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Governing Water in India: Notes

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table of contents
  1. Title Page
  2. Copyright
  3. Contents
  4. List of Illustrations
  5. Preface and Acknowledgments
  6. List of Abbreviations
  7. Introduction
  8. Chapter 1. The Historical Formation of India’s Water Bureaucracy
  9. Chapter 2. The Regulatory Water State in Postliberalization India
  10. Chapter 3. The Political Economy of Federalism and the Politics of Interstate Water Negotiations
  11. Chapter 4. Regulatory Extraction, Inequality, and the Water Bureaucracy in Chennai
  12. Chapter 5. State, Class, and the Agency of Bureaucrats
  13. Conclusion
  14. Notes
  15. Works Cited
  16. Index

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

  1. Epigraphs: “Use MGNREGA Funds for Water Conservation—Modi,” Hindu, April 24, 2018, www.thehindu.com/news/national/use-mgnrega-funds-for-water-conservation-modi/article23659940.ece. “2019 Water India Expo,” Smart Cities Mission, New Delhi, India, accessed November 29, 2021, www.waterindia.com/about-us.aspx.

  2. 1   For a public example of this, consider, for instance, the iconic film Mother India.

  3. 2   For instance, India’s economic growth has been largely spurred on by the services sector and industries such as IT, while traditional sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing, have not fared as well.

  4. 3   Within the policy realm, the shift toward local governance was built into specific legislative frameworks that were designed to promote decentralization. The 1992 seventy-third and seventy-fourth constitutional amendments were specifically designed to strengthen both rural and urban governance in villages and small towns. Decentralization has had varying implications for restructuring state authority in postliberalization India. Such variations have been shaped by a range of factors, including the nature of local state governments, local political contexts, societal dynamics and elite capture, and the institutional capacity of local governments (see Manor 2016; S. Singh 2016; Singh and Sharma 2007).

  5. 4   Govind Gopakumar (2012), for instance, provides a rare and important analysis of the ways in which varying domestic political coalitions have shaped the trajectory of water reforms in urban cities in India.

  6. 5   There is also a distinctive stream of scholarship that is focused on the impact of states on social welfare rather than purely on the nature of reforms and investment (see Deshpande, Kailash, and Tillin 2017; P. Singh 2016).

  7.   6   Water is listed as entry 17 on the State List. “Water Information,” Central Water Commission, Ministry of Jal Shakti, Department of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, Government of India, accessed November 29, 2021, www.cwc.gov.in/water-info.

  8. 7   This paradoxical nature of the Indian state is not new. One of the key features of the Indian state that scholars have long grappled with is the contradictory nature of what Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph called the paradox of the “weak-strong state” (1987).

  9. 8   See, for example, Aman Sethi, “At the Mercy of the Water Mafia,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/17/at-the-mercy-of-the-water-mafia-india-delhi-tanker-gang-scarcity.

  10. 9   I use the name Tamil Nadu in accordance with governmental and public conventions; note that the culturally specific linguistic name of the state is Tamilnadu.

  11. 10   The parties emerged out of the Dravidian movement in the state, which centered on conceptions of justice and equality that focused on caste hegemony (specifically Brahmans) and caste discrimination as well as cultural nationalist conceptions of ethnic-linguistic Tamil identities.

  12. 11   “Level of Urbanisation,” Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Government of India, accessed November 29, 2021, https://mohua.gov.in/cms/level-of-urbanisation.php.

  13. 12   For a useful discussion of such organizations in Mumbai, see Anand (2017). For an example of the critique of privatization, see Urs and Whittell (2009).

1. FORMATION OF INDIA’S WATER BUREAUCRACY

  1. 1   Patel would famously passionately defend the Administrative Service as India in his speech to Parliament on October 10, 1949 (see Singh 2017, 247). This has become known in Indian public culture as Patel’s defense of the IAS as India’s “steel frame.”

  2. 2   Precolonial forms of social and political power were also fundamentally linked to the control and distribution of water resources (see Ludden 1985).

  3. 3   For a rich discussion of practical expertise in flood-prone Orissa and the deleterious effect of modern colonial technical projects, see D’Souza 2006.

