CHAPTER 1 The Sociology of Late Industrialization

Industrialization has long been understood as the essential transformation in societies’ entrée to modernity: an archetypal sociopolitical project that has at the same time fundamentally shaped the course of social science theorizing. Changes related to industrialization involve social structures, sectors, institutions, psychology, and culture.¹ The central question explored by social scientists has been how to understand the scope and patterns of such changes, with late industrialization becoming the order of the day in the postwar era.

The most controversial question in sociology in the 1950s and 1960s was whether industrialization would bring about universal consequences regardless of different historical, social, and political contexts. Concerns for contextualization were absent in the major Western paradigms in sociology. Marxism and functionalism, regardless of their fundamental differences in perspectives on social conflict, converged on the unilinear development pattern based on Western historical experiences.² The developing world was viewed as a sphere for modernization that would bring democracy in politics and capitalist development in the economy.

The emergence of the Communist Bloc and the expansion of US hegemony played important roles in validating the Marxism and functionalism paradigms; however, challenges to these paradigms came through cultural and institutional turns. Marxism based on economic determinism came to be challenged by cultural turns in class analysis wherein complexity of human behaviors is understood in cultural and traditional terms beyond economic interests, while modernization theories based on functionalism also showed limitations, faced with diverse paths to success and failures of modernization in different parts of the world.³ Mechanistic paradigms of universalism were rendered obsolete, giving rise to the turn to culture and tradition. Multiple paths to modernity began to be recognized, and the positive value of tradition was invoked.⁴

Sociology in North America lost interest in macrosociology, which focuses on social structural changes, in the 1980s, and institutionalism emerged as the major paradigm.⁵ The state, which had not been regarded as an important variable for social change, was again regarded in sociology as an important institution.⁶ Regardless of different orientations in institutionalism, however, a macrosociological perspective was not a major concern. Even in the case of historical institutionalism, the primary focus has been political economy, as seen in the “varieties of capitalism” literature.⁷ Divergent paths to capitalist development were explained by incorporating tradition and culture as an important basis for path dependence in historical institutionalism. Different contexts of industrialization are given serious consideration, but contextualization remains at the level of economy, short of engaging in macrosociology. Thus, the path to abandoning universalism has been uneven: while universalism has been questioned, the old habit persisted in institutional prescription, termed “institutional monocropping.”⁸ The state has been brought back and diversity in industrialization has been recognized, but with a heavy tilt toward political economy.

Some scholars have suggested alternative ways of approaching social changes through units other than class. Social anthropologists have proposed focusing on “non-groups” for analysis, and, at the same time, anthropologists have demonstrated the significance of persistent family and quasi-family units in modern settings.⁹ In the meantime, relational sociologists have proposed a relational approach to society in which static and substance-based approaches are rejected.¹⁰ Rational actor and norm-based models, diverse holisms and structuralisms, and statistical “variable” analyses are rejected. But these alternatives to structural units or analysis seldom question the pattern of industrialization; instead, they are considered under the assumption that there is only a single pattern. In short, although many alternative views of the non-Western world have been suggested and much effort to contextualize different facets of modernization has been made, contextualized approaches to social change under different patterns of industrialization have not received due attention.¹¹

The current research on social change presumes that industrialization brings about universal consequences, whether in the West or wherever industrialization occurs. This assumes that industrialization is a powerful force that generates considerable standardization without leaving much room for variation.¹² Lack of differentiation of social consequences or the assumption of universal social consequences is closely related to the lack of differentiation of patterns of industrialization.

POLITICAL ECONOMY, THE STATE, AND THE CONTEXTUALIZATION OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

This neglect of interest in late industrialization among sociologists has multiple intellectual sources: the lack of differentiation of patterns of industrialization; lack of attention to the possible role of the state in social change; assumption of universal consequences of industrialization; and the ambiguous conceptual status of tradition in theories of industrialization.

