Surveillance and Fear

Since the implementation of the “People’s War on Terror” in 2014, access to Xinjiang has been increasingly restricted. The chapter by Deng Kai, David Demes, and Chih-Jou Jay Chen (this volume) outlines the intensification of mass surveillance across China under Xi Jinping’s leadership. What they refer to as “the surveillance state” has been particularly intrusive in Xinjiang, where it has been used to enforce increasingly restrictive control over the everyday lives of Uyghurs. In 2016, the new Party secretary Chen Quanguo, former Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, introduced the grid management system, which subdivides communities into small units for the purposes of information gathering and monitoring.¹⁹ This unprecedented security apparatus has brought everyday life in Xinjiang under highly policed surveillance. Fear was omnipresent among Uyghurs when I visited in 2016; people were extremely cautious about what they said and did. Journalists’ reports from 2017 and 2018 showed heavily restricted areas, empty streets, and a proliferation of surveillance cameras.²⁰ In 2019 and 2020, they witnessed residents going through security checks robotically even without police supervision, knowing that any misbehavior would have severe consequences.²¹ This increase in surveillance has created a widespread environment of distrust and pervasive fear, which has its own internalizing function. Even without being noticeably watched, Uyghurs tend to control and censor themselves out of fear of being seen or caught doing something that would raise suspicion. As one Uyghur told me, “We don’t even dare to think, let alone do or say anything.”²²

Chen Quanguo tested his neighborhood grid surveillance system while in charge of the Tibet Autonomous Region, but expanded it massively in Xinjiang through the use of both technologies (for example, cameras, facial recognition) and people, with neighbors assigned to spy on each other.²³ In more densely populated urban areas of the Uyghur homeland, “convenient” police stations were established every fifty to two hundred meters. Regular inspections of homes by police or neighborhood-level cadres became possible at any time.²⁴ The state outlawed “suspicious” beards, veils, and Islamic baby names. Anyone who had ever studied or taught the Quran or even saved or viewed religious content on their smart devices became subject to imprisonment under charges of extremism or terrorism.²⁵ Uyghur residents’ passports were confiscated, and those who had previously traveled abroad or had relatives abroad became targets of political indoctrination. According to local rules, people were not only to spy on their neighbors but also to make sure they behaved well. “They would take your credit card, cut your electricity or water [for the whole neighborhood] if you failed to report any suspicious person or behavior in the neighborhood,” said one resident.²⁶ “They will catch you anyway. Cameras are everywhere,” they continued, “so we had better report them while we can.” Xinjiang increased its security budget by 365 percent in 2016.²⁷ In 2018, Lucas Niewenhuis, the newsletter editor at the China Project, reported that the state had arrested 227,000 people from Xinjiang in 2017, an increase of 731 percent from 2016.²⁸ Xinjiang has become a land of “criminals.” Although its residents constitute only 1.5 percent of the total population of the People’s Republic of China, they accounted for one in every five persons arrested in 2017. These statistics do not even begin to address the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who have been detained without formal charge or sentencing. Several Uyghurs told me that they slept in their clothes because they had seen their neighbors arrested in the middle of the night in their pajamas, with no time to change.

The fear of disappearing without a trace and the fear of losing loved ones without any explanation haunt Uyghurs every day. Both in person and via media, people can no longer talk to each other without the fear of being overheard and caught saying something they should not. In an effort to save themselves, they go silent. As surveillance intensified in 2017, many people buried their smartphones or threw them into the river, and those who kept them returned them to their factory settings and deleted the contact information of any friends and relatives outside of China. As the anthropologist Linda Green observes, silence when used as “a survival strategy” is simultaneously a “powerful mechanism of control” that creates more fear and divides people further.²⁹ If people cannot speak to each other, they cannot trust each other. Another level of terror was created by the awareness that those detained on suspicion of being a “religious extremist,” “separatist,” or “two-faced person” (liangmian ren) were being put under pressure to inform on other people who may have committed similar crimes.³⁰ These crimes could include any incident of criticizing the state or overtly displaying religiosity, even if it happened years ago. Detainees were told that if they provided at least three names and incidents, it would be better for both them and their family. Survivors testified at the Uyghur Tribunal (London, June 2021) that they were asked to provide this information while enduring torture. This contributed to a massive increase of detainees held without factual evidence. As a Uyghur elder stated, “During the Cultural Revolution, we were accused of being a ‘two-hearted person’ [liangxin ren]. Now we are accused of being two-faced persons. It’s impossible to prove our loyalty to them.”³¹

What makes surveillance in Xinjiang so powerful is the use of technology to make it a routine part of everyday life, inevitably sparking comparisons to George Orwell’s 1984. On top of the surveillance cameras on every street corner, all residents of Xinjiang are required to install surveillance smartphone apps such as Cleannet Bodyguard (Jingwang Weishi) or the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), which gather data on whatever the user does and flag any suspicious activity, from photos to videos and even WiFi login data.³² Facial recognition technologies have been installed at checkpoints throughout the region, following Uyghurs wherever they go and constantly cataloging their travel, making them feel as if they are never free from monitoring.³³ They have also been integrated into smartphone apps. As of April 2021, citizens are required to download the National Anti-Fraud Center (Guojia Fanzha Zhongxin) smartphone app, developed by the Ministry of Public Security in China. A user’s name, phone number, ID number, address, and facial scan are all required to create an account. The app then has access to nearly everything on the phone, including the microphone, camera, contacts, SMS (Short Message Service) code, call log, and browsing history.³⁴ The required use and the nature of this app have created considerable discussion among netizens nationwide.

