Cross-Strait Relations: From Cooperation to Stagnation

Since 2008, Taiwan-China relations have experienced a pendulum swing from exchange and cooperation to antagonism and stagnation. When the Nationalist Party candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election, some observers foresaw peaceful relations.¹ Beijing and Taipei agreed to a diplomatic truce—Beijing wouldn’t try to disrupt Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with states that formally recognize Taipei and not Beijing—and reinitiated dialogue between the semiofficial Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF). Restrictions on the “three links” (santong)—postal, transportation, and trade connections between China and Taiwan—were lifted, allowing greater people-to-people exchange. In 2010, representing Beijing and Taipei, respectively, ARATS and SEF signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and initiated major steps toward the integration of the Chinese and Taiwanese economies.

From 2008 to 2012—during Ma Ying-jeou’s first term as president—expectations grew on the prospect of talks concerning the question of political unification. Subsequent developments, however, scuttled such hopes. In 2011, the Nationalist Party and the DPP geared up for the 2012 presidential election. Meanwhile, China was preparing for a change in political leadership, as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao neared their final year in office. The benefits of the ECFA were hotly debated while Taiwan rebounded from the global economic downturn, precipitated in part by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. Uncertainties prevented Beijing and Taipei from major political negotiations.

Xi Jinping’s rise as paramount leader in late 2012 commenced a sea change in China-Taiwan relations. Xi expressed global ambitions as well as a determination to resolve disputes over Taiwan’s political status, possibly during his time in office. At the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference, Xi expressed the sentiment of “China and Taiwan being one family” and told Taiwan’s representative in the talks, former vice president Vincent Siew, that “political differences across the Strait cannot pass from generation to generation and must be resolved gradually.”² Xi’s positions on such matters resonated with some in Taiwan, but not with the majority of the population, which, polls indicate, seeks the perpetuation of the status quo and has come to see Taiwan rather than China as its nation. Unsurprisingly, Xi’s remarks generated debates on the future of China-Taiwan ties within Taiwan, though without arriving at a public consensus. Over time, the grim global economic outlook and concerns over the rapid pace and scope of economic integration with China led to growing disapproval of the Ma Ying-jeou government and the rise of anti-government social movements. A frustrated population—students and young people in particular—occupied Taiwan’s legislature in March 2014, signaling to the Ma government that it should do more to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and halt the pursuit of further economic integration with China.

The Sunflower occupation, named for flowers donated to protesters, proved a pivotal factor in Taiwan-China relations, contributing indirectly to more bilateral friction. In 2016, when the DPP’s presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, won handily and the DPP returned its first-ever parliamentary majority, relations with the Xi government rapidly worsened. China began adopting measures aimed at isolating Taiwan in international relations. The ARATS-SEF communication channel was severed. Beijing discouraged tourists and students from visiting Taiwan. Cross-strait exchanges came to an abrupt halt, with the result that Taiwan would commence decoupling from China and pursue more diversified regional and global trade relations.

On January 2, 2019, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi Jinping made an open statement in light of the fortieth anniversary of the issuance of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (Gao Taiwan tongbao shu).³ Xi stated that “the future of Taiwan lies in national reunification, and the well-being of the people hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and that “peaceful reunification and ‘one country, two systems’ is the best approach.”⁴ President Tsai Ing-wen responded by rejecting the 1992 Consensus, a notion first advanced by Nationalist politician Su Chi, that Taiwan is part of China but that Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China may disagree on what that means exactly. She asserted that “Taiwan absolutely will not accept the ‘one country, two systems’” plan devised by Deng Xiaoping for unifying Hong Kong and Macau with China.⁵ Xi’s and Tsai’s divergent statements showcased what appear to have become increasingly intractable positions. Presumably, resolving such wide differences peacefully would require a long time horizon and much trust building. Yet, such an impasse was clearly unsatisfactory for Xi, who has since expressed keen interest in compelling closer economic and political relations, with military force, if necessary.⁶

The relationship between China and Taiwan deteriorated further in August 2022, when US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi made a formal visit to Taiwan. China responded with live-fire military exercises, including missile launches that flew over Taiwan, reminding some of the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis. The resulting spike in tensions attracted global attention as well as expressions of support for Taiwan from North American and European capitals. Chinese military encroachments also indicated how dangerous the Taiwan Strait had become. Despite changes in the international environment, including the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan, China’s slowing economic growth, and the Russia-Ukraine war, which have ostensibly weakened China’s global influence, Xi Jinping remains insistent on “gradually resolving the Taiwan issue.”