Contextualization or differentiation of industrialization in respect to social change did not receive serious academic attention until the 1970s, when the political economy approach became a dominant paradigm of research. Neither the prevalent Marxian perspective nor structural-functionalist approaches paid much attention to the question, largely because market-based industrialization and economy were taken for granted. Thus, structural-functionalism and modernization theory regard social differentiation as a requirement that Third World countries must satisfy.¹³ Similarly, Marxian thinking views the industrialization that occurred in the West as a model for underdeveloped economies.¹⁴

Interest in different paths to capitalism started with the political economy interpretation of late industrialization in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when a number of scholars reworked the Marxist conception of the state to show that its bureaucratic apparatus was different, and partially autonomous, from the interests of the capitalist ruling class.¹⁵ A number of these young, left-leaning scholars wanted to “bring the state back in” as the prominent factor contributing to social and economic change.¹⁶ They argued that the relative autonomy and administrative capacity of the state was an important feature in achieving societal stability and economic growth.¹⁷ A number of scholars of Asia who borrowed these ideas empirically applied them to explain East Asian industrialization.

The first to do so was political scientist Chalmers Johnson, who posited the idea of the “developmental state,” arguing that Japanese industrialization could be explained largely by the active intervention of the state in the economy.¹⁸ Other scholars soon elaborated on this thesis for other rapidly industrializing East Asian economies, especially South Korea and Taiwan.¹⁹ Sociologist Peter Evans, who first suggested the importance of the state regime in Brazilian economic development, conceded that East Asian states were “stronger” than Latin American states and thus could industrialize faster and more successfully.²⁰

The study of late industrialization was a clear departure from the past in terms of contextualization of industrialization. The most significant theoretical contribution of the political economy approach was the shift of analytical focus from society to the state. The relative autonomy and administrative capacity of the state was seen as important to achieving economic development, especially in newly industrializing countries such as South Korea and Taiwan.²¹ Regarding social change in late industrialization, the political economy approach with its focus on the role of the state (vs. market) made expecting different patterns of social change possible by recognizing different patterns of industrialization. The dominant political economic perspective, from the view of the developmental state to the recent “varieties of capitalism” debate, has focused mostly on the state as an all-encompassing institution, on government policy incentives, and on state-business relationships.

However, in most studies of political economy, society is an object of analysis only insofar as it influenced economic changes. The political economy approach thus unwittingly left social and cultural aspects in the process of industrialization largely conceptually underdeveloped.²² Institutionalism has not shown how the state’s strong role in the course of economic development affects society. Indeed, society, tradition, and institutions have been frequently drawn on to explain economic institutions and development without much attention to macro-social implications.²³ The challenge in the field of political economy to the notion of universal patterns of industrialization was not matched by a similar one in sociology due to the declining interest in macrosociology in America in the 1980s.²⁴ What is needed is now is a sociological conceptual framework for understanding social and institutional changes in different types of industrialization.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIALLY MEANINGFUL UNITS BEYOND CLASS

Class analysis as a heuristic tool has been assumed to be universally applicable to societies, regardless of the pattern of industrialization. Furthermore, with the spread of Marxism-Leninism in the postcolonial world, class analysis was uncritically adopted by non-Western intellectuals as a basis for explaining social change.²⁵ In the 1960s, this economic determinism began to be challenged by micro-historical-national analysis.²⁶ Historian E. P. Thompson defined class and class formation as a “social and cultural formation” that needs to be understood in relation to other classes through time and by works based on the specific experiences of workers in European countries during the 19th century.²⁷ Similarly, sociologist Michael Mann analyzed the impact of many different social, economic, political, and international factors on the formation of workers’ image in major European countries.²⁸ He concluded that the image of workers had been affected by such macro political and social changes as economic fluctuations, religion, nation-building processes, militarism and war, and ideologies. Identity based on economic status had to compete in workers’ consciousness with many other images: direct rivals such as deference, sectionalism, and a cautious pragmatism toward the employer and the multiple undercutting images of everyday life, derived from gender, age, family responsibilities, religion, region, and so on.²⁹

