Preface and Acknowledgments

The background of this book begins in the 1980s, when I returned to Seoul after a decade of study in the United States. The first thing that struck me was a contrast between what Korean social scientists said and wrote and what I observed in Korean society as a Soviet specialist. To most scholars, Korean society was viewed as “modern” largely because it was already highly industrialized. Employing Marxian or Parsonian paradigms, they were discussing workers, labor movements, and the middle class or strata. But similarities between Soviet and Korean societies were clear. Various informal ties—and the exchange of favors based on them—were ubiquitous in both societies. These ties were indispensable in accessing banks for loans, securing doctors’ appointments, getting promotion in public and private bureaucracies, and in election campaigns. Korean society in the 1980s still showed strong signs of the persistence of traditional group identities. Elementary school alumni association gatherings had become more common, and meetings among people from the same hometown were more frequent. My casual counting of the growing number of these primary organizations, which were commonly announced in newspapers, confirmed my observation, even as the industrialization process deepened.

In contrast to observed daily life, rife with “neofamilial” (as I call them) practices crucial to conducting business and social interactions—such as securing financial resources, information on economic educational opportunities, and access to medical services—Korean intellectual circles still clung to a defunct Marxian paradigm. Rampant regionalism within labor unions or labor- management relations did not draw much attention. The anti-authoritarian struggles of “progressive intellectuals” borrowed from Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, Stalinism, and even Kim Il Sungism. These ideologically tinted frameworks were retrofit onto Korean society not only to bolster anti-regime movements but also frequently to explain Korean society at large. However, conventional functionalism was widely applied to explain social changes in Korea after more than two decades of industrialization. Beyond these divergent worldviews, other macro and mid-range theories and frameworks were introduced to explain socio-political phenomena, such as world system theory, dependent development, and bureaucratic authoritarianism. Korean intellectual terrain was muddled with these conflicting frameworks, leaving distinctive aspects of Korean society relegated to a residual category after the universal aspects of it were “explained” by imported paradigms.

Addressing this lacuna was not a priority for academic research, either because Korean society wanted to be viewed as modernized or because the neofamilism that intellectuals themselves practiced was so natural a part of their lives that they were not so conscious of it. Such a tendency to ignore reality might have reflected wishful thinking that socio-cultural catch-up had happened, commensurate to the national economic achievements known as the “Miracle on the Han River.” But more importantly, behind such wishful thinking is the prevalent Western sociological presumption that industrialization brings about universal social consequences; this epistemological influence had been deeply rooted in South Korean intellectual circles long before the Han miracle. It is only natural that the combination of wishful thinking and prevailing social science paradigms prior to economic development brought about a strange intellectual vacuum in which distinctive aspects of Korean social changes have been left out. This book seeks to understand these social phenomena that are so personal and familiar that they have been taken for granted.

A significant paradigm shift toward political economy was also occurring during the 1980s in the American social sciences, with the state enjoying a new limelight. Curiously, however, the developmental state was not analyzed in terms of its own dynamics: whether embeddedness changes over time and thus whether the developmental state undergoes institutional changes in the course of economic development. Given my past experience as a bureaucrat, I began to pay attention to this when reviewing archival data on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of South Korea. I had a rare opportunity to look into the ministry’s recruitment, decision-making, and implementation. Through numerous interviews with former bureaucrats and high-ranking chaebol managers, I was able to better understand how embeddedness-based interactions between the state and business had occurred and with what institutional consequences. It was an effort to analyze the institutional evolution of the developmental state itself.

This insider’s view of the institutional dynamics of the South Korean developmental state revealed that Korean bureaucracies, from the beginning of late industrialization in the mid-1960s, were increasingly based on both examination (merit) and regionalism. Regionalism, in turn, encompassed school ties as prominent regional high school graduates were conspicuously overrepresented in passing the civil service examination. Business sectors, too, emulated the state’s recruitment patterns. The reason for this was sought in the top leader’s urgent pursuit of industrialization, which drove business sectors to adopt mimetic patterns of recruitment. But these synergistic patterns of recruitment based on regional and high school ties were not merely necessities for business survival. Had, and how had, the developmental state changed over time? The current literature on this question is not only sparse but also largely structural: shifts in the balance of power between the state and business are typically analyzed over time rather than based on closer examination of changes within the state itself. Close examination of state-business relations reveal subtle and complicated dynamics of this relationship, showing that Korean bureaucracy gradually lost its coherent decision-making power and that its bureaucratic integrity diminished.