The Xi Jinping Factor

Xi Jinping’s eagerness to resolve the “Taiwan question” may stem from his lengthy administrative experience in Fujian, the Chinese province that is culturally and geographically closest to Taiwan. After his first posting as the vice mayor of Xiamen in 1985, Xi Jinping spent a total of seventeen years in Fujian, serving as the municipal secretary of Fuzhou and provincial governor of Fujian. As governor, Xi met with Taiwanese businesspeople, including notable figures such as the chair of TPV Technology, Jason Hsuan, and the later chair of Yulon Motor Corporation, Kenneth Yen.⁷ In addition, Xi established the Xiamen Taiwanese Business Association (Xiamen Taishang Huiguan), the first of its kind in China.⁸ As a result of Xi Jinping’s experiences in Fujian, he is more familiar with Taiwan and Taiwanese than his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were, despite Xi never having visited Taiwan.

While Xi Jinping’s desire to create a great political legacy is clear, his ambitions may be easier imagined than achieved. Mao Zedong brought New China to its feet, Deng Xiaoping set the country on the course of economic development, Jiang Zemin guided the country to prosperity, and Hu Jintao led China toward peaceful development and great power status. As Xi has considered how to make his mark, reunifying Taiwan with China has gained appeal, as a task that his predecessors were unable to achieve. Xi has thus sought to position China as militarily powerful enough to conquer and reunify Taiwan by force, possibly in a very short period of time.⁹

Xi assumed the role of paramount leader at a time of numerous obstacles to the country’s ascendance, including great power rivalry with the United States. The Taiwan issue is one that Xi Jinping thought he could leverage—not only to shift popular attention away from China’s domestic problems (see the chapters by Martin King Whyte and Alexsia T. Chan in this volume, for example) but also to challenge the global status of the United States.

Xi Jinping has had to contend with an identity shift in Taiwan toward seeing Taiwan (and not China) as the nation. This long-term development is certain to make unification more difficult to attain. Xi Jinping has therefore felt the need to act in order to prevent Taiwan from drifting further away. With pro-independence sentiment increasing in Taiwan, supported by the so-called tianrandu, or the generation born with a Taiwanese identity, trends in self-identification suggest that time is not on China’s side.

Meanwhile, the Tsai administration has adopted an active approach toward cross-strait relations. The DPP has urged Beijing to undertake dialogue and negotiations without set preconditions. In an interview with CNN in 2021, Tsai Ing-wen noted that she had not abandoned the possibility of improved relations with China and would sit down with Xi Jinping for talks.¹⁰ At the same time, Taipei, seeking to internationalize a dispute that China claims is purely a domestic political affair, compared Taiwan’s democratic successes to global democratic backsliding and drew attention to the threat that autocracies pose to a rules-based international order.¹¹ In doing so, Taipei implies that all countries concerned about democracy should lend their support to Taiwan.

In 2018, Xi Jinping attempted to prevent new inroads by Taiwan to win greater international clout, assigning Liu Jieyi, former ambassador to the United Nations, to head the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Liu’s rich experience in foreign affairs set him apart from previous TAO directors. In 2022, Song Tao, a career diplomat and former head of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Liaison Department (Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Duiwai Lianluobu), replaced Liu as the TAO’s director. Compared with his predecessor, Song is associated with a softer approach toward Taiwan. Song has advocated not only a return of cross-strait exchanges but also a lifting of bans on Taiwanese products. On March 16, 2023, the TAO announced the cessation of bans against fish imports from Taiwan, and some observers credited Song Tao with playing a role in the move.¹² Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the TAO’s shift in outlook represents the beginning of a reconciliatory trend or is simply part of Xi Jinping’s strategy to apply both “carrot and stick” strategies toward Taiwan.