  4. 4   For a more extensive discussion of the formation of the universalized science of irrigation that was taking root, see Gilmartin 1994 and Mosse 1999.

  5. 5   On this contrast, see Mosse 1999, 310.

  6. 6   Peter Mollinga, for instance, has argued that famine protection was a real objective. See his discussion of the famine commissions in 1880 and 1901–3 in Mollinga 2003.

  7. 7   Such laws included the 1873 Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, the 1882 Easement Act on groundwater, the 1920 United Provinces Minor Irrigation Works Act, the 1931 Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act, and the 1935 Government of India Act that gave provinces rights over water.

  8.   8   The legal structure, as Philippe Cullet has noted, produced a significant linkage between land and water. The control of groundwater was connected to control of land. The result was that property rights developed around the ownership of water (2009, 28).

  9. 9   Sadr-ul-Mahan Political Department, His Exalted Highness the Nizam’s Government, Hyderabad-Deccan, to the Secretary to the Honourable the Resident at Hyderabad-Deccan, December 26, 1935, no. 3186.

  10. 10   Sadr-ul-Mahan to the Secretary.

  11. 11   PWD memorandum no. 2450-D/36-2, July 2, 1936. The conference took place on July 23, 1934.

  12. 12   PWD memorandum, 28.

  13. 13   This also extended to the PWD’s interpretation of riparian law.

  14. 14   “Water in Indian Constitution,” Ministry of Jal Shakti Department of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, Government of India, accessed December 4, 2021, www.mowr.gov.in/water-indian-constitution.

  15. 15   For critical work on development and water politics, see Baviskar 2005; Agarwal and Narain 1997. For a discussion of this developmental model of political economy in the early decades of independence, see Frankel 2015; see also Gupta 1998. There is a very large amount of scholarship on dams in India. For a good overview of the literature, see Joy et al. 2008.

  16. 16   The weight of such institutional continuities that shaped the state’s approach to water in postindependence India does not of course mean that there were no significant changes. In the context of critiques of India’s developmental state, it is often too easy to forget the shift in state objectives. Thus, for instance, food security and self-sufficiency were central objects of the state in the early decades of independence.

  17. 17   The formal name of the ministry has undergone changes over time. The current name is Ministry of Jal Shakti. For the reader’s accessibility, I use the abbreviated name Ministry of Water Resources throughout the book.

  18. 18   Other significant water-related issues, such as governance over droughts and floods, were treated by distinct institutional structures and efforts. On problems with drought governance, see Jairath 2008.

  19. 19   See a similar discussion of the PWD in UP in Gould 2011.

2. THE REGULATORY WATER STATE

  1. 1   This has ranged from political discourses such as Arvind Kejriwal’s (then activist who would later become Delhi’s chief minister) campaign against the privatization of water in Delhi to NGO activities in Mumbai (see Anand 2017) to academic works (Shiva 2016).

  2. 2   The classic case of expanded privatization is Chile.

  3. 3   See, for example, the creation of specific procedures for such initiatives and the establishment of a PPP Approval Committee, F.N0.2/10/2004-INF, Government of India Ministry of Finance Department of Economic Affairs, 2005.

  4.   4   Such centralizing tendencies are not limited to the water sector. For example, while the planning commission was disbanded, it was replaced by the NITI Aayog, which has been placed under the centralized authority of the prime minister. See Swenden and Saxena 2017.

  5. 5   The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992, Government of India, accessed December 4, 2021, www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-seventy-third-amendment-act-1992.

  6. 6   The Sukthankar Committee recommended devolving responsibility to neighborhood/resident associations. The Ministry of Urban Development formulated the Pooled Finance Development Fund Guidelines for small and medium ULBs (see Hoque 2012)

  7. 7   The World Bank has been advocating this measure in the irrigation sector since 1998. See Koonan and Bhullar 2012 on this point and for an assessment of the WRA model.

  8. 8   Government of India Notification F.N0.2/10/2004-INF, Government of India Ministry of Finance Department of Economic Affairs, November 29, 2005.