The ubiquitous surveillance enabled by technology has created an atmosphere of proactive self-censorship and changed how people think about the state, which has an increasingly omnipotent presence. In making surveillance a routine part of everyday life, the Party has also made fear routine, forcing people to live in a chronic state of anxiety while appearing normal.³⁵ Surveillance at the community level has created an internalized embodiment of fear and distrust that has forced people to present an inauthentic self in daily life. Party-state control of ethnic minority communities through fear is not just a top-down management approach. It is also a strategy to facilitate assimilation through internalization of rules and norms and by weaponizing neighbor against neighbor. It has deeply penetrated the bodies and minds of Uyghurs. While I have been able to communicate with some Uyghurs in Xinjiang, mostly via chat rooms or video games, they rarely speak to me in the Uyghur language and keep their messages in Chinese as short as possible. Fear has facilitated a dystopian reality, driving people to do whatever they have to do to physically survive, including the performance of inauthentic “happiness” that mediates structural violence and state terror.³⁶ This fear is the primary fuel behind the cult of personality surrounding Xi Jinping in Xinjiang—the reason why he is praised in songs and why parents teach children that he is their grandfather. After all, as the Uyghur expression goes, “Tamningmu quliqi bar” (Walls have ears).

Destroying Families

The “War on Terror” strategy and the “Chinese Dream” vision of Han-based national identity have had a significant impact on Uyghur families. Xi Jinping’s political control in Xinjiang has dismantled family bonds by making the very notion of family and kinship precarious and fear-driven. Of the twelve million Uyghurs native to the region, it is estimated that between one and two million have been detained for longer or shorter periods in camps since 2017, and many have been sent on to jail or forced labor camps.³⁷ This high number of detentions means that nearly every Uyghur, including those who have been forced into exile or are otherwise living abroad, has a friend or family member who has been taken.³⁸ One person in Australia counted fifty-two extended family members and friends who had been taken to camps as of February 2019.³⁹ Those who have survived the camps and managed to leave China have testified that they experienced physical and psychological trauma in the camps and were forced to disown their Islamic beliefs while showing gratefulness to the CCP.⁴⁰ There have also been reports of deaths inside the camps, not only of the elderly but also of youths.⁴¹

Since the reeducation system has targeted Uyghur men between the ages of twenty and fifty, many women have struggled to support their families financially. This is particularly the case in villages, where most women do not have jobs and the majority of male breadwinners (agricultural workers, small business owners) have been incarcerated. Many children have had both parents disappeared. Effectively orphaned, these children have been placed in boarding schools and orphanages where, under state care, they are educated in Chinese language and Han culture.⁴² Some members of the Uyghur diaspora who left their children with family members when they went abroad to work or study (or were forced to flee) have told me that they recognized their sons and daughters in TikTok videos made by the teachers of those schools. Even children who live with their parents are instructed to speak Chinese in public spaces, even to their parents.⁴³ This creates a huge disconnect between generations. A popular Uyghur saying goes, “Nowadays grandparents and grandchildren need a translator.”

In most cases, communication between Uyghurs abroad and their relatives in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ceased entirely for between one and three years starting in 2017. Those in the diaspora could only connect to each other to share their hopelessness, represented by the typical expression “I don’t know if they are alive or dead.” They no longer asked each other, “How is your family?” but rather “Have you been able to get in touch with them?” The testimonies featured in the Xinjiang Victims Database are powerful and relatable. Uyghurs and Kazakhs are pictured holding their loved ones’ photos and talking about their mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, husbands, and children. While many detainees were released over the course of 2019 and 2020, and some contact was reinstated, albeit under tight control, many diaspora Uyghurs have endured tremendous anxiety, guilt, and feelings of powerlessness.⁴⁴ Among those whom I have encountered, many show symptoms of trauma, despair, and depression.⁴⁵

As people lost loved ones to the camps and were unable to contact them, more than 1.2 million Han citizens were being placed into Uyghur houses under the “Becoming Family” (Jiedui Renqin) campaign, another measure that Chen Quanguo tested in the Tibet Autonomous Region and expanded in Xinjiang and that was ongoing at the time of writing.⁴⁶ Every two months, state cadres spend at least five days in the assigned villagers’ home, to assess their loyalty and ability to speak standard Chinese (Putonghua)—now referred to as the “national language” (Guoyu)—and to report on any suspicious activities.⁴⁷ These “sent-down” state employees also study Xi Jinping’s reports and thoughts with the family. According to Darren Byler’s study of the campaign in 2018, Han cadres often did not fully grasp the consequences of their actions and saw it as an opportunity to work toward the goals of the state in a way that would benefit their careers.⁴⁸ Videos of Han family members “happily” joining Uyghur families who seem distressed are common on TikTok. For example, in one video, while a Han cadre performs as an intimate family member, a boy asks, “If Dad comes home, can he stay?,” and the mom answers, “I don’t know if he can come.”⁴⁹ According to government documents, the behavior of Uyghurs in front of these Han family members, as well as in other aspects of daily life, will affect how long the loved ones will be detained.⁵⁰

This integration of Han Chinese into Uyghur households has been promoted under the slogan “Our Chinese Dream—a family of ethnic unity” (Women de Zhongguo Meng, minzu tuanjie yi jiaqin).⁵¹ In the place of the Uyghur family comes the “Chinese” family, instituted and inserted into Uyghur homes by the Xi Jinping regime. Uyghur pioneers of ethnic unity, “Becoming Family,” and interethnic marriage are celebrated by the state as model China Dream catchers.⁵² For Uyghurs in Xinjiang, however, the dream is one of survival. Living in fear and silence, they have no choice but to be family with Han “brothers” and “sisters” and assimilate into a greater Chinese “family,” even if this is a process that destroys their Uyghur family.

