Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Yi Munung, Kongŏphwa kwajŏng.
2. Chungang Sŏn’gŏ Kwalli Wiwŏnhoe [National Election Commission], https://www.nec.go.kr/portal/main.do.
3. Based on the author’s survey results, as discussed in chapter 6.
4. Yi Chŏngjin, “Chŏngdang yŏnhap,” 119.
5. Hyŏndae Sahoe Yŏn’guso, Kungmin ŭisik kujo yŏn’gu, 90.
6. Kim Chibŏm et al., Han’guk chonghap sahoe chosa (2011 survey).
7. Pak Hŭi, Han’guk taegiŏp, 221.
8. Mr. K, a unionist; see chapter 6.
9. John H. Goldthorpe, “Theories of Industrial Society”; and Clark Kerr, Future of Industrial Societies.
10. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship; Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant; Byung-Nak Song, Rise of the Korean Economy; and Meredith Woo-Cumings, “Introduction.”
11. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy.
12. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In.
13. Val Burris, “Late Industrialization”; Yow-Suen Sen and Hagen Koo, “Proletarianization”; Kenji Hashimoto, “Class Structure”; and Hong-Zen Wang, “Class Structures”; Sin Kwangyŏng, Kyegŭp kwa nodong undong; Sŏng Hogŭn, Yŏllin sijang, tach’in chŏngch’i; and Kim Hogi, Hyŏndae chabonjŭi.
14. Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn, “Disaster in the Making”; and Chalmers Johnson, “Preconception vs. Observation.”
15. Herbert Blumer differentiated five different responses of tradition to industrialization: rejective, disjunctive, assimilative, supportive, and disruptive. Herbert Blumer, Industrialization, 189ff. This book focuses on assimilative and supportive aspects of the responses of tradition to industrialization.
16. Yasusuke Murakami, “Ie Society” (1984); and Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy.
17. Kenneth Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism”; and Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism.
18. Daniel Harrison Kulp II, Country Life; Ch’oe Chaesŏk, Han’gugin ŭi sahoejŏk sŏnggyŏk; Pak Yŏngsin, Yŏksa wa sahoe pyŏndong; and Ok Sŏnhwa, “Hyŏndae Han’gugin.” Kulp defined familism as follows: “Familism is a social system wherein all behavior, all standards, ideals, attitudes and values arise from, center in, or aim at the welfare of those bound together by the blood nexus fundamentally. The family is therein the basis of reference, the criterion for all judgments. Whatever is good for the family, however that good is conceived, is approved, and developed; whatever is inimical to the interests of the family, however they are formulated, is taboo and prohibited” (xxix).
19. J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, International Systems.
20. Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism.
21. Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 588–89.
22. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Pak Chŏnghŭi sŏnjip, 2:165–91.
23. Inoue Tomoichi, an influential Home Ministry bureaucrat, openly worried that Japan was falling behind the other powers, as measured by several indices of national strength. Not only were the Japanese people working far fewer hours than Western counterparts, even their hens appeared to be less than diligent—laying a mere 40 eggs per year, compared to 70 in Germany. The key to “managing a nation,” concluded Inoue, was “making a people who work harder.” Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, 9.
24. Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 593–94; Holland Hunter, “First Soviet Five-Year Plan,” 245; and Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism, 29. Park Chung Hee’s opening ceremony of the seventh national assembly session, July 10, 1967 (Year Beginning Speech, 1966, 1. 18): “To us one year is merely a moment of the perpetuity and really a short time, but what we can achieve and how we achieve for one year will have a decisive impact on the process of the modernization of fatherland.” For more on Park Chung Hee, see chapter 3.
25. Robert E. Cole, “Theory of Institutionalization,” 52.
26. David L. Hoffmann, Peasant Metropolis, chap. 2.
27. Roger L. Janelli and Dawnhee Yim Janelli, Ancestor Worship; and Seung-Kyung Kim, Class Struggle.
28. Yasusuke Murakami, “Ie Society” (1984); and Stephen Vlastos, Mirror of Modernity. On the ambivalence of post-colonial leaders on their tradition, see Mary Matossian, “Ideologies.”
29. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 416.
30. Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” 21.
31. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy; Hagen Koo, Korean Workers; and William W. Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan.
32. Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason.
33. W. Dean Kinzley, Industrial Harmony; Koji Taira, “Factory Legislation”; Robert E. Cole, “Theory of Institutionalization”; and Robert J. Smith, Japanese Society.
34. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 395.
35. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 394.
36. The social structure of a country’s “transitional phase” should, therefore, be a primary focus of analysis rather than be dismissed as a survival of the past. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 410.
37. “If one wants to give the social structure of Imperial Germany a name, it would be the paradoxical one of an industrial-feudal society.” Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 58.

1. THE SOCIOLOGY OF LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION

1. Herbert Blumer, Industrialization, 3.
2. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics; Walt W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth; Clark Kerr, Future of Industrial Societies; and John H. Goldthorpe, “Theories of Industrial Society.”
3. Peter A. Hall, “Dilemmas,” 137; and Arif Dirlik, “Rethinking Colonialism,” 444.
4. The clear sign for admission to the end of universalism was Samuel Huntington’s remark that the United States is a unique case. Samuel P. Huntington, “West Unique,” 28–46.
5. An exception to this trend is literature on world-system theory and the dependency school. However, insofar as social changes are considered, they were viewed as the reflection of economic realities. Immanuel Wallerstein, Capitalist World-Economy; and Immanuel Wallerstein, Politics of the World-Economy.
6. The second reason history matters is that actors or agents can learn from experience. Historical institutionalists understand that behavior, attitudes, and strategic choices take place inside particular social, political, economic, and even cultural contexts. Sven Steinmo, “Institutionalism,” 183.
7. Wolfgang Streeck, “Taking Capitalism Seriously.”
8. Peter Evans, “Development as Institutional Change.”
9. Jeremy Boissevain, “Place of Non-Groups,” 544–46. Non-group refers either to individual or to the process of transition from individual level to group level. See also Eric R. Wolf, “Kinship, Friendship.”
10. Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto.”
11. Examples are the non-group approach proposed in social anthropology; second society and neotraditionalism in approaching socialist societies; and, finally, a proposition that a new paradigm is needed to understand post-socialist societies, focusing not on change from a traditional to modern society but where transition from socialist modern to capitalist modern society occurs. Liping Sun, “Societal Transition.”
12. John H. Goldthorpe, “Employment, Class, and Mobility.”
13. John Walton, “Theory and Research.”
14. Marx said in Capital: “Ironically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.” Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 383. On Marx’s thought on India, see Ashutosh Kumar, “Marx and Engels.” On the limitations of rational-choice theory in capturing distinctiveness and subtle- ties in area studies, see Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn, “Disaster in the Making.”
15. Ralph Miliband, State in Capitalist Society; Nicos Poulantzas, “Problem of the Capitalist State”; Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization; and Bob Jessop, Capitalist State.
16. Theda Skocpol, “Critical Review”; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions; Peter Evans, Dependent Development; Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In; and Fred Block, Revising State Theory.
17. Scholars in the so-called varieties of capitalism school, for instance, also tried to understand the “institutional similarities and differences among the developed economies” as a “response to the economic problems”; see Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism.
18. Chalmers Johnson, MITI.
19. Bruce Cumings, “Legacy”; Thomas B. Gold, State and Society; Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant; Robert Wade, Governing the Market; Ziya Öniş, “Logic”; and Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift.
20. Peter B. Evans, Dependent Development; and Peter Evans, “Class, State, and Dependence.”
21. The embedded autonomy framework by Peter Evans was first proposed by Karl Polanyi, who questioned the myth of the free market and argued that markets are socially embedded. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy; and Karl Polanyi, Great Transformation. The direction of focus is from society to market or economics rather than from economics to society, which is the focus of this book.
22. In this respect, the present study takes quite the opposite approach from that of economic sociology, which posits that society was incorporated to the extent that it helps to explain economic change.
23. Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, “Sociological Perspective”; and Richard Swedberg, “Economic and Sociological Approaches.”
24. Peter A. Hall, “Dilemmas,” 137.
25. Sin Kwangyŏng, Kyegŭp; Sŏng Hogŭn, Yŏllin sijang; and Kim Hogi, Hyŏndae chabonjŭi.
26. Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, “Social Class.”
27. E. P. Thompson, English Working Class, 11; Ronald Aminzade, Class, Politics; Richard Biernacki, Fabrication of Labor; Craig Calhoun, Question of Class Struggle; Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class; William H. Sewell Jr., Work and Revolution; and D. Lockwood, “Sources of Variation.”
28. Michael Mann, “Sources of Variation.”
29. Michael Mann, “Sources of Variation.”
30. Neville Kirk, “History.”
31. David Camfield, “Re-orienting Class Analysis,” 427.
32. James Wickham, “Social Fascism”; and Michael Mann, “Sources of Variation.”
33. This refers to the repressed and underprivileged elements of the populace as a whole, without any clear structural configuration. Hagen Koo, Korean Workers.
34. Max Weber’s focus on the intervention of status and power in the market is a good starting point to think about different patterns of social change, due to different weights of state and market in industrialization. Also, his consideration of status brings back the persistence of traditional institutions and values in approaching social change under state-led industrialization. In short, the critical question regarding social change in late industrialization is how to consider the strong role of the state and traditional institutions and values. Max Weber, “Status Groups and Classes,” 302–5.
35. Edward Shils, Tradition, 12.
36. Daniel Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society.
37. Olivia Harris, “Temporalities of Tradition,” 7.
38. Eric R. Wolf, “Kinship”; Edward Shils, Tradition; and Ruth Benedict, Chrysanthemum and the Sword.
39. Edward Shils, Tradition, 15.
40. “Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.” Jaroslav Pelikan, Vindication, 8.
41. Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets.
42. Karl W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization.”
43. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 372.
44. S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”; and Yu Yingshi, Chinese History, 372.
45. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 411.
46. “Modernity can be seen as a process of radical creation out of the past, rather than the outcome of the functional differentiation, rationalization, conformity to the Western social institution, or indeed to modernization.” Jeremy Smith, “Japan’s Modernity,” 102.
47. Chee Meow Seah, Asian Values; Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond, “Confucius Connection”; Kuan Yew Lee, “Asian Values”; Francis Fukuyama, “Asian Values”; and David S. Landes, Wealth and Poverty.
48. Masahiko Aoki, Comparative Institutional Analysis; Chalmers Johnson, MITI; and Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism.
49. W. Dean Kinzley, Industrial Harmony; Koji Taira, “Factory Legislation”; Robert E. Cole, “Theory of Institutionalization”; Robert J. Smith, Japanese Society; and Stephen Vlastos, Mirror of Modernity.
50. On socialist cases of interactions between modernization and tradition, see Kenneth Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism”; and Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism.
51. J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, International Systems; and S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities.”
52. Ibrahim Kaya, Social Theory.
53. Yun-Shik Chang, “Personalist Ethic,” 124.
54. Norman Jacobs, Korean Road to Modernization.
55. Gregory Henderson, Korea.
56. Pak Yŏngsin, Yŏksa wa sahoe pyŏndong; Pak Hŭi, “Han’guk taegiŏp”; Kim Manhŭm, “Chŏngch’i kyunyŏl”; Kim Yonghak, “Ellit’ŭ ch’ungwŏn”; Yu Sŏkch’un and Sim Chaebŏm, “Han’guk sahoe pyŏnhyŏk”; and Yun-Shik Chang, “Personalist Ethic.”
57. Yi Munung, Kongŏphwa kwajŏng; and Ch’oe Chaesŏk, Han’gugin.
58. Clark W. Sorensen, Over the Mountains; Roger L. Janelli, Making Capitalism; and Seung-Kyung Kim, Class Struggle.
59. Cho Hyŏng, “Han’guk ŭi tosi pigongsik”; and Hŏ Sŏngnyŏl, “Tosi muhŏga.”
60. In this regard, Dore’s remarks a generation ago are quite apt and relevant to this study: “The predominance of this kind of personalistic dependency may be ascribed to cultural and personality characteristics.… But it can also be attributed to the structural characteristics of society.… The situation is clearly different from that in the societies which nurtured bourgeois liberalism.” Ronald P. Dore, “South Korean Development,” 299–300, 301.
61. Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany; and Reinhard Bendix, “Preconditions of Development.”
62. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness.
63. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Imperialism.
64. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 395.
65. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 394.
66. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 33–37.
67. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 44.
68. Lysbeth Walker Muncy, Junker.
69. Yasusuke Murakami, “Ie Society” (1985); and Steven Rosefielde, “Stalinism.” On Korea, see chapter 2.
70. Max Weber, cited in Richard Swedberg, “Afterword,” 379.
71. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 44.
72. Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1:302–5.

2. THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF NEOFAMILISM

1. Sin Yongha, Ilche singminji kŭndaehwanon; Yang Chihye, “Chŏnsi ch’ejegi”; and Kim Kyŏngil, Ilje ha nodong undongsa.
2. Sin Yongha, Ilche singminji kŭndaehwanon, 35.
3. Hŏ Suyŏl, Kaebal ŏmnŭn kaebal.
4. An Pyŏngjik, “Singminji Chosŏn ŭi koyong kujo”; An Pyŏngjik, “Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa”; Dennis L. McNamara, Colonial Origins; Carter J. Eckert, Offspring of Empire; Cho Sŏkkon, “Sut’allon kwa kŭndaehwaron”; Chŏng T’aehŏn, “Sut’allon ŭi songnyuhwa”; and Sin Yongha, “Singminji kŭndaehwaron.”
5. That the development-exploitation debate has intensified in proportion to Korean achievement of extraordinarily high and rapid economic growth (in effect, raising the political stakes) again suggests that a political agenda has been interposed between data and theory.
6. Pae Sŭngjun, “Chosŏn kongŏphwa”; An Pyŏngjik, “Singminji Chosŏn ŭi koyong kujo”; and Yang Chihye, “Ilbon Chilso Piryo Chusik Hoesa.”
7. A critical remark on colonial studies made in another context is also relevant to the Korean case: “Modernity was never itself the object of a non-teleological criticism. This is what the post-colonial present demands. Rather than the anti-colonial problems of overthrowing colonialism (or the West) what is important for this present is a critical interrogation of the practices, modalities, and projects through which modernity inserted itself into and altered the lives of the colonized.” David Scott, “Colonialism,” 523.
8. For a critical discussion of this problem in political science and area studies, see Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn, “Disaster in the Making”; and Chalmers Johnson, “Preconception vs. Observation.”
9. Bruce Cumings, “Origins and Development.”
10. Michael Robinson, “Broadcasting”; and Kim Tongno, “Singmin sidae ŭi kŭndaejŏk sut’al.”
11. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, Colonial Modernity, introduction and chap. 3.
12. Soon-Won Park, “Colonial Industrial Growth, 131.
13. Georges Balandier, “Colonial Situation,” 51.
14. Georges Balandier, “Colonial Situation,” 54.
15. Of course, Balandier’s main concern was the way ethnic groups or tribes were treated in the African context, as if they were a part of a social whole without considering the colonial situation. His inter-ethnic premise of the colonial situation can be extrapolated more generally to issues between different sectors, such as political, social, and economic sectors. I thank Clark Sorensen for reminding me of this point.
16. P. Mercier, “Problems of Social Stratification,” 341.
17. D. M. P. McCarthy explores how colonial bureaucrats’ interest in control hindered market development in Tanganyika (Tanzania). D. M. P. McCarthy, Colonial Bureaucracy.
18. Georges Balandier, “Colonial Situation,” 28.
19. For the case of American Indians, see Thomas R. Berger, Long and Terrible Shadow.
20. Peter P. Ekeh, Colonialism and Social Structure, 17.
21. Fanny Colonna, “Educating Conformity,” 362.
22. Ekeh suggested three forms of institutions in a colonial society as an example of the fragmentation of colonial society (indigenous institutions, migrated institutions, and emergent social institutions). Peter P. Ekeh, Colonialism and Social Structure, 15.
23. Landlords were not easily able to transform themselves into capitalists because of the colonial power’s interest in control in the rural areas. Bruce Cumings, “Legacy,” 492.
24. “Secondary adjustments, namely, practices that do not directly challenge staff but allow inmates to obtain forbidden satisfactions or to obtain permitted ones by forbidden means. These practices are variously referred to as the angles, knowing the ropes, conniving, gimmicks, deals or ins. Such adaptations apparently reach their finest flower in prisons, but of course other total institutions are overrun with them, too. Secondary adjustments provide the inmate with important evidence that he is still his own man, with some control of his environment; sometimes a secondary adjustment becomes a kind of lodgment for the self.” Erving Goffman, Asylums, 55.
25. Fanny Colonna, “Educating Conformity,” 354.
26. Fanny Colonna, “Educating Conformity,” 358.
27. Fanny Colonna, “Educating Conformity,” 362.
28. Chŏng Chaech’ŏl, Ilje ŭi tae Han’guk singminji kyoyuk, chap. 6.
29. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, 265.
30. Gregory Henderson, Korea, 89. Korea was referred to as Chōsen in Japanese during the colonial rule.
31. An analysis of the school records of Kyŏnggi High School reveals that as colonial rule progressed, a more sophisticated list of items to check student behaviors was developed. For instance, in 1918 there were nine items—personality, behavior, strength, weakness, hobbies, facial look, uniform, language, and punishment—and by 1930 there were 11—character, willpower, behavior, language, skills, strength, weakness, special features, hobbies, punishment/reward, and student activity. Ha Yong-Chool, “Analysis of School Registrars.”
32. Han Uhŭi, “Pot’ong hakkyo,” 63.
33. Han Uhŭi, “Pot’ong hakkyo,” 65.
34. Han Uhŭi, “Pot’ong hakkyo,” 65. In 1915, only 17.7% of school-aged children in the urban areas and 2.6% of those in rural areas entered primary schools, and in 1926, it changed to 33.8% and 16.2%, respectively. Han Uhŭi, “Pot’ong hakkyo,” 67.
35. Gregory Henderson, Korea, 90.
36. Many Japanese officials referred to this phenomenon of educational credentialism. Zenshō Eisuke, Suigen gun ichi, 110; and Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsenjin no shisō to seikaku.
37. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, 266.
38. Annual Government General’s Office Statistical Reports, respective years, cited in Hashitani Hiroshi, “1930–40nyŏndae Chosŏn sahoe,” 398.
39. Tongnip Undongsa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, Tongnip undongsa 9, 300.
40. Chŏng Sehyŏn, Hangil haksaeng; Kim Sŏngsik, Iljeha Han’guk haksaeng; and Cho Tonggŏl, “Han’guk kŭndae haksaeng undong.”
41. Cho Tonggŏl, “Han’guk kŭndae haksaeng undong,” 326–27.
42. Chōsen Sōtokufu, Keimukyoku, Dōmei kyūkō, 6–7, 43–46.
43. Chōsen Sōtokufu, Keimukyoku, Dōmei kyūkō, 52–53.
44. Tongnip Undongsa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, Tongnip undongsa 9, 696.
45. The numbers were recounted based on data in Cho Tonggŏl, “Han’guk kŭndae haksaeng undong,” 326–91.
46. Cho Tonggŏl, “Han’guk kŭndae haksaeng undong,” 458–60.
47. Pak Kyŏngsik, Ilbon chegukchuŭi, 544–53. For similar patterns in other cases, see Cho Tonggŏl, “Han’guk kŭndae haksaeng undong,” 450; and Kyŏngsang-buktosa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, Kyŏngsang-buktosa, 1:460.
48. Pak Kyŏngsik, Ilbon chegukchuŭi, 314.
49. Gregory Henderson, Korea, 111.
50. Social networks were formed through school ties to protect their interests; Sollin high school graduates, many of whom became employees of the Korean Shokusan Bank, looked after one another in terms of promotion and transfer, reflecting limited social trust basis for all leading elite groups in a dynamic environment. For the landlord case, see Hong Sŏngch’an, Han’guk kŭndae nongch’on, 350–61.
51. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, 84.
52. In this regard, an article in Tong-A Ilbo (April 12, 1927) is revealing: “Industrial development draws rural people to cities. Rural youth’s dream is to leave the villages to enjoy cultural activities in cities. What of the Korean situation? There is no pull of rural youth from industrial sectors, but land is being taken away from peasants and exploitation of landlords is becoming more severe and threatening the lives of peasants.” Quoted in Kim Yŏnggŭn, “1920nyŏndae nodongja,” 147.
53. Sin Yongha, Han’guk kŭndae sahoesa yŏn’gu; Chu Ponggyu, Ilcheha nongŏp kyŏngjes; and Ch’a Kibyŏk, Ilche ŭi Han’guk singmin t’ongch’i.
54. Untouchables refers to official slaves, kisaeng (female entertainer at a bar), and butchers, for example.
55. Kim Yŏngmo, “Ilje sidae taejiju,” 110–11.
56. Zenshō Eisuke, Kōryō-gun, 196.
57. Practically all the official publications on rural conditions used these categories. For examples, see notes 67 and 68.
58. Ha Yong-Chool, “Analysis of School Registrars.”
59. Zenshŏ Eisuke, “Chōsen ni okeru dōzoku buraku no kōzō,” 20.
60. Zenshō Eisuke, “Chōsen ni okeru dōzoku buraku no kōzō.”
61. Keikido Naimufu, Keikido nŏson shakai jijyŏ, 26, 27, 29.
62. Keikido Naimufu, Keikido nŏson shakai jijyŏ, 28.
63. Hong Sŏngch’an, Han’guk kŭndae nongch’on, 359.
64. Inaba Iwakichi, “Chōsen no bunka mondai,” 80–81. He further observed that there are no extended families without yangban.
65. For colonial authorities choosing landowners, see Hong Sŏngch’an, Han’guk kŭndae nongch’on, 359.
66. Yasuda Mikita, “Chōsen ni okeru kazoku,” 9–10.
67. Nomura Chōtaro, “Chōsen kazoku,” 21.
68. Suzuki Eitarō, “Chōsen no nōson,” 7, cited in Hashitani Hiroshi, “1930–40nyŏndae,” 409.
69. Zenshō Eisuke, Chōsen no shuraku zenhen, 593.
70. Mun Sojŏng, “Iljeha Han’guk nongch’on,” 18.
71. Ha Sangrak, “Ilche sidaeŭi sahoe pojang,” 27–31.
72. O Chŏng, “Chōsen no shinzoku kankei,” 103.
73. Zenshō Eisuke, Chōsen no shuraku zenhen, 110.
74. Ki Chŏn, “Chugŭl saram,” 2–3.
75. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, 187.
76. Essential elements include a household head with strong authority and loosely blood-based kin structure.
77. Kawashima Takeyoshi, Kazoku oyobi kazokuhō, 205–55; and Patrick Beillevaire, “Family,” 242–43.
78. Kang Inch’ŏl, “Han’guk chŏnjaeng kwa sahoe insik.”
79. Kim Tongch’un, “1950nyŏndae Han’guk,” 206.
80. Kim Tongch’un, “1950nyŏndae Han’guk,” 199.
81. Kim Tongch’un, “1950nyŏndae Han’guk,” 200.
82. On the confused family law system at the end of the colonial rule, see Yang Hyŏna, “Han’guk ŭi hoju chedo”; Hong Yanghŭi, “Singminji sigi ch’injok kwansŭp”; Sungyun Lim, Rules of the House; and Kwŏn Hŭijŏng, “Singminji sidae Han’guk kajok.” On how the adoption of the myŏn as a new administrative unit dissolved voluntary basis of the village-based self-help institution (tonggey), see Yun Haedong, Chibae wa chach’i. On the failed attempt to change Korean tradition, see the case of the attempt to abolish local bazaars in colonial Korea: Hŏ Yŏngnan, Ilje sigi changsi yŏn’gu. And on the partial success of the colonial reform, the enforcement of lunar calendar system, and local bazaars, see Hŏ Yŏngnan, Ilje sigi changsi yŏn’gu, part 2.
83. In this context Bendix’s comment is quite apt: “Another limitation becomes apparent when one applies these concepts to colonial and post-colonial societies. Can any colonial society be said to have the characteristics of ‘tradition’? Does it have universally accepted norms? And since the prevailing norms surely do not apply to the subject population, in what sense can one in fact speak of one society? To contrast the past and present social structure one should take account of at least two traditions: the native tradition and the tradition of a dual society created by the colonizing country.” Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 403.
84. James Mahoney, “Path Dependence.”

