Manicheans

Written by Pierre Bayle

Transcribed and translated in a critical edition by Oliver Lohrentz

Introduction

This text comes from Historical and Critical Dictionary, by Pierre Bayle. This book is essentially an encyclopedia, and Manicheans is one of the entries, the following text is a footnote in the entry on Manicheans. The Manicheans were followers of Manichaeism, which was a religious group led by the Persian prophet Mani in the 3rd century AD. The Manicheans were a christian sect that believed that Mani was another prophet in a long line of successive prophets, beginning with Adam and including Buddha and Jesus. They believed in one god and one devil, and thus were a dualistic christian religion. Despite being all but driven to extinction in the 6th century, believers remained, and their influence sparked neo-Manichaeist sects such as the Paulicans or Cathari in France. As a result of this, they remained an example of a heretical Christian sect in France in Bayle’s time.

        This footnote in Bayle’s entry on the Manicheans is a very interesting example of pre-enlightenment revolutionary thinking. Hidden in the footnote of a little known entry of an encyclopedia, Bayle wrote a logical argument that tried to disprove many of the tenants of the Catholic church, but did so under a very specific and disarming guise. He said that though the Manicheans were clearly heretical and wrong, a pagan philosopher more skilled in debate would have polytheistic ideas that would be hard to disprove. He frames this as a theoretical argument between two historical philosophers; Melissus, a monotheist, and Zoroaster, a polytheist.

        I used the primary source text of the entry on Manicheans found in Gallica, and from there I transcribed exactly what was written into my transcribed version. All of the old French spelling and grammar is exactly the same in my transcribed version as it was in the original, and I tried to keep my transcription as direct and accurate as possible. In my translation, I tried to do the entire translation myself. I speak French and Italian, and so I managed to accurately translate most of the French and Italian that was written in this text, but I had to use other sources to translate the Latin. In the few moments where I could translate the text, but the meaning was harder to discern, I turned to an English translation of the text that already exists. In my translated version, I changed around some of the syntax and diction to make it more comprehensible to the modern reader. In the footnote that I used as my text, there were further sub-footnotes which I transcribed, but kept in the original French and did not translate to English because they were mostly references to other entries in Historical and Critical Dictionary.

Main Text

Transcribed version

        (page 529) (D) …Difficile à refuter soutenu par des Philosophes Payens.] Par les raisons à priori ils auroient été bien tôt mis en suite; les raisons à posteriori etoient leur fort: c’étoit là qu’ils se pouvoient batre long tems, & qu’il étoit difficile de les forcer. On m’entendra mieux par l’exposition que l’on va lire. Les idées le plus sûres & les plus claires de l’ordre nous aprenent qu’un être qui existe par lui’méme, qui est necessaire, qui est éternel, doit être unique infini, tout-puissant, & doüé de toutes fortes de perfections. Ainsi en consultant ces idées, on ne trouve rien de plus absurde que l’hypothese de deux Principes éternels, & independans l’un de l’autre, dont l’un n’ait aucune bonté, & puisse arrêter les desseins de l’autre. Voila ce que j’apelle raisons à priori. Elles nous conduisent necessairement à rejeter cette hypothese, & à n’admettre qu’un Principe de toutes choses. S’il ne faloit que cela pour la bonté d’un systême, le procés seroit vuidé à la confusion de Zoroastre, & de tous ses sectateurs; mais il n’y a point de systême qui pour être bon n’ait besoin de ces deux choses, l’une que les idées en soient distinctes, l’autre qu’il puisse donner raison des experiences. Il faut donc voir si les phenomenes de la nature, se peuvent commodément expliquer par l’hypothese d’un seul Principe. Quand les Manichéens nous alleguent que puis qu’on voit dans le monde plusiers choses qui font contraires les unes aux autres (g), le froid, & le chaud; le blanc, & le noir; la lumiere, & les tenebres; il y a necessairement deux premiers Principes, ils font pitié. L’opposition qui se trouve entre ces êtres, fortifiée tant qu’on voudra par ce qu’on appelle variations, desordres, irregularitez de la nature, ne fauroit faire la moitié d’une objection contre l’unité, la simplicité & l’immutabilité de Dieu. On donne raison de toutes ces choses ou par les diverses facultez que Dieu a données aux corps, ou par les loix du mouvement qu’il a établies, ou par le concours des causes ocasionnelles intelligentes, sur lesquelles il lui a plu de se regler. Cela ne demande pas les quintessences que les Rabins ont imaginées, & qui ont fourni à un Evêque d’Italie un argument ad hominem (h), en faveur de l’Incarnation. Ils disent que Dieu s’est uni avec dix Intelligences très-pures nommées Sefirà, & qu’il opere avec elles de telle forte, qu’il faut leur attribuër toutes les variations, & toutes les imperfections de effets. Attribuendosi à Dio ne’ sacri libri atti frà se contrarii e imperfetti, per salvare l’immutabilità e sua somma perfettione, hanno posto una Gerarchia di dieci Intelligenze purissime, per mezo della quali, come istrumenti della sua potenza, egli opera tutte le cose, ma in modo che à loro sole s’attribuisce ogni varieta, imperfettione, e mutation (i). Sans se mettre en tant de frais, on peut sauver de Dieu: le seul établissement de causes occasionnelles y suffit, pourvenu que l’on n’ait à expliquer que les phenomes corporels, & que l’on ne touche point à l’homme. Les cieux & youy le reste de l’univers prêchent la gloire, la puissance, l’unité de Dieu: l’homme seul, ce chef d’œuvre de son Createur entre les choses visibles, l’homme seul, dis-je, fournit de très-grandes objections contre l’unité de Dieu. Voici comment.