Xi Jinping’s Two-Pronged Taiwan Policy

To date, Xi Jinping’s approach to Taiwan could be understood as involving soft and hard policies. Soft policies refer to “persuasive” actions that attempt to influence individual preferences in Taiwan through material and nonmaterial inducements. Hard policies, in contrast, describe coercive actions that imply or involve the use of military force. Lin Chong-pin, former deputy defense minister of Taiwan, has used the expression “Hard gets harder, soft gets softer” to describe Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policies.¹³ Lin has argued that hard initiatives such as military threats and diplomatic isolation have limited utility; hence Beijing has adopted an approach under Xi that employs both soft and hard policies, with a growing emphasis on the latter.¹⁴ Moreover, as Brantly Womack points out in his chapter in this volume, there is an inverse correlation between the growth of China’s hard power and the reduction of its soft power.

Taiwan Strait: To War or Not to War?

Since 2016, Xi Jinping has issued verbal warnings and threats toward Taiwan. He has lashed out at “Taiwanese independence activists” (taidufenzi), threatening to defeat them in the pursuit of unification with or without the use of force. At the 19th National Congress of the CCP, Xi Jinping highlighted unification of the fatherland through the “one country, two systems” model and asserted that “China has sufficient capabilities to defeat Taiwanese independence of any form.”²⁹ A few months later, at the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi proclaimed, “Our great fatherland absolutely cannot lose even an inch of Chinese territory.”³⁰ Perhaps the strongest statement relating to Taiwan came in the 2019 speech commemorating the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”: “China must be and will be unified.… Cross-strait reunification is the trend of history. Taiwan Independence goes against the trend of history and will lead to a dead end.… We are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities.… We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means.”³¹

Many observers consider the 2019 statement as expressing Xi Jinping’s determination and perhaps growing impatience vis-à-vis the Taiwan issue.³² In light of rising tensions, pundits have speculated about when Beijing could be more or less likely to carry out its “endgame” or seek to force Taiwan’s unification through military means. The “two centenaries” (liangge yibainian) of 2021 and 2049 were considered possible dates: 2021 marked the centenary of the founding of the CCP, while 2049 will mark the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.³³ Perhaps due to the COVID-19 pandemic, war did not break out in the Taiwan Strait in 2021. However, the fact that the antagonism between China and Taiwan grew during the pandemic has increased anxieties about the future of the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, Xi Jinping commenced his third term as the president of China, a development made possible through constitutional reforms in March 2018 that eliminated term limits for the position of PRC president (see Ashley Esarey and Rongbin Han, this volume). Attention has turned to 2027 as a potential year for conflict. Some observers claim that war is likely to break out in 2027 for two reasons: (1) it will mark the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Liberation Army, and (2) Xi Jinping will be completing his final term in office, that is, if he does not seek another term.³⁴

If Xi remains keen to resolve the Taiwan issue, then developments since 2020 suggest that he may need to take action rather than postponing it indefinitely. Besides Taiwan’s changing national identity, new factors may diminish China’s prospects for continued economic development and political stability. The COVID-19 pandemic’s unpopular “zero COVID” policy slowed the rate of China’s economic development and generated domestic political opposition, while disrupting global supply chains and hurting the global economy. In November 2022, the “white paper revolution”—popular protests in response to a deadly apartment fire that killed ten people and injured nine others in Ürümqi—broke out in cities across China, prompting Beijing to rapidly lift COVID-19 restrictions.