3. THE STATE AND TRADITION

1. On the early life of Park Chung Hee, see Carter J. Eckert, Park Chung Hee.
2. Han’guk Kunsa Hyŏngmyŏngsa P’yŏnch’anwiwŏnhoe p’yŏn, Han’guk kunsa hyŏngmyŏngsa, 3.
3. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Kukka wa hyŏngmyŏng kwa na, 29–30. For another example of Park’s negative view of Korean history, see Pak Chŏnghŭi, Minjok ŭi chŏryŏk, 252.
4. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Chungdan, 271.
5. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Choguk ŭi kŭndaehwa, 6. For another example, see Pak Chŏnghŭi, Minjok ŭi chŏryŏk, 252.
6. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Country, the Revolution and I, 252.
7. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Choguk ŭi kŭndaehwa, 158.
8. Park also points out the relative backwardness vis-à-vis Japan (Pak Chŏnghŭi, Pak Chŏnghŭi sŏnjip, 5:386) and North Korea (Pak Chŏnghŭi, Pak Chŏnghŭi sŏnjip, 1:16).
9. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Pak Chŏnghŭi sŏnjip, 3:119.
10. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Pak Chŏnghŭi sŏnjip, 1:2.
11. Sin Hangsu, “Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏnggwŏn”; and Kim Tongno, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae.”
12. Mary Matossian, “Ideologies.”
13. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Chungdan, 269.
14. Pak Chŏnghŭi, annual New Year message, January 18, 1966, cited in Chŏng Chaegyŏng, Pak Chŏnghŭi, 2:487.
15. Opening Ceremony of the 7th National Assembly session, July 10, 1967, cited in Chŏng Chaegyŏng, Pak Chŏnghŭi, 2:486. A similar statement was made: “To us one year is merely a moment of the perpetuity and really a short time, but what we can achieve and how we achieve for one year will have a decisive impact on the process of the modernization of fatherland.” Pak Chŏnghŭi, annual New Year message, January 18, 1966, cited in Chŏng Chaegyŏng, Pak Chŏnghŭi, 2:487.
16. T’onggyech’ŏng, T’onggyero pon Han’guk, 313.
17. T’onggyech’ŏng, T’onggyero pon Han’guk, 136–37.
18. Yi Taegŭn, “Han’guk chŏnjaeng,” 306–7.
19. Kim Taehwan, “1950nyŏndae Han’guk,” 181.
20. Tanimura Takeo, “Haebang hu chabon hyŏngsŏng,” 312–31.
21. Edward S. Mason et al., Economic and Social Modernization, 13.
22. Pak Chongch’ŏl, “Suip taech’e wŏnjo.”
23. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, 94–97.
24. His sense of urgency to overcome backwardness manifested in his preoccupation with the scale of business, such as production capacity. For example, in 1966, given the domestic market for ethylene, an international consultant recommended producing 30,000 tons, but considering the capacity for export in the future, 60,000 tons was considered; Park raised it to 100,000 tons. O Wŏnch’ŏl, “Sanŏp chŏnllyak kundan sa,” September 24, 1992.
25. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 119.
26. Pak Chunghun, Minister of Industry and Commerce under Park Chung Hee, interview with Han’guk Kyŏngje Sinmun [Korea Economic Daily], October 12, 1992.
27. The first and perhaps most important difference between the Rhee and Park regimes was the degree of leadership commitment to growth. Rhee was an independence leader who devoted his attention to politics and national integration while largely ignoring economics. Park’s orientation could not be more different, with economic growth having priority second only to national and personal political survival. Since only the higher goals are seen as being furthered by growth, economic affairs have been enshrined as the dominant operational system objective. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, 290.
28. For details on the history and contents of Korea’s economic plans and the state’s role in economic development and transition to export promotion strategy, see Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government; and Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant.
29. Different interpretations exist for the reason to shift to the export promotion strategy under the Park Chung Hee regime. On the domestic origin of the policy shift, see Kimiya Tadasi, Pak Chŏnghŭi. On the US influence, see Yi Pyŏngjŏn, “Naengjŏn pundan ch’eje”; on the domestic response to US influence, see Stephan Haggard, Pathways. For comparisons of ISI and export-led industrialization (ELI) strategies, see Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, Manufacturing Miracles; and Stephan Haggard, Pathways.
30. A contrast in economic opportunities between import substitution and export promotion can be seen in the increase of manufacturing firms from 15,204 in 1960 to 25,726 in 1977, while the number of workers employed in those manufacturing firms increased from 275,254 to 1,918,981 during the same period. Eui Hang Shin and Seung Kwon Chin, “Social Affinity,” 8.
31. Anne O. Krueger, “Political Economy.”
32. Kim Chusin, the second interview, December 18, 1999.
33. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, 254.
34. O Wŏnch’ŏl, Chunghwahak kongŏphwa, 179, cited in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 128.
35. Mr. O, interview by the author, April 18, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 139.
36. Wontack Hong, Trade, Distortions, 82–83; and Youngil Lim, Government Policy, 18.
37. Youngil Lim, Government Policy, 24.
38. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], March 29, 1963, 4; and Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], November 27, 1962, 1.
39. O Wŏnchŏl, “Sanŏp chŏnllyak kundan sa,” September 30, 1992, 3, cited in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 137–38.
40. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, chap. 4.
41. O Wŏnch’ŏl called this method “impact policy.” The main ideas behind this approach were that if the state selects and nurtures strategic industries, (1) the level of all industries will be one step further elevated; (2) the effect will reach the entire economy; (3) investment efficiency will improve; and (4) time for industrialization will be shortened. In Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 107.
42. Mr. K, interview by the author, January 26, 2015, discussed in chapter 6.
43. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 129.
44. Song Hyorim, Kakkaisŏ pon Pak Chŏnghŭi, 102.
45. O Wŏnch’ŏl, Han’gukhyŏng kyŏngje kŏnsŏl, 3:343, cited in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 130.
46. Kim Chusin, the second interview, December 18, 1999.
47. O Wŏnch’ŏl, “Sanŏp chŏnllyak kundan sa,” September 24, 1992, cited in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 120.
48. O Wŏnch’ŏl, “Sanŏp chŏnllyak kundan sa,” September 24, 1992, cited in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 120.
49. One example for President Park’s urgency was well reflected in the following case. He ordered a comprehensive overhaul of export policies based on resolving differences and coordination among ministries involved in exports, but the report should be done within 10 days. Office of the President, “Such’ul ch’okchin’gwa sin sijang kaech’ŏk” [Export promotion and market expansion], in Taet’ongnyŏng ŭimyŏng jisi [Based on president’s order], document no. 91-1, tae 1-1, no. 48, December 5, 1964.
50. His sense of urgency manifested itself in several different ways. It was clearly seen in his frequent visits to industrial sites for personal inspection. For example, for the 22 months between his inauguration and October 1965, he recorded 43 local visits over 109 days. This means he spent 1.15 days per week for field visits, and by 1977 the number of visits reached 183. Song Hyorim, Kakkaisŏ pon Pak Chŏnghŭi, 102.
51. In another example, on April 10, 1973, regarding the compensation issues for industrial zones, President Park ordered the final decisions to be ready right away, and the report was done in four days. Office of the President, “Kakha chisi sahang chung chunghwahakkongŏppunya sujŏng (pujŏnji)” [Revision of president’s instructions on heavy-chemical industry sector], in Taet’ongnyŏng ŭimyŏng jisi [Based on president’s order], document no. 91-1, tae 2-2, no. 214, April 14, 1973.
52. O Wŏnch’ŏl, interview by the author, April 18, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 165.
53. Businessman L interview, April 22, 2002, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 165.