        L’homme est mechant & malheureux: chacun le conoît par ce qui se passe au dedans de lui, & par le commerce qu’il est obligé d’avoir avec son prochain. Il suffit de vivre 5. ou 6. ans (k) pour être parfaitement convaincu de ces deaux articles; ceux qui vivent beaucoup, & qui font fort engagez dans les affaires, conoissent cela encore plus clairement. Les voyages sont des leçons perpetuelles làdessus; ils font voir par tout les momumens (l) du malheur & de la mechanceté de l’homme; par tout des prisons, & des hôpitaux, par tout des gibets (page 530) & des mendians. Vous voyez ici les debris d’une ville floriffante, (a) ailleurs vous n’en pouvez pas même trouver les ruines, jam seges est ubi Troja suit. Les gens d’étude sans sortir de leur cabinet, sont ceux qui aquierent le plus de lumieres sur ces deux articles, parce qu’en lisant l’Histoire ils sont passer en revuë tous les siecles & tout les païs du monde. L’Histoire n’est à proprement parler qu’un recueil des crimes, & des infortunes du genre humain; mais remarquons que ces deux maux, l’un moral & l’autre physique, n’occupent pas toute l’histoire, ni toute l’experience des particuliers; on trouve par tout & du bien moral & du bien physique; quelques exemples de vertu, quelques exemples du bonheur; & c’est ce qui fait la difficulté. Car s’il n’y avoir que des mechans & de malheureux, il ne faudroit pas recourir à ‘hypothese des deux Principes; c’est le mêlange du bonheur & de la vertu avec la misere & avec le vice, qui demande cette hypothese, c’est là que se trouve le fort de la secte de Zoroastre. Voyez le raisonnement de Platon & de Plutarch dans les passages que j’ai citez ci-dessus.

        Afin que l’on voye combien il seroit difficile de refuter ce faux systême, & qu’on en concluë qu’il faut recourir aux lumieres de la revelation pour le ruiner, seignons ici une dispute entre Melissus & Zoroastre. Ils étoient tous deux Payens, & grans Philosophes. Melissus qui ne reconoissoit qu’un (b) Principe diroit d’abord, que  son systême s’accorde admirablement avec les idées de l’ordre: l’être necessaire n’est point borné, il est donc infini, & tout-puissant, il est donc unique, & ce seroit une chose monstrueuse & contradictoire s’il n’avoit pas de la bonté, & s’il avoir le plus grand de tous les vices, savoir une malice essentielle. Je vous avoüe, lui repondroit Zoroastre, que vos idées sont bien suives, & je veux bien vous avoüer qu’à cet égard vos hypotheses surpassent les miennes: je renonce à une objection dont je me pourrois prevaloir, qui seroit de dire que l’infini devant comprendre tout ce qu’il y a de realitez, & la (c) malice n’étant pas moins un être réel que la bonté, l’univers demande qu’il y ait des être mechans & des êtres bons, & que comme la souveraine bonté, & la souveraine malice ne percent pas subsister dans un seul sujet, il a falu necessairement qu’il y eût dans la nature des choses un être essentiellement bon, & un autre essentiellement mauvais; je renonce, dis-je, à cette objection (d), je vous donne l’avantage d’être plus conforme que moi aux notions de l’ordre: mais expliquez moi un peu par vôtre hypothese d’où vient que l’homme est mechant, & si sujet à la douleur & au chagrin. Je vous defie de trouver dans vos principes la raison de ce phénomène, comme je la trouve dans les miens; je regagne donc l’avantage; vous me surpassez dands la beauté des idées, & dans les raisons à priori, & je vous surpasse dans l’explication des phenomenes, & dans les raisons à posteriori. Et puis que le principal caractere d’un bon systême est d’être capable de donner raison des experiences, & que la seule incapacité de les expliquer est une preuve qu’une hypothese n’est point bonne, quelque belle qu’elle paroisse d’ailleurs, demeruez d’accord que je frape au but en admettant deux Principes, & que vous n’y frapez pas, vous qu n’en admettez qu’un.