  9. 9   Thus, for example, all interlinking projects are to be classified as “national projects” in order to speed up funding. Vishwa Mohan, “Linking of Rivers May Get National Tag,” Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/govt-may-declare-inter-state-river-linking-projects-as-national-projects/articleshow/62544432.cms.

  10. 10   For a critical discussion, see Iyer 2012.

  11. 11   “Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission,” Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Government of India, accessed December 4, 2021, https://mohua.gov.in/cms/jawaharlal-nehru-national-urban-renewal-mission.php.

  12. 12   “Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission.”

  13. 13   ICICI Bank Limited (formerly ICICI Ltd), Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited and Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (see TNUDF, n.d.).

  14. 14   These reforms were implemented in Tamil Nadu in 1994 (GTN 1994).

  15. 15   The act was amended in 2002 (GTN 2002).

  16. 16   Networking of Rivers vs. IN RE, October 31, 2002, Supreme Court of India, Casemine, accessed December 4, 2021, www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea95bf607dba382a0794c2.

3. FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE NEGOTIATIONS

  1. 1   See, for example, Tamil Nadu’s attempt to compete with Andhra Pradesh for investment in the IT sector (Kennedy 2004).

  2. 2   The amendments still contain loopholes that allow delays. For instance, there is no time limit provided for publication of the tribunal decision in a gazette, which is a legal requirement for the implementation of an award (see Iyer 2002). I use Cauvery Tribunal or Cauvery Water Tribunal as abbreviated names for the full formal name, Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal.

For the original act, see “The Inter-state River Water Disputes Act, 1956,” Government of India, accessed December 5, 2021, www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1664/3/A1956-33.pdf; for the text of the 2002 amendment, see “The Inter-state Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2002,” Indian Kanoon, accessed December 5, 2021, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1048477. For the 2019 amendment, see “The Inter-state River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019,” PRS Legislative Research, accessed December 5, 2021, https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-inter-state-river-water-disputes-amendment-bill-2019.

  1. 3   “Cauwery [sic] Water Row: Inter-state Traffic Comes to a Standstill at Border,” Deccan Chronicle, September 8, 2016, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/080916/cauwery-water-row-inter-state-traffic-comes-to-a-standstill-at-border.html; “Cauwery [sic] Water Row: Water Dispute Turns Violent,” Deccan Chronicle, September 13, 2016, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/in-other-news/130916/cauvery-water-row-water-dispute-turns-violent.html.

  2. 4   See, for example, “Cauvery Water Row: Social Media Turns Anti-social,” Deccan Chronicle, September 13, 2016, www.deccanchronicle.com/amp/nation/current-affairs/130916/cauvery-water-row-social-media-turns-anti-social.html.

  3. 5   See, for example, Sowmya Aji, “Karnataka Farmers in Distress as Crops in Karnataka Wither,” Economic Times, October 7, 2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/karnataka-farmers-in-distress-as-crops-in-cauvery-basin-wither/articleshow/54725081.cms. Tamil Nadu meanwhile has seen a similar acute crisis. During my fieldwork, for instance, there was a pattern of distress- related farmer suicides. In 2020–21, there has been a mass sustained mobilization of farmers in Delhi.

  4. 6   Chennai does not rely on the Cauvery resources for its drinking water supply. However, there are parallel patterns of strains on water resources through economic growth and both planned and unplanned urbanization.

  5. 7   Nagesh Prabhu, “No Water from Crops in Cauvery Basin,” Hindu, August 2, 2017, www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/no-water-for-crops-in-cauvery-basin/article19410286.ece.

  6. 8   For details on the final award, see “Award of Cauvery Tribunal,” Ministry of Jal Shakti Department of Water Resources, River Development and Ganha Rejuvenation, Government of India, accessed December 5, 2021, http://jalshakti-dowr.gov.in/acts-tribunals/current-inter-state-river-water-disputes-tribunals/cauvery-water-disputes.

  7. 9   The central government established the Cauvery Management Authority in 2018 and took more than three years to appoint a chairperson for the entity. See “Cauvery Management Authority Gets Full-Time Chairman,” Hindu, September 28, 2021, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/cauvery-water-management-authority-gets-full-time-chairman/article36712190.ece.

