The Economic Recentering of Pacific Asia

The most important vector influencing China’s relationship with Southeast Asia is the size, connectivity, and prospects of its economy. Neither the regional nor the Chinese economy is shrinking, though China hit a trough in 1989 and Southeast Asia did the same in 1997 and 2008. As figure 9.1 illustrates, the Chinese economy has grown faster than that of Southeast Asia. It doubled the region in 2006 and is currently 274 percent of the region’s size and steady at that level. By comparison, the economy of the United States is 271 percent of Latin America’s. In terms of sheer economic mass as well as population, Southeast Asia stands in the shadow of China.

Another important finding of the chart is that China’s relative rate of growth has been declining since 2011, and it is now almost at the region’s average. The large annual differences of 2007–10 were due to the contrast between China’s steadiness and the region’s fluctuation. At present, the poorer Southeast Asian countries are growing at China’s rate or better, while the richer are still slightly behind. China’s continuing growth prospects are therefore less scary to its neighbors than they were ten years ago, although clearly China is not going away. Indeed, the region is more concerned about a possible Chinese slowdown than another leap forward, concerns that are heightened by China’s trade war with the United States and the economic effects of the pandemic.

However, scale matters. China’s economy grew at 6.1 percent in 2019, possibly slower than some Southeast Asian countries, but its added production in 2019 is more than the entire Thai economy.¹⁴ The proportional relationship of China’s economy to the region is likely to remain similar to that of the United States and Latin America at roughly triple that of the region, varying according to which country has a crisis, but generally stable or with gradual increments.¹⁵ Of course the reason for the preponderances is different. The United States has a much higher per capita gross domestic product (GDP) than Latin America and roughly half the population, while China has twice the population of Southeast Asia.

Another important dimension of China’s economy vis-à-vis Southeast Asia is its rise in developmental status. I use per capita GDP as a rough indicator of relative levels of development.¹⁶ As figure 9.2 illustrates, there have been dramatic changes in China’s relative status over the past forty years. Initially, China’s per capita GDP was beneath the “poor four” of ASEAN. It did not rise above that group until 1988, but by 2000 it had doubled their per capita gross national product (GNP). China has been climbing relative to the middle ASEAN countries since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and in 2020 its GDP per capita surpassed their average for the first time. When the United States looks at China it sees an economy with four times its population but one-fourth its GNP per capita, therefore a demographic power but not an equal in developmental status. China has only 18 percent of Singapore’s per capita GDP, but Singapore has four-tenths of 1 percent of China’s population, and Shanghai’s per capita GDP is 38 percent of Singapore’s. In terms of general relative development, however, Southeast Asia looks sideways if not up at China. A visit to Shanghai or Shenzhen only confirms the perception, and China’s own infrastructure miracles lend credibility to the promises of the BRI.

The most direct economic linkage between China and Southeast Asia is trade. In 2004, China’s merchandise trade was 8 percent of ASEAN’s global trade and ASEAN’s internal trade was three times higher.¹⁷ By 2017, China’s trade had climbed to 17 percent of global trade and 74 percent compared to internal trade. In 2019, China’s trade with Myanmar exceeded Myanmar’s trade with the rest of ASEAN.¹⁸ Although ASEAN as a region consistently runs a slightly favorable overall balance of trade, it has run a deficit with China that ran in the single digits before 2013, reached a high of 22 percent in 2016, and in 2017 was 17 percent. Imports from China equaled 91 percent of internal ASEAN imports that year and were 20 percent of global imports. The US trade exposure to China is comparable to that of ASEAN, but the American trade imbalance is considerably more acute. A corollary of this is that China’s 14 percent share of ASEAN’s sales abroad is important to the regional economy.

Although the BRI has attracted global attention to Chinese investments abroad, China is still playing catch-up with the developed world in terms of investment.¹⁹ In Southeast Asia, China’s investment has almost doubled its share of global investment from the launch of the BRI in 2014–17, from 4.8 percent to 8.4 percent. Compared to intra-ASEAN investment, China’s share has risen from 28 percent to 42 percent. Thus, it is not the existing level of investment that is impressive, but rather the dynamic. Besides the prospective growth of Chinese investment, the emphasis of the BRI on transformative infrastructure projects is welcome.²⁰ Given the already lowered expectations of emerging markets in 2019, the BRI took on added significance, and its projects remain central to prospects of post-pandemic progress.²¹