54. O Wŏnch’ŏl, personal communication with the author, April 13, 2001.
55. Pragmatism refers to the tendency to easily make changes to accommodate the need to realize set goals. It is natural that pragmatism becomes frequent due to the sense of urgency and under strong pressure to realize unrealistically high economic targets. The background of pragmatism in decision-making and implementation is that any means can be mobilized to achieve goals. Here it highlights the situation where due to the lack of experience of the state and business, decisions are made hurriedly and frequently change. See Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, 60–61.
56. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, 63.
57. T. Seo, personal communication with the author, May 29, 2001.
58. Mr. S, interview by the author, October 6, 1999, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 173.
59. O Wŏnch’ŏl, Han’gukhyŏng kyŏngje kŏnsŏl, 7:524–27.
60. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 139.
61. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 189.
62. Han Chŏnghwa, “Han’guk taegiŏp,” 423.
63. For Park Chung Hee’s reliance on the military, see Suk-Choon Cho, “Bureaucracy,” 73; and Se-Jin Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, 161–66.
64. On the details regarding the increasing regional bias toward the southeast, see Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, chap. 4. The southeast population was 19% of the whole population. Kim Manhŭm, Han’guk ŭi chŏngch’i kyunyŏl, 81.
65. Son Chongho, “Han’guk kogŭp kongmuwŏn,” 11.
66. Ha Taegwŏn, “Han’guk insa haengjŏng,”108.
67. Pak Tongsŏ, Han’guk kwallyo chedo; Yu Hun, “Han’guk kogŭp kongmuwŏn”; No Chŏnghyŏn, “Han’guk kwallyo”; Yang Sŏngch’ŏl, Han’guk chŏngburon; Son Chongho, “Han’guk kogŭp kongmuwŏn”; and Kim Manhŭm, “Han’guk ŭi chŏngch’i kyunyŏl.” On the provincial origins of high-ranking officials, see Ha Taegwŏn, “Han’guk insa haengjŏng,” 108.
68. The southeastern region includes North and South Kyŏngsang Provinces, and southwestern region includes North and South Chŏlla Provinces. Park Chung Hee was from the southeastern region (North Kyŏngsang Province).
69. Chŏng Chŏnggil, Taet’ongnyŏng ŭi kyŏngje ridŏsip.
70. Mr. L, former official of the MCI, interview by the author, April 15, 2000, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 105.
71. On the data sources, Yong-Chool Ha and Myung-Koo Kang, “Creating a Capable Bureaucracy,” 83–91. On the trend of the number of SNU graduates, see Yong-Chool Ha and Myung-Koo Kang, “Creating a Capable Bureaucracy,” 91.
72. Examples of company-specific incentives are clearly seen in Article 46 of the Enforcement Decree of Trade Law. The article was revised 11 times from 1967 to 1979; most of the revisions were aimed at permitting particular companies or nstitutions to import certain goods. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 177–78.
73. Pak Pyŏngyun, “Chunghwahak,” 59.
74. Pak Pyŏngyun, “Chunghwahak,” 62–67.
75. Kong Chŏngja, “Han’guk taegiŏpka,” 202–3.
76. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], July 19, 1980.
77. Y. Yi, personal communication with the author, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 143.
78. Pak Hŭi, “Han’guk taegiŏp,” 127. It is not merely coincidental that this pattern was similar to that within the government. Ch’oe Tonggyu, Sŏngjang sidae, 318.
79. Pak Pyŏngyun, “Chunghwahak,” 59.
80. Pak Pyŏngyun, “Chunghwahak,” 84.
81. Hong Wan’gi, interview by the author, November 24, 1999, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 88.
82. Nam Ch’unho, “Inongmin ŭi chigŏp idong.”
83. Roger L. Janelli, Making Capitalism, 136; Robert F. Spencer, Yŏgong; and Seung-Kyung Kim, Class Struggle. Regionalism was pervasive among workers on a daily basis: for example, when a watch went missing in a female dormitory of a factory in the Changwon-Masan industrial complex, a female worker from the southeastern region immediately suspected that one from the southwestern region stole it. Seung-Kyung Kim, Class Struggle, 24.
84. Mr. L, interview by the author, April 7, 2002, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 167.
85. Mr. P, interview by the author, August 10, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 168.
86. Mr. L, interview by the author, April 7, 2002, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 180.
87. Mr. L, interview by the author, April 10, 2000, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 182.
88. Mr. H, interview by the author, November 17, 1999, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 184.
89. Mr. O, interview by the author, April 18, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 185.
90. Privatism is defined here as attitude and behavior in both private and public spheres, based on exclusivity against people outside neofamilial connections. This sense is different from that used by Jürgen Habermas, who tends to focus on individuals’ political indifference by retreat from politics and turning to (nuclear) family, career, and consumption in an advanced capitalist context. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 75. However, privatism in the context of civil society in Korea is analogous to what Kerstin Jacobsson calls civic privatism in Poland. She differentiates the privatism of Habermas from civil privatism as follows: “I use civic privatism to connote an attitude of active individuals to their engagement in civil society and thus based on a civic/citizen identity. What I am arguing in this study of animal rights/welfare activists in Poland is that the ethos of the private sphere is readily brought into their civil society engagement.” Kerstin Jacobsson, “Rethinking Civic Privatism,” 85.
91. Louis Wirth, “Urbanism,” 36–42.
92. Kim Manhŭm, “Chŏngch’i kyunyŏl.”
93. Leroy P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, 266.
94. Sŏ Chaejin, Han’guk ŭi chabonga kyegŭp, 124.
95. Hong Changp’yo, “Han’guk esŏ ŭi hach’ŏng,” 111.
96. Hong Wan’gi, personal communication with the author, November 24, 1999, in Ha Yongch’ul, in Hubal sanŏphwa, 188.
97. Han Iksu, CEO, Hanil Precision Machinery, interview by the author, July 16, 2015.
98. Nodongch’ŏng, Han’guk nodong t‘onggye yŏn’gam, 52–59.
99. Kap-Hwan Oh and Hae-Young Lee, “Urbanism in Korea,” 234.
100. Once any group is organized based on school, regional, blood, and other ties, it easily turns into one beyond the original purpose of the group. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Choguk ŭi kŭndaehwa, 16.
101. Ŭn Chŏngt’ae, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae”; Kim Tongno, “Simin undong”; and Ch’oe Yŏnsik, “Pakchŏnghŭi ŭi minjok.”
102. Pak Chŏnghŭi, Pak Chŏnghŭi sŏnjip, 1:102–14. However, he never failed to mention negative aspects of tradition, such as lack of sincerity and carrying through, the yangban system, hierarchy orientation, clannishness, regionalism, and school ties. Chŏng Chaegyŏng, Pak Chŏnghŭi, 2:485.
103. There were some exceptions, such as the New Ritual Ordinance, which tried to change wasteful practices of marital ceremony and ancestral worship. See Ko Wŏn, “Pak Chŏnghŭi.” The New Village Movement was named as such in 1969 as a village modernization campaign, which was extended to urban areas and factories in 1975. The National Charter of Education in 1968 promoted Korean tradition: mutual aid and patriotism are highlighted. The Second Economy Campaign was first propounded in the New Year’s address of Park Chung Hee in 1968, and the gist of it is that spiritual change should follow material progress. See Pak T’aegyun, “1960nyŏndae.”
104. The Yusin (Reform) regime was established after Park abolished the old constitution and adopted the new one, by which the president was to be elected indirectly and which significantly restricted individual and press freedom, in October 1972.
105. Kim Tongno, “Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae.”
106. For details on the changes that the yangban class, the ruling class, had gone through during the colonial period, see chapter 2.
107. Mr. W, a former high-ranking bureaucrat who was quite close to President Park Chung Hee, interview by the author, August 18, 2015, in Seoul.
108. Yong-Chool Ha, “Myth of the Breakdown.”
109. Kim Sŏnyŏp, “Han’guk taedosi chumin,” 211; and Kim Manhŭm, “Chiyŏk kyunyŏl.”