  8. 10   “PM Modi Busy with Karnataka Polls, Says Centre after SC’s Cauvery Order, Deccan Chronicle, May 3, 2018, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/030518/pm-modi-busy-with-karnataka-elections-centre-after-scs-cauvery-order.html.

  9. 11   For a useful detailed timeline of events, see T. Arvind, “Cauvery Issue: A Timeline,” Hindu, February 16, 2018, www.thehindu.com/news/resources/cauvery-issue-timeline/article11264946.ece1.

  10. 12   “Cauvery Issue: Centre Seeks Modification of SC Order to Set up Water Management Board,” Firstpost, October 3, 2016, www.firstpost.com/india/kaveri-issue-centre-seeks-modification-of-sc-order-to-set-up-water-management-board-3031918.html.

  11. 13   “Can’t Be Asked to Set up Cauvery Board: Centre,” New Indian Express, October 4, 2016, www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2016/oct/04/cant-be-asked-to-set-up-cauvery-board-centre-1524853.html.

  12. 14   Samanwaya Rautray, “Supreme Court All Set to Give Cauvery Board Final Shape Soon,” Economic Times, May 18, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/supreme-court-all-set-to-give-cauvery-board-final-shape-soon/articleshow/64214965.cms.

  13. 15   For the 2019 amendment, see “The Inter-state River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019,” PRS Legislative Research, accessed December 5, 2021, https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-inter-state-river-water-disputes-amendment-bill-2019.

  14. 16   R. Iyer had criticized the amendments for not incorporating an appeals process. This very lack of appeals process has in effect brought the Supreme Court back into the process as foreshadowed by Iyer. See Iyer 2002.

  15. 17   Chief Minister Jayalalitha attempted to gain the intervention of then Congress prime minister Manmohan Singh. T. Arvind, “Cauvery Issue: A Timeline,” Hindu, February 16, 2018, www.thehindu.com/news/resources/cauvery-issue-timeline/article11264946.ece1; “Government Is Committed to Go Ahead with Mekedatu Dam: CM,” Business Standard, August 8, 2015, www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/government-is-committed-to-go-ahead-with-mekedatu-dam-cm-115080800569_1.html.

  16. 18   “Cauvery Dispute: Is Resolution in Sight?,” Deccan Chronicle, September 18, 2016, www.deccanchronicle.com/opinion/op-ed/180916/cauvery-dispute-is-resolution-in-sight.html.

  17. 19   The newly independent state of Telangana is now a part of this process.

  18. 20   L. Renganathan, “Troubled Waters of Cauvery: A Primer on the Legal Route,” Hindu, October 31, 2015, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/troubled-waters-of-cauvery-a-primer-on-the-legal-route/article7824627.ece.

  19. 21   Renganathan, “Troubled Waters of Cauvery.”

  20. 22   This would eventually begin to change the dynamic of the Liaison Committee (Mohanakrishnan 2016b, 70).

  21. 23   “A Dream Will Come True Tomorrow,” Hindu, September 28, 1996, cited in Mohanakrishnan 2011a, 144.

  22. 24   The initial goal of fifteen TMC was modified to twelve TMC.

  23. 25   “Andhra Pradesh in Dilemma over Tamil Nadu’s Plea for Krishna Water,” Times of India, January 19, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Andhra-Pradesh-in-dilemma-over-Tamil-Nadus-plea-for-Krishna-water/articleshow/46049396.cms.

  24. 26   K. Raju, “Even Minor Maintenance Work Can’t Be Done in Mullaperiyar Dam,” Hindu, March 14, 2014, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/even-minor-maintenance-works-cant-be-done-in-mullaperiyar-dam/article5781820.ece.

  25. 27   V. Mayilvaganani, “Madurai Corporation to Tap Water from Mullaperiyar Dam,” Times of India, August 3, 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/madurai-corporation-to-tap-water-from-mullaperiyar-dam/articleshow/39519366.cms.

  26. 28   “Two Years after SC Judgment, Mullaperiyar Dispute Drags On,” Economic Times, August 13, 2016, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/renewable/two-years-after-sc-judgment-mullaperiyar-dispute-drags-on/53668129.