One of the five categories of connectivity promoted by Xi Jinping in the BRI is people-to-people contact, and Chinese tourism has leapt forward in the past few years before jumping back from COVID-19 in 2020. In 2013, Chinese tourists constituted 12 percent of ASEAN’s total tourists and 23 percent of its tourists from outside ASEAN. In 2017, China furnished 20 percent of the total and one-third of non-ASEAN tourists, more than Europe, the United States, and Japan combined. From 2013 to 2019, visits to ASEAN by Chinese rose 155 percent, while non-Chinese visits went up by 24 percent.²² Tourism accounts for over 10 percent of the GDP of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, and Cambodia.²³ Of course, the contact provided by tourism is a mixed blessing even without the specter of epidemics. Residents not profiting from tourism are inconvenienced by crowded facilities and cultural friction. Nevertheless, tourism broadens the direct people-to-people experience, and the experience is deepened by increasing numbers of students going to China. The target that had been set for 2020 of one hundred thousand students was already doubled in 2018.²⁴

Because of ASEAN, the Southeast Asian region has more economic integration and coherence in outlook than any other region on China’s periphery, and it is adamantly open and global in its diplomacy. Nevertheless, with twice the population and three times the production, it is hardly surprising that China is again becoming the center of attention in Southeast Asia. If we add China’s rapid increases in connectivity with the region, then integration amplifies centricity. Finally, although China’s growth is slowing in the “Xi normal” era, it is still expected to exceed the growth of the United States and other developed countries. And while developing countries such as India or Ethiopia might occasionally match or exceed China’s rate of growth, China has already achieved a massiveness of production that guarantees its continuing primacy in the developing world for the foreseeable future. China’s prominence has become part of regional common sense. In a 2018 poll of regional opinion leaders, 73 percent thought that China had the most economic influence, compared to 11 percent for ASEAN and only 8 percent for the United States.²⁵ In the 2019 version of the same survey, China moved up to 79 percent.²⁶ Thanks to COVID-19, China moved down to 72 percent in 2020, but came back up to 77 percent in 2021.²⁷

One could say, therefore, that, as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, Xi Jinping’s notion of “a community of common destiny” is a reality rather than a dream. The question remains whether a shared destiny remains one of mutual benefit and respect.

Xi Jinping and Southeast Asia

The effect of Xi Jinping’s leadership on regional perceptions has been mixed. On the one hand, all ASEAN states were founding members of the BRI and of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Meanwhile, the earlier institutional relationships such as the ASEAN China Free Trade Area continue to grow, and China supports the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an ASEAN initiative that gained new importance when the United States pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Besides the ASEAN countries, the RCEP includes Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. It is the first trade agreement covering all of Pacific Asia, and its members represent one-third of the global population and one-third of the global GDP.

In addition, the major objections to Xi’s leadership raised by the United States and other developed countries have a quite different salience in Southeast Asia. The region is not happy about the treatment of Uyghurs, but it has its own problems, including the treatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar and their refugee status elsewhere, and also Rodrigo Duterte’s mass executions of drug suspects in the Philippines. At a deeper level, there is strong sentiment that Asian values are different from Western values and that official judgments should not be made concerning the internal affairs of other countries. American sanctions and interventions are often viewed as high-handed. As for intellectual property, most Southeast Asian countries share China’s situation with regard to innovation transfer. They are also on the receiving end rather than on the protecting end. Finally, the region did not share American illusions that China’s economic development would lead to democratization. Democratization has had its ups and downs in Southeast Asia, and tolerance of regime differences is part of the culture of ASEAN. And the concern raised by Kiron Skinner, chief of policy planning in Trump’s State Department at the time, that rivalry with China is “the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian” sounds a bit different when heard by other non-Caucasians.²⁸

On the other hand, there are three aspects of Xi’s leadership that heighten the region’s concerns about their increasing asymmetric integration with China: the encouragement of Chinese nationalism, Xi’s aspirations of global leadership, and his personalistic authoritarianism. Chinese nationalism encouraged by Xi is the major source of worry and the one most directly tied to the South China Sea disputes. While Xi’s campaigns such as “China Dream” may have the immediate objective of raising collective self-regard within China, in combination with efforts to increase China’s international presence, China under Xi’s leadership appears more alien and intrusive to others. Moreover, there is little effort to control the overt nationalism of publications such as Global Times and of social media. Articles projecting Chinese nationalism or militarism produce allergic reactions among China’s vulnerable neighbors. Disputed sovereignty is by its nature a hot-button issue for all sides, and Xi’s abandonment of Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach to foreign policy makes the Chinese claim more threatening.²⁹

Since the oil rig incident in 2014 and the Philippines arbitration in 2016 there has been an ebb in maritime confrontations, and there has been slow progress on arriving at a code of conduct for the South China Sea. All sides declared their intention of arriving at a code by 2021, derailed by COVID-19, and China has been pushing for its completion.³⁰ However, the continuing militarization of maritime features and the rhetoric of Chinese netizens are disturbing, especially to Vietnam and the Philippines. Besides the tendency for Chinese nationalism to stimulate counter-Chinese nationalism in Southeast Asia, there is the special regional problem of a history of tensions and crises regarding ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. While ethnic Chinese have been on the defensive for much of the past seventy years, there is concern that with the new assertiveness of China, current ethnic balances could be upset.³¹

