CHAPTER 5 Civil Society and Democratization

Discourses on civil society have, over their long history, evolved in different directions, depending on time, place, and sociopolitical contexts.¹ Yet there has been a tendency to indiscriminately apply a universal and ahistorical concept of civil society to describe different settings. An example of this trend is the idea that civil society is a part of society with a life of its own, different from the state and largely autonomous from it. Civil society thus has been envisioned to lie beyond the boundaries of family, clan, and locality.²

This typical illustration of autonomous society and limited state, based on market economy and legal institutions that protect individuals, has been widely adopted and used regardless of regional and historical differences. However, this view is merely an extrapolation of British or French cases, or “a privileged moment in the history of England, Scotland, and France.”³ As sociologist Adam Seligman observes, “it should be clear by now that however admirable the idea of civil society is as a political slogan, we should have serious doubts as to its efficacy as a concrete model for social and political practice. These doubts arise both from the inadequacy of the idea itself, along with the contradictions that inhere to it, and from the fact that it reflects not only a particular stage of historical development in the West but the particular conditions that are obtained there and not necessarily in other parts of the world.”⁴ When this image of civil society—which spans macrostructural levels down to individual psychological characteristics as components of civil society—is extrapolated to the non-Western world, it is either adopted as an ideal, highly abstract model lacking in detailed historical analysis or conveyed as ideal weapons in anti-authoritarian struggles.

At the same time, the discrepancy that the concept of civil society causes between the ideal and reality easily leads to frustration or an inferiority complex among political activists in the non-Western world. More specifically, when the concept was extended to Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, it became associated with democratization. In these newly democratizing countries, the term civil society was adopted not because of existing or available conditions for a civil society but rather because of its freshness and novel symbolic value for mobilizing people around anti-dictatorial movements.⁵ Such a political use of the definition of civil society has led to confusion and myths surrounding the relationship between democratization and civil society. Equating civil society with democratization leads to a misconceived notion that wherever there is democratization, there is civil society.

While it would be misleading to think of democratization and civil society as being unconnected, the prevailing conflated view cited above tends to uncritically regard oppositional forces arrayed against non-democratic regimes as necessarily constituting civil society. As philosopher Axel Honneth remarks, “This concept served to tie together all the spheres of social action not belonging to state institutions, insofar as these spheres could serve as a basis for the construction of a democratic opposition.”⁶ Opposition forces are composed of various groups, whose natures and orientations can only be understood in relation to the wider social context and to leading political groups. That is, depending on features of the structure and ethos of a society, opposition forces that merely engage in democratization movements may or may not develop into civil society. As one expert on the issue pointed out, without holistically considering general characteristics of society or ordinary citizens, literature tends to focus on elite-led or dominant democratization movements at the top rather than at the level of society and its ordinary citizens.⁷ The general literature on civil society misses this point.

This elite-oriented approach tends to view the number of opposition groups and civil organizations as an indicator of civil society development. The sudden mushrooming of civil organizations during or after democratization is certainly a big change that is not to be ignored, but the sheer number of organizations do little to describe the depth and extent of civil society. Weber aptly comments that “the quantitative spread of organizational life does not always go hand in hand with its qualitative significance.”⁸ Related is the tendency to identify social movements with civil society. The fact that social movements have been instrumental to toppling non-democratic regimes is significant in understanding the nature of civil society. However, there is a rift between anti-regime movements and the development of civil society. Whether social movement leads to civil society depends on many other factors, such as general societal features and the nature of the relationship between political elite groups and the masses.

The confusion and myths originate from the fact that elite-led democratization movements in Eastern European and Asian countries adopt the same definition of civil society as seen in prototype cases such as Great Britain and France without considering historical contexts. In latter cases, civil society originally had more to do with social order than political order, where gradually political democracy grew based on social conditions. In contrast, in non-Western cases, political democratization was initiated and led by elite political groups that were not necessarily joined by social groups in the form of social movements. Political sociologist Luis Roniger’s remark on this point is germane: “Whereas the concept was phrased originally in connection with the nature of modernity, in the last decade the revival of interest in civil society has been connected with the process of democratization. This has created a widespread conceptual identification between civil society, democracy, and equality.”⁹

New ways of understanding civil society reflect such frustration and limitations of the conventional use of civil society and seek possibilities of diverse paths to civil society framed by context. Historian Frank Trentmann’s remarks in this regard are revealing and significant: “Rather than crystallizing into a single master definition, then, the modern history of civil society is an unfolding dialogue between different imaginaries of the social. The dialogue rests on a shared recognition that society has its own life with roots outside the state and a shared interest in the mechanisms and values that make society work, not on any programmatic, let alone ideological, agreement on its relationship to state and economy.”¹⁰ Trentmann’s remarks raise interesting and important comparative questions. For instance, regarding the autonomy of civil society in relation to the state, one might question the different degrees and thus different patterns of autonomy, depending on the historical and institutional development of a society. Another point to consider is whether individualism is a necessary condition for civil society and, if so, whether we can imagine different degrees of individual autonomy as a basis for civil society.

Such concerns about avoiding a historically specific conception of civil society led to relatively more open and dynamic definitions. Sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander, for instance, defines civil society “as the arena of social solidarity that is defined in universalistic terms. It is the we-ness of a national community, the feeling of connectedness to one another that transcends particular commitments, loyalties, and interests and allows there to emerge a single thread of identity among otherwise disparate people.”¹¹ Such broad definitions are meant to go beyond historically specific cases of civil society and open possibilities to accommodate different paths of civil society development. However, it is important to accept different patterns of state-society relations and thus varying degrees of social autonomy in different contexts as well as to come up with a typology of different cases of social changes in the world, based upon which a comparative framework can be formulated.¹² Korean scholarship on civil society is thus due for re-examination through the lens of neofamilism.

KOREAN STUDIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Most of the problems and weaknesses as seen in the general research on civil society are evident in studies of Korea. For instance, it is generally assumed that democratization is closely related to civil society. Civil society is viewed either as (a) an important contributing factor for democratization or (b) its consequence. In many cases, the relationship between the two views is not clearly stated. Scholars who adopt the former view approach civil society as a way to explain democratic transition and consolidation, while the latter camp focuses on expansion and development of civil society.¹³ The exact nature of the relationship has seldom been questioned. Impressed with the number of organizations that were formed during democratization, civil society is presumed to have existed to oppose the authoritarian regime and was assumed to have bloomed further with successful democratization. Ultimately, a strong continuity is assumed to exist between civil society and social movements for democratization. Establishing such a mechanistic connection between civil society and democratization makes it difficult to question the nature of social movements prior to democratization and to discern whether, why, and how social movements necessarily lead to civil society.¹⁴

This lack of clarity is, however, not accidental; it reflects the lack of understanding the complex relationship between socioeconomic changes and democratization (political changes).¹⁵ Democratization initiated by politicized activist groups, successful industrialization, and an emergent middle class and workers led to an easily assumed conclusion of the existence of civil society. Mass participation in the democratization process is regarded as being tantamount to civil society. Democratization is viewed as a joint effort by both elite activists and the masses (minjung). Social movements are understood to develop almost automatically into civil society.