        Nous voici sans doute au neud de toute l’affaire: c’est ici la grande occasion pour Melissus, Hic Rhodus, hic saltus. Res ad triarios rediit. Nunc animis apus Ænea, nunc pectore firmo. Continuons de faire parler Zoroastre.

        Si l’homme est l’ouvrage d’un seul Principe souverainement bon, souverainement saint, souverainement puissant, puit-il être exposé aux maladies, au froid, au chaud, à la soif, à la douleur, au chagrin? Peut-il avoir tant de mauvaises inclinations? Peut-il commettre tant de crimes? La souveraine sainteté peut-elle produire une creature criminelle? La souveraine bonté peut-elle produire une creature malherueuse? La souveraine puissance, jointe à une bonté infinie, ne comblera-t’elle pas de biens son ouvrage, & n’éloignera-t’elle point tout ce qui le pourroit offenser, ou chagriner? Si Melissus consulate les notions de l’order, il repondra que l’homme n’étoit point mechant lors que Dieu le fit. Il dira que l’homme reçut de Dieu un état heureux, mais que n’ayant point suivi le lumieres de la conscience, qui selon l’intention de son Auteur le devoient conduire par le chemin de la vertu, il est devenu mechant, & qu’il a merité que Dieu souverainement bon, lui fit sentir les effets de sa colere. Ce n’est donc point Dieu qui est la cause du mal moral, mais il est la cause du mal physique, c’est-à-dire de la punition du mal moral: punition qui bien loin d’être incompatible avec le Principe souverainement bon emane necessairement de l’un de ses attributs, je veux dire de sa justice qui ne lui est pas moins essentielle que sa bonté. Cette reponse, la plus raisonnable que Melissus puisse faire, est au fond belle & solide, mais elle peut être combatuė par des raisons qui ont quelque chose de plus specieux, & de plus éblouïssant: car Zoroastre ne manqueroit pas de representer, que si l’homme étoit l’ouvrage d’un Principe infiniment bon & saint, il auroit été creé non seulement sans aucun mal actuel, mais aussi sans aucune inclination au mal; puis que cette inclination est un defaut qui ne peut pas avoir pour cause un tel Principe. Il reste donce que l’on dise que l’homme sortant des mains de son Createur, avoir seulement la force de se determiner de lui-même au mal, & que s’y étant determiné, il est seul la cause du crime qu’il a commis, & du mal moral qui s’est introdiduit dans l’univers. Mais I. nous n’avons aucune idée distincte qui puisse nous faire comprendre, qu’un être qui n’existe point par lui-même, agisse pourtant par lui même. Zoroastre dira donc que le libre arbitre donné à l’homme, n’est point capable de se donner une (page 531) determination actuelle, puis qu’il existe incessamment & totalement par l’action de Dieu. 2. Il sera cette question, Dieu a-t-il prevu que l’homme se serviroit mal de son franc arbitre? Si l’on repond qu’ouï, il repliquera qu’il ne paroît point possible qu’aucune chose prevoye ce qui depend uniquement d’une cause indeterminée. Mais je veux bien vous accorder, dira-t’il, que Dieu a prevu le peché de sa creature, & j’en conclus qu’il l’eût empêchée de pecher; car les idées de l’ordre ne soufrent pas qu’une cause infiniment bonne & sainte, qui peut empêcher l’introduction du mal moral, ne l’empêche pas, lors sur tout qu’en la permettannt, elle se verra obligée d’accabler de peines son propre ouvrage. Si Dieu n’a point prevu la chute de l’homme, il a du moins jugé qu’elle étoit possible: puis donc qu’au cas qu’elle arrivât il se voyoit obligé de renoncer à sa bonté paternelle, pour rendre ses enfans très miserables, en exerçant sur eux la qualité d’un Juge severe, il auroit determiné l’homme au bien moral, comme il l’a determiné au bien physique: il n’auroit laissé dans l’ame de l’homme aucune sorce pour se porter au peché; non plus qu’il n’y en a laissé aucune pour se porter au malheur, entant que malheur. Voilà à quoi nous conduisent les idées claires & distinctes de l’ordre, quand nous suivons pied à pied ce que doit faire un Principe infiniment bon. Car si une bonté aussi bornée que celle des peres exige necessairement qu’ils previennent autant qu’il leur est possible le mauvais usage que leurs enfans pourroient faire des biens qu’ils leur donnent, à plus forte raison une bonté infinie & toute-puissante, previendra-t’elle les mauvais effets de ses presens. Au lieu de donner le franc arbitre, elle determinera au bien ses creatures; ou si elle leur donne le franc arbitre, elle veillera toûjours efficacement pour empêcher qu’elles ne pechent. Je croi bien que Melissus ne demeureroit point court, mais tout ce qu’il poirroit repondre seroit combatu tout aussi-tôt par des raisons aussi plausibles que les siennes & ainsi la dispute ne seroit jamais terminée (a).