A second concern is with the global turn of Xi Jinping’s ambitions. Reasonable people in the region are not worried about China expanding its land boundaries toward the south. China settled its last land border dispute with Southeast Asia in 2001, and its basic southeastern border was set in the fifteenth century with the defeat of the Ming annexation of Vietnam.³² But coping with American rivalry has become Xi’s dominant concern, and that poses several derivative risks for the region. The most basic problem is that it threatens to make the region into a passive venue of great power tensions. This was Southeast Asia’s fate during the American war in Vietnam, and it was a major reason for the founding of ASEAN.³³ For the past twenty-five years, ASEAN’s prestige and agency have blossomed, and arguably the rise of China has helped rather than hurt its prominence. But the region’s significance and autonomy will be reduced if both China and the United States fixate on their bilateral relationship—whether a rivalrous new Cold War or a collaborative Group of Two (G2)—and deduce regional policies from their global concerns. For example, China’s militarization of the South China Sea is aimed primarily at countering American capabilities, but it has the secondary effects of making regionally based demilitarization unlikely and stimulating American military activities in the region.

A second related problem with incipient US-China rivalry is that most other countries would prefer not to choose between them. While Southeast Asia welcomed the growing American interest in the region exemplified by the “pivot toward Asia,” it would be a disaster to be exclusively on one side or the other in a Cold War–type confrontation. In the 2019 survey of Southeast Asian elites, 79 percent wanted to avoid taking sides and to strengthen ASEAN, though only 3 percent wanted to keep the superpowers out of the region.³⁴ In the 2020 survey, despite a more jaundiced view of China and high hopes for the Biden administration, the percentage wanting to avoid taking sides increased to 84 percent.³⁵

Regional countries have leverage as long as both sides are trying to entice friends and partners, but to take sides would mean either to lose access to China’s markets, products, and connectivity or to cut off a vital buffering relationship beyond Asia. Since the choice would be an unwelcome one, whichever side attempts to force the choice would thereby become the proximate threat. If both sides force a choice, the best policy for other countries would be to reduce exposure to both by strengthening non–great power relationships and regional institutions such as ASEAN.³⁶

The third aspect of Xi Jinping’s leadership that worries Southeast Asia is his increasing tendency toward personalistic authoritarianism. The region is not shocked by this tendency. It has plenty of its own experience with this genre of leadership. Cambodia’s Hun Sen was in power from 1979 until succeeded by his son in 2023. But precisely because of this background, there are concerns about the long-term reliability and quality of Chinese leadership. Xi’s deinstitutionalization of Party and state processes and muzzling of contrary views and criticism have not improved the quality and sensitivity of Chinese diplomacy. Yang Jiechi, Xi’s former chief foreign policy adviser, is infamous in the region for reminding Singapore’s foreign minister in 2010 that China is a big country but Singapore is a small one. “Wolf warriors” may be popular in China, but Southeast Asia faces the toothy end of the wolves. And while Xi’s consolidation of personal power at the 20th Party Congress promises stability in the medium term, it doesn’t guarantee consistency in policy, and it raises the questions of “after Xi, what?” and “after Xi, when?”

Public opinion in Southeast Asia reflects both awareness of China’s arrival as a global power and reservations about its nationalism, rivalry with the United States, and leadership. The fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, the most extensive and detailed political opinion survey of East Asia, was conducted in China, Japan, and South Korea and all Southeast Asian countries except Brunei in 2014–16 and contained some questions relating to international perceptions.³⁷ The timing is useful because it captures Xi’s first years and the effect of Barack Obama’s pivot toward Asia. Opinions differed widely, and varied according to current country-specific interactions, but, in general, American influence on Asia was viewed more positively (73 percent) than Chinese influence (56 percent).³⁸ However, as one researcher put it simply, “Prosperity attracts East Asians.”³⁹ This trait benefits the prestige of Japan and Singapore, and it also accounts for a smaller rise in esteem for China and little change for the United States despite the efforts of Obama and Hillary Clinton. China was viewed as “the main driver of regional integration and greater economic openness.”⁴⁰ The difference in political systems between China and respondents’ countries had little effect, leading the researchers to conclude that “China’s one-party authoritarian system is no longer an obstacle to its ascendance in the region.”⁴¹ In 2016, China was, if not the coming attraction for the region, the coming reality.

In sum, Xi Jinping’s coming to power in 2012 did not define a new era in China–Southeast Asian relations, but it has reshaped them. The age of anxiety replaced the golden age already in 2008, as China appeared to leap forward while others, especially the United States, fell back. However, Xi brought anxiety to its highest point with the crises of 2014 and 2016. Since then, few would disagree that China is now the major economic and political influence. But the “Xi normal” has not created a comfort zone for China’s neighbors. China’s soft power and political prestige lagged behind perceptions of its economic might and dynamic.