Here the aforementioned pitfalls of the current literature repeat themselves. Absent are concrete analyses of historical patterns of the emergence of civil society; the typical state-versus-society model is imposed on the Korean case, and opposition at the elite level is assumed to be shared by the masses without a detailed analysis of the relationship between the two. As will be shown, it is true that the elite and the masses held certain shared interests in opposing authoritarianism in the process of Korean democratization, but that says little about the relationship between the two groups or about the extent to which such a sentiment of opposition against the authoritarian regime was shared. In short, the Western model was imposed without a concrete analysis of social structure and ethos at the societal level at the time of elite-initiated democratization after liberation.¹⁶

Indeed, a review of major works on civil society in Korea reveals how such an automatic assumption of civil society leads to awkward explanations of the nature of Korean civil society. Frequently quoted peculiarities are cultural and historical in nature, such as civil society without civic rights, lack of pluralism, family orientation, network orientation, inability to develop civil values and inner moralities, amalgamation of modern and traditional values, and regionalism. Within this cultural perspective where cultural characteristics of Korean society are shared, there are some variations.¹⁷ One view argues that despite the distinctiveness of state-led economic development, the Korean middle class emerged as a pillar of civil society as in the West. In this view, negative factors such as a strong central state power; statism; a state, capital and mass media tripartite alliance; cronyism; a politicized civil society; the weak foundation for the welfare state; and the weak link of civic organizations to the grass roots in Korea are attributed to state dominance.¹⁸

A slightly different set of views within this Korean tradition of studying civil society contends that cronyism and authoritarianism were the problems with the state, while a different pattern developed at the societal level through capitalistic development and education.¹⁹ These views, despite differences, share the flaw of mistakenly presuming the separation of state, economy, and society—with little understanding of how the state, economy, society, and tradition all interacted to cause distinct patterns of cultural and social changes and state dynamics during Korea’s late industrialization.

Put differently, these views suffer from the assumption that industrialization brings about universal social consequences. From this perspective, it becomes extremely difficult to understand how the emergence of the middle class in Korea occurred under strong traditional and non-modern cultural values.²⁰ At the same time, as long as they hold assumptions of universal industrial social changes, there is no way to consider how culture interacts with industrialization, and therefore cultural values are viewed as remaining static and treated as separate from the industrialization process. These approaches attempt to mitigate this pitfall by attributing “negative” cultural values to state dominance or dependent development patterns. However, they do not explain why and how the state or dependent forms of development were related to these traditional values without affecting society and particularly the economy. In short, it is futile to posit the assumption of universal industrial social changes regardless of the patterns of economic development. Thus, without an adequate framework to explain how tradition and culture interacted with economic development in which the state plays a strong role, it becomes difficult to synthesize cultural and economic changes. The absence of a framework to understand how culture and tradition interact with the economy led to a strangely optimistic view that regionalism can be conducive to rejuvenation of civil society.²¹

In fact, it is almost fashionable to try to understand distinctive features of Korean civil society by models developed in Western contexts. Korean Marxists argue that civil society is too ambiguous to locate the true social base for democratization and that the true base is minjung, a synonym for all oppressed forces under authoritarian rule.²² Other views adopted a trichotomized model of state/political society/civil society, with political society inserted between civil society and state. These efforts to understand distinctive aspects of Korea’s civil society reinforce the universalistic view of civil society by treating distinctiveness within universal frameworks. Furthermore, such model-based approaches of trying to fit realities into models fail to suggest frameworks for understanding distinctive aspects of interactions among state, economy, and society.²³

One of the interesting points of confusion in Korean literature is the treatment of chaebols from the perspective of civil society. Marxists consider chaebols as a part of the state, while another view describes chaebols as agents for confronting the state. Most literature is silent about the chaebols’ theoretical status and relation to civil society. As much as this indicates confusion in the field, it is important to note that we lack an adequate political sociology of late industrialization.

The state is significantly absent in the discussion of civil society in Korean literature. It is only logical when we consider the Western orientation of the models and arguments. However, given the state’s strong role in industrialization and other matters, it is necessary to consider how the state evolved institutionally during and after industrialization and democratization. First, while shedding assumptions of universal industrial social changes, a conceptual framework and empirical analyses are needed to determine the structural features and distinct ethos that emerged in the course of industrialization. Second, the relationship between the political activist groups and the masses needs to be better differentiated. Third, the state and international factors need to be considered in terms of their roles and impacts in relation to civil society.²⁴

In short, the Korean case is complex in that at the political levels there was sharp confrontation between opposition groups and the regime, while a completely different structure and ethos emerged among the masses, resulting in serious implications for the emergence of civil society in Korea. Neofamilism is crucial in understanding the dual aspect of Korean masses: on the one hand, they were sympathetic toward anti-authoritarian struggles; on the other, their daily lives were run based on neofamilial practices for survival. The next task is to explore these complex interaction patterns.

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The following analysis is aimed at demonstrating the distinct patterns of state-society relations; they are not intended to historicize each pattern, and therefore they are ideal-typical in highlighting fundamental differences among the four different types of state-society relations: state-versus-society, state-in-society, state-over-society, and state-leading-society.

State-versus-Society Model

Great Britain is an exemplary case for the state-versus-society model. It is well known that Britain experienced spontaneous industrialization in which the market played a major role and thus the state’s presence was negligible. Class rose as a new basis of social identity, and individualism became the primary mode of personal existence. To the extent that British civil society was against the state in this implicit sense (as opposed to the active oppositional stance of the French bourgeoisie), the state’s role was limited to legal provisions for charity, incentives for workers to establish self-help savings banks, promoting fraternal societies, retail and industrial co-ops, and legal guarantees for labor unions.²⁵

Such perception of state and society by the bourgeoisie led to a proliferation of voluntary organizations at the rural as well as urban levels. The fact that voluntary organizations spread through the entire nation distinguishes the British case from late developers, where civil organizations are usually organized at the central or urban levels. The voluntary organizations in Great Britain were operated on democratic principles, providing a high level of affinity with the political democratization process that was to follow.²⁶

One important factor in the growth of civil society in Great Britain was the role of political parties. Local party organizations went beyond their role in elections to become instrumental in political education and inculcation of values: local parties implemented regular lectures and discussions of political issues and programs to understand the requisites of a good government. They also implemented projects to teach people how to read newspapers critically and develop critical ways of thinking, offered recreation programs, and suggested habits to abide by laws.²⁷

The most important implication of the British experience for other cases is its gradual transition from economic changes to political ones. Social instability was avoided due to the democratic transition that occurred amid economic plenty. The British pattern of democratization is distinguished from many non- Western cases where democratization was launched by certain elite groups. In Great Britain there was considerable affinity between economic changes based on the market and patterns of social change. Civil society was implicitly linked to market principles in terms of individualism and universalism, an aspect that cannot be easily applied to other cases of social and political changes.

