four pieces with their blank verso surfaces exposed: from top to bottom, 51aaaa, 51bbbb, 51eee, and 51iii. All four fragments follow the regular pattern of displacement by one scroll cycle as observed elsewhere in the manuscript and can be returned to their original locations within the delaminated area, basically in reverse order: fragment 51iii belongs to lines 15–16 immediately below 51aaa in line 14; 51bbbb belongs to lines 16–17; 51eee belongs to line 17; and 51aaaa belongs to a separately delaminated area at the beginning of line 19 immediately after fragment 51ggg(r). Fragment 51iii is positioned above line 24 on the lower edge of a hole at the right edge of the manuscript at the beginning of line 23. On the recto, it contains the lower and upper portions of syllables in two successive lines and can be returned to its original location at the beginning of lines 15–16. Although the recto surfaces of 51bbbb and 51aaaa are hidden, they can be discerned through the infrared images of their blank verso surfaces. Fragment 51bbbb contains the first eight syllables in line 16 and the first nine syllables in line 17. Fragment 51eee represents a piece of the surface bark from this delaminated area of the recto that became dislodged from its original location, slipped through the hole of the manuscript at the beginning of line 18, and was turned over, coming to rest on the verso between lines 125 and 127. It contains ink remnants that can be combined with the partial syllables on fragment 51bbbb to form the first three syllables in line 17. Fragment 51aaaa is blank on the verso and thus also represents a delaminated layer of bark. However, since it adheres to the verso of fragment 51H at a place above 51iii, 51bbbb, and 51eee, it must have originated from an area on the recto below these fragments. Since fragments 51iii, 51bbbb, and 51eee originated from lines 15–17 of the recto, and fragment 51ggg preserved at the beginning of line 19, belongs in line 18, it is likely that 51aaaa contains the remnants of five syllables belonging to the beginning of line 19, which 51ggg now covers.

51ddd: Small fragment wedged at the right edge of the manuscript in a crack between lines 16 and 17 (corresponding to verso ll. 127–128). It contains writing on both the recto and verso, and in accordance with the regular pattern of displacement by one cycle of the scroll, it was likely originally located in line 8 (corresponding to verso l. 136), presumably also near the right edge.

51ggg: Fragment that moved downward one line to the beginning of line 19 (corresponding to verso ll. 124–125), leaving a hole at the right edge of the manuscript in line 18 (corresponding to

verso l. 125). On the recto, it contains six syllables at the beginning of line 18, and on the verso, five syllables at the beginning of line 125.

51mmm: Small fragment wedged on the right edge between the upper and lower segments of fragment 51H, bisecting the beginning of line 31. It follows the regular pattern of displacement by one cycle of the scroll. On the recto, it contains part or in certain cases all of the first eight syllables at the beginning of line 23, and on the verso, the first eight syllables in line 121.

51ppp, 51qqq, 51rrr: Small fragments conserved near the left edge within a separation between two segments of fragment 51H between lines 34 and 35 (corresponding to verso ll. 109–110). In the initial black-and-white photograph of frame 51, these small fragments form one larger fragment, which was broken into three due to the movement of the glass frame after conservation. This single larger fragment has a relatively straight edge and is blank on the verso with ink from the upper tips of several syllables on the recto. Since manuscript parts 51 and 52 were originally glued together, the lower portion of the recto surface of part 51 was left blank to allow part 52 to be glued on top; the verso of part 51, which was glued on top of the verso of part 52, contains writing down to its bottom edge. These three fragments then likely originated from this top edge of the verso of manuscript part 51, and tentative locations for the partially preserved syllables have been identified just above line 102 near the right edge of the verso of manuscript part 51 (51H(v)). Thus, these fragments follow the regular pattern of displacement by one scroll cycle.

51sss, 51ttt, 51uuu, 51vvv, 51www, 51xxx: From the initial black-and-white photographs through the most recent infrared images, the upper and right edges of fragment 51H(v) have undergone increasing deterioration resulting in the displacement of chips 51sss, 51ttt, 51uuu, 51vvv, 51www, and 51xxx from their original locations along the upper and right edges of the verso of manuscript part 51. The locations of several of these chips can be determined along the upper or right edge in lines 102–104, but most chips remain unplaced.

51yyy: A small fragment conserved on the bottom edge of the recto, or top of the verso, of manuscript part 51. Even though the recto of 51yyy contains only one dot of ink, three complete syllables on the verso permit placement of the fragment in line 110 (corresponding to recto l. 35). Once again, fragment 51yyy follows the regular pattern of displacement by one scroll cycle.

51jjjj–oooo: Bark pieces and fragments that cover much of 51G(v) from lines 135–139 and were likely originally part of layer 51ssss. Distinguishing among the various fragments covering this area is difficult because of the lacquer fixative that was sprayed on the exterior of the scroll prior to conservation.

51ssss: A continuous layer of bark that covers the lower portion of 51G(v) from line 139 to the end of the fragment as well as the verso surfaces of 51C and 51F. Since it is in the same scribal hand and contains terms encountered elsewhere in the text, it must represent part of the same original manuscript as parts 51 and 52. Although it is clear that the final portion of 51G(v) as well as 51F(v) and 51C(v) are covered by this layer of bark, its relationship to the other fragments in manuscript part 51 and hence its original placement relative to these fragments remain unclear. The larger fragments in the two outer strips of the scroll, 51A, 51B, 53A, and 51D as well as the smaller fragments 51i–aa on the recto and 51cccc–dddd on the verso, could all represent parts of layer 51ssss, which should then be placed just beyond fragments 51C and 51F. Or layer 51ssss could have

originally been located between the two outer strips, 51D and 51A–B, or it could have constituted the outermost portion of the manuscript originally located beyond fragments 51A–B. In any scenario for the original location of layer 51ssss, approximately fourteen lines of text from the recto of layer 51ssss and fourteen lines from the verso of fragments 51G, 51C, and 51F are now hidden.⁷

2. Frame 52

Even though damage has occurred at the right edge throughout manuscript part 52, it is generally better preserved than part 51. However, since it represents the interior portion of the scroll, it also suffered greater compression, separation into horizontal strips, and more marked damage along the junctures between these strips. It comprises eight larger fragments, 52A–H, but these fragments are not conserved in their original order. The largest of these fragments, fragment 52A, comprises four horizontal bark pieces, but they remained connected and were unrolled and conserved in their correct order and orientation recto to verso. However, presumably as a result of difficulties during the process of conservation, manuscript part 52 was placed within the glass frame with strip 52B turned over recto to verso and strips 52C and 52F out of order. The correct original order of the strips, from top to bottom on the recto, is as follows: 52A(r), 52C(r), 52B(v), 52F(r), 52D(r), 52E(r), 52G(r), and 52H(r).⁸

Manuscript part 52 also contains forty-five smaller bark fragments, pieces, and chips numbered 52i through 52ppp. As in the case of manuscript part 51, only those smaller fragments or chips that are important either as examples of patterns of damage or for the reconstruction of the manuscript or text will be mentioned here.

2.1. Larger Fragments

52A: Conserved as a single fragment comprising four connected horizontal strips, which contain lines 43–58 on the recto and lines 89–101 on the verso.

52B: Conserved turned over recto to verso and out of its original order. The fact that 52B was turned over is suggested first by the color of its verso surface, which is lighter than the other fragments on the verso of manuscript part 52 but is consistent with those on the recto. Further, the correct placement of 52B, after being turned over recto to verso, between 52C and 52F can be confirmed on the basis of the realignment of bisected lines of text. Fragment 52B contains part or all of lines 61–64 on the recto and lines 83–85 on the verso.

52C: Conserved in the correct orientation recto to verso but out of its original order. Its original location between fragment 52A and 52B, which must be turned over recto to verso, can be confirmed by the bisected syllables that 52C(r) shares with both 52A(r) and 52B(v). It contains part or all of lines 58–61 on the recto and lines 86–88 on the verso.

52D: Conserved in the correct orientation but out of its original order. It should be placed between fragments 52F and 52E since it shares syllables with these strips on both the recto and the verso. It contains virtually all of two lines on both the recto (ll. 67–68) and the verso (ll. 79–80).

⁷ Manuscript Notes: Initial Fragments, 51A–B(v)+53A.

⁸ Manuscript Notes: ll. 51–61.

52E: Conserved in the correct orientation but out of its original order. Its location between fragments 52D and 52G is confirmed by the bisected syllables that 52E shares with these strips on both the recto and the verso. 52E contains two complete lines on the recto (ll. 69–70), and one complete and two partial lines on the verso (ll. 77–79).

52F: Conserved in the correct orientation but out of its original order. Shared syllables confirm its location between fragments 52B, which must be turned over recto to verso, and 52D. Both the recto (ll. 64–66) and the verso (ll. 81–83) contain part or all of three lines.

52G: Conserved in the correct orientation and in its original order next to 52H. Shared syllables on the verso confirm the placement of 52G between 52E and 52H. It contains part or all of two lines on both the recto (ll. 71–72) and the verso (ll. 76–77).

52H: Conserved in the correct orientation and in its original order as indicated by the bisected syllables that it shares with 52G on both the recto and the verso. The shortest vertical strip in the manuscript, 52H contains only one line on the recto (l. 73) and a second partial line on the verso (ll. 74–75).

2.2. Smaller Fragments

52i, 52j, 52k, 52m, 52n: Even during the initial black-and-white photographing of the manuscript, small fragments and chips along the edges of 52A shifted from their original locations when frame 52 was turned over from recto to verso. Further shifting of small fragments and chips occurred between the time of the initial black-and-white photographs and the subsequent digital images. On the basis of the initial black-and-white photograph of the recto, it is possible to determine the original locations of some of these chips along the right edge of the manuscript (52k, 52m, 52n) in lines 45–47, but two of the larger fragments (52i, 52j) remain unplaced.

52r, 52ff, 52ll: Fragments located at the junctures between horizontal strips and consisting of a piece of bark that remains attached to one of the two contiguous strips. Fragment 52r is found at a partial separation in the middle of fragment 52A (l. 51) and therefore does not influence the placement of any other fragment or strip. Fragment 52ff is found at the bottom of 52C(r) and supports the contiguous placement of 52C(r) and 52B(v), which has a corresponding hole along its top edge. Fragment 52ll is found along the top right edge of fragment 52H(r) and reveals the bottom verso edge of 52G(v), thereby confirming the contiguous placement of 52G and 52H.

3. Frame 53

Several fragments from manuscript part 51 are found preserved in frame 53. The scroll containing manuscript parts 51 and 52 apparently became stuck to this separate scroll containing manuscript part 53 during the period of their storage in the clay pot. Both scrolls were then placed together in the same modern glass jar (J13). When they were separated during conservation, a large fragment (53A) from one of the two initial strips, or outer cycle, of manuscript part 51 was torn away and conserved in the initial strip of manuscript part 53. Two smaller fragments (53b, 53c) originating from the same strip in manuscript part 51 are also preserved in frame 53.

3.1. Larger and Smaller Fragments

53A: Conserved on the outermost verso layer of manuscript part 53. Fragment 53A contains four partial lines of text. Syllables in three of these lines are shared with fragment 51B(v) and confirm that these two fragments were located together in the same strip of manuscript part 51.

53b, 53c: Two other small fragments that originated from the strip containing 53A, 51A(v), and 51B(v) in manuscript part 51. Fragment 53b is conserved in the outermost verso strip of manuscript part 53 about 1.5 cm to the left of the top of fragment 53A and can be placed securely within this first line of 53A. Fragment 53c is conserved on the verso of manuscript part 53 at the bottom of the third strip just underneath the strip that contained 53A. Even though no physical connection can be established between 53c and the other fragments from this strip of manuscript part 51, its position in manuscript part 53 suggests that it was originally located within the same strip of manuscript part 51, at some point below fragment 53A.

4. Debris Frame Fragments

When the BL manuscript scrolls were placed in modern glass jars after their discovery, small chips of bark from the scrolls accumulated at the bottom of each jar. Since the scroll containing BL 28 was placed into jar 13 together with at least one other scroll whose manuscript parts are conserved in frames 53–55 (BL 29), the chips of bark at the bottom of jar 13 could have originated from either scroll in that jar. These chips of bark, or “debris,” from jar 13 are conserved in two frames (1, 7), which together contain over fifty small fragments or chips. Fortunately, the scribe of BL 29 has an elongated, spidery hand with a larger letter size and a more calligraphic appearance that can be easily distinguished from the hand of scribe 21 of BL 28. Among these fifty fragments, only five can be identified on the basis of their scribal hand as belonging to manuscript parts 51 or 52. Since the right margins of manuscript parts 51 and 52 are heavily damaged, it is likely that that scroll was placed into the glass jar with the right margin toward the bottom, and these debris box fragments would likely have originated from locations along the right margin. However, unfortunately, none of these five debris box fragments has been successfully placed within the reconstructed manuscript.

4.1. Debris Frame 1

D13-1.28a

side 1: *di na pa[la]*

side 2: *nasti na [vi]*

D13-1.28b

side 1: *vi na ?*

side 2: *[kṣ]. ? [s].*

D13-1.28c

side 1: *[r]va ta ?*

side 2: *[a • śa]*

D13-1.28d

side 1: *[d]. da di*

side 2: ? *[te va]*

4.2. Debris Frame 7

D13-7.28a

side 1: ? *g.l.* ?

side 2: ? ?

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Word Index

This index contains all words, even the few cases where the intended word is uncertain. Where the function of a word cannot be determined because its ending or immediate context is unclear, the word ends in a hyphen, and the uncertain grammatical information is specified: *ava[r](*a)-* (case/number/gender uncertain). In all other cases, entries are presented with the following information in this order:

1. Head word (italics and boldface)

Nouns, adjectives, indeclinables: Words that occur only once are cited in a hybrid form that is based upon the transcription but also contains the reconstruction of reasonably certain missing portions. This citation includes square brackets ([]) indicating uncertain letters as well as parentheses ((*)) with an asterisk indicating reconstructions: *a[dh](*v)[a]* for *adhva*. As in the text reconstruction, letters that were omitted or miswritten by the scribe and have been restored or corrected are surrounded by angle brackets with an asterisk (< * >): *anupurva<*bhi>[s](*a)[m](*a)[ye]* and *adiḍa<*g>are*. If a word occurs several times in various forms, the entry appears in a regularized stem form reflecting the reconstruction but without brackets, parentheses, or angle brackets. It also ends in a hyphen indicating the possibility of multiple inflected forms: *adiḍa-* subsumes *adiḍa*, *adiḍado*, *adiḍam*, *adiḍaṣa*, and *adiḍa-*. Locations within the manuscript for each occurrence are listed under a given form, and reconstructions that differ from the given form are found immediately after their locations.

Compounds: Compounds are cited in a hybrid form combining the transcription and reconstruction. They are listed as separate entries under their first member(s) with hyphens dividing subsequent members of the compound: *a[di]ḍa-ṛaga-doṣa-moha*. In the case of sandhi (vowel elision or coalescence) at compound junctures, the compound is given in its simple hybrid form, again alphabetized according to its first member(s), with the sandhi combination clarified: *(*ka)[yanu]paśa* (in sandhi combination *(*ka)[y(a)-anu]paśa*) and *cakhaḍḍana-* (in sandhi combination *cakh(u)-aiḍana*). The subsequent members of compounds are listed as separate entries with cross-references back to the full compound alphabetized according to its first member(s): *-[anu]paśa* in *(*ka)[yanu]paśa*. Compounds in which a given word appears as a subsequent member are cited at the end of that word's entry: under *akuśala-*: *-akuśala*, in *kuśalakuśala*.

Verbs and verbals: Finite verb forms and verbal derivatives such as participles, absolutes, gerundives, and infinitives appear as separate entries with cross-references to the Sanskrit equivalent of the verb root or prefix + verb root under which their full information is given.

2. Pali and Sanskrit equivalent (italics)

Although no parallel for the text preserved in BL28 has been identified, presumptive Pali and Sanskrit equivalents have been offered on the basis of analogous discussions in other Pali and Sanskrit exegetical texts. Pali equivalent(s) are given first, separated by a comma from the Sanskrit equivalent(s). Equivalents in Pali and Sanskrit that are the same are indicated by P/Skt. Multiple equivalents within one language are separated by a single solidus, and unattested hypothetical equivalents are marked with an asterisk.