  27. 29   The most well known, of course, is the Narmada Bachao Andolan in Gujarat.

  28. 30   “Farmers’ Protest Turns Violent,” Hindu, December 22, 2011, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/farmers-protest-turns-violent/article2736024.ece.

  29. 31   “Kerala CM’s Dam Remark Draws Flak,” Hindu, May 30, 2016, www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/Kerala-CM’s-dam-remarks-draw-flak/article14347669.ece.

  30. 32   Via Onmanoraman, “Consider Reducing Mullaperiyar Water Level to 139 Feet: SC to Tamil Nadu,” Week, August 16, 2018, www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/08/16/water-rising-mullaperiyar-states-supreme-court.html.

  31. 33   J. Venkatesan, “Kerala Blames Floods on TN’s Sudden Water Releases,” Deccan Chronicle, August 24, 2018, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/240818/kerala-govt-blames-floods-on-tns-sudden-water-release.html.

  32. 34   J. Venkatesan, “Consider Reducing Water Level of Mullaperiyar Dam to 139 Ft,” Deccan Chronicle, August 18, 2018, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/180818/consider-reducing-water-level-of-mullaiperiyar-dam-to-139-ft.html.

  33. 35   “Kerala-TN Reach Accord over Parambikulam-Aliyar Waters,” New Indian Express, October 16, 2012, www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2012/oct/17/kerala-tn-reach-accord-on-parambikulam-aliyar-water-416083.html.

  34. 36   This has occurred in both 2013 and 2017, before and after the final Supreme Court judgment on the dam. See “Kerala Water Pact to Help Parched Kovai,” New Indian Express, April 29, 2013, www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2013/apr/29/kerala-water-pact-to-help-parched-kovai-472490.html.

  35. 37   For instance, a revenue official of Kerala removed a reading scale installed by TNPWD. “Kerala Official Removes Scale from Dam Site,” New Indian Express, November 18, 2014; “Mullaperiyar Dam TNPWD Engineers Roughed up at Dam Site,” New Indian Express, November 18, 2014; “Rumours Being Spread on Mullaperiyar Dam: PWD,” Hindu, December 11, 2011; “Locals Stop PWD Team from Visiting Dam Site,” New Indian Express, June 21, 2012.

  36. 38   “KERI [Kerala Engineering Research Institute] Expert Team Conducted a Sur- vey in Mullaperiyar Reservoir Accompanied by Water Resources Dept That Produced an Objection by TNPWD,” Hindu, September 15, 2011.

  37. 39   “TN Spy Found in Water Dispute with Kerala, Say Cops,” Indo Asian news service, April 26, 2013.

  38. 40   “Kerala to Open Police Station Near Mullaperiyar Dam,” Hindu, January 5, 2016, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/Kerala-to-open-police-station-near-Mullaperiyar-dam/article13982607.ece.

  39. 41   “Tamil Nadu Withdraws Plea for CISF Security Cover at Mullaperiyar Dam,” NDTV, April 13, 2016, www.ndtv.com/tamil-nadu-news/tamil-nadu-withdraws-plea-for-cisf-security-cover-at-mullaperiyar-dam-1395101.

4. EXTRACTION, INEQUALITY, AND WATER BUREAUCRACY

  1. 1   See, for example, “Delay in Opening Sluice Gates Caused Flooding,” Times of India, December 9, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/delay-in-opening-sluice-gates-caused-flooding/articleshow/50099873.cms.

  2. 2   This is one of the stated objectives of the Water Resources Organisation (see PWD, n.d.a.).

  3. 3   PWD Demand no. 38 Policy Note 2005–6, 2006, 45.

  4. 4   At the time of publication, Census 2021 data was not available, and the census was reported to have been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

  5. 5   One professor of civil engineering in Chennai noted that bureaucrats were resistance to new ideas, such as using porous materials rather than concrete for sidewalks. Author’s interview, August 2017.

  6. 6   The Tamil Nadu government order was passed on November 11, 1991, and planning authorities require the permission of the Agricultural Department for the conversion of land. The order was also meant to protect wetlands.