Russia’s troubled invasion of Ukraine has also proved unsettling for China. The fact that Russia has struggled to conquer Ukraine after more than a year of war has emboldened people to call for caution with respect to Chinese plans to launch a tricky amphibious invasion of Taiwan. At the same time, a number of commentaries have appeared comparing Taiwan to Ukraine and proposing that Russo-Chinese collaboration might make it possible for Xi Jinping to invade Taiwan soon.³⁵

During much of the pandemic, Taiwan proved to be one of the safest societies in which to live. A related reputational boost and efforts to strengthen ties to democracies worldwide have drawn attention to the need to support Taiwan diplomatically and decry acts of Chinese aggression. Taiwan’s donation of face masks and medical supplies strengthened partnerships with countries in North America and Europe. Such tactics helped to win the support of at least one country, Lithuania, which subsequently opened a trade and representative office in Taiwan in November 2022, to Beijing’s great displeasure. In response to China’s growing military challenges, Taiwan also used support for its “freedom” discourse to attract visits by legislative representatives from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Lithuania, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States, among others, which elevated the island nation’s international status. In some instances, heightened awareness of Taiwan’s situation has spilled into the security realm. For example, Japan sees “Taiwan contingency as a contingency for Japan,” linking the two island nations’ security.³⁶ In January 2023, the European Parliament’s Common Security and Defense Policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy asserted that the belligerence of China’s military destabilizes global security and urged the European Commission to promote strategic cooperation with Taiwan.

At the same time, growing global awareness of the grave security situation in the Taiwan Strait has contributed to a Chinese security dilemma about how best to proceed: further offensive measures toward Taiwan increase international support and military aid for Taipei, diminishing China’s sense of security. Further, should Beijing back down with respect to its sovereignty disputes with Taipei, Taiwan could gain more room to pursue even de jure independence, which could come with dire consequences for the popularity of Xi Jinping’s rule in China. Hence Xi continues to “make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means.”³⁷ Yet Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan risks driving it further away from unification in a negative feedback loop that has led Taiwan to look to the United States for greater military support, while strengthening its own defense capabilities.

Under Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP administration, Taiwan has sought to balance against the threat posed by China in a sharp contrast from the integrationist strategy of the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008–16). Under Tsai’s leadership, Taiwan has made efforts to improve its defense capability and to deepen security cooperation with the United States. Guided by the motto “War can be avoided only by preparing for war” (Beizhan caineng zhizhan), the Tsai Ing-wen administration has emphasized “all-out defense,” a concept that stresses the participation of everyone in society, including women, in support of national defense.³⁸ In January 2022, the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense launched the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (Guofangbu Quanmin Fangwei Dongyuanshu), a new ministry tasked with the mobilization of reservists during wartime as well as disaster relief. The Tsai administration has extended the period of mandatory military service from four months to one year, as of January 2024. Currently, Taiwan’s Ministry of Education is considering the possibility of mobilizing students over the age of sixteen, regardless of gender, for military training and the formation of youth protection groups. Taiwan has authorized several large military procurements from the United States, from both the Donald Trump and Joseph Biden administrations, ranging from spare parts for fighter jets to missiles, torpedoes, and anti-tank munition-laying systems.³⁹ In 2022, under the United States’ State Partnership Program, the US National Guard began training Taiwan’s military for a range of defensive actions. In January 2023, the United States announced the appropriation of funds to help Taiwan participate in the International Military Education and Training program to improve the interoperability of forces and the capability for joint military operations.⁴⁰ In addition to improving its military strength, Taiwan-US cooperation shores up perceptions of Taiwan as a sovereign state, thereby undermining Chinese claims that Taiwan is an errant subnational polity.

Conclusion

China-Taiwan relations in the Xi Jinping era have moved in a downward spiral, leaving the impression that war could be imminent. Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, ostensibly to show her support for Taipei, triggered large-scale Chinese military maneuvers and military crisis. Unlike China’s territorial disputes with India or fellow claimants to territory in the South China Sea, conflict between China and Taiwan has the potential to ignite a global war. Thus, it is fitting to consider the future of cross-strait relations, highlighting the challenges and opportunities ahead as well as factors that might affect whether or not war will break out.