3. English translation in quotation marks

4. Grammatical information for nouns, adjectives, compounds, and finite verb forms

5. Locations for occurrences in the reconstructed text

Locations in smaller fragments or chips are cited with both fragment or chip labels and line numbers; for the larger manuscript fragments 51G–H and 52A–H, only the continuous line numbers 1–141 are given. References to separate occurrences within the same fragment are separated by a comma, and those in separate fragments or chips are separated by a semicolon.

-āḍana-: see s.v. *ayaḍana-*.

[-aṃśa]: “bit,” m.; in *[e]k(*a)[-m-aṃśa]*.

akamaṃ: *akammaṃ, akarma*; “other than action,” (*nañ* kdh.), nom. sg. n. l. 3.

akuraṣa: *aṅkurassa, aṅkurasya*; “of a sprout,” gen. sg. m. l. 1.

akuśala-: “unvirtuous,” adj. (*nañ* kdh.).

akuśa[lana]: *akusalānaṃ, akuśalānām*; gen. pl. m. l. 47.

[a]kuśalasa: *akusalassa, akuśalasya*; gen. sg. m./n. (gender uncertain) 51C+51F(r) l. 5.

-akuśala: in *kuśalakuśala*.

akuśala-ka[ma-sva]go: *akusalakammassako, akuśalakarmasvakaḥ*; “one for whom the [matured effect of] unvirtuous action is one’s own,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. m. l. 19.

akuśala-dhama: *akusaladhammā, akuśaladharmāḥ*; “unvirtuous factors,” (kdh.), nom. pl. m. l. 48.

-agara-: “aspect,” m.; in *atvagara-, adidağara-, anagaḍagara-, anativagara-, (*a)sacagara,*

*a[s](*a)r[v]a[ga]ro, dukhagarena, śatagara-, śuñagağara-, sacagar[en](*a), sarvagarena, suhagar(*a).*

aguḍi-mala: *Aṅgulimālo, Aṅgulimālaḥ*; “Aguḍimala,” P.N. (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 41.

agulina: *aṅgulīnaṃ, aṅgulīnām*; “of fingers,” gen. pl. f. l. 41.

aḷatva: *ajjhataṃ, adhyātmaṃ*; “internally,” adv. l. 81.

ajada: see s.v. *√jan*.

añeṣ[ui]: *aññesu, anyeṣu*; “to others,” adj., loc. pl. m. l. 18.

aṭhana: *aṭṭhannaṃ, aṣṭānām*; “of eight,” adj., gen. pl. m./n. (gender uncertain) 51xxxx.

ati + *√i*: “pass.”

adiḍa-: “past,” pp.

adiḍa: *atīto, atītaḥ*; nom. sg. m. ll. 72, 72 (*a)d(*i)d(*a), 73 [2x], 74, 75 [adi]ḍa, 124, 125 adi[ḍ](*a); 51D(v) l. 3.

adiḍa: *atītaṃ, atītaṃ*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) l. 5 adi[ḍ](*a); ll. 4, 9 (*a)-

- [d]i(*da), 16 (*a)[d](*)ida, 30, 71, 76.
- a[dida]**: *atītā*, *atītāḥ*; nom. pl. m. ll. 1–2.
- adida**: P/Skt *atīte*; loc. sg. n. l. 131.
- adida-**: P/Skt *atīta-*; (case/number/gender uncertain) 51D(r) l. 6 (*a)-[di](*)da; 51C+51F(r) l. 2; 51F(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 2 [*adida*], 2 (*a)-[di](*)da.
- adidado**: *atītā*, *atītāt*; abl. sg. n. ll. 21, 54 (*a)*didado*.
- adidam**: *atītam*, *atītām*; nom. sg. n. (in *adidam eva*) l. 76.
- adidaṣa**: *atītassa*, *atītasya*; gen. sg. n. 51jj(r) *adida[s]a*; ll. 56 *adidaṣa[s](*)a*, 77, 78, 79.
- atra**: P/Skt *atra*; “with regard to this,” ind. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7.
- atvagara-**: “aspect of self,” (kdh.), m. (in sandhi combination *atv(a)-agara*).
- atvagara**: *atīkāro*, *ātīkāraḥ*; nom. sg. l. 112.
- atvarena**: *atīkārena*, *ātīkāreṇa*; instr. sg. l. 113.
- a[thi]**: see s.v. \sqrt{as} .
- a[thi]ta**: see s.v. *astida*.
- adida-**: see s.v. *ati* + \sqrt{i} .
- [a](*)d][ida]-anagada**: *atītānāgatā*, *atītānāgatāḥ*; “past and future [factors],” adj. (kdh.), nom. pl. m. ll. 138–139.
- adida-k](*)a][r](*)a][nena]**: P/Skt *atītakāraṇena*; “by reason of past [factors],” (tp.), instr. sg. n. ll. 113–114.
- adida-[ka]la**: *atītakālo*, *atītakālah*; “past time,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. ll. 108–109.
- adidagara-**: “past aspect,” (kdh.), m. (in sandhi combination *adida(a)-gara*).
- adida(*)gare**: *atītakāro*, *atītakāraḥ*; nom. sg. l. 110 (corrected from *adidaakare*).
- adida(*)garena**: *atītakārena*, *ātītakāreṇa*; instr. sg. l. 110 (corrected from *adidaakaranena*).
- adida-ḥhanena**: *atītātṭhānena*, *atītasthānena*; “within the region of the past,” (kdh.), instr. sg. n. l. 30.
- adi(*)datva)-(*sva)]bha]ya**: *atītattasabhāvo*, *atītatvasvabhāvaḥ*; “intrinsic nature of pastness,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. ll. 77–78.
- adidaanagada-[p](*)r][acu]p](*)a-[n](*)a][s](*)a][kh](*)a][d](*)a**: *atītānāgatapaccupannāsaṅkhatā*, *atītānāgatapratyutpannāsaṃskṛtāḥ*; “past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors],” adj. (dv.), nom. pl. m. (in sandhi combination *adida(a)-anagada-[p](*)r][acu]p](*)a][n](a)-(*)a][s](*)a][kh](*)a][d](*)a)* l. 83.
- [a](*)didana)][g](*)a][d](*)a]-[bh](*)a][v](*)a**: *atītānāgatabhāvā*, *atītānāgatabhāvāḥ*; “modes of the past and future,” (tp.), nom. pl. m. (in sandhi combination *[a](*)did(a)-(ana)][g](*)a][d](*)a]-[bh](*)a][v](*)a)* ll. 72–73.
- adida-bhava**: *atītabhāvo*, *atītabhāvaḥ*; “past nature,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. l. 126.
- a[di]ida-raga-doṣa-moha**: *atītarāgadosamohā*, *atītarāgadveṣamohāḥ*; “past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion,” (dv.), nom. pl. m. ll. 75–76.
- [adi]ida-vi]vaga**: *atītavipāko*, *atītavipākah*; “past matured effect,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. l. 11.
- adivada**: “taking,” m.; in *pranadivada*.
- a[dh](*)v][a]**: *addhāno*, *adhvānaḥ*; “time periods,” nom. pl. m. l. 70.
- adhva**: in *traya-adhva*.
- anagada-**: see s.v. \bar{a} + \sqrt{gam} .
- (*)a][n](*)a][g](*)a][d](*)a]-idriya**: *anāgatindriyāni*, *anāgatendriyāṇi*; “future [unimpaired] controlling faculties,” (kdh.), nom. pl. n. l. 103.
- (*)a][n](*)a][g](*)a][d](*)a]-[k](*)a][r](*)a][nen]-(*)a**: P/Skt *anāgatakāraṇena*; “by reason of future [factors],” (tp.), instr. sg. n. l. 114.

anagaḍa-kala: *anāgatakālo, anāgatakālah;*
“future time,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. l. 108.

anagaḍagara-: “future aspect,” (kdh.), m. (in sandhi combination *anagaḍ(a)-agara-*).

anagaḍa⟨*g⟩ara: *anāgatākāro,*
anāgatākārah; nom. sg. l. 110
(corrected from *anagaḍakarana*).

anagaḍa⟨*g⟩arena: *anāgatākārena,*
anāgatākāreṇa; instr. sg. l. 110
(corrected from *anagaḍakarena*).

anagaḍatva-svabha(*va): *anāgatattasabhāvo,*
anāgatatvasvabhāvaḥ; “intrinsic nature of future-ness,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. ll. 78–79.

anagaḍa-bhavo: *anāgatabhāvo,*
anāgatabhāvaḥ; “future nature,” (kdh.),
nom. sg. m. ll. 126, 132 *anagaḍ(*a)bhavo*.

(*a)[n](*)[g](*)[d](*)-[bh](*)[vo]:
anāgatabhāvam, anāgatabhāvam;
“possessed of a future mode,” adj. (bv.),
nom. sg. n. l. 129.

(*anagaḍa-vaṣaga)-[s](*)[mu]nagaḍ[o]:
anāgatavassikasamannāgato,
anāgatavarṣakasamanvāgataḥ;
“accompanied by (*future years),”
adj. (tp.), nom. sg. m. 51D(v) ll. 4–5
(reconstruction tentative).

anagaḍ(*a)-samunag[a]mo:
anāgatasamannāgamo,
anāgatasamanvāgamah; “accompaniment
of future [factors],” (tp.), nom. sg. m.
51D(v) l. 2.

anagamo: **anāgammam, anāgamyam;* “[the
stage of] ‘not yet having reached,’” nom.
sg. n. l. 63.

anatvagara-: “aspect of non-self,” (kdh.), m.
(in sandhi combination *anatv(a)-agara-*).

anatvagarena: *anattākārena,*
anātmākāreṇa; instr. sg. l. 112.
anatvagarō: *anattākāro, anātmākārah;*
nom. sg. l. 113.

anathariya: *anathiko, anarthikah;* “without
efficacy,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. m. l. 75.

(*a)[nala]: *analam, analam;* “insufficient,” adj.
(*nañ* kdh.), nom. sg. n. l. 26.

anirudha: see s.v. *ni* + √*rudh*.

anivurta-: see s.v. *nir* + √*vyt*.

⟨*a⟩nupaḍa(*e): *anuppādāya, anutpādāya;*
“for the sake of the non-arising,” (kdh.),
dat. sg. m. ll. 47–48 (corrected from
*unupaḍa(*a)*).

anupaḍa-dhama-: “factor not subject to
arising,” (kdh.), m.

anupaḍa-dhama: **anuppādidhammo,*
**anutpādidharmah;* nom. sg. ll. 40
*anupaḍadham(*a), 65 (*a)[n](*)[pa]-*
ḍadhama.

anupaḍa-dhama: **anuppādidhammā,*
**anutpādidharmāḥ;* nom. pl. ll. 39, 49,
64.

anupaḍa-dhama: **anuppādidhammam,*
**anutpādidharmam;* acc. sg. 51D(r) l.
3 *anu[pa]ḍadhama;* ll. 36–37, 63 *(*a)-*
nupaḍadhama, 63, 66.

anupaḍa-dhama: **anuppādidhamme,*
**anutpādidharmān;* acc. pl. l. 50.

anupaḍa-dhamo: **anuppādidhammam,*
**anutpādidharmam;* acc. sg. l. 141
*(*anupaḍadha)[mo]* (reconstruction
tentative).

anupanana: see s.v. *ut* + √*pad*.

-[anu]paśa: “observing,” m.; in *(*ka)[yanu]-*
paśa.

anupaṣapana-: see s.v. *upa* + *sam* + √*pad*.

anupurva⟨*bhi⟩[s](*)[m](*)[ye]:
anupubbābhisamaye, anupūrvābhisamaye;
“in gradual clear comprehension,”
(kdh.), loc. sg. m. (in sandhi combination
*anupurv(a)-a⟨*bhi⟩[s](*)[m](*)[ye]*)
51A–B(v)+53A l. 4.

anu + √*yuj*: “enjoin.”

anuyujidava-: “should be upheld,” gdv.
anuyujidava: *anuyuñjītabbam,*
anuyoktavyam; nom. sg. n. ll. 87,
104; 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4.

- anuyujīdavu:** *anuyuñjītabbaṃ*,
anuyoktavyam; nom. sg. n. l. 109.
- anuyujīdavo:** *anuyuñjītabbaṃ*,
anuyoktavyam; nom. sg. n. l. 86.
- anuyujīdavo[fo]:** *anuyuñjītabba-*,
anuyoktavya-; nom. m./n. (gender
uncertain) 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 2.
- anuyujīdava-:** see s.v. *anu* + √*yuj*.
- anuyoga:** *anuyogo*, *anuyogaḥ*; “point of
discussion,” nom. sg. m. l. 82 (in sandhi
combination *tatr(a) anuyoga*).
- anusāya-:** “contaminant,” m.
[a]n[u]śayo: *anusayo*, *anusāyaḥ*; nom. sg.
51A–B(r) l. 6.
[a]nuśayo-: *anusaya-*, *anusāya-*; (case/
number uncertain) sg. 51A–B(r) l. 3.
- apam:** *appam*, *alpam*; “small,” adj., nom. sg. n.
l. 25.
- apalo:** *aphalam*, *aphalam*; “not possessed of a
fruit,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. n. l. 57.
- [abromi]-cia-vaṣa:** *abrahmacariyavāse*,
abrahmacaryavāse; “life contrary to
religious practice,” (tp.), loc. sg. m. l. 39.
- abhinipana:** “established,” pp; in
astitvabhinipana.
- a⟨*bhi⟩[s](*)[m](*)[ye]:** “in clear
comprehension,” m.; in *anupurva⟨*bhi⟩-*
[s]()[m](*)[ye]*.
- abhi + sam + √i:** “clearly comprehend.”
abhisamedī: *abhisameti*, *abhisamayati*;
“one clearly comprehends,” 3rd sg. pres.
51A–B(v)+53A ll. 1 *[a](*)bhisa[m]-*
()e*di, 5 *[a]bhisa[me]di*.
- abhisamedī:** see s.v. *abhi* + *sam* + √*i*.
- abhi + sam + √kr:** “instigate.”
a[vis]()[kh](*)rodi:* *abhisāṅkharoti*,
abhisāṅskaroti; “one instigates,” 3rd sg.
pres. l. 35.
- amaṃ:** *āma*, *ām*; “yes,” ind. 51F(r)
[51ssss(r)+51nn] *ama[m]*; l. 10.
- aya-īda-:** “this,” dem. pron.
aya: *idaṃ*, *idaṃ*; “this,” nom. sg. n. l. 35.
- īdasa:** *imassa*, *asya*; “of this,” gen. sg. n. l.
93 *(*)[d](*)[s](*)*, 93.
- ayaḍana-:** “sense sphere,” n.
-aiḍana-: (compound-final form)
-(*)iḍa⟨*na⟩-: P/Skt *-āyatana-*; nom.
(number uncertain) 51C+51F(r) l. 3.
-(*)iḍana-: P/Skt *-āyatana-*; (case/
number uncertain) 51C+51F(r) l. 3.
-aiḍana-: in *cakhaīḍana-*, *para-*
kadha-para-aiḍana-para-dhadu-
yo(a), *manaīḍanena*, *ruvāiḍana-*,
[r]()u[v](*)-[ca]khaīḍana*,
*ṣaḥai⟨*ḍa⟩na-ḥiḍa*.
- ayaḍana:** *āyatanam*, *āyatanam*; nom. sg. ll.
85 *aya[ḍa]na*, 89, 92, 96, 117.
- ayaḍanehi:** *āyatanehi*, *āyatanaiḥ*; instr. pl.
ll. 69 *ayaḍaneha*, 115 *aya[ḍa]n[e]hi*,
117.
- ayaḍana-:** in *duaḍasa-[a]yaḍa[n]a-*
[saḡ]()rahiḍa*.
- araṃbana-:** “object-support,” n.
araṃbana: *ārammaṇam*, *ālambanam*; nom.
sg. ll. 93 *[a]raṃbana*, 94 *(*)[r](*)am-*
[b]()[na]*.
- arabane:** *ārammaṇam*, *ālambanam*; acc.
sg. 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 3, 4.
- ara[m]bana-bhava:** *ārammaṇabhāvo*,
ālambanabhāvaḥ; “nature of the object-
support,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 94.
- aramiṃya-bhava:** *ārāmikabhāvo*,
ārāmikabhāvaḥ; “mode of the monastery
attendant,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. ll. 73–74.
- ara[ha]tva-prataṣa:** *arahattapattassa*,
arhattvaprāptasya; “of one who has
acquired arhatship,” adj. (tp.), gen. sg. m.
51D(r) l. 2.
- arahaḍa:** *arahato*, *arhataḥ*; “of an arhat,” gen.
sg. m. l. 75.
- arahaḍa-bhava:** *arahabhāvo*, *arhadbhāvaḥ*;
“mode of the arhat,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 74.
- arya-mago:** *ariyamaggo*, *āryamārgaḥ*; “noble
path,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. ll. 62, 63 *ar[y]-*