The Trump Vector

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 created a global political crisis comparable to the global economic crisis of 2008.⁴² The main effect of both crises was the creation of systemic uncertainty. The big difference between the two is that with Trump the uncertainty continued to deepen, and even after his departure uncertainty remains as a cloud over American diplomatic predictability. As in 2008, the crisis created the opportunity for China to leap forward in prominence, this time in terms of political prestige and visibility. But just as its earlier economic advances generated anxieties in Southeast Asia, China’s political prominence is unsettling.

The structural uncertainties introduced by Trump were evident from the beginning of his administration and can be divided into five dimensions: policy content, implementation, continuity, adaptability, and duration. First, Trump’s assertions of policy preferences were occasionally contradictory or inconsistent. Second, implementation was hampered by frequent changes of key personnel and by the demoralization of the diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities. Third, Trump took pride in disrupting continuity with previous administrations. Fourth, although his style of bargaining to a crisis point and then compromising involved a certain kind of flexibility, he did not admit mistakes, nor did he learn from them. Fifth and last, but not least, although Trump lost the 2020 election, the strength of the Republican Party and of the Trump faction within it raises the question of a possible return of right-wing politics—with or without Trump himself—in 2024. And the riot at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, raises the prospect of a new level of violence in American domestic politics.

The regional Trump shock in Asia began on the first day of his presidency when he abandoned the TPP. Organizing the TPP option was the capstone of Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” Trump’s quick scuttling of the TPP demonstrated that his talk about “America First” was not just campaign rhetoric. His personal style and his tweets aimed at his right-wing domestic base have continued to alienate and irritate the region. After Trump’s first hundred days in office in 2017, a poll of Southeast Asian foreign policy elites showed that while 70 percent supported active US involvement in the region, only 4 percent thought that Southeast Asia was an American priority.⁴³ A majority thought that the United States now considered Southeast Asia unimportant or irrelevant, and 72 percent thought that the US global image had deteriorated over the previous four months. The United States was considered an undependable ally by 44 percent and highly undependable by 11 percent. Two-thirds did expect the United States to continue its involvement in the South China Sea, but did not expect continuing interest in human rights or international law. While half expected ASEAN to strengthen intraregional cooperation, three-quarters considered China most influential in the region now and for the next ten years, followed by ASEAN (18 percent), Japan (5 percent), and the United States (4 percent). If the United States created a strategic vacuum, then 80 percent expected China to be the major beneficiary. These low expectations of the Trump administration stemmed not from anticipated economic losses (only 9 percent expected “huge losses” from America First), but rather from Trump’s initial policies and general uncertainties.

A similar elite poll conducted in November–December 2018 confirmed the initial judgments of Trump and of Xi.⁴⁴ The United States and China were equally distrusted, at 51.5 percent for China and 50.6 percent for the United States. There were surprisingly low ratings for China from its presumptive friend Cambodia (21 percent trusted) and for the United States from its ally Thailand (14 percent trusted). The political nature of the current crisis was underlined by the contrast between 43 percent considering the regional outlook uncertain and 55 percent being optimistic about the regional economy. More expected to benefit rather than to lose in a US-China trade war, but most were uncertain about it. Only Vietnam (78 percent) and the Philippines (62 percent) considered military tensions a major problem, but many were worried about ASEAN becoming the arena of major power competition (62 percent). Most thought that US global and regional power and influence had deteriorated over the past year (59 percent), and only Vietnam thought the United States had done better (47 percent positive, 32 percent negative). There was an even split on the reliability of the American security role in the region. One-third considered it reliable (especially Vietnam and Cambodia), one-third were unsure (especially Indonesia, Laos, and Myanmar), and one-third were doubtful (especially Malaysia, Brunei, and Thailand). The general view of the BRI was positive, but there was concern about China’s ultimate ambitions in the region. While China was clearly the leading economic power (73 percent), the responses regarding political and strategic influence are more diverse: 45 percent choose China, 31 percent choose the United States, and 21 percent choose ASEAN. Singapore ranks the United States and China equally; China is the leader everywhere else. Two-thirds expect the United States and China to be strategic competitors.

One year later, The State of Southeast Asia survey documented a continuation of China’s rise in prominence in an atmosphere of increasing general concern.⁴⁵ China’s status as the leading economic power in the region grew from 73 to 79 percent, and it was now seen as the leading political and strategic power by 52 percent, almost twice the American share of 27 percent and three times ASEAN’s 18 percent. But people are not happy about the trend. Eighty-five percent of those who consider China the largest political influence are worried about China’s influence in their own country. Seventy-nine percent do not want to choose sides in a global rivalry, but if they had to, 46 percent would choose China and 54 percent the United States.