4. HOLLOWING OUT BUREAUCRACY

1. In a different context from the developmental state, Joel S. Migdal proposed to study the state in terms of process and interaction with non-state actors. See Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies, chap. 1.
2. On the importance of considering time in social sciences, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue; and Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma.
3. On the dynamics of the strong and the weak, see Erving Goffman, Asylums; James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak; and Susie Scott, “Revisiting the Total Institution.”
4. Bruce G. Carruthers, “When Is the State Autonomous?”; and George Steinmetz, “Myth and the Reality.”
5. Evelyn B. Davidheiser, “Strong States, Weak States.”
6. David C. Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development; Barry Eichengreen, “Government”; Joseph H. Stern et al., Industrialization; and, for partial exception, Byung-Sun Choi, Economic Policymaking.
7. Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy.
8. On taking the state as abstract entity, see introduction, n. 1.
9. Kate Crowley et al., Reconsidering Policy, 55–74.
10. S. N. Eisenstadt, “Bureaucracy.” Thus, it becomes difficult to apply a Weberian template, based primarily on Western experiences, to the cases of late industrialization. Late industrialization differs from market-based industrialization in terms of mode of industrialization, state status, and the number and nature of social and economic institutions outside of the state. The dynamics of the state is defined through interactions with such internal and external institutions. As such, a new conceptual framework is necessary to understand the dynamics of the state under late industrialization. See Marshall W. Meyer and M. Craig Brown, “Process of Bureaucratization,” 364–65; and Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “Social Structure and Organizations,” 142–93.
11. Mr. L, a former official of MCI, interview by the author, April 15, 2000, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 107:

Q: Were there informal groups within the MCI?

A: Naturally, school seniors and juniors grouped themselves.

Q: Were they organized by regional background?

A: Not to the same degree, but those from Taegu (southeastern region) were seen flocking toward themselves, while those from Ch’ungch’ŏng did not do so.

Q: How about those from the southwestern region?

A: Yes, they did. However, they could not do so openly. Those from the southeastern region naturally gathered among themselves because there were many from the region.

12. Mr. S, a former official of MCI, interview by the author, October 20, 1999, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 107:

Q: When do you think such informal groups organized within the ministry? Did those from the southeastern region organize themselves first, or did those from other regions start first?

A: It was the opposite. That is, under similar conditions, those from the southeastern region were doing better in taking certain posts and advancing in promotions, and thus those from the southwestern region felt threatened.

13. Mr. C, a former official of MCI, interview by the author, March 23, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 108:

Q: Was there an effort to promote internal solidarity among bureaucrats from the same region?

A: It was the case with bureaucrats from the southeastern region and they were watchful over those from the southwestern region. Whenever those from the southwestern region had meetings among themselves, those from the southeastern region asked the following question: Did you have a meeting for unity? As such those from the southwestern region had difficulty organizing themselves.

Q: How frequently did members from the southwestern region gather?

A: They did once in a while, but due to scrutiny from southeastern region members it was difficult to have frequent meetings.

Q: Then such informal groups affected personnel policies?

A: Yes, I am quite sure. Those from the southeastern region took care of personnel issues all by themselves.

Q: Is it true that southeastern region members were put into positions of high visibility and thus they get could get promoted quicker?

A: Yes, that was the case. Even when the same positions are given to both groups, the difference was those from the southeastern region got recognition, and that made a lot of difference.

14. Mr. S, a former official of MCI, interview by the author, May 17, 2009, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 109:

Q: When you made decisions and implemented them, did you utilize school and regional ties?

A: I could not help using them.

Q: How was outside influence?

A: Issuing permits after briberies is not good for business. Monetary dealings should not be involved in decision-making and implementation. However, it was quite natural that favors were rendered if there were shared school ties like Seoul National University (SNU) or ministry officials and businesspeople shared similar professional areas.

15. In addition to school and regional ties, shared military service was sometimes a source of solidarity.
16. Refer to the section “Family-School-Regional Nexus in the Business Sector” in chapter 3.
17. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], March 22, 1973, 2.
18. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], June 3, 1976, 2.
19. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], June 2, 1978, 2; and Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], September 23, 1978, 2.
20. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 185.
21. Mr. O, interview by the author, April 25, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 114.
22. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], January 15, 1970, 1.
23. An Haegyun, Han’guk haengjŏng ch’ejeron, 264–69.
24. Kim Hŭng Ki, Yŏngyok ŭi Han’guk kyŏngje, 265.
25. “We staked our life on the job, there was no one who knew anything, and thus it was like wandering around the virgin forest. In such a situation nobody could have strong conviction about what he did. We did our best and left the rest in god’s hands … we simply sowed seeds and planted trees and hoped for the best.” Mr. O, former MCI official, interview by the author, April 25, 2001, in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 126–27.
26. The wild horse phenomenon manifested in three primary ways. First, business would contact the president or higher levels of bureaucracy to scrap the government plans; second, the government selects a final beneficiary among different companies based on the plan; third, business shares its profits with politicians. The first form tended to occur most frequently, whereas the last was least damaging to state interests. The wild horse phenomenon seriously undermined bureaucratic stability and was essentially the result of business learning how to manipulate the state through the top leader, thereby undercutting regular decision-making processes and ignoring relevant regulations. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 148.
27. In 1965, President Park issued a directive to eliminate inter-ministerial differences in rules and regulations related to export, in which ministries were urged to reach a broad consensus for a new comprehensive list of measures, including export promoting finance, interest rates, inspection, and measures for resource mobilization in implementing the rules and regulations. He never failed to mention that it should take no more than 10 days. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 157.
28. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 163.
29. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 160–61. The sense of urgency was equally felt in the financing sector. For example, Park urged banks to prioritize the development of machinery industries even by deemphasizing their main business of financing and pressuring them to pay more attention to the completion of major state-led industrial projects. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 127.
30. O Wŏnch’ŏl, “Sanŏp chŏnllyak kundan sa,” in Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 126.
31. To meet export targets, President Park and ministers on down had to exhort business for export through close contact. Minister Chang, for example, checked export records daily and called owners of chaebols into his office to encourage exports. Every appeal made by business was reported to the Expanded Export Promotion Conference for resolution. President Park spared no effort in supporting the ministry. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 166.
32. Businessmen and bureaucrats had to work together even on Sundays in the Mobile Ministry, a temporary arrangement established in 1971 whereby the ministry’s officials were present where factories and business quarters were located to expedite issuing permits and other supportive measures. In 1976, export exhorters were dispatched to different companies to urge on exports. Out of such constant contact emerged the phenomenon of “mingling” between the state and business, which in turn gave rise to changes in the way business perceived the state. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 167.
33. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 169.
34. S. N. Eisenstadt, “Bureaucracy,” 305–6.
35. S. N. Eisenstadt, “Bureaucracy,” 318.
36. Ha Yongch’ul, “Hanil kwallyoje pigyo.”
37. In contrast, Japan was able to maintain symbiotic relations between state and business with a clear boundary, and in the Soviet Union, social and economic interests were absorbed into the state (absorption model). Jan Pakulski, “Bureaucracy.”
38. Pokchibudong can be roughly translated as “buck passer” but more specifically refers to a situation in which bureaucrats do not take initiative to avoid risk and are solely interested in protecting their positions and interests.
39. On the hollowing out of one sector of state bureaucracy spilling into another, see Ha Yongch’ul, “Pogŏn chŏngch’aek,” 33–68. The author’s research deals with how what happened to Korean economic bureaucracies affected non-economic bureaucracy. Its basic argument is that when economic bureaucracies become involved in the state’s priority tasks of economic development, the ethos and modes of bureaucratic operation affect non-economic bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The study analyzes how the autonomy of the ministry was lost in managing the conflict between oriental herbal medicine and Western medicine. The non-economic bureaucracy’s loss of autonomy is called the secondary hollowing out.
40. Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon, “Institutions and Economic Policy.”
41. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State; and Eun Mee Kim, “Crisis of the Developmental State.”
42. Hyun-Chin Lim and Jin-Ho Jang, “Between Neoliberalism and Democracy.”
43. Sky Daily, February 14, 2012.
44. There were more than 38 incentive measures to promote export. Wontack Hong, Trade, Distortions, 82–83.
45. In this regard, the view that the state succumbed to becoming hostage to and “captured” by business stops short of dealing with specific business strategies and defining the nature of state-business relations. Although the hostage argument explains the limited capacity of the state due to its dependence of business for economic success, it does not explain the respective and mutual statuses of the state and business. Sagong Yŏngho, “Kabujangjŏk haengjŏng,” 116–17.
46. Kenneth Jowitt, Leninist Response.
47. Paul Shankman, “Phases of Dependency.”
48. Sanggongbu, Sanggong Chŏngch’aek Simnyŏnsa, 282. On the significance of the export promotion meetings, see Yung Whee Rhee, Bruce Ross-Larson, and Garry Pursell, Korea’s Competitive Edge, chaps. 2 and 3.
49. There were many cases of collusion between business and officials at the MCI to obtain preferential interests for exporters. The ministry was heavily criticized as being an agent for chaebols in securing preferential treatments. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], May 22, 1966.
50. From the latter part of the 1960s, business became overly sensitive in demonstrating export records. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], February 20, 1969, 3.
51. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], May 31, 1972, 1, 4; and Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], October 24, 1971, 2.
52. Yu Inhak, Han’guk chaebŏl ŭi haebu, 70–71.
53. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], November 21, 1974, 2.
54. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], October 15, 1975, 2.
55. Sindonga, “Kwŏndu Chwadam: Mainŏsŭ sŏngjang,” 109.
56. Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn, 1973nyŏn kyŏngje paeksŏ, 36.
57. On the example for the Economic Planning Board to reorganize non-performing projects, due to chaebols’ appeals to political circles, see Kim Hŭng Ki, Yŏngyok ŭi Han’guk kyŏngje, 228–31.
58. Joseph H. Stern et al., Industrialization, 41.
59. Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn, Uri kyŏngje ŭi changgi chŏnmang.
60. Yi Chŏng, “Ulsan Chosŏnso 1,” 68.
61. Pak Pyŏngyun, Chaebŏl kwa chŏngch’i, 198–99.
62. Pak Yunu, “6 konghwaguk,” 490.
63. Yi Manhŭi, “Han’guk ŭi sanŏp chŏngch’aek,” 87. Chaebols demanded many benefits in return for streamlining their business, such as financial assistance, compensation for investment made, and monopolistic or oligopolistic status in the market. For example, Hyundai Yanghaeng demanded compensation for reducing debt, capital reassessment, and takeovers of technology and construction contracts. Yi Manhŭi, “Han’guk ŭi sanŏp chŏngch’aek,” 98.
64. Hyundai Yanghaeng was established in 1962 by Chŏng Inyŏng. It later became Hanguk Heavy Industry in 1980 and ultimately Doosan Heavy Industries in 2000. On its taking over assets while excluding debt, see Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn, Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn 30nyŏnsa, 216–17.
65. Sŏul Taehakkyo Haengjŏng Taehagwŏn, Chŏngch’aek chiphaeng sarye, 105–6.
66. Pak Wŏnbae, “Chaegye pihwa,” 467–68.
67. Yu Yongŭil, “P’asan chikchŏn,” 439; and Yi Changgyu, Kyŏngje nŭn tangsin.
68. Yu Inhak, Han’guk chaebŏl ŭi haebu, 139.
69. Policy funds, or policy finance, refers to loans, insurance, and/or guarantees the state provides to facilitate industrial development. Policy funds are distributed by state-supported special banks, such as Korea Development Bank, Export-Import Bank, and Small-Medium Industry Bank.
70. Ch’oe Pyŏngsŏn, “Chŏngch’i kyŏngje ch’eje,” 266.
71. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 226; and Hwang Chongsŏng, “Minjuhwa,” 256–57.
72. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], June 24, 1990, 6.
73. Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 226.
74. Pressure from the political circles for favoritism was suspected regarding the blitzkrieg-like decision having ignored conventional procedure, such as holding public hearings. Han’guk Kyŏngje Sinmun [Korea economic daily], July 5, 1992, 3.
75. R. A. W. Rhodes, “Hollowing Out”; H. Brinton H. Milward and Keith G. Provan, “Hollow State”; and Ian Holliday, “British State Hollowing Out?” The structure of state-business relations in Korea is quite different from that of Japan in that the role of Korea’s top leader is visible and its bureaucracy is not as stable as Japan’s, due to external penetration and influence from the top leader. In addition, due to the stronger sense of urgency in Korea compared to Japan, the state interfered in business far more arbitrarily than it did in Japan. Thus, the concept of reciprocal consent is not likely to apply to Korea’s state-business relations. On the reciprocal consent in understanding state-business relations in Japan, see Richard J. Samuels, Japanese State. Also, it seems that the state’s decision on deselection in Korea is more unpredictable than in Japan, due to the higher possibility of penetration by business in state bureaucracy compared to Japan. On MITI’s selection and deselection of industries, see Saadia M. Pekkanen, Picking Winners?
76. One example is that between 1980 and 1983, more than 1.1 trillion won was poured into industrial restructuring through the Bank of Industrial Development. Sŏn Haktae, “Han’guk ŭi chunggongŏp, 160.
77. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 194.
78. Yi Sŏngt’ae, “Han’guk sahoe chibaeja,” 264–65.
79. K, former minister, Ministry of Finance and chief secretary to president, interview by the author, May 15, 2003.
80. Ha Yongch’ul, “Pogŏn chŏngch’aek.”
81. There were roughly three patterns of implementation: cases strictly following laws and regulations, cases in which laws and regulations were ambiguously interpreted and applied, and arbitrary and illegal cases. Where contacts between bureaucrats and business were not institutionalized and thus bureaucrats could contact business on a personal basis, chances for arbitrary decision and implementation were quite high.

5. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

1. This literature can be roughly classified into three groups: political thought approach or intellectual historical studies, ideal-typical research, and historical-case studies. On examples of political thought or intellectual historical approaches, see Adam Ferguson, History of Civil Society; Francis Hutcheson, Nature and Conduct; Adam Smith, Moral and Political Philosophy; John Keane, Civil Society; Becker, Emergence of Civil Society; and Adam B. Seligman, Idea of Civil Society. For an ideal-typical approach, see Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation. On historical-regional approaches, see Naomi Chazan, “Africa’s Democratic Challenge”; Isabel V. Hull, Sexuality; Nancy Bermeo and Philip G. Nord, Civil Society; Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, Civic Engagement; Marc Morjé Howard, Weakness of Civil Society; Sheri Berman, “Civil Society”; Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics; Richard Price, British Society; and Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr, State of Civil Society.
2. Edward Shils, “Virtue of Civil Society,” 9.
3. Marvin B. Becker, Emergence of Civil Society.
4. Adam B. Seligman, Idea of Civil Society, 168–69.
5. On the abuse of the concept of civil society, Seligman says, “I would hazard the guess that the use of the term civil society instead of democracy in Eastern Europe to describe the above organizational features of social life is to be explained less by any additional analytic weight carried by the idea of civil society than simply by the fact that civil society as a term was neutral and uncorrupted by forty years of State propaganda, whereas the term democracy … was heavily tainted by the past.” Adam B. Seligman, Idea of Civil Society, 204.
6. Axel Honneth, “Conceptions of ‘Civil Society,’” 19.
7. On too much emphasis on elites, Marc Morjé Howard says, “Analysis has tended to focus too much on elites and institutions rather than on society and ordinary citizens. They have therefore been too quick in overlooking or dismissing the relative societal similarities among post-communist societies in the regions.” Marc Morjé Howard, Weakness of Civil Society, 146.
8. Cited in Sheri Berman, “Civil Society,” 407. See Marc Morjé Howard, Weakness of Civil Society, 152, on the lesser importance of the number of organizations as a sign of civil society.
9. Luis Roniger, “Civil Society,” 68.
10. Frank Trentmann, Paradoxes, 7.
11. Cited in Piotr Sztompka, “Mistrusting Civility,” 193.
12. Civil society has been found in the economy and in the polity, in the area between the family and the state or the individual and the state, in non-state institutions that organize and educate citizens for political participation, and even as an expression of the whole civilizing mission of modern society. Krishan Kumar, “Civil Society,” 383.
13. Sun Hyuk Kim classifies Korean literature on civil society in terms of whether civil society is treated as an independent or dependent variable. Works that treat civil society as a dependent variable are further organized into three subcategories: works on conceptual and perception issues related to civil society, those focusing on historical aspects, and empirical works on attributes and changes of civil groups. The following works belong to the first subcategory: Pae Tongin, “Simin sahoe ŭi kaenyŏm”; Yang Sŭngt’ae, “Konggongsŏng”; and Sin Kwangyŏng, “Simin sahoe kaenyŏm.” On the second, see Ko Sŏngguk, “Han’guk simin sahoe.” On the third, see Pak Myŏnggyu, “Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe”; and Sunhyuk Kim, “Discussions of Civil Society.”
14. On the impacts of democratic movements on civil society, see Chŏng T’aesŏk, “Simin sahoe wa NGO”; and Yu P’almu and Kim Hogi, Simin sahoe wa siminundong. On the impacts of civil society on democracy, see Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of Democratization; Cho Hiyŏn, Han’guk ŭi minjujuŭi; Yun Sangch’ŏl, 1980nyŏndae Han’guk; and An Pyŏngjun et al., Kukka, simin sahoe, chŏngch’i minjuhwa.
15. Han Wansang, “Han’guk esŏ simin sahoe”; Ch’oe Changjip, Han’guk minjujuŭi iron; Mun Pyŏngju, “Han’guk minjujuŭi”; Son Hoch’ŏl, “Kukka-simin sahoeron”; Kim Sŏngguk, “Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe”; and Kim Sŏngguk, “Sinsahoe undong ŭi ironjŏk kiban.”
16. Yu P’almu, “Han’guk simin sahoe.”
17. Pak Hyŏngjun, “Simin sahoe iron.”
18. Kim Sŏngguk, “Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe.”
19. Yu P’almu and Kim Hogi, Simin saho wa siminundong, 256.
20. Kim Sŏngguk, “Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe.”
21. Pae Tongin, “Simin sahoe ŭi kaenyŏm.”
22. Son Hoch’ŏl, “Kukka-simin sahoeron,” 25–30.
23. Ch’oe Changjip, Han’guk minjujuŭi iron.
24. As for a rare example that discusses nationalism in relation to civil society, see Pak Myŏnggyu, “Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe.”
25. John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain, 101. In the British case of the state-versus-society model, it was more negative in terms of society’s shying away from the state, whereas in France it was more positive in society’s opposition to the state. On the weak presence of the state in the development of civil society, see Richard Price, British Society, chap. 6.
26. On the growth of voluntary organizations, see R. J. Morris, Class, Sect and Party.
27. John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain, 107.
28. It is known that British and French colonial rule had divergent impacts on African societies. However, this thesis is rejected among most African scholars. The following analysis is based on the literature that rejects divergent impact of British and French rule. On the various approaches to the colonial impact on Africa, see Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, “Institutions,” 253–72.
29. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies, chaps. 1 and 2; and Peter M. Lewis, “Political Transition,” 46.
30. Naomi Chazan, “Africa’s Democratic Challenge,” 285.
31. Naomi Chazan, “Africa’s Democratic Challenge,” 285.
32. Naomi Chazan, “Africa’s Democratic Challenge,” 286.
33. Peter M. Lewis, “Political Transition,” 40.
34. Naomi Chazan, “Africa’s Democratic Challenge,” 286.
35. Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager, 160–206; and Jan Pakulski, “Bureaucracy.”
36. Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy.
37. Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, “Nature of Social Ties,” 120–21.
38. With the exception of the smaller Jacobin clubs in the 1790s, German bodies were distinguished by their apolitical view of civil society: they saw their mission as complementing their states by improving the local infrastructure and gathering information to assist official knowledge and not as opposing or eliminating government. Administrators played a disproportionate role in German clubs, and confidence in enlightened reform absolutism remained high. Frank Trentmann, Paradoxes, 15.
39. Daniel A. McMillan, “Energy,” 188.
40. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 58.
41. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society,” 425.
42. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society,” 426.
43. W. Dean Kinzley, Industrial Harmony.
44. Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, 20.
45. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society,” 414.
46. John A. Hall, “Nature of Civil Society,” 39. On the counterargument that the state plays a positive role in civil society formation, see Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, Civic Engagement.
47. Kim Manhŭm, “Chŏngch’i kyunyŏl,” 225–29.
48. Modular citizens are those “who are members of groups but not too strongly attached to any one group; a sense of moral obligation that forces individuals to honor their commitments willingly, not because of social pressure; cultural homogeneity within a given nation-state, involving the elimination of ‘semi-private and local’ languages and idioms; and rationality, including ‘the non-conflation of issues, the separating-out of the social strands.’” Charles Kurzman, review of Conditions of Liberty, 345.
49. Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of Democratization.