State-in-Society Model

The state-in-society model is one in which the state is disconnected from social organizations; thus, social organizations are autonomous from the state and have no engagement, or the state cannot reach them.²⁸ In the African context, state boundaries do not necessarily coincide with traditional tribal boundaries due to colonial control, rendering the state’s reach among villages difficult. Traditional villages are left autonomous and thus resistant to state influence. Migdal calls this situation strong society versus weak state and characterizes it as a “web-like society” in that once the state reaches the villages, it cannot move or get out.²⁹

There are three different forms of social organization in a web-like society in terms of their orientations toward the state. One group is basically survival oriented in nature. Urban migrants organize themselves based on regional and blood ties to survive harsh urban settings. Naomi Chazan calls them “a medley of local improvement societies, farmers’ and women’s cooperatives, and spiritual churches.”³⁰ These groups are isolated from the state and do not undermine the state’s power. The second group is more threatening to the state in that they contend and supersede and thus try to take over the state. Fundamental groups, ethno-national movements, and ideological associations belong to this category. The third group includes trade unions, student organizations, and women’s organizations. Chazan calls them pseudo-civil society as they resemble civil society but are actually strongly influenced and manipulated by the state, primarily via patron-client networks. The state lacks the discipline and consistency to deal with these organizations, which frequently invoke particularistic access to state power.³¹

These three groups are not conducive to the development of civil society. The first group is withdrawn from the state, the second challenges it, and the third internally undermines state authority. In particular, the phenomenon of withdrawing from the state is quite serious as people protect themselves by relying on their own survival mechanisms at the local level. Chazan explains in the context of Africa that “with state agencies unable or unwilling to assume responsibility for the welfare of their citizens, individuals and groups had to devise methods of fending for themselves in conditions of growing impoverishment. A variety of survival strategies, ranging from migration and passive resignation to self-encapsulation in local or religious communities and parallel market activities, were refined and elaborated during the early 1980s.”³² Behavioral consequences range from “passive departicipation, repression or empty form of controlled participation.”³³ People tend to rely on primary groups and narrow communities for survival, leading to “abdication from the public sphere” and “a virtual exit” from the state.”³⁴

In short, the social and political legacies persisted in a slightly different form under the undisciplined mode of African state operation. While the state is arbitrarily strong, it lacks institutional integrity or discipline and is thus in actuality weak and unpredictable. Society had to adjust to such state behaviors and isolate from the state. The African situation provides two important lessons in our understanding of civil society. First, autonomy of social organizations alone is insufficient for civil society unless the autonomy is engaged with the state. Second, a weak state is not necessarily good for civil society, and the mode of state operation affects civil society formation.

State-over-Society Model

The state-over-society model is based on the political, economic, social, and international experiences of the former socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and those of Eastern Europe, in which the state absorbed political, economic, and social functions. The highly overcentralized system did not function properly from the start.³⁵ One of the institutional consequences of the malfunctional socialist system was an increasing gap between formal and informal institutions. Amid hardships such as extreme shortages of goods arising in the formal sector, socialist societies had to rely on informal social relations to survive.³⁶ Informal practices meant subversions of official goals, rampant false reporting, and lying, which further widened the gap between official and private realms.

Opposition toward the communist system had to hide underground or face severe surveillance. With the sudden death of the communist system in Eastern Europe countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, opposition groups developed during severe state control resurfaced but were faced with the serious task of overcoming legacies. These groups found themselves mired in a deep sense of elitism and status based on hierarchy. Being recruited into these opposition groups, which evolved into pro-democratic forces, became a daunting task for which the right contacts were needed to be a member. The monopoly that opposition groups held was heavily tilted toward unity within the groups, and thereby they lacked effective conflict management. Gradually, fragmentation of opposition groups led to political division as different groups struggled for resources and members. Under such circumstances, political parties formed without much linkage to society. Consequently, their representation function was weak if not nil, and they were quite disconnected from the interests of people. Civil organization bridged this disconnect between political parties and society at large. The weakening of the state’s roles in state-society relations and the enforcement of laws exacerbated the situation; non-political or trivial issues became easily politicized.³⁷

State-Leading-Society Model

This model is based on cases of late capitalist industrialization, mainly from Germany and partly from Japan, and is thus the most relevant to understanding the emergence of civil society in Korea. One common element among late industrialization cases is that the state played a major—if not the most important—role in industrialization; the contents and extent of the state’s role vary by case, in turn affecting modes of social changes. However, in all cases the state was supportive of business, which held ownership and was responsible for economic outcomes. The way in which the state affects social changes in late industrialization is determined by the social-structural conditions at the time of industrialization and the degree of the state’s manipulation of traditional values, behaviors, and institutions.

Although the social-structural consequences of late industrialization vary, a common element among the late industrialization cases of Germany, Japan, and Korea is a strong statist or elitist tradition, where state exists above individuals or society and is perceived as playing a leading role. As such, the state is entrusted to do good for society. Such perception of the state was reflected in the ethos and growth of civil society in Germany and Japan. In Germany, significant growth of civil organizations occurred during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the surface, there were numerous civic organizations ranging from hobby groups to charities that resembled those in Great Britain. In fact, this time was called a period of civil organizations.

However, such apparent similarities beguiled the state’s strong influence on German civil society. First was the tradition of following the state or ensuring a harmonious relationship between state and society. Second, during Bismarck’s period such a harmonious relationship denoted an increasing influence of state on society. Amid increasing workers’ organizations and political activism, the state interfered to slow down the development of civil society and blocked horizontal linkages among civil organizations through various social protection laws and policies. This depoliticization effort by the state toward civil organizations gave rise to peculiar features of German civil society. German civil organizations, though numerous, were apolitical in that they avoided confrontation with the state.³⁸ Such a harmony-oriented stance of civil organizations was a fundamental difference between German society and French and Anglo-American ones. Unlike the latter, German civil organizations were not based on individual autonomy and lacked freedom from state interference.³⁹ There were persisting feudal influences of the Junkers, whose lifestyle was emulated even by the new middle class.⁴⁰

German political institutions were not conducive to the development of civil society either. German bourgeois political parties remained aloof from the masses as they were initially elitist and thus disconnected. Parties’ social bases were narrow and particular; workers, large landowners, large industrialists, Catholics—these groups all had their own parties. As Sheri Berman notes, “instead of reconciling the interests of different groups or creating a sense of national unity, therefore, parties reflected and deepened the divisions within German society.”⁴¹ As for bourgeois parties, their elitist organizational style was a failed attempt to develop grassroots linkages.⁴² Such weak nationwide political institutions further drove people into their narrow civic organizations during the hard years of the 1870s and the 1920s. Citizens’ activities were confined to their own organizations rather than crossing interorganizational boundaries, until Hitler overcame this pattern.