  7. 7   Times News Network, “Comprehensive Infra Plan Needed in Suburbs, Say Experts,” Times of India, December 10, 2012, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/comprehensive-infra-plan-needed-in-suburbs-say-experts/articleshow/17550328.cms.

  8. 8   “Level of Urbanisation,” Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Government of India, accessed December 7, 2021, http://mohua.gov.in/cms/level-of-urbanisation.php.

  9. 9   Karen Coelho has illustrated the ways in which this conception of public by Metrowater engineers encodes exclusionary conceptions of class-based respectability. See Coelho 2005b.

  10. 10   Census of India, Government of India, accessed December 5, 2021, www.census2011.co.in/census/metropolitan/435-chennai.html. The 2021 census was delayed.

  11. 11   C. S Kotteswaran, “Water from 300 Tiruvallur Wells for Parched City,” Deccan Chronicle, February 5, 2017, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/in-other-news/050217/water-from-300-tiruvallur-wells-for-parched-chennai.html.

  12. 12   Tamil Nadu Groundwater (Development and Management) Act, 2003, Casemine, accessed December 7, 2021, www.casemine.com/act/in/5a9ccdf34a932653478130aa.

  13. 13   T. Ramakrishnan, “Adieu to Tamil Nadu Ground Water Law,” Hindu, Septem- ber 20, 2013, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/adieu-to-tamil-nadu-groundwater-law/article5147072.ece.

  14. 14   For a critical discussion of the central government’s data on groundwater, see Dhawan 1995.

  15. 15   “Groundwater Declining in All the Districts of Tamil Nadu,” Deccan Chronicle, January 3 2017, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/030117/groundwater-level-declining-in-all-the-districts-of-tamil-nadu.html.

  16. 16   National data on groundwater is also being tracked by NASA. See “Groundwater Gains in India,” NASA Earth Observatory, accessed December 7, 2021, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/91008/groundwater-gains-in-india.

  17. 17   T. Ramakrishnan, “Adieu to Tamil Nadu Ground Water Law,” Hindu, Septem- ber 20, 2013, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/adieu-to-tamil-nadu-groundwater-law/article5147072.ece.

  18. 18   “Tamil Nadu Brings Stringent Rules to Protect Groundwater,” Deccan Herald, July 31, 2014, www.deccanherald.com/content/422966/tamil-nadu-brings-stringent-rules.html; “TN Order Banning Water Extraction Challenged in High Court,” Business Standard, October 23, 2014, www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/tn-order-banning-water-extraction-challenged-in-hc-114102300533_1.html.

  19. 19   “Indiscriminate Exploitation of Groundwater in TN: CAG Report,” Hindu, August 13, 2014, www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/indiscriminate-exploitation-of-ground-water-in-tn-cag-report/article23153804.ece.

  20. 20   “TN Order Banning Water.”

  21. 21   For a detailed critical discussion of this process, see V. Sridhar, “A Pipe Dream?,” Frontline, May 21, 2004, https://frontline.thehindu.com/other/article30222555.ece.

  22. 22   See “Sector-Wise GDP of India,” Statistics Times, accessed August 25, 2017, http://statisticstimes.com/economy/sectorwise-gdp-contribution-of-india.php, for an overview.

  23. 23   This dominance is intensified both by the sociocultural power of larger cities and by the financial weakness of small urban areas (P. Mohanty 2016). Contestations within urban environments and between rural and urban contexts stand to deepen long-standing inequalities that structure access to water. David McKenzie and Isha Ray (2009, 443), for example, have demonstrated a national relationship between asset wealth and access to water. In Rajasthan, in one case, Rajputs in the village forced Dalits to pay, while in other villages, Dalits were excluded (see Cullet 2009, 167). Philippe Cullet also provides a useful analysis of the complex impact in terms of class inequality where the poorest are indirectly affected by cost-recovery principles.

  24. 24   Quoted in Amit Anand Choudhary, “Tamil Nadu Government Cannot Remain Silent on Farmers’ Suicide: Supreme Court,” Times of India, April 13, 2017, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tamil-nadu-government-can-not-remain-silent-on-farmers-suicide-supreme-court/articleshow/58169114.cms.