amago.
arya-saca-: “noble truth,” (kdh.), n.
arya-saca: *ariyasaccam*, *āryasatyam*; nom. sg. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 2 (*a)[ry](*)a][s]-(*a)[c](*)a; ll. 85 *ar[ya]sace*, 89–90 (*arya)s(*a)ca, 91, 120.
ar[ya]-sace: *ariyasaccam*, *āryasatyam*; nom. sg. l. 85.
avara-: “another,” adj.
ava[r]()a-*: P/Skt *apara-*; (case/number/gender uncertain) 51C+51F(r) l. 2.
avaro: *aparo*, *aparah*; nom. sg. m. 51D(v) l. 3.
avaśa: *avassam*, *avaśam*; “inevitably,” adv. ll. 40, 40 (*a)[v](*)a)śa, 44 (*a)va[śa], 51, 64 [ava](*)śa).
[ava]ṣiyo: *avassiko*, *avarṣikah*; “not possessed of [past] years,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. m. 51D(v) l. 4.
(*)a)vi[d](*)a)-[r](*)a)[g](*)a-: P/Skt *avītarāga-*; “not freed from lust,” adj. (bv.), (case/number/gender uncertain) 51A–B(r) l. 5.
-avinaśa(*do): “due to non-destruction,” m.; in *hedu-avinaśa(*do)*.
avivaka-vivaga-: “whose matured effect has not yet matured,” adj. (bv.).
avivaka-vivaga: *avipakkavipāko*, *avipakvavipākaḥ*; nom. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 2.
avivaka-vivaga: *avipakvavipākam*, *avipakvavipākam*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) ll. 3–4 [a]viva[ka]vivaga; ll. 4, 8 (*aviva)[ka]vivaga, 8–9 [a]-(*vivakavivaga), 14 *avivakaviva[ga]*, 14–15 (*a)[viv](*)a)[k](*)a)[v]ivaga, 16, 16–17, 22 [a]vi[v](*)a)[k](*)a)-vivaga, 29–30, 31 *avivakaviva[g](*)a*, 33.
avivaga-: “not possessed of a matured effect,” adj. (bv.).
(*)avi)va(*ga): *avipākam*, *avipākam*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) l. 6.

avivagena: P/Skt *avipākena*; instr. sg. n. 51D(r) l. 5.
avivagatva: *avipākattam*, *avipākatvam*; “state of not being possessed of a matured effect,” (*nañ* kdh. with abstract *-tva* suffix), nom. sg. n. 51D(r) ll. 3, 4.
a[vis](*)a)[kh](*)a)rodi: see s.v. *abhi* + *sam* + √*kr*.
[a]śīlavata: *aśīlavanto*, *aśīlavantaḥ*; “not observing moral conduct,” adj., nom. pl. m. 51D(v) l. 6.
√*as*: “exist, be.”
a[thi]: *atthi*, *asti*; “it exists,” 3rd sg. pres. l. 106.
a[thi]: P/Skt *santi*; “they exist,” 3rd pl. pres. (with plural subject) l. 122.
asata-: “nonexistent, not existing,” pres. part. (*nañ* kdh.).
asata: *asantam/asam*, *asat*; nom. sg. n. ll. 71, 87; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5.
asaḍa: *asam/asanto*, *asan*; nom. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 5.
asaḍa: *asantam/asam*, *asat*; nom. sg. n. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6.
asaḍa: *asantassa/asato*, *asataḥ*; gen. sg. n. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7.
asti: *atthi*, *asti*; “it exists, it is, there is,” 3rd sg. pres. 51D(r) ll. 2, 4, 6 [asti]; 51C+51F(r) ll. 3, 4; ll. 4, 5, 6 (*a)sti, 6 [a]sti, 8, 11 [a]sti, 12, 14 [a]sti, 14 [asti], 16, 17, 23 [3x], 24 [3x], 25 [2x], 28 [2x], 29 [4x], 29 [ast]i, 31, 32, 33 [2x], 58 [3x], 67 (*a)[st](*)i, 67 [2x] [a]sti, 67, 68 (*a)[sti], 68 [3x], 69 [a]sti, 70, 71 (*ast)[i], 72 [a]sti, 72, 73, 74 [3x], 75 [4x], 81, 82, 83 [2x], 84 [3x], 85 [2x], 86 [3x], 88 [3x], 89 (*a)[st]i, 89 [3x], 91 [4x], 92 [4x], 94, 95, 97 [2x], 98 [asti], 98 a[st]i, 99 (*a)[sti], 100 [2x], 101, 101 (*a)[st]-(*i), 102, 102 (*a)[st](*)i, 104, 105 [3x], 106, 107 [2x], 108, 109, 110 [2x],

- 111 [2x], 112 [2x], 113 *a[sti]*, 113, 116, 117 [2x], 118 *(*a)[sti]*, 119 *(*a)-[sti]*, 127 [2x], 130 [3x], 134 *(*a)[sti]* [2x], 134, 140 *a[sti]*; 511111 l. 2 *[asti]*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 2 *[a]sti*, 5 [2x], 6 [4x], 7 [2x]; 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 1, 3; 51D(v) ll. 2 [4x], 3, 4, 5 *a[sti]*.
- asti**: P/Skt *santi*; “they exist, they are,” 3rd pl. pres. (with plural subject) 51D(r) l. 4; ll. 31 [2x], 38, 39, 69, 73, 76, 83 *[asti]*, 97, 99, 103 [2x], 109, 116, 123 *ast[i]*, 126 *[a]sti*, 139; 51D(v) l. 3 *<*na>sti* (corrected from *[ye]sti*).
- asti**: *atthi*, *asti*; “that which exists,” 3rd sg. pres. (used as pseudo-substantive) ll. 69 [2x], 95, 97.
- asti**: 3rd pres. (number uncertain) 51jjjj ll. 2 *a[sti]*, 3 *(*a)[sti]*.
- sata-**: “existent, existing,” pres. part.
sata: *santam*, *sat*; nom. sg. n. ll. 71, 86; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5.
sate: P/Skt *sati*; loc. sg. n. l. 101.
sada: *santam/sam*, *sat*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) l. 5.
sada: *santassa/sato*, *satah*; gen. sg. n. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5 [2x], 7 *[s>(*a)[d>(*a)]*.
- aṣa**: P/Skt *atha*; “or else,” ind. 51D(r) l. 2 *[a]ṣa*; ll. 13, 14 *[aṣa]*, 19, 23, 33, 38, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52 *(*a)[ṣa]* *(*a)*, 53, 54, 56, 57, 65, 70, 133 *a[ṣa]*; 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 1; 51jjjj l. 1 *[aṣa]* *(*a)*.
- aṣakhada-**: see s.v. **sam** + **√kṛ**.
- (*a)sacagara**: *asaccākāro*, *asatyākārah*; “aspect of untruth,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. (in sandhi combination *(*a)sac(a)-agara*) l. 112.
- asata**: see s.v. **√as**.
- asada**: see s.v. **√as**.
- aṣabhina**: see s.v. **sam** + **√bhid**.
- a[s>(*a)r[v]a[ga]ro**: *asabbākāro*, *asarvākārah*; “aspect of what is not everything,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. (in sandhi combination *a[s]-(*a)r[v](a)-a[ga]ro*) l. 113.
- aṣi[p>(*ad)ij**: *adhipati*, *adhipatih*; “sovereign condition,” nom. sg. m. l. 94.
- asti**: see s.v. **√as**.
- asti-karana**: *atthikāraṇam*, *astikāraṇam*; “reason for existence,” (tp.), nom. sg. n. l. 5.
- astita**: see s.v. **astiḍa**.
- astitva**: *atthittam*, *astitvam*; “existence,” nom. sg. n. l. 7.
- astitvabhiniṣpana**: *atthittābhiniṣpanno*, *astitvābhiniṣpannaḥ*; “established as having existence,” adj. (kdh), nom. sg. m. (in sandhi combination *astitv(a)-abhiniṣpana*) ll. 78, 79 *(*a)[sti]tvabhiniṣpana*, 79–80 *asti[tv>(*abhini)[p>(*a)[n>(*a)]*.
- astiḍa**: *atthitā*, *astitā*; “existence,” nom. sg. f. **a[thi]ta**: l. 123.
astita: l. 70
astiḍa: ll. 70 [2x], 71, 81, 86–87 *asti(*ḍa)*, 90.
- a[s>(*vago)**: *asako*, *asvakaḥ*; “not one’s own,” adj. (*nañ* kdh.), nom. sg. m. l. 18.
- √ah**: “state.”
aha: P/Skt *āha*; “one states,” 3rd sg. pret. 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 4 *[aha]*, 6; 51F(r) [51ssss(r)+51nn] *[a]ha*; ll. 10, 12, 21, 32, 84, 104, 119 *[aha]*, 123, 124, 133 *a[h>(*a)]*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 3, 4.
ahadi: P/Skt *āha*; “one states,” 3rd sg. pret. ll. 4, 18 *(*a)[h>(*a)[di]*, 45, 47, 57 *(*a)[h>(*a)[di]*, 88 *(*a)hadi*, 100, 127 *a[h>(*a)[di]*, 129, 130 *aha[di]*, 132, 134 *[a>(*ha)[di]*; 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3; 51A–B(r) l. 6 *[ahadi]*.
ahasu: *āhaṃsu*, *āhuḥ*; “they state,” 3rd pl. pret. 51D(r) l. 3; ll. 51 *(*a)[h>(*a)su]*, 83; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6.
aha: see s.v. **√ah**.
ahadi: see s.v. **√ah**.
ahasu: see s.v. **√ah**.

\bar{a} + \sqrt{gam} : “come.”

anagada-: “future,” pp. (*nañ* kdh.).

anagada: *anāgato*, *anāgataḥ*; nom. sg. m. ll. 62 [2x], 62 (**ana*)*gada*, 66, 66 (**a*)*nagada*, 72 [2x], 73, 74, 74 <(**a*)*naga[d]*(**a*), 123–124, 124–125; 510000 l. 2 *anagad*(**a*).

anagada: *anāgataṃ*, *anāgatam*; nom. sg. n. ll. 71, 76, 128; 51D(v) l. 6 (**a*)*[n]*(**a*)*[g]*(**a*)*do*.

anagada: *anāgatā*, *anāgatāḥ*; nom. pl. m. ll. 2, 38, 39, 64 (**ana*)*[g]*(**a*)-*[d]*(**a*), 131–132, 132; 51D(v) l. 3.

anagada: *anāgataṃ*, *anāgatam*; acc. sg. m. l. 63.

anagada: P/Skt *anāgate*; loc. sg. m. l. 73.

anagada: P/Skt *anāgate*; loc. sg. n. ll. 131, 132.

anagada-: P/Skt *anāgata-*; (case/number/gender uncertain) ll. 135–136 (**ana*)*[g]*(**a*)*[da]*, 141 [*anagada*]; 511111 l. 2 [*an*](*)*[g]*-(**ada*); 51A–B(r) l. 7 (**a*)*[n]*(**a*)-*[g]*(**a*)*[d]*(**a*).

anagadae: *anāgatāya*, *anāgatāyai*; dat. sg. f. 51A–B(r) ll. 4, 5 [*a*]*nagadae*.

a[na](*)gadam: *anāgataṃ*, *anāgatam*; nom. sg. n. (in *a[na]*(*)*gadam*) *eva* ll. 76–77.

anaga[dena]: P/Skt *anāgatena*; instr. sg. n. l. 80.

anagadehi: *anāgatehi*, *anāgataiḥ*; instr. pl. m. 51D(v) l. 4.

anagadehi: *anāgatehi*, *anāgataiḥ*; instr. pl. m./n. (gender uncertain) 51A–B(r) l. 2.

anagado: *anāgato*, *anāgataḥ*; nom. sg. m. l. 36; 51D(v) l. 4 *anagado*.

(**a*)*[n]*(**a*)*[g]*(**a*)*do*: *anāgataṃ*, *anāgatam*; nom. sg. n. 51D(v) l. 6.

-anagada-: in [*a*](*)*[d]**[ida]*-**anagada**, **adidanagada**-*[p]*(*)*[r]**[acup]*(*)*[n]*-

(**a*)*[s]*(*)*[kh]*(*)*[d]*(*)*a*, [*a*]-(**didana*)*[g]*(*)*[d]*(*)*a*-*[bh]*(*)*a*-*[v]*(*)*a*.

ikaṣa: see s.v. *eka-*.

i ca ma [sa]: 51C+51F(r) l. 3 (reconstruction tentative, meaning uncertain).

icheaṣi: see s.v. $\sqrt{iṣ}$.

iḍasa: see s.v. *aya-/iḍa-*.

(**i*)*[r]**jiya*: *indriyāni*, *indriyāṇi*; “controlling faculties,” nom. pl. n. l. 104.

-īdriya-: in (**a*)*[n]*(*)*[g]*(*)*[d]*(*)*a*-*īdriya*, *uvahaḍa-īdriana*.

$\sqrt{iṣ}$: “wish.”

icheaṣi: *iccheyyāsi*, *iccheḥ*; “you might wish,” 2nd sg. opt. l. 66.

ukṣividav[u]: see s.v. *ut* + $\sqrt{kṣip}$.

-[u]khkṣa: “in a cauldron,” f.; in [*he*]*m[u]*-*khkṣa*.

ut + $\sqrt{kṣip}$: “throw up, raise.”

ukṣividav[u]: **ukkhepitabbam*, *utkṣeptavyam*; “should be expanded,” gdv., nom. sg. n. ll. 115, 117.

ut + \sqrt{pad} : “arise.”

anupanana: *anuppannānaṃ*, *anutpannānām*; “of [factors] that have not arisen,” pp. (*nañ* kdh.), gen. pl. m. l. 47.

upajadi: *uppajjati*, *utpadyate*; “it arises,” 3rd sg. pres. ll. 51, 93, 94.

upajiṣadi: *uppajjissati*, *utpatsyate*; “it will arise,” 3rd sg. fut. ll. 40 [2x], 45 *upa*<(**j*)*iṣadi* (corrected from *upadiṣadi*), 64 [*up*](*)*[j]*(*)*[ṣ]*(*)*adi*, 65.

u(*padido): *uppajjitum*, *utpattum*; “to arise,” inf. ll. 43–44.

upajadi: see s.v. *ut* + \sqrt{pad} .

upajiṣadi: see s.v. *ut* + \sqrt{pad} .

upaḍa-dhama-: “factor subject to arising,”