Although Japan shared Germany’s deferential attitude to the state, Japan’s path of social change in the course of late development was different in that there were no powerful, old social groups like the Junkers. Instead, the political elites made every effort to redefine Japan’s tradition in terms of values and institutions. They found and reinforced affinity between organizational prerequisites for industrialization and ie, the traditional social unit. Japan worked judiciously to combine the principles of ie with the notion of individuality in modern civil codes and family law. In the area of social welfare, family obligations were given priority over those of the state. Efforts were made at the local level to revive the neighborhood system of premodern Japan and to teach self-help and self-management methods. The government intervened in labor-capital relations to ensure class conflicts were contained.⁴³ All of these efforts amounted to a reinvention of tradition. As a result, the state was regarded as an agent of progressive change for traditional society, and the boundary between the state and society was often blurred. Ultimately, the goals of the state and society were viewed as identical.⁴⁴

Among the four patterns of state-society relations, one can discern two distinct modes of civil society formation: one is the bottom-up socioeconomic model and the other is the top-down political model. The state-versus-society model represents the first type, while the state-leading-society and the state-over-society models describe the second. In the bottom-up socioeconomic model, emergence of civil society was gradual and thus a rather even and comprehensive pattern of change developed at the social and economic levels. At the same time, the discussion of civil society covers as low a level as individuals in terms of personal autonomy. In contrast, in the top-down political model, the discussion of civil society is made in conjunction with how to derive a relatively autonomous arena out of the state-dominant institutions and everyday practices. The Korean case clearly belongs to this model. The state led industrialization, whereby Korean society followed the state’s leading role in economic development. Neofamilism was a social consequence from interactions between the state and society through economic development. In the political field, democratization was initiated by anti-authoritarian political activists. Thus, Korea’s case shows a mixed pattern: the attitude of Korean masses who lived in the strong neofamilial environment toward democratization and the disjunctive relationship between them and the political activists are crucial in understanding the emergence of civil society and democracy in Korea.

BEYOND LOCATING SOUTH KOREA’S STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

From a comparative perspective, the four types of state-society relations help us contextualize Korean civil society. First, the ideal-type cases highlight the importance of understanding general social structure in discussing the nature of emerging civil society. The former socialist cases and the German and Japanese cases direct our attention to the nature of social structure before or at the time of democratization. A complex mixture of formal and informal organizations and fragmented aspects of former socialist societies need to be considered in understanding the process and nature of civil society.

Relatedly, the mere emergence of the middle class or the formal existence and number of civil organizations should not be taken as evidence per se of civil society, let alone a strong civil society. If voluntary organizations resign themselves only to their own survival, without connection to the state and other organizations, they cannot be said to constitute civil society. German and Japanese cases show that the ethos of the middle class and civil organizations as well as the patterns of interactions among civil organizations all need to be taken into consideration. Autonomous organizations need to be interactive and communicative with one another to facilitate the development of civil society. Autonomy without engagement negatively impacts the prospects for development of civil society.⁴⁵

Second, the cases of the state-leading-society model indicate the importance of examining the role of the state in social change, particularly in how it takes advantage of traditional values and institutions, and to analyze the variegated social structures arising from late industrialization. Germany had to struggle to reconcile the increasing formation of the working class with the traditional Junkers. In Japan, there was no immediately visible traditional group like the Junkers and thus it was able to redefine Japanese tradition with much ease. In both cases, states played a strong and active role in shaping their intended social structure, in contrast to the case of England, where there was a hampering effect upon the spontaneous emergence of civil society.

African cases show that a weak state is not necessarily conducive to the development of civil society. Arbitrary intervention or oppression by the state certainly does not facilitate the development of civil society. A general perception has been that a strong state is not conducive to civil society.⁴⁶ Relaxation of state control is needed but should not be understood as weak. Furthermore, the state needs to function predictably and provide incentives to the development of civil society. Thus, the notions of “weak” or “strong” are best understood in terms of describing the scope and depth of state control over society; a strong level of control should signify the state’s capacity to maintain institutional boundaries with society and maintain a certain level of predictability. Capricious or arbitrary state actions cause confusion and chaos, which are inconducive to civil society. A weak state not only militates against civil society; as demonstrated in the African case, it may further destroy emerging civil society due to its lack of legal discipline and ability to provide equal protection. Finally, modes of state operations, such as personnel policies and distribution of incentives, can affect the nature of organization and social groupings in societies where civil society is yet to emerge. For instance, patrimonial modes of operations in the state may encourage society to move in that direction.

Regarding the relationship between civil society and democratization, the four cases highlight the need to understand the relationship between opposition groups and society in terms of the extent to which the wider society affects, both formally and informally, the structure and ethos of opposition groups. As is clear in the case of the Solidarity movement in Poland, opposition groups could not exist without the protection of intricate informal networks of wider society. Also important is the extent of cooperation and protection and the common values shared between the two sides, as well as the internal structure of opposition groups in terms of hierarchization, internal cohesion, and general ethos.

The relationship between civil organizations and political parties needs to be carefully analyzed in terms of affinity, differences, backgrounds, and orientations. Related important issues include the degree of linkage between society and political parties, relations among political parties in terms of communication and compromise, and the tradition of political parties and the degree of their connection with society. For instance, the extent of elitist orientation, the nature of the social base, and patterns of interparty rivalry need to be closely analyzed before drawing a conclusion about the role political parties play in the attainment of civil society or democratization.

NEOFAMILISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY

The three key aspects of neofamilism—identity, individual survival strategies, and institutional consequences—impinge on civil society. Neofamilial identity describes how these ties define an individual and prove highly consequential in designing one’s life strategies for survival. The quality of various neofamilial connections also determines the degree of access to state power.

Neofamilism as a strategy refers to the use of neofamilial ties to promote socioeconomic interests; rather than “playing by the rules,” people mobilize such ties to promote their own interests. This behavior interferes with the application of universal norms and predictability in administrative and legal operations. Neofamilism at the institutional level is the consequence of the other two aspects: identity and survival strategy. It refers to the effects that neofamilial identities and survival strategies have on institutions. The social consequence of the development of small, neofamilial units is that society loses its structural configuration and institutions are rendered vulnerable to outside penetration based on neofamilial ties.

In fact, neofamilism operates at both macro and micro levels. At the macro level, neofamilism discourages the creation of class-based units, as seen through rampant regionalism in Korean elections at all levels (legislative and presidential).⁴⁷ At the micro level, transfers and promotions in public bureaucracies are based largely on school and regional ties and are also observed in the business sector; blood, school, and regional ties are salient features in management structures. These characteristics necessitate reconsidering other institutional consequences of Korea’s industrialization; prevalent assumptions about the existence of a coherent middle class, the emergence of civil society, and bureaucratization require serious revision. The Korean middle class shares only an income level; its constituents are otherwise segregated from one another according to their means of gaining access to the state. In fact, the entire society is stratified by the degree of accessibility to state power. As for bureaucratization, contrary to prevalent thought, the Korean bureaucracy has been hollowed out, its bureaucratic elements diminished.