It is important to note that only three ASEAN states preferred the United States to China in 2019, namely, Vietnam (86 percent), the Philippines (83 percent), and Singapore (61 percent); the other seven preferred China, but by smaller margins. The gap is a reminder of the diversity of attitudes within ASEAN, as well. Vietnam’s relation to the United States actually improved under Trump. He visited Hanoi twice, US military actions in the South China Sea were welcome, Vietnam’s trade was improved by Trump’s trade war with China, and human rights criticism disappeared. Over the course of 2019, respondents became significantly more worried about domestic political instability, economic downturn, and climate change, followed distantly by military tensions and terrorism, but military tensions related to the South China Sea ranked first for Vietnam and the Philippines. Many were concerned that new initiatives regarding the Indo-Pacific might sideline ASEAN’s initiatives.

The elite poll conducted immediately after the defeat of Trump in the 2020 election documented the region’s vast relief and its hope for an American return to predictability.⁴⁶ Now 68 percent expected US engagement in the region to increase, as opposed to only 10 percent the previous year. Confidence that the United States “will do the right thing” under Biden rose from 30 percent to 48 percent, and confidence in the United States as a strategic partner rose from 35 percent to 55 percent. This is especially impressive considering the confusion in American politics that persisted until January 2021 (when the poll concluded) and the poor performance of the United States in the COVID-19 crisis. But positive attitudes should not be mistaken for a regional swing toward the United States. Only 6 percent had full confidence in the United States as a strategic partner, and 84 percent wanted to strengthen ASEAN and avoid a choice between the global powers. The United States is seen as one of a number of hedges against China but not as an alternative. Japan and the European Union, while not as powerful, are more popular, and there is a positive reception of the new regional trade organization, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

The New Normal of China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia

Given the ebbing of American hegemony, it is notable that the world’s general confidence in China’s leadership has decreased while perceptions of its importance have increased. According to a global poll in October 2018, 70 percent see China as moving forward over the past decade, 34 percent consider China the leading economic power, and only 19 percent think that having China as the leading power is good. Despite generally low opinions of Trump, 60 percent prefer American leadership.⁴⁷ In Europe as well as in Asia there is nostalgia for the “good old days” before Trump.⁴⁸ This promises a post-Trump rebound effect, already visible in the 2020 ASEAN poll, but a full return to earlier confidence is unlikely, and a return of American economic hegemony is far less likely.

The reasons for the lag in confidence concerning China are complex. Part of the gap is due to negative aspects of Xi’s diplomacy and part to China’s party-state system, though, in any case, changing asymmetric relations generate anxieties. Using the political scientist Joseph Nye’s original definition of soft power as the ability to achieve cooperation without rewards or sanctions, China’s soft power appears to be far behind its hard power capabilities.⁴⁹ Clearly, soft power is more complex than an automatic accompaniment of power, the “gleam on the sword.” Indeed, in the case of Vietnam, it seems that the vividness of China’s hard power accounts for Vietnam’s extreme suspicion. Up close, a sword in a neighbor’s hand is not attractive, nor are the bared teeth of a neighbor’s diplomats.

Especially under Xi Jinping, China has certainly attempted to develop the persuasiveness of its soft power. Xi’s slogans of “win-win” and the “community of common destiny” attempt to emphasize the mutual benefit of specific initiatives and the general situation of shared needs and goals. But “win-win” is unconvincing in asymmetric relationships.⁵⁰ The larger side is proportionally less exposed to risk in the transaction and can more freely take chances. If a BRI project fails, China loses money, but the other side loses its budget and the next election. Moreover, while the tighter bond forged by cooperation enables the smaller side to participate in accomplishing something desirable, it leaves the residue of a closer relationship with a stronger power.⁵¹ That closer relationship can be comfortable only if the larger power is trusted. Trust requires confidence that the autonomy and core interests of the smaller side will be respected. In turn, the larger side must be confident that the smaller side is not scheming against it. The most important factor in creating mutual trust is mutual respect over time. Eventually, the stability of the relationship becomes the commonsense expectation of both sides.

The term new normal is therefore a bit of a contradiction. A relationship becomes normal as it ages. In the instance of China and Southeast Asia, the rise of China has been too recent and there is the even more recent problem of sharpening global rivalry. China has reasons to be confident that Southeast Asia will not balance against it, and Southeast Asia has reasons to be confident that China will respect its collective and individual autonomy. But there are doubts on both sides, and Southeast Asia is at best a collective actor rather than a unitary one. Appropriate diplomacy is necessary on both sides in order to embed normalcy.