        S’il recouroit à la voye de la retorsion, il embarrasseroit beaucoup Zoroastre; mais en lui accordant une fois ses deux Principes, il lui laisseroit un chemin fort large pour arriver au denouëment de l’origine du mal. Zoroastre remonteroit au tems du Chaos: c’est un état à l’égard de ses deux Principes, fort semblable à celui que Thomas Hobbes apelle l’état de nature, & qu’il supose avoir precedé l’établissement des societez. Dans cet état de nature l’homme étoit un loup à l’homme; tout étoit au premier occupant; personne n’étoit maître de rien qu’en cas qu’il fût le plus fort. Pour sortir de cet abîme chacun convint de quitter ses droits sur tout, afin qu’on lui cedât la proprieté de quelque chose; on fit des transactions; la guerre cella. Les deux Principes las du Chaos, où chacun confondoit & bouleversoit ce que l’autre vouloit faire, convinrent de s’accorder chacun ceda quelque chose; chacun eut part à la production de l’homme, & (b) aux loix de l’union de l’ame. Le bon Principe obtint celles qui procurent à l’homme mille plaisirs, & consentit à celles qui exposent l’homme à mille douleurs; & s’il consentit que le bien moral fût infiniment plus petit dans le genre humain que le mal moral, il se dedommagea sur quelque autre espece de creatures, où le vice seroit d’autant moindre que la vertu. Si plusieurs hommes dans cette vie ont plus de miseres que de bonheur, on recompense cela sous un autre état; ce qu’ils n’ont pas sous la forme humaine, ils le retrouvent sous une autre forme (c). Au moyen de cet accord le Chaos se debrouilla; le Chaos, dis-je, principe passis, qui étoit le champ de bataille des deux Principes actifs. Les Poëtes (d) ont representé ce debrouillement sous l’image d’une querelle terminée. Voilà ce que Zoroastre pourroit alleguer, se glorifiant de ne pas attribuer au bon Principe, d’avoir produit de son plein gré un ouvrage qui devoir être si mechant & si miserable; mais seulement après avoir éprouvé qu’il ne pouvoir faire mieux, ni s’opposer mieux aux desseins horribles du mauvais Principe. Pour rendre son hypothese moins choquante, il pouvoit nier qu’il y ait eu une longue guerre entre les deux Principes, & chasser tous ces combats, * ces prisonniers dont les Manichéens ont parlé. Tout se peut reduire à la conossance certaine que les deux Principes auroient euë, que l’un ne pourroit jamais obtenir de l’autre que telles & telles conditions. L’accord auroit pu se faire éternellement sur ce pied-là.

        On pourroit objecter à ce Philosophe mille grandes difficultez; mais comme il trouveroit des reponses, & qu’après tout il demanderoit qu’on lui fournit donc une meilleure hypothese, & qu’il pretendroit avoir refuté solidement celle de Melissus, on ne le rameneroit jamais au point de la verité. La raison humaine est trop soible pour celal c’est un principe de destruction, & non pas d’édification; elle n’est propre qu’à former des doutes, & à se tourner à droite & à gauche pour éterniser une dispute; & je ne croi pas me tromper, si je dis de la revelation naturelle, c’est-à-dire des lumieres de la raison, ce que les Theologiens disent de l’œconomie Mosaïque. Ils disent qu’elle n’étoit propre qu’à faire conoître à l’homme son impuissance, & la necessité d’un Redempteur, & d’une loi misericordieuse. Elle étoit un pedagogue (ce sont leur termes) pour nous amener à JESUS-CHRIST. Disons à-peu-près le même de la raison; elle n’est propre qu’à faire conoître à l’homme ses tenebres & son impuissance, & la necessité d’une autre revelation. C’est celle de l’Ecriture. C’est là que nous trouvons de quoi refuter invinciblement l’hypothese des deux Principes, & toutes les objections de Zoroastre. Nous y trouvons l’unité de Dieu, & ses perfections infinies; la chute du premier homme, & ce qui s’ensuit. Qu’on nous vienne dire avec un grand appareil de raisonnement, qu’il n’est pas possible que le mal moral s’introduise dans le monde, par l’ouvrage d’un Principe infiniment bon & saint, nous repondrons que cela s’est est pourtant saint, & par consequent que cela est très-possible. Il n’y a rien de plus insensé que de raisonner contre des faits: (page 532) l’axiôme ab actu ad potentiam valet consequentia, est aussi clair que cette proposition 2. & 2. sont 4. Les Manichéens s’aperçurent de ce que je viens de remarquer; c’est pour cela qu’ils rejetterent le Vieux Testament; mais ce qu’ils retiennent de l’Ecriture, fournissoit d’assez fortes armes aux Orthodoxes: ainsi on n’eut pas beaucoup de peine à confondre ces heretiques, qui d’ailleurs s’embarassoient puerilement lors qu’ils descendoient dans le (*) detail. Or puis que c’est l’Ecriture qui nous fournit les meilleures solutions, je n’ai pas eu tort de dire qu’un Philosophe Payan seroit mal aisé à vaincre sur cette matiere. C’est le texte de cette remarque.