The pervasiveness of neofamilism in Korean society becomes apparent through the lens of the neofamilial structure and its practices and extends to political, administrative, social, and cultural areas. It has become a significant part of defining one’s identity and a means for survival. Widespread neofamilial practices have serious implications for civil society, however defined. For instance, neofamilial practices show how social trust is limited to small groups based on school, blood, and regional ties. Thus “real communication” and information flows do not fully circulate throughout society. People seek “real” information, the value of which is only confirmed through neofamilial ties; trust is established based on the degree of trust attributed to the person providing the information. Consequently, information is not fully shared. The range of people for contact is also limited to those who share neofamilial ties, and those who are connected are treated differently. Inter-neofamilial group boundaries are very rigid. This raises serious issues regarding legal universalism, in that laws are not always applied predictably and equally. It is obvious in this context that the modular citizen is quite inconceivable.⁴⁸

Neofamilial ties have also been used primarily to get access to state power to secure incentives provided by the state. This important fact illustrates attitudes and behavior of dependency upon the state, which is quite contrary to autonomy from the state, as is the case with the state-versus-society or state-in-society models. Indeed, Korean neofamilial practices gave rise to one type of state-leading-society model in which both state and society were weakened in the process of industrialization: the state was hollowed due to constant penetration by neofamilial groups while there lacked a sense of a larger abstract notion of society beyond small group identities.

CIVIC MOVEMENT GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS VERSUS CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS

We now analyze how neofamilism interacted with ruling opposition groups (elites) involved in democratization, social movements, and political parties to clarify the relationship between democratic transition and civil society. The Fifth Republic of South Korea was born in 1981, through a military coup d’état in 1980 after the assassination of Park Chung Hee, marked by amending the constitution to adopt an indirect selection of the president. The collapse of the authoritarian regime was a spectacular process that involved a large coalition of various social and political forces in Korean society: the “June Democratic Uprising,” from June 10 to June 29, 1987, drew ever more diverse and larger sectors of Korean society, reaching the point where the police could not control the situation. The 17-day run of demonstrations ended on June 29 with the Declaration of Democratic Reform by Roh Tae Woo, the ruling party presidential candidate. It was proclaimed by the anti- authoritarian forces that the victory was won by the participation of various sectors of Korean society, such as students and both white- and blue-collar workers, representing a victory of the masses. The June Democratic Uprising was unprecedented in recent Korean political history in terms of the range and scale of participation in democratization, its success the result of long struggles by organized anti-regime groups. Because detailed analysis on anti- authoritarian struggles has been done elsewhere, it suffices here to provide a short overview concerning questions about Korean civil society.⁴⁹

Political relaxation under the Chun Du Hwan regime began in 1983, giving rise to new alliances among students, workers, and church leaders. The Minch’ongyŏn (Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement, YCDM) was launched in 1983 and the Han’guk Nohyop (Korean Council for Labor Welfare, KCLW) was established in 1984. Two national umbrella organizations appeared: the Council of Movement for People and Democracy (CMPD), which emphasized a more radical orientation, and the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR), with a more moderate orientation, organized in 1983 and 1984, respectively. These two organizations were consolidated into Mint’ongyŏn (People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification [PMCDR]) in 1985. In May 1987, the people’s movement groups organized the National Movement Headquarters for Democratic Constitution (NMHDC), 24 groups and organizations that represented labor and peasant organizations, various religious leaders, journalists, writers, and other intellectuals.⁵⁰

Thus, the number of organizations that participated in democratization movements in Korea is quite numerous and impressive and at least provides sound evidence for activism in civil society. It is only reasonable to assume that civil society in Korea contributed to the emergence of democracy and that democratization further facilitated the development of civil society. How can we differentiate Korea’s pattern of civil society development from other cases? The answer depends on how to characterize the nature of the relationship between civil society groups and broader society. One view is that the distinctiveness of Korean civil society, unlike what happened in the state-versus-society model, lies in the fact that the Korean bourgeoisie was under strong state influence even after Korea was considerably industrialized. At the same time, unlike elite-based democratization, in which links with the masses are not closely established, the anti-authoritarian groups who struggled for democratization constantly claimed their connection to Korean masses. This view, while accepting the positive role of civil society in democratization, places the Korean case of the relationship between civil society and democratization as neither a state-versus-society model of the West nor one in which elitist orientation is quite strong, as in Latin America.⁵¹

By recognizing the positive role of civil society yet leaving the Korean case in conceptual limbo, this view does not address the basic problems facing Korean civil society. Even when this view points out the dangers of state influence over and politicization of civil society, it does not adequately explain them. Overcoming such a conceptual limbo requires clear distinctions to be made between an abstract and a macro level of concept such as civil society and the nature of civic organizations within it, on the one hand, and between civic organizations and larger society beyond civil society, on the other. As shown in the four models, civil society groups and civil society either overlap, or the former emerges from the latter only in the state-versus-society model, which describes spontaneous socioeconomic changes following political changes.

The nature of the relationship between civil society groups and larger society needs to be specified depending on the context. For instance, scholars observed that various sectors of Korean society, including the middle class, participated in anti-authoritarian regime struggles and thus supported democratization.⁵² A logical conclusion from this premise is that there wasalmost no gap between political elite groups and larger society. However, one view is that there existed widespread political groups called masses (minjung) that were not only economically but also politically oriented against the upper class. More specifically, it is believed that a sort of collective mass consciousness exists in Korean society. The widespread feeling according to this view is that the masses are separate from upper layers of society and that the latter cannot understand the former. Also strong is the perception that masses should not blindly follow upper layers of Korean society but that they should be autonomous.⁵³

Therefore, the masses are those who are not composed of any singular economic class but are rather an amalgamation of trans-class orientations sharing a similar political orientation against a common enemy (illegitimate ruling groups). An implication of this view is the presumed existence of strong ties between the masses and the anti-authoritarian activist groups. Apart from the question as to the true orientation of the masses—whether they are real entities or describe sentiment—this view does not explain the following conflicting survey results. While about half (49%) were in favor of economic development over democratic reform in 1993, about a quarter (26%) chose democratization over economic development. In 1997, however, less than a tenth (9%) replied that democratization was more important than economic development for their nation. As a result, their desire to live in a greater democracy remains, by and large, an abstract political ideal signifying few of the concrete practices of democratic change.⁵⁴

In practice, there has been little decline in the propensity to which Koreans, whether democrats or non-democrats, are committed to authoritarian means of dealing with national problems, as demonstrated during the first democratic government. A large majority (66%) remains subscribed to the belief that a powerful dictator, such as former General Park Chung Hee, is more effective than a democratic government in handling those problems; a majority (58%) rejects the democratic method of conflict resolution in favor of the authoritarian method.⁵⁵

Thus, the complexity lies in the Janus-faced political orientations of the Korean masses, which supported and even participated in the democratization process while maintaining anti-democratic tendencies as described. Rather than assume the congruence of perspectives between masses and the opposition groups, this complex relationship needs to be explained. One explanation is economic in nature. As political scientist Doh C. Shin concludes, “adherence to such authoritarian practice remains linked to the economic gains that many Koreans personally experienced during three decades of military rule.”⁵⁶ This view may explain the undemocratic tendency but not the pro-democratic side of the masses’ orientation.

A more plausible explanation is provided by historian David Steinberg when he says that democracy may have been taught as “an abstract concept in schools (conformity was taught in practice), but was clearly undercut by observable events outside the classroom.”⁵⁷ According to this view, democratic principles learned at a cognitive level are opposite to the realities of practice, possibly explaining the double-faced orientations of the masses. However, it cannot explain why the masses decided to participate in demonstrations in the late 1980s in particular. In other words, while this view seems reasonable, its universal validity itself is its weakness, thus serving merely as a background variable.