- (kdh.), m.
upaḍa-dhama: *uppādidhammo,
 *utpādidharmah; nom. sg. 51D(r)
 1. 3 u[pa]ḍadhama; ll. 43, 46, 46 [u]-
 paḍadhama, 51 (*upa)[ḍa]dhama, 62
 [2x], 64, 65–66 upa(*ḍadhama).
upaḍa-dhama: *uppādidhammā,
 *utpādidharmāh; nom. pl. ll. 38, 48
 [2x], 50, 64 (*u)[p](*)[d](*)[dh]-
 (*a)[m](*)a.
upaḍa-dhamo: *uppādidhammo,
 *utpādidharmah; nom. sg. ll. 36, 37
 [2x], 39 [u]paḍa[dha]mo, 43, 44
 upaḍa[dh](*)a mo.
u(*padido): see s.v. **ut** + √**pad**.
upaṣapaḍa-: “attainment of [religious
 practice],” f.
upaṣapaḍa: P/Skt *upasampadā*;
 “attainment of [religious practice],”
 nom. sg. 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3 [u]-
 paṣapaḍa; 51D(v) l. 2; 51A–B(r) ll.
 3–4 u(*paṣapaḍa).
[u]paṣapa[ḍ](*)a-: P/Skt *upasampadā*-;
 (case uncertain) sg. 51C(v)[51ssss(v)]
 l. 3.
upaṣapana-: see s.v. **upa** + **sam** + √**pad**.
upa + **sam** + √**pad**: “attain.”
anupaṣapana-: “not attained [religious
 practice],” pp. (*nañ* kdh.).
anupaṣapana: *anupasampannā*,
anupasampannāh; nom. pl. m.
 51jjjj l. 1.
(*anu)[p](*)[ṣapan](*)a-: P/Skt
anupasampanna-; (case/number/
 gender uncertain) 51D(v) l. 1.
anu[va]ṣapano: *anupasampanno*,
anupasampannah; nom. sg. m.
 51D(v) l. 3.
upaṣapana-: “attained [religious practice],”
 pp.
[u]paṣap(*ana)- or **[u]paṣap(*aḍa)-:**
upasampannā, *upasampannāh*;
 nom. pl. m. or P/Skt *upasampadā*-;
 f. sg. (case uncertain) 51C(v)
 [51ssss(v)] l. 3.
[up](*)a[ṣ](*)a[p](*)a[n](*)a- or
(*an)[up](*)a[ṣ](*)a[p](*)a[n]-
(*a)-: P/Skt *upasampanna*- or
 P/Skt *anupasampanna*-; (case/
 number/gender uncertain) 51F(v)
 [51gg].
[u](*)pa[ṣ](*)a[pa]no: *upasampanno*,
upasampannah; nom. sg. m.
 51D(v) ll. 2–3.
ubhaya-: “both,” adj.
[ubha](*)e)h(*i): *ubhayehi*, *ubhayaiḥ*; instr.
 pl. n. l. 30.
[ubh](*)a[y](*)a-: P/Skt *ubhaya*-; (case
 uncertain) pl. n. 51aaaa.
ubhaye: P/Skt *ubhayāni*; nom. pl. n. ll. 31,
 31 *ubhay[e]*.
uvahaḍa-īdriana: *upahatindriyānaṃ*,
upahatendriyāṇāṃ; “of impaired
 controlling faculties,” (kdh.), gen. pl. n. l.
 102.
eka-: “one,” adj.
ikaṣa: *ekassa*, *ekasya*; gen. sg. m. l. 106.
[e]k(*a): *eko*, *ekah*; nom. sg. m. l. 25.
ekaca: *ekacce*, *ekatye*; “certain,” adj., nom. pl.
 m. ll. 122, 123 *[e]kaca*.
ekaḥha: *ekaḥṭṭham*, *ekastham*; “constitutes one
 part,” adj., (tp.), nom. sg. n. l. 30 [2x].
eka-deṣa: *ekadesa*, *ekadeṣe*; “in one division,”
 (kdh. dvi.) loc. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 1, 1
[ekade]ṣa.
[e]k(*a)[-m-aṃśa]: *ekamso*, *ekāṃśah*; “little
 bit,” (kdh. dvi.) nom. sg. m. l. 25.
ekunaviśadi: *ekūnavīsatiṃ*, *ekonaviṃsatiḥ*/
ekonaviṃśah; “nineteenth,” adj., nom. sg.
 f. (or m.) ll. 85, 89 *[ekuna]v[i]ś(*a)[d](*)i*,
 92, 120 *ekunaviśaḍa*.
[et](*)a: see s.v. **eḍa-eṣa-**.
eḍa-eṣa-: “this,” dem. pron.
[et](*)a: *eso*, *eṣah*; nom. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 4.

eda: *etaṃ, etad*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) ll. 5
 (*e)[da]; ll. 26 [e]da, 93.
eṣa: *etaṃ, etad*; sg. (interpretation tentative,
 case/gender uncertain, possibly acc. n.)
 l. 82.
¹**eva:** “very, same, alone,” emphatic ind.
¹**eva:** P/Skt *eva*; ll. 7, 8 [*eva*], 15, 16 *e[va]*,
 52, 76, 77 (*e)[*v*](*a*), 77; 51oooo l. 2
 <*e>*va* (corrected from [*o*]*va*); 51C(v)
 [51ssss(v)] l. 1.
¹**va:** P/Skt *eva*; l. 2.
²**eva:** *evaṃ, evam*; “in this/that way, thus, such,”
 ind. ll. 2, 28, 34, 60 *e[va]*, 78, 79, 80 [2x],
 87, 101, 103, 121; 51D(v) l. 3.
eva-ruva: *evarūpaṃ, evaṃrūpaṃ*; “with such
 form,” adj. (bv.), acc. sg. n. l. 93.
eṣa: see s.v. **eda-/eṣa-**.

kaigam: *kāyikaṃ, kāyikam*; “corporeal,” adj.,
 nom. sg. n. (in *kaigam eva*) l. 52.
kata: *kattā, kartā*; “agent,” nom. sg. m. l. 54.
[ka]tavo: see s.v. √*kr*.
kato: see s.v. √*kr*.
kaḍama-: “which,” interr. pron.
ka[d](*a*)ma: *katamaṃ, katamat*; nom. sg.
 n. l. 22.
kaḍama: P/Skt *katame*; nom. pl. m. l. 131.
kaḍamaḍa: *katamasmā/katamato*,
katamasmāt; abl. sg. n. ll. 21, 51
 [*kaḍa*]*mado*.
kaḍamaṣa: *katamassa, katamasya*; gen. sg.
 n. l. 39.
kaḍamena: P/Skt *katamena*; instr. sg. n. l.
 118 *ka[ḍa]mena*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 2
 [*ka*]*dam[en](*a*)*; 51D(v) l. 2 [*k*](*a*)-
 [*d*](*a*)[*m*](*e*)[*na*].
kadi: P/Skt *kati* “how many,” interr. pron. nom.
 pl. n. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 6.
¹**kadha:** *kathaṃ, katham*; “how,” interr. ind. l.
 58.
²**kadha:** *khandho, skandhaḥ*; “aggregate,” nom.
 sg. m. ll. 89, 91.

-kadha-: in *para-kadha-para-aḍana-para-*
dhadu-yo(a).

kama-: “action,” n.

kama: *kamma, karma*; nom. sg. 51D(r) l. 5;
 ll. 23 [*k*](*a*)[*ma*], 23, 24 [*kama*], 29
 [3x], 31 [*k*](*a*)*ma*, 32 [*kama*], 33, 33
ka[ma], 53, 57, 59 [2x], 61.

kama: *kamma, karma*; acc. sg. ll. 35, 51
*kama[d](*a*)*.

kamaḍa: *kammato/kammanā, karmaṇaḥ*;
 abl. sg. ll. 21, 51 *kama[d](*a*)*.

kamado: *kammato/kammanā, karmaṇaḥ*;
 abl. sg. l. 55 *kama[do]*.

kamaṣa: *kammassa/kammuno, karmaṇaḥ*;
 gen. sg. 51jj(r) *kama(*a*)*; ll. 13, 23
ka[ma]sa, 24, 54 *kamasa*.

kamena: *kammena/kammunā, karmaṇā*;
 instr. sg. l. 17.

-kama-: in *akuśala-ka[ma-sva]go*.

k(*a*)ma-s[vag](*a*): *kammassako*,
karmasvakah; “one for whom the [matured
 effect of] action is one’s own,” adj. (bv.),
 nom. sg. m. l. 19.

kama-heduo: *kammahetuko, karmahetukaḥ*;
 “has action as its cause,” adj. (bv.), nom.
 sg. m. l. 2.

-[k](*a*)[y](*a*): P/Skt *kāya-*; “body,” (case/
 number uncertain) m. 51cc(v).

(*ka*)[yanu]paśa: *kāyānupassī, kāyānupaśyī*;
 “observing the body,” adj. (tp. with *-in*
 suffix), nom. sg. m. (in sandhi combination
 (*ka*)[*y(a)-anu*]*paśa*) 51A–B(v)+53A l. 3.

k(*a*)y(*a*)-s(*ad*)[i]: *kāyasati, kāyasmṛtiḥ*;
 “mindfulness of the body,” (tp.), nom. sg. f.
 51A–B(v)+53A l. 3.

karana-: “reason,” n.

karana: *kāraṇaṃ, kāraṇam*; acc. sg. l. 37.

karanena: P/Skt *kāraṇena*; instr. sg. ll. 3,
 8 (*ka*)[*r*](*a*)[*nen*](*a*), 8, 15, 16 [*k*]-
 (*a*)*ranena*, 45–46 *k(*a*)[r](*a*)[n](*e*)-*
[na], 46 *ka[r](*a*)<ne>[n](*a*)*.

karano: *kāraṇaṃ, kāraṇam*; nom. sg. l.

133.
-karana-: in *adi[da-k](*)[r](*)[nena]*,
()[n](*)[g](*)[d](*)-[k](*)[r]-*
()[nen](*)*, *asti-karana*, *pacupana-*
karanena, *pala-karana*, *sarva-*
karanen()*.
kariśadi: see s.v. \sqrt{kr} .
kareasu: see s.v. \sqrt{kr} .
karodi: see s.v. \sqrt{kr} .
kala-: “time,” m.
kalena: P/Skt *kālena*; “during the time, by
means of time,” instr. sg. 51cc(v); l.
109.
-kala-: in *adiḍa-kala*, *anagaḍa-kala*, *paca-*
bhata-kala-, *pure-bhata-kala-*, *sarva-*
kala.
ki-: “what, which,” interr. pron.
ki: *ko*, *kaḥ*; nom. sg. m. l. 94.
kī: *kiṃ*, *kim*; nom. sg. n. ll. 93, 94 [*kji*], 132.
ki: *kiṃ*, *kim*; “how,” interr. adv. ll. 41, 48
k[i], 55, 57, 128.
kena: P/Skt *kena*; instr. sg. n.
51A–B(v)+53A l. 5; l. 3.
kica-: “some,” indef. pron.
kica: *kiñci*, *kiṃcit*; nom. sg. n. ll. 23
kic()*, 23, 29 [3x], 31 *ki[c](*)*, 33
ki[ca], 83, 102 *(*)ki*ca, 102 [*k*](*)*i*[*c*]-
()*, 105 [2x]; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6
[2x].
kica: *kiñci*, *kiṃcit*; “in some way, in some
cases, at all,” adv. ll. 1, 2, 32, 97, 97–
98 [*kic*](*)*a*, 98 *ki[c](*)**a*, 98 [*kica*].
kica: *kiñci*, *kiṃcit*; (function uncertain)
51A–B(v)+53A [53c].
kici: *kiñci*, *kiṃcit*; nom. sg. n.
51A–B(v)+53A l. 5; ll. 24 [*k*]*ici*, 90, 90
kic()**i*.
kici: *kiñci*, *kiṃcit*; “in some way, in some
cases, at all,” adv. l. 134 [*kici*].
kici: see s.v. *kica-*.
ku[dar](*)[hi]: *katarehi*, *kataraiḥ*; “by means
of which,” interr. pron. instr. pl. n. l. 20.
-(*)ku][ś](*)la-: *-kusala-*, *-kuśala-*; “virtuous,”
(case/number/gender uncertain)
51C+51F(r) l. 5.
kuśalakuśala: *kusalākusalā*, *kuśalākuśalāḥ*;
“virtuous and unvirtuous,” adj. (kdh.), nom.
pl. m. (in sandhi combination *kuśal(a)-*
akuśala) l. 114.
 \sqrt{kr} : “act as, take as, bring about.”
[ka]tavo: *kattabbo*, *kartavyaḥ*; “should be
brought about,” gdv., nom. sg. m. l. 18.
kato: *kattum*, *kartum*; “to act as,” inf.
51D(r) l. 3; ll. 37, 38 [*ka*]to, 66.
kariśadi: *karissati*, *kariṣyati*; “it will act
as,” 3rd sg. fut. l. 63 [2x].
kareasu: *kareyyum*, *kuryuḥ*; “they would
act as,” 3rd pl. opt. l. 2.
karodi: P/Skt *karoti*; “one takes as, it acts
as,” 3rd sg. pres. 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 3,
4; ll. 1, 141 [*kar*](*)*o*[*di*].
karodi: *karonti*, *kurvanti*; “they act as,” 3rd
pl. pres. l. 50.
kena: see s.v. *ki-*.
-[kṣaya]-: *khaya-*, *kṣaya-*; “destruction,” (case/
number uncertain) m. 51ff.
khu: *kho*, *khalu*; “possibly,” ind. (in *ki nu khu*
“now how possibly”) ll. 41, 48, 105.
gatava: see s.v. \sqrt{gam} .
 \sqrt{gam} : “go, reach.”
gatava: *gantabbaṃ*, *gantavyam*; “should be
reached,” gdv., nom. sg. n. l. 44.
grihi-bhava: *gihibhāvo*, *gr̥hibhāvaḥ*; “mode of
the householder,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 73.
ca: P/Skt *ca*; “and,” ind. 51D(r) l. 3; ll. 1, 3, 6
[*ca*], 13 [2x], 14 [*c*](*)*a*, 15, 18, 18 [*c*]-
()*, 22 [*ca*], 25 [3x], 27, 28, 47, 50, 58
[*ca*], 59, 64, 69, 81 [*c*](*)*a*, 81, 95 [*ca*], 95,
97 [2x], 108, 109, 116, 120 [3x], 121 [2x],
126 [2x], 127, 139; 51A–B(r) l. 2.

cakhaīdana-: “visual sense sphere,” (kdh.), n.
(in sandhi combination *cakh(u)-aiḍana*).

cakhaīdana: *cakkhāyatanam*,
caḥṣurāyatanam; nom. sg. ll. 95, 95
[c>(*a)[kh>(*a)[id>(*a)[na], 116 [2x].

cakhaīdana: *cakkhāyatane*, *caḥṣurāyatane*;
loc. sg. l. 99.

-cakhaīdana: in [r>(*u)[va]-*cakhaīdana*.

cakhu-viñana-: “visual perceptual
consciousness,” (tp.), n.

cakhu-viñana: *cakkhuvīñāṇam*,
caḥṣurvijñānam; nom. sg. 51G(v)
[51ssss(v)] l. 4.

cakhu-viñanena: *cakkhuvīñāṇena*,
caḥṣurvijñānena; instr. sg. 51G(v)
[51ssss(v)] l. 3.

ca[t>(*u)[n>(*a): see s.v. *catvar-/cadu-*.

catvar-/cadu-: “four,” adj.

ca[t>(*u)[n>(*a): *catunnam*, *caturṇām*; gen.
pl. m. l. 94.

catvare: *cattāro*, *catvārah*; nom. pl. m. l.
103.

cadu-: (case/gender uncertain) 51G(v)
[51ssss(v)] l. 6.

catvare: see s.v. *catvar-/cadu-*.

cadu-: see s.v. *catvar-/cadu-*.

-cia-: “practice,” m.; in [*abromi*]-*cia-vaṣa*,
brami-cia-vaṣa, *bromi-cia-vaṣa-*.

cita-: “thought,” n.

cita: *cittam*, *cittam*; nom. sg. l. 95.

cita(*sa): *cittassa*, *cittasya*; gen. sg. ll.
93–94.

cha[d](*a): *chando*, *chandaḥ*; “longing,” nom.
sg. m./n. l. 81.

jatva: see s.v. √*han*.

jaḍa: P/Skt *jātu*; “undoubtedly,” ind. l. 123.

jadi: *jāti*, *jātiḥ*; “birth,” nom. sg. f. l. 43.

√*jan*: “be born.”

ajaḍa: *ajātā*, *ajātāḥ*; “unborn,” pp. (*nañ*
kdh.), nom. pl. m. l. 2.

Jana: *jhānam*, *dhyānam*; “trance,” acc. sg. n. ll.
55 [jana], 56.

(*ja)[n>(*a)]g[o: *janako*, *janakaḥ*; “father,”
nom. sg. m. l. 59.

jiva-: “soul,” m.

jiva: *jīvo*, *jīvaḥ*; nom. sg. ll. 88, 92, 118
[jiva], 119 [j>(*iva), 121.

jive: *jīvam*, *jīvam*; nom. sg. l. 84.

ñana-: “knowledge,” n.

-ñan(*a)-: *ñāṇa-*, *jñāna-*; (case/number
uncertain) 51dddd.

ñanena: *ñāṇena*, *jñānena*; instr. sg.
51A–B(v)+53A l. 5.

-ñana-: in *dukha-ñana-*.

-ñhanena: “within the region,” n.; in *adiḍa-*
ñhanena.