A Xi Jinping effect on the bilateral relationship could be the most decisive factor in the near future. The prospect that Xi could serve indefinitely as China’s top leader greatly contributes to uncertainty concerning the future of relations across the Taiwan Strait. Xi’s willingness to depart from tradition, with respect to his tenure as paramount leader and in other areas of politics noted in this volume, suggests that the actions of prior Chinese leaders who pursued a “long game” with Taiwan, rather than military confrontation in the near term, are poor predictors of what Xi might do. Cross-strait relations have changed significantly since Deng Xiaoping’s time. Xi Jinping may indeed wonder whether the goal of peaceful reunification is still feasible. If one assumes that Xi Jinping will remain in power for another decade and the relationship between China and Taiwan fails to improve, Xi might be tempted to hazard the use of force to compel Taiwan’s unification with China. Should Xi leave office, as mentioned by Brantly Womack (this volume), in China’s relationship with Taiwan such questions as “After Xi, what?” and “After Xi, when?” will undoubtedly emerge.

Developments in Taiwan are also important indicators for whether tension will continue to dominate Taiwan-China relations. Since 2016, the 1992 Consensus has lost appeal for the Taiwanese population, to the extent that the concept is little discussed in Taiwan. The discourse on independence has come to dominate discussions on Taiwan’s relations with China. Whether an alternative discourse can emerge that effectively counterbalances the independence discourse could be critical to improving relations. Such a development might involve, for example, a stronger voice for proponents of the political status quo, a large segment of the population that is usually silent. Whether the pro-independence DPP or the traditionally pro-unification Nationalist Party comes out on top in presidential elections could also decide Taiwan’s stance toward China in the near term. Over the long term, however, perceptions of China and its political system will heavily influence Taiwanese deliberations over the sort of relations Taipei should pursue with Beijing. Regardless of future electoral outcomes, a healthy democracy with vibrant discussion among different groups may well prove to be Taiwan’s best defense against the threat of externally imposed authoritarianism.

In a context in which relations across the Taiwan Strait appear to offer little room for optimism, one should not discount the possibility that new developments may halt or slow down further acceleration of tensions. How the war in Ukraine turns out, whether it wraps up soon and with a Russian defeat, could offer some light for resolving tensions in the Taiwan Strait, particularly if China concludes that it cannot afford a similarly costly debacle during a time of sputtering economic growth. As the COVID-19 pandemic winds down, China and Taiwan may negotiate the reopening of the minor links that facilitated exchanges between Xiamen and Kinmen and Matsu. Should people-to-people exchange recommence more broadly, positive spillovers into other policy areas may follow. Finally, in relation to Xi’s pursuit of the China Dream, Taiwan presents a critical dilemma, with potentially enormous economic and political implications: Does the prospect of unification with Taiwan represent a strategic opportunity or a dangerous trap that poses risks for arguably more significant Chinese developmental objectives? In other words, is the pursuit of the unification of Taiwan essential for China’s political ambitions or a great misstep with more potential downsides than benefits for China’s continued rise? Xi’s answer to these questions may prove critical to the future course of Taiwan-China relations.

Notes

1. 1. See Fu-Kuo Liu, “Ma Ying-jeou’s Rapprochement Policy: Cross-Strait Progress and Domestic Constraints,” in Political Changes under Ma Ying-jeou: Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges, ed. Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle (New York: Routledge, 2014), 175–94.

2. 2. Alan Romberg, “From Generation to Generation: Advancing Cross-Strait Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 43 (2014): 1–23, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM43AR.pdf.

3. 3. The “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” was first issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 1979. The statement called for the termination of the military standoff between China and Taiwan and the commencement of cross-strait exchange, including the opening of the three links. At the same time, China announced an end to its regular shelling of Kinmen. The statement is a definitive description of China’s position toward Taiwan and represented a shift away from a more bellicose stance.

4. 4. Taiwan Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “Xi Jinping: Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification,” April 12, 2019, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201904/t20190412_12155687.htm.

5. 5. Office of the President of the Republic of China, “President Tsai Issues Statement on China President Xi’s ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,’” January 2, 2019, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621.