More than simply another layer of surveillance of Uyghur political loyalties, the “Becoming Family” campaign is therefore part of efforts to reengineer Uyghur identity, culture, and values in line with Xi Jinping’s vision of a Han-based national culture and identity. According to Xi: “Every ethnic group must tightly bind together like the seeds of a pomegranate.”⁵³ The pomegranate, a symbol of beauty and fertility in Uyghur culture and literature, has become a symbol of ethnic unity, which for non-Han people means giving up or denouncing fundamental parts of their own family, religion, and cultural identity. In a 2018 government white paper on ethnic policy in Xinjiang, state authorities declared that “Chinese” culture should be considered the core of all other ethnic cultures, which “have their roots in the fertile soil of Chinese civilization. All ethnic cultures in Xinjiang have borrowed from Chinese culture from the very beginning.”⁵⁴ This distinction between “ethnic cultures” and the “Chinese culture,” asserting that the former have borrowed from the latter, suggests that Han culture represents a central core; it is a superior culture that emerged prior to others. In August 2018, the mayor of Ürümqi made this even more explicit, declaring that “Uyghurs are not descendants of Turks” and instead are “members of the Chinese family,” effectively erasing Uyghur history.⁵⁵ In state media and broader social discourse, the differences between Han and Uyghur culture are continuously emphasized to make plain that one is desirable and the other is not. Han culture is elite, superior, and civilized and associated with patriotism and modernity, while Uyghur (and Muslim) culture is represented as backward and violent and, since the Chinese “War on Terror” campaign, has been increasingly criminalized.

Criminalizing Uyghur Distinction, Reengineering Identity

“This is worse than the Cultural Revolution” is a common phrase I heard during interviews both inside and outside Xinjiang.⁵⁶ The increasing politicization of and hostility toward any aspect of Uyghur religious life has effectively removed religiosity, from everyday greetings to weddings and funerals, while an ever-tightening cultural space has weakened the use of the Uyghur language across generations. During my fieldwork in 2016, I heard that religious books and books deemed illegal were being confiscated and burned. One villager told me that, although people were very afraid, they were unwilling to burn books that were sacred, so they threw them into local rivers. In some cases, the sluice gates of irrigation canals became blocked with discarded books. Although Uyghur-language publications had previously been subject to the approval of state censors, the effective criminalization of the Uyghur language now makes it impossible for anything Uyghur—other than propaganda and expressions of loyalty—to remain within the boundaries of state-permitted speech. For either aesthetic or historical purposes, the practical value of the Uyghur language continues to diminish due to state oppression.⁵⁷

Many small bookshops that catered to the Uyghur language have closed down, and even the larger state-owned bookshops no longer support Uyghur publications to any significant extent. For the most part, only texts translated into Chinese remain. Online spaces have also witnessed significant decreases in Uyghur language use, with many sites being shut down or their owners disappearing. TV programs rarely have any Uyghur-language content. If they do, it must have Chinese subtitles. TikTok videos display young Uyghurs speaking Chinese. This is in strong contrast to what I observed on social media in the early 2010s, when many people were shown speaking their mother tongue. People are required to learn Chinese at home to complete assignments for each week’s neighborhood political education gathering. As one Uyghur resident stated: “Every time I was finally able to contact my mother, I learned that she was doing homework, every day copying Chinese characters, each one hundred times.”

The language shift is most obvious in traditional Uyghur music and popular media. For example, Uyghur Muqam, a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) intangible cultural heritage featuring traditional music and dance, was performed in Chinese during the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2019. This brought distress to many Uyghurs, according to my contacts in the diaspora. The 2020 Xinjiang New Year’s gala hosted a few young Uyghur musicians, yet there was not a single trace of the Uyghur language or traditional dance. The expression of state-curated ethnic difference via song and dance performances by “happy” and exoticized Uyghurs has long been a staple of such official events. These examples show that even this is disappearing and “being swallowed up by Hanness” as Uyghur language and arts disappear from public life.⁵⁸ Expressions of devotion to Xi and the Party seem to have become the only safe way of using Uyghur language and Uyghur cultural forms such as folk songs.

The disappearance of visible and well-known members of the Uyghur cultural elite demonstrates the Party’s message even more clearly to the public, further intensifying and routinizing internalized fear. The Uyghur Human Rights Project has reported that more than 380 Uyghur intellectuals have disappeared since 2017, among whom the anthropologist Rahile Dawut and the geographer Tashpolat Tiyip once made international headlines for their scholarly work. There is growing public demand for the Chinese government to be transparent and provide information regarding their fates. When we look at the many public figures who have disappeared, from human rights activists to scholars, it is evident that those whose work is related to Uyghur language and the preservation of Uyghur identity, culture, and history have been targeted.⁵⁹ Exiled Uyghur poet and filmmaker Tahir Hamut Izgil stresses that the attack on and eradication of intellectuals who had been leading research on Uyghur art, culture, and history not only serves as an example to citizens but also causes widespread despair throughout Uyghur society.⁶⁰

The attack on Uyghur culture has extended to the removal of physical traces of Uyghur beliefs, values, and identity in the landscape under the policy of “Sinicizing” religion, which has been intensified and diversified under Xi Jinping.⁶¹ A five-year plan to “Sinicize Islam” was adopted in 2019, justified as the regulating of “non-state-approved religious beliefs.”⁶² Journalists and Uyghur researchers have uncovered systematic destruction of sacred sites, mosques, and cemeteries through satellite imagery data and in-person visits. Uyghur researcher Bahram Sintash confirmed the disappearance of more than one hundred mosques and sacred shrines (mazars) by comparing satellite images over a span of several years.⁶³ In the name of the “standardization” of old graves, many cemeteries have been relocated without community approval, and some cemeteries near town centers have been transformed into parks or residential areas.⁶⁴ Praying at sacred places, a central part of Uyghur life for centuries, has been prohibited. This is ironic since camp detainees have been forced to effectively worship President Xi by learning his thoughts and chanting or singing songs in his praise in order to receive their meals.⁶⁵ As Zenz highlights, religiosity is equated to addiction and the internment camps are seen as treatment centers, as if religion is a disease or drug to be overcome.⁶⁶ The only way to be “free” from religion is through state-sponsored treatment, and with this treatment comes the erasure and replacement of one’s religious beliefs and cultural values.