-ñhiḍa: “stationed in,” pp.; in *sañhaiḥ(*ḍa)na-*
ñhiḍa.

ta-: “he, she, it, they, this, that,” dem. pron.

ta: *so*, *saḥ*; nom. sg. m. 51ee; ll. 64, 65,
133; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3 [t>(*a).

ta: *taṃ*, *tad*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) ll. 4, 5; ll.
12, 33, 53, 60, 60 [ta], 70, 71 [t>(*a),
81, 86, 97.

ta: *taṃ*, *tad*; “then, therefore,” adv. ll. 1, 3
[t>(*a), 50 [ta].

ta: P/Skt *te*; nom. pl. m. l. 116 [ta].

tasa: *tassa*, *tasya*; gen. sg. n. 51D(r) l. 6
[tas>(*a); 51ff [tasa]; ll. 15 *tas(*a)*, 54,
54 [t>(*a)[s>(*a).

[tas>(*a)-: *tassa*, *tasya*; m./n. gen. sg.
or *tassā*, *tasyāḥ*; f. gen. sg. (gender
uncertain) l. 136.

¹**taṣa**: *tassa*, *tasya*; gen. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 4;
ll. 55 *tasa*, 133 [taṣa].

²**taṣa**: *tassā*, *tasyāḥ*; gen. sg. f. l. 28.

[tasmī]: *tasmim*, *tasmin*; loc. sg. m. l. 42.

te: P/Skt *te*; nom. pl. m. ll. 2, 48.

- tena:** P/Skt *tena*; instr. sg. m. l. 44.
- tena:** P/Skt *tena*; instr. sg. n. ll. 8 [t>(*e)-[n](a) (in sandhi combination [t>(*e)-[n(a) eva]), 16 [t>(*e)[n](a) (in sandhi combination [t>(*e)[n(a) eva]), 17, 18 [te]na, 43, 45, 46.
- tena:** P/Skt *tena*; “then, therefore, as a result of that,” adv. 51C+51F(r) l. 2; ll. 5 [t]ena, 6, 12, 12 [e]na, 13, 14 [t]-ena, 18 te[n](**a*), 30, 33, 45 [t>(*e)[n]-(**a*), 46, 52, 58, 65, 66, 95 te[n](**a*), 97, 98, 99, 102, 105 [te]na, 116, 122, 130; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 3, 4; 51D(v) ll. 3, 5, 6; 51A–B(r) l. 4.
- sa:** *so, saḥ*; nom. sg. m. ll. 54, 55 [sa].
- sa:** *taṃ, tad*; nom. sg. n. l. 25.
- [sa]:** P/Skt *sā*; nom. sg. f. ll. 25, 130 [s](**a*), 134 [s](**a*).
- ṣa:** P/Skt *tāni*; nom. pl. n. l. 27.
- se:** P/Skt *sā*; nom. sg. f. l. 97.
- se:** P/Skt *te*; nom. pl. m. l. 69.
- so:** *so, saḥ*; nom. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 2; ll. 17, 20 s[o], 37, 55; 51D(v) ll. 2, 5; 51A–B(r) l. 4.
- so:** *taṃ, tad*; nom. sg. n. ll. 5, 59 [2x], 61 [so].
- so:** *so, saḥ*; nom. sg. m. or P/Skt *taṃ*; nom. sg. n. or P/Skt *sā*; nom. sg. f. (gender uncertain) 51C(r)[51ssss(r)] l. 3.
- tatra:** *tatra/tattha, tatra*; “in that case, there, with regard to that,” ind. 51ee (**ta*)tra; ll. 4–5 ta(**tra*), 10 [ta]tra, 22 tat(**r*)a, 43, 82 tatr(a) (in sandhi combination tatr(a) *anuyoga*), 82, 101, 118, 120 [tatra], 122, 123, 125, 127, 128; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3; 51C(v) l. 4 [ta]tra.
- tasa:** see s.v. *ta-*.
- ¹**taṣa:** see s.v. *ta-*.
- ²**taṣa:** see s.v. *ta-*.
- ³**taṣa:** “in that way,” ind.
- taṣa:** P/Skt *tathā*; ll. 4 [ta]ṣa, 91 [taṣa], 94–95 [t](**a*ṣa); 51jjjj l. 1 [t](**a*)[s]-(**a*).
- taṣa taṣa:** P/Skt *tathā tathā*; ll. 28, 35 [taṣa taṣa].
- [tasmī]:** see s.v. *ta-*.
- te:** see s.v. *ta-*.
- tena:** see s.v. *ta-*.
- teneva:** see *tena* s.v. *ta-* (in sandhi combination *ten(a) eva*).
- [tra]:** *tīni, trīni*; “three,” adj., nom. pl. n. l. 127.
- traya-:** “three,” adj., pl.
- traya:** *tayo, trayah*; nom. m. l. 126 [t](**ra*)-ya.
- traya:** *tīni, trīni*; nom. n. l. 81 [tr](**a*)[ya], 131.
- traya-adhva:** **teyaddhā, traiyadhvāḥ/ traiyadhvikāḥ*; “belonging to the three time periods,” adj. (kdh. dvig.), nom. pl. m. ll. 70 (**tra*)[y](**a*)adhva, 123 trayaa(**dh*)va (corrected from *trayaatva*).
- treḍaṣa:** *terasamaṃ, trayodaśam*; “thirteenth,” adj., nom. sg. n. ll. 85 t(**r*)e[**d*](**a*)[**ś*]va (corrected from t(**r*)e[*śaḍ*](**a*), 89, 91–92 tre(**ḍa*)śa, 117.
- thamena:** *thāmena, sthāmnā*; “by virtue of strength,” instr. sg. n. l. 36.
- theraṣa:** *therassa, sthavirasya*; “of an elder,” gen. sg. m. 51D(v) l. 5.
- dajadi:** see s.v. √dah.
- daḍavo:** see s.v. √dā.
- √dah: “consume by fire.”
- dajadi:** **ḍayhati/*dayhati, dahyate*; “it is consumed by fire,” 3rd sg. pres. pass. l. 60 [2x].
- √dā: “give, present.”
- daḍavo:** *dātabbaṃ, dātavyam*; “should be presented,” gdv., nom. sg. n. ll. 7, 31 [d](**a*)[d](**a*)[vo].

di: *iti/ti, iti*; ind. quotative particle,

51A–B(v)+53A ll. 4 [*di*], 6; 51D(r) ll. 5 (**d*)[*i*], 6 [*di*]; 51C+51F(r) l. 4, 4 [*di*]; 51F(r)[51ssss(r)+51nn] [2x]; ll. 3, 4 [2x], 6, 7, 10, 11, 17 [*di*], 22 *d*⟨**i*⟩ (corrected from *do*), 24, 25, 26 (**d*)[*i*], 28, 29, 31, 37, 44, 45, 46 [2x], 51, 53, 54, 56 [2x], 57 [2x], 70, 83 [*di*], 86, 91, 93, 95 [2x], 97, 98, 99, 101 [*di*], 102, 104, 107, 109 [*di*], 116 [2x], 119 [*di*], 119 [2x], 121, 121 [*di*], 122, 123 [2x], 127, 129, 129 [*di*], 130 [2x], 132, 133, 136 [*di*], 140; 51jjjj l. 1 *d*[*i*]; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 3, 4, 5 [2x]; 51D(v) ll. 3 *d*[*i*], 4, 5 [*di*], 5, 6.

duaḍaṣa-: “twelve,” adj.

duaḍaṣa: *dvādasa, dvādaṣa*; nom. pl. n. l. 96.

duaḍaṣa: *dvādasahi, dvādaṣabhiḥ*; instr. pl. n. ll. 69, 115; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 1 (**dua*)[*d*](**a*)ṣa.

duaḍaṣa-[a]yaḍa[n]a-[sag](ra*)hiḍa:**

dvādasāyatanaśaṅgahitam,
dvādaśāyatanaśaṅghītam; “included within the twelve sense spheres,” adj. (tp.), nom. sg. n. ll. 116–117.

dukha-: “suffering,” n.

dukha: *dukkham, duḥkham*; nom. sg. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 2 [*dukha*].

dukha: *dukkham, duḥkham*; acc. sg. 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 1 *du*[*kha*], 5.

[dukh](a*)-**: *dukkha-*, *duḥkha-*; (case uncertain) sg. 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3.

dukhagarena: *dukkhākāreṇa, duḥkhākāreṇa*; “aspect of suffering,” (kdh.), instr. sg. m. (in sandhi combination *dukh(a)-agarena*) l. 112.

dukha-ñana-: “knowledge of suffering,” (tp.), n.

du[*kha*]-[*ñ*](**a*)[*n*](**a*): *dukkhañāṇam,*
duḥkhajñāṇam; nom. sg. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 1.

dukha-ñana: *dukkhañāṇāni,*
duḥkhajñāṇāni; nom. pl.

51A–B(v)+53A l. 6.

(d*)**[*ukh*](**a*)**ta:** *dukkhatā, duḥkhatā*; “nature of suffering,” nom. sg. f. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 4.

dukha-ñiro[*sa*]: *dukkhanirodho,*
duḥkhanirodhaḥ; “in the cessation of suffering,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 39.

[du]⟨**ve*⟩: *dve/duve, dve*; “two,” adj., nom. pl. n. l. 26 (corrected from [*dudo*]).

¹de: *-to, -tas*; ind. particle/suffix of probable ablative sense (interpretation tentative: see commentary l. 4; see also *paḍiñade* s.v.

pradiña-, [*s*](**o*)[*p*](**a*)**lade** s.v. *sapala-*).

¹de: “in accordance with the fact that,” (in *taṣa de*) l. 4 [*de*].

¹de: “as a result of that,” (in *tena de*) ll.

12, 46 [*de*], 52, 97, 98 [*de*], 105, 122; 51jjjj l. 1 (**tena*) [*de*] (reconstruction tentative).

¹de: “then surely,” (in *nanu de*) ll. 59, 61 ⟨**d*⟩[*e*].

¹de: “insofar as,” (in *yaṣa de*) l. 94.

²de: P/Skt *te*; “your,” 2nd pers. pron. (enclitic form, oblique cases), gen. sg. l. 105.

-deṣa: “in [one] division,” m.; in *eka-deṣa*.

-doṣa-: “hatred,” m.; in *a*[*di*]*ḍa-raga-doṣa-moha*.

dhadu: *dhātu, dhātuḥ*; “element,” nom. sg. f. or m. (gender uncertain) ll. 85, 89 *dha*[*du*], 92, 120.

-dhadu-: in *para-kadha-para-aḍḍana-para-dhadu-yo(a)*.

dhama-: “factor,” m.

dhama: *dhammā, dharmāḥ*; nom. pl. ll. 121 (**dha*)[*m*](**a*), 122 [2x].

[dha]mana: *dhammānaṃ, dharmāṇāṃ*; gen. pl. l. 47.

(dhama*)**[*s*](**a*): *dhammaṣa, dharmasya*; gen. sg. m. l. 126.

-dhama-: in *akuśala-dhama, anupaḍa-dhama-, upaḍa-dhama-, prac*[*u*]*pana-dhamo*.

dharedi: see s.v. √*dhṛ*.

√*dhṛ*: “wear.”

dharedi: *dhāreti, dhārayati*; “one wears,”
3rd sg. caus. l. 41.

na: “not,” ind.

na: P/Skt *na*; 51A–B(v)+53A l. 4 [*na*];
51D(r) l. 5; 51C+51F(r) l. 2 [2x];
51C(r)[51ssss(r)] l. 3; ll. 1, 13 *n(*a)*,
15, 17 [*n(*a)*], 18 [*na*], 19 [2x], 32
[*na*], 32, 34, 35, 37 [2x], 38, 40, 43
[2x], 45 [*n(*a)*], 48, 53, 54, 58 [3x],
65, 75 [2x], 90, 97 [*na*], 98 [2x],
100, 104, 131, 134 [*n(*a)*]; 51jjjj
l. 1 [*na*]; 51C(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 1 (in
sandhi combination *n(a) eva*); 51F(v)
[51ssss(v)] l. 3 [*n(*a)*], 3; 51D(v) l. 5.

nasti: *natthi, nāsti*; (in sandhi combination
n(a) asti) 51D(r) l. 6 [*n(a)*]; ll. 14
[*n(a)*], 23, 29, 31, 33 [2x], 39, 58 [3x],
71 (**n(a)*), 75, 83 [2x], 86 [2x], 88
[3x], 89 (**n(a)*), 89 [3x], 91 [3x], 92
[4x], 94, 97, 101 [*n(a)*], 102 [*n(a)*],
105, 117 [2x], 118 [*n(a)*], 119 [*n(a)*],
123, 127, 130; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 2
[*n(a)*], 5, 6 [4x], 7; 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l.
3; 51D(v) ll. 2 [2x], 3 (**n(a)*) (in **na-*
sti corrected from [*ye*]*sti*).

na ca: P/Skt *na ca*; “isn’t it the case that,” ind.
ll. 60, 90 [*na ca*].

nana-vilakṣana: *nānāvilakṣaṇāni,*
nānāvilakṣaṇāni; “various distinguishing
characteristics,” (kdh.), acc. pl. n.
51A–B(v)+53A l. 5 [*na*]navila[*kṣa*]na.

nanu: P/Skt *nanu*; “surely,” ind.
51A–B(v)+53A l. 4 [*n(*an)*]*u*; ll. 59, 61,
62, 63.

nama: “certainly,” ind.

nama: P/Skt *nāma*; ll. 2, 3, 83 *nam[a]*;
51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6.

namo: P/Skt *nāma*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 6
namo.

nasti: see **nasti** s.v. **na** (in sandhi combination

n(a) asti).

nastiḍa: *natthitā, nāstītā*; “nonexistence,”
(neg.) nom. sg. f. ll. 71 [2x], 87, 90
[*nastiḍ*]*(*a)*.

nahi: *na hi, nahi*; “for it is not the case,” ind.
ll. 3, 44 [*nahi*]; 51llll l. 1 [*n(*a)*]*[h(*i)]*;
51A–B(r) l. 6 (**na*)*hi*.

n[i](*pala): *nippalaṃ, niṣphalam*; “not
possessed of a fruit,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. n.
ll. 5–6.

nirartha: *nirattham, nirartham*; “without
purpose,” adv. l. 49.

nirarthiya: **niratthiko, nirarthikah*; “without
purpose,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. m. ll. 38, 65.

nirujadi: see s.v. **ni** + √*rudh*.

ni + √*rudh*: “cease.”

anirudha: *aniruddho, aniruddhah*; “not
ceased,” pp. (*nañ* kdh.), nom. sg. n. ll.
55–56 *ani(*rudha)*, 56.

nirujadi: *nirujjhati, nirudhyate*; “it ceases,”
3rd sg. pres. pass. ll. 53 *nirujadi*, 53,
53–54 *niruja(*di)*, 54, 59–60 *niru(*ja)-*
*[d](*i)*.

nirudha-: “ceased,” pp.

nirudha: *niruddham, niruddham*; nom.
sg. n. ll. 55, 61.

nirudha: P/Skt *niruddhā*; nom. sg. f.
l. 56.

nirudha-: see s.v. **ni** + √*rudh*.

-niro[ṣa]: “in the cessation,” m.; in *dukha-*
niro[ṣa].

nir + √*vṛt*: “occur.”

anivurta-: “not occurred,” pp. (*nañ* kdh.).
*(*aniv)[u](*rta)*: *anibbatto, anivṛttaḥ*;
nom. sg. m. 51D(r) l. 1.