The two approaches, despite differences in focus and the level of analysis, were critical of economic structuralism.³⁰ Both assert that class is not a fixed reality; rather, it is historically and culturally contingent on historical and cultural contexts in which people live. Class consciousness is formed not only at the workplace but also at home, in the community, and in social clubs and through leisure activities. Furthermore, the formation of class consciousness needs to be approached both synchronically at a certain place and diachronically at different time points. Workers thus began to be viewed from the perspective of their work environment and worker-centered experiences. Also, the premodern cultural and traditional legacies are important diachronically in the course of industrialization. Related to this is the understanding that society is composed of a “totality of social relations.”³¹

The contextual interpretation approach to labor history and working-class movements in the West is also different from that of older economic structuralism. This emergent paradigm was critical of the conventional view that a working-class movement per se was regarded as an important indicator for formation of the working class. Not all workers participate in such movements as much as is assumed in economic structuralism, and thus the movements should not be considered as the critical expression of class consciousness.³²

A Thompsonian framework is also applied to the study of working-class formation in South Korea. Nationalism, familism, national security, and harmony were identified as factors that the industrialized state mobilized to suppress the formation of class identity and class consciousness. The state inculcated Confucian values as a way to reinforce patriarchal relations in which docility and submissiveness to authority are encouraged, while anti- communism for the sake of national security discouraged class formation based on horizontal ties among workers. At the same time, workers’ reinterpretations of Korean history and mass movements of intellectuals such as the minjung movement, which worked to build solidarity among workers, countered state influence on class formation.³³ While the Thompsonian framework recognizes class formation in South Korea’s late industrialization in terms of the state’s propensity to leverage such anti-class-forming factors as inculcated Confucian values, anti-communism, and paternalism, these factors are external to late industrialization. Put differently, the main question was whether to pursue social change while keeping class as a socially meaningful unit or whether meaningful units other than class could occur due to the institutional imperatives of late industrialization.

All the views take industrialization for granted, without specifying types within it. Even when the analysis of social change is conducted in the context of late industrialization, the social impact of lateness is understood within the confines of class. This book identifies and analyzes neofamilism as a distinct, socially meaningful phenomenon that resulted from interactions between economic developmental tasks and traditional institutions that had been brought back by the Korean state.³⁴

TRADITION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Tradition, according to sociologist Edward Shils, is something that is “handed down” and can take various forms. Tradition can be concrete, such as material objects, buildings, monuments, landscapes, sculptures, paintings, books, tools, or machines, or it can take form of cultural constructions, such as beliefs, images of persons and events, practices, and institutions.³⁵ Cultural constructs become tradition only when a pattern of assertion or action has entered into social memory over time.

Tradition concerns the relationship between the past and the present, especially the impact of the former on the latter. Approaches to the relationship between tradition and social change have undergone remarkable change over the past few decades, related to three different approaches to understanding tradition: structuralist, modernist, and postmodern. The structuralist approach highlights continuity from the past to the present and is indifferent to change or time. This view assumes that once structure is established, it seldom changes. The distinction between the past and the present is not regarded as significant. The modernist perspective is predicated on the discontinuity or disconnect of the present from the past. Modernity is about something new. The postmodern approach to tradition assumes neither continuity between the present and the past nor the abrupt rupture of the present from the past. It is open to various possibilities in terms of interactions between the past and the present and of their consequences.³⁶

The definition of tradition varies across the three perspectives. The modernist and the structuralist approaches share a fixed notion of tradition. They differ in that the modernist perspective views tradition as being incompatible with modernity and thus assumes the ultimate fading away of tradition.³⁷ The structuralist perspective, however, assumes continuity without much change.³⁸ Tradition assumes the involvement of agents that are responsible for the continued succession from one generation to the next at least for three generations.³⁹ The agent can vary in form, from individual or family to the community and the state, depending on the nature of the tradition and the scope of its impact. Tradition connotes neither positive nor negative implications; in contrast, traditionalism refers to reliance on the past.⁴⁰ In this book, tradition is represented in institutions and values in which the state is the main agent in bringing them to the present. The postmodern approach has become prevalent, largely due to its flexibility in understanding interactions between the past and the present and for its focus on actors and projects in linking the past to the present, thus allowing a variety of patterns, such as creation, reinvention, and negotiation.⁴¹