50. On the details of the tense situation, see Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of Democratization, 86–93. Specific sectoral and regional representations were as follows: by sector, 253 Catholic priests, 270 Protestant pastors, 160 women’s movement leaders, 308 from the Council for the Promotion of Democracy Movement, 171 peasant activists, 39 labor activists, 18 urban poor activists, 43 publishers and journalists, 43 authors and writers, 66 artists, 55 educators, 12 youth movement leaders, and 44 lawyers; and by region, 11 from Kyŏnggi Province, 73 from Kangwŏn Province, 29 from Ch’ungnam Province, 54 from Ch’ungbuk Province, 40 from Chŏnnam Province, 56 from the city of Pusan, and 89 from Kyŏngbuk Province. Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of Democratization, 92. Specific names of organizations are the Seoul Labor Movement Coalition (Sonoryon), the Korean Council for Labor Welfare, the Protestant Peasant Association (Kinong), and the Catholic Peasant Association (Kanong).
51. Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of Democratization, 139.
52. Kim Sŏngsu, “Minjuhwa kwajŏng,” 135; and Yi Kapyun and Mun Yongjik, “Han’guk ŭi minjuhwa,” 229.
53. Han Sangjin, “Minjung sahoehak,” 126.
54. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 252–53.
55. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 252.
56. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 252.
57. David I. Steinberg, “Civil Society,” 157.
58. Kim Wŏn, Ich’yŏjin kŏt, 90.
59. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 205.
60. Three-fifths (60%) of the Korean population are primordialists, whose public life is still confined within the boundaries of interpersonal or religious ties. They represent nearly five times as many as extra-primordialists (13%), who are active beyond those boundaries. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 109.
61. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 205.
62. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 108.
63. Kang Sanguk, “NGO ŭi sŏngjang,” 17–18.
64. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics, 22.
65. Sŏng Hogŭn, “Sinsahoe undong,” 1.
66. The financial sources of the Coalition for Environmental Protection are as follows: about 50% member contribution and donations, 23% from various projects, 21.7% from profit-making activities, and 4.1% from educational projects. Yu Sŏkch’un, Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe, 11.
67. Han’guk Ilbo [Hanguk daily], “Toel kŏri man choch’a taninŭn,” 26.
68. Hong Ilp’yo, “Ije tasi wit’aeroun mohŏm,” 15–16.
69. Han’gyŏre, “Nodong·sahoe tanch’e,” 20; Han’gyŏre, “Int’ŏbyu,” 18; Han’gyŏre, “‘Ch’amyŏhanŭn simin,’” 6; Han’guk Ilbo [Hanguk daily], “Simin p’awŏ,” 19; and Han’guk Ilbo [Hanguk daily], “Sinnyŏn t’ŭkchip,” 34.
70. Yang Kiho, “Han’guk simin tanch’e,” 73–75; Han’guk Ilbo [Hanguk daily], “Iisyuwa hyŏnjang/simindanch’e,” 17.
71. Yu Sŏkch’un and Kim Yongmin, “Han’guk simin tanch’e”; and Kim Tongno, “Simin undong.” On another example for civic activists entering politics, see Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], “Undonggwŏn pyŏnhyŏk,” 22.
72. Han’gyŏre, “Undonggwŏn,” 20; Han’gyŏre, “Ttajyŏbŏpsida,” 9; Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], “Undonggwŏn pyŏnhyŏk,” 22; Han’gyŏre, “Simin tanch’e,” 26; and Han’guk Ilbo [Hanguk daily], “Todŏksŏng siryŏn,” 7, 13.
73. Han’guk Ilbo [Hanguk daily], “Isyuwa hyŏnjang,” 17; Yi Yonghwan, “Simin innŭn simin tanch’e,” 28; and Yu Sŏkch’un, Han’guk ŭi simin sahoe, 55–56.
74. Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of Democratization, 97.
75. Hagen Koo, Korean Workers, 118. The activist’s name was Bang Yongsŏk, the president of the Wonpoong Textile union. Students, according to him, were apt to engage in a kind of “political adventurism” at the risk of destroying unions.
76. Yu Simin, interview. Also, according to other data, as of February 2003, 43 (16%) of the 273 members of the National Assembly were arrested for their political activities (anti-regime opposition), and when labor activists and anti-poverty movement activists are added, 70 members of the National Assembly had experiences in political struggles in the past. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], “Undonggwŏn pyŏnhyŏk.”
77. Generation 386 refers to the cohort who were in their thirties (3), entered college in the 1980s (8), and were born in the 1960s (6).
78. Whang Seongjoon, “80nyŏndae undonggwŏn.”
79. On the gap that arises between masses and political activists, Yi Sinhaeing’s remarks are suggestive: “intellectual movements by college students and religious leaders do not reflect the whole picture of Korean society. They reflect some sectors of the society which are receptive to the movements. Therefore, it is my view that civic and social movements do not represent our whole society or are the manifestation of legitimacy of the whole society.” Yi Sinhaeing, “Han’guk simin sahoe,” 42.
80. Chŏng Sunmi, Han’guk haengjŏng kaehyŏk. For examples, revelations of political scandals such as the expensive dress lobby scandal, Lee Yongho gate, Jung Hyunjoon gate, Chin Seunghyun gate, Yoon Taeshik gate, Choi Kyuson gate, the military service evasion scandal, and the special allotment of apartment scandal.
81. Calculated based on Kim Hyŏnu, Han’guk chŏngdang.
82. Max Weber, Social and Economic Organization, 329–41. The dynamics of Korea’s strong state has been treated elsewhere; see Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa.
83. Yi Pyŏnggon, “Han’guk sahoe,” 215.
84. Some examples are the inability to decide on a nuclear waste site, the second mobile communication system development decisions, decisions on the entry of Samsung Motors, conflict between herbal medicine specialists and pharmacists, and chaos surrounding the separation between prescription and dispensation of drugs. Thus, the weakened role of the state further exacerbated the politicization process of civic organizations. See Ha Yongch’ul, “Pogŏn chŏngch’aek”; and Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa.

6. DAILY PRACTICE OF NEOFAMILISM

1. Survey questions were prepared by the author and the survey was conducted by Han’guk Risŏch’i (Korea Research) in Seoul, Korea, on April 9, 2015. The size of the sample (N = 106) is not large enough to be representative of the entire Korean society, but as it was selected based on particular age brackets (those in their 60s and 70s, as they were active during the peak of industrialization), region, education, and gender, it secured a high level of typicality about Korean society. See John Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 96–97; and Malcolm Williams, Making Sense. As Layna Mosely points out, although it isn’t representative in the statistical sense, the sample is diverse and informative on the variables that matter to the present analysis. Layna Mosley, Interview Research. In addition to the 2015 survey, surveys on 44 people were randomly done by the author over a period of three years, from 2004 to 2007. The goal was not to secure systematic patterns of neofamilial attitudes and behaviors, but to identify various behavioral manifestations of neofamilism in daily life for the purpose of illustration.
2. Among 36 who said the ties were not that relevant, either co-workers (38.8%) without the ties or neighbors (33.3%) were mentioned as the important source of social interactions. In terms of limits of neofamilial ties, the results from 44 randomly selected people indicate that 37% could ask for help only from those who are directly connected through neofamilial ties, while 56% felt they could do so with the acquaintances of the directly connected. See Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa. On the range of trust in the case of Italy, see Jeremy Boissevain, “Place of Non-Groups.”
3. See note 1. The survey question asks, “To what extent do you think familial ties, school ties, and regional ties affected economic behaviors during the 1960s and 1970s?”
4. Q11: “Do you think the rapid democratization since 1987 has changed human relations based on blood, regional, and school ties?” Q12: “What do you think of the degree of conflicts among different economic strata during the democratization?”
5. The following statements are from the random surveys and the 2015 survey, as introduced in note 1.
6. On the top leader’s focus on export goals, see Ha Yongch’ul, Hubal sanŏphwa, 156–57.
7. Quotations are from the surveys of 44 people.
8. Quotations are from the surveys of 44 people.
9. The author conducted in-depth interviews in 1999 and 2015 with 10 people of different professions; out of the 10 cases, four are selected here, reflecting different career patterns, to demonstrate the relationship between career development and neofamilial ties.
10. Interview by the author, January 8, 2015.
11. Interview by the author, October 31, 2015.
12. Interview by the author, November 24, 1999.
13. Interview by the author, January 26, 2015.