A more crucial variable is the existence of a high level of cognitive dissonance between college life and post-college life. While in college, the majority of students experienced an acute collective guilt that they did not actively participate in student movements.⁵⁸ This psychological burden became exacerbated as they entered the business world after graduating, as they had to accept and follow neofamilial practices for survival. Under such circumstances, cognitive dissonance emerged between real life and the dictates of their consciences. This process served as a base for a psychological and sentimental bridge between salaried white-collar workers and opposition groups, especially student groups.

Another significant situational factor is the Kwangju massacre of 1980, which deeply affected many Koreans. The results of one survey show that the masses were most supportive of “punishing the military leaders who plotted a coup in 1979 and ordered the massacre of Kwangju residents in 1980.”⁵⁹ A high level of concern and propensity to be involved in anti-military regime demonstrations are therefore quite conceivable, given the aforementioned cognitive dissonance already embedded in the minds of many college graduates and the recent memory of the Kwangju incident. In addition, the enhanced economic status of those who joined the struggles must have played some role by providing a sense of confidence. Thus, an array of structural, psychological, and situational factors came into play in the process of the collapse of the authoritarian regime.

A critical note is that the link between the political activists and the masses was based on sentiment, not on any institutionalized mechanism. That the masses targeted the regime rather than the entire system is also important. This means that in both political and civil society, opposition groups are not systematically linked to the general masses once anti-regime struggles are over, and strong neofamilial practices persist at the societal level. This situation can be demonstrated more vividly when attention is directed to problems of Korean civil society formation, as outlined below.

The current status of Korean civil society is better understood by focusing on civic movements and the extent of the gap between civic movement and larger society. The gap vividly manifests in “civic movement without citizens.” This phenomenon can be understood from two perspectives: first, the degree of participation in civic movements can be an indicator at the mass level. As expected from neofamilial structures and ethos, the majority of Korean people conduct their lives in neofamilial settings. As one finding shows, over seven in 10 (73%) are affiliated with at least one of the primordial associations built on fraternal, neighborly, or religious ties. In contrast, only one in six (15%) belongs to any business or communal institutions that symbolize civil life in modern society featuring high levels of industrialization and urbanization.⁶⁰

This means a low portion of Korean people is affiliated with institutions related to civil society. A large majority (85%) is not affiliated with any modern type of mass organizations that directly seek to influence the governing process. Among those affiliated with these types of associations, which serve as channels of representative democracy, a small minority (38%) join multiple and diverse civic associations. This indicates that Korea is still a nation of numerous elements that are closed off from one another.⁶¹ Consequently, the proportion of the population that is affiliated with modern civil associations is 9%, and just 4% is affiliated with interest groups or business associations.⁶² The findings are clear: beyond the organic boundaries of the personal ties deeply rooted in the pre-industrial age, a vast majority of Koreans remain unconnected with one another; they still refuse to join hands with strangers.⁶³ Other survey results roughly show a similar tendency. Among 817 Seoul residents, only 6.2% replied they were participating in civil activities; 17.7% were actively participating 17.7%; and 11.2% stated that they contributed.

From a second perspective, the organizational structure and mode of operations of civil movement organizations indicate a gap between larger society and civil movement groups. First, most civil movement groups are run by former political activists. According to one survey, Korea’s new civic movement is primarily led by civic activists and professors (59%), full-time professional workers (21.3%), volunteers (16.4%), and general membership (3.3%). The proportion of civic activists is much higher in the case of “voice” types of civic organizations (67%), which advocate for change, than in the case of service type organizations (48%), which promote knowledge or engagement.⁶⁴ Personal networks are also important to promoting membership and recruitment of leaders and activists (as opposed to cognitive recruitment in the West) in Korea’s new social movement.⁶⁵ These characteristics reflect that Korea’s civic movement has been top-down in nature, led by professional groups such as social activists, professors, and lawyers. Also, the fact that civil organizations have grown faster in the area of publicity that focuses on raising social, economic, and political issues further reinforced the leadership role of civic activists and professors.

Such organizational features raise several related issues. The weak social basis for civil organizations naturally means a low degree of financial autonomy, which in turn indicates dependency on support from state, business, individual donations, and profit-making projects. The low level of citizen participation leads to decision-making that is largely dominated by a handful of top leaders or permanent staff.⁶⁶ More important is the tendency for civic organizations to expand their focus of interests, which dilutes professional competency. For instance, Korea’s Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (KCEJ) originally covered a range of areas, including unification issues, information and science, environment, women’s issues, urban planning, government reforms, agricultural issues, and international exchanges. The organization has grown to 20 committees and councils, four auxiliary organizations, and 30 regional branches. The expansion of organizational scope is not limited to the KCEJ. As discussed below, virtually every organization has experienced the expansion of organizational scope.

Another noteworthy consequence of the weak social foundation is “attention-seeking” behaviors of these organizations as a way to demonstrate their raisons d’être.⁶⁷ Many civic organizations raise issues to get attention from society, focusing on politically sensitive topics including medicine-pharmacy differentiation, driving out unfit candidates for the National Assembly, and the minority rights movement. Again, this issue-oriented behavior means weak continuity and long-term strategy. Shifting attention from one issue to another sometimes causes the “fallacy of no error.” Civic organizations are faced with issues for which the long-term implications or solutions are uncertain, as they were either poorly understood or prepared.⁶⁸

POLITICIZATION OF KOREAN CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS

Politicization is the most serious consequence of civic movements and organizations without citizen participation; Korean civil organizations have been criticized for being too involved in the political process. The tendency toward politicization takes form in different ways, including excessive attention to political issues, attempts to reorganize into political organizations, and the leadership of civil organizations entering politics. Civic organizations’ tendency to pay heavy attention to political issues is closely related to seeking attention from the general public.⁶⁹

In terms of an oversensitive orientation toward political issues, civil society groups or civil movement groups were primarily concerned with political goals and means, irrespective of socioeconomic conditions. Prior to the 1980s, the major political goals of student movements included anti-Korean-Japanese normalization, an anti-constitutional amendment, opposition to the dispatch of troops to Vietnam, and autonomy from dependence on foreign powers. Recent issues include the reduction of the number of National Assembly members, the revision of political party law, and implementing hearings for high-ranking officials (in doing so, some activities questioned the legality of campaign activities involved in driving out unfit candidates).⁷⁰

The second aspect of politicization is the securing of entry to political positions by civic activists, a tendency supported by several cases. Under the government of Kim Young-sam (1993–98), several leaders of the KCEJ joined either the cabinet or the ruling party.⁷¹ The final aspect of politicization of civic organizations is an inclination to organize separate political parties. Within the KCEJ, the Korea Environment Movement Coalition, and other organizations, there have been serious debates concerning the desirability of converting the civic movement into a political movement. These debates started after the local election in 1995 when some leaders of the KCEJ openly proposed the idea for “political reforms through politicization of civil movements.”⁷² Yet another similar debate came up several months before the 17th National Assembly election in July 2003. Representatives of various civic organizations issued a joint declaration that urged the need to form a new political force for political reforms.⁷³

The reason the anti-authoritarian political activists targeted the regime was that basic political rights, such as voting rights and freedom of association, were granted without struggles in the founding constitutions in 1948 under the influence of the United States. As the target was the regime, not individual rights per se, a growing gap developed between the general masses and the political activists who later became the backbone of civic organizations. That is, the struggles were “upward” against the regime as the political activists did not need to secure basic individual political rights. Such distance from the general masses and upward struggle against the regime led to a situation in which their struggles were closely related to and influenced by the main oppositional political figures, such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young-sam. In fact, different groups of activists supported either of the two prominent political figures of the time.