The criminalization and destruction of the Uyghur language, culture, and faith are tangible manifestations of the ways in which Party-state authority intensifies fear. Intense pressure on Uyghurs to demonstrate loyalty and patriotism through performing an undifferentiated Han-based Chineseness, combined with the effective criminalization of Uyghur identity and ubiquitous surveillance of their lives and actions, has left many Uyghurs with little choice but to abandon their own culture, language, and traditions. Some have even changed their names to Han names.⁶⁷ Uyghur cultural festivals have disappeared from public life. Communities now celebrate traditional Han festivals such as Chinese New Year, the Dragon Boat Festival, and even Tomb-Sweeping Day. Those who do not celebrate have been fined, according to reports from the region.⁶⁸ Uyghur friends in Xinjiang testified that in some cases when Han “family” members visited Uyghur homes during Chinese New Year, they forced Uyghurs to write couplets and eat pork dumplings together—a major violation of Uyghur halal traditions. Many small Uyghur towns have held Chinese traditional dances as a way of celebrating Chinese New Year.⁶⁹ They perform traditional Peking operas, learn classical Chinese poems, and speak and eat like they are Chinese. If state media broadcasts are to be believed, Uyghur children are studying the Chinese classics dressed up in costumes representative of the Ming era, the last Han-led dynasty.⁷⁰

All of these examples show that the state, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, is intolerant of the existence of Uyghurs as a people with a very different language, culture, and religion. The securitization and the destruction of Uyghur families, religion, and culture are threatening the very existence of Uyghurness, a process that some commentators have referred to as “cultural genocide” or “ethnic cleansing.”⁷¹ The CCP’s end goal is to reengineer the entire Uyghur population to fit a Chinese nationalistic vision and interests based on Han values and traditions. The anthropologists Amy Anderson and Darren Byler, in their analysis of Uyghur music, argue that the act of criminalizing a culture’s language sends the message that the language and its associated culture have no value in mainstream society.⁷² People are being taught and shown through propaganda, the “Becoming Family” program, and the internment camps that adopting Han culture is the better, pragmatic choice for Uyghur people; they are expected to be grateful that so many people, from camp personnel to Han “family” members, are willing to help them assimilate. It is no wonder that under this state of oppression, fear, and censorship we witness elderly mothers ending conversations with phrases such as “Party bless you, my child” or “Xi Jinping bless you.”

“Love” Xi Jinping with Fear

The fear that Uyghurs have internalized has resulted in outward obedience to Xi Jinping and the Party. As Byler and the human geographer Sarah Tynen have demonstrated, for most, if not all, Uyghurs in China there is no room to show resistance—instead, life centers around survival and existence.⁷³ This reflects a significant change in the lives of Uyghurs under the Xi administration. Studies of Uyghur-state and Uyghur-Han relations in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century analyzed Uyghur ethno-nationalist sentiment and documented people’s resistance to Han state nationalism through everyday language and activities, as well their everyday acts of “symbolic resistance” to assimilation.⁷⁴ Since Xi Jinping’s rise as paramount leader in 2012, however, life in Xinjiang has shifted to survival through the active performance of Han-based Chinese national identity and “full-hearted” support and love for Xi in daily life.

Xi Jinping has become larger than life. His words and image have come to offer the only safe means for Uyghurs to express their “solidarity” with and loyalty to the Party. Just as Uyghurs used to greet each other using a Mao quotation during the Maoist period, it is becoming common to quote Xi Jinping in daily conversation. Although no one trusts each other, they trust that these texts can be used without fear as a way to express their loyalty. The political scientist Rongbin Han’s recent study of popular nationalism and regime support in China suggests that there is a measure of freedom of expression and space for some criticism of the regime under Xi among domestic as well as overseas Chinese netizens.⁷⁵ However, this does not extend to Uyghur netizens, whose online posts and comments are full of “love” and “gratitude” to the nation, to the greatest leader, Xi Jinping, and “hope” for achieving the Chinese Dream. The overwhelming patriotic and monolithic tone of Uyghur social media results from the extreme fear that pushes people to express loyalty through love and gratitude in order to survive.

Internment camp survivors have testified that as part of their reeducation, policy documents and speeches written by Xi Jinping were used as study materials that they were required to memorize to demonstrate their knowledge and loyalty to the Party. They were forced to chant “Thanks to the Party! Thanks to the Motherland! Thanks to Chairman Xi!” (Ganxie dang! Ganxie zuguo! Xiexie Xi Zhuxi!) before each meal.⁷⁶ This reinforced the message that their thoughts had to be aligned to the Party, and more specifically to Xi Jinping. Former detainees have refuted the idea that the camps have in any way been places of learning or vocational training.⁷⁷ They have all been about learning the Chinese language, Xi Jinping Thought (Xi Jinping Sixiang), and Xi’s speeches, as well as self-criticism of Uyghur traditional and religious beliefs.⁷⁸ Some have said that all they did was watch television with only one channel, which showed nothing other than footage of Xi Jinping’s visits to other countries and how he is helping them to develop.