On the Southeast Asian side, diplomatic appropriateness and stability are made more difficult by the number and variety of sovereign actors. Each has a long and idiosyncratic relationship with China. Consider the examples of Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines. Vietnam’s party-state is most similar to China’s and their party-to-party relations are considered more important than their state-to-state diplomacy. Nevertheless, no country in the region is more suspicious of China than Vietnam. Righteous resistance to China is a central part of Vietnamese national identity, underlined by hostility from 1978 to 1991.⁵² Singapore’s small size and affluence creates nervousness in its regional relationships as well as with China. It is like a small orphan with a fat wallet in a raucous playground, and it relies on its agility to survive. Singapore’s military expenditures as a percentage of its GDP are double the average of Pacific Asia and 1.8 times that of China, and conscription at age eighteen is compulsory.⁵³ The Philippines continues to have a close but fraught relationship to the United States. More important than the formal alliance (often ignored by both sides) is the thick web of transnational family connections. Remittances from the United States were $11 billion in 2017, ranking behind only Mexico, China, and India and contributing 4 percent of its GDP.⁵⁴ Moreover, political swings in the Philippines have led to dramatic changes in attitudes toward China with each new president. In 2014, during Benigno Aquino’s presidency only 32 percent of Filipinos had a positive view of Xi, but six months into Duterte’s presidency in 2017 it had risen to 53 percent.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, China’s power and influence was still considered a threat by 77 percent.

The fluctuation and diversity of China’s bilateral relations with Southeast Asian countries underlines the importance of ASEAN. ASEAN is key to the China–Southeast Asia relationship because it pools (but does not compress) the divergent perspectives of its members and reduces the asymmetry of their individual relationships with China.⁵⁶ By creating a regional international profile and point of attention, ASEAN strengthens the collective autonomy of its members.⁵⁷ Just as importantly, inclusivity is the essence of its foreign policy. Thus ASEAN facilitates both sides of the asymmetric relationship. It reassures its members, but not by suggesting an alliance against outsiders. In the China–Southeast Asia relationship over the past twenty-five years, ASEAN has had the opposite function of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) between Europe and Russia.

Even the researchers at the ASEAN Studies Centre in Singapore were surprised at their findings that ASEAN was considered second only to China as the country/organization with the most economic influence in Southeast Asia, and with substantial political influence as well.⁵⁸ ASEAN’s strength is its weakness: because it operates by consensus it cannot force its membership, and because it is not an alliance it cannot threaten others. Its challenge is to preserve credible centrality as connectivity with China continues to strengthen and as great power rivalry hardens.

Conclusion

China’s diplomacy toward Southeast Asia under Xi Jinping has followed the successful lines of his predecessors. He has continued to develop exchanges of official visits at all levels. In 2020, Xi’s first official overseas trip was to Myanmar. The first top official whom Xi met after the confirmation of his third term as Party secretary in 2022 was General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong of Vietnam. The BRI has provided an umbrella and label for a general commitment to expand China’s domestic and international connectivity. Xi has shown respect for ASEAN itself and for ASEAN’s continued leadership in its various initiatives such as the RCEP, the East Asia Summit, and the East Asia Community. Although bilateral tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines reached their high points under Xi, like his predecessors he was careful to keep the crises from crossing a threshold into hostility or from creating more lasting and generalized enmity.⁵⁹ To a great extent the region’s nostalgia for American presence and concerns about China’s growth are due to its decreasing exposure to the United States and increasing exposure to China rather than to bad diplomacy or aggressive actions on China’s part. The United States seems less threatening because it is less capable of threatening.

The problematic features of Xi’s diplomacy also have their roots in previous policy. Even before 2008 the domestic discussion of China’s peaceful rise occurred in the context of a new interest in the rise of great powers.⁶⁰ In the South China Sea the number of incidents increased after 2008, whether by central direction or by a loosening of the leashes of various Chinese units operating there. The problem of maritime loose cannons continued under Xi until 2014, when the severity of the oil rig crisis with Vietnam led to some leash-tightening but not significant accommodation. But the cannons continue to multiply. Xi’s physical and military building of the maritime points under Chinese control was central policy, though that also had precedents.

Perhaps the major personal failings of Xi’s regional diplomacy thus far are problems of omission rather than of commission. The general contours of the China–Southeast Asia relationship are more favorable for a stable, mutually beneficial asymmetric relationship than they have ever been. Southeast Asia needs no further persuasion that a positive relationship with China is essential. China should be confident that Southeast Asia and ASEAN will not abuse its favors. The shock of China’s post-2008 growth rate is over. China under Xi aspires to sustainable stability, not leaps forward, and Southeast Asia can view China as a socio-economy more similar to itself in problems and aspirations. Southeast Asians appreciated China’s help during the COVID-19 crisis.⁶¹ Both China and Southeast Asia have to deal with the problem of American nationalism and unpredictability, though from different perspectives. Southeast Asia does not want to choose between global rivals, and even less does it want to become again the venue for global conflict.