-[an]i[v]u(*r)[t](*a)-: *anibbatta-*,
anivṛtta-; (case/number/gender
uncertain) 51D(r)[51dd(r)].

nivartadi: *nibbattati, nirvartate*; “it
occurs,” 3rd sg. pres. ll. 12, 13 [2x], 15,
20, 21, 22, 52, 54, 55 [*ni*]*vartadi*, 57.

nivartiṣadi: *nibbattissati, nirvartiṣyati*; “it

will occur,” 3rd sg. fut. ll. 32, 32–33
ni[va]r[t]()śadi*, 34 *nivartīśadi*.
nivurta-: “occurred,” pp.
nivurta: *nibbatto*, *nirvṛttaḥ*; nom. sg.
 m. 51D(r) l. 1.
-(*)ni[vurta]-: *-nibbatta-*, *-nirvṛtta-*;
 (case/number/gender uncertain)
 51C(r)[51ssss(r)] l. 4.
nivartadi: see s.v. *nir* + √*vṛt*.
nivartīśadi: see s.v. *nir* + √*vṛt*.
niviśeṣa-: *nibbesesa-*, *nirviśeṣa-*; “without
 distinction,” adj. (bv.), nom. (number/
 gender uncertain) 51C+51F(r) ll. 2 [n]-
i[viś]()e[ś](*)a*, 3.
nivurta-: see s.v. *nir* + √*vṛt*.
nu: P/Skt *nu*; “now,” ind. (in *ki nu khu* “now
 how possibly”) ll. 41 *n[u]*, 48 *[n]u*, 105
 (**n*)[*u*].
[nera]a: *nirayaṃ*, *nirayam*; “hell,” acc. sg. m.
 l. 44.
neraiyana: *nerayikānaṃ*, *nairayikānām*; “of
 hell-beings,” adj., gen. pl. m. l. 103.
neraiya-bhava-: “nature as a hell-being,” (tp.),
 m.
neraiya-bhava: *nerayikabhāvo*,
nairayikabhāvaḥ; nom. sg. l. 42.
neraiya-bhave: *nerayikabhāve*,
nairayikabhāve; loc. sg. l. 99.
neva: see s.v. *na* (in sandhi combination *n(a)*
eva).
no: P/Skt *no*; “not,” ind. l. 69.
paca-bhata-kala-: “the time after the meal,”
 (kdh.), m.
paca-bhata-ka[l](*)e: *pacchābhattakāle*,
paścādbhaktakāle; loc. sg. ll. 107–108.
paca-bhata-kalo: *pacchābhattakālo*,
paścādbhaktakālah; nom. sg. l. 107.
pacupana-: see *pracupana-* s.v. *prati* + *ut* +
 √*pad*.
pacupana-karanena: *paccuppannakāraṇena*,

pratyutpannakāraṇena; “by reason of
 present [factors],” (tp.), instr. sg. n. l. 114.
pacupana-kale: *paccuppannakāle*,
pratyutpannakāle; “present time,” (kdh.),
 loc. sg. m. l. 108.
pacupanatva-svabhava:
paccuppannattasabhāvo,
pratyutpannatvasvabhāvaḥ; “intrinsic
 nature of presentness,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m.
 l. 79.
pacupana-bhava: *paccuppannabhāvo*,
pratyutpannabhāvaḥ; “present nature,”
 (kdh.), nom. sg. m. ll. 126–127 *pacu[p]-*
()a*nabhava, 132, 133–134.
paṃcama-: “fifth,” adj.
paṃcama: *pañcamaṃ*, *pañcamam*; nom.
 sg. n. l. 89 *[paṃc](*)a*[*m*](*)a).
paṃcamam: *pañcamam*, *pañcamam*; nom.
 sg. n. l. 120.
paṃcame: *pañcamaṃ*, *pañcamam*; nom.
 sg. n. ll. 85, 91 *pa[m]came*.
paḍama: *paṭhamam*, *prathamam*; “first,” adj.,
 acc. sg. n. ll. 55 *[p](*)a*[*ḍ*](*)a)⟨**ma*⟩, 56
*pa(*ḍ)[am](*)a* (corrected from *pa[cam]-*
()a*).
paḍikakṣidava: see s.v. *prati* + √*kāṅkṣ*.
(*)paḍig-: 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 7
 (reconstruction tentative, meaning
 uncertain).
paḍiñade: see s.v. *pradiña-*.
paḍi[ya]nadi: see s.v. *prati* + √*jñā*.
paḍi[ya]naṣa: see s.v. *prati* + √*jñā*.
paḍiṣavededi: see s.v. *prati* + *sam* + √*vid*.
para-kadha-para-aīḍana-para-dhadu-yo(a):
parakhandhaparāyatanaparadhātuyogo,
paraskandhaparāyatanaparadhātuyo-
gaḥ; “connection with the aggregates of
 another, the sense spheres of another, and
 the elements of another,” (tp.), nom. sg. m.
 (in sandhi combination *para-kadha-para-*
aīḍana-para-dhadu-yo(a) *a[thi]*) l. 106.
para-bhava-: “other-nature,” (tp.), m.

- para-bhava:** P/Skt *parabhāve*; loc. sg. l. 100.
- para-bhav[e]:** *parabhāvo, parabhāvah*; nom. sg. l. 100.
- parinipanañhaḍa-:** “for the sake of the determination,” (tp. with abstract *-tā* suffix), f.
- parinipanañhaḍae:**
**parinipphannañhatāya,*
**pariniṣpannasthatāyai*; dat. sg. ll. 78, 79 [*parinipa*]ñhaḍae.
- [p](*)[rinipana]ñhaḍaye:**
**parinipphannañhatāya,*
**pariniṣpannasthatāyai*; dat. sg. l. 80.
- pala-:** “fruit,” n.
- pala:** *phalaṃ, phalam*; nom. sg. 51C(r) [51ssss(r)] l. 3 [*pa*]la; ll. 25 [*p*](*)la, 25, 28, 30 *pa*[l](*)a.
- palani:** P/Skt *phalāni*; nom. pl. ll. 26 *p*(*)-*la*[n](*)i, 27.
- palena:** P/Skt *phalena*; instr. sg. ll. 58 [2x], 60.
- pala-:** in [*h*](*)e[*d*](*)u-[*p*](*)a[*l*](*)a-[*p*](*)ra)ti.
- pala-karana:** *phalakāraṇaṃ, phalakāraṇam*; “reason [constituted by] the fruit,” (kdh.), nom. sg. n. l. 5.
- pavagana:** *pāpakānaṃ, pāpakānām*; “of evil,” adj., gen. pl. m. l. 47.
- pav[e]:** *pāpā, pāpāh*; “evil,” adj., nom. pl. m. l. 48.
- √paś:** “see.”
pa[śa]dī: *passati, paśyati*; “one sees,” 3rd sg. pres. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 5.
- pa[śa]dī:** see s.v. **√paś**.
- pi:** “also, both,” ind.
pi: *api/pi, api*; ll. 64 [2x], 77 <*p>i (corrected from *yi*), 86 [2x], 114 [*p*](*)i, 114 [*p*]i.
vi: *api/pi, api*; l. 115; 51D(v) ll. 2 [2x], 5 [*vi*].
- pugala-:** “person,” m.
pugala: *puggalo, pudgalaḥ*; nom. sg. ll. 88, 92 *pu*[gala], 118 (**pu*)[*g*](*)a[*l*](*)a, 119 [*p*](*)u[*g*](*)a[*l*](*)a, 121.
pugale: *puggalo, pudgalaḥ*; nom. sg. l. 84.
putrena: *puttena, putreṇa*; “through [the existence of] the son,” instr. sg. m. l. 58.
puna: “further, now,” ind.
puna: *puna, punar*; ll. 17, 53, 54 *p*[un](*)a, 106, 122, 128.
ma[na]: *puna, punar*; 51D(v) ll. 3–4.
vuna: *puna, punar*; ll. 130 [*v*](*)u)na, 134 [*vu*]na.
pure-bhata-kala-: “time before the meal,” (kdh.), m.
pure-bhata-kala: *purebhattakālo, purobhaktakālah*; nom. sg. l. 108.
pure-bhata-kale: *purebhattakāle, purobhaktakāle*; loc. sg. l. 107.
peyala-: “and so on,” adv.
peyala: *peyyālaṃ, peyālam/piyālam/paryāyam*; ll. 99, 115, 118 *peyal*(*)a.
peyale: *peyyālaṃ, peyālam/piyālam/paryāyam*; l. 109.
peyalo: *peyyālaṃ, peyālam/piyālam/paryāyam*; l. 117 *peyal*[o].
pra + √āp: “acquire.”
prata: *patto, prāptaḥ*; “acquired,” pp., nom. sg. m. l. 133.
-pracageha: “through conditions,” m.; in *sarva-pracageha*.
pracupana-: see s.v. **prati + ut + √pad**.
prac[u]pana-dhamo: *paccuppannadhammo, pratyutpannadharmaḥ*; “present factor,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. l. 62.
(*)p[r](*)ac[up](*)a[n](*)a-[bh](*)ava):
paccuppannabhāvaṃ, pratyutpannabhāvam; “possessed of a present mode,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. n. l. 129.
√prach: “ask.”
p[r]()o)cha[dī]:* *pucchati, pṛcchati*; “one asks,” 3rd sg. pres. l. 23.

prochi: *pucchi/apucchi, aprakṣīt*; “one asked,” 3rd sg. pret. l. 82.

prochidava-:

prochidava: *pucchitabbam, praṣṭavyam*; “should be asked,” gdv., nom. sg. n. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 3 [*pro*]*chidav*(**a*); ll. 7, 17, 21, 29, 36.

p(*ro)[chi]davo: *pucchitabbam, praṣṭavyam*; “should be asked,” gdv., nom. sg. n. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 6.

prañahi: *paññāhi, prajñābhiḥ*; “by means of [other applications of] insight,” instr. pl. f. l. 115.

prata: see s.v. *pra* + √*āp*.

-prataṣa: “of one who has acquired,” pp.; in *ara[ha]tva-prataṣa*.

prati: *patti, prāptiḥ*; “acquisition,” nom. sg. f. l. 129.

-[p](ra*)ti:** “acquisition,” f.; in [*h*](**e*)[*d*](**u*)-[*p*](**a*)[*l*](**a*)-[*p*](**ra*)*tī*.

prati + ut + √pad: “approach, arise.”

pracupana-: “present,” pp.

pacupana: *paccuppanno, pratyutpannah;* nom. sg. m. ll. 125 *pa*(**cupa*)[*na*], 133.

pac(*u)pana: *paccuppannam, pratyutpannam;* nom. sg. n. l. 8.

pacupana: *paccuppanne, pratyutpanne;* loc. sg. n. l. 130.

pacupana-: *paccuppanna-, pratyutpanna-;* (case/number/gender uncertain) 51A–B(r) l. 2 [*pac*]*u*[*pa*]*na*.

pacupanaṣa: *paccuppannassa, pratyutpannasya;* gen. sg. m. l. 128.

pracupana: *paccuppanno, pratyutpannah;* nom. sg. m. ll. 124 *pracu*[*p*](**a*)[*n*](**a*), 124, 125 [*p*](**r*)[*a*]*cupana*.

pracupana: *paccuppannam, pratyutpannam;* nom. sg. n. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 1 [*pr*](**a*)-*cupana*; ll. 9 (**p*)[*r*](**ac*)[*up*](**a*)-[*n*](**a*), 14, 14 [*pr*](**ac*)[*up*](**a*)-[*n*](**a*), 16, 71–72 *pra*(**cupana*), 77.

pracupana: *paccuppannam, pratyutpannam;* acc. sg. n. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 1 [*pr*](**a*)[*c*]-(**u*)[*p*](**a*)[*n*](**a*).

pracupana: *paccuppanne, pratyutpanne;* loc. sg. n. l. 12.

pracupana-: *paccuppanna-, pratyutpanna-;* (case/number/gender uncertain) 51A–B(v)+53A l. 2 [*pr*](**acupana*); 51l(v)+51m(v)+51n(v)+51o(v) l. 1 [*pr*](**ac*)[*u*](**pana*); 51A–B(r) l. 2 [*pac*]*u*[*pa*]*na*.

[pr](a*)[cup](**a*)*naḍa:* *paccuppannā, pratyutpannāt;* abl. sg. n. l. 52.**

[p]r(ac*)u[pan](**a*)*doj:* *paccuppannā, pratyutpannāt;* abl. sg. n. l. 52.**

pracupanam: *paccuppannam, pratyutpannam;* nom. sg. n. (in *pracupanam eva*) l. 77.

-pracupana-: in *adiḍanagaḍa-[p](**r*)-[acup](**a*)[n](**a*)[s](**a*)[kh](**a*)-[d](**a*).*

prati + √kāṅkṣ: “wish, anticipate.”

paḍikakṣidava: *pāṭikaṅkhitabbāni, pratikāṅkṣitavyāni;* “should be anticipated,” gdv., nom. pl. n. l. 27.

prati + √jñā: “admit.”

paḍi[ya]nadi: *paṭijānāti, pratijānāti;* “one admits,” 3rd sg. pres. l. 122.

paḍi[ya]naṣa: *paṭijānātha, pratijānātha;* “you admit,” 2nd pl. pres. l. 90.

prati + sam + √vid: “experience.”

paḍiṣavededi: *paṭisaṃvedeti/*

- paṭisaṃvedayati, pratisaṃvedayati;*
“one experiences,” 3rd sg. denom. ll.
20, 35 *paḍi[ṣave]dedi.*
- pradiña-**: “proposition,” f.
paḍiñade: paṭiññāya, pratijñāyāḥ;
“proposition,” abl. sg. l. 10.
pradiña: paṭiññā, pratijñā; nom. sg. ll. 15,
50.
- pranadivāḍa:** *pāñātīpāto, prāñātīpātaḥ;*
“taking life,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. (in sandhi
combination *pran(a)-adivāḍa*) 51D(r) l. 2.
- pra + √vac:** “proclaim.”
provucadi: pavuccati, procyate; “it is
proclaimed,” 3rd sg. pres. pass. ll. 26
*prov(*u)cadi, 26–27 [p]ro[v](*)[c]-*
*(*a)di.*
- praśana:** “exertion,” n.; in *same-praśana.*
- p[r](*)chadi:** see s.v. *√prach.*
- prochi:** see s.v. *√prach.*
- prochidava-:** see s.v. *√prach.*
- provucadi:** see s.v. *pra + √vac.*
- bu[dhas](*)a:** *buddhassa, buddhasya;* “of the
Buddha,” gen. sg. m. l. 18.
- brami-cia-vaṣa:** see s.v. *bromi-cia-vaṣa-.*
- √brū:** “say.”
bromi: brūmi, bravīmi; “I say,” 1st sg. pres.
ll. 26 [*bromi*], 28.
broṣi: brūsi, bravīsi; “you say,” 2nd sg. pres.
l. 139.
- bromi:** see s.v. *√brū.*
- bromi-cia-vaṣa-:** “life of religious practice,”
(tp.), m.
brami-cia-vaṣa: *brahmacariyavāso,*
brahmacaryavāsaḥ; nom. sg. ll. 38, 45.
bromi-cia-vaṣa: *brahmacariyavāso,*
brahmacaryavāsaḥ; nom. sg. ll. 34
br[o]mici[a]vaṣa, 35–36 br[o]()mi-*
[c]()i[avaṣo], 39 [bromi]ciavaṣa, 65*
br[o]miciavaṣa.
- br[o](*)mi-[c](*)i[a-vaṣo]:**
brahmacariyavāso, brahmacaryavāsaḥ;
nom. sg. ll. 35–36.
- broṣi:** see s.v. *√brū.*
- bhagavaḍa-:** “Bhagavat,” m.
bhagavaḍa: *bhagavā, bhagavān;* nom. sg.
l. 47.
bhagavaḍa: P/Skt *bhagavatā;* instr. sg. l.
34.
- bhata-:** “meal,” n.; in *paca-bhata-kala-, pure-*
bhata-kala-.
- bhava-:** “nature, mode,” m.
bhava: *bhāvo, bhāvāḥ;* nom. sg. l. 74;
51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 3–4 [*bh*](*)*ava*),
4–5 *bha[va]*, 7 [*bh*](*)*ava*, 7 [*bh*](*)*a-*
[v]()a.*
- bhava:** *bhāvā, bhāvāḥ;* nom. pl. ll. 115, 126
bha[va], 131.
- bhava-:** P/Skt *-bhāva-;* (case/number
uncertain) 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4.
- bhavaṣa:** *bhāvassa, bhāvasya;* gen. sg. l.
128.
- bhave:** *bhāvā, bhāvāḥ;* nom. pl. l. 103.
- [bh](*)a[ve]-:** P/Skt *bhāva-;* (case/number
uncertain) 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 2.
- bhavehi:** *bhāvehi, bhāvāiḥ;* instr. pl. l. 127.
- bhava-:** in [*a*](*)*didana*)[*g*](*)*d*](*)*a-*
[bh]()a[v](*)a, adida-bhava,*
*anagaḍa-bhava, (*a)[n](*)a[*g*](*)*d*-*
*(*a)-[bh](*)a[vo], ara[m]bana-bhava,*
aramiya-bhava, arahaḍa-bhava, grihi-
bhava, neraīya-bhava-, pacupana-
*bhava, para-bhava-, (*p)[r](*)ac-*
[up]()a[n](*)a-[bh](*)ava), ru[v](*)a-*
[bh]()ava, veśīa-bhavo, sarva-bhava,*
sva-bhava-.
- bhavati:** see s.v. *√bhū.*
- bhavita:** see s.v. *√bhū.*
- bhavedi:** see s.v. *√bhū.*
- bhūḍatva-:** “creaturehood,” n.
bhūḍatva: *bhūtattam, bhūtattvam;* nom. sg.