Outside the camps, Uyghurs study Xi Jinping Thought with their Han “family members” and at regular neighborhood political education gatherings, which they are required to attend. They display Xi’s image in their living rooms and hold song and dance gatherings where Uyghur musicians improvise lyrics thanking “father Xi Jinping” for teaching them how to be “modern” Chinese citizens. Showing any lack of love for Xi, the Party, Chinese nationalism, or Han culture is interpreted as a sign of disloyalty and extremism. As one elder told me, “They call us extremist, yet not realizing how extreme they are.” In this case, fear is not silent anymore; it is expressed through demonstrations of “love.” In a video that circulated on Uyghur social media in 2018, a group of Uyghur village women sing together:

There are a growing number of songs in both Uyghur and Chinese dedicated to praising Xi Jinping. In Xinjiang, it has become a political duty to learn and perform these songs.

Based on available ethnographic data, it is unclear whether all performances of devotion to Xi, from public singing to the display of his image in the “private” space of the home, are official requirements or a response to the political climate in Xinjiang—a means of demonstrating loyalty and avoiding being sent to a reeducation camp. They are likely a combination of both. Several recent exiles from Xinjiang have confirmed that neighborhood-level cadres directly ask residents to display a photo of Xi Jinping and other core leaders of the CCP. As every family receives daily checkups from these cadres, it is dangerous to take the pictures down. This has driven people to engage in the cult of personality around Xi Jinping in fear of their lives.

The image of “father” or “soulmate” Xi has penetrated deep into Uyghur life. No matter how his cult of personality began—whether it was promoted by Xi Jinping, his supporters, or genuine grassroots admiration—in Xinjiang, Xi Jinping has become the highest symbol of state power. Party officials such as Chen Quanguo, as well as the Han family cadres sent to Xinjiang, help to reinforce and maximize the effects of Xi’s cult of personality. By extension, Xi’s Chinese Dream attempts to make the ideals of the past and the future (a unified China) a reality in the present. Ostensibly, Xi Jinping placates the current generation’s fears and provides safety to future generations. Yet when his personality cult is intertwined with an internalized fear, resistance to Xi’s “love” is not an option. The absurd horror of forced assimilation and cultural genocide is thus normalized in contemporary Uyghur society, at least on the surface. There is no space to voice any criticism of Xi or the Party in this tightly controlled region. Uyghurs in Xinjiang understand that demonstrating their knowledge of Xi Jinping Thought and venerating him publicly are the safest ways to show loyalty and thereby continue to survive.

Conclusion

When Uyghur elders advise young people to remain calm if faced with forceful confrontation, they often use the idiom “The one who fears will throw the first punch” (Qorqqan awal mush koturer). Violence here is a sign not of strength, but of fear. Some Uyghurs have pointed out that the extreme assimilationist policies implemented under Xi Jinping are the result of state and Han fear of Uyghurs and their differences, and the possibility of separatism. This fear has been projected onto and internalized by the Uyghurs of Xinjiang by way of mass internment camps and ubiquitous surveillance, the disintegration of Uyghur families, and the replacement of Islam with the personality cult of Xi Jinping. It is clear that the Chinese state’s ethnic policies have entered a new phase under Xi with an emphasis on assimilation and a growing Han-based cultural nationalism. Given extreme state pressure, it seems that the majority of Uyghurs have no choice but to accept the terms of the “Chinese Dream” and adopt an undifferentiated Chinese identity built solely on Han cultural traditions, even if that means having their culture and way of life transformed into something foreign to them. Only a complete reversal of the policies implemented in the name of the “War on Terror” and Xi’s “Chinese Dream” could offer freedom from the fear of the state for Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

At present, Uyghurs are never free from fear; the difficulty of expressing the depth of their fear and terror has been a challenge in the writing of this chapter. Fear of disappearance and detention, and of family destruction, are overwhelming. These fears are exacerbated by other fears—fears of showing ethnic pride, of not being loyal enough, and of not showing enough love for Xi Jinping. As more and more Uyghurs describe themselves as a “people destroyed” and as having “broken spirits,” the state defends its strategy in Xinjiang and circulates propaganda images of “happy” Uyghurs.⁸⁰ Cognitive dissonance, indeed. Since 2014, images of Xi Jinping have become unavoidable in Xinjiang, embedded into every facet of daily life. No one dares to criticize him: he is the new god; his words guarantee safety. People venerate Xi Jinping; they learn his words and thoughts, talk about them, and cite them to protect themselves and their families. The extent of Xi Jinping’s direct involvement in causing this tragic effect is unclear. What is certain is that his image, views, and leadership have transformed the deepest corners of the Uyghur homeland and everyday life.

Notes

Musapir is the pen name of a Uyghur scholar. Search for other works by this author on ORCID, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9547-1352.

1. 1. For an example, see the image of a mural showing Xi surrounded by Uyghur children accompanying the article from the Associated Press, “With Parents Detained, Chinese State Cares for ‘Uighur Orphans,’” VOA News, September 21, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/with-parents-detained-chinese-state-cares-for-uighur-orphans-/4581363.html. The first part of the Chinese slogan can be more literally translated as “Xi Jinping’s heart is connected to the hearts of all the peoples of Xinjiang.” I have chosen to follow the nuances of the Uyghur slogan, which uses the term qelbdash. Qelbdash means “soulmate” in the sense of a person who is your closest friend, who can deeply understand you, and who shares your thoughts.