        Quelque longue qu’elle soit, je ne la finirai pas sans avertir mon lecteur qu’il me reste encore 3. observations à faire, que je renvoye à un autre (a) article. Je dirai dans la I. si les Peres ont toûjours bien raisonné contre les Manichéens, & s’ils ont pu les pousser à bout; & dans la 2. que selon les dogmes du Paganisme, les objections de Zoroastre n’avoient pas beaucoup de force; & dans la 3. en quel sens on pourroit dire que les Chretiens ne rejettent pas le systême des deux Principes. Ils ont entre’eux des disputes sur la liberté, dans lesquelles l’aggresseur (✝) semble être toûjours le plus fort; & parce aussi que le petit nombre de predestinez, & l’éternité de l’Enfer fournissent des objections que Melissus n’auroit pas fort redoutées.

Footnotes

(page 529)

(g) Voyez St. Epiphane quand il parle de Scythianus, pag. 619. adv. Hares.

(h) Di questa unione parla diffusamente l’Autore, portanda gli esempi e le similitudini, con cui la spiegano i Rabbini (alcune delle quale sono le medesime che adoprano i nostri Teologi per esplicar l’Incarnatione) e con le stesse loro dottrine prova evindentemente ch’ella non sia altro che un insefiratione, cioe due nature se fireita, e Divinita insieme in un supposto. Joseph Ciantes Evêque de Marsique, in diseursu de sanctissima incarnatione clarissimis Hebraorum doctrinis ab eorumdem argumentorum oppositionibus defensa, dan le journal d’Italie du 27, Août 1668. pag. 102.

(i) Le journal d’Italie ibid. pag. 101.

(k) A cet âge-là on a fait et on a souffert des tours de malice: on a eu du chagrin et de la douleur: on a bondé plusiers fois.

(l) Ex Afia rediens, cum ab Ægina Megaram versus navigarem cœpi regiones circumcirca prospicere. Post me erat Ægina, ante Megara, dextra Piræus, sinistra Corinthus: quæ oppida quodam tempore florentissima fuerunt, nunc prostrata & diruta ante oculos jacent. Sulpicius ad Ciceron. epist. 5. l. 4. Cicer. ad famil.

(page 530)

(a) Voyez l’entretien 30. De Balzac.

(b) Voyez Diogene Laërce l. 9. n. 24. du ibi Menagium.

(c) C’est-à dire l’action malieieuse. Je fais cette note afin qu’on ne vienne pas m’alleguer que le mal n’est qu’une privation.

(d) J’au lu dans le Journal d’Italie du 31. Août 1674. pag. 101. Que Piccinardi dans le 3. Livre de sa Dogmatica Philosophia Peripatetica Christiana, refute la these, An alius Deus fit possibilis soutenuë par le Pere Pierre Conti contre le Columera.

(page 531)

(a) Tout ceci est plus amplement discuté dans les remarques de l’article Pauliciens.

(b) Apliquez ici ce que Junon dit à Venus: Sed quis erit modus aut quo nunc certamine tanto? Quin potius pacem æternam paεtosque hymenæos Exercemus>... Communem huncergo populum, paribus-que regamus Auspiciis. Virgil. Æn. l. 4. v. 98.

(c) Notez que tout ceux ou la plûpart de ceux qui ont admis deux Principes, ont tenu la metempsy chose.

(d) Hane Deus & melior LITEM natura diremit. Ovidius Metam. lib. 1.

(page 532)

(*) Voyez la remarque B.

(a) A celui des Pauliciens.

