3 A HAN EMPEROR ACCEPTING THE BLAME Edict by Emperor Wu 武帝 (r. 141–87 BCE)
In the “Edict on Luntai,” considered the first Rescript for Accepting Blame in Chinese history, Emperor Wu recounts the failures of his Central Asian campaigns against the Xiongnu.
Emperor Wu had one of the longest reigns in Chinese history. He presided over a great expansion of Han territory, sending armies into Korea to the east, Vietnam to the south, and Central Asia (the Western Regions) to the west. Near the end of his reign, however, he had a change of heart. In 89 BCE, he issued the “Edict on Luntai,” rejecting his advisers’ suggestion to establish new agricultural colonies at Luntai in the Western Regions. In the edict, he took responsibility for recent military failures and blamed himself for the consequent suffering of the soldiers.
This edict established a precedent for the ruler to take the blame when a policy failed or a natural calamity occurred, often as a way to deflect criticism. In the Han period alone, a total of eighty-two Rescripts for Accepting Blame are recorded. In many cases, an official probably drafted the edict, using conventional language, but the ruler had to consent to the wording. As Emperor Wu’s “Edict on Luntai” was the first of its kind, it is easier to imagine it as conveying Emperor Wu’s own feelings. Some see it as reflecting his turn toward Daoism in his late years.
Edict on Luntai
To shore up the funding for the frontiers, some officials proposed increasing the poll tax by thirty cash per person, which would have excessively burdened the old, weak, orphaned, and alone. Now they propose sending soldiers to set up an agricultural colony in Luntai [Xinjiang], which is located more than one thousand li west of Jushi [northwest of Turpan]. Previously, when Duke Kailing led the expedition to Jushi, the royal families of the six local kingdoms who lived in the Jushi capital quickly joined our side. They prepared livestock and food for the Han troops and raised armies of tens of thousands of troops. The princes served as generals and participated in the siege of Jushi, which led to the king of Jushi surrendering. After the armies of the six kingdoms were disbanded, they could no longer supply provisions for the Han army. When the Han army arrived at Jushi, there was still plenty of food, but the soldiers had not brought enough supplies for the subsequent military operation. As a result, the strong ones kept all the food and livestock for themselves while the weak ones died by the roadside by the thousands. I ordered Jiuquan [Gansu] to arrange a donkey and camel convoy to carry food supplies to meet the army at Yumen [Gansu] and to get officers and soldiers from Zhangye [Gansu] to handle the logistics. Even though the distance was not great, the soldiers became separated and many failed to reach their destination.
At first, the facts were kept from me. The military official Hong’s memorial to the court stated that “the Xiongnu tied up a horse’s four legs and left it outside of the city gate, with a note saying, ‘This horse is a gift for the Chinese.’” In addition, the Xiongnu retained Han envoys and refused to let them return. Therefore, I sent General Li Guangli of Ershi [Osh, Kyrgyzstan] to attack the Xiongnu to secure the release of the Han envoys. In ancient times, when officials gave advice, they first had divinations performed and would not act if the results were not auspicious. At the time, I shared the letter on the tied-up horse with my top officials—the counselor-in-chief, imperial censors, all officials with a salary of two thousand piculs, all grand masters and scholars, even commandants of subordinate states and commanderies such as Cheng Zhong and Zhao Ponu. They said things like, “The barbarians tied up their own horse, which is an extremely bad omen,” or “the Xiongnu want to look strong; they lack supplies but pretend to have plenty.”
Divination based on The Book of Changes (Yijing) came back with the hexagram “Great Excess” as well as lines that indicated a flying dragon (imperial throne) and the Xiongnu’s defeat. Military astrologists observed the stars and meteorological phenomena, and grand diviners conducted yarrow stalk and turtle shell divinations. All agreed that the results were auspicious: the Xiongnu would definitely be defeated; the timing was perfect and should not be missed. They also predicted, “As long as it is a general-led northern expedition, the Xiongnu will be defeated at the Fu Mountains.” The divinations also pointed to General Li as the best choice for general. Therefore, I personally sent off General Li to the Fu Mountains, though I ordered him not to march too deep into the territory. With hindsight, we can see that the plans were wrong and divinations misinterpreted. The Xiongnu intelligence gatherer captured by Duke Chonghe reported, “Upon hearing that the Han military forces were coming, the Xiongnu leaders ordered shamans to bury sheep and cows by the roads and waterways where the Han armies would travel as a curse. Whenever the Chanyu [the Xiongnu ruler] gave the emperor a leather robe, he ordered the shamans to put a curse on it. The tied-up horse was intended as a curse against Han military action.” A divination result showed “inauspicious” for a Han military general. The Xiongnu often say, “The Han Empire is large, but the Han people are incapable of resisting hunger and thirst. If we lose one wolf, they will lose a thousand sheep.” Subsequently, General Li was defeated and many soldiers were killed and stranded. This has caused me no end of grief.
The current request to set up agricultural colonies and military fortresses in Luntai would greatly burden the empire without bringing any benefit to the people, making it totally unacceptable. The chamberlain for dependencies and others also suggested recruiting prisoners to accompany the Xiongnu envoys back to Xiongnu territory. They also proposed that we promise the title of duke to anyone who successfully assassinates the Chanyu as our revenge for the Li Guangli fiasco. Such a scheme is so appalling that it would have been shunned even by the five hegemons in the Spring and Autumn period. Besides, when Han subjects surrender to the Xiongnu, the Xiongnu often frisk and interrogate them. Currently, the borders are disorganized and there are no restrictions on border crossing. Officers, clerks, and soldiers who guard the border hunt animals and sell animal skin and meat to support themselves [so might inadvertently stray into Xiongnu territory]. The soldiers are hard-pressed and can barely maintain the beacon fire system. Nevertheless, previous reports to the imperial court made no mention of their miserable conditions. I learned about them only after reports from captured or surrendered Xiongnu.
We now should shore up our military defenses by prohibiting brutality, stopping unauthorized taxes, encouraging agriculture, and replenishing our supply of horses by offering tax incentives to those who raise them. Throughout the country, officials with pay above two thousand piculs should submit proposals for raising horses and increasing supplies at the border. They should send them to the court along with their routine reports.
SOURCE: Ban Gu 班固, Hanshu 漢書 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1970), 96B.3912–14.
Further Reading
- Bo, Chen, and Gideon Shelach. “Fortified Settlements and the Settlement System in the Northern Zone of the Han Empire.” Antiquity 88 (2014): 222–40.
- Cai, Liang. Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire. Albany: State University of New York, 2014.
- Chin, Tamara T. Savage Exchange: Han Imperialism, Chinese Literary Style, and the Economic Imagination. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014.
- Di Cosmo, Nicola. Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.