ll. 88, 92 *bh[u]datv(*a)*.
bhūdatve: *bhūtattam, bhūtattvam*; nom. sg. l. 84.
√bhū: “is, be, become, there is.”
bhavati: *bhavanti/honti, bhavanti*; “they become,” pres. 3rd pl. l. 96.
bhavita: *bhavitvā, bhūtvā*; “having been,” abs. l. 125 [2x].
bhavedi: *bhāveti, bhāvayati*; “one cultivates,” 3rd sg. caus. pres. ll. 48 [*bhavedi*], 50.
bhodi: *bhavati/hoti, bhavati*; “it/one is, becomes,” 3rd sg. pres. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 4; 51D(r) l. 5 [2x]; ll. 17 [*bho*](**di*), 35, 38, 54 *bh(*o)di*, 65, 66, 124 [2x], 125 [*bhodi*], 125 [*bho*](**d*)[*i*], 131, 133 *bho[di]*; 51A–B(r) l. 6.
[bho]di: *bhavanti/honti, bhavanti*; “there are,” 3rd pl. pres. l. 131.
bhoṣa: *bhavatha/hotha, bhavatha*; “you are,” 2nd pl. pres. l. 90.
hode: *bhaveyya, bhavet*; “there would be,” 3rd sg. opt. l. 34.
bhodi: see s.v. **√bhū**.
bhoṣa: see s.v. **√bhū**.
-mago: “path,” m.; in *arya-mago*.
[ma]ḍa: see s.v. **√man**.
√man: “consider, hold.”
[ma]ḍa: *matam, matam*; “it is held,” pp., nom. sg. n. l. 19; 51jjjj l. 1.
ma[na]: see s.v. **puna**.
manaīḍanena: *manāyatanena, manaīyatanena*; “by means of the mental sense sphere,” (kdh.), instr. sg. n. (in sandhi combination *man(o)-aiḍana*) l. 119.
manuśa: *manusse, manuṣyān*; “human being,” acc. pl. m. l. 41.
mano-viñāna-: “mental perceptual consciousness,” (tp.), n.
mano-viñānaṣa: *manoviññāṇassa, manovijñānasya*; gen. sg. ll. 120

*[man](*o)[v](*i)[ñ](*a)[n](*a)[s](*a)*,
 121 [*manoviñāna*](**ṣa*).
mano-viñānena: *manoviññāṇena, manovijñānena*; instr. sg. l. 119; 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 4 [*ma*]noviñānena.
maranaṣa: *marāṇassa, marāṇasya*; “after death,” gen. sg. n. l. 53.
-mala: “garland,” f.; in **aguḍi-mala**.
maha-sarvastivaḍa: **mahāsabbatthivādā, *mahāsarvāstivādāḥ*; “Mahāsarvāstivādins,” P.N. (kdh.) nom. pl. m. (in sandhi combination *maha-sarv(a)-asti-vaḍa*) ll. 82, 82–83 *maha(*sarva)-[sti]vaḍa*; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 5–6, 7 *maha[sa](*)[v](*)[sti](*)vaḍa*.
me: P/Skt *me*; “of me,” 1st pers. pron. (enclitic form, oblique cases), gen. sg. l. 81.
metra-: “loving kindness,” f.
me[t](*)[r][a]: *mettā, mairā*; nom. sg. l. 25.
[metra]e: *mettānam, mairāyāḥ*; gen. sg. l. 25.
-moha: “delusion,” m.; in **a[di]ḍa-raga-doṣa-moha**.
ya-: “who, which,” rel. pron.
ya: *yo, yah*; nom. sg. m. ll. 20, 64.
ya: *yam, yad*; nom. sg. n. ll. 70, 86 [*ya*].
ya: P/Skt *yā*; nom. sg. f. l. 15.
ya: P/Skt *ye*; nom. pl. m. ll. 2, 115.
ya: *yam, yad*; acc. sg. n. l. 37.
ya: *yam, yad*; “that, since,” adv. l. 93.
‘yasa: *yassa, yasya*; gen. sg. n. ll. 22, 23 *yasa*, 24 [2x], 32 [*y*](**a*)*sa*, 33–34 *ya[s](*)a*.
[ya]smi: *yasmiṃ, yasmin*; loc. sg. m. l. 41.
ye: P/Skt *ye*; nom. pl. m. l. 69; 51C(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 3.
yena: P/Skt *yena*; instr. sg. m. 51cc(v); ll. 1, 7 *yen(*a)* (in sandhi combination *yen(a) eva*), 15 *yen(*a)* (in sandhi combination *yen(a) eva*).

- [yen](*a):** P/Skt *yena*; m./n. instr. sg. (gender uncertain) 51C+51F(r) l. 2.
- yena:** P/Skt *yena*; “since, when,” adv. 51D(r) l. 6; l. 55.
- [yo]:** P/Skt *yo*; nom. sg. m. 51D(v) l. 2.
- yo:** *yam*, *yad*; nom. sg. n. l. 5 [yo], 5.
- yat(*r)a:** *yatra/yattha*, *yatra*; “in which case, in the case of,” ind. l. 128 (corrected from *yata*).
- yadi/yidi:** “if,” ind.
- yadi:** P/Skt *yadi*; 51D(r) ll. 4, 5 [yadi]; ll. 5, 6, 12, 21, 38, 46, 54 *ya[di]*, 63 [yadi], 91, 96 [y](*)[di], 100, 104, 135 [yadi].
- yidi:** P/Skt *yadi*; 51A–B(v)+53A ll. 2 [yidi], 4 (*yi)[di], 4, 6; 51C+51F(r) l. 4 [yidi]; ll. 10 [yi]di, 12, 18 [yi]di, 30 y[i]di, 32 yi[di], 37 y[i]di, 43, 45, 49 [yi]di, 53, 57 yi[di], 58 [yidi], 59, 105, 122 y[i]di, 123, 124, 127 [yi](*)di, 130, 140; 51o000 l. 2; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4; 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3; 51D(v) l. 4 yi[di].
- yava:** *yāva*, *yāvāt*; “so long as, continuing on through,” adv. ll. 2, 80, 117, 128.
- ¹yasa:** see s.v. *ya-*.
- ²yasa:** “just as, insofar as, in which way,” ind.
- yasa:** P/Skt *yathā*; l. 77.
- yaśa:** P/Skt *yathā*; ll. 60, 62, 94.
- yaśa yaśa:** “in whatever way,” P/Skt *yathā yathā*; ll. 27, 34–35 *ya[śa]* [y](*)*śa*.
- [ya]smi:** see s.v. *ya-*.
- yidi:** see s.v. *yadi/yidi*.
- √yuj:** “apply.”
- yoyiḍava:** *yuñjitaḅam*, *yoktavyam*; “should be applied,” gdv., nom. sg. n. l. 80.
- ye:** see s.v. *ya-*.
- yena:** see s.v. *ya-*.
- yeneva:** see *yena* s.v. *ya-* (in sandhi combination *yen(a) eva*).
- yo:** see s.v. *ya-*.
- yo(a):** “connection,” m.; in *para-kadha-para-aiḍana-para-dhadu-yo(a)*.
- yoyiḍava:** see s.v. √yuj.
- raga-:** “lust,” m.; in (*a)vi[ḍ](*)a-[r](*)a[ḡ]-(*a)-, a[ḍi]ḍa-*raga-doṣa-moha*, *viḍa-raga-ruḷpa-* “material form,” n.
- ⟨*ru⟩[p](*)o:** *rūpaṃ*, *rūpam*; nom. sg. l. 129 (corrected from *j(*a)p(*o)*).
- ⟨*ru⟩po:** *rūpāni*, *rūpāni*; nom. pl. l. 127 (corrected from *japo*).
- ⟨*ru⟩poṃ:** *rūpaṃ*, *rūpam*; nom. sg. ll. 127 (corrected from *japoṃ*), 128.
- rupoṃ:** *rūpaṃ*, *rūpam*; acc. sg. 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 4.
- ruva:** *rūpaṃ*, *rūpam*; nom. sg. l. 131.
- ru[va]:** *rūpāni*, *rūpāni*; nom. pl. l. 131.
- ruvaśa:** *rūpassa*, *rūpasya*; gen. sg. 51C(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 2.
- rupino:** P/Skt *rūpī*; “consists of material form,” adj., nom. sg. m. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 4.
- ruva-:** see s.v. *rupa-*.
- ruva:** “form,” n.; in *eva-ruva*.
- ruvaiḍana-:** “material-form sense sphere,” (kdh.), n. (in sandhi combination *ruv(a)-aiḍana-*).
- ruvaiḍana:** *rūpāyatanam*, *rūpāyatanam*; nom. sg. l. 99.
- (*r)[u](*vaiḍana)-:** P/Skt *rūpāyatana-*; (case/number uncertain) 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] ll. 1–2.
- [r](*)u[v](*)a-[ca]khaḍana:** *rūpacakkhāyatanāni rūpacakṣurāyatanāni*; “the material-form sense sphere and the visual sense sphere,” (kdh.), nom. pl. n. ll. 96–97.
- ru[v](*)a-[bh](*)a):** *rūpabhāvo*, *rūpabhāvah*; “nature of material form,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. ll. 130–131.
- lakṣana:** *lakṣhaṇāni*, *lakṣaṇāni*; “characteristics,” nom. pl. n. l. 81.

latsadi: see s.v. $\sqrt{\text{labh}}$.

$\sqrt{\text{labh}}$: “obtain.”

latsadi: *lacchati, lapsyate*; “it obtains,” 3rd sg. fut. ll. 45, 46.

¹**va:** see s.v. ¹*eva*.

²**va:** P/Skt *vā*; “or,” ind. 51ff; ll. 31 [2x], 36 [2x], 81, 123.

$\sqrt{\text{vac}}$: “say.”

vatava-: “[it] should be said,” gdv.

vatava: *vattabbo, vaktavyah*; nom. sg. m. 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 5.

vatava: *vattabbaṃ, vaktavyam*; nom. sg. n. 51D(r) ll. 4, 5 (**va*)[*ta*](**va*); 51C+51F(r) l. 4; ll. 10 *vata*[*v*](**a*), 17, 18 [*vat*](**a*)[*v*](**a*), 19, 22 *va*[*t*](**a*)*va*, 24 *vata*[*v*](**a*), 46, 47 [2x], 58, 60, 70, 71 [3x], 76, 77 [*v*](**a*)*tava*, 77, 80–81 [*va*](**ta*)*v*(**a*), 84, 87 (**va*)[*t*](**a*)*va*, 87, 90–91 *vata*(**va*), 98 [2x], 100, 104, 105 *vata*[*va*], 118, 120 [*vatava*], 122 [*va*] *tava*, 123, 125, 128, 129, 132; 51G(v)[51ssss(v)] ll. 3, 5 [2x]; 51C(v) l. 4 [*va*](**tava*).

vatava: *vattabbā, vaktavyāḥ*; nom. pl. m. ll. 70, 121 *va*[*tav*](**a*).

vatava-: *vattabba-*, *vaktavya-*; nom. (number/gender uncertain) 51llll l. 1 [*v*](**atava*); 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 3 [*v*](**a*)*ta*[*v*](**a*).

vatave: *vattabbaṃ, vaktavyam*; nom. sg. n. l. 101.

vatu: *vattum, vaktum*; “to say,” inf. l. 66.

vuta: *vuttam, uktam*; “it has been said,” pp., nom. sg. n. ll. 34, 121 *v*[*u*] *ta*.

vaca: *vācā, vāc*; “speech,” nom. sg. f. l. 56.

vatava-: see s.v. $\sqrt{\text{vac}}$.

vatu: see s.v. $\sqrt{\text{vac}}$.

-vaśena: “due to the force,” m.; in *samagra-*

vaśena, samagri-vaśena.

vaśaga-: “year,” m.

vaśaga: *vassiko, varṣakah*; nom. sg. 51D(v) ll. 3 *va*[*ṣ*](**a*)*ga*, 4, 5.

vaśage: *vassiko, varṣakah*; nom. sg. ll. 72 [*v*](**a*)[*ṣ*](**ag*)*e*, 72.

vaśagehi: *vassikehi, varṣakaiḥ*; instr. pl. 51D(v) l. 4.

-vaśaga-: in (**anagada-vaśaga*)-[*s*](**a*)-[*mu*] *nagad*[*o*].

vašo: *vasso, varṣah*; “year,” nom. sg. m. 51D(v) l. 4.

-vaśa: “life,” m.; in [*abromi*]-*cia-vaśa, bramici-vaśa, bromi-cia-vaśa*.

vi: see s.v. *pi*.

vi + ava + $\sqrt{\text{hr}}$: “declare.”

voharadi: *voharati, vyavaharati*; “one declares,” 3rd sg. pres. l. 28.

vi + $\sqrt{\text{jñā}}$: “perceive.”

(**v*)[*i*](**ñi*)[*śadi*]: *vijānissati, vijñāsyati*; “one will perceive,” 3rd sg. fut. 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 3.

viñeadi: *vijāneyya, vijānīyāt*; “one should perceive,” 3rd sg. opt. 51G(v) [51ssss(v)] l. 4.

viñana-: “perceptual consciousness,” n.

viñana: *viññāṇaṃ, vijñānam*; nom. sg. l. 93.

viñanasa: *viññāṇassa, vijñānasya*; gen. sg. l. 93.

viñanena: *viññāṇena, vijñānena*; instr. sg. l. 118.

viñano: *viññāṇaṃ, vijñānam*; nom. sg. l. 128.

-viñana-: in *cakhu-viñana-, mano-viñana-*.

(**v*)[*i*](**ñi*)[*śadi*]: see s.v. **vi + $\sqrt{\text{jñā}}$** .

viñeadi: see s.v. **vi + $\sqrt{\text{jñā}}$** .

$\sqrt{\text{vid}}$: “know.”

vedidava: *veditabbaṃ, veditavyam*; “should be known,” gdv. nom. sg. n. ll. 118 [*vedid*](**ava*), 119 [*vedi*](**da*)[*v*](**a*).