(✝) Voyez la remarque penultiéme de l’article Marcionites

Translated version

        (D) …Difficult to refute under pagan philosophers.] By à priori arguments they would have been defeated; their strengths were à posteriori arguments^[1]. It was with these that they could argue for a long time, and it would have been difficult to defeat. You will understand me better with the exposition you will read. The most pure and clear ideas teach us that a being exists by itself, who is necessary, who is eternal, who must be infinite, all powerful, and with every perfection. By consulting these ideas, you find no more absurd idea than the hypothesis of two principles, eternal and independent of each other, one which has no goodness, and can stop the plans of the other. These are what I call à priori arguments. They lead us necessarily to reject this hypothesis, and to only allow one principle for everything. If only this were necessary for the goodness of a system, the argument would be over, to the confusions of Zoroaster, and all his followers; but there is no good system that does not need two things, the first being that the ideas be distinct, the other being that it can explain experiences. It is thus necessary to see if natural phenomena can be explained by the hypothesis of one principle. When the Manicheans allege that you can see many things in the world that are contrary to one another - cold and heat, black and white, light and darkness - two principles are necessary, they say pitifully. The opposition that you find between these beings, strengthened as much as you want by what you call variations, disorders, irregularities of nature, must not make half an objection against the unity, simplicity, and immutability of god. You can explain all these things either by the diverse faculties that god gave to bodies, or by the law of motion that he established, or by the showing of occasional intelligent causes, about which he is pleased to regulate himself. This does not require the essence that the Rabbis imagined, who have supplied to an Italian bishop an ad hominem (h) argument, in favor of the incarnation. They say that god is plain with ten pure intelligences named Sefirà, and that he operates strongly with them in such a way that he must attribute all variations and imperfections to them. “By attributing to god the contrary and imperfect acts in the holy books, to salvage his immutability and perfection, they have placed a hierarchy of ten pure intelligences, for half of which, as instruments of his power, he operates everything, but in such a way that they attribute only to him all variety, imperfection, and change” (Originally in Italian) (i). Without going to this extent, you can explain the ways of god: the establishing of only occasional causes suffice, provided that you only must explain physical phenomena, and not that which concerns mankind. The heavens and universe preach the glory, power, and unity of god: man alone, this masterpiece of the creator among visible things, man alone, I say, embodies great objections to the unity of god. Here is how.

        Man is mean and sad: each knows this from what happens inside themselves, and from trade he needs to continue with those around him. He must only live 5 or 6 years (k) to be convinced of these two articles; Those who live long, and who are strongly involved in affairs, know this again more clearly. Travels are perpetual lessons of this; you can see everywhere all the monuments to the sadness and malice of man; in all prisons, hospitals, gallows, and beggars. You see here the pieces of a flourishing city, elsewhere you cannot even find ruins, jam seges est ubi Troja suit (The harvest is already where Troy stood). Educated men who never leave their office, these are who find enlightenment in these two articles, because by reading history they are watching all eras and lands pass. History, properly speaking, is only a collection of the crimes and misfortunes of humanity; but let us remark that these two evils, one moral and the other physical, do not take up all of history and all experience, you find everywhere moral and physical goodness; some examples of virtue, some examples of happiness, and it is this that creates difficulties. Because if there were only meanness and misery, there would be no need to employ the hypothesis of two principles; it is the mix of happiness and virtue with misery and vice, that necessitates this hypothesis, it is there that you find the strength of Zoroaster. See the reasoning of Plato and Plutarch in the passages that I have cited below.

        In order to see how it would be difficult to refute this false system, let us conclude that you must employ the light of revelation to ruin it, let us imagine here a dispute between Melissus and Zoroaster^[2]. They were both pagans, and great philosophers. Melissus, who only recognized one (b) principle, first would say that his system agrees admirably with the ideas of order: The necessary being is not bounded, he is thus infinite and all powerful, he is thus unique, and it would be a horrible and contradictory thing  if he did not have goodness, and if he had the greatest of all vices, to know an essential malice. I confess to you, Zoroaster would respond, that your ideas are well thought out, and I would again confess that in this regard your hypotheses mine: I renounce an objection that I could impose, which would be to say that the infinity should encompass all reality, and malice is not less real than goodness, the universe demands that there are bad beings and good beings, and just as supreme goodness and supreme malice cannot subsist in a single object, it in necessary that there is in the nature of things an essentially good being and another essentially bad; I renounce, I say, this objection (d), I give you the advantage of being more true than I to the notions of order: but explain to me a little by your hypothesis where man’s meanness comes from, and how man is subject to pain and sadness. I defy you to find in your principles the reason behind this phenomenon, such as I find in mine; I thus retake the advantage; you surpass me in the beauty of your ideas, and in à priori reasoning, and I surpass you in the explanation of phenomena and in à posteriori reasoning. And since the most important characteristic of a good system is to be able to explain experiences, and since only being incapable of explanation is proof that a hypothesis is not good, however beautiful it appears otherwise, you must agree that I hit my goal by admitting two principles, and that you did not hit yours by admitting only one.