2. 2. Altishahr means “six cities” and is the historical name for the Tarim Basin region.

3. 3. Interviews and conversations with members of the Uyghur diaspora.

4. 4. The videos cited in this article have been gathered from other members of the Uyghur diaspora and are in the author’s personal archive.

5. 5. While “Xi dada” is sometimes translated as “Uncle Xi” from the Chinese, in Uyghur it means “father Xi”; chong dada means “grandfather.” In this article, I follow the Uyghur meaning.

6. 6. Although the last words of the first and sixth lines share the same phonetic spelling (atimiz), they have different etymological roots, with ata meaning “father,” and at meaning “shooting” or “horse.”

7. 7. Personal observation, shared by several other members of the Uyghur diaspora who have expressed this to me in personal communications.

8. 8. Liangen Yin and Terry Flew, “Xi Dada Loves Peng Mama: Digital Culture and the Return of Charismatic Authority in China,” Thesis Eleven 144, no. 1 (2018): 80–99.

9. 9. See Peter Ferdinand, “Westward Ho—the China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 941–57; Michael Gow, “The Core Socialist Values of the Chinese Dream: Towards a Chinese Integral State,” Critical Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (2017): 92–116.

10. 10. On the heightening of tensions in Xinjiang, see Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Joanne N. Smith Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Michael Clarke, “China’s ‘War on Terror’ in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): 271–301.

11. 11. James Leibold, “Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of ‘Ethnic Mingling,’” China Brief 14, no. 12 (2014): 1–12.

12. 12. Gerald Roche and James Leibold, “China’s Second-Generation Ethnic Policies Are Already Here,” Made in China Journal 5, no. 2 (2020): 32, https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/09/07/chinas-second-generation-ethnic-policies-are-already-here; see also James Leibold, “Planting the Seed: Ethnic Policy in Xi Jinping’s New Era of Cultural Nationalism,” China Brief 19, no. 22 (2019): 1–32.

13. 13. Ben Hillman, “Xinjiang and the ‘Chinese Dream,’” East Asia Forum, October 24, 2018, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/24/xinjiang-and-the-chinese-dream.

14. 14. Leibold, “Planting the Seed.”

15. 15. This shift in policy and its affects have been discussed by scholars such as Tashi Rabgey, James Millward, and Darren Byler in the podcast Sinica, https://thechinaproject.com/series/sinica. See also the articles by Martin Lavička, Anonymous, Ildikó Bellér-Hann, and Rune Steenberg in “Voiced and Voiceless in Xinjiang: Minorities, Elites, and Narrative Constructions across the Centuries,” special issue, Asian Ethnicity 22, no. 1 (2021).

16. 16. See, for example, Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang,” China Brief 18, no. 10 (2018): 1–45.

17. 17. Anna Hayes, “Interwoven ‘Destinies’: The Significance of Xinjiang to the China Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Xi Jinping Legacy,” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 121 (2020): 31–45.

18. 18. Magnus Fiskesjö, “China’s ‘Re-education’/Concentration Camps in Xinjiang / East Turkestan and the Wider Campaign of Forced Assimilation Targeting Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Etc.,” Uyghur Human Rights Project, last revised March 21, 2021, https://uhrp.org/bibliography. This archive not only provides extensive information and evidence about the current situation, but it also could serve as a catalyst for future truth and reconciliation in China by providing valuable resources. Xinjiang Victims Database, last accessed January 5, 2024, https://shahit.biz/eng. I also interviewed people who actively volunteer for or add content to this database.

19. 19. On Chen Quanguo, see James Leibold and Adrian Zenz, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief 17, no. 12 (2017): 1–28. For a brief description of grid management, see Deng, Demes, and Chen, in this volume.

20. 20. Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, “Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,” Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355.

21. 21. Hanna Burdorf, “A Police State Going into Hiding,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, January 31, 2020, https://livingotherwise.com/2020/01/31/a-police-state-going-into-hiding.

22. 22. Personal communication with author, 2016.

23. 23. International Campaign for Tibet, “The Origin of the ‘Xinjiang Model’ in Tibet under Chen Quanguo: Securitizing Ethnicity and Accelerating Assimilation,” December 19, 2018, https://savetibet.org/the-origin-of-the-xinjiang-model

24. -in-tibet-under-chen-quanguo-securitizing-ethnicity-and-accelerating-assimilation;

25. Leibold, “Planting the Seed,” 48.

26. 24. Each neighborhood has a residents’ committee (ahaliler komteti) that functions as a bridge between local government and residents; in Chinese these administrative units in urban areas are called shequ and in villages dadui. In present-day Xinjiang, ahaliler komteti cadres are the main heads of surveillance acting on behalf of the government. See Sarah Tynen, “Uneven State Territorialization: Governance, Inequality, and Survivance in Xinjiang, China” (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 2019).

27. 25. Tanner Greer, “48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp,” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/13/48-ways-to-get-sent-to-a-chinese-concentration-camp.

28. 26. Personal communication with author, 2016.

29. 27. Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State,” China Brief 17, no. 4 (2017): 21–27.

30. 28. Lucas Niewenhuis, “A Police State of Historic Proportion: Criminal Arrests Up 731 Percent in Xinjiang,” China Project, July 25, 2018, https://thechinaproject.com/2018/07/25/a-police-state-of-historic-proportion-criminal-arrests-up-731-percent-in-xinjiang.

31. 29. Linda Green, “Living in a State of Fear,” in Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Culture, ed. Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius Robben (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 118–19.

32. 30. “China Condemns Two Ex-Xinjiang Officials in Separatism Cases,” AP News, April 7, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/world-news-race-and-ethnicity-beijing-china-national-security-e4d7a915a2e3ebb6c6f50778a2aec81a.