  25. 25   See also Carolin Arul’s research, which confirms this practice, noting that the state is able to “withdraw slowly the irrigation supply to the command areas and allow urbanization to take place on its own, so that agriculture becomes defunct” (2008, 197).

  26. 26   See, for example, “World Bank Approves $400 Million to Improve Urban Services in Tamil Nadu, India,” World Bank Press Release, March 31, 2015, www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/03/31/world-bank-improve-urban-services-tamil-nadu-india, and “World Bank Approves $150 Million Loan for Tamil Nadu,” Economic Times, October 1, 2021.

  27. 27   K. Lakshmi, “Metrowater Plans Digital Water Meters in Commercial Buildings,” Hindu, April 5, 2017, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/metrowater-plans-digital-water-meters-in-commercial-buildings/article17819571.ece.

  28. 28   “All Commercial Establishments to Have Digital Water Meters Soon,” Hindu, January 28, 2021, www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/all-commercial-establishments-to-have-digital-water-meters-soon/article33679790.ece.

  29. 29   For an extensive critical discussion of this model of urban financing, see Kundu 2001.

  30. 30   This funding structure in Tamil Nadu was used as a national model in India and was specifically designed to address the lack of government resources necessary for infrastructure development in small towns.

  31. 31   Ashwin Mahalingam, Ganesh Devkar, and Satyanarayana Kalidindi (2011) have analyzed the microdynamics of such initiatives and have shown that there are varying degrees of effectiveness in the implementation of water-related infrastructure projects (including delays in the ability of local governments to effectively take over and manage completed projects).

  32. 32   These reforms were first implemented in TN in 1994 (GTN 1994). The Tamil Nadu Farmers’ Management of Irrigation Systems Act, 2000 (TN Act 7 of 2001) was enacted on March 2001.

  33. 33   World Bank Operations Evaluation Department Report, ICRR 12141, July 20, 2005, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604181474649821377/pdf/000020051–20140613052041.pdf.

  34. 34   A. Vidyanathan, “Agrarian Crisis: Nature, Causes and Remedies,” Hindu, November 8, 2006, www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/agrarian-crisis-nature-causes-and-remedies/article3044873.ece.

  35. 35   For example, the city experienced significant floods in 1943, 1976, and 1985.

5. STATE, CLASS, AND THE AGENCY OF BUREAUCRATS

  1. 1   See, for example, Anna Hazare’s movement, which gained widespread publicity in 2011. This highly publicized movement did not focus on corporate corruption.

  2. 2   Cited in Gopalkrishna Gandhi, “Governments Should Use Right to Transfer Officials Judiciously,” Hindustan Times, February 22, 2014, www.hindustantimes.com/columns/governments-should-use-right-to-transfer-officials-judiciously/story-20t9ALideHXdNq3R02GMeL.html.

  3. 3   For an overview of such contemporary debates, see Vaishnav and Khosla 2016.

  4. 4   C. P. Chandrasekar and Jayati Ghosh, “The Withering Trend of Public Employment in India,” Hindu, July 29, 2019, www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/the-withering-tren-of-public-employment-in-india/article28750003.ece.

  5.   5   Government employees continue to resist this. See, for example, a 2017 strike by the Tamil Nadu Government Employees Association. The primary demand was a rollback of the new pension scheme. See “Government Employees Call Off Strike,” Hindu, April 27, 2017, www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-tamilnadu/government-staff-call-off-strike/article18235867.ece.

  6. 6   Note that Modi in fact first used this term in the 2012 Assembly elections in Gujarat. See “Gujarat BJP Manifesto Targets Neo-middle class,” Deccan Herald, Decem- ber 3, 2012, www.deccanherald.com/content/296228/gujarat-bjp-manifesto-targets-neo.html.

  7. 7   Note that recent financial constraints have led the state government to try to cut back on such expenditures.

  8. 8   B. Sivakumar, “81 Lakh Tamil Nadu People in Search of Government Employment,” Times of India, April 16, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/81-lakh-tamil-nadu-people-in-search-of-govt-employment/articleshow/58202411.cms.