The people’s movement groups were split into three different camps. The first camp argued for “critical support” (pip’anjŏk chiji) of Kim Dae Jung, who succeeded Kim Young-sam as president and was “relatively progressive.” The PMCDR was aligned with many student organizations, and the YCDM took this position. The second camp called for talks to resume between the two Kims and insisted on negotiating a single candidate. This camp argued that the important issue was not progressiveness but the “electability” of a candidate. The Seoul Labor Movement Coalition and various student groups belonged to this camp. The third camp, composed of many labor unions and radical student groups, deeply distrusted political society and proposed an independent “people’s candidate.” This camp argued that it was time for the people’s movement groups to organize themselves as a meaningful political force.⁷⁴

In this regard it is important to note that even the labor movement was viewed as a part of the political struggle rather than being specifically for the interests of workers, such as strengthening labor unions. While labor leaders were very cautious toward elevating labor disputes at the political level out of fear of political retaliation, students-turned-workers were much more willing. On this difference in perception of the significance regarding labor movements, one former labor activist remarked that “students sometimes do not appreciate how precious our unions are and how many sacrifices we had to make in order to establish these unions.”⁷⁵

Political choices that anti-authoritarian activists made after the breakdown of the authoritarian regime revealed not only the distance between workers and themselves but also where their motives lie. Based on the activists’ affinity for opposition leaders such as Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae Jung, former civic movement leaders joined political groups. In choosing political camps, their personal or regional connections were more important than ideological or policy affinities, as one former activist testified:

It was at the end of 1987 or the beginning of the year 1988 when intellectual groups entered the political world in large numbers. More than 100 of them joined the first opposition party, the Pyongmin Party, between the 1987 presidential election and the April 26 general election. More than 100 intellectuals joined the party if my memory serves me correctly. Most of them entered college between 1974 and 1981. Ten of them ran for office and the rest became party functionaries. Kim Dae Jung promised that if he failed in the presidential election, he would organize a good quality party. We joined him with the thought we could build up a regular party. Put differently, we joined the party as if we were launching a political movement. But now the situation is quite different. Now the new “386” generation does not enter the party as party functionaries.⁷⁶

In fact, it is customary in Korean politics to classify student activists turned politicians in terms of their entry point into politics: for example, the April 19 student uprising group, the June 3 generation of the mid-1960s, the Yushin generation of the 1970s, and “Generation 386” of the 1980s.⁷⁷ What is institutionally significant about Generation 386 of the 1980s and early 1990s democratization is that they are not only large in numbers but are also well organized: their organizations are even called “families,” based on the solidarity founded upon longtime participation in secret ideological circles. As prestigious high school alumni associations constituted major human networks, these “family” organizations have become a major source of political solidarity and groupings. Due to their historical background as secret organizations, they are exclusive and closed to outsiders, as was the case with the Solidarity movement in Poland. Of course, such clandestine organizations existed largely in isolation from the general masses. One former student activist described the situation as follows:

The notion of family is not only limited to explaining student movements in the early 1980s. We need to pay attention to the active “family” alumni associations with the emergence of “Generation 386” as a political force. As well known, high school associations were the main sources of human connections. What is happening now is that informal groups (“families”) are organized based on members of past student movements and are becoming a major source of human connections. In the early 1980s, the core of the Seoul National University underground student movement was called “family” or “team.” The origins of these units vary, but most of them started in 1971, when campus circle activities were banned by special military order, going underground when the circles were disbanded by force. Major underground circles at Seoul National University were “Apple,” “Aka,” “Gate,” “Guggyong,” “Nongbop,” “Kyongbop,” and “Hugyong,” which are acronyms or abbreviations.⁷⁸

The factors above contributing to the distance between political activists and the general masses should be understood in a wider and longer historical perspective that accounts for a strongly embedded tradition of elitism. Elitism here refers to the belief among the intelligentsia and political elites that they should lead society and the masses. When elitism is combined with the senses of backwardness and urgency, elites tend to think that they are the ones who should plan for the future on behalf of society and that whatever they do would be viewed by the rest of society as legitimate and positive. This belief assumes that elites are self-sacrificing and do whatever they can for the future of the country. As such, elites’ behaviors and thoughts have never been empirically scrutinized. Normally, the thoughts of leading groups developed into programs that map the future of the country. Given the push from the West at the end of the 19th century and ensuing colonial rule, ideas of the elite have been seldom tested empirically until the 1960s. Ideas and thoughts of political activists of the 1980s and 1990s were no exception to this pattern. Although the real gap between the elite and the masses narrowed considerably in the 1980s due to industrialization and social and cultural changes, the trend still persisted, as discussed earlier.⁷⁹

Given this perspective, Korean society is faced with two problems: One is building a new political process based on compromise and tolerance in interactions among political elites. The other is establishing a relationship between the masses and political elites, based on a sense of representation rather than responsiveness. Democratization brought about change in political elites; former political opposition groups were given a chance to rule based on a mandate from the people. In the Korean case, groups both old and new mingled, with little concern about policy and political differences. Such a political marriage of convenience has not been conducive to creating new interaction patterns among different political groups. As old wounds and grudges erupted, revenge politics virtually became the dominant pattern of interaction among political elites where mutual backbiting occurs regularly. Such mudslinging among political elites brought about constant revelations of corruption and scandal. The two former presidents were imprisoned for corruption scandals as well as their previous wrongdoings; the sons of presidents were arrested for illegal exercise of influence; and a multitude of corruption and improper behavior by political leaders in the form of “gates” and “winds” captured the eyes of the public incessantly throughout the 1990s.⁸⁰ The ruling elites aired too much dirty laundry to the public largely due to inadvertent fighting among themselves. Invective and acrimonious exchanges of words and behaviors among politicians led the general public to become extremely cynical about politics, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of public authority.

Since the late 1980s, political parties have continued to manipulate regionalism as a way of garnering electoral support (see tables 11 and 12). Just as the developmental state was hollowed out by “dysfunctional” personalistic/tribal/neofamilial allegiances, so the development of a more rational and mature policy/political system was hobbled. Political parties failed to present alternative policy options and new ways of understanding politics, society, and international relations. Instead, they continued to assume an elitist stance, using elections simply as a formal way of securing power.

TABLE 11. Presidential elections by region (in percentages)

Source: Central Election Management Committee, South Korea, cited in Yi Chŏngjin, “Chŏngdang yŏnhap,” 119.