In these circumstances China has the opportunity—thus far not grasped—to confirm a normal relationship with Southeast Asia. The basic diplomatic challenge is to provide a credible framework for the relationship that guarantees Southeast Asia’s individual and collective autonomy and core interests. While China does not see itself as threatening regional autonomy, it needs to convince Southeast Asia that respect for regional interests is not a matter of changeable policy. The first step would be to sign a code of conduct for the South China Sea. What matters with the code is that it would provide a mutually agreeable and binding structure for interactions despite continuing differences over sovereignty. The fact of the signing of the code would be more important than its content. The second step would be to continue to emphasize that increased connectivity to China would enhance rather than restrict connectivity elsewhere, including connectivity with the United States. The most effective response to American containment would be not counter-containment but rather openness.⁶² Joining the revised TPP would be a brilliant move that would push forward openness while preventing containment. A third step would be developing cooperative institutions to cope with regional problems shared by China such as natural disasters, effects of global warming, and fisheries.

China is no longer a rising power vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. It is a risen power, but it is not all-powerful, and it will never be. The age of hegemony is over. What has already replaced the hegemony of the United States is a multinodal web of interacting relationships in which relative power matters, but is not decisive.⁶³ Even if the United States disappeared, China would not be all-powerful. This is the basic context of the Xi normal in China–Southeast Asia relations. Xi Jinping’s task is how to stabilize and institutionalize a mutually beneficial asymmetric relationship. He has not taken off in a contrary direction, but there are important steps not yet taken.

Notes

1. 1. Suisheng Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022).

2. 2. Camilla T. N. Sørensen, “The Roots of China’s Assertiveness in East Asia: Analysing the Main Driving Forces in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 2 (December 2021): 10–32.

3. 3. Yi Wang, “Jointly Advancing the Global Development Initiative and Writing a New Chapter for Common Development,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 21, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220922_10769721.html; Yi Wang, “Acting on the Global Security Initiative to Safeguard World Peace and Tranquility,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 24, 2022, http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202205/t20220505_10681820.htm.

4. 4. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2017).

5. 5. Brantly Womack, Recentering Pacific Asia: Regional China and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

6. 6. World Trade Organization (WTO), Global Value Chain Development Report 2019: Technological Innovation, Supply Chain Trade, and Workers in a Globalized World (Geneva: WTO, 2019).

7. 7. In dollar value, Pacific Asia was 73 percent of combined US and EU production in 2021. China was 62 percent of Pacific Asia’s total production. Calculated from International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (Washington, DC: IMF, October 2022).

8. 8. Until the accession of Vietnam in 1995, the members of ASEAN were Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Philippines.

9. 9. Brantly Womack, “China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy,” Pacific Affairs 76, no. 4 (Winter 2003/4): 529–48.

10. 10. Jayant Menon and Anna Cassandra Melendez, “Upgrading the ASEAN- China Free Trade Agreement,” East Asia Forum, August 14, 2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/14/upgrading-the-asean-china-free-trade-agreement.

11. 11. Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7–48; Bjorn Jerden, “The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Bought into It,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 47–88; Brantly Womack, “China and the Future Status Quo,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 115–37.

12. 12. The oil rig crisis was certainly the lowest point in Vietnam’s recent relationship with China, and it has had lasting effects. Alexander Vuving, “Where to Now for Vietnam after Trong?,” East Asia Forum, February 27, 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/27/where-to-now-for-vietnam-after-trong.

13. 13. David M. Lampton, Celina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2020).

14. 14. Calculated from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, accessed December 23, 2023, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook; estimate from the IMF, World Economic Outlook (Washington, DC: IMF, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-october-2019.

15. 15. In the past twenty years, the United States has fluctuated between 313 percent and 239 percent of the Latin American economy, according to the IMF.

16. 16. There are numerous problems with equating per capita GNP to wealth and poverty. However, the most extreme problems of inflated gross national products (GNPs) per capita are due to resource export, which does not affect these comparisons.

17. 17. All China-ASEAN trade, investment, and tourism figures calculated from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2018 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, December 2018), https://www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/asyb-2018.pdf.

18. 18. John Reed, “China and Myanmar Sign off on Belt and Road Projects,” Financial Times, January 18, 2020.

19. 19. Evelyn Goh and Nan Liu, “Chinese Investment in Southeast Asia, 2005–19: Patterns and Significance,” SEARBO Policy Briefing, New Mandala, August 11, 2021, https://dokumen.tips/documents/chinese-investment-in-southeast-asia.html?page=2.

20. 20. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 111–29, especially 121.

21. 21. Jonathan Wheatley, “Investors Look to Emerging Markets amid IMF’s Prognosis,” Financial Times, April 12, 2019.

22. 22. Calculated from ASEAN Stats Data Portal, “Visitor Arrival to ASEAN Member State States by Origin Countries,” accessed March 2, 2021, https://data.aseanstats.org/visitors.

23. 23. ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2016–2025 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ATSP-2016-2025.pdf.