33. 31. Interview with author, Xinjiang, 2016.

34. 32. James Leibold, “Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region: Ethnic Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement,” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 121 (2020): 46–60. On the IJOP system and app, see also Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0519_web.pdf.

35. 33. Nithin Coca, “China’s Xinjiang Surveillance Is the Dystopian Future Nobody Wants,” Engadget, February 22, 2018, https://www.engadget.com/2018-02-22-china-xinjiang-surveillance-tech-spread.html.

36. 34. Yujie Xue, “Anti-Fraud App from Chinese Police Sees Soaring Downloads amid Complaints of Forced Installs,” South China Morning Post, April 12, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3129222/anti-fraud-app-chinese-police-sees-soaring-downloads-amid-complaints#.

37. 35. Here I have drawn inspiration from Linda Green’s discussion on the routinization of terror and its effects in Guatemala. See Green, “Living in a State of Fear,” 108.

38. 36. Gene Bunin, “How the ‘Happiest Muslims in the World’ Are Coping with Their Happiness,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, July 31, 2018, https://livingotherwise.com/2018/07/31/happiest-muslims-world-coping-happiness.

39. 37. Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. Says It Has Credible Reports That China Holds Million Uighurs in Secret Camps,” Reuters, August 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-that-china-holds-million-uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU; Zenz, “New Evidence”; Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser, Uyghurs for Sale: “Re-education,” Forced Labour and Surveillance beyond Xinjiang (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020).

40. 38. Sarah Parvini, “‘They Want to Erase Us.’ California Uighurs Fear for Family Members in China,” Los Angeles Times, August 9, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-california-uighur-muslims-china-20190610-story.html.

41. 39. Fergus Hunter, “Detained and in Danger: The Tortured Australian Families Who Fear for Their Missing Loved Ones,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 17, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/detained-and-in-danger-the-tortured-australian-families-who-fear-for-their-missing-loved-ones-20181115-p50g5q.html; Kate Lyons, “17 Australian Residents Believed Detained in China’s Uighur Crackdown,” Guardian, February 10, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/11/revealed-17-australian-residents-believed-detained-in-chinas-uighur-crackdown.

42. 40. Gerry Shih, “‘Permanent Cure’: Inside the Re-education Camps China Is Using to Brainwash Muslims,” Business Insider, May 17, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-life-like-in-xinjiang-reeducation-camps-china-2018-5.

43. 41. Eva Dou, Jeremy Page, and Josh Chin, “China’s Uighur Camps Swell as Beijing Widens the Dragnet,” Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-uighur-camps-swell-as-beijing-widens-the-dragnet-1534534894; Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, “Uyghur Muslim Scholar Dies in Chinese Police Custody,” trans. Alim Seytoff and Paul Eckert, Radio Free Asia, January 29, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-death-01292018180427.html; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-education Camp,” trans. Alim Seytoff and Joshua Lipes, Radio Free Asia, March 14, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/teenager-03142018154926.html.

44. 42. Emily Feng, “Crackdown in Xinjiang: Where Have All the People Gone?,” Financial Times, August 5, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/ac0ffb2e-8b36-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340; John Sudworth, “China Muslims: Xinjiang Schools Used to Separate Children from Families,” BBC News, July 4, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48825090. Reporters from CNN tracked down some of these children in Xinjiang and Istanbul and provided extensive detail of this tragedy of family separation. See David Culver, “CNN Finds Stranded Uyghur Children,” CNN, March 24, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/03/24/china-xinjiang-children-culver-pkg-intl-hnk-vpx.cnn.

45. 43. Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing,” ChinaFile, October 24, 2018, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang.

46. 44. Nathan Vanderklippe, “Exporting Persecution: Uyghur Diaspora Haunted by Anxiety, Guilt as Family Held in Chinese Camps,” Globe and Mail, August 12, 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-exporting-persecution-uyghur-diaspora-haunted-by-anxiety-guilt-as.

47. 45. Further research needs to be done on the mental health and trauma many members of the Uyghur diaspora live with.

48. 46. Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” May 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region.

49. 47. Zhiyun Zhao, “Zizhiqu dangwei jueding: 12 yue jizhong kaizhan minzu tuanjie ‘jieqin zhou’ huodong” (The Party Committee of the Autonomous Region has decided to focus on the “Unity Week” of ethnic unity in December), Bingtuan News, December 11, 2017, http://web.archive.org/web/20180812111510/http:/www.bt.chinanews.com/bingtuan/20171211/8699.shtml (site discontinued).

50. 48. Byler, “China’s Government.”

51. 49. Darren Byler (@dtbyler), “An incredible scene of Han state workers invading a Uyghur home,” Twitter, November 4, 2019, https://twitter.com/dtbyler/status/1191474404472963072.

52. 50. “Document: What Chinese Officials Told Children Whose Families Were Put in Camps,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-detention-directive.html.

53. 51. Sunzhen Song and Zhang Ziwei, “Xinjang wulumuqi: Shequ juban ‘women de zhongguo meng, minzu tuanjie yijia qin’ ying xinchun lianhuan huì” (Urumqi, Xinjiang: “Our Chinese Dream, National Unity and One Family” New Year celebration party held by the community), Sina, January 14, 2020, https://k.sina.cn/article_3164957712_bca56c10020014h4j.html?from=news&subch=onews.

54. 52. See, for example, Darren Byler, “On Qurbanjan Semet’s Photobook ‘I Am from Xinjiang on the Silk Road,’” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, September 3, 2015, https://livingotherwise.com/2015/09/03/on-qurbanjan-semets-photobook-i-am-from-xinjiang-on-the-silk-road.