        We are here without doubt to the point of the whole affair: It is here that the big opportunity for Melissus. Hic Rhodus, hic saltus. Res ad triarios rediit. Nunc animis apus Ænea, nunc pectore firmo (Rhodes is here, this is where you jump. The matter returned to the triaries. Æneas now with a bee's mind, now with a firm breast)^[3]. We now continue to let Zoroaster speak.

        If man is the work of a sole supremely good principle, supremely holy and supremely powerful, can he be exposed to sickness, cold, heat, thirst, pain, and sadness? Can he have so many negative inclinations? Can he commit so many crimes? Can the supreme holiness produce a criminal creature? Can the supreme goodness produce an unhappy creature? Would the supreme power, joined to an infinite goodness, not fill his works with good, and would he not take away entirely all that could offend and sadden? If Melissus consults the notions of order, he will answer that man was not mean when god created him. He will say that man received from god a happy state, but that having not followed the lights of conscience, which according to the intentions of his creator would make him follow the path of virtue, he became mean, and he thus deserved that supremely good god made him feel the effects of his anger. Then it is not god that is the cause of moral evil, but of physical evil, that is to say of the punishment of moral evil: punishment that far from being incompatible with the supremely good principle emanates  necessarily from one of his attributes, which I would say is his justice, which is not less essential than his goodness. This answer, the most reasonable that Melissus could make, is deep down good and solis, but it can be combated by arguments that are something more special, and more magnificent: since Zoroaster would not fail to represent, that if man was the work of an infinitely good and holy principal, he would have been created not solely without any actual evil, but also without any inclination to evil; since that inclination is a defect that cannot have this principal as cause. It remains to say that man leaves the hands of his creator, to have only the ability to determine his own evil, and that since it was determined, he alone is the cause of the crimes he committed, and is the moral evil that was introduced in the universe. But, 1) we have no distinct idea that could make people understand that a being that does not exist by himself, however, acts by himself. Zoroaster said thus that the arbitrary freedom given to man is not capable of giving actual self-determination, since it depends directly and totally on the will of god. 2) There would be this question, did god intend that man would badly serve him with this free will? If you respond yes, he will reply that it does not seem possible to foresee something that depends solely on an undetermined cause. But I would like to agree with you, he would say, that god foresaw the sin of his creature, and I conclude from this that he would have prevented sinning; since the ideas of order do not allow that an infinitely good and holy cause, that can prevent the introduction of immorality, do not prevent it, especially since by permitting it, he will see himself obliged to overwhelm his own creations with pain. If god did not foresee the fall of man, he at least judged that it was possible: thus since he arrived at the conclusion that he would be obligated to renounce his paternal goodness, to make his children miserable, by enacting upon them severe judgements, he would have guided man to morality, as he guided them to physical goodness: He would not have left in man’s soul any source of sin; no more than he would let himself be carried to misery. Here the clear and distinct ideas of order are what lead us, when we follow step by step what an infinitely good principle must do. Since if a goodness as limited as that of our fathers requires necessarily that he prevent his children as much as possible from the evil usage of the good that he gave them, more strongly will an infinite and all powerful goodness prevent the ill effects of its presence. In place of giving free will^[4], it would force its creatures to goodness; or if it gives them free will, it will always efficiently watch to prevent sin. I well believe that Melissus would not be cut short, but all that he would answer would be entirely combated immediately by reasons as plausible as his own and in this way the argument would never end (a).

        If he employed the view of retaliation, he would confuse Zoroaster greatly, but by granting him his two principles one time, he leaves him a wide path to arrive at the outcome of the origin of evil. Zoroaster would get back to the time of chaos: it is a state with regard to his two principles, strongly resembling that which Thomas Hobbes calls the state of nature, and he supposes to have preceded the establishment of society. In this state of nature man was a wolf to man; everything was with its first owner; no one was master of anything except for in the case of being the strongest. To leave this abyss everyone agreed to give up their rights to everything, so they would be ceded the ownership of something; they did transactions; the war stopped. The two principles tired of chaos, where everyone confused and disrupted what others wanted to do, admitted to agree to each give up something, each had a part in the production of man, and (b) in the laws of the union of the soul. The good principle obtained that which gave man a thousand pleasures, and consented to that which exposed man to a thousand pains; and if he consented that morality was infinitely scarcer in humanity than immorality, he compensated through some other species of creature, where vice was equally scarcer than virtue. If more men in this life have more misery than happiness, they compensate in another state; what they do not have in human form, they recapture in another form (c). At least by this agreement chaos unraveled; chaos, I say, a passive principle, that was the battlefield for the two active principles. The poets (d) represented this unraveling in the image of a ceased quarrel. Here is what Zoroaster could have alleged, priding himself to have not attributed to the good principle the producing with his full will a creation that must be so evil and miserable; but only after having proved that he could not do better, nor having better opposed the horrible designs of the evil principle. To make his hypothesis less shocking, could have denied that there was a long was between the two principles, and brush off all these fights, (*) these prisoners that the Manicheans spoke of. All of this could be reduced to the certain knowledge that the two principles would have had, that one could have never obtained from the other under such and such conditions. The agreement could have been made for eternity on this basis.