MODERNIZATION AND TRADITION

In earlier versions of modernization theory, tradition is viewed as a hindrance to modernity, with modernity and tradition considered mutually exclusive; thus, modernity is realized through the breakdown of tradition.⁴² Tradition is thereby regarded as something to be mitigated (if not eradicated), leaving no room for tradition to play any positive role in modernization (industrialization). Earlier versions of modernization had been heavily criticized for reifying ideal types, based on the oversimplification of Western experiences. They were not attentive to historical contexts where traditional institutions, such as the family, played a role in the course of Western modernization.⁴³ Later versions of modernization theory focus more on historical contexts in which industrialization and modernization occur. Pluralities of tradition are recognized. Closer examinations of modernization revealed not only that the breakdown of tradition did not necessarily bring about modernity but also that breakdown of the family, community, or even political settings tended to lead to disorganization, delinquency, and chaos. Tradition, in fact, turned out to be conducive to modernization.⁴⁴ Further modernization may not bring about modernity, and even if it does, modernity can be partial or uneven.⁴⁵ Modernization ceases to be viewed as necessarily Western or American and is recognized as non-unilinear.⁴⁶ At the same time, the influence of traditional systems and values is understood as not necessarily receding with industrialization, and cultural change is viewed as path dependent. Modernization paths are accepted as diverse and not universal.

The emergence of newly industrializing countries (NICs) was empirical proof that industrialization and modernization can take various paths different from the West and that traditional institutions and values could be conducive to the acceleration of late industrialization in East Asian countries, as seen in literature on “Asian values” and “varieties of capitalism.” Arguments that address tradition in relation to late industrialization stress that traditional Confucian values were conducive to generating economic wealth under state- led industrialization.⁴⁷ The role of the state in mobilizing these values has been acknowledged, but the main problem with this framework is how to approach values in relation to industrialization. Treating the values as an independent variable juxtaposes values and industrialization without analyzing the specific process and context in which values interact with industrialization through the mediation of the state. Furthermore, arguments that invoke so-called Asian values Orientalize those cultures and make them static, since such values are seen as timeless and unrelated to historical development. This imagined stasis cannot explain why the same values became the sources of developmental problems. Research on varieties of capitalism recognizes the role and persistence of traditional institutions in late industrialization.⁴⁸ Such literature focuses on institutions rather than only on markets and claims that markets operate within the confines of institutions. The institutions are the products of historical evolutions, and economic actors are constrained by the institutions. For example, labor relations are understood to have developed based on traditional institutions of a country (e.g., lifetime employment in Japan and centralized bargaining in Northern Europe). These historically evolved institutions are path dependent, so that institutions are not only mutually interdependent but also difficult to change.

Closely related to the varieties of capitalism is the invention of tradition, which concerns the redefinition of traditional institutions and values in the present context by certain social and political groups. The notion of invention transcends temporality and recognizes intentional human actions in dealing with traditional institutions and values. The invention approach recognizes various projects of political and social actors, including industrialization. Thus, this notion is particularly relevant to the understanding of social change in late industrialization. For example, inventions of tradition in Japanese industrialization include the redeployment of the Japanese traditional societal unit ie (家), or household, to the sphere of Japanese modern institutions, such as the factory, and the invention of paternalism for labor relations.⁴⁹ Other than the case of Japan, little study has been conducted on the role of tradition in late industrialization through interactions with the state’s role and industrialization tasks.⁵⁰

Modernization theories have thus evolved to recognize multiple paths to modernization and industrialization, considering historical and cultural contexts.⁵¹ Multiple paths are based on the understanding that modernization (industrialization) is an effort by elites to mitigate their nations’ “inferior” economic status and move toward equivalence with “well-placed” nations. Thus, the domestic environment, dispositions, and capabilities of elites are important in understanding modernization.⁵² Also, the roles of traditional institutions and values vary, depending on the historical contexts and how and how quickly nations industrialize, as decided by elites. However, while the functional aspects of traditional institutions and values are recognized in different industrial sectors and institutions, little analytical attention has been given to how the state incorporates traditional institutions and values at the macro level, which gives rise to distinct social and institutional consequences.