55. 53. Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

56. 54. State Council Information Office, “Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang,” November 15, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/15/c_137607548.htm.

57. 55. Shan Jie, “Uyghurs Are Not Descendants of Turks: Urumqi Mayor,” Global Times, August 26, 2018, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1158545.shtml.

58. 56. Central Asia Program, “Symposium on China’s Mass Incarceration of Uyghurs: Contextualizing the Re-education Camps,” November 27, 2018, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYVfnRLK9mU.

59. 57. Byler wrote a series of columns for the China Project about this issue. See, for example, Darren Byler, “‘Ethnic Extinction’ in Northwest China,” China Project, July 7, 2021, https://thechinaproject.com/2021/07/07/ethnic-extinction-in-northwest-china.

60. 58. Amy Anderson and Darren Byler, “‘Eating Hanness’: Uyghur Musical Tradition in a Time of Re-education,” China Perspectives, no. 3 (2019): 17–26.

61. 59. Eziz Eysa, interview with author, 2019.

62. 60. Tahir Hamut Izgil, interview with author, 2020.

63. 61. See “China Passes Law to Make Islam ‘Compatible with Socialism,’” Al Jazeera, January 5, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/5/china-passes-law-to-make-islam-compatible-with-socialism.

64. 62. Li Qingqing, “China Explores Effective Governance of Religion in Secular World,” Global Times, January 6, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1134750.shtml [page no longer active], accessed February 15, 2020.

65. 63. Bahram Sintash, “Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines,” Uyghur Human Rights Project, October 28, 2016, https://uhrp.org/report/demolishing-faith-the-destruction-and-desecration-of-uyghur-mosques-and-shrines.

66. 64. Eva Xiao, Pak Yiu, and Andrew Beatty, “Even in Death, Uighurs Feel Long Reach of Chinese State,” Taipei Times, October 14, 2019, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2019/10/14/2003723889.

67. 65. Brian McGleenon, “Inside China’s Secret ‘Concentration Camps’ Where Detainees ‘Pray to President Xi Jinping,’” Daily Express, May 28, 2019, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1132815/china-re-education-camps-muslim-minority-crack-down-uyghur-oppression-xi-jinping-xinjiang.

68. 66. Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a Healthy Heart Attitude’: China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey 38, no. 1 (2019): 102–28.

69. 67. Guo Cheng and Rizwangul, “Mandatory Name Change Campaign Reflects the Sharpening of Assimilation Policy against Uighurs,” International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation, March 10, 2018, https://www.iuhrdf.org/content/mandatory-name-change-campaign-reflects-sharpening-assimilation-policy-against-uighurs.

70. 68. Darren Byler, “Images in Red: Han Culture, Uyghur Performers, Chinese New Year,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, February 23, 2018, https://livingotherwise.com/2018/02/23/images-red-han-culture-uyghur-performers-chinese-new-year.

71. 69. See, for example, “Wen su xian: She huo xunyan nao xinchun” (Wensu County celebrating new year), China News Service Xinjiang, December 30, 2022, https://www.xj.chinanews.com.cn/dizhou/2022-12-30/detail-ihcihaha6948914.shtml. For an image of Uyghurs celebrating Chinese New Year in Yengeriq Village, Awat County, Aksu, in 2018, see the news website Tianshannet, February 16, 2018, http://uy.ts.cn/system/2018/02/16/035099046.shtml.

72. 70. “Uyghurs Asked to Celebrate Chinese New Year in 2018,” February 20, 2018, YouTube, 8:35–8:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyp9XL24bwE&ab_channel=TheArtofLifeinChineseCentralAsia.

73. 71. Azeem Ibrahim, “China Must Answer for Cultural Genocide in Court,” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/uighurs-xinjiang-china-cultural-genocide-international-criminal-court; “What Congress Can Do Now to Combat China’s Mass Ethnic Cleansing of Uighurs,” Washington Post, May 23, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/what-congress-can-do-now-to-combat-chinas-mass-ethnic-cleansing-of-uighurs/2019/05/23/fe906c68-7d6a-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html.

74. 72. Anderson and Byler, “‘Eating Hanness.’”

75. 73. Darren Byler, “Spirit Breaking: Capitalism and Terror in Northwest China,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, July 22, 2019, https://livingotherwise.com/2019/07/22/adam-hunerven-capitalism-and-terror-in-northwest-china; Tynen, “Uneven State Territorialization.”

76. 74. Bovingdon, The Uyghurs; Smith Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance.

77. 75. Rongbin Han, “Cyber Nationalism and Regime Support under Xi Jinping: The Effects of the 2018 Constitutional Revision,” Journal of Contemporary China 30, no. 131 (2021): 717–33.

78. 76. Gerry Shih, “China’s Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, March 29, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/kazakhstan-ap-top-news-international-news-china-china-clamps-down-6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b.

79. 77. Gene Bunin, “There Was No Learning at All,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, December 13, 2019, https://livingotherwise.com/2019/12/13/there-was-no-learning-at-all.

80. 78. Gene Bunin and Darren Byler have interviewed many camp survivors.

81. 79. Mamtimin Ala (@MamtiminAla), “Uyghur women are praising Xi Jinping, singing ‘Zhongguo de Xi dada, shijie de Xi dada’ [Father Xi of China, father Xi of the world],” Twitter, April 20, 2019, https://twitter.com/MamtiminA/status/1119699224420126720.

82. 80. On Uyghur self-descriptions as a “people destroyed” and as having “broken spirits,” see, respectively, Bunin, “How the ‘Happiest Muslims in the World’ Are Coping,” and Byler, “Spirit Breaking.”