6. 6. See Wayne Chang, Yong Xiong, and Ben Westcott, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Vows to Pursue ‘Reunification’ with Taiwan by Peaceful Means,” CNN World, October 9, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/08/china/xi-jinping-taiwan-reunification-intl-hnk/index.html.

7. 7. Hong-da Lin, “Yi sheng Jiansheng xiong toulu Xi Jinping de Taishangxue” (“Brother Jiansheng” exposes Xi Jinping’s thinking toward Taiwanese businessmen), Wealth Magazine, April 19, 2018, https://www.wealth.com.tw/articles/af19f0db-c00d-4cdd-8574-5bf8e61d58d7.

8. 8. Guo-Cheng Song, “Xi Jinping shiqi de duitai zhengce” (Taiwan policy in the Xi Jinping period), Taipei Forum, May 22, 2012, http://140.119.184.164/view_pdf/04.pdf.

9. 9. See Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 4 (July/August 2021): 58–67.

10. 10. William Ripley, Eric Cheung, and Ben Westcott, “Taiwan’s President Says the Threat from China Is Increasing ‘Every Day’ and Confirms Presence of US Military Trainers on the Island,” CNN World, October 28, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/27/asia/tsai-ingwen-taiwan-china-interview-intl-hnk/index.html.

11. 11. Trevor Sutton, “The Anomaly of Taiwanese Democracy,” Washington Monthly, March 11, 2020, https://washingtonmonthly.com/2020/03/11/the-anomaly-of-taiwanese-democracy.

12. 12. See Jin-Hong Lai and Zheng-Lu Chen, “Lu shishanyi, tai er shuichan huifu jinkou” (China gives out good will, resuming import of two Taiwanese seafoods), United Daily News, March 16, 2023, https://udn.com/news/story/7333/7034501?from=udn_ch2_menu_v2_main_cate.

13. 13. Wang Yu-ping, “Xuezhe guandian: Hu Jintao duitai yingdeyueying ruandeyueruan” (Academic perspective: Hu Jintao toward Taiwan—hard gets harder, soft gets softer), Liberty Times, January 30, 2005, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/11168.

14. 14. Lin Chong-pin, “Shijiudahou Xi Jinping duitai: Ruanshouweigong, yingshouweishou, yizai gaibian Taiwan minyi” (Xi Jinping toward Taiwan after the 19th CCP National Congress: Soft policies as offense, hard policies as defense, aimed at changing public opinion in Taiwan), Independent Opinion@CommonWealth Magazine, March 30, 2018, https://opinion.cw.com.tw/blog/profile/70/article/6740?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Daily.

15. 15. Yu Yuan-Jie, “Liangan jiaoliu sanshi nian: Sanzhongyiqing dao yidaiyisian zhi tongzhan fenxi” (Thirty years of cross-strait exchange—an analysis of the CCP United Front from “Three Middles and One Young” to “One Generation, One Line”), Clear Current Bimonthly, no. 11 (September 2017): 12–17.

16. 16. The social classes category also refers to those with lower income.

17. 17. The Art of War by Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) is generally believed to have been compiled between 515 and 512 BC. One of the most well-known lessons from the classic is “Winning a war without a fight remains the highest principle of strategy,” or, simply, to claim victory without losing soldiers is the best strategy in war.

18. 18. “Quanguo zhengxie huiyi kaimu Yu Zhengsheng zuo gongzuo baogao” (Yu Zhengsheng’s work report at the opening of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Wenwei News, March 3, 2017, http://news.wenweipo.com/2017/03/03/IN1703030027.htm.

19. 19. See Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “Guanyu jinyibu cujin liangan jingji wenhua jiaoliu hezuo de ruogan cuoshi” (Several measures to promote further cross-strait economic and cultural exchange cooperation), November 4, 2019, http://www.mod.gov.cn/big5/topnews/2019-11/04/content_4854414.htm.

20. 20. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Guanyu fayin guanyu cujin liangan jingji wenhua jiaoliu hezuo de ruogan cuoshi de tongzhi” (On the announcement of the measures on stimulating cross-strait economic and cultural exchange and cooperation), February 28, 2018, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201802/t20180228_11928139.htm.