Analysis of the evolution of the Korean developmental state led me to search for the origins of high school ties, which in turn led to comparative work on neighboring Japan and Taiwan. As I suspected, the social significance of high school ties emulated Japan during the colonial era, but surprisingly, these ties did not play as important a role in Japan as they had in Korea. The pervasiveness of high school ties, originating in colonial rule, is unique to Korea and became the basis for the embeddedness of the developmental state; Park Chung Hee relied on these ties as an important recruitment source. Tracing the origins of high school ties through research on students’ anti-colonial protest movements during colonial rule led me to think about the nature of colonial Korean society. Japanese colonial rule affected Korean society not only economically; it also entailed lost opportunity for Koreans to invent traditions, which has had a lasting impact on Korean society.

Empirical understanding of interactions between the state and business through neofamilial ties led me to question the macro implications of the interactions. With chaebols (conglomerates) in the Korean economy so preponderant, it was a short step from the political economic considerations of state-business interactions to search for broader social and institutional implications. Neofamilism obviously was not limited to business-state relations. In searching for relevant literature on social change in state-led late industrialization, it quickly became clear to me that theorizing social change under state-led industrialization was not well developed in comparison to analyses based in political economy. The political economy paradigm presented an alternative approach to market-based economic development by highlighting the role of the state but did not say much about social change in general. Chaebols turned out to be more than economic actors; they are a microcosm of Korean society in terms of the evolution of neofamilism.

The analysis of the role of high school, blood, and regional ties in Korea’s late industrialization led me to think about the role of tradition in late industrialization—an important clue in understanding the macro social consequences of late industrialization. That tradition could play a positive role, and not be merely an impediment, has been addressed in the critical literature on post-modernization paradigms. Less known are the specifics of an apparent irony of late industrialization: why, when, how, and by whom tradition is introduced and plays a role in late industrialization—a research terrain that until now had not been clearly developed. A comparative review of the roles of tradition in different countries such as Japan, the Soviet Union, and Germany make it clear that traditional institutions and values play different roles in different contexts. In late industrialization, they play an essential facilitating role, giving rise to an irony in terms of macro social consequences. I found that traditional institutions and values play a critical role in shaping society. This book is an effort to demonstrate how to think about diverse paths to social change in different cases of late industrialization by looking at how tradition plays different roles, depending on timing, location, and leadership.

Thus, study of late industrialization is bound to take a multi-disciplinary approach as it needs to examine the state, business, culturally specific traditions, history, and international aspects. A closer examination of the social implications of state-business interactions requires careful cross-disciplinary readings. Over the course of my research, discovering how compartmentalized specialization inhibits free thinking was an important revelation.

This book was developed and completed over many years. Along the way I have accumulated much intellectual debt to many institutions and individuals. First of all, I would like to thank Professor Steven R. Brown at Kent State University, who taught me the importance of typology in looking at human behavior and social change from early on in my intellectual career. Most of all, I learned so much from my teachers at the University of California, Berkeley. Ken Jowitt’s lectures were always inspiring in developing conceptual thinking. His notion of neotraditionalism stimulated my interest in the role of tradition in industrialization. Reinhard Bendix alerted me to the danger in equating industrialization with modernity. My adviser, George Breslauer, taught me the importance of empirical evidence. His careful readings of the draft chapters greatly helped me in conceptual clarification. Aaron Wildavsky constantly reminded me of the importance of critical thinking. Robert Scalapino never failed to support me during my stay at Berkeley. I am also heavily indebted to the late Professor Hong Yung Lee, who understood the importance of my study and rendered constant support to the development of a neofamilial approach to Korean society with his detailed comments and guidance.