Note: DJP: Democratic Justice Party; RDP: Reunification Democratic Party; PPD: Party for Peace and Democracy; NDJP: New Democratic Justice Party; DLP: Democratic Liberal Party; DP: Democratic Party; UNP: Unification National Party; NCNP: National Congress for New Politics; NKP: New Korea Party; NMDP: New Millennium Democratic Party; GNP: Grand National Party.

TABLE 12. Turnout in national assembly elections

Source: Central Election Management Committee, South Korea, cited in Yi Chŏngjin, “Chŏngdang yŏnhap,” 120.

Political elites frequently reshuffled among different parties in the form of merges and splits, with little regard for the general public. Between 1948 and 1999, there were 150 attempts to merge parties involving 249 parties.⁸¹ Also, the mergers occurred right before and after elections. These figures illustrate the political opportunism of Korean political parties. As with the case of Eastern Europe, Korean political parties played their games without regard for the interests of society, failing to uphold the principle of representing the sentiments of the public. A tendency of Korean political parties to remain particularly attached to regionalism has not contributed to diluting traditional institutions like neofamilism at the societal level; on the contrary, they have exploited them. It is clear from this analysis that neither interaction patterns among political elites nor the political parties’ relationship with the masses has been conducive to the development of civil society; if anything, they have negatively affected it.

STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN KOREA

What was the nature of the Korean state in relation to civil society at the time of democratization? Institutional consequences of state-business interactions based on neofamilism in the process of industrialization eventually caused the “hollowing” of Korea’s bureaucratic structure rather than bureaucratization, as has been argued in Western sociological literature.⁸² The impacts of democratization on an already hollowed-out bureaucracy have been disastrous, as seen in growing and overt political influence on state administration in terms of decision-making and personnel policies. With the system’s weakened ability to limit political influence in staffing major administrative posts, frequent regime changes have meant increasing irregularities in personnel policies. As each new regime attempts administrative reform, the administrative structure has considerably destabilized.

Adding to these factors are frequent revelations of corruption among bureaucrats. In 1991, the number of bureaucrats penalized for misdeeds was 3,996; in 1992, 4,092; in 1993, 7,116; in 1994, 6,223; in 1995, 5,061; and in 2000, 4,507. About 30% to 40% of the cases involved negligence on the job, and in 2000, misconduct at the top was followed by violations of operational codes and bribery. These statistics indicate a low sense of responsibility on the part of individual bureaucrats, enabled by lax organizational discipline.⁸³ The spillover effect from the political arena made matters worse. The negative view of politics as previously described easily extended to public perception of bureaucrats, reinforced by revelations of corruption in both arenas. This has fostered a distrust of state authority among Korean people and has developed into state bashing in which people challenge the state’s decisions. Examples range from everyday situations, such as confronting the police on the street, to bigger issues in which the state’s role of arbitration and coordination are questioned.⁸⁴

Finally, international factors also impinge on prospects for civil society in Korea. Democratization proceeded along with the breakdown of the Cold War international system in the mid-1980s. However, the dismantling of the Cold War in the Korean Peninsula has been rocky and uneven compared to the rest of the world, largely due to the continuity of the North Korean socialist regime. As a result, South Korean views toward North Korea have become highly polarized, and opinions unthinkable during the Cold War are beginning to receive new attention, as evidenced by the Sunshine Policy, which opened up dialogue and interaction between North Korea and South Korea. Adding in the emotional politics of the elite, South Korean policies toward North Korea have become increasingly contentious and divisive.

There are two large trends in Korean society: rapid industrialization in the absence of reinventing tradition has caused insecurity and identity crises alongside a feeling of overconfidence that has manifested into the desire to be recognized by the international community. Compounding these two factors are a sudden loss of confidence in and existential fear about the sustainability of the Korean economic system, expressed in a defensive posture against external “intruders” during and after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. These complex cognitive and psychological dynamics are a fundamental source of institutional and social anxiety, which is closely related to emotional responses to various situations.

These phenomena have taken on a collective nationalistic facade. The nationalistic tendency has made compromise and rational thinking about foreign policies extremely difficult, as seen in the formulation of new policies with the United States. While new patterns of debates on foreign policies have begun to develop, such a nationalistic facade is inconducive to civil society in that it does not easily allow pluralism or tolerance, which is needed in any form of civil society.

Civil society has been a goal to be achieved in and of itself, especially in the forming of a democracy. In the West, it has been a differentiating symbol in comparison with the non-Western world, and in the East, it is a symbol of modernity to be constructed. However, idealizing the concept has created myth and confusion. The main source of confusion comes from a lack of understanding of contextual differences in developmental paths between different regions. A different way of contextualizing historical experiences suggests the possibilities of different patterns of state-society relations, situating the Korean case in that conceptual framework.

Four different models for state-society relations illustrate different paths of social changes and thus civil society, each model determined by different patterns of industrialization and democratization. First, by rejecting the assumption that industrialization brings about universal social consequences, the framework easily differentiates Western cases such as Great Britain from other cases such as South Korea. Spontaneous industrialization brings about social and institutional consequences that differ from state-led industrialization in terms of social units and modes of institutional operation; this in turn affects paths of civil society. In the case of South Korea, neofamilial units have emerged as a result of Korean state-led industrialization, thus affecting the state apparatus and even institutions of anti-authoritarian political groups. In a nutshell, Korean-style industrialization has had the effect of weakening both state and society.

Democratization led by opposition groups occurs in varying social contexts. In this regard, understanding the larger social context in which democratization occurs is important. In contrast to the bottom-up model in Great Britain, a complex relationship exists between opposition groups and the rest of society in terms of general ethos and goals to be achieved. This illustrates a need to reconsider the seemingly automatic relationship between democratization and civil society; democratization may start with some support from society, but that should not assume a simple path for development of civil society from democratization. The sources that support democratization, the institutional dynamics of state and political institutions like parties, the legacies of anti-authoritarian struggles, and international factors are important in this regard. Currently, what is impeding the development of civil society in Korea is politics, namely the political elite and their modes of behavior.

The emotional and vengeful pursuit of political hegemony and a consequent lack of compromise between different parties and strong legacies of regionalism have seriously hampered the facilitation of civil society. In the meantime, the Korean people have undergone tremendous psychological and institutional upheaval. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997, Korean people and society have experienced the clashes of economic institutions between embedded values, behaviors, and institutions, on the one hand, and Western institutions that have been adopted en masse in various fields, including finance, business practices, state bureaucracy, and labor issues, on the other. What sort of equilibrium will eventually emerge remains to be seen. However, Korean neofamilial embeddedness will not disappear. The form and content of Korean civil society will be determined at two levels. The speed and extent to which institutionalization of new political processes will have a significant effect on society will be key factors at the elite level. At the societal level, a new equilibrium between Korean traditions and Western institutions will determine how Korean civil society will take form. Korean civil society will not look the same as civil societies of the West. After all, civil society is neither static nor shrouded in mystery; rather, it is the attempt to grapple with the central problems of modern society. If the question of civil society for the West has been about the atomization of competitive society and a state-dominated existence, the Korean case highlights the imperatives of balancing the constraints needed for survival and the need for participation in Korean political and economic contexts.