21. 21. Huang Pei-jun, “Zhongguo tongzhantuan xuanqian dajiangjia shiwutian xinaotuan zhiyao liangqianba” (Chinese “tongzhan” tour, major discount before election—fifteen days for only 2,800 NT), Liberty Times, October 31, 2019, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1328670.

22. 22. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), “Republic of China (Taiwan) Rejects WHO Characterization of Its Participation in World Health Assembly and Expresses Its Strong Dissatisfaction to WHO Secretariat,” May 12, 2017, https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&s=161DC7A70C4856E0.

23. 23. See Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Friends, Enemies or Frenemies? China-Taiwan Discord in the World Health Organization and Its Significance,” Pacific Affairs 85, no. 4 (2012): 701–22.

24. 24. “US Reassessing Aid to Solomon Islands after Taiwan Ties Cut,” Reuters, September 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-diplomacy-usa-solomons-idUSKBN1W32RL.

25. 25. Roy Lee, “China’s Agricultural Bans Don’t Yet Threaten Taiwan’s Economic Security,” East Asia Forum, December, 10, 2022, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/12/10/chinas-agricultural-bans-dont-yet-threaten-taiwans-economic-security.

26. 26. Nick Aspinwall, “Taiwan Promotes ‘Freedom Pineapples’ in Response to China’s Import Ban,” Diplomat, March 6, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/taiwan-promotes-freedom-pineapples-in-response-to-chinese-import-ban.

27. 27. “Chinese Incursions Nearly Doubled Last Year,” Taipei Times, January 3, 2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/01/03/2003791889.

28. 28. See “The Most Dangerous Place on Earth,” Economist, May 1, 2021, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/05/01/the-most-dangerous-place-on-earth.

29. 29. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Xinhua News Agency, October 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

30. 30. “Speech Delivered by Xi Jinping at the First Session of the 13th NPC [National People’s Congress],” China Daily (Hong Kong), March 21, 2018, https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/184/187/127/1521628772832.html.

31. 31. “Highlights of Xi’s Speech at Gathering Marking 40th Anniversary of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xinhua News, January 2, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/02/c_137715300.htm.

32. 32. See Shih-Min Chen, “Xi Jinping de zhanlue zhuanxian yu taihai jushi de bianqian: 2021–2018” (A shift in Xi Jinping’s strategy and the changing cross-strait security situation: 2012–2018), Prospect Quarterly 20, no. 2 (2019): 56.

33. 33. Yiu Chung Wong, “Independence or Reunification? The Evolving PRC-Taiwan Relations,” Baltic Journal of European Studies 9, no. 2 (2019): 120.

34. 34. See Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan in ‘Next Six Years,’” USNI News, March 9, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years; Derek Grossman, “Taiwan Is Safe until at Least 2027, but with One Big Caveat,” The RAND Blog, November 10, 2021, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/taiwan-is-safe-until-at-least-2027-but-with-one-big.html.

35. 35. See William H. Overholt, “Ukraine Offers No Easy Lessons on Taiwan,” Global Asia 17, no. 2 (2022): 36–39; David Keegan and Kyle Churchman, “Taiwan and China Seek Lessons from Ukraine as Taiwan’s International Position Strengthens,” Comparative Connections 24, no. 1 (2022): 89–100.

36. 36. See Kunihiko Miyake, “Shinzo Abe’s No-Nonsense Message to Beijing,” Japan Times, December 21, 2021.

37. 37. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” October 25, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202210/t20221025_10791908.html.

38. 38. Peter Wood, “Taiwan’s ‘All-Out Defense’ in Context of Aggressive PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Exercise,” OE Watch, no. 7 (July 2022): 9–10.

39. 39. For a complete list of US military arms sales to Taiwan, please refer to the press release section of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency website, accessed January 2, 2024, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales.

40. 40. Li Yi-hsuan, “US Funding Taiwan Military Training,” Taipei Times, January 25, 2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/01/25/2003793116.