TRADITION IN KOREAN SOCIETY

Structural-traditional approaches to the Korean case have in fact examined the role of traditional social relationships in shaping values and institutions in the process of industrialization and the implications of these relationships for class formation. One variation of this approach analyzes the responses of Korean society to the market, noting the persistence of collectivism based on the traditional concept of mutual help, rather than the rise of individualism and class identification.⁵³ The patrimonial modernization view of Korean society focuses on the continuation of traditional patrimonialism in political, administrative, economic, and social arenas.⁵⁴ In this model, Korean society is composed of privileged officeholders who dominate unorganized non-officeholders. This model draws a distinction between modernization, any attempt to improve a society’s economic performance, and development, the maximization of a society’s potential. Since Korea industrialized with its patrimonial institutions intact, according to this model, it is modernized but not developed. A similar model understands Korean society as one in which the masses stand alone and isolated from state authority.⁵⁵

Korean scholars have noted the continuous existence of regionalism, school ties, and familism as a distinct feature of Korean society.⁵⁶ Micro-traditional approaches to the question of Korean social organization help reveal the role of personal ties in Korean society. Studies on Korean social networks have identified how familial, regional, school, and neighborhood ties are formed for specific purposes.⁵⁷ Anthropological studies have demonstrated the continued existence of traditional ties and behaviors throughout industrialization.⁵⁸ Studies of the urban poor have shown how traditional networks serve as a means of survival through supplementing income sources in construction and factory work.⁵⁹

These approaches, whether the focus is micro or macro, have the following characteristics: Most of the studies are static, in that they take the existence and operation of Korean traditional institutions for granted, without specifying how and why these institutions persist in the context of late industrialization. Due to this lack of contextual consideration, these studies are limited to sectoral analysis without being able to consider structural implications of the persistence of the traditional institutions. What is important and relevant to this study is not the mere persistence of traditional institutions but why and how the traditional institutions had been reinforced in the process of late industrialization, with implications for macro social change. It is only through that clarification that the structural implications of the persistence and reinforcement of traditional institutions can be understood.⁶⁰ The alternate view presented here understands Korean society not in terms of class or stratum, or a state-society division, but in terms of neotraditional personal relations. State-led industrialization in Korea thus served to reinforce and strengthen primary groups, leading to a society best understood in terms of neofamilism.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION

Late industrialization and its social, institutional, and political implications have a very lengthy scholarly pedigree, although they are not coherently approached. The initial focus on late industrialization began with the case of Germany. For example, the early 20th-century economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen, who recognized the technological advantages of latecomers through borrowing from early industrializers, was also concerned with social, political, and institutional consequences of late industrialization. He highlighted urgency as an impetus for hurried state intervention in economic development, given the threats from warring European nation- states; in turn, the state is likely to emphasize strengthening military force. In regard to Germany’s experience with late development, Veblen thought state intervention and initiatives to spur industrialization brought about dependency of the populace on the state, resulting in their passivity vis-à-vis the state.⁶¹

Economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron provided a more systematic view of institutional features related to late industrialization. Latecomers are bound to go through a path of development that is constrained by lack of capital and technology. In order to overcome these deficiencies, they are likely to adopt institutional forms and policy measures that are different from those of early developers, such as the roles of the state and banks, which establish ties with industrial enterprises as a way to mitigate risks that fledgling firms cannot otherwise afford to take. Although Gerschenkron also demonstrated that late industrialization requires ideologies for overcoming backwardness, his focus was limited to economic institutions.⁶²