        You could object to this philosopher a thousand great difficulties; but as he would find answers, and then demand to be supplied with a better hypothesis, and then pretend to have solidly refuted those of Melissus, you would never be led to the truth. Human reason is too feeble for this, being the principle of destruction, and not of edification; it is only proper to form doubts, and to turn it right and left to prolong a dispute, and I do not believe to be mistaken, if I say of natural revelation, that is to say the lights of reason, what theologians say of the mosaic economy. They say that it was only proper to make man understand his weakness, and the necessity of a redeemer, and merciful law. It was a teaching (these are their terms) to bring us to jesus christ. We say more or less the same of reason; it is only proper to make known to man his blindness and helplessness, and the necessity of another revelation. The scripture is this. It is there that we find what invincibly refutes the hypothesis of the two principles, and all the objections of Zoroaster. We find there the unity of god, and his infinite perfection; the fall of the first man, and what follows. Let someone come to tell us, with a great system of arguments, that it is not possible that immorality introduces itself into the world by the work of an infinitely good and holy principle, we will respond that this is however true, and consequently that it is very possible. There is nothing more insensing than to argue against the facts: the axiom ab actu ad potentiam valet consequentia (from the fact that something exists, it follows that it is possible)^[5], is as clear as 2 plus 2 equals 4. The Manicheans noticed what I come to say, it is because of this that they reject the old testament; but what they retained of the scripture, supplied enough strength against the orthodox: In this way it was not very painful to confound these heretics, who, by the way, embarrassed themselves childishly when they descended into (*) details. Yet since the scripture furnished us with the best solutions, I was not wrong to say that a pagan philosopher would be not easy to defeat in this matter^[6]. That is the subject of this remark.

        However long it was, I will not finish it without warning my reader that there remains for me 3 observations to make, that I return to in another (a) item. I will say in the first if the fathers have always well argued against the Manicheans, and if they have been able to push them to the end; and in the second, that according to the dogmas of paganism, the objections of Zoroaster hadn’t much strength; and third, in which sense you could have said that the christians didn’t reject the system of two principles. They have between them disputes on liberty, in which the aggressor (✝) seems to be forever the strongest; and also because the small number of the predestined, and the eternity of hell furnishes objections that Melissus would have had no strong reason to worry.

Bibliography

Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706). Auteur du texte. “Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, Par Monsieur Bayle. Tome 3.” Gallica, Reinier Leers, Rotterdam, 1 Jan. 1697, gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k15120980/f7.item.

This is the primary source, the entry on Manicheans in the original French, as uploaded onto Gallica. I am going to use this as the basis of my project.

Bayle, Pierre. An Historical and Critical Dictionary. Printed for C. Harper and 12 Others, 1710.

This is a physical book, which I am checking out from the UW library system. It is a copy of ‘An Historical and Critical Dictionary’ by Pierre Bayle in english. I will be using this to check my translation.

Hickson, Michael W. “Theodicy and Toleration in Bayle’s Dictionary - Philpapers.” HICTAT, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2013, philpapers.org/archive/HICTAT.pdf.

This is a paper written on Bayles overall views on religion as shown in ‘An Historical and Critical Dictionary’. I will be using this paper to increase my knowledge of the overall arguments and thoughts that Bayle had while writing this work.

Hickson, Michael. “Pierre Bayle.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 12 Jan. 2023, plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayle/.

This is a brief history of Pierre Bayle. I will be using this text for background information on Bayle to show the influence that his life had on his work.

“Manichaeism.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 19 Oct. 2023, www.britannica.com/topic/Manichaeism.

This is a brief history of Manichaeism. I will be using it as background information.

Norton, David Fate. “Leibniz and Bayle: Manicheism and Dialectic.” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 Jan. 2008, muse.jhu.edu/article/229881/pdf.

This is an article written on the competing theories of Bayle and another author; Leibniz. I will be using this to better inform myself on the differing beliefs that were contrary to Bayle’s as expressed in Manicheans.