24. 24. The target was set in 2010 at the 13th ASEAN-China Summit. The current estimate is for students in both directions. Tommy Koh, “ASEAN and China: Past, Present, and Future,” Tembusu College, National University of Singapore, October 22, 2018, https://tembusu.nus.edu.sg/news/2018/asean-and-china-past-present-future.

25. 25. Tang Siew Mun, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Pham Thi Phuong Thao, and Anuthida Saelaow Qian, The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2019.pdf. This is an annual online survey of “policy influencers and informers” in Southeast Asia. It tries to include a spectrum of responders from across government, academic, and other specialist areas. The 2022 survey included sixteen hundred respondents.

26. 26. Tang Siew Mun, Hoang Thi Ha, Anuthida Saelaow Qian, Glenn Ong, and Pham Thi Phuong Thao, The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2020.pdf.

27. 27. Sharon Seah, Hoang Thi Ha, Melinda Martinus, and Pham Thi Phuong Thao, The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf; Sharon Seah, Joanne Lin, Sithanonxay Suvannaphakdy, Melinda Martinus, Pham Thi Phuong Thao, Farah Nadine Seth, and

28. Hoang Thi Ha, The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–

29. Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-State-of-SEA-2022_FA_Digital_FINAL.pdf.

30. 28. Joel Gehrke, “State Department Preparing for Clash of Civilizations with China,” Washington Examiner, April 30, 2019.

31. 29. Womack, “China and the Future Status Quo.”

32. 30. Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea: China and the Code of Conduct,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 11, 2020, https://www.scribd.com/document/489530542/Thayer-Consultancy-Annual-Report-for-2020.

33. 31. Bilahari Kausikan, “Two Global Trends That Will Shape Singapore’s Future” (speech, Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation Forum, Singapore, July 12, 2018).

34. 32. James Anderson and John Whitmore, eds., China’s Encounters on the South and Southwest: Reforging the Fiery Frontier over Two Millennia (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

35. 33. Lee Hsien Loong, “The View from Singapore and Southeast Asia” (speech, 18th Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2019).

36. 34. Tang et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report, 28.

37. 35. Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report, 32.

38. 36. Brantly Womack, “Asymmetric Parity: US-China Relations in a Multinodal World,” International Affairs 92, no. 6 (November 2016): 1463–80.

39. 37. Asian Barometer Survey, accessed December 23, 2023, https://www.asianbarometer.org.

40. 38. Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang, “Xi’s Foreign-Policy Turn and Asian Perceptions of a Rising China,” Global Asia 12, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 104–11.

41. 39. Kai-Ping Huang and Bridget Welsh, “Trends in Soft Power in East Asia: Distance, Diversity and Drivers,” Global Asia 12, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 112–17.

42. 40. Min-Hua Huang and Mark Weatherall, “Democratic Distance and Asian Views of Chinese and American Influence,” Global Asia 12, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 118.

43. 41. Huang and Weatherall, “Democratic Distance,” 119.

44. 42. Brantly Womack, “International Crises and China’s Rise: Comparing the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 2017 Global Political Crisis,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 383–401.

45. 43. ASEAN Studies Centre, “How Do Southeast Asians View the Trump Administration?,” May 3, 2017, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ASCSurvey40517.pdf.

46. 44. Tang et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report.

47. 45. Tang et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report.

48. 46. Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report.

49. 47. Kat Devlin, “5 Charts on Global Views of China,” Pew Research Center, October 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views-of-china.

50. 48. Guy Chazan and Michael Peel, “Confidence in NATO in Sharp Decline,” Financial Times, February 10, 2020.

51. 49. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

52. 50. Brantly Womack, “Beyond Win-Win: Rethinking China’s International Relationships in an Era of Economic Uncertainty,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (July 2013): 911–28.

53. 51. Evelyn Goh, ed., Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

54. 52. Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

55. 53. World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” 2019, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators.

56. 54. Pew Research Center, “Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2017,” April 3, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/interactives/remittance-flows-by-country.

57. 55. Laura Silver, “How People in Asia-Pacific View China,” Pew Research Center, October 16, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/16/how-people-in-asia-pacific-view-china.

58. 56. Alice Ba, (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Amitav Acharya, ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 2021).

59. 57. Nguyen Vu Tung, Flying Blind: Vietnam’s Decision to Join ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021).

60. 58. Tang et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, 22.

61. 59. Frances Yaping Wang and Brantly Womack, “Jawing through Crises: Chinese and Vietnamese Media Strategies in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 119 (2019): 712–28.

62. 60. Gotelind Müller, Documentary, World History, and National Power in the PRC: Global Rise in Chinese Eyes (London: Routledge, 2013).

63. 61. Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report.

64. 62. Wang Jisi, “Qualitative Change in US China Policy in 4 Perspectives,” Global Times, June 16, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1154466.shtml.

65. 63. Womack, Recentering Pacific Asia, chap. 5.