The strong role of the state in late industrialization goes beyond the economic level. An important factor in considering social implication of the strong role of the state is the persistence of already established social structures in the process of late industrialization. Once they are formed, social structures persist, possibly for centuries, and different structures and types display different degrees of this ability to survive.⁶³ Bendix specified that even after a considerable degree of economic change occurs, the consequent social structure will not take on universal forms, but will depend on the “pre-industrial conditions, the particular impetus to develop, the path which modernization takes, the significant difference that persist in developed economies, and finally with the impact and timing of dramatic events.”⁶⁴ He further observed that the roles and functions of traditional groups, such as kinship ties and collectivism in the pursuit of late development, were compatible with modernization.⁶⁵

Identifying why and how traditional social institutions and values, as Bendix observed, interact with late industrialization is crucial to understanding social implications of late industrialization.⁶⁶ Although the connection between late industrialization and traditional institutions has not been clearly analyzed, it is generally assumed that the involvement of non-market factors, such as the state, would make possible the continuity of traditional institutions. Or more generally, as Dahrendorf remarked, “each country assimilates industrialization into its tradition.”⁶⁷

Analyzing cases of late industrialization mandates careful attention to contextual factors such as the status of traditional social elites and the degree of the autonomy of the state. In Germany, strong opposition groups to industrialization such as Junkers existed, whereas in Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union, opposition was either weakened or destroyed. In Germany, Junkers held many important bureaucratic positions, which set limits on developmental priorities and other policies.⁶⁸ In Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union, bureaucrats were the main movers in industrialization without much resistance from society. In Japan, samurai-turned-bureaucrats enjoyed a high level of insulation from politics and society, derived from the state’s exam- based merit system of recruitment. While there was no salient opposition group to industrialization in Japan, state officials, politicians, and intellectuals made judicious efforts not to lose Japanese traditional social structures and values in the course of industrialization. In contrast, in the Soviet Union and Korea, the traditional groups and classes were either deliberately destroyed or lost political significance (due to the colonial rule), respectively.⁶⁹

The state thus plays a key role in effecting group formations, and to the extent that the state is involved in late industrialization, non-market factors such as ethnicity, traditional ties, and nationality influence patterns of social change. When the market is the only operating institution in economic transactions, the ultimate object is “to acquire a certain object (amount of money); and the interest in the other person is minimal.”⁷⁰ Class emerges purely as a consequence of market-based economic relations. When non-market factors are involved in economic relations, forms of human interactions and social formation go beyond purely class-based social ones. In short, state intervention in the economy brings about different rules of the game from those in market-based ones, and these different rules mean that human interaction patterns and institutional operations will differ accordingly, and in culturally distinctive ways.

A second observation of the literature is that social structures and ethos prior to late industrialization may persist and even play a positive role, contrary to what modernization theories have advocated. The literature also shows that late industrialization involved traditional institutions and values through state actions, although the specific mechanisms of the process and interactions between late industrialization and tradition are not clear. The peculiarities of social consequences of late industrialization have been insufficiently studied, while social and institutional histories of Germany and Japan have been treated as sui generis and not studied comparatively.⁷¹

Third, because of the paucity of successful late industrialization cases in the 1960s and early 1970s, debates between adherents of the modernization paradigm and its critics took on an abstract character, with few concrete references to actual cases. The inconclusive end of this debate was overwhelmed by the new paradigm of political economy in the 1970s, which focused more on economic outcomes at the expense of adequately capturing societal effects. This gap between studies of political economy and of the social consequences of late industrialization has widened and persists today.

Social science analysis has focused on the variations of class, avoiding consideration of alternatives to class as a unit for social change. More significantly, German sociologist and political economist Max Weber’s critical observation that class as a social outcome is based on market-based economic changes has not been heeded; rather, class analysis has been liberally applied to the cases of late industrialization with insufficient consideration of the role of the state in social change.⁷² The same can be said about studies of tradition, which have stalled since the modernization paradigm was criticized in the mid-1970s and political economy studies began to focus on the roles of institutions and policies in explaining economic success of late industrialization. The role of tradition in social change at the macro level in late industrialization has thus remained unexplored; rather, tradition has been approached either in the context of management and industrial sectors or is considered external to the actual industrialization process. This book, building on studies that recognize and consider tradition, explores the social implications of state actions in the economy through the case of South Korea’s late industrialization.