- viḍa-raga-**: “freed from lust,” adj. (bv.).
viḍa-raga: P/Skt *vītarāgā*; nom. sg. f. 51A–B(r) l. 3.
vi[d](*)a-[r](*)a][g](*)ae: *vītarāgāya*, *vītarāgāyai*; dat. sg. f. 51A–B(r) l. 5.
-viroṣa: “contradiction,” m.; in *sutra-viroṣa*.
viriyena: *viriyena*, *vīryeṇa*; “by virtue of energy,” instr. sg. n. ll. 36 *viryen[a]*, 118 *vi[ry](*)e[n](*)a*; 510000 l. 2 *[viriy](*)ena*.
-vilakṣana: “distinguishing characteristics,” n.; in *nana-vilakṣana*.
vivaga-: “matured effect,” m.
vivaga: *vipāko*, *vipākaḥ*; nom. sg. 51D(r) ll. 1 *[viva]ga*, 1, 4 *[vi]vaga*, 5, 6 (**viva*)-*[g](*)a*; 51C+51F(r) l. 4, 4 *viva[ga]*; 51ee; 51ff *viva(*)ga*; ll. 12, 15 *vi[v]-(*)a)[g](*)a*, 20, 21, 22, 22 *vi[v](*)a-g(*)a*, 24 [2x], 32 [2x], 34, 51 *vi[v]-(*)a)[g](*)a*, 52 *v[i]vaga*, 55, 57.
vivaga: *vipākam*, *vipākam*; acc. sg. l. 35.
vi[v](*)a)[g](*)a-: P/Skt *vipāka-*; (case/number uncertain) 51hh.
vivagaṣa: *vipākassa*, *vipākasya*; gen. sg. l. 13.
vivagena: P/Skt *vipākena*; instr. sg. l. 61.
vivago: *vipāko*, *vipākaḥ*; nom. sg. ll. 3, 23.
-vivaga-: in *[adi]ḍa-vi]vaga*, *avivaka-vivaga-*, *voharo-vi]va]ga*.
vivagatva: *vipākattam*, *vipākatvam*; “state of being a matured effect,” nom. sg. n. 51D(r) ll. 3, 6 *viva[g](*)atva*.
vivaga-hedu: *vipākahetu*, *vipākahetuḥ*; “cause of maturation,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 3.
(*)viva]jaga: **vibhājako*, **vibhājakaḥ*/*vibhajakaḥ*; “distinguisher (?)” nom. sg. m. l. 82 (reconstruction tentative).
vi[vatas](*)a: *vivādassa*, *vivādasya*; “of dispute,” gen. sg. m. l. 26.
vivarjavaḍa: *vibhajjavādā*, *vibhajjavādāḥ*; “Vibhajjavādins (one who maintains distinctions),” P.N. (tp.), nom. pl. m. l. 90.
viharadī: see s.v. *vi* + *√hr*.
vi + *√hr*: “abide.”
viharadī: P/Skt *viharati*; “one abides,” 3rd sg. pres. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 3.
vuta: see s.v. *√vac*.
vuna: see s.v. *puna*.
[ved](*)a)[n](*)a: *vedanam*, *vedanām*; “feelings,” acc. sg. f. 51A–B(v)+53A l. 3.
vedidava: see s.v. *√vid*.
[v]eśia-bhavo: *vessabhāvo*, *vaiśyabhāvaḥ*; “mode of the merchant,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 74.
voharadī: see s.v. *vi* + *ava* + *√hr*.
voharo-vi]va]ga: *vohāravipākā*, *vyavahāravipākā*; “has conventional speech as its matured effect,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. f. l. 27.
śaka: *sakkā*, *śakyā*; “it is possible,” indecl. 51D(r) l. 3 *[ś](*)a)[k](*)a*; 51C+51F(r) ll. 2 (**śa*)ka, 4; ll. 36, 37 [2x], 38, 43, 65.
śatagara-: “aspect of tranquility,” (kdh.), m. (in sandhi combination *śat(a)-agara-*).
śatagare: *santākāro*, *śāntākāraḥ*; nom sg. l. 111.
śatagarena: *santākārena*, *śāntākāreṇa*; instr. sg. l. 111.
śadehi: *satehi*, *śataiḥ*; “one hundred,” instr. pl. n. ll. 86, 87 *śad[e]hi*.
ś(*)a)m(*)ae: *samāya*, *śamāya*; “tranquility,” dat. sg. m. l. 26 *[ś](*)a)[m](*)ae*.
śila: “moral conduct,” n.
śila: *sīlam*, *śīlam*; nom. sg. ll. 52–53 *śi[la]*; 51D(v) l. 6 (**śi*)[l](*)a).
śila-: *sīla-*, *śīla-*; (case/number uncertain) 51D(v) ll. 5, 6.
śuñāḍagara-: “aspect of voidness,” (kdh.), m. (in sandhi combination *śuñ(a)-aḍagara-*).
śu]ñā]ḍagara: *suññatākāro*, *śūnyatākāraḥ*; nom. sg. l. 111.
[ś]uñā]ḍagarena: *suññatākāreṇa*, *śūnyatākāreṇa*; instr. sg. l. 111.

ṣa-: *cha-*, *ṣaṣ-*; “six,” (case/number/gender uncertain) 51xxxx (reconstruction tentative).

ṣaṭhāi⟨*ḍa⟩na-ṭhida: *chaṭṭhāya⟨*ta⟩na-ṭṭhitam*, *ṣaṭhāya⟨*ta⟩na-sthitam*; “stationed in the sixth sense sphere,” adj. (tp.), nom. sg. n. (in sandhi combination *ṣaṭh(a)-ai⟨*ḍa⟩na-ṭhida*) l. 53.

ṣeṭha: *chaṭṭho*, *ṣaṣṭhaḥ*; “sixth,” adj., nom. sg. m. ll. 84 *ṣe[ṭha]*, 89 *ṣ[e]ṭha*, 91 *ṣ[e]ṭha*.

sa: see s.v. *ta-*.

ṣa: see s.v. *ta-*.

sakhaḍaṣa: see s.v. *sam* + √*kr*.

sagrahida: see s.v. *sam* + √*grah*.

-[sag](*ra)hida: “included within,” adj.; in *duḍaṣa-[a]yada[n]a-[sag](*ra)hida*.

-saca-: “truth,” n.; in *arya-saca-*.

sacagar[en](*a): *saccākāreṇa*, *satyākāreṇa*; “with the aspect of truth,” (kdh.), instr. sg. m. (in sandhi combination *sac(a)-agar[en](*a)*) ll. 111–112.

sañā: *saññā*, *saṃjñā*; “conception,” nom. sg. f. l. 27.

sata: see s.v. √*as*.

-satva: “sentient beings,” m.; in *sarva-satva*.

sada: see s.v. √*as*.

-s(*ad)[i]: “mindfulness,” f.; in *k(*a)y(*a)-s(*ad)[i]*.

sadha: *saddhiṃ*, *sārdham*; “together with,” adv. ll. 60, 61.

sapala-: “possessed of a fruit,” adj. (bv.).

sapala: *saphalam*, *saphalam*; nom. sg. n. ll. 57, 58 *[sapal](*a)*, 59 *ṣapala*, 59, 60, 60–61 *[s](*a)[p](*ala)*.

sapalo: *saphalam*, *saphalam*; nom. sg. n. ll. 4 *[so]palo*, 57 *[sapal]o*, 58.

sopala: *saphalam*, *saphalam*; nom. sg. n. l. 5.

[s](*o)[p](*a)lade: *saphalā*, *saphalāt*; abl. sg. n. l. 6.

samagra-vaśena: see s.v. *samagri-vaśena*.

samagri: “complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions],” f.

samagri: *sāmaggī*, *sāmagrī*; nom. sg. ll. 130, 134 *samag(*r)i*, 140 *[sa]mag[ri]*.

samagri: *sāmaggim*, *sāmagrīm*; acc. sg. ll. 45, 46.

samagri-vaśena: “due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions],” (tp.), m.

samagra-vaśena: *sāmaggīvasena*, *sāmagrīvaśena*; instr. sg. ll. 129 *[s](*a)mag[r](*a)vaśe[n](*a)*, 133.

samagri-v(*aśena): *sāmaggīvasena*, *sāmagrīvaśena*; instr. sg. l. 139.

sam + **anu** + **ā** + √**gam**: “accompany.”

samunagado: *samannāgato*, *samanvāgataḥ*; “accompanied,” pp., nom. sg. m. 51D(v) l. 5.

-samunagado: in *(*anagada-vaśaga)-[s](*a)[mu]nagad[o]*.

samavanaṣa: see s.v. *sam* + **ā** + √**pad**.

sa[ma]varjadi: see s.v. *sam* + **ā** + √**pad**.

samahe: P/Skt *samaye*; “time,” loc. sg. m. ll. 41, 42.

sam + **ā** + √**pad**: “gain.”

samavanaṣa: *samāpannassa*, *samāpannasya*; “has gained,” pp., gen. sg. m. l. 56.

sa[ma]varjadi: *samāpajjati*, *samāpadyate*; “one gains,” 3rd sg. pres. l. 55.

samunagado: see s.v. *sam* + **anu** + **ā** + √**gam**.

-samunagamo: “accompaniment,” m.; in *anagad(*a)-samunag[a]mo*.

samuṣana: *samavadhānaṃ*, *samavadhānam*; “concurrence,” nom. sg. n. l. 13.

same-praśana: *sammappadhānaṃ*, *samyakpradhānaṃ*; “right exertion,” (kdh). acc. sg. n. ll. 48 *[s](*a)[mepr](*a)[s](*a)-[n](*a)*, 49–50 *same(*pra)[s](*a)na*.

sam + √**kr**: “condition.”

aśakhaḍa-: “unconditioned,” pp. (*nañ* kdh.).

aśa[kha]ḍa: *asañkhato*, *asaṃskṛtaḥ*;

- nom. sg. m. l. 66.
aśakhadēna: *asāṅkhatena*,
asamskṛtena; instr. sg. n. l. 80.
-aśakhaḍa: in *adiḍanagaḍa-[p](*)r-*
[acup]()a[n](*)a[s](*)a[kh](*)a-*
[ḍ]()a*.
sakhaḍaṣa: *saṅkhatassa*, *saṃskṛtasya*; “of
a conditioned [factor],” pp. gen. sg. m.
l. 81.
sam + √*grah*: “included within.”
sagrahiḍa: *saṅgahitā*, *saṃgrhītāḥ*;
“included within,” pp., nom. pl. m.
ll. 69 *ṣagrahiḍa* (corrected from
aṣagrahiḍa), 115 *sagrahi[ḍa]*.
sam + √*jñā*: “conceive.”
sa[rja]nadi: *sañjānāti*, *saṃjānāti*; “one
conceives,” 3rd sg. pres. l. 28.
sam + √*bhid*: “confuse.”
aśabhina: *asambhinnā*, *asambhinnāḥ*; “not
confused,” pp. (*nañ* kdh.), nom. pl. m.
l. 70.
sa[rja]nadi: see s.v. **sam** + √*jñā*.
sarva-: “everything, every, all,” adj.
sarva: *sabbaṃ*, *sarvam*; nom. sg. n. ll. 69
[2x], 75, 81 [*sarva*], 84 (**sa*)[*rva*], 95,
97 [3x], 98 [*sa*]*rva*, 98 [*sarva*], 117
[*sa*]*rva*.
sarva: *sabbe*, *sarve*; nom. pl. m. 51jjjj l. 1
[2x] (reconstruction tentative); 51D(v)
l. 6 *sa[rva]*.
sarvam: *sabbaṃ*, *sarvam*; nom. sg. n. (in
sarvam asti) ll. 66–67 [*sar*](**vam*), 67
[2x], 67 *sarva[m]*, 68 [3x], 69 (**sar*-
[*v*](**a*)[*m*], 75 (**sar*)[*va*]*m*, 75, 82,
91 (**sa*)[*rva*]*m*, 98–99 *sarva*(**m*),
102 [*s*](**a*)*rvam*, 104, 106, 107, 109
sar[va]m; 51F(v)[51ssss(v)] l. 1 (**sar*-
[*v*](**a*)*m*.
sarvaṣa: *sabbassa*, *sarvaṣya*; gen. sg. n. l.
l. 106.
sarve: *sabbaṃ*, *sarvam*; nom. sg. n. ll. 101
[*s*](**ar*)[*ve*], 105 [*sa*]*rve*.
ṣarve: *sabbe*, *sarve*; nom. pl. m. ll. 114–115.
sarveṣu: *sabbesaṃ*, *sarveṣāṃ*; loc. pl. m. ll.
102 [*s*](**a*)*rveṣu*, 104, 105 *sarveṣ[u]*.
sarva-karanen(*a): *sabbakāraṇena*,
sarvakāraṇena; “through every reason,”
kdh. instr. sg. n. l. 67.
sarva-kala: *sabbakāle*, *sarvakāle*; “at all
times,” (kdh.), loc. sg. m. ll. 6, 67, 107.
sarvaga: *sabbagāni*, *sarvagāni*; “everywhere,”
adj., nom. pl. n. l. 103.
sarvagarena: *sabbākāreṇa*, *sarvākāreṇa*;
“with every aspect, with the aspect of
everything,” (kdh.), instr. sg. m. (in sandhi
combination *sarv(a)-agarena*) ll. 67, 109,
113.
sarvatra: *sabbattha*, *sarvatra*; “everywhere,”
ind. ll. 67, 98 *sarvat[r]a*, 100–101 [*sa*](**r*-
[*vat*](**ra*), 101 *sarva[t]*(**r*)*e*.
sarva-pracageha: *sabbappaccayehi*,
sarvapatyayaiḥ; “through all conditions,”
(kdh.) instr. pl. m. l. 68.
sarva-bhava-: “all modes, all natures” (kdh.), m.
sarva-bhave: *sabbabhāvā*, *sarvabhāvāḥ*;
nom. pl. l. 99.
sarva-bhaveha: *sabbabhāvehi*,
sarvabhāvaiḥ; instr. pl. l. 68.
sarva-satva: *sabbasattā*, *sarvasattvāḥ*; “all
sentient beings,” (kdh.), nom. pl. m. 51C(v)
[51ssss(v)] l. 3.
-sarvastivaḍa: “Sarvāstivādin,” P.N. (tp.), m.;
in *maha-sarvastivaḍa*.
sarva-heduha: *sabbahetūhi*, *sarvahetubhiḥ*;
“through all causes,” (kdh.), instr. pl. m.
l. 68.
sarvevadu: *sabbāvato*, *sarvāvataḥ*; “in
entirety,” adv. 51D(v) l. 6.
savivaga: *savipākaṃ*, *savipākam*; “possessed of
a matured effect,” adj. (bv.), nom. sg. n. l.
59, 59 *ṣavivaga*.
sutra-: “scripture,” n.
sutr[e]: *sutte*, *sūtre*; loc. sg. 51jjjj l. 1 (re-
construction tentative).
sutrehi: *suttehi*, *sūtraiḥ*; instr. pl. ll. 86, 87.

sutra-viroṣa: *suttavirodho, sūtravirodhaḥ;*

“contradiction of scripture,” (tp.), nom. sg. m. l. 56.

suhagar(*a): *sukhākāro, sukhākāraḥ;* “aspect of happiness,” (kdh.), nom. sg. m. (in sandhi combination *suh(a)-agar(*a)*) l. 112.

se: see s.v. *ta-*.

so: see s.v. *ta-*.

so: *su, svid;* “then (?),” ind. (with *ki*) ll. 55, 57.

sopala: see s.v. *sapala-*.

sva-: *sa-, sva-;* “self, intrinsic,” (function uncertain) 51A–B(v)+53A l. 5.

svago: *sako, svakaḥ;* “one’s own,” adj., nom. sg. m. l. 19.

-svago: in *akuśala-ka[ma-sva]go, k(*a)-ma-s[va]g(*o)*.

sva-bhava-: “intrinsic nature,” (kdh.), m.

sva-bhave: *sabhāvo, svabhāvaḥ;* nom. sg. l. 100.

[sva]-bhav[e]: *sabhāve, svabhāve;* loc. sg. l. 100.

-sva-bhava-: in *adi(*ḍatva)-(*sva)[bha]va, anagaḍatva-(*sva)[bha]va, pacupanatva-svabhava*.

ha: see s.v. *hi*.

[ha]ta: *handa, hanta;* “well then (!),” ind. l. 90.

√han: “kill.”

jatva: **hantvā/*jhatvā, hatvā;* “having killed,” abs., l. 41 (see commentary l. 41).

√hā: “abandon, reject.”

hina: “worsted, defeated,” P/Skt *hīnā;* pp., nom. sg. f. l. 50.

hi: “for, indeed,” ind.

ha: P/Skt *hi;* ll. 70 *[ha]*, 71 *[ha]*.

hi: P/Skt *hi;* ll. 17 *h[i]*, 26, 27 *[hi]*, 34, 40, 121; 51D(v) l. 5.

hina: see s.v. *√hā*.

hedu-: “cause,” m.

hedu: *hetuṃ, hetum;* acc. sg. ll. 1, 2.

[he]du[n](*a): *hetūnaṃ, hetūnām;* gen. pl. l. 27.

-hedu-: in *kama-heduo, vivaga-hedu, sarva-heduha*.

hedu-avinaśa(*do): *hetavināsā, hetvavināśāt;* “due to the non-destruction of the cause,” (tp.), abl. sg. m. 51D(r) ll. 4–5.

[h](*e)[d](*u)-[p](*a)[l](*a)-[p](*ra)ti:

hetuphalapatti, hetuphalaprāptiḥ;

“acquisition of fruits from causes,” (tp.), nom. sg. f. l. 7.

hema: *hemaṃ, hema;* “gold,” nom. sg. n. l. 60.

[he]m[u]kḥkṣa: **hemokkhāya/*hemokkāya, *hemokhāyām;* “in a gold cauldron or crucible,” (tp.), loc. sg. f. (in sandhi combination *[he]m(a)-[u]kḥkṣa*) l. 60 (reconstruction tentative).

hode: see s.v. *√bhū*.