Conducting research and writing started in earnest when I began teaching at the Department of International Relations, Seoul National University from 1986 to 2007, where I greatly benefited from so many colleagues and students. Discussions with Professors Choi Jueong Un, Yoon Young Gwan, Lim Hyun Chin, and Chang Kyung Sup provided invaluable insights in understanding Korean society. Professors Baik Chang Jae and Sohn Yul provided careful readings of the manuscript on the dynamics of the strong state. Many undergraduate and graduate students who later became full-fledged scholars on their own provided not just research assistance but also faith in the importance of my work at a time when my research was in inchoate form. Yumi Moon, Bong Jun Ko, Myung Koo Kang, Sunil Kim, Jung Whan Lee, Young Ho Yoon, Kyung Jun Choi, Han Seok Cho, Heyjung Cho, Yeo Jung Yoon, Choong Ku Lee, Yong Mi Ryu, Nah Hosung, Hong Yerim, and Lim Bonkyu were willing to join me in interviewing former bureaucrats and businessmen and helped me record the interviews and collect data. I am especially indebted to Yumi Moon at Stanford University and Myung Koo Kang at CUNY. Wang Hwi Lee at Ajou University, Kyung Joon Choi at Konkuk University, and Ian Oates, associate director of the Center for Korean Studies at University of Washington, offered careful readings of the various chapters of the book and provided valuable feedback over the years.

My intellectual indebtedness continued when I moved to the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington in 2007. There I met with eminent colleagues, such as Anand Yang, Don Hellmann, Ken Pyle, Gary Hamilton, Joel Migdal, Robert Pekkanen, Steve Pfaff, James Lin, Susan Whiting, Scott Radnitz, Jonathan Warren, and Hajin Jun. They appreciated the significance of the book project and encouraged me whenever I met challenges in writing. They were also gracious enough to participate in a seminar to discuss the different chapters of the book. I also express my special thanks to the Center for Korean Studies and its chair, Clark Sorensen, who have been supportive of my book writing from early on with careful readings and advice on publication, along with Hyokyoung Yi, Korean librarian at Tateuchi East Asia Library, University of Washington, for her assistance in locating important materials.

Beyond my affiliated institutions, I must thank several individuals and institutions, without whose help I could not have completed this book. Korea Research Foundation, Samsung Electronics, Korea-Japan exchange programs, and One Asia Foundation provided research funds at various stages of research for this book. My special thanks go to Professors Beom Shik Shin and Chae Sung Chun for their facilitation for research funding at the Asia Center at Seoul National University during my sabbatical year from 2014 to 2015 (SNU Asia Center Research Grant 2015). Special thanks also go to Professors Hyun Chin Lim, Myung Koo Kang, and Su Jin Park, who were directors of the center throughout my visits for the past 10 years. The writing support fund was invaluable in drafting chapters 4 and 5, collecting supplementary data, and conducting interviews by traveling around South Korea. My gratitude goes to Dr. Sang Hyon Lee of the Sejong Institute, who provided a comfortable environment to finish the book during my sabbatical leave for Fall 2021. I also would like to express my gratitude to Professors Wada Haruki of Tokyo University, who invited me to the Institute of Social Science at Tokyo University, and Hagen Koo of the University of Hawai‘i, who did a careful reading of the introduction and chapter 3 and provided detailed advice for revision. Professors Se-jung Oh and Jong Woon Kim, former presidents of Seoul National University, understood the importance of Korean studies abroad and played an important role in helping me with fundraising and conducting research. Professor Unchan Jeong, who later became Prime Minister of South Korea, has shown constant support to my research and Korean studies in general. Finally, my thanks go to Lorri Hagman and Joeth Zucco at the University of Washington Press, the copy editor Alja Kooistra, and my personal editor, Brian Folk, for their extensive and detailed editorial advice.

Last but not least, I do not know how to express my thanks to my family, who endured so much over the years while I was preparing this book. My wife, Yangwon, has been a constant source of support, and my son, Justin, actively participated in the book preparation with careful reading and editing contributions. Although this book is a product based on assistance, cooperation, and collaboration with so many people and institutions, for any mistakes and misinterpretations in the book I am solely responsible.