  9. 9   Lisa Björkman’s (2015) study provides useful insights into some of the challenges that technical workers face in Mumbai’s water sector.

  10. 10   “Madras High Court Fumes over Unchecked, Corruption in Chennai Corporation,” Legal India, August 16, 2018, www.legalindia.com/madras-high-court-fumes-over-unchecked-corruption-in-chennai-corporation.

  11. 11   “Desilting on Paper, Two Suspended,” July 11, 2018, Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/desilting-on-paper-two-suspended/articleshow/64938021.cms.

  12. 12   Letter to editor, Deccan Chronicle, June 20, 2017, print edition.

  13. 13   Interviews were conducted with varying ranks of employees in January 2018.

  14. 14   The TNPWD Association of Engineers urged the state government to drop its plan to bifurcate PWD. See “Engineers against Bifurcation of Public Works Department,” Hindu, October 25, 2009. The bifurcation was tied to a World Bank loan of Rs. 2,500 crores. See “Government Urged to Drop Move to Split PWD,” Hindu, February 26, 2007.

  15. 15   There is a reservation of 30 percent for women in government jobs, provided for under section 21 of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules.

  16. 16   The PWD does not publish data on its workforce. Estimates are based on interviews and field site discussions that I carried out in 2017.

  17. 17   Suresh Kumar, “Madras High Courts Quashes Appointment of 11 TNPSC Members,” Hindu, December 23, 2016, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/Madras-High-Court-quashes-appointment-of-11-TNPSC-members/article16927844.ece1.

  18. 18   For an exception, see A. Sinha’s (2011) work on bureaucratic agency drawing on a rational actor model of choice.

  19. 19   See, for example, E. N. Mangat Rai (1973) and Mohammed Ali Rafath (2012). David Potter’s (1996) work represents one of the few texts that has dealt in depth with similar memoirs, mainly in the colonial period and early decades of independence.

  20. 20   The book is not publicly for sale and is held within the offices of the PWD and within Anna University’s Centre for Water Resources.

  21. 21   Medha Patkar is a well-known antidam activist who spearheaded a national and then international campaign against the dam on the Narmada River.

CONCLUSION

  1. 1   T. E. Narasimhan and Gireesh Babu, “Tamil Nadu Water Woes,” Business Standard, June 17, 2019, www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/tamil-nadu-water-woes-chennai-goes-thirsty-industries-feel-the-heat-119061700389_1.html.

  2. 2   Hussain Zakeer, “Nature’s Bounty: Mettur Dam Full after 5 Years,” Deccan Chronicle, July 24, 2018, www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/240718/natures-bounty-mettur-dam-full-after-5-years.html.

  3. 3   “Stalin Slams AIADMK for Huge Wastage of Cauvery Waters,” Deccan Chronicle, August 20, 2018, print edition.

  4. 4   Priyanka Thirumurthy, “Cauvery Delta Not Getting Enough Water from Mettur Dam: Farmers Slam TN Government,” August 21, 2018, www.thenewsminute.com/article/cauvery-delta-not-getting-enough-water-mettur-dam-farmers-slam-tn-government-87021. For earlier, ongoing reports on problems with sand mining, see “Farmers Blame Water Crisis on ‘Catastrophic’ Sand Mining,” Times of India, April 18, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/trichy/farmers-blame-water-crisis-on-catastrophic-sand-mining/articleshow/58230325.cms.

  5. 5   “Water Wars: Plachimada vs. Coca Cola,” Hindu, July 15, 2017, www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/water-wars-plachimada-vs-coca-cola/article19284658.ece.

  6. 6   Sruthi Radhakrishnan, “The Hindu Explains: Sterlite Protests,” Hindu, May 23, 2018, www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/the-hindu-explains-sterlite-protests/article23969542.ece; D. Govardan, “TN Government Orders Permanent Closure of Vedanta Group’s Sterlite Plant in Tuticorin,” Times of India, May 28, 2018, www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sterlite-plant-in-tuticorin-to-be-shut-down-permanently-orders-tn-govt/articleshow/64355727.cms.

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