7. THE 1997 FINANCIAL CRISIS

1. Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis; Robert F. Emery, Korean Economic Reform; Brian Bridges, Korea after the Crash; Robert Wade, “Gestalt Shift”; Ha-Joon Chang, “Korea”; Stephan Haggard, Political Economy; and Kyu-Sung Lee, Korean Financial Crisis.
2. Jiho Jang, “Economic Crisis”; Tran Van Hoa, Social Impact; and Song Puyong, “IMF ch’eje.”
3. The interest rate was raised in order to stabilize the won. The overnight call rate rose from 12.15% on December 1, 1997, to 31.32% on December 31, 1997. Young Baek Choi, “On Financial Crisis,” 487.
4. Sŏul Kyŏngje Sinmun [Seoul Economic Daily], October 21, 1998.
5. Kyu-Sung Lee, Korean Financial Crisis, 26.
6. Jiho Jang, “Economic Crisis,” 54. Note the percentage change over the same month of last year, cited in Jiho Jang, “Economic Crisis,” 55.
7. National Statistical Office, in Jiho Jang, “Economic Crisis,” 56.
8. Nam Ŭnyŏng, “Oehwan wigi,” 73.
9. Paek China, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 32.
10. Paek China, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 32.
11. Mun Hyŏngjin, “Oehwan wigi ihu,” 93.
12. Mun Hyŏngjin, “Oehwan wigi ihu,” 98–99.
13. Im Insuk, Sirŏp kwa kajok, cited in Paek China, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 37.
14. Jiho Jang, “Economic Crisis,” 59.
15. Paek Chin, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 38.
16. Ham Inhŭi, “Sahoe kyŏngjejŏk wigi,” 553.
17. Yi Chuhong, “Han’guk sahoe ŭi ihonyul,” 116.
18. Chŏng Chinsung, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 109.
19. Chŏng Chinsung, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 109.
20. Kim Ŭnmi and Yi Sŏni, “Kosirŏp sidae ŭi kajok”; An Pyŏngch’ŏl, “Sirŏp kwa kajok”; Chang Hyekyŏng and Kim Yŏngnan, “IMF wa kajok munje”; and Paek China, “Kyŏngje wigi.”
21. Chŏng Chinsung, “Kyŏngje wigi,” 109.
22. Ham Inhŭi, “Sahoe kyŏngjejŏk wigi,” 538.
23. The reduction of debt ratios was part of the agreement between President Kim Dae Jung and the chaebols on January 13, 1998.
24. Yang Tongsŏk, “Saoe isa chedo,” 253; and Peter M. Beck, “Revitalizing Korea’s Chaebol,” 1028.
25. Yang Tongsŏk, “Saoe isa chedo,” 254; and Yang Chongmin, “Net’ŭwŏk’ŭ punsŏk.”
26. Yi Kisu, “Saoe isa chedo ŭi kanghwa,” 77.
27. Yang Tongsŏk, “Saoe isa chedo,” 264.
28. Yi Sujŏng, “Saoe isa ŭi tongnipsŏng,” 10–20; and Yi Kisu, “Saoe isa chedo ŭi kanghwa,” 79.
29. Son Hyŏk and Chŏng Chaegyŏng, “Saoe isa nŭn ch’oego”; and Sŏ Chŏngil, Yi Kyŏnghwan, and Yun Sungnam, “Sin’gyu isa immyŏng.”
30. Mŏni Tudei, “Kyŏngyŏngjin e kildŭryŏjin isahoe.”
31. Herŏldŭ Kyŏngje [Herald economy], April 21, 2014.
32. Kim Hyŏngŏn, “Sahoe isanimdŭl, annyŏng hasimnikka?,” 1.
33. Ha Yongch’ul, “Oehwan wigi,” 216; and Joongi Kim, “Next Stage,” 17. One study observes that companies adopted the outside director system and elected even greater numbers of outside directors than required by law, while outside directors still do not perform their functions properly. The authors argue that this is an indication that companies do not comply with the original intentions of the outside director system; instead, they changed the system to meet their purpose. Yi Kyŏngmuk and O Chonghyang, “Saoe isa ŭi ch’ogwa,” 1229.
34. Kim Chin, Sangsokse mit chŭngyŏse.
35. Song Kich’ŏl, “Taegiŏp ŭi kyŏngyŏngja.”
36. Pusan Ilbo [Pusan daily], August 21, 2015.
37. CEO Sŭkoŏdeili [CEO Score Daily], November 30, 2001.
38. Ha Yongch’ul, “Oehwan wigi,” 214.
39. Ha Yongch’ul, “Oehwan wigi,” 213. Indirect intervention involves going through a formal procedure, such as holding a personnel committee meeting, but a subtle message on the regime’s preference is conveyed to the committee.
40. The pervasive perception that the state influence over financial institutions on personnel and lending policies persists is in contrast to the government view that Korean financial institutions are autonomous in the two areas. Kim Jong Chang, chairman, Korean Financial Supervisory Board, interview by the author, July 8, 2008.
41. Ha Yongch’ul, “Oehwan wigi,” 213.
42. An interesting and important change in lending practice at the micro level was the renewal and expansion of the bank credit review system. For business, a basic information system regarding the nature of business and its prospects was established to review requests for loans. For individuals, a new credit scoring system was introduced to evaluate individuals’ loan limit. In the past, whether the loans were made out for personal use or for businesses, the judgment of the person in charge carried weight, but since the financial crisis, credit is determined by the system rather than by personal judgment. Credit reviews prior to the crisis frequently varied from one branch of the bank to another. This would have serious consequences for neofamilism in that prior to the crisis, companies or individuals could go to another branch or bank officials in the event that they could not get satisfactory decisions on their loan applications. That is, they could mobilize neofamilial ties before applying for loans or when they were rejected for prior loan applications. Banking was also more individualized: after the crisis, banks no longer approached individual credit within the context of the entire family but treated each member on his or her own. Lee Young Jin, Shinhan Bank, interview by the author, July 15, 2008.
43. Cho Sŏngjae, “Chojik kwa pun’gyu,” 19.
44. Note that the basic political rights for organizers pertained to enhanced latitude to engage in union organizing, political activity, and so on; thus, it was good for labor organizers, whereas average workers suffered from the economic crisis, such as greater vulnerability to layoffs.
45. Yi Chongsŏn, “IMF kyŏngje wigi,” 198–99.
46. Hyo-Soo Lee, “Paternalistic Human Resource Practices,” 841.
47. Hyo-Soo Lee, “Paternalistic Human Resource Practices,” 842.
48. Sky Daily, “Taegiŏp punsŏk.”
49. Wi P’yŏngnyang, “Chaebŏl ro ŭi kyŏngje chipchung,” 12.
50. Wi P’yŏngnyang, “Chaebŏl ro ŭi kyŏngje chipchung,” 13.
51. Han’gyŏre, “30tae chaebŏl naebu kŏrae.”
52. Yŏnhap News, “Chuyo chaebŏlgŭrup.”
53. Yi Chaehyŏng, “Tae·chung-so kiŏp,” 4.
54. Sin Kwangsik, Chaebol kaehyok, 44.
55. Wi P’yŏngnyang, “Chaebŏl ro ŭi kyŏngje chipchung,” 19.
56. Peter M. Beck, “Revitalizing Korea’s Chaebol,” 1021.
57. Ch’oe Chŏngp’yo, “Oehwan wigi chikhu,” 62–63.
58. Yŏnhap News, “Sŏul Kyot’onggongsa.” Seoul City Transportation Corporation changed the status of 1,285 employees who were on indefinite contract to regular worker status. It turned out that 108 out of 1,285 had family ties to current employees of the corporation, including sons and daughters (31), brothers and sisters (22), uncles (15), and spouses (12).
59. Sŏul Kyŏngje Sinmun [Seoul economic daily], January 13, 2019.

CONCLUSION

1. David Beetham, “Conditions.”
2. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Composition and Status Ordering”; Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, Small State Status Seeking; and Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status.
3. Hyeong-Ki Kwon, “Asian Financial Crisis”; Hyun-Chin Lim and Jin-Ho Jang, “Between Neoliberalism and Democracy”; Kyung Mi Kim, Korean Developmental State; Robert Wade, “Globalization”; and Linda Weiss, “Developmental States.”
4. The proportion of social welfare in GDP has shown considerable growth for the past 20 years: 6.4% in 2005, 8.4% in 2008, 10.5% in 2015, and 15.6% in 2020. And the budgetary weight of social welfare in the national budget also has changed: 24.2% in 2005, 25.2% in 2006, 25.9% in 2007, 26.2% in 2009, 27.7% in 2010, 29.9% in 2014, and 33.7% in 2018. Hangyŏre, “Pokchi·Kyoyuk·Kukpang”; Chamyŏyŏndae, “2019nyŏn pogŏnbokchi”; and KOSIS [Korean Statistical Information Service], “Sahoebokchi jich’ul” [Social welfare expenditure], February 28, 2022, https://kosis.kr/index/index.do.
5. Kim Tuyŏl, Kyŏngje sŏngjang.
6. T’onggyech’ŏng, Han’guk sahoe t’onghyang 2008, 294–95.
7. For many Koreans, the name Kim Young-ran did not hold special meaning until it became associated with a new controversial law. Initiated by former judge Kim Young-ran, the so-called Kim Young-ran Law—a severe, far-reaching anti-corruption law—took effect on September 28, 2016. Under the law’s terms, a public official or even schoolteacher could face criminal charges for accepting a bribe worth more than one million won. The public reaction is mixed. Some welcome the law as a catalyst to eradicate corruption. Others question the impartiality of the law. Critics believe that the broad scope of the law enables authorities to abuse it. This is because of the possibility for arbitrary application of the law, due to the seemingly fine line between bribes and simple favors. It is yet to be seen whether the enactment of the law will be the starting point toward a more transparent society or will exacerbate litigiousness and contentiousness.
8. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], January 27, 2020.
9. See Han’gyŏre, April 11, 2018, on various kinds of illegal practice of hiring in the government. The report says there were 2,311 cases of violations in hiring in various public agencies between 2013 and 2017.
10. Chungang Ilbo [Chungang daily], September 10, 2019.
11. Chosŏn Ilbo [Chosŏn daily], December 23, 2020.
12. See chapter 7.
13. As analyzed in chapter 7, chaebol reforms advanced more in the field of finance but were slow to change in terms of corporate governance, which reflects tenacity in regard to neofamilism.
14. Sŏng Hogŭn, “Kongnonjang”; see Jennifer S. Oh, “Strong State.”
15. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society,” 414.
16. Sŏng Hogŭn, “Kongnonjang”; and Tracii Ryan et al., “How Social Are Social Media?”
17. On the social, cultural, and institutional consequences of the compressed modernity of South Korea, see Kyung-Sup Chang, Logic of Compressed Modernity.

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